John Morrison | |
AffiliationI am a professor of philosophy at Barnard College, Columbia University. I am an affiliate of Barnard's Neuroscience and Behavior Department, Columbia's Mind Brain Behavior Institute, and Columbia's Center for Theoretical Neuroscience. I am also a mentor in Columbia's Neurobiology and Behavior Graduate Program. My research has been supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, National Science Foundation, Mellon Foundation, and Data Sciences Institute. I am an editor of the Journal of Philosophy. I led the effort to create the cognitive science program at Barnard and Columbia, and served as Barnard's founding director. TeachingI am on leave this semester. In the fall I will teach Introduction to Cognitive Science with Chris Baldassano (last year's syllabus) and the senior project seminar for cognitive science majors.ResearchMy research is primarily in the philosophy of mind (esp. cognitive neuroscience) and the history of modern philosophy (esp. the seventeenth century). I am currently working on two projects. The first is an attempt to understand the brain from an abstract perspective. Physics and economics provide helpful models of what I'm aiming for. When trying to understand a thermodynamic system, it’s often better to abstract away from the activities of individual molecules, and instead focus on more global features, such as pressure and temperature. When trying to understand an economic system, it’s often better to abstract away from the activities of individual consumers, and instead focus on more global features, such as inflation and gross domestic product. Likewise, when trying to understand brains, it’s often useful to abstract away from activities of individual neurons, and instead focus on more global features, such as representation and algorithm. This is particularly true when trying to understand how our brains enable us to successfully interact with our environment. Unfortunately, whereas we have precise and uniform definitions of pressure, temperature, inflation, and gross domestic product, there are no widely accepted definitions of representation and algorithm in terms of neural activity. The overall goal of this project is to develop a useful and precise framework for attributing representations and algorithms to the brain. This project builds on past research on conscious perception. In one line of research, I argued that our conscious perceptions involve probabilities. I called this view Perceptual Confidence. I have expanded my focus to include unconscious neural representations and the algorithms that rely on them. In another line of research, I argued that our conscious perceptions of color properties, such as redness, depend on our representations of the differences and similarities between objects, thereby reversing the traditional order of explanation. I called this view Perceptual Structuralism. I am now expanding my focus to include unconscious neural representations of other properties, such as orientation. The second project is about the foundations of Spinoza's metaphysics. It's an attempt to unravel his claims about minds, bodies, God, and their essences. In past research, I argued for new interpretations of Spinoza's basic notions, namely causation, conception, and inherence. I also argued that Spinoza would reject the Indiscernibility of Identicals in response to a puzzle of identity over time, and that this is the key to understanding his view of the mind's relation to the body. I am now trying to understand his view of essences. Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience"Algorithms for Neural Networks," (email for draft) "Representations for Neural Networks," (in progress) "Representation in the Hippocampus," "Using Transfer Learning to Define a Neural System's Algorithm," "Source Invariance and Probabilistic Transfer: "Flavors of Abstraction: Comparing Methods for Identifying Algorithms in Neural Networks," with Amir Zur, Atticus Geiger, Benjamin Peters (in progress) Probabilities and Perception"Perceptual Confidence," "Perceptual Confidence and Categorization," "Third-Personal Evidence for Perceptual Confidence," Perceptual Structuralism"Colour in a Physical World," "Anti-Atomism about Color Representation," "Triangulating How Things Look," "Perceptual Variation and Structuralism," "Perceptual Variation and Relativism," "Perceptual Variation and Ignorance," Early Modern Metaphysics"Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics," "Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom," "Truth in the Emendation," "Two puzzles about Thought and Identity in Spinoza," "Spinoza on Numerical Identity and Time," "Descartes on Numerical Identity and Time," "Spinoza on Mind, Body, and Numerical Identity," "Three Medieval Aristotelians on Numerical Identity and Time," ReviewsReview of Valtteri Viljanen's Spinoza's Geometry of Power Review of De Rosa's Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation (with Elliot Paul), Mind (2014), final |
Contactjmorrison [at] barnard.eduCVPostdocsNedah Nemati (2023-) Raphael Gerraty (2019-2021) PhD StudentsLisa Clark (advisor) Andrew Richmond (advisor, PhD 2022) Natalie Hannan (committee, PhD 2021) Simon Brown (committee, PhD 2020) Jorge Morales (advisor, PhD 2018) Jeremy Wolos (advisor, PhD 2016) |