

Comparative Politics Field Survey II

Spring 2017

Instructor: Kimuli Kasara | kk2432@columbia.edu

Location: Tues 4:10pm-6:00pm, 711 IAB

Overview

This seminar is the second of a two course sequence surveying major research questions in comparative politics. Students need not have taken the first course in this sequence. The entire syllabus for both courses can be found in the Comps Exam Handbook.

There are few required readings, so you are expected to read each *carefully* and to come to class prepared to discuss them. While reading consider the following questions:

- Does the authors' argument and evidence make sense on their own terms?
- How does this reading fit into contemporaneous theoretical and methodological debates in the discipline?
- How well does this work stand up to recent theoretical arguments, methodological advances, and political events?
- How can I most usefully contribute to answering this research question?

This course is primarily intended for PhD students preparing for their qualifying exams and enrollment is limited to 18 students. Students not in the PhD program need my permission to take the class.

Requirements and Evaluation

- **Class Participation** – *20% of the final grade.*
- **Three Response Papers** – *15% of the final grade each.* Students will submit a short paper making an argument related to the week's readings. Response papers should be less than 1,500 words long. Response papers are due on 9am the Monday before class meets and should be posted to the class page. You are expected to read and be prepared to comment on other students' response papers.

To ensure that all topics are adequately covered, please fill out this form indicating your preferred week to write a response paper by 5pm on January 19th.

- **Final Exam** – 35% of the final grade. On April 25th students will take a practice comprehensive exam.

Reading

Jan 17 – Introduction

Jan 24 – Institutions

1. Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Rational Choice Institutionalism*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008. ISBN 9780199548460. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0002. URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0002>.
2. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century england. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(04):803–832, 1989. ISSN 1471-6372. doi: doi:10.1017/S0022050700009451. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2122739>
3. H. Peyton Young. The economics of convention. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(2):105–122, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138484>
4. Greif, Avner. Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)*, 158(1): 168–204, 2002. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40753063>
5. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5):936–957, 1996. ISSN 1467-9248. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x>

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- William H. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2):432–446, 1980. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/1960638. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960638>
 - John D. Huber. The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(2):269–282, 1996b. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2082884. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082884>
 - Timothy Frye. A politics of institutional choice post-communist presidencies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(5):523–552, 1997. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/30/5/523.short>

- Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. *Economics & Politics*, 2(1):1–23, 1990. ISSN 1468-0343. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x>
- Peter A. Hall and David. Soskice. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 9780191647703
- Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. *American Political Science Review*, 84(3):873–890, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962770>
- David Soskice. Wage determination: the changing role of institutions in advanced industrialized countries. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, pages 36–61, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23606157>
- Terry M Moe. The politics of structural choice: Toward a theory of public bureaucracy. In Oliver E. Williamson, editor, *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, pages 116–53. Oxford University Press New York, 1995
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677930>

Jan 31 – The State, Institutions, & State Strength I: Origins

1. Charles Tilly. *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992 (Studies in Social Discontinuity)*. Wiley-Blackwell, revised edition, September 1992. ISBN 1557863687 Chapters 1-3
2. Jeffrey Herbst. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton University Press, March 2000. ISBN 0691010285 Chapters 1-3
3. Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. Democracy, war, and wealth: lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation. *American Political Science Review*, 106(01): 81–102, 2012. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000517>

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- Miguel Angel Centeno. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. Penn State University Press, 2002
 - Cameron G Thies. War, rivalry, and state building in Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3):451–465, 2005. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3647725>

- James C Scott. *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. Yale University Press, 1998 1-83.
- James A. Robinson. States and power in africa by jeffrey i. herbst: A review essay. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 40(2):510–519, 2002. ISSN 00220515. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2698386>
- Isabela Mares and Didac Queralt. The non-democratic origins of income taxation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 2015. doi: 10.1177/0010414015592646. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/07/28/0010414015592646.abstract>

Feb 7 – The State, Institutions, & State Strength II: Bureaucracies

1. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2002 Chapters 1-4, & 6
2. Terry M Moe. Political institutions: The neglected side of the story. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, pages 213–253, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/764990>
3. Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer. Legal origins. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pages 1193–1229, 2002. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132477>
4. James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans. Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. *Journal of Public Economics*, 75(1):49–71, 2000. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(99\)00044-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00044-4). URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272799000444>

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- John D Huber and Nolan McCarty. Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform. *American Political Science Review*, 98(03):481–494, 2004. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001297>

Feb 14 – Political Violence

1. Jeremy Weinstein. *Inside Rebellion*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 9781139458696 Introduction & Chapters 1 and 2.
2. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
3. Paul Brass. *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1997 Chapter 3

4. Donald L Horowitz. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Univ of California Press, 2001 Chapter 1 & 13

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- Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel. Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1):3–57, September 2010. doi: 10.1257/jel.48.1.3. URL <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.3>
 - Ted R Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press, 1970
 - Stathis Kalyvas. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*. Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0521670047 Chapter 1,2
 - Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(4): 725–753, 2004. ISSN 0022-3808. doi: 10.1086/421174. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/421174>
 - Steven I Wilkinson. *Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, 2006
 - Paul Collier. On the Economic Consequences of Civil War. *Oxf. Econ. Pap.*, 51(1): 168–183, January 1999. doi: 10.1093/oep/51.1.168. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488597>

Feb 21 – Non-Democratic Systems

1. Milan W Svoblik. *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012 Chapters 1-4
2. Beatriz Magaloni. *Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2006 Chapters 1 & 2
3. Lisa Blaydes. *Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, 2010 Chapters 1-3

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- Eva Bellin. The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 36(2):139–157, 2004. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140>
 - Stephen Haber. Authoritarian government. In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pages 693–707. Oxford University Press, 2006

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(4):559–590, 2002. ISSN 00071234. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092374>
- Jeffrey Herbst. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton University Press, March 2000. ISBN 0691010285
- David Collier. Overview of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model. In David Collier, editor, *The new authoritarianism in Latin America*, volume 12, pages 1–4. Princeton University Press, 1979

Feb 28 – Parties & Democratic Systems

1. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter, Alignments: An Introduction*, pages 1–63. Free Press, New York, 1967
 2. Gary Cox. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*. Cambridge University Press, 1987 Chapters 1-3
 3. John H. Aldrich. *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. University of Chicago Press, 1995 Chapter 1 & 2
 4. Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. A theory of political parties: Groups, policy demands and nominations in american politics. *Perspectives on Politics*, 10(03):571–597, 2012. ISSN 1541-0986. doi: doi: 10.1017/S1537592712001624. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712001624>
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- John Huber. *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*. Cambridge University Press, 1996a
 - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. *American Political Science Review*, 84(3):873–890, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962770>
 - Robert Alan Dahl. *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*. Yale University Press, 1973b. Ch 1.
 - Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova. Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1):100–123, February 1994. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111337>
 - Bonnie M. Meguid. Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success. *The American Political Science Review*, 99(03):347, 2005. ISSN 0003-0554. doi: 10.1017/S0003055405051701

Mar 7 – Voting & Elections I: Electoral Systems

1. Thomas R Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. *American Political Science Review*, 101(03):373–391, 2007. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070384>
2. Carles Boix. Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. *American Political Science Review*, pages 609–624, 1999. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585577>
3. Ernesto Calvo. The competitive road to proportional representation: partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition. *World Politics*, 61(2):254–295, 2009. URL <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/summary/v061/61.2.calvo.html>
4. Marcus Kreuzer. Historical knowledge and quantitative analysis: The case of the origins of proportional representation. *American Political Science Review*, 104(02):369–392, 2010. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055410000122. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000122>
5. Lucas Leemann and Isabela Mares. The adoption of proportional representation. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(02):461–478, 2014

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- Gary Cox. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press, 1997

Mar 14 – Spring Break

Mar 21 – Electoral Participation

1. John H. Aldrich. Rational choice and turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1):246–278, 1993. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111531>
2. Kimuli Kasara and Pavithra Suryanarayan. When do the rich vote less than the poor and why? explaining turnout inequality across the world. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3):613–627, 2015. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12134. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12134>
3. Pablo Beramendi and Francesc Amat. Inequality and electoral participation. *APSA*, 2015
4. Alan S. Gerber. Social pressure and voter turnout: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. *The American political science review*, 102(01):33, 2008. ISSN 0003-0554. doi: 10.1017/S000305540808009X

5. Alberto Chong, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. Does corruption information inspire the fight or quash the hope? a field experiment in Mexico on voter turnout, choice, and party identification. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1):55–71, 2015. ISSN 00223816. doi: 10.1086/678766. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/678766>

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- R.A. Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press, 1973a. ISBN 9780300153576. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=JcKz2249PQcC>
 - R.D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R.Y. Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton paperbacks. Princeton University Press, 1994. ISBN 9781400820740
 - Guillermo Trejo. Religious competition and ethnic mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church promotes indigenous movements in Mexico. *American Political Science Review*, 103(03):323–342, 2009. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055409990025. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990025>
 - Sidney Verba, Norman H Nie, and Jae-on Kim. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. University of Chicago Press, 1978. ISBN 0226852989

Mar 28 – Voting & Elections: Vote Choice

1. John D. Huber, Georgia Kernell, and Eduardo L. Leoni. Institutional context, cognitive resources and party attachments across democracies. *Political Analysis*, 13(4): 365–386, 2005. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpi025. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/4/365.abstract>
2. Ana L. De La O and Jonathan A. Rodden. Does religion distract the poor?: Income and issue voting around the world. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5):437–476, 2008. doi: 10.1177/0010414007313114. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/41/4-5/437.abstract>
3. James E. Alt, David D. Lassen, and John Marshall. Credible sources and sophisticated voters: When does new information induce economic voting? *Journal of Politics*, 78(2):327–343, 2016. URL http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jmarshall/files/denmark_messages_paper_v6_0.pdf
4. Raymond M. Duch and Randy Stevenson. The global economy, competency, and the economic vote. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(01):105–123, 2010. ISSN 1468-2508. doi: doi:10.1017/S0022381609990508. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990508>

5. Noam Lupu. Party brands and partisanship: Theory with evidence from a survey experiment in argentina. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1):49–64, 2013. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x>

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- Scott Ashworth. Electoral accountability: Recent theoretical and empirical work. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1):183–201, 2012. doi: doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823>
 - Noam Lupu. Party brands and partisanship: Theory with evidence from a survey experiment in argentina. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1):49–64, 2013. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x>

Apr 4 – Inequality & Polarization

1. David Rueda and Daniel Stegmueller. The externalities of inequality: Fear of crime and preferences for redistribution in western europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(2):472–489, 2016. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12212. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12212>
2. Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. Institutions, partisanship, and inequality in the long run. *World Politics*, 61(02):215–253, 2009. ISSN 1086-3338. doi: doi:10.1017/S0043887109000094. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000094>
3. Michael Wallerstein. Wage-setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(3):649–680, 1999. ISSN 00925853, 15405907. doi: 10.2307/2991830. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991830>
4. Noam Lupu and Jonas Pontusson. The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 105(02):316–336, 2011. ISSN 0003-0554. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055411000128. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000128>
5. Kathleen Thelen. *Varieties of liberalization and the new politics of social solidarity*. Cambridge University Press, 2014 Chapters 1, 4, & 5

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- Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik. Distributive politics and economic growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109(2):465–490, 1994. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118470>

- Torben Iversen. *Contested economic institutions: The politics of macroeconomics and wage bargaining in advanced democracies*. Cambridge University Press, 1999
- David Soskice. Wage determination: the changing role of institutions in advanced industrialized countries. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, pages 36–61, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23606157>
- John E. Roemer. Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb. *Journal of Public Economics*, 70(3):399–424, 1998. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(98\)00042-5](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00042-5). URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272798000425>
- John D. Huber. Measuring ethnic voting: Do proportional electoral laws politicize ethnicity? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(4):986–1001, 2012. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00601.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00601.x>

Apr 11 – Corruption

1. Daniel Treisman. What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research? *Annual review of political science*, 10: 211–244, 2007. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418>
2. John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in peru. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(4):69–92, 2004. doi: 10.1257/0895330042632690. URL <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/aea/jep/2004/00000018/00000004/art00004>
3. Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745, 2008. doi: 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/2/703.abstract>
4. Eric C. C. Chang. Electoral systems, district magnitude and corruption. *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(01):115, 2007. ISSN 0007-1234. doi: 10.1017/S0007123407000063

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- Miriam A. Golden and Eric C. C. Chang. Competitive corruption: Factional conflict and political malfeasance in postwar italian christian democracy. *World Politics*, 53 (04):588–622, 2001. ISSN 1086-3338. doi: doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0015. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0015>

- Paolo Mauro. Corruption and growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3): 681–712, 1995. ISSN 0033-5533. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2946696>
- Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3):599–617, August 1993. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118402>
- Joel S Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann. Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31(4):751–773, 2003. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596703001021>

Apr 18 – Growth

1. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677930>
2. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer. History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in india. *The American Economic Review*, 95(4):1190–1213, September 2005. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132711>
3. Douglass C North. *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press, 1990 Chapter 1
4. Nathan Nunn. The long-term effects of africa’s slave trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1):139–176, 2008. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098896>

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- Avinash Dixit and John Londregan. Redistributive politics and economic efficiency. *American Political Science Review*, pages 856–866, 1995. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082513>
 - Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken. Do leaders matter? national leadership and growth since world war ii. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):835–864, 2005. doi: 10.1093/qje/120.3.835. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/120/3/835.abstract>

Apr 25 – Final Exam