

# THE INVISIBLE HAND IN INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

Josep M. Colomer

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*Through actors' self-interested behavior, institutional choices seem to be guided by an 'invisible hand' favoring relatively acceptable solutions.*

## **AUTHOR'S NOTE**

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Regime change and the choice of democratic institutions have become a paramount issue in current international politics. Some accumulated knowledge in international and comparative studies, which is reviewed and summarized in this article, may cast light on the performance of different institutional formulas and help the choice of institutions in processes of regime change.

The baseline for this discussion is that different political institutions can produce different degrees of political satisfaction or 'utility' to the citizens and attain different degrees of duration and stability on the basis of their social support. Political satisfaction can be estimated for the inclusiveness of citizens in the participation processes and the fit between policy-making decisions and citizens' preferences. From this perspective, institutions favoring the diffusion of power, such as universal suffrage, multiple governments and institutions dealing with different issues, and multiple political parties with opportunities to access or share power, can be considered relatively 'good' to the extent that they create wider opportunities for people's participation and influence in decision-making than those favoring the concentration of power into a single government, group or political party.

Regarding the process of institutional change, the assumption that people seek their own interest not only when making private or public policy decisions, but also when choosing the institutional rules for making those decisions, has obtained broad acceptance in both academic studies and practitioners' decisions. Institutional choosers often aim at putting levers of rule at their easy disposal in order to concentrate, rather than check power. The crucial point is, however, that a socially efficient institutional design can result from circumstances in which no actor has sufficient influence to impose its own project and diverse ambitions counterweight each other. Not surprisingly, this is a relatively frequent situation in a complex world, which may explain why major institutional choices are increasingly made in favor of formulas able to produce the diffusion of power and to satisfy broad groups of people.

The diffusion of power can thus be both a criterion for good governance and a prudent choice by power-seeking actors. In the current world, as we document in this article, the number of small, relatively homogeneous communities increases; the number of democracies also increases; institutional choices tend to favor the division of powers rather than concentration into a single body or party; and electoral rules are increasingly chosen to permit multiple parties

to participate in and share government. As actors' self-interested behavior leads to broadly efficient and satisfactory institutional choices, it seems that a kind of 'invisible hand' in the field can be identified.

I use the 'invisible hand' term in the metaphorical sense in which it has been used by the classics in economics and other fields. In this case, the metaphor basically suggests that while political actors choosing political institutions intend gains for themselves in terms of having access to power, they tend to favor the diffusion of power among multiple potential actors. Needless to say, I do not mean that there is a real 'hand' behind people's behavior, but I am referring to some 'hidden' social mechanism which often produces initially unintended consequences of actors' decisions. Of course, political actors may be aware of some consequences of their choices, although they are not always. In fact the accumulation of experience and of cumulative knowledge helps people to make more conscious choices and be increasingly attentive to potential connections between self-interested motivations and social benefits.

A basic model of institutional choice based on people's self-interested motives basically assumes that political actors, whether they have strong policy or ideology motivations or not, are interested in power. Then, in situations of uncertainty regarding the future, political actors tend to prefer institutions promoting power-sharing or likely alternation in power rather than risky formulas creating permanent absolute winners and absolute losers.

More specifically, a situation of uncertainty appears when the incumbent rulers are challenged by demands launched by new groups. If the existing institutional formulas permit only the absolute victory of one actor at the expense of all the others, whether the winner is defined as a social class, an ethnic group, or a political party, the incumbent rulers risk becoming absolute losers. The emerging challengers may feed expectations of becoming new absolute winners and of replacing the incumbent rulers under the existing institutions. Yet if some degree of uncertainty regarding future outcomes is shared by the challengers, they may also prefer institutions favoring the diffusion of power. Changes in favor of broader diffusion of power include the broadening of voting rights, the creation of several polities from a previous single government, the division of powers between central and territorial governments, the introduction of separate elections for the presidency and the assembly able to produce multiple

winners, and the adoption of proportional representation inducing power sharing by multiple parties in parliaments and coalition governments.

The subsequent institutional formulas can reinforce themselves. The very key actors whose existence is viable under the existing institutional framework tend to support those institutions and resist the introduction of adverse changes. If the institutional formulas favor or permit the emergence and survival of multiple actors accessing power positions, they can obtain wide, endogenous support, and generate resistance toward changes favoring the concentration of power.

In the rest of the article I survey worldwide, long-term tendencies in major institutional choice and design which can be interpreted according to this view. Specifically, in successive sections I review the number and size of the countries in the world, the number of democracies, the political regime formulas chosen for democratic experiences, and the choice of electoral rules, as well as some connections between choices in the different fields. The numbers are summarized in a few figures in order to show long-term tendencies. Detailed data are given in the Appendix, which can also be a reference for further discussion and research.

## **THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INCREASES**

In recent worldwide developments, the classical building of large sovereign states has mostly been replaced by a proliferation of small countries. The Westphalian model of state-building implied the unification of various territories under a single source of power, as was enforced most notoriously in France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Sweden, especially as of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The peak of this kind of processes was reached with the creation of modern Germany and Italy in the late nineteenth century. Afterwards, many large or medium-sized territories previously under a single institutional formula have tended to disaggregate into smaller political units. Indeed the number of independent countries in the world has almost quadrupled. Specifically, while there were only 50 independent countries in the world in 1870 and about the same number in 1900, there are 192 members of the United Nations in 2008, as shown in Figure 1.

With the modern proliferation of countries, average country size decreases. Building a polity no longer implies unification, but rather segregation. The current members of the United Nations include 70 mini-states with a population of between one and ten million inhabitants and 41 microstates with less than one million inhabitants. The median country size is nowadays about 7 million inhabitants. In addition, there are more than 500 non-state political units with governments and assemblies with legislative powers located within a couple of dozen vast federations or decentralized 'empires'. There are also about 20 'territories' formally linked but physically non-contiguous to some large state or empire and in fact quite independent, and about a further 15 de facto territories seceded from recognized states. (With data from Gleditsch and Ward 1999 and the Correlates of War project; see details in Colomer 2007).

The creation of small political communities can be evaluated for their benefits and costs. Regarding the benefits, it is old knowledge that small communities can be more appropriate than large, populous territories for soft, democratic forms of self-government. In large states, local majorities can become state-wide minorities and see their preferences rejected from binding collective decisions. In contrast, the proliferation of small communities increases the number of people whose preferences become collective decisions.

More specifically, the advantages of small communities can be found in each of the three stages of the decision process: deliberation, aggregation and enforcement. First, in a small community, people have more opportunities to gain knowledge for collective decisions by direct observation and experience; thanks to territorial proximity, people can also deal more directly with political leaders; the latter can easily gain information about people's demands and expectations by direct communication. Second, since a small community tends, in general, to be relatively homogeneous in terms of both economic and ethnic variables, people may also have relatively harmonious interests, shared values and a common culture, which may make it easier to identify priority public goods and make collective decisions that are generally acceptable. Finally, small communities are more likely to generate loyalty; people will tend to comply with collective rules and decisions, while leaders may be more responsive regarding their own decisions and activity. (The advantages of small communities for good government were discussed, of course, by Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu and Rousseau, among others; see, more recently, Dahl and Tufte, 1973).


Looking at the question from the other side, the disadvantages large unitary states have in establishing a democracy able to satisfy the preferences of a large majority of its citizens are not difficult to identify. Within a large political unit, different interests, values and opinions are likely to exist among the citizens. A collective decision made on a set of different policy issues in bloc is likely to produce a high number of losers. There is likely to be a group of absolute winners, whose endurance may induce the losers either to resist the enforceability of collective decisions, not comply with them, rebel, secede or emigrate. In the extreme, dictatorships are more likely to emerge and triumph in very large or highly heterogeneous political units.

Regarding the costs for small countries, they have decreased dramatically during the last few decades. Specifically, small countries can be economically viable in an international context of free trade. Indeed increasing trade has developed since the mid-twentieth century in large areas of the world. Reductions in the costs of transport, especially by air, and of communications, especially by telephone and the internet, have greatly favored this development. The new institutional setting also favors stability, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, as well as numerous regional transnational agreements and a few common currencies.

All this makes the traditional protection of markets by relatively large states less necessary and even insufficient. Indeed small countries tend to develop more foreign trade relative to their domestic product than large units. Actually this is only another way of saying that within a large state or empire there is extensive trade among people and firms located in its different internal 'regions', which counts as 'domestic', whereas people and firms located in a small independent state can develop similar amounts of trade with traders located at similar distances, but across borders, which counts as 'international'. The political implication is that a small territorial unit seceding from a large empire or state can be economically viable if, once separated, its individuals and companies can maintain the same amount of external trade, including with traders in its former regional counterparts. (The insightful argument about the economic viability of small nations in an international context of free trade was presented by Friedman 1977, and Wittman 1991, 2000; and has been extensively developed by Alesina and Spolaore 2003).

In short: open trade and communications make the economic advantages of large-scale states less relevant, while the costs of exclusion in their political decision making become more visible. Then, driven by the ambition and expected benefits of freedom and self-government, many small political communities can be created thanks to the reduction of the economic costs of political independence and the emergence of new opportunities for their viability. The process may be self-reinforcing: international trade and large scale economic integration foster regional specialization, which permits small countries to focus on a few activities, enhance their competitiveness and increase their internal homogeneity.

**Figure 1.**  
**Number of countries**



## THE NUMBER OF DEMOCRACIES INCREASES

Democratic regimes have been widely diffused across the world and at an increasing pace during the last few decades. In the late nineteenth century, competitive elections to legislative assemblies were regularly held in only nine of about 50 empires and states existing at the time. These were France, Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Spain, Norway and Belgium, where adult male suffrage (and female in only one case) was established between 1871 and 1900. In other words, about a century ago, electoral democracy existed in less than one fifth of the extant states, an area inhabited by less than ten percent of the total population; most humankind lived in authoritarian monarchies or empires or under colonial domination.

In contrast, by the early twenty-first century, democracy characterized by high levels of civil liberties and competitive elections in which both men and women vote exists in 90 countries. This is the highest number ever and represents almost half of the 192 currently recognized countries, inhabited by almost half (48 percent) of the world's population, as shown in Figure 2. (Data revised and updated from Colomer 2003, partly based on Polity IV and Freedom House series).

In fact, these numbers might imply some undervaluation of the spread of freedom. If a less restrictive definition of democracy is used, the number of 'electoral democracies' in 2007 is 121, which includes almost two-thirds of the independent countries. If an intermediate classification of 'partly free' countries is accepted, then non-free countries or strict dictatorships currently encompass only about one third of the world's population, mostly concentrated in Northern Africa and the Middle East. This is about half the proportion of one hundred years ago. (Freedom House 2008).

Democracy expanded, first, when some of the larger colonial empires, especially Great Britain, lost some of their colonies, which facilitated internal opening and democratization, as well as the subsequent creation of new independent nations. A number of new democracies were also established in the aftermath of the First World War, when several old empires in continental Europe fell and a number of new states were created. The number of democracies doubled in twenty years. However, virtually all of these new democratic regimes disappeared as

a consequence of revolutions and counter-revolutions. The context was one of strong protectionism and inter-state colonial rivalries and wars. At the beginning of the Second World War, the number of democracies was about the same as forty years before.

Democratization spread more widely after WWII with the liberation of Western Europe and Japan, and also with the further independence of many colonies and the formation of new countries in Africa and Asia, a period during which the number of democratic regimes doubled. Finally, the so-called third wave of democratization started in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe, moved to Latin America, to some countries in Africa and Asia, and more dramatically to Central and Eastern Europe, where the number of new countries also rose, globally multiplying the number of democracies again, this time by more than two and a half.


As this outline may suggest, there seems to exist a positive correlation between the spread of democracy and the increase in the number of independent countries, which implies a decrease in their size, as well as with the concurrent decentralization of large states and empires. In little more than one hundred years, while the number of countries in the world has nearly quadrupled, as mentioned in the previous section, the number of democracies has increased by a factor of ten. The proportion of countries with democratic regimes has thus increased by a factor of two and a half; the proportion of the world's population living in democracy by a factor of five.

The correlation between size and democracy is empirically consistent. At the beginning of the 21st century, there is democracy in almost all recognized micro-countries with less than 300,000 inhabitants, in more than two thirds of those with less than one million inhabitants (including the former group), and in more than one half of all small countries with less than 10 million inhabitants (including the two former groups). In contrast, only one third of large countries with more than 10 million inhabitants enjoys democratic regimes. As a result, the number of small democracies is twice the number of large democracies (specifically there is democracy in 63 of 111 countries with less than 10 million inhabitants and in 27 of the 81 countries with more than that population).

The rates of success in democratization are even higher for small communities within large federations. Nowadays, of all the large countries in the world with more than 10 million inhabitants, those with local legislatures or a federal structure are democratic in three-fourths of

the cases, while in large centralized and unitary states, democracy only exists in less than one-fourth of the cases (specifically, there is democracy in 13 of the 18 large federal countries, but in only 14 of the 63 large centralized states). Decentralization and federalism, which give small nations and regions means of self-government, consolidate democracy. When multiple small political units have been established within a large territory, they effectively resist further attempts at centralization and concentration of power. No backsliding towards authoritarianism has existed in recent times in plural federations which have adopted democratic formulas. (More details in Colomer 2007 and the sources mentioned there).

Figure 2.  
Democracies



## DIVIDED AND MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENTS PROLIFERATE

The spread of democracy is linked not only to changes in country size, but also to choices of democratic institutional formulas. Specifically, democratic regimes tend to endure when they adopt institutional formulas favoring divided and multiparty governments rather than a concentration of power in a single political party.

In order to classify democratic regimes, at least two dimensions must be considered: division of powers (which can be simplified into the parliamentary-presidential dichotomy) and electoral rules (which in turn can be simplified into the majority-proportional dichotomy). Then, three types of institutional regimes emerge: parliamentary-majority, parliamentary-proportional and presidential. The first category, parliamentary-majority, favors single-party government, often on the basis of a minority of popular votes (as in the paradigmatic case of Britain). The second category, parliamentary-proportional, tends to produce multiparty coalition governments with broad legislative and electoral support (as in the exemplary case of Germany). The latter category has several variants (not always following the United States' model), but is less affected by the electoral rule dimension since at least one of the rules, the one concerning the election of the president, must be based on the majority principle and produce a single, absolute winner. Divided government and 'cohabitation' are frequent outcomes in this kind of regimes.

In fact, different institutional regimes producing different types of government outcomes have been linked to different rates of success in attempts at democratization and different durations of democratic regimes. As suggested in the introduction, it may be logical to expect that citizens and political leaders tend to support those formulas producing satisfactory results for themselves and reject those permanently excluding and defeating them. As a consequence, institutional formulas producing wider diffusion of power can be more able to develop endogenous support and endure than those favoring the concentration of power.

Updated calculations show that of all attempts to establish a democratic regime (including elections by adult male suffrage) in countries with more than one million inhabitants since the 19th century, those having initially adopted the British model of parliamentarism with majority electoral rule have survived in only 37 percent of cases, while the rate of success for parliamentarism with proportional representation is 72 percent, and for presidential and semi-


presidential regimes 54 percent (with high variance in duration). In a long-term perspective, while the number of democratic regimes with parliamentary-majority rules has stalled and their proportion has declined, those with either parliamentary-proportional formulas or division of powers have surged, as shown in Figure 3. (Updated from Colomer 2003).

Success rates were relatively favorable for the parliamentary-majority formula, the British model, during the first wave of democratization before World War II. But, as mentioned, this was valid for only a very small number of cases. In contrast, during the second wave, most experiences with this simple model favoring the concentration of power into a single group failed, especially in former colonies in Africa and Asia with plural ethnic, religious, or language composition. No new democracy established during the third wave has adopted parliamentarism with majority rule. Actually, even the United Kingdom has introduced some proportional electoral rules and a certain degree of decentralization.

In contrast, parliamentary-proportional representation formulas performed very well in terms of duration after both the second and third waves, especially in Europe. In turn, presidential and semi-presidential formulas have obtained very high levels of success at the third wave. On the basis of previous experiences, the capability of presidential democracies to survive has been submitted to intense discussion. Yet direct presidential elections were re-established in Latin America during the processes of re-democratization and have also been adopted by some newcomers to democracy in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, so far without many major fallbacks.

By the early twenty-first century, out of sixty-four democratic regimes in countries with more than one million inhabitants, only one sixth are parliamentary regimes with majority electoral rules, while one third are parliamentary regimes with proportional representation, and one half are presidential or semi-presidential regimes.

**Figure 3.**  
**Types of democratic regime**  
(countries > 1m inh)



## PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION EXPANDS

More specific institutional choices involve the rules for assembly elections. In a global perspective they have evolved from indirect elections to direct elections by majority rule and from these to mixed systems and proportional representation rules, thus steadily enlarging the potential basis for participating and power-sharing groups.

In a democratic regime with only a few parties, they can be satisfied with a majority rule electoral system in which the winner takes all but there can be regular alternations in power. Indeed dominant and large parties prefer single-seat districts with majority rule able to exclude others from competition. But the number and the size of new parties can increase, due to the emergence of new issues and new contenders for seats and offices and their own failure at coordinating themselves into a small number of candidacies. Generally, multiple small parties prefer large districts with proportional representation rules able to include them. With the proliferation of parties and candidacies, relatively large incumbent parties may fear the risk of becoming absolute losers too. Then they can shift to more inclusive electoral formulas able to reduce the risks of competing by giving all participants higher opportunities to obtain or share power, that is, those favoring the diffusion of power among multiple political parties.

Since the nineteenth century, we have counted 82 major changes of assembly electoral system in 41 countries with more than one million inhabitants. In consistency with the discussion above, we observe that more than 80 percent of these changes have been in the direction of more inclusive formulas. Specifically, indirect assembly elections decreased and virtually disappeared in the early twentieth century. The appeal of majority rule, which was the basic formula in the few democratic countries existing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was replaced by proportional representation, especially after the First World War. This trend has intensified in recent democratization processes. Mixed systems have also spread in the more recent period, mostly as a result of changes from non-democratic regimes or majority rule. Nowadays, most democratic countries with more than one million inhabitants use electoral systems with proportional representation rules, as shown in Figure 4. (Extensive data in the collective handbook on electoral system choice edited by Colomer 2004).


To see how some of these institutional choices are inter-related, let us discuss the relationship between country size, as commented on in the first section, and electoral rules. It is well established that the number of parties in the assembly is positively correlated with both the number of seats in the assembly (or assembly size) and the number of seats to elect in each district (or district magnitude). This relation has been established both by scholars trying to explain the number of parties as derived from electoral rule variables and by those trying to explain the choice of electoral rules by previously existing parties. (See, for instance, the recent discussion in Taagepera 2007, Colomer 2005, 2008).

From both perspectives, the number of parties lies on one side of the equation and the assembly size and district magnitude lie on the other (even though the line of causality may be inverted). Thus for a similar number of parties, the larger the assembly, the smaller the expected district magnitude can be. In fact we tend to see large assemblies with small districts, as well as small assemblies with large districts. But the size of the assembly depends on the size of the country in terms of population, which is relatively stable. Thus we can see a relationship between large assemblies in large countries and small district magnitudes, particularly single-seat electoral districts by plurality or majority rule. Likewise we can see a relationship between small assemblies in small countries and large multi-seat districts, typically with proportional representation rules.

This relationship can make sense of very disparate formulas. In very large countries such as Australia, Canada, France, India, the United Kingdom, the United States, a large assembly can be sufficiently inclusive, even if it is elected in small, single-seat districts, due to the territorial variety of the representatives. In small countries, by contrast, the size of the assembly is small and, as a consequence, the enlargement of voting rights, the broadening of the public agenda and the development of multiple parties favor more strongly the adoption of more inclusive, large multi-seat districts with proportional representation rules. Indeed, proportional representation began to be adopted for parliamentary elections in the early twentieth-century in a few relatively small West European countries, such as Belgium, Finland, Norway and Sweden, soon followed by Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland, and has widely spread among new democracies in relatively small countries during the last decades.

In the long term, as we have seen in this paper, both the number of countries and the number of democracies in the world increase, leading to an overall decrease in the size of the democratic countries. The size of democratic assemblies also decreases, since it is positively correlated to the country's population. Thus, as the number of parties eventually increases within each democracy, more and more countries tend to adopt electoral systems with multi-seat districts and proportional representation rules.

Figure 4.  
Assembly electoral systems  
(countries > 1m inh)



## CONCLUSION

It is not unfounded to assume that the choice of political institutions is usually driven by politicians' and would-be rulers' ambition, the search for power, and calculations, estimates or expectations about the likely consequences of different institutional formulas to favor choosers' self-interest. However, as we have seen in the previous pages, the outcomes of such endeavors tend to be relatively favorable to formulas restricting the opportunities for high a concentration of power and permitting the broad satisfaction of people's preferences and demands. Specifically, institutional choices during the last decades have tended to produce small countries, more democracies, division of powers, and electoral rules favoring multiparty representation. In spite of, or precisely through actors' self-interested behavior, institutional choices seem to be guided by an 'invisible hand' favoring relatively acceptable solutions.

Of course, all of this is based on long-term tendencies and is positively tested with only average values for large numbers of cases. For single-case analyses, we should take into account that many specific decisions and reforms are embedded in larger sets of institutional choices, thus entailing some trade-offs between different levels and sets of rules. For instance, federalism or territorial representation in very large countries with diverse population may work as a substitute for proportional representation. By giving different homogeneous, territorially-based groups opportunities to enter institutions, a major electoral reform can be prevented. As another example, the introduction of direct presidential elections may open a new opportunity for electoral contest. But it may also constrain the degree of multipartism in the assembly because presidential elections are always submitted to some majority rule and thus foster polarization.

Specific processes may not be, therefore, as linear as the big numbers presented in this paper may suggest. All in all, however, it seems that actors' self-interested behavior tends to lead to broadly efficient and satisfactory institutional choices.

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**Table 1.**  
**Institutional Choice in the World**  
**(1870-2007)**

Year	Number of countries	Number of democracies	Democratic regime			Assembly electoral system		
			Plmt.-Maj	Plmt.-PR	Pdtial.	Majority	Proportional	Mixed
1870	50	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
1871	51	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
1872	51	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
1873	51	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
1874	51	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
1875	51	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
1876	51	3	3	0	0	3	0	0
1877	51	3	3	0	0	3	0	0
1878	54	3	3	0	0	3	0	0
1879	54	4	3	0	1	4	0	0
1880	54	4	3	0	1	4	0	0
1881	54	4	3	0	1	4	0	0
1882	54	4	3	0	1	4	0	0
1883	54	4	3	0	1	4	0	0
1884	54	4	3	0	1	4	0	0
1885	54	5	4	0	1	5	0	0
1886	53	5	4	0	1	5	0	0
1887	53	5	4	0	1	5	0	0
1888	53	5	4	0	1	5	0	0
1889	52	5	4	0	1	5	0	0
1890	52	6	5	0	1	6	0	0
1891	52	7	6	0	1	7	0	0
1892	52	7	6	0	1	7	0	0
1893	52	7	6	0	1	7	0	0
1894	51	7	6	0	1	7	0	0
1895	51	7	6	0	1	7	0	0
1896	51	7	6	0	1	7	0	0
1897	51	8	6	1	1	7	0	0
1898	51	8	6	1	1	7	0	0
1899	51	9	6	2	1	7	1	0
1900	51	9	6	2	1	7	1	0
1901	52	9	6	2	1	7	1	0
1902	53	10	7	2	1	8	1	0
1903	54	11	7	2	2	9	1	0
1904	54	11	7	2	2	9	1	0
1905	55	11	7	2	2	9	1	0
1906	55	11	7	2	2	10	1	0
1907	56	12	7	3	2	10	2	0
1908	56	12	7	3	2	10	2	0
1909	56	12	7	3	2	10	2	0
1910	57	14	8	4	2	11	3	0
1911	57	14	8	4	2	11	3	0
1912	57	15	8	4	3	12	3	0
1913	58	15	8	4	3	12	3	0
1914	58	15	8	4	3	12	3	0

1915	58	16	8	5	3	11	5	0
1916	56	16	8	5	3	11	5	0
1917	57	17	8	6	3	11	5	0
1918	65	20	7	9	4	10	10	0
1919	67	22	7	10	5	9	13	0
1920	67	24	7	11	6	10	13	1
1921	69	24	7	11	6	9	14	1
1922	70	27	7	14	6	8	18	1
1923	70	26	7	13	6	8	17	1
1924	70	25	6	13	6	7	17	1
1925	70	26	6	13	7	7	18	1
1926	70	26	6	13	7	7	18	1
1927	70	24	5	12	7	8	15	1
1928	70	24	5	12	7	8	15	1
1929	70	24	5	12	7	8	15	1
1930	70	24	5	12	7	8	15	1
1931	70	24	6	12	6	7	16	1
1932	72	24	6	12	6	7	16	1
1933	72	24	6	12	6	7	16	1
1934	72	22	6	11	5	7	14	1
1935	72	20	6	9	5	7	12	1
1936	72	20	6	9	5	7	12	1
1937	72	19	5	9	5	6	12	1
1938	72	19	5	9	5	6	12	1
1939	72	19	5	9	5	6	12	1
1940	72	19	5	8	6	6	12	1
1941	69	14	4	4	6	5	8	1
1942	69	14	4	4	6	5	8	1
1943	69	15	5	4	6	6	8	1
1944	70	16	5	4	7	6	9	1
1945	73	24	5	11	8	6	16	1
1946	74	27	6	11	10	10	18	1
1947	78	29	8	11	10	10	18	1
1948	82	34	10	13	11	10	21	1
1949	83	33	10	13	10	10	21	0
1950	83	32	10	13	9	11	20	0
1951	84	32	10	13	9	11	20	0
1952	84	35	11	13	11	12	21	0
1953	85	35	11	13	11	12	21	1
1954	87	36	12	13	11	12	21	1
1955	87	35	12	13	10	12	20	1
1956	90	36	13	13	10	10	22	1
1957	92	38	14	13	11	12	22	1
1958	93	39	13	12	14	13	24	0
1959	93	38	12	12	14	14	24	0
1960	112	43	14	12	17	15	24	1
1961	113	45	16	12	17	15	25	1
1962	120	45	17	12	16	17	24	0
1963	121	44	17	12	15	17	24	0
1964	125	44	17	12	15	17	24	0

1965	129	43	18	12	13	17	22	0
1966	133	43	18	12	13	17	22	0
1967	133	40	15	12	13	16	21	0
1968	137	39	15	12	12	16	19	0
1969	137	37	15	12	10	17	18	0
1970	139	36	14	12	10	17	18	0
1971	143	36	14	12	10	17	18	0
1972	143	44	14	12	10	16	18	0
1973	144	44	13	12	9	14	18	0
1974	147	41	13	12	7	14	16	0
1975	153	40	14	13	7	16	18	0
1976	154	42	14	13	8	16	18	0
1977	155	43	13	14	7	13	19	0
1978	158	47	13	14	8	12	21	0
1979	161	51	13	14	11	14	23	0
1980	162	51	13	14	13	14	24	0
1981	164	54	12	14	13	14	23	0
1982	164	54	12	14	16	14	25	0
1983	165	52	13	14	15	13	26	0
1984	166	53	12	14	17	13	27	0
1985	166	56	12	14	16	13	27	0
1986	168	57	12	14	17	13	28	0
1987	168	58	12	14	17	13	28	1
1988	168	60	12	14	18	14	27	1
1989	168	61	12	14	19	15	29	1
1990	169	65	12	16	21	16	32	3
1991	186	76	12	17	23	17	34	3
1992	189	75	12	18	27	18	36	4
1993	189	72	11	19	25	16	35	5
1994	190	76	10	23	27	16	37	7
1995	190	76	10	23	27	15	37	8
1996	190	79	10	23	28	15	38	9
1997	190	81	10	23	29	14	38	10
1998	190	88	10	23	30	14	38	10
1999	190	85	10	23	30	14	39	10
2000	190	86	10	25	31	14	41	11
2001	190	85	10	25	32	14	42	11
2002	191	89	10	25	32	14	42	11
2003	191	88	10	25	32	14	42	11
2004	191	89	10	25	33	14	42	12
2005	191	89	10	25	33	14	42	12
2006	192	90	10	25	32	14	42	11
2007	192	90	9	25	32	14	42	10

Note. Plmt-Maj: Parliamentary regime with majority electoral rule; Plmt.-PR: Parliamentary regime with proportional representation; Pdtial: Presidential or semi-presidential regime. The columns on 'Democratic regimes' and 'Assembly electoral system' include only the countries with more than one million inhabitants.