Contact info:
Email me: klewis [at] barnard [dot] edu
Mail: Barnard College
Department of Philosophy
3009 Broadway
New York, New York, 10027
Office: Milbank Hall, Rm 326E

My Columbia department profile


Karen S. Lewis

Assistant Professor • Department of Philosophy
Barnard College, Columbia University





I received my PhD from Rutgers, along with a graduate certificate in cognitive science, in 2011. I wrote my dissertation, Understanding Dynamic Discourse, under the direction of Jeffrey C. King. Before joining the Barnard-Columbia department, I was an assistant professor in the school of philosophy at USC. My research is mainly in the philosophy of language, though it often brings me into the realms of metaphysics, epistemology, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and linguistics. Broadly construed, all my projects have something to do with the interaction of context and content. I work on topics in dynamic vs. static semantics, the nature of semantic vs. pragmatic explanations, pronominal anaphora, counterfactual conditionals, and context-sensitivity.


Counterfactual Discourse in Context
Forthcoming. Noûs.

Dynamic Semantics
Forthcoming. Oxford Handbooks Online.

Counterfactuals and Knowledge
2017.The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Ed. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa.

2016. (with Jeffrey C. King) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition) Ed. Edward N. Zalta.

Elusive Counterfactuals
2016. Noûs. Vol. 50 Issue 2, pp. 286-313.
Published version

Do we need dynamic semantics?
2014. Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, Eds. Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, OUP, pp. 231-258

Speaker's Reference and Anaphoric Pronouns
2013. Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Language. Vol. 27, Issue 1, pp. 404-437
Published version

Discourse dynamics, pragmatics, and indefinites
2012. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 158, Issue 2, pp. 313-342
Published version

Work in progress

Anaphora and Negation: Trouble for Dynamic Semantics. Email me for a draft.

The speaker authority problem for context-sensitivity (or: you can't always mean what you want) Email me for a draft.


Review of François Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, 2010.
2014. Mind 123 (492), pp.1234-1238.
Published version


I am on leave during the 2016-2017 school year.




Updated 1/12/2017