The UFW and IUMSWA in Competition, 1940-1942John R Stobo © April 2004
The IUMSWA Returns to the BNY
Jurisdictional Conflict Within the CIO
The IUMSWA Fails Again in the BNY
Continued Activity of the UFW in the Navy Yards
The UFW on the Defensive
ConclusionThe IUMSWA Returns to the BNY
In January 1940 the IUMSWA once more gave its attention to the navy yards, spurred on by the defection of James Breslin, a sheetmetal worker and head of the Philadelphia Navy Yard's MTC. He said that the experience of the IU organizing in New York Ship in Camden, across the Delaware river, had convinced him that the industrial model of organization was indeed the superior one. He thereupon quit his union post and membership and joined the IU to become organization director for the navy yards. In particular, he disliked the AFL policy of allowing supervisors to remain in their unions, which his new union did not permit. [SW, January 1940; March 1940; The CIO News, January 1940.]By February, IU organizers, including Breslin, were back at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and hard at work in Philadelphia. By now the IU could present what was its major carrot, as well as stick, in organizing: its control over access to most private shipyard jobs in the East, including the port of New York. As such, a laid-off navy yard IU member could transfer to a private shipyard without cost. On 12 April 1940, the IU re-chartered its Philadelphia local as #101, saying that it would be a loud voice at the upcoming wage board hearings. It would demand the elimination of the two lowest trade grades or reduce their proportion as much as possible, ask for a uniform rate for all mechanics except for a few specialized ones, and that efficiency lists be replaced by seniority lists. Breslin claimed that by now first-class rates in at least ten occupations in the New York Ship yard were higher than in the PNY and that the navy yard had a higher percentage of workers in the second and third classes. He cautioned the government that as a result, the navy yard could lose workers to the private yards and that it was imperative therefore that the federal government set the example in keeping wages high. [SW, February 1940; April 1940; May 1940.]
The IUMSWA was not pleased at being denied the CIO seat on the Departmental Wage Board hearings later in the year [the first to be called since 1929], but given that its presence in the navy yards at that point in time was minimal it is not surprising that John Lewis's nod went to UFW president Jacob Baker instead. But it was probably all was for the best given the results, and the IU added its cries of “foul” to the resultant storm following the publishing of the new wage schedule, with its most minimal of raises. Not being on the Board did however allow the BNY organizer to take some pot shots against its UFW rival as well as the AFL. Along with other unions, throughout the following year the IU called for the hearings to be re-opened. Van Gelder suggested a first-class rate of $1.18 per hour, plus a 7 per cent bonus for evening and night shifts. [The CIO News, April 1940; SW, November 1940; December 1940; February 1941; March 1941; August 1941; Letter, van Gelder, to Cianflone, December 1940; [hand-written] Letter, Cianflone to Brother (van Gelder?), December 1940; Archives, IUMSWA.]
The Wage Board snub was more than compensated for in April 1941, when the IUMSWA proudly announced that it was to be the sole labor representative to sit on the Stabilization Conference for east coast shipyards, which then accounted for about seventy per cent of US shipbuilding. The Conference committee gave the AFL observer status only and excluded all other labor groups, such as the welders' IAMW. [SW, April 1941; May 1941.]
In May 1940 the IU hired ex-painter Joseph Cianflone, who had served a term as shop committee representative in 1936 for the Paint Shop, to be its lead organizer in the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The new local, #102, was chartered on 14 December 1940, and the union, along with a newly-elected set of local officers promised to fight against low wages, the three-grades system, layoffs, and discrimination against their members. [SW, May 1940; December 1940; December 1940. Cianflone had been discharged from the Brooklyn Navy Yard in December 1939. Letter, van Gelder, to M.H. Goldstein, esq, March 1941; Archives, IUMSWA.] Cianflone reported some initial successes to the union newspaper in the spring of 1941. The union had found jobs in local IU-controlled shipyards for some 25 workers laid off from the navy yard due to low ratings. Now receiving better wages, overtime pay, and double time for Sundays, the shipbuilders were making much more than they had when working for the government. In July 1941 the local distributed organizing flyers outside the Yard claiming responsibility for the recent legislation giving overtime pay to lower-level IVbs. The paper boasted that once the New York Port was fully organized by the IU there would be nowhere for a shipyard worker to go without the union card. So, in order to “protect the future of your wife and children” the paper encouraged shipyard workers to join up soon. [SW, March 1941; Flyer, signed by Joseph Cianflone, National Representative, IUMSWA - CIO, July 1941; RG181; NA-NY; SW, April 1941.]
Jurisdictional Conflict Within the CIO
Unfortunately for the IUMSWA, its position in the navy yards was weakened by jurisdictional disputes with other CIO unions as well as with the federation itself. First, the the union became drawn into a three-way dispute in the late 1930s with the CIO Steel Workers Organizing Committee and the AFL's MTD in their mutual attempts to organize some California shipyards. Then, the IU and the National Maritime Union picked a fight over the right of seamen, members of the NMU, to perform repair work on ships in port. [Mergen, “History of the IUMSWA.”]But the union's longest-running jurisdictional dispute was with the United Federal Workers of America over organizing in the navy yards, focusing particularly on those in Philadelphia and Brooklyn. The UFW protested the IU's renewed attempts to organize in them, and John Green, IUMSWA president, asked John Brophy, chair of the CIO Appeals Committee, to mediate. In January 1940, Jacob Baker suggested free transfer of membership between the two unions, but Green refused the request. In February, Brophy tentatively suggested that the navy yards should remain with the UFW while the IU would merge with SWOC, and that a council of UFW and private-sector shipyard workers be created. Without hesitation, the IU declined to discuss the proposal, stating in their turn that jurisdiction should be determined by the type of work done, not who the employer was.
In April 1940 the three groups reached an agreement in which they agreed to establish an Amalgamated Navy Yard Workers Union, CIO-UFW-IUMSWA for the two northeast navy yards, with Baker, Green, and the CIO's Director of Organization, Allen Haywood sharing the top three leadership positions. Baker soon had second thoughts and asked that the new organization be restricted to the Philadelphia navy yard. The two union leaders could not reconcile to each other and after a few more conferences during the spring the organizational experiment fell apart. [Mergen, “History of the IUMSWA.” It could be further argued that part of the problem was that the CIO did not pay all that much attention to either union. Articles about the IU and UFW in the CIO News from 1938-1941 are relatively scarce. Outside of the three cited elsewhere there are four articles on the UFW (May 1938; August 1938; February 1941 {twice}), and three on the IUMSWA (September 1938; May 1941). CIO conventions for these years generally passed just one resolution from the UFW, adopting their organizing and legislative program, and no resolutions from the Shipworkers. “Proceedings of the First Constitutional Convention of the CIO,” 1938; “Daily Proceedings,” 1939, co-sponsored with FAECT; “Daily Proceedings, 1940, again with FAECT, and a UFW resolution condemning the wage borad schedule; “Daily Proceedings,” 1941, two wage resolutions by FAECT; a resolution by UFW, FAECT, and SCME, calling for collective bargaining rights; and two resolutions on rights of federal employees, UFW/FAECT and protesting their recent harassment, UFW. The apparent lack of attention that the CIO gave to the navy yards and to federal workers in general as compared to that given by the MTD and the AFL is profound.]
In the BNY there still appeared to be some interest in a rapprochement between the two unions, for in October 1940 Cianflone notified van Gelder that Wilson Long, now with the UFW, had visited him at the local's office, curious as to his intentions. In December he and others returned to inquire if the IU local might want to discuss their two groups merging. From then until the following August the two locals and their parent unions held a series of negotiations but eventually nothing came of it and the two locals drifted back apart. [Letter, Joseph Cianflone, to van Gelder, October 1940; Letter, van Gelder, to Cianflone, October 1940; [hand-written] Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, December 1940; Letter, van Gelder, to Cianflone, December 1940; Letter, van Gelder, to Cianflone, February 1941; [hand-written] Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, March 1941; Letter, van Gelder, to Cianflone, March 1941; Postal telegraph, James J. Cullen, treasurer, John Healey president, Local 137, UFWA, BNY, April 1941; "Notes, Conference with Michael Esposito representing John Healy, June 1941," n.a.; Letter, van Gelder, to Healy, June 1941; Letter, Burge [IUMSWA national leader], to Healy, June 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, June 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, July 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, August 1941; Archives, IUMSWA. There is no mention of these talks in the UFW newspaper.]
TopThe IUMSWA Fails Again in the BNY
Local 102's attention was soon directed in another direction, one that led to its eventual downfall. At first, the local appeared to have gathered some support from a wide range of shops in the BNY. Asking for permission to post a meeting notice in June 1941, Cianflone asked for access to the bulletin boards in the shipfitters, pipecoverers, electricians, riggers, sheet metal, painters, apprentice school, machine shop, pipefitters, boilermakers, boatbuilders, coppersmiths, drillers, welders, carpenter shop, riveters, and reamers shops, as well as in the Supply Department. [Under Yard regulations union postings could only be put up in shops that had members working in them.] But what constituted a “member” was another matter. Like its predecessor, Local 102's paid membership was small. In December 1940 its new secretary reported only 60 signed-up members, of whom 49 had paid dues. By the end of January 1941 the local had 90 members in good standing, by April 1941, 130 working members, and in July the secretary noted 150 members in good standing. But appearances can be deceptive. [Letter, Cianflone, to T.B. Richey, June 1941; RG181; NA-NY. Notes, meeting, by Emanuel Dans, Recording Secretary, December 1940; Organizers and field representatives report, by Jack Randolph, financial secretary, December 1940, January 1941; Organizing report for week of 24 January 1941; [hand-written] Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, January 1941 (the letter has as its date the year 1940 but this is an error); Letter, Joe Cianflone, Organizer, Local 21, to van Gelder, February 1941; Official Report Sheet for month of March 1941 for Local 102, Irving Finkel, Rec. Secretary, April 1941; Official Report sheet from L102 for month of July 1941, from Harry Flemming, Rec. Secretary, July 1941. All in Archives, IUMSWA.]By early 1941 the local had on its own initiative begun organizing drives at three small private yards in the vicinity of the BNY. One, in Greenpoint, manufactured steel barges, another built small wood boats, and the third did marine welding. When questioned as to his activities Cianflone informed the IU that he was doing this work on his spare time. By the end of July he had a case pending at the NLRB over election irregularities at one of the shops, was projecting a union election at a second in early September, and was continuing the drive at the third. On 26 August, 15 union supporters at Lane Lifeboat, the company over which Cianflone had filed the appeal, were fired and the rest of the shop wildcatted in response. When van Gelder asked Cianflone about this, he replied that he had received authorization from a regional IUMSWA official. In early September, Cianflone reported that the election at Dekom, the second firm, had been won and that contract negotiations would commence immediately. [Official Report Sheet for month of March 1941 for L102, Irving Finkel, Rec. Secretary, April 1941; Official Report sheet from Local 102 for month of July 1941, from Harry Flemming, Rec. Secretary, July 1941; Archives, IUMSWA; SW, September 1941. Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, July 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, August 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, September 1941; Letter, fCianflone, to van Gelder, September 1941; Archives, IUMSWA.]
The problem with Cianflone's extra-curricular work was that it detracted from his work at his primary assignment, the Brooklyn Navy Yard. As early as January 1941, the local's financial secretary, Jack Randolph, personally wrote to van Gelder to inform him that of the then-seventy members of Local 102 only fifteen worked for the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Randolph praised Cianflone as being as true an organizer as they came but that he too could not overcome the dismal truth that “the Brooklyn Navy Yard is the graveyard for all CIO organizers.” [Letter, Jack Randolph, Financial Secretary, Local 102, to van Gelder, January 1941; Archives, IUMSWA.]
Cianflone had overstepped his authority, which was made quite clear by his inability to resolve the Lane strike. By October it was still in progress, half the strikers in the meantime having returned to work, and the union stepped in find a “face-saving” means of getting the rest back in. Behind the scenes, a deeper frustration with Cianflone's work appeared. An attorney working for Local 102 since April 1941 on the Lane appeal submitted an affidavit accusing Cianflone of “disgraceful” conduct in the local's affairs and in the running of the Lane strike, going so far as to accuse him of pocketing some of the strike relief money raised from other IUMSWA locals in the Port. Cianflone could not account for the missing money and said that he had given it directly to the strikers as handouts. On 18 October Cianflone was fired and replaced by Sidney Schulman, one of the national's organizers. [Letter, van Gelder, to Cianflone, October 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, October 1941; Letter, Cianflone, to van Gelder, October 1941; postal telegraph, Louis Daviso, chairman [Dekom committee], to John Green, October 1941; Letter, van Gelder, to Daviso, October 1941; statement of Emanuel Finkel, attorney for Local 102, n.d.; Archives, IUMSWA.]
It would seem that the lure of the smaller companies, legally capable of being organized into a bargaining unit, was too much for Cianflone to pass up, and that Local 102's growing membership rolls in 1941 came from these latter sources. When in angry reaction to Cianflone's termination the Dekom organizing committee requested permission of the national to form their own local they argued that were strong enough to go their own way as their seventy members was the largest contingent in Local 102. [Letter, Negotiating Committee and shop steward [Dekom], to John Green, November 1941. The petition was denied. Letter, van Gelder, to Theodore Beck, November 1941; Archives, IUMSWA.]
Schulman, also assigned the Philadelphia local, went to work. He and Local 102 printed flyers taking credit for the revised navy yard wage scale of 1941, as it was based on the wage scale for the private shipyards formulated by the Shipbuilding Stabilization Code, whose new rates built on largely on IUMSWA's gains during the previous decade. The union now added the expanding work hours in the Yard [due to war-preparation construction] to the standard litany of charges and grievances, pointing out that “All work and no play is not the American way.” But all the activity returned poor results. The local's report to the national in November 1941 showed that of 230 members in Local 102 (it does not break them down by shop) that just 52 were in good standing, and of the rest about half had not paid dues for a year. [Letter, Schulman, to van Gelder, November 1941; Flyers, Local 102, October 1941, some n.d.; Chart, Analysis of present membership of Local 102, by dues paying and non-paying, n.a., November 1941; Archives, IUMSWA.]
The IU Philadelphia and Brooklyn locals continued to agitate around various issues as the US approached war. They released a ten-point program for “negotiations” with their respective navy yard managements: abolishing the two extra ratings; enacting unemployment insurance and better retirement pension; ending abuses in promotions; a strict definition of dirty work; medical exams for departing employees to check for possible latent occupational diseases; stopping supervisors from speaking to workers on non-work subjects; better civil service protection for workers; parity of navy yard wages with private yards; abolishing the rule denying overtime pay to a worker if he took a leave day during the week; and strict health and safety enforcement, including gloves for riveters and oil skins for workers in poor weather. [SW, December 1941.]
But it was mostly for naught, and Local 102 did not last much longer than did its predecessor. Once the U.S. entered the war the IU for the most part gave up on the navy yards in order to spend its energy on the rapidly-growing private shipyards. In April 1942 the national informed the Brooklyn local they were to operate from then on a “self-sustaining basis” and reassigned its organizer to other shipyards in the Harbor. In June 1942, eighteen months after its establishment, the IU revoked the local's charter for failing to pay its per capita to the national. A month later the local made good on its debt and regained its charter. But the leaders of Local 102, frustrated or just politically maladroit, continued to complain of the IU's lack of support, and on 28 November 1942 the union shut down the local for the last time. [Letter, van Gelder, to Harold Ash, Local 102, April 1942; Letter, van Gelder, to Ash, June 1942; Letter, van Gelder, to Ash, July 1942; Letter, Martin Ludwig, Pres., Local 102, to van Gelder, November 1942; Letter, John Green, to Ash, November 1942; Archives, IUMSWA. Mergen, “History of the IUMSWA,” for charter dates.]
TopContinued Activity of the UFW in the Navy Yards
At the national level the UFW worked to improve its relations with the Navy Department. In October 1939, union officials met with Captain Fisher, the Director of Shore Establishments, to discuss their representation on the upcoming local and national wage boards. Fisher took the opportunity to float a wage proposal and the union agreed to discuss it with their locals. The Department suggested instituting the intermediate rate as the standard rate, reserving the minimum rate for new workers and the maximum for exceptional workers. In Brooklyn, Local 137 asked to testify before the local wage board and said they would ask for the abolition of the balanced shop, substituting a basic rate of pay for 85% of each trade, but on condition that workers be kept at the minimum rate for their first ten days only and probation be reduced to three months. Given the high turn-over rate this in effect meant paying one rate for almost all permanent employees. Dunn replied that everybody would get their chance to speak when the time came. [FR, October 1939; Letter, Long, to Dunn, October 1939; Reply, from Dunn, November 1939; RG181; NA-NY; FR, 13 November 1939.]After consultation with its navy yard locals the UFW responded to Fisher, stating that the Navy should abolish relative ratings and the “bell curve system,” and give increased weight to seniority, especially for raises and promotions. Relative ratings were subjective and as such inappropriate for judging workers' worth. Instead, workers should be evaluated on the quality and quantity of their work, and on their deportment. It was more important that a worker had performed satisfactorily for three years than if he had received a grade of 80 or 90. The union also asked that the seniority bump be increased to fifteen points. As to wages, they proposed that new workers be paid at the minimum rate for their first ten days, and that everyone be paid at the maximum rate after working for five years. [FR, October 1939; October 1939; January 1940. In early 1940 the Federal Record lists UFW activity at the Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Mare Island, and Puget Sound yards. FR, February 1940.]
This willingness to negotiate seemed to have paid off for the union. In March 1940 the Federal Record announced that ASN Compton had told the union he was in favor of having CIO representatives as well as those from the AFL sit on the wage boards. In April, the Navy Department announced that Jacob Baker, the UFW president, upon the recommendation of John Lewis, would be the CIO representative on the national Wage Board, to convene on 13 May. When the hearings began, the UFW submitted its proposals for abolishing the balanced shop, for higher ratings, and for revision of the efficiency ratings. National Organizer Henry Rhine spoke for the union at the national board hearings and among other points argued that workers should be graded only as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. In the regional hearings the Federal Record reported that Brooklyn's local 137 requested that the overwhelming majority--ninety per cent--of the ordnance machinists be paid the same rate, a hefty $1.30 per hour. New hires should receive a short-term entrance rate of $1.24, and "exceptional" workers be allowed a “special” rate of $1.36. They also wanted a 10% bonus for the evening shift and 15% for the overnight. [FR, March 1940; April 1940; May 1940; April 1940; June 1940.]
Baker's appointment to the Wage Board proved to be a mixed blessing and shortly after the announcement of the meager awards [in many cases, a penny or less per hour raises] he left the union to take a consultant's job, and new CIO president Philip Murray appointed one of his top organizers, Allan Haywood, to lead the union. The UFW then denounced the new schedule and called for the hearings to be reopened. Throughout 1941 the union pointed out that this was only fair as wages in private industries, especially those with CIO shops were steadily increasing. [FR, November 1940; June 1941. What happened to Fisher's proposal is unclear, and given the announced wage schedules it could well have been Fisher's idea alone.]
TopThe UFW on the Defensive
As war rumbles deepened during 1941 whatever good relations the UFW had established with the Navy Department the previous year soon deteriorated. A union noted for leftist political tendencies, it lodged a protest in May 1941 against secret Hatch Act investigations conducted by the Civil Service about some of its members. It demanded that all employees under scrutiny be told of all charges in a timely manner, be able to have representation at all hearings, be asked only questions relevant to the charges, have personal questions in general kept to a minimum, and that written records be made of all meetings, with a copy given to the defendant. [FR, May 1941.]Relations soon worsened. Throughout 1941 the Department delayed action on reconvening the wage boards, waiting on the wage negotiations for the private shipbuilding industry to conclude. During these months all the navy yard unions engaged in heavy lobbying to have the Department re-open the hearings. By the middle of the year the management of the Philadelphia Navy Yard became convinced that some of its workers were engaged in a slow-down as a form of protest against the wage schedule. In June 1941, marines seized 23 of them, 8 of whom belonged to the UFW, took their I.D. badges, hauled them out of the yard in a truck, and handed them suspension notices. The Navy accused the Philadelphia's UFW local's secretary, one of the suspended men, of having received orders from the national to institute the work action. The union protested the “Gestapo-like methods” claiming it was loyal to the Navy and the government. The repression, they said, was a part of the then-ongoing investigations of federal employees in general, especially by the Dies committee, into their opinions, activities, and affiliations, as well as being aimed at curtailing union organizing in general in America. [FR, June 1941; July 1941; New York Times, June 1941; Dorwart, Philadelphia Navy Yard.]
Shortly after the expulsions thirty representatives from UFW locals in northeast navy yards visited the Department to request a “fair trial” with union counsel for the eight suspended workers. They said they had the support of both of Pennsylvania's senators, and presented Atkins with a petition signed by CIO leaders in the Philadelphia area. The union leaders took the opportunity to stress that organized labor was loyal to the country and that it was the PNY, not the UFW, that had acted in an “un-American” manner by suspending the men solely because of their active campaign to raise wages. [FR, July 1941.]
Confrontations between the UFW and the federal government quickly arose elsewhere. Over the summer of 1941 a series of suspensions of UFW members occurred in various government agencies. The Puget Sound Navy Yard local lost its president and the Mare Island local eight members to disciplinary action. The War Department suspended UFW-affiliated employees in the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia, in its Brooklyn army base, and in its own departmental office. The Civil Service put out one member for political activities, and the Labor Department fired another for supposed communist ties. Eleanor Nelson, the UFW vice-president, attempted to arrange conferences to discuss the military suspensions and requested a full disclosure of charges and evidence, an impartial board, the right for the suspended workers to stay on the job until a guilty verdict was delivered, and their right to representation. [FR, July 1941; July 1941; August 1941; The CIO News, September 1941.]
Shore Establishments Director Atkins met with UFW delegates in August 1941 and told them that if the fight against fascism was to succeed ship production must proceed smoothly, with all employees giving their complete cooperation. The union representatives agreed with him but said they wanted to bring to his attention that 600 skilled workers had left the Philadelphia Navy Yard in the past three months, allegedly to take better-paid jobs elsewhere. Battleships could not be built by trainee mechanics and apprentices alone. Since June the ratio of trainees to mechanic had jumped from four to six and could easily go higher. New York Ship and Cramps paid from 25 to 60 cents an hour more on many jobs than did the PNY and so, if the navy yards wanted to keep their workers and maintain production they needed to match the wages of the private-sector shipyards. The delegates reported their reception as less than warm and claimed that Atkins had told them that if navy yard workers did not like their pay they could “go jump in the lake,” certainly not the most tactful reply. [FR, August 1941.]
The union had some small success in its grievances over the disciplinary actions. Of the ten members (two others had also been shown the gates) suspended at PNY, the Department agreed in mid-August to reinstate two with back pay. Haywood continued to meet with various government agency officials over the other dismissals, and in November was able to get ASN Bard to agree to reconsider the outstanding navy yard cases. But there is no further mention of the suspensions in the Federal Record. Most likely they were not resolved in the UFW's favor and the union chose not to publicize the matter after the US entered the war. [FR, August 1941; September 1941; November 1941.]
In the BNY, Local 137 seems to have maintained decent relations with Yard management during the months preceding U.S. entry into the war. There is one rather cordial set of notes exchanged between the local and Manager Broshek in which the local requested a meeting to discuss various complaints about working conditions and Broshek consented without the local even as was “customary,” having to submit a detailed agenda in advance. A short time later, the local thanked the Manager for allowing Jewish workers to not work on weekends. [Letter, Walter Shellsrom, Corr. Sec., Local 137, to Capt. Broshek, September 1941; Reply, Broshek, September 1941; Letter, Shellstrom to Broshek, September 1941. All in RG181; NA-NY.]
There are no extant records of UFW locals' memberships. From time to time the Federal Record published membership numbers but they seem clearly exaggerated in light of what information is known about the union's overall membership numbers. [For instance, the UFW claimed 1300 members in the Philadelphia Navy Yard in 1940. FR, May 1940.] Most likely, UFW navy yard locals claimed mere supporters or those whose took advantage of their help in grievances as "members, whether or not they actually signed a union card. As was the case with the two IUMSWA locals in the BNY it seems highly probable that a small cadre of devoted workers ran Local 137. In comparison with the IUMSWA, the UFW did have one distinction which was both to its advantage and disadvantage, in that it was dedicated to work only within federal agencies. Without potential lures outside of its original jurisdiction the UFW locals settled into their navy yard niches, much like the AFL unions had done, exploiting what grievances fell their way during the war but unable to apply the political muscle the trade unions could in order to grow. [For instance, during the war years the UFW took on grievances for those workers, Jewish, minority, and women, mostly ignored by AFL unions. On the first two, see: October 1945, Closed Cases - Brooklyn Navy Yard; RG228, Records of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice; NA-NY. On the last, see Letter, Commander N.D. Hubbell, to Walter Woods, UFWA, August 1945; RG81; NA-NY.]
TopConclusion
It is clear that the navy yards were not one of the CIO's success stories; nor was the federal sector in general. There are several reasons for this that directly relate to the federal government's labor relations policy. One is that unlike private shipyards where AFL unions were busted in the open-shop movement of the early 1920s, the federal government and the Navy Department pursued no such policy in the navy yards. Protected by the provisions of the 1912 Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the craft unions remained strong in the navy yards in the inter-war era, leaving few organizing opportunities for the CIO to exploit.But while that act permitted government workers to openly belong to unions it did not recognize them for the purposes of collective bargaining. Without a contract and its guarantee of sole access to unions of the right to negotiate with management and to workers' dues, it was just not worth the while of the IUMSWA and the CIO, organizations on the make, to pursue organizing in the navy yards or in the rest of the federal agencies.
The major AFL unions in the navy yards all had a long history of existence and with that, the resultant experience of dealing with the various components of the government. Being craft unions, they were also not confined to any one trade and could use their strength in other organized occupations to bolster their work in the government yards. This would also include the craft unions' ability to enforce dues payments from their members as a requirement of maintaining membership and with it the right to take union jobs outside the navy yards.
It also should be said that the AFL was willing to accept the compromises of working within the confines of government restrictions, since government benefits, though not wages, were often superior to those of unionized craft workers. And in both wages and benefits federal jobs far surpassed, especially in the pre-Wagner Act era, those of the non-unionized private sector. There was little the CIO unions could do to distinguish themselves from the AFL unions in the pre-war years, outside of their position forbidding supervisors union membership and workers in the government's military and civilian agenceis could see little reason to throw over the older, established and proven unions for the lure of unknown ones.
Finally, there is the issue of overt government repression. The law forbade striking the US government [albeit in the years before 1946 in a somewhat roundabout manner], a major tool of growth, especially in the 1930s, for AFL, CIO, and independent unions. This prohibition was further enhanced by President Roosevelt's letter against striking [although its legal standing is questionable]. Then the passage of the Hatch Act gave the state the right to pursue government employees whose loyalty its agents found problematic. Without the organizational and activist tools available to unions in the private sector and falling easy prey to charges of disloyalty the UFW was unable to grow much in these years, and after the war, these hobbling measures as well as its own inability to counter them eventually led to its destruction.