

Democracy and Development: Theory, Empirics and Conditions

Instructor: Kate Baldwin

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Course time: Monday, 2-4 pm

Course location: 19 West 4th St., Rm 432

Office hours and location: Monday, 4-6 pm, Rm 304 or by appointment

OVERVIEW

Are there theoretical reasons for expecting democracy to contribute to development? Does an empirical relationship exist between democracy and development? Is this relationship conditional on particular factors, such as information levels, social homogeneity and societal inequality? This course provides an in-depth look at the relationship between democracy and a variety of development indicators. Students will read theoretical and empirical articles on these subjects, will debate the merits of the scholarly work, and will conduct original research on a topic related to the themes of the class. A secondary goal of the course is to expose students to a wide range of research tools, including quantitative and qualitative analysis, formal models and experimental methods.

REQUIREMENTS

1. Two discussant presentations (5% x 2)

You will be assigned as the lead discussant for two readings from the course. The readings will be assigned during the first class. Your oral response should be 5 minutes and will kick-off our discussion of that particular article. The focus on the presentation should be on evaluating the strengths and limitations arguments and evidence presented.

2. Two response papers (10% x 2)

You will write responses to two of the readings on the syllabus. You may select any readings except for the two readings to which you are assigned as “discussant.” These responses should not be more than 3 pages long. You should summarize the core contention of the paper in a paragraph, and then spend the remainder of the paper critiquing aspects of the argument and/or empirical results with reference to other course readings. The response papers must be handed in at the BEGINNING (2 pm sharp!) of the class in which we will discuss that reading.

3. Overall participation (10%)

You are expected to participate actively in class each week.

4. Presentation of paper (10%)

You will present your research to the class during the end of November or beginning of December. The exact date of your presentation will be assigned during the first class. Note that your final paper is not due until Dec. 18. As a result, you will be able to incorporate any feedback you receive during your presentation into the final paper.

5. Final paper (50%)

- You will submit a two-page outline of your paper topic to me in class during the week of October 19. This outline will indicate the question you will be addressing, your preliminary hypotheses, and the data you will use to test these hypotheses. The outline will not be graded but will give you a chance to get feedback on your idea.
- You will submit a 20-30 page paper displaying original research and related to one of the themes of the course. These research papers will contain (i) a theoretical argument, engaging with one of the key themes of the course and (ii) an empirical test of that argument. The empirical part may be quantitative or qualitative; the main requirement is that the analysis has the potential to falsify your argument.

READINGS

The amount of weekly reading for this course is not particularly heavy, but the expectation is that you will take the time to reflect deeply on each reading. Do you believe this argument? How broadly would you expect the argument to hold? What are the limitations of the evidence presented? Can you think of additional empirical tests that could be conducted? The articles are available via the library's electronic databases, and the required book chapters are available electronically through the course's blackboard page. All books have also been placed on reserve at the library.

PART 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS

1.1 Conceptualizing and Measuring Development [Sept. 14]

Walt Rostow. 1959. "The Stages of Economic Growth." *Economic History Review* 12 (1).

Amartya Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York, Anchor Books, Chapter 1 & Chapter 2.

UNDP. 2008. "Calculating the Human Development Indices." Technical Notes to the 2007/08 HDR. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_Tech_Note_1.pdf

Additional readings:

James M. Cypher and James L. Dietz. 1997. *The Process of Economic Development*. London: Routledge, pp.26-54.

1.2 Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy [Sept. 21]

Robert Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press), Chapter 1.

Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens. 1997. "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory and Social Dimensions." *Comparative Politics* 29 3 (April), pp. 323-342.

David Collier and Steven Levitsky. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives." *World Politics* 49 (3), pp. 430-451.

- Kenneth A. Bollen. 1990. "Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (1), pp. 7-24.
- Adam Przeworski, Mike Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Performance in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 1.

Additional readings:

- Adam Przeworski. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense" in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds. *Democracy's Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 23-55.
- Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press), pp.3-30.

1.3 How Do Democracies Come About? [Sept. 28]

- Adam Przeworski. 1988. "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in John Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds. *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 59-80.
- Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49 (2).
- Carles Boix. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 1.
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

Additional readings:

- Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 53 1 (March), pp. 69-105.
- Barry Weingast. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91 2 (June), pp. 245-63.
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 6.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith. 2009. "Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 2, pp. 167-197.

PART II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Economic Growth: Theory [Oct. 5]

- Huntington, Samuel P., and Jorge I. Domínguez. 1975. "Political Development." In *Handbook of Political Science*, edited by F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
- Douglas North and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49, pp. 803 – 832.

- Mancur Olson. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87 (Sept), pp. 567-76.
- Amartya Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York, Anchor Books, Chapter 6.

Additional readings:

- Mancur Olson. 2000. *Power and Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books.

2.2 Economic Growth: Empirics [Oct. 12]

- Adam Przeworski, Mike Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Performance in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 3.
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91 5, pp. 1361-1401.
- Edward Glaser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 9 3 (September), pp. 271-303.
- Daron Acemoglu. 2003. "An African Success Story: Botswana" in Dani Rodrik, ed. *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Additional readings:

- Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (Summer), pp. 51-69.
- Robert Barro. 1997. *Determinants of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: MIT Press), Chapter 2.
- Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 9 2 (June), pp. 131-165.

2.3 Public Goods Provision and Redistribution [Oct. 19]

Reminder: Two-Page Paper Outline Due Today!

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders." *British Journal of Political Science* 32, pp. 559-590.
- Matthew Baum and David Lake. 2001. "The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services." *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (6), pp. 587-621.
- David Stasavage. 2005. "Democracy and Education Spending in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2), pp. 343-58.
- Michael Ross. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4), pp. 860-874.

Additional readings:

- Thomas A. Husted and Lawrence W. Kenny. 1997. "The Effect of the Expansion of the Franchise on the Size of Government" *The Journal of Political Economy*, 105 1 (February), pp. 54-82.
- Carles Boix. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 5.
- Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

2.4 Private Goods Provision and Corruption [Oct. 26]

- Daniel Triesman. 2000. "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Public Economics*. 76 (3), pp. 399-457.
- Alicia Adserà, Carles Boix and Mark Payne. 2003. "Are you Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. 19 (2), pp. 445-490.
- Leonard Wantchekon. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." *World Politics*. 55 (3), pp. 399-422.
- Staffan Lindberg. 2003. "It's Our Time to "Chop": Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counteract it?" *Democratization* 10 2, pp. 121-140.

Additional readings

- Susan Rose-Ackerman. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Strategies for Reform*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

PART III. IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONAL ON OTHER FACTORS?

4.1 Information [Nov. 2]

- Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4), pp. 1415-1451.
- David Stromberg. 2004. "Radio's Impact on Public Spending," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (1), pp. 189-221.
- Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. 2009. "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (2): 735-769.
- David Stasavage. 2005. "The Role of Democracy in Uganda's Move to Universal Primary Education," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43 (1), pp. 53-73.
- Ben Olken. 2006. "Do Television and Radio Destroy Social Capital: Evidence from Indonesian Villages" *NBER Working Paper No. 12561*.

Additional readings

- Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. 2005. "Fighting corruption to improve schooling: Evidence from a newspaper campaign in Uganda." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3 (2-3), pp. 259-267.

Frederico Finan and Claudio Ferraz. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 2, pp. 703-745.

4.2 Identity Politics [Nov. 9]

James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Good Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 4 (November), pp. 709-725.

Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (4), pp. 1243-1284.

Moses Shayo. 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103 (2), pp.147-174.

John Huber and Piero Stanig. 2007. "Why Do the Poor Support Right-Wing Parties: A Cross-National Analysis," *Working Paper*.
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/stuff_for_blog/johnpiero.pdf

Additional readings:

William Easterly and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4), pp.1203-1250.

Daniel N. Posner. 2004. "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4), pp. 849-863.

Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser. 2006. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Ken Scheve and David Stasavage. 2006. "The Political Economy of Religion and Social Insurance in the United States, 1910-1939," *Studies in American Political Development* 20, pp. 132-159.

4.3 Inequality and Social Hierarchy [Nov. 16]

Allan Meltzer and Scott Richards. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5), pp. 914-927.

Roberto Perotti. 1996. "Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say." *Journal of Economic Growth* 1 (2), pp. 149-87.

Philip Keefer. 2007. "Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed?" *American Journal of Political Science* 51, pp. 804-21.

Javier Auyero. 2000. "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account." *Latin American Research Review* 35 (3), pp. 55-81.

Additional readings:

Anirudh Krishna. 2007. "Politics in the Middle: Mediating Relationships Between Citizens and the State in Rural North India" in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson. 2008. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile." *American Economic Review* 98:5, pp. 1737-1765.

4.4. Institutional Choices [Nov. 23]

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 2006. "Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details." *American Economic Review* 96 2 (May), pp. 319-324.

Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Class: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others?" *American Political Science Review* 100 (2), pp. 165-181.

Barry Weingast. 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 11 (1), pp. 1-31.

Additional readings:

Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico. 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives." *American Economic Review* 91 (1), pp. 225-239.

PART IV. RESEARCH COMPONENT

5.1 Presentation of Papers-in-Progress [Nov. 30]

5.2 Presentation of Papers-in-Progress [Dec. 7]

5.3 Presentation of Papers-in-Progress [Dec. 14]

FINAL PAPER MUST BE E-MAILED TO ME BY 5:00 PM ON DECEMBER 18.

RESEARCH RESOURCES AND HELPFUL LINKS

I do not mind which citation style you use, so long as you apply it consistently throughout your paper. Here is a link that explains various citation styles:

<http://www.lib.unc.edu/instruct/citations/>

Here are some suggestions on how to conduct research and write papers from other professors of political science:

<http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds/Leedsrespaperguide.pdf>

http://qcpages.qc.edu/Political_Science/researching.html

In addition, the following books provide general guides to conducting quantitative and qualitative research in political science:

Van Evra, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.

Shively, W. Phillips. 2005. *The Craft of Political Research*, 7th ed.. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Pollock, Philip. 2003. *The Essentials of Political Analysis*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.