Contact info:

Email me: klewis [at] barnard [dot] edu
Mail: Barnard College
Department of Philosophy
3009 Broadway
New York, New York, 10027
Office: Milbank Hall, Rm 326E

Fall 2014 Office hours: Tues/Thurs 2:30-3:30








Elusive Counterfactuals
Forthcoming in: Noûs
Penultimate draft

Do we need dynamic semantics?
Forthcoming in: Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, edited by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, OUP
Penultimate draft

Review of François Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, 2010.
Forthcoming in: Mind

Speaker's Reference and Anaphoric Pronouns
2013. Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Language. Vol. 27, Issue 1, pp. 404-437
Penultimate draft
For citations please use the published version.

Discourse dynamics, pragmatics, and indefinites
2012. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 158, Issue 2, pp. 313-342
Penultimate draft
For citations please use the published version.

Work in progress

Anaphora and Negation: Trouble for dynamic semantics
I argue that contrary to expectations, it is actually dynamic semantics, and not static semantics plus dynamic pragmatics, that has difficulty accounting for the behavior of indefinite descriptions under the scope of negation and their relationship to anaphoric pronouns. In particular I argue that the vast majorityof existing dynamic semantic accounts of negation predict that anaphoric pronouns will be felicitous internal to negation and infelicitous external to it. I argue that both elements of this prediction fails, and offer a static semantics and dynamic pragmatics that better accounts for the data.
Draft coming soon.

A new puzzle about epistemic modals
(Joint work with Ben Lennertz)
In this paper we present a problem for most views of epistemic modals. The problem stems from the interaction of epistemic modals and the term 'because' in sentences like 'Joe might be the thief because he has crumbs in his pocket'. I'll post more about this project soon!


Updated 1/22/2016