Bureaucratic Capacity and Class Voting: Evidence from Across the World and the United States.

Kimuli Kasara
Columbia University

Pavithra Suryanarayan
Johns Hopkins University *

January 2019

Abstract

Why do the rich and poor support different parties in some places? We argue that voting along class lines is more likely to occur where states can tax the income and assets of the wealthy. In low bureaucratic capacity states, the rich are less likely to participate in electoral politics because they have less to fear from redistributive policy. When wealthy citizens abstain from voting, politicians face a more impoverished electorate. Because politicians cannot credibly campaign on anti-tax platforms, they are less likely to emphasize redistribution and partisan preferences are less likely to diverge across income groups. Using cross-national survey data, we show there is more class voting in countries with greater bureaucratic capacity. We also show that class voting and fiscal capacity were correlated in the United States in the mid-1930s when state-level revenue collection and party systems were less dependent on national economic policy.

*We thank Kate Baldwin, Pablo Beramendi, Hoahan Chen, Timothy Feddersen, Herbert Kitschelt, Isabela Mares, Susan Stokes, and the participants at the 2015 meeting of the American Political Science Association, the Politics and Political Economy Seminar at SAIS-Johns Hopkins, the Yale Comparative Politics Workshop, and the Duke University workshop on Preferences over Redistribution for their comments on earlier drafts.

Elites opposed to extending the franchise were often concerned that the poor would vote for taxation and redistribution. However, contemporary democracies rarely resemble the tyranny of the poor feared by elites because people frequently do not vote based on their economic interests. Therefore, variation in class voting presents a puzzle for political scientists grounded in both political economy and political sociology.[1] In this paper, we argue that the political preferences of the rich and poor will be more likely to diverge where the state can tax income and assets. Existing theories of redistribution and class voting were developed concerning historical contexts in which the state could implement redistributive policies. However, contemporary democracies vary considerably in the state's capacity to locate and tax the income and assets of the wealthy, which has implications for citizens' political behavior and politicians' mobilization strategies.

We argue that the bureaucratic capacity of the state affects whether politicians can credibly campaign on promises to redistribute income. Across democracies, while vote-seeking politicians may campaign on promises to provide voters particularistic benefits or universalistic policies, they can only credibly campaign on *anti-redistributive* platforms where the state can tax the wealthy. When fiscal capacity is high, the relatively wealthy must take the possibility that the state will implement redistributive policies more seriously. The incentives of the relatively wealthy to participate in electoral politics are critical to how politicians mobilize the electorate *as a whole* because the non-poor have the resources to influence electoral outcomes through voting and other forms of political participation. Put another way, parties protecting the rich from taxation have a smaller constituency where fiscal capacity is low. Therefore, in states lacking the bureaucratic capacity to tax the wealthy, parties are less likely to emphasize redistribution and income will be less predictive of vote choice.

Although some scholars have paid attention to how tax capacity may shape redistributive pol-

[1]Canonical political economy models of redistribution turn on the, often incorrect, assumption that people prioritize their economic interests (Romer 1975, Meltzer & Richard 1981). Research on class voting in Western Europe with its origins in political sociology has focused on declining support for left-wing parties among members of the industrial working class (Lipset 1981, Evans 2000).

icy, no prior work has considered the implications of variation in tax capacity for class voting. Alesina & Glaeser (2004), for example, raise and then dismiss the possibility that the efficacy of the tax collection system can account for lower rates of redistribution in the U.S. than in Europe. They also observe that effective tax collection systems may account for variation in the size of government between the developed and developing worlds, but do not spell out the effect of these differences in tax capacity for redistributive politics. Becker & Mulligan (2003) argue that improvements in the efficiency of tax collection increase the size of government, but they treat the political process translating the preferences of taxpayers and beneficiaries into policy as a "black box." When scholars have developed theories of distributive politics hinging on the method by which redistribution occurs, they've emphasized attributes, such as ethnicity or region, allowing policymakers to discriminate between the beneficiaries of tax revenue rather than its sources (Fernandez & Levy 2008, Huber & Ting 2013, Huber 2017).

In one sense, it is unsurprising that we are the first to explore the effect of tax-raising capacity on class voting. Scholars developed most theories of redistributive politics holding in mind places where such capacity can be assumed to exist. Yet, the state's ability to tax the wealthy plays an essential role in related research on when elites support transitions to democracy. Owners of mobile assets are in a better position to bargain for policy concessions and have less to fear from redistribution under democracy (Bates & Lien 1985, Boix 2003). Focusing on state capacity as we do, Soifer (2013) argues that democratic transitions pose less of a redistributive threat to the rich in weak states. According to Dunning (2008), elites may be less opposed to democracy where natural resource rents mitigate redistributive demands. We argue that while the existing literature contends that the potential tax exposure of the rich influences their support for democracy, it also shapes their political behavior in democratic regimes, with consequences for the party system as a whole.

We define class voting as the extent to which the political preferences of the rich and poor diverge. We focus on divergent preferences rather than a directional definition of class voting, in

which the poor vote for the left and the rich vote for the right, for both theoretical and practical reasons. Our theory implies that politicians will campaign on redistributive policy when fiscal capacity is high. Therefore, parties will probably be harder to reliably define as left- or right-wing in many of our cases, making a directional definition of class voting less useful. And much of the research on class voting in Western Europe emphasizes the role of the industrial working class, a group far from straightforward to define across a range of countries with wide variations in occupational structure.

We exploit cross-national and sub-national sources of variation in class voting. First, we estimate differences in the partisan preferences of the rich and the poor using survey data from 71 countries and multiple sources from 1996 to 2012. Because political scientists often argue ethnic cleavages mask class cleavages, we demonstrate that ethnic inequality cannot account for our findings. Because the creation of tax-raising institutions and elite-based political parties may predate democratic politics, we show that our results are robust to limiting our sample to new and established democracies respectively. Our findings are robust to controlling for levels of economic development, which is correlated with bureaucratic capacity.

We also use early opinion polls to study the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and class voting in the U.S. in the 1930s (AIPO 1937, Berinsky, Powell, Schickler & Yohai 2011). While sub-national studies allow us to hold constant important social and institutional factors, these shared conditions homogenize local party systems within countries (Cox 1987, Caramani 2004, Chhibber & Kollman 2004). Therefore, a sub-national study of the effect of bureaucratic capacity on class voting requires a less nationalized party system. We study class voting in the 1930s – a period in which states raised more of their own tax revenue. The New Deal Era was a key point in the evolution of a nationalized party system (Schattschneider 1960, Stokes 1967). The expansion of the federal government shortly after the period we study increased the importance voters and politicians placed on representation at the national level (Milkis 1993, Chhibber & Kollman 2004). We find that the political preferences of the rich and poor diverge more in states where direct

taxes are a higher proportion of state revenue, even controlling for racial demographics and racial inequality.

By emphasizing the link between bureaucratic capacity and class voting, this paper contributes to the literature on redistributive politics by providing an additional mechanism underlying the weak relationship between democracy and redistribution. Research on the extent to which income differences matter to vote choice take two broad approaches differing from ours. First, some scholars explain the effect of beliefs and social identification on preferences for redistribution (Alesina & La Ferrara 2005, Scheve & Stasavage 2006, Alesina & Glaeser 2004, Shayo 2009). Our argument is more consistent with a second approach which emphasizes how party competition interacts with institutions and heterogeneous preferences on a non-economic dimension to constrain vote choice. In these accounts, politicians may create cross-class coalitions leaving voters without a party that offers their preferred policy on both redistribution and some other dimension (Roemer 1998). Consequently, institutions giving politicians an incentive to bundle redistribution with non-economic issues will attenuate the relationship between income and voting (De La O & Rodden 2008, Vernby & Finseraas 2010). We emphasize how state capacity, rather than institutions and non-economic preferences, affect politicians' incentives to campaign on redistributive platforms.

1 Explaining Class Voting

We argue that the relationship between income and vote choice is weaker in states with low bureaucratic capacity. Bureaucratic capacity shapes the participation and preferences of the rich – those who might expect to fund redistribution through their taxes – and the likelihood that politicians will make class-based redistributive appeals to all voters. The electoral participation of the wealthy, and the credibility of appeals politicians can make on redistributive issues are, therefore, central to our argument. The economic interests of the wealthy shape politicians' incentives because – due to their greater resources – the behavior and policy preferences of the wealthy have more significant

implications for party strategies than those of the poor.

To see how bureaucratic capacity affects the income-vote relationship, consider how it shapes the incentives of the relatively wealthy to participate in electoral politics. Although the poor are possible recipients of redistributive social policy in all contexts, the wealthy are not always taxpayers funding redistribution. Therefore, where the relatively wealthy do not face the possibility of taxation, they are less likely to participate in electoral politics. As Kasara & Suryanarayan (2015) show, income is negatively correlated with turnout in countries with low fiscal capacity. Where the wealthy abstain from participating in electoral politics, politicians have less to gain from campaigning on *anti-redistributive* platforms because they face a more impoverished electorate. Therefore, bureaucratic capacity leads to class voting because politicians adjust their campaign strategies to the fact that the wealthy are less likely to participate in politics where they face fewer redistributive threats.

We treat the existence of anti-redistributive parties as a puzzle to be explained. Because parties opposing redistribution are the oldest parties in many democratic countries, political scientists have not treated the presence of right-wing parties as though they are the result of politicians' strategic choices. Much of the literature on party system change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century focused on the emergence of parties representing the poor (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, Przeworski & Sprague 1986, Boix 2009, Jusko 2017). However, a right-wing incumbent party cannot be presumed to exist in many post-colonial and post-communist countries, where democratization preceded the creation of political parties representing the wealthy. For example, Evans (2006) argues that class voting appears to be influenced by the type of communist rule and non-economic cleavages. In Africa, in the immediate post-colonial period left-leaning academics searched in vain for a class basis for politics (Sandbrook 1977, Sklar 1979).

Our argument differs from other accounts linking state capacity to class-biased political participation and mobilization because we assume rich and poor voters differ only in preferences about the level of redistributive taxes and transfers. Alternative theories assume that rich and poor voters

have inherently different preferences about the form distributive politics takes regardless of how revenue is raised, with the wealthy preferring programmatic policy and the poor favoring private or clientelistic benefits.[2] Nathan (2016) argues that the state in Ghana and other developing countries cannot provide the programmatic goods preferred by the middle-class, suppressing their incentive to participate in politics. In Nathan's (2016) account, state capacity is the ability of the state to provide a class of goods preferred by wealthy and middle-income voters, not its capacity to raise revenue from the middle-class. Amat & Beramendi (2018) argue that turnout by the poor is driven by clientelistic offers by the wealthy which will be provided at higher rates when income inequality is higher as this means a relatively poor median voter. They argue that state capacity interacts with income inequality, but define it in their model as the ability of the wealthy to hide their income from the state when taxed.[3] In their model, state capacity (and anything else that increases the share of revenue going to the poor), has a positive effect on the total amount spent on direct benefits to the poor rather than public goods because poor voters are assumed to prefer direct benefits strongly.

Why shouldn't we start with the assumption that poor voters prefer direct benefits? First, this assumption isn't very general. Although the literature on clientelism in developing countries shows that politicians often target the poor with private benefits and the wealthy prefer programmatic policies (e.g., Stokes (2005) & Weitz-Shapiro (2012)), this research reflects a set of cases where clientelistic transfers are the norm because bureaucratic capacity is low. Relatively poor voters are offered programmatic policies in many other contexts. Second, even if we assume preferences for how government benefits are distributed differ by class, we argue that if the wealthy can be taxed, they are unlikely to ignore electoral politics and allow representatives accountable to the poor to set policy. The preferences of the wealthy matter because, despite being a smaller portion of the electorate, higher-income people can be expected to have a disproportionate influence on policy

[2]We define clientelism as the contingent exchange of direct benefits to voters by politicians.

[3]In their sub-national empirical analysis using Brazillian audit study, they measure shocks to state capacity as a reduction in politicians' ability to divert municipal funds to clientelistic campaigning due to randomly-assigned audits.

should they choose to participate in electoral politics.

We argue that bureaucratic capacity increases the likelihood of politics premised on fiscal policy and class-based voting, but make no predictions about the form non-class politics will take. Ethnic politics is frequently considered an alternative to class politics. However, determining whether and when ethnic politics will emerge in low fiscal capacity settings (or mitigate class voting in high-fiscal capacity settings) requires additional assumptions about ethnic demography, geography, and institutions that are currently outside our theory. Huber (2017), for example, treats class and ethnic voting as the only two available alternatives in a model in which the sizes of ethnic and class groups vary and politicians seek to form political coalitions with the smallest majority under set electoral rules.[4]

In this section, we have argued that the capacity of the state to effectively tax has implications for the participation of the wealthy, and consequently, the extent to which politicians mobilize voters along class lines. In the next section, we describe our measures of class voting and bureaucratic capacity.

2 Class Voting Across the World

We study class voting in 71 countries from 1996 to 2012 using survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the Global Barometer Project, the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).[5] We define class voting as a divergence in the political preferences of the rich and the poor. An alternative approach would be to define class voting directionally, as support for left-wing parties by the poor and right-wing parties by the rich. We do not use a directional measure of class voting because our theory predicts that parties are more likely to be defined as left or right-wing on redistribution where state capacity is

[4]Huber (2017) argues that the logic of group identity politics is robust to an extension of his model in which revenue is raised from the wealthy rather than appearing as a windfall to be distributed by politicians, but if revenue is raised by taxing the rich the emergence of class politics more likely.

[5]Table S1 in the appendix containing supporting information (SI) shows the countries and surveys covered.

high. Therefore, a directional measure of class voting is less likely to be accurate in our low state capacity cases. Additionally, we define class in terms of affluence and not occupation because our theory concerns redistributive politics across a wide range of developed and developing countries. Research on class voting in advanced industrialized countries focuses on members of the industrial working class or manual laborers but increasingly debates how occupational categories ought to adapt to changes in the composition of the labor force (Evans 2000). Moreover, occupation-based definitions of class voting are hard to apply across a range of developing countries where fewer people work in industry or the formal sector. [6]

In the analysis that follows our main outcome of interest is the electoral distance in political preferences between the top and bottom quintile. The electoral distance between the voting preferences of two groups (m and n) is:

$$Electoral\ Distance_{mn} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}\sum_{p=1}^{P}(V_m^p - V_n^p)^2} \tag{1}$$

where there are P parties, and V_m^p is the proportion of members of group m who state they support party p. *Electoral Distance* equals 0 when people in each group support the same parties to the same degree and 1 if there is no overlap in the parties supported by people in each group in a two-party system. We measure political preferences using responses to open-ended questions in the surveys. The wording of specific questions on preferences, however, vary by survey.[7]

We measure respondents' relative affluence within a country using asset ownership. Asset indices are a good proxy for long-run socioeconomic status, particularly where people rely on seasonal employment or irregular wages (Filmer & Pritchett 2001, Montgomery, Gragnolati, Burke & Paredes 2000). We constructed a *Wealth Index*, which is the first principal component of a

[6]Mainwaring, Torcal & Somma (2015) discuss the difficulties associated with applying occupational categories used to measure class voting in advanced industrialized countries to Latin America.

[7]Wherever possible, we use the question about who the respondent would vote for if the elections were held tomorrow (Barometer surveys). Where this was not asked, we rely on who the respondent voted for in the previous election (CSES). Finally, if neither option were available we used responses to the question on which party the respondent felt close to (LAPOP & WVS).

principal components analysis of assets by country and used it to place respondents into quintiles.[8] For the WVS and CSES surveys, we used income quintiles based on self-reported income.[9] Figure 1 shows how *Electoral Distance* varies cross-nationally.

[Figure 1 about here]

Most outcomes used to measure bureaucratic capacity are partly the result of current government policy, and bureaucratic capacity may exist even though it is unused by policymakers. We use four standard measures of bureaucratic capacity which, to varying degrees, reflect both the potential capability of the state and current policy choices (Hendrix 2010). First, we use a measure of *Bureaucratic Quality* developed by the Political Risk Services Group (PRSG). *Bureaucratic Quality* takes on a higher value in countries where the bureaucracy can govern autonomously and if there are established mechanisms for training and staffing the civil service. Second, we use a measure of *Government Effectiveness* based on experts' perceptions of the quality of public service (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2010). Third, we include the share of government revenue from direct taxes (*Direct Tax/Revenue*) as a measure of fiscal capacity. Finally, following the literature on civil conflict, we use GDP per capita as a measure of state capacity (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Hendrix 2010).

In our main regressions, we control for social and political institutions other than bureaucratic capacity that shape class voting. We control for whether a country has proportional representation (PR) in all regressions.[10] In proportional electoral systems, a greater number of social and eco-

[8]The assets used in each survey round are: Latinobarometer (TV, refrigerator, own home, computer, washing machine, telephone, mobile telephone, car, second home, drinking water, hot water, sewage system, bathroom with shower, electricity), Afrobarometer (TV, radio, bicycle, motorbike, and car), and LAPOP (telephone, refrigerator, landline telephone, cellular telephone, vehicle/car, washing machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, computer, flat panel TV, internet).

[9]Regarding the measurement of income, as Donnelly & Pop-Eleches (2018), for example, note that there is variation in how self-reported income is measured and income deciles calculated in the World Values Survey. In the empirical section that follows, we show that our findings are robust to excluding surveys with self-reported income.

[10]*PR* is measured using a dummy variable. By this definition, countries have a proportional representation electoral system if candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party or if our sources describe the country as having a PR electoral system. Data on electoral laws come from the CSES and Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer & Walsh (2001).

nomic groups may be represented by a distinct political party (Cox 1987, Iversen & Soskice 2006). Because compulsory voting may increase politicians' incentives to campaign on redistributive platforms, we include a dummy variable for the cases in which the government strictly enforces compulsory voting laws (Panagopoulos 2008, Boveda 2013).

Institutions limiting politicians' responsiveness to voters limit the potential tax exposure of the rich. Because meaningful electoral competition may increase the policy stakes of class-based politics, we control for the quality of a country's democracy using its *Polity Score* (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2013). We also exclude from the analysis any country with a *Polity Score* of -4 or less.

We place people into quintiles by country, but the relative well-being of the richest and poorest people is greater in places with more income inequality. Therefore, we control for inequality using Gini coefficients estimated from household surveys and using gross income, i.e., income before taxes and transfers (Milanovic 2013). We use gross rather than net income to measure inequality because Gini coefficients constructed using net income are likely to capture a state's tax capacity and current redistributive policy.

Issues other than redistribution from the rich to the poor may be politically salient for reasons unrelated to a state's tax-raising capacity. We control for two other aspects of politics that may reduce the political importance of redistribution. First, we control for ethnic diversity as measured by Fearon (2003) because ethnic voting is frequently an alternative to class voting. Second, citizens may be more likely to focus on the provision of public security than redistribution where political violence occurs. Although there are data sources that track election-related violence, they cover primarily developing countries. Therefore, we control for the importance of political violence using the *Homicide Rate*.[11]

[11]The *Homicide Rate* is defined as the number of intentional homicides per 100,000 persons in the population from 2003 to 2008. These data come from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The homicide rate is estimated using data from public health surveys and not police reports because intentional homicide is underreported.

We estimate the following model:

$$Electoral\ Distance_j = \delta + \gamma_1 Bureaucratic\ Quality_j + \gamma_2 PR_j + \gamma_3 Concurrent_j + \gamma_4 Compulsory_j$$
$$+\gamma_5 Polity_j + \gamma_6 Gini_j + \gamma_7 Homicide_j + \gamma_8 Ethnic\ Fractionalization_j + e_j$$

We present results of Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) regressions on *Electoral Distance* .[12] We used standard errors from country-level bootstrap simulations as weights for the error correction.[13] Because there are multiple surveys for some countries, our standard error estimates are clustered by country. All continuous explanatory variables were rescaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 to make it easier to compare continuous and binary variables.

We first present results without controls in Table 1 and find a positive relationship between *Electoral Distance* and each measure of bureaucratic capacity providing evidence for our claims that the partisan preferences of people in the top and bottom quintiles in each country differ more when bureaucratic capacity is high.

[Table 1 about here]

In Table 2 we add the main controls we describe above. Although our four measures of state capacity (*Bureaucratic Quality*, *Government Effectiveness*, *Direct Tax/Revenue*, and *Log. GDP per capita*) differ, they have roughly the same substantive effect on *Electoral Distance*. A one standard deviation increase in our capacity measures is associated with an increase in *Electoral Distances* of between 0.04 to 0.06.[14] To put this number in context, *Electoral Distance* in our sample ranges from approximately 0.01 (e.g., Guatemala and Venezuela) to 0.3 (e.g., South Africa and the United States) with a standard deviation of 0.07 (See Figure 1).[15] Measuring class voting

[12] We use a FGSLS estimator to deal with likely heteroskedasticity in the country-level analysis and to account for the sampling error in individual-level surveys used to generate the measure (Lewis & Linzer 2005).

[13] We used a 1000 samples of 100 observations each to create measures of *Electoral Distance* to generate standard errors for the sampling distribution.

[14] This is equivalent to an increase in *Electoral Distances* of between 0.29 to 0.40 standard deviations. Table S2 in the SI shows descriptive statistics

[15] The surveys and years these illustrative values of *Electoral Distance* are drawn from are: Guatemala (LAPOP

using the preferences of people in all five quintiles, rather than preferences of those in the top and the bottom quintile, we find a smaller substantive effect of bureaucratic capacity on income-based voting.[16]

All four models in Table 2 show a negative relationship between levels of inequality and the Gini coefficient measured using gross income in a country. This finding is surprising as conventional political economy models would predict that higher levels of inequality should be associated with more rather than less class voting. We conjecture, but cannot show, that high pre-tax inequality may in part reflect low bureaucratic capacity over the long-term as weak states cannot redistribute income.

[Table 2 about here]

Maybe the partisan preferences of the rich and the poor diverge because voters care about some other trait, such as ethnicity, that is unevenly distributed along class lines. Huber & Suryanarayan (2016), for example, find that ethnic voting is more likely when there are greater economic differences between ethnic groups. Our theoretical framework allows for the possibility that ethnicity rather than class emerges as a basis of political mobilization where bureaucratic capacity is low. Even where ethnicity and class overlap significantly, we would expect to see greater voting polarization by income where the state can tax the wealthy. To explore the possibility that overlapping class and ethnic cleavages drive voting polarization in some of our cases, we control for inequality between members of different ethnic groups as measured by Baldwin & Huber (2010). Table 2 shows that bureaucratic capacity remains correlated with class voting for three out of four of our

2006), Venezuela (LAPOP 2010), United States (CSES 2004), and South Africa (Afrobarometer 2008) Though the figure for Venezuela may seem surprising, it is consistent with what Lupu's (2010) findings for the period just before 2010.

[16]See Table S3 in the SI. To measure class voting use a modified version of the polarization statistic developed by Esteban & Ray (1994) to characterize income distributions. Other scholars have used variants of the Esteban-Ray polarization statistic to measure ideological, ethnic, and political polarization (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005, Clark 2009, Desmet, Weber & Ortuño Ortín 2009, Huber 2012). Because we measure how much political preferences diverge by quintile, *Voting Polarization* is defined as the average of the electoral distances between any two quintiles appropriately scaled. Except for the coefficient on inequality, none of the other controls are precisely estimated across all four models.

measures, even when we control for inequality across ethnic lines. *Between Group Inequality* is statistically significant in only one of the four models.

[Table 2 about here]

We have argued that fiscal capacity drives class voting, but the historical conditions under which fiscal capacity was developed present one potential source of endogeneity. In older democracies state-building often went with limited franchise expansion, with wealthy elites investing in tax institutions to defer the threat of mass democratization or where democratization resulted from elite bargains across economic sectors (Ansell & Samuels 2014, Mares & Queralt 2015). Newer democracies present a harder test of our argument because where electoral competition preceded the extension of the franchise, parties representing the interests of wealthy landowners and capitalist elites were organized before democratization giving rise to the conditions for class voting. In Tables 4 and 5 we show that our results are robust to dividing our sample into states created before and after 1900.[17]

[Table 4 about here]

[Table 5 about here]

Because countries with robust states are often wealthy ones, economic development is a potential confounding variable. Of particular concern for us is the possibility that people living in developed countries are more likely to engage in class voting for reasons *other* than the redistributive potential of the state. The literature offers two alternative accounts of how development may affect class voting. As we discussed in Section 1, in one account, poor people may be more

[17] In addition, we use an instrumental variable approach used by Dincecco & Prado (2012) in a paper exploring the effect of state capacity on economic growth. We instrument for state capacity using the number of casualties in premodern wars (conflicts between 1816 to 1913). This approach assumes that war casualties before World War I do not affect class voting other their impact on fiscal capacity. Instrumenting for bureaucratic capacity in this way, we find that bureaucratic capacity predicts class voting (Table S4).

likely to support non-programmatic policy at low levels of development. However, scholars studying voting behavior in advanced industrialized countries have also argued that economic growth decreased class voting as voters became more interested in post-materialist issues (e.g., Inglehart & Rabier (1986)). In Tables 6 and 7 we show that fiscal capacity and class voting are positively correlated in countries both above and below the median GDP per capita in our sample, but the results are weaker for developing countries.[18]

[Table 6 about here]

[Table 7 about here]

Even though we exclude most non-democracies from our sample, democratic responsiveness still varies in the countries we include. We expected voting polarization by class to be greatest where elections are consequential for policymaking. However, democratic quality – as measured by a country's *Polity Score* – does not affect voting polarization by income. When we use a stricter threshold for what counts as a democracy, our findings are substantively the same.[19]

Exploring the structural and institutional correlates of class voting across a range of developed and developing countries necessitates using cross-national survey data. Although we use survey sources typically used in cross-national research on voting behavior, our data sources vary in quality and representativeness. We show that our findings are robust to dropping each survey source[20] Additionally, as Donnelly & Pop-Eleches (2018) note about income measures in the World Values Surveys, even the same survey might inconsistently measure a variable in different countries. In the section that follows we examine class-based voting using sub-national data. We examine class-based voting in the American states in the 1930s because more limited federal spending during that period led to a closer relationship between state party systems and fiscal capacity (Chhibber & Kollman 2004).

[18]Table S5 in the SI also shows that our results are robust to controlling for infant mortality.

[19]Table S6 in the SI shows the regressions in Table S6 including countries with a minimum *Polity Score* of 0 instead of -4.

[20]See Tables S7, S8, S9, S10, & S11 in the SI

3 Class Voting in the United States in the 1930s

We measure class voting in the U.S. using a combined dataset of 21 nationwide Gallup Polls conducted in 1936 and 1937 comprising approximately 60,000 respondents. Surveys conducted by Gallup before the 1950s used a quota-controlled sampling method to impose demographic controls on their samples. Pollsters interviewed predetermined proportions of people from specific demographic groups. State sample sizes were chosen to match state voting patterns in the previous three presidential elections. Within regions and cities, respondents were selected using quotas based on age, sex, and socioeconomic status. Besides these quotas, enumerators could draw respondents from anywhere in the community.

While the polls have significant flaws, they are valuable because they offer the only means to study public opinion in this critical period (Verba & Schlozman 1977, Erikson & Tedin 1981, Page & Shapiro 1982, Berinsky et al. 2011). It is worth discussing two potential sources of bias in the sample. Surveyors' attempts to represent specific groups rather than the population introduce the first potential source of bias. The second source of bias arises because interviewers were given discretion in selecting respondents who met the assigned demographic quotas (Berinsky 2006). Gallup samples were designed to be representative of voters as opposed to the whole public – the polls under sampled women, poor, and uneducated voters as well as Southern blacks. As our variable of interest is class voting, the under-sampling of uneducated and poor respondents is likely to underestimate class differences in political preferences, making our sample a harder test of the theoretical claims of this paper. Moreover, using poststratification weights, as in Berinsky et al. (2011), to correct for this undersampling is likely to overstate the participation of these marginalized groups and by extension class voting in the states.

To construct the *Electoral Distance* variable, we use a respondent's retrospective vote choice in the 1936 Presidential Election. Respondents were asked, "For whom (or for which presidential candidate) did you vote in the November [1936] election?" Respondents were placed in four

socioeconomic categories: On Relief, Poor/Poor Plus, Average and Average Plus. These four categories were used in every survey by Gallup in 1936 and 1937. We regrouped respondents into three categories by combining On Relief and Poor/Poor Plus into a single low-income group and used these three groups to create the class voting measures. We do this because the distinction between poor and on-relief respondents in this period is somewhat arbitrary. The Federal Emergency Relief Act implemented in 1933 provided federal grants to states to meet their relief needs. As Hopkins (1999) notes, while FERA money supported direct and work relief, states were slow to accept and roll out relief, resulting in state-wide variation in people "On Relief".[21] Also, recipients were not means-tested and were eligible for relief if they could provide evidence of unemployment. Taken together, we believe it is unclear whether the share of the population "On Relief" reflects poverty or a state's efficacy in dealing with unemployment. Figure 2 shows how *Electoral Distance* varies across states.

[Figure 2 about here]

We measure fiscal capacity as the proportion of state revenue coming from direct taxation.[22] We also use a measure of the percentage of total revenue derived from taxes of any kind (*Tax/Revenue*). Though direct taxes are more difficult to collect, any taxation is an indicator of how much state governments draw on local resources as opposed to nontax revenues, such as federal grants, during this period (Sylla, Legler & Wallis 2006).

Table 8 shows that the political preferences of rich and poor voters diverged in states where the government was primarily funded through taxation. As predicted, Models 1 and 2 show a positive and significant coefficients for both *Direct Tax/Revenue* and *Tax/Revenue*.

[Table 8 about here]

[21] FERA's successor, the Civil Works Administration which was created in 1934, while more successful than FERA, was still criticized for the arbitrariness of its implementation (Hopkins 1999).

[22] In 1932, direct taxes include dates on property, businesses, income, and sometimes a special inheritance (Sylla, Legler & Wallis 2006).

Race is a critical cleavage which has shaped both the American welfare state and public opinion on redistribution (Gilens 2009, Katznelson 2005, Katznelson 2013). According to Key (1949) the defining feature of politics in the South was the status and potential voting power of African Americans. Race shaped policymakers' support for and enforcement of redistributive policies across the states (Farhang & Katznelson 2005, Lieberman & Lapinski 2001). White people are less likely to favor redistribution where blacks were historically and are now large percentages of the population (Glaser 1994, Acharya, Blackwell & Sen 2016).

We account for the likely effect of race on class voting by white respondents in four ways. First, all regressions control for whether a state is in the *Deep South* as defined by Key (1949). Second, we control for the proportion of a state's population who were black.[23] As Table 8 shows, the *Deep South* indicator has a negative and significant coefficient suggesting that the South, which in this period was a one-party system, had low levels of class voting. The coefficient on the $\%$ *Black* variable is not significant, but this is unsurprising given this variable's high correlation with our indicator for the South.

Alesina & Glaeser (2004) argue that the coincidence of black racial difference and poverty drove opposition to redistribution in the U.S. Therefore, as in the cross-national part of the paper, we control for between-group inequality.[24] Even controlling a state's location in the Deep South and for the share of the population who are black, we find that *Between Group Inequality* reduces class voting (Table 8, Model 4). Finally, perhaps some other aspect of Southern exceptionalism accounts for our findings. Mickey (2008) describes the South as an enclave of authoritarian rule with the Democratic party dominating the political landscape using white-only primaries. In Table 8, Model 5 we include only a sub-sample of Northern states. The coefficient of the *Direct*

[23]The 11 states in Key's seminal book on southern politics include Virginia, Alabama, Tennessee, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas.

[24]We measured *Between Group Inequality* using total family income in 1950 for whites and blacks only using the U.S. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles, Trent, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder & Sobek 2010). Although this date occurs after the survey, the 1930 sample census includes no measure of total family income, only one of educational attainment. Though not ideal, this measure is justifiable because racial inequality changes little over time.

Tax/Revenue variable is larger in magnitude if only Northern states are included as is the negative coefficient on *Between Group Inequality*.

Theories of class voting suggest that political mobilization by the working class and inequality increase demand for redistribution. The industrial working class was a core constituency for left-wing parties. Authors studying the New Deal Era legislation and labor movements have emphasized the highly contentious role of labor in redistributive politics before and during the Civil Rights Movement (Lichtenstein 1930, Brinkley 2011). Because demand for redistribution may be higher in states with high concentrations of industrial workers, we include the proportion of the workforce engaged in manufacturing in 1930 in all regressions. Contrary to expectation, neither inequality nor the percent of the workforce in manufacturing predict divergent political preferences along class lines.[25]

The class categories chosen by Gallup constrains us, but our findings are robust to alternative ways of measuring class voting and political preferences. As in the cross-national section, our results are substantively unchanged if we use *Voting Polarization* across all three income classes rather than *Electoral Distance* as our outcome.[26] In Table 8 we placed people classified by surveyors as "Poor" and those categorized as "On Relief," into the same income category, and our results are the same when we separate those two categories.[27] Finally, respondents may have partisan preferences that are not reflected in their stated vote choice because of strategic voting. We created the *Electoral Distance* measure using party affiliation for about 3,000 respondents. To capture party affiliation, respondents were asked "Do you regard yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or a Socialist?" Measuring electoral distance in party affiliation rather than vote choice we find that fiscal capacity and *Electoral Distance* are positively correlated.[28]

[25]Because organized labor (rather than just labor in the manufacturing sector) might be key to organizing voters by class; we include a control for *Union Density*. The variable is measured as the proportion of unionized laborers to total non-agricultural wage labor and salaried employees in a state in 1939 as reported in Troy (1957). Table S12 shows that *Union Density* is not significant at conventional thresholds.

[26]See Table S13 in the SI.

[27]See Table S14 in the SI.

[28]See Table S15 in the SI.

4 Conclusion

We have argued that the political preferences of the rich and poor diverge as a state's capacity to raise revenue through taxation increases. While parties often have a range of strategies they can use to attract low-income voters, they are more constrained in how they can use tax policy to attract wealthy voters. Where fiscal capacity is high, rich voters must take the threat of redistribution seriously and are more motivated to participate in politics and more likely to respond favorably to conservative economic platforms. In turn, where politicians can credibly promise to tax the wealthy, they are more likely to campaign on platforms that allow voters to vote their economic interests on redistribution.

Using both contemporary cross-national data and subnational public opinion data from the United States in the 1930s we show how bureaucratic capacity shapes class voting in both these spheres. Our cross-national and U.S. findings are robust to multiple measures of how preferences diverge by class. Ethnicity influences preferences for redistribution both directly, through people's willingness to support redistribution to ethnic others, and indirectly, through its effect on how politicians create coalitions to win elections. Therefore, in both the U.S. and cross-nationally, we include a measure of ethnic composition. Because likely beneficiaries of redistribution may be concentrated in one ethnic group, we show that our results are robust to including a measure of economic inequality between ethnic groups.

Even though our primary goal is to argue that bureaucratic capacity partially explains where class voting predominates, our theory has predictions regarding when politicians will emphasize redistribution even in places where class is a political cleavage. In established democracies, parties moderate their platforms in response to changes in voter preferences (See Adams (2012)). For example, Tavits & Potter (2015) argue that inequality, which increases demand for redistribution, leads right-wing parties to emphasize values rather than economic interests as inequality increases. Although no prior work has shown that changes in fiscal capacity lead right-wing parties to mod-

erate or de-emphasize their stances on redistribution, our theory predicts that they will do so.

We show that racial inequality in the U.S. states is negatively correlated with class voting during the period we study, even in the North. While there is an extensive literature on the effects of racial composition on both racial attitudes and voting behavior at the local level, the relationship between racial economic inequality and class voting remains relatively understudied (Key 1949, Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman & Combs 1995, Carsey 1995).[29] A natural extension of this paper would be to explore how changes in racial inequality have affected class voting since the 1930s.

Besides contributing to research on class voting, this paper also has implications for research on accountability in rentier states. The literature on the resource curse suggests that nontax revenue produces poor governance because, absent taxation, citizens are uninformed or politically disengaged (Ross 2004). Our argument suggests a different mechanism linking resource rents and accountability. As the wealthy can more easily demand accountability, poor governance may arise in rentier states because politicians have little incentive to stress fiscal stewardship to citizens best placed to demand political accountability.

[29]Though Gay (2006) shows that African Americans have more hostile attitudes towards Latinos in neighborhoods where Latinos are better off.

References

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell & Maya Sen. 2016. "The Political Legacy of American Slavery." *The Journal of Politics* 78(3):621–641.

Adams, James. 2012. "Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15(1):401–419.

AIPO, American Institute of Public Opinion. 1937. "1936-1937 Composite Gallup Poll.".

Alesina, Alberto & Edward Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Alesina, Alberto & Eliana La Ferrara. 2005. "Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities." *Journal of Public Economics* 89(5–6):897–931.

Amat, Francesc & Pablo Beramendi. 2018. "Democracy Under High Inequality: Political Participation and Public Goods.".

Ansell, Ben W & David J Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and democratization: an elite-competition approach*. Cambridge University Press.

Baldwin, Kate & John D. Huber. 2010. "Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision." *American Political Science Review* 104(04):644–662.

Bates, Robert & Da-Tsiang Donald Lien. 1985. "A Note on Taxation Development and Representative Government." *Politics and Society* 14(1):53–70.

Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer & Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." *World Bank Economic Review.* 15(1).

Becker, Gary S & Casey B Mulligan. 2003. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government." *Journal of Law and Economics* 46:293.

Berinsky, Adam J. 2006. "American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70(4):499–529.

Berinsky, Adam J, Eleanor Neff Powell, Eric Schickler & Ian Brett Yohai. 2011. "Revisiting Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44(03):515–520.

Bledsoe, Timothy, Susan Welch, Lee Sigelman & Michael Combs. 1995. "Residential Context and Racial Solidarity among African Americans." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(2):434–458.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boix, Carles. 2009. The Emergence of Parties and Party Systems. In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix & Susan C. Stokes. Oxford University Press.

Boveda, Karina C. 2013. "Making People Vote: The Political Economy of Compulsory Voting Laws.".

Brinkley, Alan. 2011. *The end of reform: New Deal liberalism in recession and war*. Vintage.

Caramani, Daniele. 2004. "The nationalization of politics : the formation of national electorates and party systems in Western Europe.".

Carsey, Thomas M. 1995. "The Contextual Effects of Race on White Voter Behavior: The 1989 New York City Mayoral Election." *The Journal of Politics* 57(1):221–228.

Chhibber, Pradeep & Ken Kollman. 2004. *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Clark, Tom S. 2009. "Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United States Supreme Court." *Political Research Quarterly* 62(1):146–157.

Cox, Gary W. 1987. *The efficient secret : the cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England*. Political economy of institutions and decisions Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Gary W. Cox. ill. ; 24 cm. Includes indexes.

De La O, Ana L. & Jonathan A. Rodden. 2008. "Does Religion Distract the Poor?: Income and Issue Voting Around the World." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4):437–476.

Desmet, Klaus, Shlomo Weber & Ignacio Ortuño Ortín. 2009. "Linguistic Diversity and Redistribution." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7(6):1291–1318.

Dincecco, Mark & Mauricio Prado. 2012. "Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance." *Journal of Economic Growth* 17(3):171–203.

Donnelly, Michael J & Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2018. "Income Measures in Cross-National Surveys: Problems and Solutions." *Political Science Research and Methods* 6(2):355363.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Erikson, Robert S. & Kent L. Tedin. 1981. "The 1928-1936 Partisan Realignment: The Case for the Conversion Hypothesis." *American Political Science Review* 75(04):951–962.

Esteban, Joan-Maria & Debraj Ray. 1994. "On the Measurement of Polarization." *Econometrica* 62(4):819–851.

Evans, Geoffrey. 2000. "The Continued Significance of Class Voting." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:401–417.

Evans, Geoffrey. 2006. "The Social Bases of Political Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern Europe." *Annual review of sociology* 32(1):245–270.

Farhang, Sean & Ira Katznelson. 2005. "The southern imposition: Congress and labor in the new deal and fair deal." *Studies in American Political Development* 19(01):1–30.

Fearon, James D. 2003. "Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:195–222.

Fearon, James D. & David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–90.

Fernandez, Raquel & Gilat Levy. 2008. "Diversity and redistribution." *Journal of Public Economics* 92(5-6):925–943.

Filmer, Deon & Lant Pritchett. 2001. "Estimating Wealth Effects Without Expenditure Data or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India." *Demography* 38(1):115–32.

Gay, Claudine. 2006. "Seeing Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes Toward Latinos." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4):982997.

Gilens, Martin. 2009. *Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy*. University of Chicago Press.

Glaser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *The Journal of Politics* 56(1):21–41.

Hendrix, Cullen S. 2010. "Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(3):273–285.

Hopkins, June. 1999. "The Road Not Taken: Harry Hopkins and the New Deal Work Relief." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29(2):306–316.

Huber, John D. 2012. "Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?" *American Journal of Political Science* 56(4):986–1001.

Huber, John D. 2017. *Exclusion by Elections*. Cambridge University Press.

Huber, John D. & Michael M. Ting. 2013. "Redistribution, Pork, and Elections." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(6):1382–1403.

Huber, John D. & Pavithra Suryanarayan. 2016. "Ethnic Inequality and the Ethnification of Political Parties: Evidence from India." *World Politics* 68(1).

Inglehart, Ronald & Jacques-René Rabier. 1986. "Political realignment in advanced industrial society: from class-based politics to quality-of-life politics." *Government and Opposition* 21(4):456–479.

Iversen, Torben & David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100(02):165–181.

Jusko, Karen Long. 2017. *Who Speaks for the Poor?: Electoral Geography, Party Entry, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press.

Kasara, Kimuli & Pavithra Suryanarayan. 2015. "When Do the Rich Vote Less Than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality across the World." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3):613–627.

Katznelson, Ira. 2005. *When affirmative action was white: An untold history of racial inequality in twentieth-century America*. WW Norton & Company.

Katznelson, Ira. 2013. *Fear itself: The new deal and the origins of our time*. WW Norton & Company.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 5430.

Key, V. O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New ed. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Lewis, Jeffrey B. & Drew A. Linzer. 2005. "Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on Estimates." *Political Analysis* 13(4):345–364.

Lichtenstein, Nelson. 1930. "From corporatism to collective bargaining: organized labor and the eclipse of social democracy in the postwar era." *The rise and fall of the New Deal Order* 1980(122):140–45.

Lieberman, Robert C. & John S. Lapinski. 2001. "American Federalism, Race and the Administration of Welfare." *British Journal of Political Science* 31(2):303–329.

Lipset, Seymour M. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. 2nd ed. ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour M. & Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter, Alignments: An Introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan. New York: Free Press pp. 1–63.

Lupu, Noam. 2010. "Who Votes for chavismo?: Class Voting in Hugo Chvez's Venezuela." *Latin American Research Review* 45(1):7–32.

Mainwaring, Scott, Mariano Torcal & Nicolàs M Somma. 2015. The Left and the Mobilization of Class Voting in Latin America. In *The Latin American Voter*, ed. Ryan Carlin, Matthew Singer & Elizabeth Zechmeister. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press pp. 69–98.

Mares, Isabela & Didac Queralt. 2015. "The non-democratic origins of income taxation." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(14):1974–2009.

Marshall, Monty G., Ted R. Gurr & Keith Jaggers. 2013. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013.".

Meltzer, A. H. & S. F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5):914–27.

Mickey, Robert W. 2008. "The Beginning of the End for Authoritarian Rule in America: Smith v. Allwright and the Abolition of the White Primary in the Deep South, 1944–1948." *Studies in American political development* 22(02):143–182.

Milanovic, Branko L. 2013. "All the Ginis Database.".

Milkis, Sidney M. 1993. *The president and the parties : the transformation of the American party system since the New Deal*. New York :: Oxford University Press.

Montalvo, José G. & Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars." *American Economic Review* 95(3):796–816.

Montgomery, Mark R., Michele Gragnolati, Kathxn A. Burke & Edmundo Paredes. 2000. "Measuring Living Standards with Proxy Variables." *Demography* 37(2):155–174.

Nathan, Noah L. 2016. "Does Participation Reinforce Patronage? Policy Preferences, Turnout and Class in Urban Ghana." *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 1–27.

Page, Benjamin I & Robert Y Shapiro. 1982. "Changes in Americans' policy preferences, 1935–1979." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46(1):24–42.

Panagopoulos, Costas. 2008. "The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems." *Political Behavior* 30(4):455–467.

Przeworski, Adam & John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Roemer, John E. 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb." *Journal of Public Economics* 70(3):399–424.

Romer, Thomas. 1975. "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax." *Journal of Public Economics* 4(2):163–185.

Ross, Michael. 2004. "Does Taxation Lead to Representation?" *British Journal of Political Science* 34(2):229–249.

Ruggles, Steven, Alexander Trent, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder & Matthew Sobek. 2010. "Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0.".

Sandbrook, Richard. 1977. "The Political Potential of African Urban Workers." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 11(3):411–433.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.

Scheve, Kenneth & David Stasavage. 2006. "Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1(3):255–286.

Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103(02):147–174.

Sklar, Richard L. 1979. "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17(4):53152.

Soifer, Hillel D. 2013. "State Power and the Economic Origins of Democracy." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48(1):1–22.

Stokes, Donald E. 1967. Parties and the nationalization of electoral forces. In *The American party systems: stages of political development*, ed. William Nisbet Chambers, Walter Dean Burnham & Frank J. Sorauf. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Journal of Political Science* 99(3):315–325.

Sylla, Richard E., John B. Legler & John Wallis. 2006. "State and Local Government [United States]: Sources and Uses of Funds, Census Statistics, Twentieth Century [Through 1982].".

Tavits, Margit & Joshua D. Potter. 2015. "The Effect of Inequality and Social Identity on Party Strategies." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3):744–758.

Verba, Sidney & Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1977. "Unemployment, class consciousness, and radical politics: what didn't happen in the thirties." *The Journal of Politics* 39(02):291–323.

Vernby, Kåre & Henning Finseraas. 2010. "Xenophobia and Left Voting." *Politics & Society* 38(4):490–516.

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):568–583.

A Figures & Tables

Figure 1: Electoral Distance Across the World



Figure 2: Electoral Distance in the U.S.



Table 1: Electoral Distance – No Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.045***			
	(0.001)			
Government Effectiveness		0.050***		
		(0.000)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.035*	
			(0.061)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.039***
				(0.001)
Constant	0.125***	0.123***	0.145***	0.126***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	182	180	114	189
Countries	67	70	53	71

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 2: Electoral Distance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.040**			
	(0.011)			
Government Effectiveness		0.056***		
		(0.005)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.054**	
			(0.025)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.042**
				(0.050)
PR	-0.026	-0.030	-0.015	-0.032
	(0.180)	(0.100)	(0.458)	(0.113)
Compulsory Voting	0.017	0.009	-0.070	0.010
	(0.391)	(0.661)	(0.126)	(0.608)
Concurrent Elections	-0.022	-0.017	-0.009	-0.022
	(0.137)	(0.171)	(0.680)	(0.110)
Polity	-0.010	-0.016	-0.020	-0.007
	(0.534)	(0.284)	(0.400)	(0.620)
Gini (Gross)	-0.034**	-0.033*	-0.035*	-0.038**
	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.027)
Homicide Rate	0.017	0.024	0.030*	0.016
	(0.375)	(0.220)	(0.073)	(0.457)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.012	-0.009	-0.036**	-0.004
	(0.424)	(0.539)	(0.037)	(0.808)
Constant	0.153***	0.152***	0.156***	0.159***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	163	159	93	167
Countries	58	59	42	60

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 3: Electoral Distance – Controlling for BGI

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.032			
	(0.220)			
Government Effectiveness		0.041*		
		(0.098)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.068**	
			(0.033)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.054**
				(0.025)
Between Group Inequality	0.040*	0.030	0.025	0.023
	(0.082)	(0.277)	(0.442)	(0.366)
PR	-0.009	-0.018	-0.002	-0.018
	(0.668)	(0.455)	(0.931)	(0.428)
Compulsory Voting	-0.054**	-0.059**	-0.112*	-0.049**
	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.087)	(0.046)
Concurrent Elections	0.013	0.014	0.016	0.011
	(0.579)	(0.519)	(0.643)	(0.607)
Polity	0.049*	0.049*	0.011	0.035
	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.789)	(0.131)
Gini (Gross)	-0.040*	-0.046*	-0.038	-0.041*
	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.142)	(0.064)
Homicide Rate	0.027	0.035	0.034	0.030
	(0.262)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.177)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.026	-0.019	-0.047	0.001
	(0.302)	(0.434)	(0.171)	(0.965)
Constant	0.137***	0.138***	0.140***	0.144***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	60	60	42	63
Countries	38	38	29	40

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 4: Electoral Distance – New Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.025			
	(0.278)			
Government Effectiveness		0.064**		
		(0.016)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.041*	
			(0.074)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.043*
				(0.088)
PR	0.002	-0.007	0.009	-0.005
	(0.914)	(0.667)	(0.796)	(0.773)
Compulsory Voting	0.034	0.037	-0.032	0.039
	(0.386)	(0.381)	(0.471)	(0.322)
Concurrent Elections	-0.023	-0.027	-0.034	-0.032
	(0.271)	(0.152)	(0.538)	(0.112)
Polity	-0.006	-0.031	-0.042	-0.021
	(0.808)	(0.246)	(0.213)	(0.322)
Gini (Gross)	-0.051**	-0.053**	-0.045*	-0.051**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.093)	(0.014)
Homicide Rate	0.060	0.076***	0.068**	0.059*
	(0.122)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.066)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.016	-0.009	-0.039*	-0.004
	(0.396)	(0.575)	(0.096)	(0.830)
Constant	0.125***	0.132***	0.147***	0.141***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	70	68	47	74
Countries	34	35	26	36

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 5: Electoral Distance – Older Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.053**			
	(0.037)			
Government Effectiveness		0.053**		
		(0.017)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.064*	
			(0.069)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.050
				(0.116)
Constant	0.124***	0.122***	0.145***	0.118***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	98	95	51	98
Countries	27	27	19	27

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *Compulsory Voting* is excluded from these regressions because, under these definitions, no established democracies for which we have some data on state capacity also have compulsory voting laws.

Table 6: Electoral Distance – Developed Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.099***			
	(0.000)			
Government Effectiveness		0.099***		
		(0.001)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.072*	
			(0.060)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.139*
				(0.067)
PR	-0.002	-0.028	-0.032	-0.004
	(0.960)	(0.583)	(0.520)	(0.929)
Compulsory Voting	0.026	0.018	-0.058	0.007
	(0.321)	(0.428)	(0.278)	(0.752)
Concurrent Elections	-0.023	-0.009	0.033	-0.025
	(0.347)	(0.729)	(0.494)	(0.291)
Polity	-0.018	-0.026	-0.039	-0.011
	(0.260)	(0.144)	(0.175)	(0.513)
Gini (Gross)	0.003	-0.009	-0.037	0.006
	(0.909)	(0.791)	(0.327)	(0.892)
Homicide Rate	0.039	0.046*	0.060	0.031
	(0.176)	(0.072)	(0.173)	(0.359)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.017	-0.015	-0.050	-0.011
	(0.585)	(0.657)	(0.263)	(0.702)
Constant	0.123***	0.130***	0.162***	0.101**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.024)
N	86	79	48	86
Countries	28	28	19	28

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 7: Electoral Distance – Developing Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	-0.016			
	(0.487)			
Government Effectiveness		0.063		
		(0.113)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.028	
			(0.403)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.013
				(0.669)
Constant	0.104***	0.136***	0.139***	0.119***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	79	85	49	86
Countries	32	35	26	36

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 8: U.S.:Electoral Distance

	(1) *All*	(2) *All*	(3) *All*	(4) *All*	(5) *North*
Direct Tax/Revenue	0.102**		0.113**	0.113**	0.146***
	(0.013)		(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.006)
Tax/Revenue		0.092**			
		(0.034)			
Gini			-0.024	-0.020	-0.019
			(0.682)	(0.722)	(0.759)
Between Group Inequality				-0.139*	-0.176*
				(0.088)	(0.062)
Deep South	-0.169**	-0.158**	-0.174**	-0.139*	
	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.073)	
% Black	-0.058	-0.066	-0.051	0.029	-0.054
	(0.409)	(0.363)	(0.487)	(0.729)	(0.663)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.005	0.007	0.015	-0.007	-0.024
	(0.896)	(0.870)	(0.746)	(0.880)	(0.635)
Constant	0.281***	0.278***	0.283***	0.272***	0.246***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	46	46	46	46	37

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

B Supporting Information

Table S1: Countries and Surveys

Country	AB03	AB04	CSES00	CSES01	CSES02	LP06	LP08	LP10	LB00	LB08	WVS05
Argentina							2008	2010	2000	2008	
Australia				1996	2004						2005
Benin	2005	2008									
Bolivia							2008	2010	2000	2008	
Botswana	2005	2008									
Brazil					2002		2008	2010	2000	2008	2006
Bulgaria					2001						
Canada				1997							2006
Cape Verde	2005	2008									
Chile						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	2005
Colombia							2008	2010	2000	2008	
Costa Rica						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Cyprus											2006
Czech Republic				1996	2002						
Denmark				1998	2001						
Dominican Republic						2006	2008	2010		2008	
Ecuador							2008	2010	2000	2008	
Egypt											2008
El Salvador						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Ethiopia											2007
Finland					2003						
Georgia											2008
Germany				1998	2002						2006
Ghana	2005	2008									2007
Guatemala						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Guyana						2006		2010			
Haiti						2006	2008				
Honduras						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Hungary				1998	2002						
India											2006
Indonesia											2006
Ireland					2002						
Israel				1996	2003						
Jamaica						2006	2008	2010			
Kenya	2005	2008									
Korea				2000	2004						
Lesotho	2005	2008									
Liberia		2008									
Madagascar	2005	2008									
Malawi	2005	2008									
Mali	2005	2008									2007
Mexico			1997	2000	2003	2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	2005
Moldova											2006
Mozambique	2005	2008									
Namibia	2006	2008									
Netherlands				1998	2002						
New Zealand				1996	2002						
Nicaragua						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Nigeria	2005	2008									
Norway				1997	2001						2008
Panama						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Peru					2006	2006	2008		2000	2008	
Philippines					2004						
Poland				1997	2001						2005
Portugal				2002	2005						
Romania				1996	2004						2005
Senegal	2005	2008									
Slovenia				1996	2004						2005
South Africa	2006	2008									
Spain			1996	2000	2004						
Sweden				1998	2002						2006
Switzerland				1999	2003						
Trinidad and Tobago								2010			
Uganda	2005	2008									
Ukraine				1998							
United Kingdom					2005						
United States				1996	2004						2006
Uruguay						2006	2008	2010	2000	2008	
Venezuela						2006		2010			
Zambia	2005	2009									2007
Zimbabwe	2005	2009									

Notes: CSES = Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems, WVS = World Values Survey, LP = Latin American Public Opinion Project, LB = Latinobarometer, AB = Afrobarometer.

Table S2: Descriptive Statistics

World	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Electoral Distance	0.13	0.07	0.01	0.34	189
Bureaucratic Quality	0.59	0.26	0	1	204
Government Effectiveness	0.16	0.9	-1.61	2.26	201
Direct Taxes/Revenue	0.29	0.11	0.1	0.66	125
Log. GDP per capita	8.08	1.42	5.02	10.64	211
PR	0.8	0.4	0	1	211
Compulsory Voting	0.04	0.2	0	1	211
Concurrent Elections	0.46	0.5	0	1	211
Polity	1.39	4.19	-3.97	10	211
Gini (Gross)	45	9.82	23.4	73.5	189
Homicide Rate	14.34	14.75	0.5	68	211
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.44	0.24	0	0.93	209
Between Group Inequality	0.04	0.03	0	0.13	74
Infant Mortality	26.12	24.25	2.7	106.2	211
Cross-National	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Electoral Distance	0.25	0.15	0	0.58	46
Direct Tax/Revenue	0.02	0.02	0	0.11	48
Tax/Revenue	0.04	0.05	0	0.33	48
Gini	0.45	0.06	0.33	0.65	48
Between Group Inequality	0.04	0.05	0	0.2	48
Deep South	0.22	0.42	0	1	51
% Black	0.1	0.14	0	0.5	48
% Manufacturing Employment	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.18	48
% Union Membership (1939)	17.13	8.99	4	41.7	49

Table S3: Voting Polarization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.006			
	(0.154)			
Government Effectiveness		0.011**		
		(0.044)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.012*	
			(0.082)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.005
				(0.355)
PR	-0.009*	-0.011**	-0.004	-0.010*
	(0.065)	(0.025)	(0.484)	(0.083)
Compulsory Voting	0.002	0.000	-0.021*	0.001
	(0.760)	(0.953)	(0.091)	(0.890)
Concurrent Elections	-0.008*	-0.007*	-0.006	-0.008*
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.385)	(0.079)
Polity	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.688)	(0.417)	(0.678)	(0.835)
Gini (Gross)	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.014**	-0.013***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.002)
Homicide Rate	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.003
	(0.533)	(0.305)	(0.218)	(0.586)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.260)	(0.411)	(0.418)	(0.435)
Constant	0.060***	0.061***	0.059***	0.061***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	165	161	94	169
Countries	58	60	42	60

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S4: Electoral Distance – Premodern War IV

	(1) *OLS*	(2) *IV*	(3) *OLS*	(4) *IV*	(5) *OLS*	(6) *IV*	(7) *OLS*	(8) *IV*
Bureaucratic Quality	0.045***	0.051**						
	(0.001)	(0.028)						
Government Effectiveness			0.050***	0.035**				
			(0.000)	(0.012)				
Direct Taxes/Revenue					0.035*	0.097		
					(0.061)	(0.558)		
Log. GDP per capita							0.039***	0.037*
							(0.001)	(0.068)
Constant	0.125***	0.125***	0.123***	0.123***	0.145***	0.144***	0.126***	0.126***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	182	182	180	180	114	114	189	189
Countries	67	67	70	70	53	53	71	71

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S5: Electoral Distance – With Infant Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.049***			
	(0.007)			
Government Effectiveness		0.062***		
		(0.003)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.056**	
			(0.028)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.069***
				(0.008)
Infant Mortality	0.020	0.016	0.004	0.040*
	(0.508)	(0.420)	(0.853)	(0.079)
PR	-0.016	-0.022	-0.014	-0.020
	(0.601)	(0.359)	(0.577)	(0.380)
Compulsory Voting	0.016	0.007	-0.073	0.006
	(0.436)	(0.730)	(0.120)	(0.766)
Concurrent Elections	-0.023	-0.017	-0.009	-0.021
	(0.135)	(0.192)	(0.682)	(0.122)
Polity	-0.008	-0.015	-0.019	-0.005
	(0.586)	(0.327)	(0.423)	(0.723)
Gini (Gross)	-0.032*	-0.033*	-0.036*	-0.040**
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.021)
Homicide Rate	0.016	0.024	0.030*	0.018
	(0.390)	(0.206)	(0.077)	(0.401)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.019	-0.015	-0.038**	-0.011
	(0.265)	(0.331)	(0.047)	(0.487)
Constant	0.146***	0.145***	0.155***	0.148***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	163	159	93	167
Countries	58	59	42	60

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S6: Electoral Distance – Altering the Threshold for Democracies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.083**			
	(0.034)			
Government Effectiveness		0.090***		
		(0.005)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.063**	
			(0.032)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.098***
				(0.005)
PR	-0.003	-0.022	-0.009	0.006
	(0.943)	(0.618)	(0.864)	(0.888)
Compulsory Voting	0.025	0.014	-0.079	0.003
	(0.317)	(0.482)	(0.105)	(0.896)
Concurrent Elections	-0.007	0.016	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.829)	(0.630)	(0.756)	(0.692)
Polity	0.002	0.001	-0.005	0.006
	(0.924)	(0.974)	(0.853)	(0.793)
Gini (Gross)	-0.008	-0.042	-0.009	-0.020
	(0.786)	(0.213)	(0.821)	(0.529)
Homicide Rate	0.014	0.041	0.002	0.018
	(0.514)	(0.120)	(0.945)	(0.477)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.014	0.027	-0.006	0.027
	(0.538)	(0.218)	(0.751)	(0.232)
Constant	0.115***	0.120***	0.143***	0.109***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)
N	75	71	50	75
Countries	29	29	21	29

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S7: Electoral Distance Without Afrobarometer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.042**			
	(0.020)			
Government Effectiveness		0.048**		
		(0.024)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.043	
			(0.137)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.037
				(0.151)
PR	-0.048	-0.050	-0.046	-0.048
	(0.138)	(0.110)	(0.172)	(0.150)
Compulsory Voting	0.016	0.009	-0.043	0.008
	(0.378)	(0.649)	(0.350)	(0.705)
Concurrent Elections	-0.016	-0.012	0.007	-0.015
	(0.330)	(0.471)	(0.856)	(0.403)
Polity	-0.022*	-0.021	-0.031	-0.013
	(0.098)	(0.139)	(0.194)	(0.338)
Gini (Gross)	-0.037*	-0.039*	-0.039	-0.042*
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.255)	(0.071)
Homicide Rate	0.005	0.012	0.020	0.004
	(0.819)	(0.595)	(0.417)	(0.865)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.021	-0.014	-0.045**	-0.016
	(0.218)	(0.426)	(0.037)	(0.390)
Constant	0.169***	0.169***	0.175***	0.168***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	136	128	70	136
Countries	47	46	31	47

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S8: Electoral Distance Without CSES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.038***			
	(0.008)			
Government Effectiveness		0.067***		
		(0.002)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.064***	
			(0.005)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.027
				(0.133)
PR	-0.017	-0.020	-0.000	-0.020
	(0.260)	(0.159)	(0.978)	(0.181)
Compulsory Voting	0.036*	0.015	-0.090**	0.030
	(0.066)	(0.474)	(0.036)	(0.178)
Concurrent Elections	-0.032**	-0.029***	-0.032	-0.033**
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.121)	(0.013)
Polity	-0.016	-0.028**	-0.024	-0.010
	(0.232)	(0.025)	(0.291)	(0.441)
Gini (Gross)	-0.040*	-0.044**	-0.058**	-0.042*
	(0.063)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.060)
Homicide Rate	0.022	0.028	0.032*	0.019
	(0.226)	(0.118)	(0.080)	(0.353)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.009	-0.011	-0.034**	-0.004
	(0.617)	(0.493)	(0.033)	(0.850)
Constant	0.147***	0.152***	0.157***	0.148***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	129	133	66	133
Countries	48	50	34	50

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S9: Electoral Distance Without LAPOP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.043**			
	(0.033)			
Government Effectiveness		0.045**		
		(0.036)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.048*	
			(0.050)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.058**
				(0.011)
PR	-0.015	-0.018	-0.012	-0.024
	(0.503)	(0.407)	(0.647)	(0.251)
Compulsory Voting	-0.018	-0.020	-0.078*	-0.018
	(0.559)	(0.557)	(0.097)	(0.563)
Concurrent Elections	-0.011	-0.009	-0.001	-0.013
	(0.539)	(0.585)	(0.975)	(0.427)
Polity	-0.003	-0.005	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.896)	(0.834)	(0.585)	(0.634)
Gini (Gross)	-0.026	-0.027	-0.021	-0.031
	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.277)	(0.110)
Homicide Rate	0.019	0.022	0.026	0.020
	(0.415)	(0.351)	(0.173)	(0.368)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.015	-0.014	-0.043**	0.001
	(0.419)	(0.442)	(0.033)	(0.979)
Constant	0.156***	0.155***	0.161***	0.166***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	111	107	78	115
Countries	53	54	41	55

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S10: Electoral Distance Without Latinobarometer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.035**			
	(0.039)			
Government Effectiveness		0.058***		
		(0.005)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.056**	
			(0.026)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.038*
				(0.094)
PR	-0.029	-0.036**	-0.017	-0.035*
	(0.139)	(0.047)	(0.439)	(0.086)
Compulsory Voting	0.031	0.028	-0.073	0.027
	(0.289)	(0.345)	(0.124)	(0.300)
Concurrent Elections	-0.029*	-0.026*	-0.014	-0.030*
	(0.099)	(0.083)	(0.570)	(0.061)
Polity	-0.006	-0.016	-0.018	-0.005
	(0.741)	(0.337)	(0.496)	(0.751)
Gini (Gross)	-0.033**	-0.032*	-0.037*	-0.036**
	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.031)
Homicide Rate	0.017	0.027	0.038**	0.016
	(0.404)	(0.165)	(0.025)	(0.480)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.013	-0.007	-0.037**	-0.004
	(0.422)	(0.621)	(0.045)	(0.820)
Constant	0.155***	0.157***	0.159***	0.162***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	132	128	79	136
Countries	58	59	41	60

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S11: Electoral Distance Without WVS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.040**			
	(0.024)			
Government Effectiveness		0.060***		
		(0.006)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue			0.058**	
			(0.020)	
Log. GDP per capita				0.043**
				(0.048)
PR	-0.023	-0.030	-0.012	-0.031
	(0.238)	(0.114)	(0.568)	(0.143)
Compulsory Voting	0.013	0.003	-0.066	0.002
	(0.400)	(0.827)	(0.161)	(0.863)
Concurrent Elections	-0.011	-0.005	0.004	-0.012
	(0.502)	(0.712)	(0.842)	(0.429)
Polity	-0.003	-0.014	-0.017	-0.003
	(0.840)	(0.392)	(0.510)	(0.854)
Gini (Gross)	-0.036*	-0.030	-0.038*	-0.039**
	(0.065)	(0.137)	(0.051)	(0.030)
Homicide Rate	0.024	0.031	0.038**	0.022
	(0.251)	(0.142)	(0.030)	(0.318)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.011	-0.007	-0.035*	-0.003
	(0.544)	(0.688)	(0.070)	(0.851)
Constant	0.140***	0.140***	0.141***	0.148***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	144	140	79	148
Countries	52	50	38	54

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S12: U.S.:Electoral Distance – Controlling for Union Membership

	(1) *All*	(2) *All*	(3) *All*	(4) *All*	(5) *North*
Direct Tax/Revenue	0.108***		0.114**	0.112**	0.146***
	(0.003)		(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.007)
Tax/Revenue		0.105***			
		(0.006)			
Gini			-0.010	-0.022	-0.035
			(0.844)	(0.653)	(0.512)
Between Group Inequality				-0.129	-0.163*
				(0.112)	(0.084)
% Union Membership (1939)	0.031	0.044	0.030	0.013	0.003
	(0.420)	(0.268)	(0.441)	(0.736)	(0.939)
Deep South	-0.159**	-0.140*	-0.162**	-0.136*	
	(0.034)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.079)	
% Black	-0.054	-0.064	-0.051	0.026	-0.051
	(0.441)	(0.376)	(0.477)	(0.760)	(0.687)
Constant	0.278***	0.273***	0.280***	0.272***	0.249***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	46	46	46	46	37

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S13: U.S.:Voting Polarization

	(1) *All*	(2) *All*	(3) *All*	(4) *All*	(5) *North*
Direct Tax/Revenue	0.057**		0.061**	0.061**	0.077**
	(0.014)		(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.011)
Tax/Revenue		0.048*			
		(0.050)			
Gini			-0.010	-0.008	-0.006
			(0.751)	(0.793)	(0.864)
Between Group Inequality				-0.078*	-0.097*
				(0.090)	(0.074)
Deep South	-0.084**	-0.079*	-0.087**	-0.067	
	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.043)	(0.120)	
% Black	-0.042	-0.045	-0.038	0.006	-0.035
	(0.293)	(0.275)	(0.350)	(0.895)	(0.626)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.019	0.022	0.023	0.011	0.002
	(0.398)	(0.363)	(0.380)	(0.688)	(0.957)
Constant	0.158***	0.157***	0.159***	0.153***	0.140***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	46	46	46	46	37

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S14: U.S.:Electoral Distance – Four Groups

	(1) *All*	(2) *All*	(3) *All*	(4) *All*	(5) *North*
Direct Tax/Revenue	0.094**		0.113**	0.113**	0.126**
	(0.041)		(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Tax/Revenue		0.092*			
		(0.056)			
Gini			-0.043	-0.037	-0.024
			(0.511)	(0.542)	(0.732)
Between Group Inequality				-0.243***	-0.249**
				(0.007)	(0.023)
Deep South	-0.193**	-0.180**	-0.203**	-0.141*	
	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.088)	
% Black	-0.094	-0.105	-0.081	0.058	-0.024
	(0.241)	(0.202)	(0.329)	(0.521)	(0.864)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.046	0.044	0.065	0.025	0.012
	(0.314)	(0.357)	(0.234)	(0.625)	(0.832)
Constant	0.403***	0.400***	0.407***	0.389***	0.369***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	46	46	46	46	37

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table S15: U.S.:Electoral Distance in Partisanship

	(1) *All*	(2) *All*	(3) *All*	(4) *All*	(5) *North*
Direct Tax/Revenue	0.078*		0.115**	0.116**	0.165**
	(0.085)		(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.010)
Tax/Revenue		0.104**			
		(0.025)			
Gini			-0.085	-0.085	-0.120
			(0.173)	(0.177)	(0.115)
Between Group Inequality				-0.028	-0.043
				(0.755)	(0.696)
Deep South	-0.058	-0.040	-0.074	-0.068	
	(0.466)	(0.613)	(0.354)	(0.410)	
% Black	-0.111	-0.127*	-0.096	-0.078	-0.065
	(0.117)	(0.071)	(0.175)	(0.405)	(0.667)
% Manufacturing Employment	-0.032	-0.049	0.005	0.001	0.005
	(0.475)	(0.283)	(0.922)	(0.989)	(0.930)
Constant	0.286***	0.281***	0.290***	0.289***	0.289***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	47	47	47	47	37

Note: Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.