Holbrooke,
Frankel and the Cuban Missile Crisis
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Today's fawning review of Max Frankel's "High Noon In The Cold War" in the NY Times epitomizes the folly of ABBism. In approving former Times editor Frankel's thesis that JFK's handling of the Cuban missile crisis is an example of US foreign policy at its multilateral best, reviewer Richard Holbrooke--one of Kerry's foreign policy advisers and Clinton's chief delegate to the UN--simply demonstrates that the choice between a "dangerous" George W. Bush and a "sane" Democratic president is illusory at best.
Holbrooke lays out a comparison
between 1962
In 1962, unlike 2003,
there really were weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear missiles were being
secretly placed off
In 1962, unlike 2003,
American intelligence and analysis was excellent. High-altitude photographs
found and identified the missiles before they were deployed.
When Adlai Stevenson
presented the evidence to the United Nations Security Council, the world
accepted
In 1962, as in 2003,
the president was under intense pressure from some members of his Cabinet to
take pre-emptive military action, but, unlike 2003, President Kennedy saw the
threat of force primarily as a tactical device to achieve a political solution.
In 1962, unlike 2003,
In the spring of 1962,
Nikita S. Khrushchev gambled that he could sneak nuclear missiles into
What is missing entirely from this side-by-side comparison
is any recognition that the
He neglects to mention that Stevenson had been caught up in
the lies surrounding the
Shortly after the
Holbrooke openly approves of the kind of collusion that went on between Kennedy's top advisers and the editors at the NY Times and Washington Post:
During the first week
of the crisis, no one but a small group of advisers known as the Executive
Committee, or ExCom, knew about the missiles. The
importance of this total secrecy cannot be overestimated; a rush to action
under public pressure could easily have resulted in a catastrophic mistake.
With great self-control, the 44-year-old president absented himself from many
of the ExCom meetings to allow freer debate, but he
was kept informed by his brother Robert, then attorney general, and by Theodore
C. Sorensen, his brilliant alter ego, who drafted many key public statements
and private messages during the crisis.
Importantly, the
secret held — with an assist from The Washington Post and The Times, which both
figured out what was going on a day or two before Kennedy was scheduled to make
his address to the nation. They both agreed, after personal requests from
Kennedy, not to print the story. (Mr. Frankel recalls listening in as the
president pleaded with The Times's
Washington bureau chief, James Reston, not to publish what they knew.) It was,
given the stakes, the correct decision.
Agreeing to not publish a story as important as this?
Considering the tendency of Timesmen such as Leslie
Gelb to shuttle back and forth from the paper to the federal government and the
decision by A.M. Rosenthal to pull Raymond Bonner out of
Holbrooke deals with the question
of a tit-for-tat with the
There was one other
issue, which has been denied, debated and finally revealed bit by bit. This
concerned the removal of 15 Jupiter medium-range missiles from
The
In the final analysis, the only way to maintain peace in the
world is to transform the current system, which allows the