Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(formerly titled "Asymmetrical Incentives and Collegial Dynamics in the Judicial Hierarchy: Decision Making on Three-Judge Panels")
Abstract: This paper argues that hierarchical politics in the federal judiciary shape collegial politics within three-judge panels of the U.S. Courts of Appeals to influence judicial voting and case outcomes. I develop a principal-agent model in which the political control of the dual layer of hierarchy above three-judge panels---full circuits and the Supreme Court---affects the ability of a single Democratic or Republican judge on a three-judge panel to influence two colleagues from the opposing party. The theory predicts that panel majorities should be more strongly influenced by a single judge of the opposing party---a ``counter-judge"---when that judge is aligned with the Supreme Court. Examining thousands of judicial votes in multiple issue areas in recent years, a period in which the Supreme Court has been conservative, I show that the effect of adding a counter-judge to a panel is consistently larger among Democratic judges than Republican judges. These results have important implications for the Supreme Court's control of the judicial hierarchy and the rule of law.
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