A Vector Monotonicity Assumption for Multiple Instruments

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Abstract

When a researcher wishes to use multiple instrumental variables for a single binary treatment, the familiar LATE monotonicity assumption can become restrictive: it requires that all units share a common direction of response even when different instruments are shifted in opposing directions. What I call vector monotonicity, by contrast, simply restricts treatment status to be monotonic in each instrument separately. This is a natural assumption in many contexts, capturing the intuitive notion of “no defiers” for each instrument. I show that in a setting with a binary treatment and multiple discrete instruments, a class of causal parameters is point identified under vector monotonicity, including the average treatment effect among units that are responsive to any particular subset of the instruments. I propose a simple “2SLS-like” estimator for the family of identified treatment effect parameters. An empirical application revisits the labor market returns to college education.

1 Introduction

The local average treatment effects (LATE) framework introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994) allows for causal inference with arbitrary heterogeneity in treatment effects, but in doing so imposes an important form of homogeneity on selection behavior. This homogeneity comes through the LATE monotonicity assumption, which is often quite natural to make when the researcher has a single instrumental variable at their disposal. However with multiple instruments, this traditional monotonicity assumption can become hard to justify – a point that has recently been emphasized by Mogstad et al. (2020b).

A natural question is whether causal effects are still identified when monotonicity holds on an instrument-by-instrument basis, what I call vector monotonicity. Vector monotonicity (VM) captures the notion that each instrument has an impact on treatment uptake in a direction that is common across units (and typically known ex-ante by the researcher). For example, two instruments for college enrollment might be: i) proximity to a college; and ii) affordability of nearby colleges. It is reasonable to assume that each instrument induces some individuals towards going to college, while discouraging none. This contrasts with traditional LATE monotonicity, which as I describe below requires that either proximity or affordability effectively dominates in selection behavior for all units.

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In this paper I provide a simple approach to estimating causal effects under vector monotonicity. I first show that in a setting with a binary treatment and any number of binary instruments satisfying VM, average treatment effects can be point identified for subgroups of the population that satisfy a certain condition. The condition is met by, for example, the group of all units that move into treatment when any fixed subset of the instruments are switched “on”. As special cases, this includes for example those units that respond to a movement of a single particular instrument, or those units that have any variation whatsoever in counterfactual treatment status given the available instruments. I show how general discrete instruments can be accommodated by re-expressing them as a larger number of binary instruments, while preserving vector monotonicity. I then propose a simple two-step estimator for the identified causal parameters. The estimator is scalable, involving the same computational burden as 2SLS despite the rapid proliferation of possible selection patterns compatible with VM as the number of instruments increases.

To appreciate the sense in which traditional LATE monotonicity is restrictive with multiple instruments, consider the two instruments for college mentioned above, with each coded as a binary variable (“far”/“close” and “cheap”/“expensive”). LATE monotonicity says that a counterfactual change to the proximity and/or tuition instruments can either move some students into college attendance, or some students out, but not both. In particular, this requires that all units who would go to college when it is far but cheap would also go to college if it was close and expensive, or that the reverse is true. We would generally expect this implication to fail if individuals are heterogeneous in how much each of the instruments “matters” to them: for example, if some students are primarily sensitive to distance and others are primarily sensitive to tuition. Vector monotonicity instead says something quite natural in this context: proximity to a college weakly encourages college attendance, regardless of price, and lower tuition weakly encourages college attendance, regardless of distance.

In a set of papers developed concurrently with this one, Mogstad, Torgovitsky and Walters (2019; 2020a; 2020b) (henceforth MTW) underline the above difficulty for LATE monotonicity with multiple instruments, and introduce a weaker assumption of partial monotonicity (PM). PM is similar to VM but allows the direction of “compliance” for each instrument to depend on the values of the others (see Section 3 for an explicit comparison). In Mogstad et al. (2020a), MTW develop a marginal treatment effects framework for partial monotonicity. They focus on a broad class of target causal parameters that may be only partially identified by IV methods, or may require continuous instruments and/or parametric assumptions for point identification. By contrast, I maintain the stronger monotonicity assumption VM and characterize a class of causal parameters that are then point identified with only discrete instruments and without any auxiliary assumptions. I show that VM differs from PM by adding to it a testable condition and that this restriction has additional identification power, expanding the set of identified parameters.

The estimator proposed in this paper can be seen as an alternative to two-stage-least-
squares (2SLS), which has been the typical method to make use of multiple instruments in applied work. 2SLS is known to identify a convex combination of local average treatment effects under the standard LATE assumptions provided that the first stage recovers the propensity score function, but this implication does not hold generally under VM or PM. MTW derive additional testable conditions which are sufficient for the 2SLS estimand to deliver a convex combination of treatment effects under PM, though the number of conditions to be verified generally grows combinatorially with the number of instruments. In the Supplemental Material\footnote{Supplemental Material is available here: http://www.columbia.edu/~ltg2111/resources/vm_externalappendix.pdf} I consider two special cases in which linear 2SLS will uncover averages of causal effects under VM with binary instruments. A sufficient condition for one of the special cases – that the instruments are independent – is straightforward to test empirically. The other special case assumes that each unit is responsive to the value of one instrument only, and is quite restrictive. My main identification result eliminates the need to rely on such additional assumptions.

A growing literature has considered extensions to the basic LATE model of Imbens and Angrist\footnote{LATE monotonicity is also generally not assumed by nonseparable triangular models with endogeneity (e.g. Imbens and Newey 2009, Torgovitsky 2015, D’Haultfœuille and Février 2015, Gunsilius 2020, Feng 2020), which typically impose some version of monotonicity in unobserved heterogeneity.} (1994), but has typically not emphasized the distinction between separate instruments, when more than one is available. Natural analogs of LATE monotonicity have been studied for treatments that are discrete (Angrist and Imbens, 1995), continuous (Angrist et al., 2000), or unordered (Heckman and Pinto, 2018). Other papers have considered identification under various violations of LATE monotonicity. In the case of a binary treatment, Gautier and Hoderlein (2011), Lewbel and Yang (2016) and Gautier (2020) consider various explicit selection models, while Chaisemartin (2017) shows that a weaker notion than monotonicity can be sufficient to give a causal interpretation to LATE estimands.\footnote{Lee and Salanié (2018) relax monotonicity in a setting with multivalued treatment and continuous instruments, generalizing results from the local instrumental variables approach of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). With discrete instruments, Lee and Salanié (2020) show that a notion of particular instrument values “targeting” particular values of a multivalued treatment carries additional identifying power.}

In Section 2 I discuss the basic setup and definitions. I compare vector monotonicity to the traditional monotonicity assumption and MTW’s proposal of partial monotonicity, and discuss examples in the context of a simple choice model. In Section 3 I show that like conventional monotonicity, VM partitions the population into well-defined “compliance groups” that can coexist in arbitrary proportions. I characterize these groups in a setting with any number of binary instruments, nesting a description from MTW of the two-instrument case. In Section 4 I use this taxonomy to demonstrate identification of a family of causal parameters, and Section 5 proposes corresponding estimators. Section 6 reports results from an application to the labor market returns to schooling. In appendices, I consider a generalization of the identification result that relaxes an assumption
of rectangular support among the instruments, consider identification with covariates, and additional results regarding the proposed estimator, including a data-driven regularization procedure to improve its performance in small samples. In online Supplemental Material, I also consider some special cases in which linear 2SLS identifies a convex combination of treatment effects under VM, and provide additional examples pertaining to the main text, including a second empirical application to the labor supply effects of family size.

2 Setup

Here I fix notation and formalize the basic setup in which a researcher has multiple instrumental variables for a single binary treatment. Within this framework, I contrast the three alternative notions of monotonicity mentioned in the introduction.

Consider a setting with a binary treatment variable \(D\), scalar outcome variable \(Y\), and vector \(Z = (Z_1 \ldots Z_J)\) of \(J\) instrumental variables that can take values in set \(Z \subseteq (Z_1 \times Z_2 \times \cdots \times Z_J)\), where \(Z_j\) is the set of values that instrument \(Z_j\) can take.

**Definition 1 (potential outcomes and treatments).** Let \(D_i(z)\) denote the treatment status of unit \(i\) when their vector of instrumental variables takes value \(z \in Z\), and \(Y_i(d, z)\) the realization of the outcome variable that would occur with treatment status \(d \in \{0, 1\}\) and instrument value \(z \in Z\).

The following assumption states that the available instrumental variables are valid:

**Assumption 1 (exclusion and independence).** a) \(Y_i(d, z) = Y_i(d)\) for all \(z' \in Z, d \in \{0, 1\}\); and b) \((Y_i(1), Y_i(0), \{D_i(z)\}_{z \in Z}) \perp (Z_{i1}, \ldots, Z_{iJ})\)

The first part of Assumption 1 states that the instruments are “excludable” from the outcome function in the sense that potential outcomes do not depend on them once treatment status is fixed. The second part of Assumption 1 states that the instruments are independent of potential outcomes and potential treatments. In practice, it is common to maintain a version of this independence assumption that holds only conditional on a set of observed covariates. For ease of exposition, I implicitly condition on any such covariates throughout, then consider incorporating them explicitly in Appendix B and in the empirical application.

2.1 Notions of monotonicity

It is well-known that when treatment effects are heterogeneous, Assumption 1 alone is not sufficient for instrument variation to identify treatment effects. The seminal LATE model of Imbens and Angrist (1994) introduces the additional assumption of monotonicity:

\[^3\] Z may be a strict subset of \((Z_1 \times Z_2 \times \cdots \times Z_J)\) when certain combinations of instrument values are ruled out on conceptual grounds, e.g. \(Z_1\) indicates a mother’s first two births being girls and \(Z_2\) indicates them both being boys.
**Assumption IAM (traditional LATE monotonicity).** For all \(z, z' \in \mathcal{Z}: P(D_i(z) \geq D_i(z')) = 1 \text{ or } P(D_i(z) \leq D_i(z')) = 1.\)

I follow the terminology of MTW and henceforth refer to this as Assumption IAM, or “Imbens and Angrist monotonicity”. As pointed out by Heckman et al. (2006), IAM can be thought of as a type of uniformity assumption: it states that flows of selection into treatment between \(z\) in \(z'\) move only in one direction, whichever direction that is.

The proposed assumption of *vector monotonicity* captures monotonicity as the notion that “increasing” the value of any instrument weakly encourages (or discourages) all units to take treatment, regardless of the values of the other instruments:

**Assumption 2 (vector monotonicity).** There exists an ordering \(\succeq_j\) on \(\mathcal{Z}_j\) for each \(j \in \{1 \ldots J\}\) such that for all \(z, z' \in \mathcal{Z}\), if \(z \succeq z'\) component-wise according to the \(\{\succeq_j\}\), then \(D_i(z) \geq D_i(z')\) with probability one.

Vector monotonicity is referred to as “actual monotonicity” by Mogstad et al. (2020b), when each \(\succeq_j\) is the standard ordering on real numbers. Mountjoy (2019) imposes a version of VM in a case with a multivalued treatment and continuous instruments.

The partial monotonicity assumption introduced by MTW is weaker than both IAM and VM. Let \((z_j, z_{-j})\) denote a vector composed of \(z_j \in \mathcal{Z}_j\) and \(z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}\), where \(\mathcal{Z}_{-j}\) indicates the set of values that the vector of all instruments but \(Z_j\) can take.

**Assumption PM (partial monotonicity).** For each \(j \in \{1 \ldots J\}\), \(z_j, z'_j \in \mathcal{Z}_j\), and \(z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}\) such that \((z_j, z_{-j}) \in \mathcal{Z}\) and \((z'_j, z_{-j}) \in \mathcal{Z}\), either \(D_i(z_j, z_{-j}) \geq D_i(z'_j, z_{-j})\) with probability one or \(D_i(z_j, z_{-j}) \leq D_i(z'_j, z_{-j})\) with probability one.

Note that under partial monotonicity, there will be a weak ordering on the points in \(\mathcal{Z}_j\), for any fixed choice of \(j\) and \(z_{-j}\). The crucial restriction made by vector monotonicity beyond partial monotonicity is that under VM, this ordering must be the same across all values of \(z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}\) for a given \(j\). Partial monotonicity could for example capture a situation in which college proximity encourages attendance when nearby colleges are cheap but discourages attendance when they are expensive – while VM could not.

An alternative characterization of VM makes this relationship to PM more explicit. Call \(\mathcal{Z}\) connected when for any two \(z, z' \in \mathcal{Z}\) there exists a sequence of vectors \(z_1, \ldots, z_m\) with \(z_1 = z\), \(z_m = z'\) and each \(z_m\) and \(z_{m-1}\) differing on only one component, and such that \(z_m \in \mathcal{Z}\) for all \(m\).

**Proposition 1.** Let \(\mathcal{Z}\) be connected. Then VM holds iff for each \(j \in \{1 \ldots J\}\) there is an ordering \(\succeq_j\) on \(\mathcal{Z}_j\) such that \(P(D_i(z_j, z_{-j}) \geq D_i(z'_j, z_{-j})) = 1\) when \(z_j \succeq_j z'_j\), for all \(z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}\) such that both \((z_j, z_{-j}) \in \mathcal{Z}\) and \((z'_j, z_{-j}) \in \mathcal{Z}\).

**Proof.** See Appendix D. □
The additional restriction made by VM over PM is empirically testable, by inspecting the propensity score function:

**Proposition 2.** Suppose PM and Assumption 1 hold, and $Z$ is connected. Then VM holds if and only if $E[D_i|Z_i = z]$ is component-wise monotonic in $z$, for some fixed ordering $\succeq_j$ on each $Z_j$.

**Proof.** See Appendix D.

By contrast, PM is compatible with any propensity score function. Note that if Assumption 1 holds conditional on covariates $X_i$, Proposition 2 also need only hold with respect to the *conditional* propensity score $E[D_i|Z_i = z, X_i = x]$ (see Section 6).

Since IAM implies PM, it follows as a corollary to Proposition 2 that if IAM and Assumption 1 hold and $E[D_i|Z_i = z]$ is component-wise monotonic in $z$, then VM holds. This establishes that if a researcher has verified that the propensity score function is monotonic, VM becomes a strictly weaker assumption than IAM. The relationship among Assumptions IAM, VM and PM is depicted graphically in Figure 1.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1:** Left panel shows ex-ante comparison of Imbens & Angrist monotonicity (IAM), vector monotonicity (VM), and partial monotonicity (PM) before the propensity score function is known. Right panel depicts the relationship when the propensity score is component-wise monotonic: PM and VM become identical, with IAM a special case. Examples for points (a)-(e) are discussed in Table 1.

Examples of the points (a)-(e) in Figure 1 can be made more concrete by considering a case with two binary instruments $Z = \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}$, with an explicit selection model of the form:

$$D_i(z_1, z_2) = \mathbb{1}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 z_1 + \beta_2 z_2 + \beta_3 z_1 z_2 \geq 0) \quad (1)$$

where $\beta_i = (\beta_{0i}, \beta_{1i}, \beta_{2i}, \beta_{3i})' \perp Z_i$ (Assumption 1). Given the binary treatments, this model is general enough to capture all possible selection functions $D_i(z)$.
A neighborhood of the zero vector in $D$.

Alice only cares about proximity, and Bob only cares about tuition, with:

If college then became either cheap or close, it is natural to expect this to only increase the net benefit of college, incenting some individuals into enrolling while discouraging none. This motivates making the restrictions

\[ P(\beta_{2i} < -\beta_{0i} \leq \beta_{1i}) > 0, \quad P(\beta_{1i} < -\beta_{0i} \leq \beta_{2i}) > 0 \]

that illustrate each of the points (a)-(e) in Figure 1. In all examples, the cost $\beta_{0i}$ can be heterogeneous across individuals, but examples (c)-(e) represent threshold crossing

models in which heterogeneity in $D_i(z)$ is not linearly separable from $z$. This is similar to a setup considered by MTW, with a slightly different notation.

Now consider the plausibility of the above cases in the returns to schooling example, with “cheap” and “close” the 1 states of $Z_1$ and $Z_2$, respectively. In a utility maximization model $\beta_{0i}$ might denote the net benefit of attending college when it is far and expensive. If college then became either cheap or close, it is natural to expect this to only increase the net benefit of college, incenting some individuals into enrolling while discouraging none. This motivates making the restrictions $\beta_{1i} \geq 0$ and $\beta_{2i} \geq 0$. If we then imagine changing to (cheap, close) from either (expensive, close) or (cheap, far), it’s reasonable to again assume that all students would move weakly towards college, unless there are individuals for whom the interaction coefficient $\beta_{3i}$ is sufficiently strong and negative.

Finally, note that a sufficient condition for the restriction from PM to VM is the existence of groups that are sensitive to that instrument alone. For example, suppose Alice only cares about proximity, and Bob only cares about tuition, with:

\[ D_{alice}(z_1, z_2) = 1(z_2 = close) \quad \text{and} \quad D_{bob}(z_1, z_2) = 1(z_1 = cheap) \]

Partial monotonicity then requires that the directions of “compliance” that Alice and Bob exhibit (lower distance and lower tuition, respectively) hold (weakly) for all other units in the population, which then implies VM. Further, the existence of both Alice and Bob imply that IAM is violated.

\[ \text{It is possible to imagine scenarios in which this could happen: for example, suppose there exist students who do not want to live with their parents during college, and feel that they will have to if attending a college near their parents’ home. Accordingly, some such students might go to college only when it is cheap and far. Note that in this case, PM would then require that there be no other individuals in the population that go to college only if it is both cheap and close. The Supplemental Material provides a taxonomy of such cases that break VM but not PM, as point (c) does, with two binary instruments.} \]

\[ \text{That is, } D_{alice}(1, z_2) > D_{alice}(0, z_2) \text{ for all } z_2 \in Z_2 \text{ implies through PM that } P(D_i(1, z_2) \geq D_i(0, z_2)) = 1 \text{ for all } z_2 \in Z_2, \text{ and similarly Bob implies that } P(D_i(z_1, 1) \geq D_i(z_1, 0)) = 1 \text{ for all } z_1 \in Z_1. \]

\[ \text{Strictly speaking, both of these implications require that there are groups of positive probability with respect to the} \]

\[ Table 1: \text{ Illustrative examples of each of the cases (a)-(e) in the random coefficients selection model Eq. (1).} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Example of support restriction on $\beta$’s</th>
<th>Implied restrictions on selection</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>$\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3$ homogeneous; $0 \leq \beta_1 \leq \beta_2$, $\beta_3 = 0$</td>
<td>$D_i(0, 0) \leq D_i(1, 0) \leq D_i(0, 1) \leq D_i(1, 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>$\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3$ homogeneous; $-\beta_2 \leq \beta_3 \leq -\beta_1 \leq 0$</td>
<td>$D_i(0, 0) \leq D_i(1, 0) \leq D_i(1, 1) \leq D_i(0, 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>$\beta_{2i} \geq \beta_{1i} \geq 0$, $-\beta_{2i} \leq \beta_{3i} \leq -\beta_{1i}$ for all $i$</td>
<td>$D_i(0, 0) \leq D_i(1, 0) \leq D_i(0, 1)$; $D_i(1, 0) \leq D_i(1, 1)$; $D_i(1, 1) \leq D_i(0, 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>$\beta_{3i} = 0$, $\beta_{1i} \geq 0$, $\beta_{2i} \geq 0$ for all $i$</td>
<td>$D_i(0, 0) \leq D_i(1, 0) \leq D_i(1, 1)$; $D_i(0, 0) \leq D_i(1, 0) \leq D_i(1, 1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>a neighborhood of the zero vector in $\mathbb{R}^3$</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is also illustrative to consider an example of this sufficient condition failing to hold. MTW offer an example where PM holds without VM, in which we consider a population of families having two or more kids (following Angrist and Evans 1998), and take as two binary instruments for having a third child indicators for the sex of the first and second child. If selection into a third child is driven uniformly by considerations of having at least one child of each sex, then no parents would respond solely to the sex of one of the first two children alone. This violates VM since whether or not the first child being female encourages or discourages treatment depends on the sex of the second child (and vice versa). However, I note that the instruments in this example can be recoded such that VM holds given the same assumptions about underlying selection behavior (see Supplemental Material for an example).

3 Characterizing compliance under vector monotonicity

In this section I show that the assumption of vector monotonicity partitions the population of interest into a set of well-defined “compliance groups”. These groups generalize the familiar taxonomy of always-takers, never-takers, and compliers from the case of a single binary instrument. Providing a characterization of the groups will be necessary to state the main identification result in Section 4.

To simplify notation, let us define a random variable $G_i$ corresponding to an individual’s entire vector of counterfactual treatments $\{D_i(z)\}_{z \in Z}$. For example, with a single binary instrument $G_i = “always-taker”$ indicates that $D_i(0) = D_i(1) = 1$. $G_i$ will be referred to as unit $i$’s “compliance group”. Compliance groups partition individuals in the population based on upon their selection behavior under all counterfactual values of the instruments. Let $G$ be the support of $G_i$. We can think of VM as a restriction on which compliance groups are allowed in the population, or equivalently a restriction on $G$. As a final bit of notation, we will denote as $D_g(z)$ the potential treatments function $D_i(z)$ that is common to all units sharing a value $g$ of $G_i$.

3.1 With two binary instruments

We first turn to the simplest case of two binary instruments, in which $G$ can be seen to contain six distinct compliance groups.

Normalize the instrument value labeled “1” for each instrument to be the direction in which potential treatments are increasing. Table 2 describes the six compliance groups that can occur under VM with two binary instruments, with names introduced for each by MTW. A $Z_1$ complier, for example, goes to college if and only if college is cheap, regardless of whether it is close. A $Z_2$ complier, in our example, would go to college if and only if college is close, regardless of whether it is cheap. A reluctant complier is “reluctant” in the sense that they require college to be both cheap and close to attend, population distribution that have the same selection patterns as Alice and Bob do.
while an eager complier goes to college so long as it is either cheap or close. Never and always takers are defined in the same way as they are under IAM: \( \max_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} D_i(z) = 0 \) and \( \min_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} D_i(z) = 1 \), respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>( D_i(0,0) )</th>
<th>( D_i(0,1) )</th>
<th>( D_i(1,0) )</th>
<th>( D_i(1,1) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>never takers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>always takers</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Z_1 ) compliers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Z_2 ) compliers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eager compliers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reluctant compliers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>T</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The six compliance groups under VM with two binary instruments.

A natural question is whether the sizes \( p_g := P(G_i = g) \) of the six groups in Table 2 can be detected empirically. In general, only two of them are point identified. Let \( P(z) := E[D_i|Z_i = z] = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} p_g D_g(z) \) be the propensity score function, where the second equality follows from Assumption 1. From the definitions in Table 2 it is clear that \( p_{n,t} = 1 - P(1,1) \) and \( p_{a,t} = P(0,0) \). For the others, we can identify certain linear combinations of the group occupancies, e.g. \( P(1,0) - P(0,0) = p_{Z_1} + p_{eager} \), \( P(0,1) - P(0,0) = p_{Z_2} + p_{eager} \), and \( P(1,1) - P(0,1) = p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant} \). This allows us to bound each of the four remaining group sizes, given that each must be positive. For example, \( \{P(1,0) - P(0,0)\} - \{P(1,1) - P(0,1)\} \leq p_{eager} \leq \min\{P(0,1) - P(0,0), P(1,0) - P(0,0)\} \). The point identified linear combinations are in fact special cases of the general identification results developed later in Section 4.1 (see Corollary 2 to Theorem 1).

### 3.2 With multiple binary instruments

Now we see how the two-instrument case generalizes to a case where the researcher has any number of binary instruments. While the overall number of compliance groups explodes combinatorially, we can still keep track of the various groups in a systematic way.

Let there be \( J \) binary instruments \( Z_1 \ldots Z_J \). I focus on the baseline case in which the space of conceivable instrument values is rectangular: \( \mathcal{Z} = \{0,1\}^J \) (see Supplemental Material for some alternatives). We wish to characterize the subset of the \( 2^{2^J} \) possible mappings between vectors of instrument values and treatment that satisfy VM, where we continue to normalize the “1” state for each \( Z_j \) to be the direction in which potential treatments are weakly increasing.\(^8\) The number of such compliance groups \( G_i \) as a function of \( J \) is equal to the number of isotone boolean functions on \( J \) variables, which

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\(^8\)This “up” value for each instrument will be taken in our results to be known ex ante. In practice, this might follow from a maintained natural hypothesis, such as that lower price encourages rather than discourages college attendance. However, the directions are also empirically identified from the propensity score function (see Proposition 2).
is known to follow the so-called Dedekind sequence (Kisielewicz, 1988):

3, 6, 20, 168, 7581, 7828354 \ldots

Let Ded_J denote the J^{th} number in the Dedekind sequence.

One group that always satisfies VM are those units for whom \( D_i(z) = 0 \) for all values \( z \in \mathcal{Z} \): so-called never-takers. Each of the other groups can be associated with a collection of minimal combinations of instruments that are sufficient for that unit to take treatment. For example, in a setting with three instruments, one compliance group would be the units that take treatment if either \( Z_1 = 1 \), or if \( Z_2 = Z_3 = 1 \). By vector monotonicity, then, any unit in this group must also take treatment if \( Z_1 = Z_2 = Z_3 = 1 \). However, another group of units might take treatment only if \( Z_1 = Z_2 = Z_3 = 1 \). This group is more “reluctant” than the former. The group of always-takers are the least “reluctant”: they require no instruments to equal one in order for them to take treatment.

By this logic, we can associate compliance groups (aside from never-takers) with families \( F \) of subsets \( S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\} \) of the instrument labels. However, we need only consider families for which no element \( S \) of the family is a subset of some other \( S' \): so-called Sperner families (see e.g. Kleitman and Milner [1973]). Families that are not Sperner would be redundant under VM, since in the example above \( S' \) could be dropped without affecting the implied selection function \( D_i(z) \).

**Definition 2 (compliance group for a Sperner family).** For any Sperner family \( F \), let \( g(F) \) denote the compliance group in which units take treatment if and only if \( z_j = 1 \) for all \( j \) in \( S \), for at least one \( S \) in \( F \). Denote the Sperner family associated with a compliance group \( g \) as \( F(g) \).

All together, the compliance groups satisfying VM with \( J \) binary instruments are as follows: the never-takers group, along with \( \text{Ded}_J - 1 \) further groups \( g(F) \) corresponding to each of the distinct Sperner families \( F \) of instrument labels.

In the simplest example of the above, when \( J = 1 \), vector monotonicity coincides with PM and IAM, and the Sperner families corresponding to this single instrument are simply the null set and the singleton \( \{1\} \): corresponding to always-takers and compliers, respectively. Together with never-takers, we have the familiar three groups from LATE analysis with a single binary instrument.

For \( J = 2 \), the five groups (aside from never-takers) described in the previous section were the only VM-compliant groups. However, as \( J \) increases, the number of VM-compliant groups grows exponentially. This is due to the fact that the number of possible VM-compliant groups is given by the Dedekind numbers, which grow much more slowly than the total number of boolean functions of \( J \) variables. For example, while \( 3/4 = 75\% \) of conceivable compliance groups for \( J = 1 \) satisfy VM, only \( 20/256 \approx 7.8\% \) do for \( J = 3 \), and just \( 7581/4294967296 \approx 1.7 \times 10^{-4} \) do for \( J = 5 \). Thus the “bite” of VM is increasing with \( J \), in the sense that it rules out a larger and larger fraction of conceivable selection patterns.

---

9 An analytical expression for the Dedekind numbers is given by Kisielewicz (1988), but only the first eight have been calculated numerically due to the computational burden. Yet while the Dedekind numbers explode quite rapidly, they do so much more slowly than the total number \( 2^{2^J} \) of boolean functions of \( J \) variables. For example while \( 3/4 = 75\% \) of conceivable compliance groups for \( J = 1 \) satisfy VM, only \( 20/256 \approx 7.8\% \) do for \( J = 3 \), and just \( 7581/4294967296 \approx 1.7 \times 10^{-4} \) do for \( J = 5 \). Thus the “bite” of VM is increasing with \( J \), in the sense that it rules out a larger and larger fraction of conceivable selection patterns.
map to Sperner families as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>name of $G_F$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
<td>“always takers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${1}$</td>
<td>“$Z_1$ compliers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${2}$</td>
<td>“$Z_2$ compliers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${1, 2}$</td>
<td>“eager compliers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${1, 2}$</td>
<td>“reluctant compliers”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rapidly expanding richness of selection behavior compatible with VM can be seen with $J = 3$, where there are 19 Sperner families, each indicated within bold brackets:

- $\{\emptyset\}, \{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$,
- $\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}, \{1, 2, 3\}$,
- $\{\{1\}, \{2\}\}, \{\{2\}, \{3\}\}, \{\{1\}, \{3\}\}, \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}\}$,
- $\{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}, \{\{1, 3\}, \{2\}\}, \{\{2, 3\}, \{1\}\}$,
- $\{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}\}, \{\{1, 2\}, \{2, 3\}\}, \{\{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}$,
- $\{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}$

For instance, an individual with $G_i$ corresponding to $\{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}$ takes treatment so long as any two instruments take the one value.

A central feature of the identification analysis will be that the selection functions corresponding to the various compliance groups are not all linearly independent from one another. Only $2^J$ such functions can be independent (though Ded$_J$ is strictly larger for $J > 1$), since any function of binary variables can be written as a polynomial in them. Let $G^c := G/\{a.t., n.t.\}$ denote the set of Ded$_J - 2$ compliance groups compatible with Assumption VM that are not never-takers or always takers. All of the groups in $G^c$ can be thought of as generalized “compliers” of some kind: units that vary treatment uptake in some way across possible instrument values.

A natural basis for the set of selection functions $\{D_g(z)\}_{g \in G^c}$ can be formed by considering functions that are products over a single subset of the instruments

$$z_S := \prod_{j \in S} z_j = 1 \quad (z_j = 1 \text{ for all } j \text{ in } S)$$

where $S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset$\[^{10}\] For a given set $S$, $z_S$ yields the selection function $D_g(S)(z)$ of the compliance group $g(S)$ corresponding to the Sperner family consisting only of the set $S$. I refer to such compliance groups $g(S)$ as simple.

For $J = 2$, the selection functions for the simple compliance groups are:

$$D_{Z_1}(z) = z_1 \quad D_{Z_2}(z) = z_2 \quad D_{reluctant}(z) = z_1 z_2$$

\[^{10}\]Note that a similar construction plays a central role in Lee and Salanié, 2018.
The selection function for the remaining group, eager compliers, can be obtained as:

\[ D_{\text{eager}}(z) = z_1 + z_2 - z_1 z_2 = D_{Z_1}(z) + D_{Z_2}(z) - D_{\text{reluctant}}(z) \]

We can express this linear dependency by the matrix \( M_J \) in the system:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
D_{Z_1}(z) \\
D_{Z_2}(z) \\
D_{\text{reluctant}}(z) \\
D_{\text{eager}}(z)
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & -1
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
D_{Z_1}(z) \\
D_{Z_2}(z) \\
D_{\text{reluctant}}(z)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

For general \( J \), we define the matrix \( M_J \) from the analogous system of equations:

\[
\{D_{g(F)}(z)\}_{F: g(F) \in \mathcal{G}^c} = M_J \{D_{g(S)}(z)\}_{S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, J\}, S \neq \emptyset}
\]

for all \( z \in \mathcal{Z} \). The rows of matrix \( M_J \) are indexed by Sperner families (corresponding to the groups in \( \mathcal{G}^c \)), and the columns by the simple Sperner families for non-null \( S \). The entries of \( M_J \) are given by the following expression\(^1\)

**Proposition 3.** \([M_J]_{F,S'} = \sum_{s \in s(F,S')}(-1)^{|s|+1} \) where \( s(F,S') := \{ f \subseteq F : \left( \bigcup_{S \in f} S \right) = S' \} \).

*Proof. See Appendix D.\(^\square\)*

### 3.3 Vector monotonicity with discrete instruments

More generally, when the researcher has discrete instrumental variables that satisfy vector monotonicity, they can be re-expressed as a larger number of binary instruments in a way that preserves vector monotonicity. By introducing a binary instrument for every value but one of each discrete instrument, the analysis can be extended to this much more general setting:

**Proposition 4.** Let \( Z_1 \) be a discrete variable with \( M \) ordered points of support \( z_1 < z_2 < \cdots < z_M \), and \( Z_2, \ldots, Z_J \) be other instrumental variables. Let \( \tilde{Z}_{mi} := 1(Z_{1i} \geq z_m) \). If the vector \( Z = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_J) \) satisfies Assumption VM on a connected \( \mathcal{Z} \) then so does the vector \( (\tilde{Z}_2, \ldots, \tilde{Z}_M, Z_2, \ldots Z_J) \).

*Proof. See Appendix D.\(^\square\)*

Applying Proposition 4 iteratively offers a fairly general recipe for mapping the instruments available in a given empirical setting into the framework of binary instruments.

Note that the mapping in Proposition 3 introduces restrictions on \( \mathcal{Z} \) for the resulting binary instruments, since for example we could not have both \( \tilde{Z}_{2i} = 1 \) and \( \tilde{Z}_{1i} = 0 \). As a result, not all of the compliance groups introduced in Section 3.2 are necessary to account for, since the possible patterns of instrument variation pool some into equivalent groups. While in the next section I assume full binary instrument support for the baseline results, Appendix A provides the necessary generalizations to make use of Proposition 4.

\(^{11}\)The matrix \( M_3 \), which has \( D_3 - 2 = 18 \) rows and \( 2^3 - 1 = 7 \) columns is given explicitly in the Supplemental Material.
4 Parameters of interest and identification

In this section I define and characterize a class of causal parameters, and show that they are generally point identified under vector monotonicity. This section maintains a setup of \( J \) binary instruments with \( Z = \{0, 1\}^J \) unless otherwise specified.

4.1 Main identification result

My identification analysis considers conditional averages of potential outcomes: for \( d \in \{0, 1\} \) and an arbitrary function \( f: \theta_0^d = E[f(Y_i(d))|C_i = 1], \) where \( C_i = c(G_i, Z_i) \) is a function \( c: G \times Z \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) of individual \( i \)'s compliance group and their realization of the instruments. Intuitively, the event \( C_i = 1 \) will indicate that unit \( i \) belongs to a certain subgroup of generalized “compliers”. Most of the discussion will center on the class of average treatment effects:

\[
\Delta_c = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|C_i = 1]
\]

which correspond to \( \theta_1^c - \theta_0^c \) with \( f(y) = y \) the identity function. Treatment effect parameters having the form of \( \Delta_c \) are familiar both from the LATE (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) and marginal treatment effects (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005) literatures. For instance, with a single binary instrument the LATE sets \( c(g, z) = 1 (g = \text{complier}) \), independent of \( z \).

The main result is that identification of is possible under VM for certain choices of the function \( c(g, z) \). In particular, it will require a condition that I call “Property M”:

**Definition 3 (Property M).** The function \( c(g, z) \) satisfies Property M if for all \( z \in Z \): \( c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0 \), while for every \( g \in G \):

\[
c(g, z) = \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} [M_J]_F(g), S \cdot c(g(S), z)
\]

where the matrix \( M_J \) is defined in Proposition 3. I’ll also say that \( \theta_0^d \) or \( \Delta_c \) “satisfies Property M” if its underlying function \( c(g, z) \) does. Intuition for Property M is provided after the statement of the identification result, and an equivalent characterization of Property M and leading examples are given in Section 4.2.

Causal parameters that satisfy Property M are identified under VM with binary instruments, provided the instruments provide sufficient independent variation in treatment uptake. The latter requirement holds when the binary instruments have full (rectangular) support.

**Assumption 3 (full support).** \( P(Z_i = z) > 0 \) for all \( z \in \{0, 1\}^J \)

Assumption 3 is stronger than is necessary but simplifies presentation – Appendix A presents a generalization.

An alternative expression of Assumption 3 is useful for writing the identification result explicitly. For an arbitrary ordering of the \( k := 2^J - 1 \) non-empty subsets \( S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, \)
define the random vector $\Gamma_i = (Z_{S_1i} \ldots Z_{S_ki})'$ from products of the $Z_{ji}$ for $j$ within each subset $S$. That is, each element of $\Gamma_i$ indicates the treatment status of a particular simple compliance group, given $Z_i$. Let $\Sigma$ be the covariance matrix of $\Gamma_i$.

**Lemma 1.** Assumption 3 holds if and only if $\Sigma$ has full rank.

*Proof. See Appendix D.*

Lemma 1 reveals that full support of the instruments is equivalent to there being independent variation in treatment takeup among all of the simple compliance groups.

We may now state the main result:

**Theorem 1.** Under Assumptions 1-3 (independence & exclusion, VM, and full support), for any $c$ satisfying Property M and any measurable function $f(Y)$ for each $d \in \{0, 1\}$:

$$\theta_{fd} = (-1)^{d+1} \frac{E[f(Y_i)h(Z_i)1(D_i = d)]}{E[h(Z_i)D_i]},$$

provided that $P(C_i = 1) > 0$, where $h(Z_i) = \lambda'\Sigma^{-1}(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])$ and

$$\lambda = (E[c(g(S_1), Z_i)], \ldots E[c(g(S_k), Z_i)])'.$$

*Proof. See Appendix D.*

It follows immediately from Theorem 1 that conditional average treatment effects $\Delta_c = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|C_i = 1]$ satisfying Property M are identified as:

$$\Delta_c = E[h(Z_i)Y_i]/E[h(Z_i)D_i]$$

Note that as the numerator of $\Delta_c$ depends on $Z_i$ and $Y_i$ only and the denominator depends on $Z_i$ and $D_i$ only, identification of $\Delta_c$ would hold in a “split-sample” setting where $Y_i$ and $D_i$ are not necessarily linked in the same dataset.

We can also re-express the empirical estimand for $\Delta_c$ delivered by Theorem 1 in a more illuminating form, directly in terms of conditional expectation functions of each of $Y_i$ and $D_i$ on the instruments:

**Corollary 1.** Under the Assumptions of Theorem 1:

$$\Delta_c = \frac{\sum_{z \in Z} \left( \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} \lambda_S A_{S,z} \right) E[Y_i|Z_i = z]}{\sum_{z \in Z} \left( \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} \lambda_S A_{S,z} \right) E[D_i|Z_i = z]}$$

where $\lambda_S$ is as defined in Theorem 1 and $A_{S,z} = \sum_{S \subseteq \{z_1 \ldots S\}} (-1)^{|f_1|}$, with $(z_1, z_0)$ a partition of the indices $j \in \{1 \ldots J\}$ that take a value of zero or one in $z$, respectively.

*Proof. See Appendix D.* The proof of Lemma 1 gives the explicit form of $A$ for $J = 2$. 

14
Intuition for Theorem 5

The basic logic behind Theorem 5 can be appreciated by focusing on the average treatment effect parameters $\Delta_c$, and observing that by Assumption 1 and the law of iterated expectations they can be written as a weighted average over compliance-group specific average treatment effects $\Delta_g := E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|G_i = g]$:

$$\Delta_c = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \left\{ \frac{P(G_i = g)E[c(g, Z_i)]}{E[c(G_i, Z_i)]} \right\} \cdot \Delta_g$$

(3)

where the weights are each proportional to the quantity $E[c(g, Z_i)]$. Now consider a general type of “2SLS-like” estimand, in which a single scalar instrument $h(Z_i)$ is constructed from the vector of instruments $Z_i$ according to some function $h$, and then used in a simple linear IV regression.\footnote{Special cases include two stage least squares: $h(z) = E[D_i|Z_i = z]$, and Wald estimands: $h(z) = \frac{1(Z_i = z)}{P(Z_i = z)} - \frac{1(Z_i = z')}{P(Z_i = z')}$.}

**Proposition 5.** Under Assumption 1 (exclusion and independence):

$$\frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, h(Z_i))}{\text{Cov}(D_i, h(Z_i))} = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \frac{P(G_i = g) \cdot \text{Cov}(D_g(Z_i), h(Z_i))}{\sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} P(G_i = g') \cdot \text{Cov}(D_{g'}(Z_i), h(Z_i))} \cdot \Delta_g$$

Proof. See the Supplemental Material for direct proof of this form. \qed

Proposition 5 reveals that such 2SLS-like estimands also uncover a weighted average of the $\Delta_g$, where the weight placed on each compliance group $g$ is governed by the covariance between $D_g(Z_i)$ and $h(Z_i)$. Comparing with Equation 3 we see that a 2SLS-like estimand can identify $\Delta_c$ if the function $h$ is chosen in such a way that $\text{Cov}(D_g(Z_i), h(Z_i)) = E[c(g, Z_i)]$ for all the compliance groups $g$. However, since the covariance operator is linear, the linear dependencies examined in Section 3.2 translate into a set of linear restrictions among these weights, captured by the matrix $M_j$. Property M guarantees that the vector of $E[c(g(F_i), Z_i)]$ across Sperner families $F$ belongs to the column-space of the matrix $M_j$, whatever the distribution of $Z_i$. What remains to secure identification is then simply to tune the covariances for the simple compliance groups, which is achieved by the construction of $h(Z_i)$ in Theorem 4.

The role of Property M in Theorem 4 can be thought of as emerging from there being under VM more compliance groups in $\mathcal{G}^c$ than there are independent pairs of points in the support of the instruments. By contrast, under IAM with $J$ binary instruments both are generally equal to $2^J - 1$, and it is possible to identify the average treatment effect $\Delta_{g'} := E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|G_i = g']$ within any single such compliance group $g'$ (and hence also obtain any desired convex combination of the $\Delta_{g'}$). However, under VM the corresponding choice $c(g, z) = \mathbb{1}(g = g')$ fails to satisfy Property M, and we will not be able to identify the $\Delta_g$ individually in general.\footnote{We can see this in a simple example with $J = 2$ and $g = Z_1$ complier. In this case Property M would require that $c(\text{eager complier}, z) = c(Z_1 \text{ complier}, z) + c(Z_2 \text{ complier}, z) - c(\text{reluctant complier}, z)$, i.e. that $0 = 1 + 0 - 1$, cf. Eq. 2.}
zero weight on always-takers or never-takers on the other hand is familiar from analysis based on IAM.

4.2 Examples from the family of identified parameters

While Property M introduced in Section 4 itself is somewhat abstract, the following result shows that it is equivalent to \( c(g, z) \) being equal to a linear combination of selection functions \( D_g(z) \).

**Proposition 6.** A function \( c : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) satisfies Property M if and only if

\[
c(g, z) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \{D_g(u_k(z)) - D_g(l_k(z))\}
\]

for some \( K \leq J/2 \), where \( u_k(\cdot) \) and \( l_k(\cdot) \) are functions \( \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z} \) such that \( u_k(z) \geq l_k(z) \) component-wise while \( l_k(z) \geq u_{k+1}(z) \) component-wise, for all \( k \) and \( z \in \mathcal{Z} \).

**Proof.** See Appendix D.

Proposition 6 yields a natural interpretation of average treatment effects that satisfy Property M, which is that they can be written as

\[
\Delta_c = \mathbb{E}\left[ Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) \bigg| \bigcup_{k=1}^{K} \{D_i(u_k(Z_i)) > D_i(l_k(Z_i))\}\right]
\]

for some functions \( u_k \) and \( l_k \) having the properties stated in Proposition 6.15 From Equation 4 we see that the types of complier groups that identified parameters can condition on are groups of individuals that are responsive to any of a set of \( K \) instrument transitions which each induce only one-way flows into treatment. This feature is in fact common to both IAM and VM. Indeed under IAM, identified parameters can also be written in a similar form, as discussed in the proof Proposition 6.

While the form of Equation 4 is somewhat familiar from LATE results under IAM, the additional structure of VM yields new causal parameters that bear economically interesting interpretations. The remainder of this section continues to focus on average treatment effects \( \Delta_c \), though \( \theta_{ed} \) parameters can be defined for the analogous groups. Table 3 presents some leading examples of \( \Delta_c \) that satisfy Property M, as can be seen by applying Proposition 6. All of the cases presented in Table 3 admit the form of Equation 4 with a single term \( (K = 1) \), given in the third column.

I call the first item in Table 3 the “all compliers LATE” (ACL), which is the average treatment effect among all units who are not always-takers or never-takers. This is the largest subgroup of the population for which treatment effects can be generally point

\[\text{Note that } \mathbb{E}[c(g, Z_i)] = 0 \text{ would also be necessary for any additional groups } g \text{ for whom, given the distribution of } Z_i, \text{ there is no actual variation in treatment status. In the baseline analysis, such additional groups will be ruled out by Assumption 3.}\]

\[\text{This expression is obtained by substituting } C_i = c(G_i, Z_i), \text{ and noting that } \sum_{k=1}^{K} D_i(u_k(Z_i)) - D_i(l_k(Z_i)) \text{ equals one if and only if } D_i(u_k(Z_i)) > D_i(l_k(Z_i)) \text{ for some } k.\]
identified from instrument variation.\footnote{We may of course still be able to say something about treatment effects for never-takers and always-takers given additional restrictions (see e.g., Section 4.3 for bounds on the unconditional ATE when potential outcomes are bounded).} With two instruments, the ACL averages over all units who are $Z_1$, $Z_2$, eager or reluctant compliers. In the returns to schooling example, we can equivalently describe the ACL as the average treatment effect among individuals who would go to college were it close and cheap, but would not were it far and expensive.

On the other end of the spectrum, the final row of Table 3 gives the most disaggregated type of parameter satisfying Property M, what might be called a \textit{partial treatment effect} $PTE_j(z^*_j)$. This is the average treatment effect among individuals that move into treatment when a single instrument $j$ is shifted from zero to one, while the other instrument values are held fixed at some explicit vector of values $z^*_j$. An example is the average treatment effect among individuals who go to college if it is close and cheap, but not if it is far and cheap. Ultimately, all $\Delta_e$ satisfying Property M can be written as convex combinations of such partial treatment effects though the number could be quite large (see Supplemental Material for an explicit expression). However, the PTEs still combine compliance groups: the example above for instance combines proximity compliers with reluctant compliers.

The remaining parameters in Table 3 constitute a middle ground between the granular Pt E’s and the very broad averaging of the ACL. For example, the ACL is a special case of what I call a \textit{set local average treatment effect}, or $SLATE_j$, which captures the average treatment effect among units that move into treatment when all instruments in some fixed set $J$ are changed from 0 to 1, with the other instruments not in $J$ fixed at their realized values. The ACL is a special case in which this set is all of the instruments: $J = \{1, 2, \ldots, J\}$. When $J$ contains just one instrument index, SLATE recovers treatment effects among those who would “comply” with variation in that single instrument. For example, $SLATE_{(2)}$ is the average treatment effect among individuals who don’t go to college if it is far, but do if it is close. This parameter may be of interest to policymakers considering whether to expand a community college to a new campus, for example. The group of individuals included in $SLATE_{(2)}$ are $Z_2$ compliers, eager compliers with high tuition rates ($Z_{11} = 0$), and reluctant compliers with low tuition rates ($Z_{11} = 1$).\footnote{Note that a single-instrument SLATE like $SLATE_{(2)}$ does not generally correspond to using $Z_2$ alone as an instrument, since this latter estimand does not control for variation in $Z_1$ that is correlated with $Z_2$. If on the other hand the instruments are independent of one another, using 2SLS may be justified, as I show in the Supplemental Material.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$c(g, z)$</th>
<th>Proposition form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$ACL$</td>
<td>$\mathbb{1}(g \in \mathcal{G}^c)$</td>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_g(1, 1 \ldots 1) - \mathcal{D}_g(0, 0 \ldots 0)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SLATE_j$</td>
<td>$\mathcal{D}<em>g((1 \ldots 1), z</em>{-j}) - \mathcal{D}<em>g((0 \ldots 0), z</em>{-j})$</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SLATT_j$</td>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_g(z) \cdot (\mathcal{D}<em>g((1 \ldots 1), z</em>{-j}) - \mathcal{D}<em>g((0 \ldots 0), z</em>{-j}))$</td>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_g(z) - \mathcal{D}<em>g((0 \ldots 0), z</em>{-j})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SLATTU_j$</td>
<td>$(1 - \mathcal{D}_g(z)) \cdot (\mathcal{D}<em>g((1 \ldots 1), z</em>{-j}) - \mathcal{D}<em>g((0 \ldots 0), z</em>{-j}))$</td>
<td>$\mathcal{D}<em>g((1 \ldots 1), z</em>{-j}) - \mathcal{D}_g(z)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PTE_j(z^*_j)$</td>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_g(1, z^<em>_j) - \mathcal{D}_g(0, z^</em>_j)$</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Leading parameters of interest satisfying Property M, including: the All Compliers LATE, set LATEs, set LATEs on the treated, set LATEs on the untreated, and partial treatment effects (see text for details).
For a discrete instrumental variable mapped to multiple binary instruments by Proposition 4, the LATE among units moved into treatment between any two of its values will also be an example of a SLATE. For example, if $Z_1$ has support $z_1 < z_2 < z_3 < z_4$, the average treatment effect among individuals for which $D_i(z_4, Z_{-1,i}) > D_i(z_2, Z_{-1,i})$ corresponds to $SLATE_J$ with $J = \{\tilde{Z}_3, \tilde{Z}_4\}$. SLATE thus allows the practitioner to flexibly condition upon compliance with respect to individual or joint variation in the instruments.

The treatment effect parameters $SLATT_J$ and $SLATU_J$ in the final two rows of Table 3 are similar to $SLATE_J$ but additionally condition on units’ realized treatment status. For example $SLATT_{\{1,2\}}$ with our two instruments averages over individuals who do go to college, but wouldn’t have were it far and expensive.\(^{18}\) SLATT and SLATU can also be used to construct bounds on the average treatment effect among the treated or untreated, when potential outcomes are bounded, following logic for the ATE given in Section 4.3.

To construct some further examples of identified parameters from the ones mentioned in Table 3, one could make use of a closure property of the set of $\Delta_c$ that satisfy Property M. Let $C$ denote the set of $c : G \times Z \to \{0, 1\}$ that satisfy Property M, and let $c_a(g, z)$ and $c_b(g, z)$ be two functions in $C$. Then it is straightforward to show that $c_a(g, z) - c_b(g, z) \in C$ if and only if $c_b(g, z) \leq c_a(g, z)$ for all $z \in Z, g \in G^c$.\(^{19}\) We can use this observation to generate parameters that condition on the “complement” of the complier group for $\Delta_{ca}$. For example, with $J = 2$:

$$E[\Delta_i | G_i \in G^c - \{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) - D_i(0, Z_{2i})\}]$$

yields the average treatment effect among individuals who are counted in the ACL but not in $SLATE_{\{1\}}$. These individuals would not respond to a counterfactual reduction in college tuition alone, but would respond if both instruments were shifted in concert.

### 4.3 Further results on identification

This section outlines some further results related to identification under VM. I begin with several observations that strengthen or extend the reach of Theorem 1.

#### Consequences and extensions of Theorem 1

1) **The size of the relevant complier sub-population is identified:** The argument used in Theorem 1 can be leveraged to show that the proportion of relevant “compliers” associated with any causal parameter satisfying Property M is also identified, and is the denominator of the associated estimand:

\(^{18}\)Note that with a single binary instrument, $SLATT_{\{1\}}$ coincides with $ACL = SLATE_{\{1\}}$, as $E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|D_i = 1, G_i = \text{complier}] = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|Z_i = 1, \text{complier}] = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|\text{complier}]$, using Assumption 1. However, when the group $G^c$ consists of more than one group, the “all-compliers” version of $SLATT$ generally differs from $ACL$.

\(^{19}\)This follows from linearity and the definition of Property M, while $c_b(g, z) \leq c_a(g, z)$ is necessary for the image of the new function to remain $\{0, 1\}$.
Corollary 2 to Theorem 1. Make Assumptions 1-3. For any $c$ that satisfies Property M, $P(C_i = 1)$ is identified as $E[h(Z_i)D_i]$, where $h(z)$ is as given in Theorem 1.

Proof. See Appendix D.

2) Property M as a necessary condition. Property M was introduced in this section as part of a set of sufficient conditions for identification of $\Delta_c$. One can show that, loosely speaking, any identified $\Delta_c$ must satisfy Property M. In this sense, Property M is also a necessary condition for identification. The simplest form of this result I express in terms of so-called “IV-like estimands” introduced by Mogstad et al. (2018), which are any cross moment $E[s(D_i, Z_i)Y_i]$ between $Y_i$ and a function of treatment and instruments. Let $P_{DZ}$ denote the joint distribution of $D$ and $Z$, which is identified. Then:

**Proposition 7.** Suppose $\Delta_c$ is identified by a finite set of IV-like estimands and $P_{DZ}$, provided that Assumptions 1-3 hold and $P(C_i = 1) > 0$. Then $\Delta_c$ satisfies Property M.

Proof. See Appendix D.

The result can be strengthened given regularity conditions on the support of potential outcomes:

**Proposition 8.** Suppose that the support of each potential outcome conditional on $G_i = g$ is independent of all $g \in G^C$ for which $P(G_i = g) > 0$, and that the density (or p.m.f.) of each $Y_i(d)$ is uniformly bounded and separated from zero over that support, conditional on each such $G_i = g$. Then if $\Delta_c$ is point identified from the distribution of $(Y_i, D_i, Z_i)$ whenever Assumptions 1-3 hold and $P(C_i = 1) > 0$, $\Delta_c$ must satisfy Property M.


3) PM alone does not lead to identification. We can demonstrate that the assumption of vector monotonicity does have identifying power in Theorem 1 above and beyond that of partial monotonicity. For the $J = 2$ case, it is possible to see by explicit enumeration of the possible compliance groups that Theorem 1 cannot hold under PM only:

**Proposition 9.** When $J = 2$, if PM holds but neither VM nor IAM hold, the ACL is not point identified from knowledge of any set of IV-like estimands and $P_{DZ}$.

Proof. See Appendix D.

4) Linear dependency among the instruments: Assumption 3 is stronger than is strictly necessary for identification, since linear dependencies between products of the instruments may not pose a problem if the corresponding “weights” in $\Delta_c$ do not need be tuned independently from one another. In Appendix A I give a version of Assumption 3 and generalization of the identification theorem that can accommodate instrument support restrictions and/or non-rectangular $Z$ (for instance after applying Proposition 4).
5) Conditional distributions of the potential outcomes. By choosing \( f(Y) = \mathbb{1}(Y \leq y) \) in Theorem \[1\] for some value \( y \) in the support of \( Y_i \), we can identify the CDF of each potential outcome at \( y \) conditional on \( C_i = 1 \) as: 

\[
Y_{(d)|C=1}(y) = \left( -1 \right)^{d+1} \frac{E[y|Z_i \leq y]}{E[z|D_i = 1]} 
\]

(note that unlike identification of \( \Delta \), this requires observing \((Y_i, Z_i, D_i)\) all in the same sample). This allows for the identification of \( C_i = 1 \) conditional quantile treatment effects, bounds on the distribution of treatment effects (Fan and Park, 2010), or distributional treatment effects: 

\[
F_{Y(1)|C=1}(y) - F_{Y(0)|C=1}(y) = \frac{E[y|Z_i \leq y]}{E[z|D_i = 1]}. 
\]

6) Covariates. If Assumption 1 holds only conditional on a set of covariates \( X \), and Assumption 3 also holds conditionally, then Theorem \[1\] can be taken to hold within a covariate cell \( X_i = x \). In Appendix \[B\] I describe how covariates can be accommodated nonparametrically, or parametrically as implemented in Section \[6\].

Identification of the ACL from a single Wald ratio

The population estimand corresponding to the all compliers LATE takes on a particularly simple form. In particular, the ACL is equal to the following single Wald ratio:

\[
\rho_{\hat{Z},\hat{Z}} := \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i = \hat{Z}]-E[Y_i|Z_i = \hat{Z}]}{E[D_i|Z_i = \hat{Z}]-E[D_i|Z_i = \hat{Z}]} \tag{5}
\]

where \( \hat{Z} = (1, \ldots, 1)' \) and \( Z = (0, \ldots, 0)' \), provided that \( P(Z_i = \hat{Z}) > 0 \) and \( P(Z_i = Z) > 0 \), and the denominator is non-zero.\(^{20}\) This can be seen by applying the law of iterated expectations over compliance groups, or using Theorem \[1\]. That \( \rho_{\hat{Z},\hat{Z}} \) is equivalent to the expression given for ACL by Theorem \[1\] is not obvious, but this can be shown by applying Corollary \[1\] and using properties of the matrix \( A \).

Thus the ACL is identified by a remarkably simple quantity: one can restrict the population to \( Z_i \in \{\hat{Z}, Z\} \) and use \( \mathbb{1}(Z_i = \hat{Z}) \) as a single instrument. However, Theorem \[1\] yields identification of a much larger class of parameters than ACL alone, which are not generally equal to a single Wald ratio. Furthermore, as we will see in Section \[5\] the alternative form of Theorem \[1\] suggests a means of improving estimation of the ACL. In particular, when the number of sample observations in \( \hat{Z} \) and \( \hat{Z} \) is not large, the Wald ratio \( \rho_{\hat{Z},\hat{Z}} \) may be difficult to estimate precisely, and the sample analog of Eq. \[5\] can be expected to perform poorly. A regularization procedure based on the expression for \( \Delta_c \) from Theorem \[1\] can be helpful in such cases, as shown in Appendix \[C\].

Identified sets for ATE, ATT, and ATU

One drawback of the identification results presented is that since parameters like \( \Delta_c \) satisfying Property \( M \) exclude never-takers and always-takers by assumption, their definition always depends upon the set of instruments available. This is not ideal unless the complier subpopulation is directly of interest.

\(^{20}\) An analogous result holds under IAM as well with finite instruments, where in that case we take any \( \hat{Z} \in \arg\max_z E[D_i|Z_i = z] \) and \( \tilde{Z} \in \arg\min_z E[D_i|Z_i = z] \), and define \( G^c := \{g \in G : E[D g(Z_i)] \in (0, 1)\}. \)
When $Y_i$ has bounded support, the parameters identified by Theorem 1 can be used to generate sharp worst-case bounds in the spirit of Manski (1990) for the unconditional average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU). Here I show this for the ATE to illustrate – identified sets for the ATT and ATU can be constructed by analogous steps. Suppose that $Y_i(d) \in [\underline{Y}, \bar{Y}]$ with probability one, for each $d \in \{0,1\}$. Then bounds for the ATE can be constructed by noting that:

1. $ATE := E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)] = p_n \Delta_n + p_n \Delta_n + (1 - p_t - p_u) ACL$
2. $p_n \Delta_n \in [\underline{Y} \cdot p_n - E[Y_i(1 - D_i)|Z_i = \bar{Z}], \bar{Y} \cdot p_n - E[Y_i(1 - D_i)|Z_i = \bar{Z}]]$
3. $p_n \Delta_n \in [E[Y_i D_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}] - p_n \cdot \bar{Y}, E[Y_i D_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}] - p_n \cdot \underline{Y}]$

where $p_u := P(G_i = a.t.) = E[D_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}]$ and $p_n := P(G_i = n.t.) = E[1 - D_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}]$.

Note that under the bounded support condition the ATE can be partially identified whenever its conditional analog is identified for some subgroup of the population, and the size of that subgroup is also identified. Using variation in all of the instruments, as the ACL does, for the conditioning event leads to the narrowest possible such bounds.

## 5 Estimation

This section proposes a natural two-step estimator for the family of identified causal parameters introduced in Section 4 focusing on the conditional average treatment effects $\Delta_c$. Theorem 1 establishes that $\Delta_c$ satisfying Property M are equal to a ratio of two population expectations – thus a natural plug-in estimator simply replaces these with their sample counterparts, provided $h(Z_i)$ is a strong enough instrument to avoid any weak identification issues.

Following $h(Z_i) = \lambda' \Sigma^{-1}(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])$ from Theorem 1 define $\hat{H} = n \tilde{\Gamma} \tilde{\Gamma}^{-1} \lambda$, where $\tilde{\Gamma}$ is a $n \times k$ design matrix with entries $\tilde{\Gamma}_{il} = Z_{S_l} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n Z_{S_j}$, where $S_l$ is the $l$th subset according to some arbitrary ordering of the $k := 2^J - 1$ non-empty subsets $S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}$. Note that the rows of $\tilde{\Gamma}$ correspond to observations of the vector $\Gamma_i$ introduced in Section 4.1 de-meaned with respect to the sample mean. The vector $\lambda$ is a sample estimator of $\lambda = (E[c(g(S_1), Z_1)], \ldots, E[c(g(S_k), Z_1)])'$, given explicitly below for our leading examples.

Given the vector $\hat{H}$ as defined above, consider $\hat{\rho} = (\hat{H}' D)^{-1}(\hat{H}' Y)$, where $Y$ and $D$ are $n \times 1$ vectors of observations of $Y_i$ and $D_i$, respectively. Noticing that for any vector $V \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $(\tilde{\Gamma}' \tilde{\Gamma})^{-1} \tilde{\Gamma}' V$ is the sample linear projection coefficient vector of $V$ on the de-meaned sample vectors of $Z_{S_l}$, we can re-express it by the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem as $(0, \lambda')(\Gamma')^{-1} \Gamma' V$, where $\Gamma$ adds a column of ones and skips the demeaning. The estimator can now be written as $\hat{\rho} = \hat{\rho}(\lambda)$ where

$$\hat{\rho}(\lambda) = ((0, \lambda')(\Gamma' \Gamma)^{-1} \Gamma' D)^{-1} (0, \lambda')(\Gamma' \Gamma)^{-1} \Gamma' Y$$ (6)
Assume existence of \((\Gamma^\Gamma)^{-1}\) in finite sample, and note that its population analog exists as a consequence of Assumption 3. When Assumption 3 does not hold but identification is still possible (see Appendix A), the matrices \(\hat{\Gamma}^\Gamma\) and \(\Gamma\) may be defined in the same way but using only sets \(S\) within a smaller collection \(\mathcal{F}\). For example, when using construction of Proposition 4 that maps discrete to binary instruments, \(\mathcal{F}\) can be taken to include all sets of the final binary instruments that do not contain distinct \(Z\) from the same original discrete instrument. In all cases, let \(\mathcal{F}\) index the elements of \(\Gamma_i\), where \(\mathcal{F} = \{S \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset\}\) in the baseline setting.

**Comparison with 2SLS:** Note that the estimator \(\hat{\rho}(\lambda)\) in Equation 6 is very similar in form to a “fully-saturated” 2SLS estimator that includes an indicator for each value of \(Z_i \in Z\) in the first stage. Indeed, that estimator is \(\hat{\rho}_{2sls} = (D^T(\Gamma^\Gamma)^{-1}D)^{-1}D^T(\Gamma^\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma Y\)\(^{21}\) The key difference is that rather than aggregating over linear projection coefficients \((\Gamma^\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma V\) for \(V \in \{D, Y\}\) using the weights \(D^T(\Gamma^\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma\) (which are governed asymptotically by the statistical distribution of \(D_i\) and \(Z_i\)), \(\hat{\rho}(\lambda)\) uses weights \((0, \lambda)^T\), chosen to match the desired parameter of interest. Relative to 2SLS, \(\hat{\rho}(\lambda)\) can be thought of as sacrificing some statistical efficiency in order to guarantee that it recovers a well-defined causal parameter under VM. In Section C.1 I discuss regaining some of that lost efficiency through regularization, which is borne out in the simulation in Appendix C. It bears emphasizing that with a large number of instruments, \(\hat{\rho}\) is no more “expensive” than 2SLS, both involve computing a pair of linear projections with the same number of terms. This is despite the fact that the richness of possible selection behavior is more more complex under VM than under IAM, scaling as \(D^J\) rather than \(2^J\).

Under regularity conditions (see Theorem 2 in Appendix C), we will have that for any \(\hat{\lambda} \xrightarrow{P} \lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{F}|}\): 

\[
\hat{\rho}(\hat{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{P} \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \sum_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} P(G_i = g)[M_J\lambda]_g \cdot \Delta_g
\]

Matching the RHS of the above to particular estimands \(\Delta_c\) that satisfy Property M is achieved by choosing \(\hat{\lambda}\). Table 4 gives natural sample estimators for ACL, SLATE, SLATT, SLATU and PTE that are consistent. Note that in the case of the ACL \(\hat{\lambda}\) does not depend on the data and thus no “first-step” is necessary in estimation.

**Regularization:** Consider the ACL, and recall from Section 4.3 that it is equal to a single Wald ratio. A natural alternative Wald estimator of the ACL is thus:

\[
\hat{\rho}_{\bar{Z}, Z} : = \frac{\hat{E}[Y_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}] - \hat{E}[Y_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}]}{\hat{E}[D_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}] - \hat{E}[D_i|Z_i = \bar{Z}]}
\] (7)

where recall that under Assumption 3 \(\bar{Z} = (111 \ldots 1)'\) or \(\bar{Z} = (000 \ldots 0)'\). It turns out that \(\hat{\rho}_{\bar{Z}, Z}\) and \(\hat{\rho}(1, 1, \ldots 1)\)' in Equation 6 are in fact numerically equivalent in finite

\(^{21}\)The proof of Corollary 1 gives the basis transformation from a design matrix of indicators to \(\Gamma\), which cancels in \(\hat{\rho}_{2sls}\).
Parameter | Estimator $\hat{\lambda}$ of population $\lambda$
---|---
ACL | $(1, 1, \ldots, 1)'$
$SLATE_J$ | $\hat{\lambda}_S = \mathbb{1}(J \cap S \neq \emptyset) \hat{P}(Z_{S-J,i} = 1)$
$SLATT_J$ | $\hat{\lambda}_S = \mathbb{1}(J \cap S \neq \emptyset) \hat{P}(Z_{S,i} = 1)$
$SLATU_J$ | $\hat{\lambda}_S = \mathbb{1}(J \cap S \neq \emptyset) \hat{P}(Z_{S-J,i}(1 - Z_{J,i}) = 1)$
$PTE_J(z^*,j)$ | $\hat{\lambda}_S = \mathbb{1}(z^*_j \cup j = S)$

Table 4: Estimators $\hat{\lambda}$ for the leading parameters of interest. $S - J$ denotes the set difference $\{j : j \in S, j \notin J\}$ and $z^*_j$ denotes the set of instruments that are equal to one in $z^*_j$.

In situations where there is non-zero but small support on the points $\bar{Z}$ and $Z$, we may thus expect that $\hat{\rho}((1, 1, \ldots, 1)')$ may perform quite poorly as an estimator of ACL in small samples, since it effectively ignores all of the data for which $Z_i \notin \{Z, \bar{Z}\}$. This issue is mentioned by Frölich (2007) in the context of IAM, in which case $\hat{\rho}_{Z,Z}$ is also consistent for the ACL with finite $Z$ (see footnote 20). Appendix C develops and investigates the performance of a data-driven regularization procedure to ameliorate this problem, while also showing asymptotic normality of the estimator with or without such regularization. Appendix C also reports a simulation study that shows the regularization procedure can indeed be helpful in practice.

6 Revisiting the returns to college

In this section I apply the results to study the labor market returns to college. In the past, this literature has based IV methods on either an assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, or the traditional IAM notion of monotonicity. Using the methods developed in this paper valid under VM, I find evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects across compliance groups, although statistical precision is an issue due to the small sample. This complements existing results that find evidence of heterogeneity, but are based upon IAM – a less plausible assumption in this context. For different choice of the instruments than I use, MTW present a test of IAM in this empirical setting and find evidence that it does not hold. In the Supplemental Material, I also present a second empirical application of my methods to the effects of children on labor supply.

6.1 Sample and implementation details

I use the dataset from Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) (henceforth CHV) constructed from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The sample consists of 1,747 white males in the U.S., first interviewed in 1979 at ages that ranged from 14 to 22, and then again annually. The outcome of interest $Y_i$ is the log of individual $i$’s wage

---

$^{22}$To see this, note that the vector $H$ of $H_i$ solves the system of equations $\Gamma’H_i = (1 \ldots 1)’$. Among vectors that are in the column space of $\Gamma$, $H$ is the unique such solution, given that the design matrix $\Gamma$ has full column rank. One can readily verify that $\Gamma’H_i = (1, 1, \ldots, 1)$ with the choice $H_i = \frac{1(Z_{i}=(1 \ldots 1))}{\hat{P}(Z_{i}=(0 \ldots 0))} - \frac{1(Z_{i}=(0 \ldots 0))}{\hat{P}(Z_{i}=(0 \ldots 0))}$, and that this $H = \Gamma \eta$ with $\eta = (1/\hat{P}(Z_{i}=(1 \ldots 1)), 0, \ldots, 0, -1/\hat{P}(Z_{i}=(0 \ldots 0)))$. 23
in 1991, and treatment $D_i = 1$ indicates $i$ attended at least some college. As in CHV, treatment effects are expressed in roughly per-year equivalents by dividing by four.

CHV consider four separate instruments for schooling. In a baseline setup, I use the two binary instruments from our running example: tuition and proximity. A second setup then adds the remaining two instruments, which capture local labor market conditions when a student is in high school. The first two instruments are defined as follows:

$Z_{2i} = 1$ indicates the presence of a public college in $i$'s county of residence at age 14, while $Z_{1i} = 1$ indicates that average tuition rates local to $i$’s residence around age 17 falls below the sample median, which corresponds to about $2,170 in 1993 dollars. This represents one particular choice of how the underlying continuous instrument from CHV can be discretized into a binary variable, but note that the methods in this paper could also be used with tuition recast as a discrete variable with a rich set of tuition levels. The Supplemental Material reports the distribution of the underlying tuition variable, whose definition is described further in CHV.

While VM is a natural assumption for the tuition and proximity instruments, a conditional version of instrument validity is more plausible than Assumption 1. Following CHV, I assume:

$$\{(Y_i(1), Y_i(0), G_i) \perp Z_i \} | X_i$$

where $X_i$ is a vector of observed covariates unaffected by treatment. Conditioning on $X_i$ can help control for unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with location during teenage years. Appendix B considers extensions of the basic identification and estimation results to include such covariates. The main result of the Appendix is that while conditional average treatment effects $\Delta_c(x) := E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | C_i = c, X_i = x]$ can be identified for each $x$ in the support of $X_i$, the unconditional $\Delta_c$ turns out to be simpler to estimate, particularly when the two conditional expectation functions $E[Y_i | Z_i = z, X_i = x]$ and $E[D_i | Z_i = z, X_i = x]$ are additively separable between $z$ and $x$. In this case, the only change required to the estimator presented in Section 5 is to “control” semiparametrically for $X_i$ in the linear projections of $Y_i$ and $D_i$ onto the instruments. In particular, when

$$E[Y_i | Z_i = z, X_i = x] = y(z) + w(x)$$

and $E[D_i | Z_i = z, X_i = x] = d(z) + v(x)$

for some functions $y, w, d$ and $v$, then a causal parameter $\Delta_c$ can be estimated as:

$$\hat{\Delta}_c = \frac{\sum_{z \in Z} \left( \sum_{S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, J\}, S \neq \emptyset} \hat{\lambda}_S A_{S,z} \right) \hat{y}(z)}{\sum_{z \in Z} \left( \sum_{S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, J\}, S \neq \emptyset} \hat{\lambda}_S A_{S,z} \right) \hat{d}(z)}$$

(9)

where the matrix $A$ is defined in Corollary 1 to Theorem 1, the estimators $\hat{\lambda}_S$ are as given in Section 5, and $\hat{y}(z)$ and $\hat{d}(z)$ are consistent estimators of the functions $y(z)$ and $d(z)$. Note that as the vector $\Gamma_i$ contains a full set of interactions between the binary instruments, both $y(z)$ and $d(z)$ are automatically linear in $\Gamma_i$. If the functions $w(x)$ and $v(x)$ are taken to also be linear in $x$, Equation 9 can be reduced to a simple generalization of the
estimator from Section 5: \[ \hat{\Delta}_c = \left( (0, \hat{\lambda})' (\Gamma' \mathcal{M}_X \Gamma)^{-1} \Gamma' \mathcal{M}_X D \right)^{-1} (0, \hat{\lambda})' (\Gamma' \mathcal{M}_X \Gamma)^{-1} \Gamma' \mathcal{M}_X Y \]

where \( \mathcal{M}_X \) is a projection onto the orthogonal complement of the design matrix of \( X \).

I follow this strategy, computing standard errors by applying the delta method to the system of regression equations (one each for \( D_i \) and \( Y_i \), along with a regression on a constant for each component of \( \hat{\lambda} \)), allowing for heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation between the equations.

I follow CHV and as control variables a student’s corrected Armed Forces Qualification Test score, mother’s years of education, number of siblings, “permanent” local earnings in county of residence at 17, mother’s years of education, number of siblings, “permanent” unemployment in county of residence at 17, earnings in county of residence in 1991, and unemployment in state of residence in 1991, along with an indicator for urban residence at 17, and cohort dummies. The definition and construction of these variables is described in CHV. Also following CHV, squares of the continuous control variables are included in \( X \), relaxing the assumption of strict linearity in each. The above variables represent the union of variables that CHV use in their first stage and outcome equation, with one exception: I drop years of experience in 1991 since it may itself be affected by schooling, as MTW do as well in their empirical application. In the two instrument setup, I also add to \( X \) the two “unused” instruments from CHV and their squares: long-run local earnings in county of residence at 17 and long run permanent unemployment in state of residence at 17.

### 6.2 Results from baseline setup with two instruments

The left panel of Table 5 reports a cross tabulation of the two instruments. As noted, the observations are relatively evenly distributed across the four cells. The instruments are positively correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of about 0.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of the instruments</th>
<th>Mean fitted propensity scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Z_2 = \text{&quot;close&quot;} )</td>
<td>( Z_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>\begin{tabular}{cc} \text{cheap} \ &amp; \text{expensive} \ 0.487 &amp; 0.451 \end{tabular}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Z_1 = \text{&quot;cheap&quot;} )</td>
<td>\begin{tabular}{cc} \text{expensive} \ &amp; \text{cheap} \ 0.509 &amp; 0.530 \end{tabular}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Left: number of observations having each pair of values of the instruments, with total sample size \( N = 1,747 \). Right: fitted propensity scores estimated by linear regression, evaluated at the sample mean of the \( X \) variables.

The right panel of Table 5 reports the conditional propensity score function \( E[D_i | Z_i = z, X_i = x] \) estimated as described above and averaged over the empirical distribution of \( X \).

\[^{23}\text{Note that while Appendix C Theorem 2 provides a variance expression for } \hat{\rho} \hat{\lambda}, \text{ this does not cover the case with covariates, so I do not implement an estimator based upon it here. Also, as the distribution of } Z_i \text{ is fairly well balanced across the four cells of } Z, \text{ I do not implement the regularization procedure proposed in Appendix C.}\]
(in practice, evaluated at the mean of $X_i$). This allows us to take the \((\text{expensive, far})\) cell 45.1\% as an estimate of the overall proportion of never-takers in the population, while the share of never-takers is estimated to be 47.0\%. The remaining roughly 8\% of the population are generalized “compliers” consisting of the tuition ($Z_1$), proximity ($Z_2$), eager and reluctant compliers. From the table we can also see that $P(D_i(\text{expensive, close}, x) > D_i(\text{expensive, far}, x)) \approx 5.7\%$, and $P(D_i(\text{cheap, far}, x) > D_i(\text{expensive, far}, x)) \approx 3.6\%$. Combining these figures and the compliance group definitions from Section 3 we see that between 1.5\% and 3.6\% of the population are eager compliers, while no more than 2.1\% are reluctant compliers. Similarly, no more than 3.6\% are tuition compliers, and between 2.1\% and 5.7\% are proximity compliers. Overall, the data are compatible with a roughly even split between the four groups, but it is also possible that proximity compliers account for more than half of all generalized compliers.

We now turn to treatment effect estimates. Figure 2 reports estimates of several of the parameters introduced in Section 4 alongside fully-saturated 2SLS for comparison. Consider first the All Compliers LATE (ACL): the point estimate of 0.14 indicates that having attended a year of college increases 1991 wages of all compliers by roughly 14\% on average. This estimate is within the range of roughly -0.1 to 0.3 of the marginal treatment effect (MTE) function estimated by CHV under the assumption of IAM, and is similar to their point estimate of the average treatment on the treated under a parametric normal selection model. The 2SLS estimate from Figure 2 yields a similar value at 0.12.

Note that given the limited sample size none of the estimates are quite significant at even the 90\% level. I thus focus discussion on the point estimates for the sake of illustration with this important caveat.

The point estimates from the remaining rows in Figure 2 suggest that the ACL aggre-
gates over substantial heterogeneity in the population. For example, the tuition SLATE suggests that a year of college has no average effect on the wages of individuals who move into treatment if and only if a college is nearby, given local affordability. Recall that this group includes proximity compliers, eager compliers for whom college is expensive, and reluctant compliers for whom it is cheap. On the other hand, the SLATE for tuition is about three times as large as the ACL. These results are suggestive that the average treatment effect among tuition compliers is larger than it is among proximity compliers, however the sign of the difference is not identified.

Note finally that the point estimates for \( SLATU \) and \( SLATT \) suggest that among the compliers averaged over by the ACL, those who in fact go to college have greater treatment effects on average than those who do not, which is consistent with some students selecting on the basis of their future gains.

6.3 Results with all four instruments

I now add the additional two instruments from CHV, to increase comparability and emphasize the scalability of the proposed methods to multiple instruments.

Accordingly, we let \( Z_{3i} \) indicate that local earnings in \( i \)'s county of residence at 17 is below the sample median, and \( Z_{4i} \) indicates that unemployment in \( i \)'s state of residence at 17 is above the sample 25% percentile. This threshold is chosen as it yields a stronger first stage as compared with the median. The two local labor market variables and their squares are removed from the vector of controls \( X_i \). Vector monotonicity implies that the propensity score is component-wise monotonic in the four instruments, implying 32 linear inequalities among first stage coefficients. Although not reported here, t-statistics are positive for all but six of these hypotheses, and none is rejected at the 10% level.

Table 3 shows that the ACL is not appreciably changed from the case with only two instruments, and we again have that the tuition SLATE is much larger and the proximity SLATE close to zero. The SLATE for low local wages occupies an intermediate value, while the SLATE for high unemployment is estimated to be negative (suggesting that more schooling reduces wages), but with a much larger standard error. The unemployment SLATE is so imprecisely estimated in part because its corresponding complier group is the smallest of the estimands considered: with just 2% of the population.

To compare these results more directly with CHV, recall that the marginal treatment effect function (e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil 2005) is defined as

\[
MTE(u, x) := E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|U_i = u, X_i = x]
\]

where \( U_i \) is a uniformly distributed heterogeneity parameter that can be thought of as a proclivity against treatment in the selection model \( D_i(z, x) = 1(P(z, x) \geq U_i) \), with \( P(z, x) := E[D_i|Z_i = z, X_i = x] \) the propensity score function. CHV estimate the MTE function evaluated at the mean of \( x \) to decrease monotonically with \( u \) over

---

24In the Supplemental Material I show in the \( J = 2 \) case that if \( \Delta_g \) and corresponding group size \( p_g \) is known for one group \( g \in G^c \) ex-ante, then the remaining three group specific treatment effects and group sizes can be identified.

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Figure 3: Estimates of various causal parameters identified under VM with all four instruments, alongside fully-saturated 2SLS for comparison. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, and “Group Size” refers to the identified quantity $P(C_i = 1)$ for each parameter.

the unit interval. For each instrument $Z_j$, call $i$ a “j-responder” if $D_i(1, Z_{-j,i}, X_i) > D_i(0, Z_{-j,i}, X_i)$. In the context of a model in which both IAM and VM hold, the estimates in Figure 3 coupled with CHV would thus suggest that tuition responders tend to have the lowest unobserved costs $U_i$, followed by wage responders, then proximity responders, and then unemployment responders. However, while IAM effectively “flattens” variation in any of the instruments into variation in the scalar parameter $P(Z_i, X_i)$, VM allows flows into treatment to depend in an essential way on which instrument is manipulated when IAM fails. The estimands in Figure 3 are directly relevant to hypothetical policies which vary that instrument alone.

The results in Figure 3 can also be compared with estimates reported by Mogstad et al. (2020b) that are calculated by 2SLS. While their empirical application focuses on the interpretation of 2SLS under PM or VM, we have seen that in this particular setting 2SLS tends to yield numerical estimates that are close to the ACL. Similarly, the SLATEs for the proximity and low local wage instruments in Figure 3 align roughly with 2SLS specifications in MTW in which a single instrument is excluded in the second stage. However this similarity will not hold in all contexts, underlying the importance of methods such as those presented in this paper or in Mogstad et al. (2020a). Appendix C provides simulates a data generating process for example in which 2SLS lies outside of the convex hull of treatment effects in the population.

Finally, observe that in this four instrument setup, there are in principle 167 underlying compliance groups aside from always- and never-takers, and that together these comprise 17.4% of the population (cf. 7.8% for the four such groups with two instruments). Nevertheless, computing the treatment effect estimates involves regressions with at most 16 terms in addition to the controls, keeping implementation manageable. Note
that while the standard errors for the 2SLS estimate are only slightly smaller than for the ACL, this is sufficient for significance at the 95% level even in this small sample. This in part reflects the fact 2SLS weighs across the groups to minimize variance rather than pin down a specific target parameter.

7 Conclusion

In both observational and experimental settings, it is natural to expect individuals to vary both in their treatment effects and in how they select into treatment. This latter type of heterogeneity is likely to be particularly pronounced when a researcher is using multiple instrumental variables for a single binary treatment. This paper has shown that causal inference with heterogeneous treatment effects is possible in such settings under a simple restriction on selection that is often motivated by economic theory: what I call vector monotonicity.

In particular, I have defined and characterized a class of interpretable causal parameters that can be point identified under vector monotonicity with discrete instruments, and proposed an estimator that is similar in construction to the familiar method of two stage least squares (2SLS). While the convenience of implementing the two estimators scales similarly with the number of instruments, 2SLS is not guaranteed to recover an interpretable causal parameter under vector monotonicity (though it may in special cases). By contrast, the estimator I propose is always targets a particular well-defined causal parameter. In an application to the labor market returns to college education, I find that estimates based on vector monotonicity suggest that underlying groups in the population that exhibit different selection behavior also have highly heterogeneous treatment effects.

A natural extension of this paper is to generalize the concept of vector monotonicity and identification results to cases in which treatment can take on more than two values, which I leave for future work.

References


Appendices

A Identification result without rectangular support

This section provides an extension of Theorem 1 for cases when the support $Z$ of the instruments is not rectangular (i.e. $\text{supp}(Z_i) \neq (Z_1 \times Z_2 \times \cdots \times Z_J)$), and there may be perfect linear dependencies between the instruments (of the form that would arise from the mapping from discrete to binary instruments presented in Section 3.3).

A weaker version of Assumption 3 is comprised of the following two conditions, with the definition that $Z_{\emptyset}$ is a degenerate random variable that takes the value of one with probability one:

**Assumption 3a** (existence of instruments). There exists a family $\mathcal{F}$ of subsets of the instruments $S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}$, where $\emptyset \in \mathcal{F}$ and $|\mathcal{F}| > 1$, such that random variables $Z_{S_1}$ for all $S \in \mathcal{F}$ are linearly independent, i.e. $P\left(\sum_{S \in \mathcal{F}} \omega_S Z_{S_1} = 0\right) < 1$ for all vectors $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{F}|}/0$.

**Assumption 3b** (non-degenerate subsets generate the compliance groups). There exists a family $\mathcal{F}$ satisfying Assumption 3a, such that for any $S \notin \mathcal{F}$, $g(F) \notin G$ for all Sperner families that $F$ that contain $S$.

Assumption 3a is in itself very weak, requiring only that there exists some product of the instruments that has strictly positive variance. Assumption 3b is much more restrictive: it says that all compliance groups aside from never-takers can be generated from members of a family of linearly independent subsets of the instruments.

The construction in Proposition 4 mapping discrete instruments to binary instruments yields a case where Assumption 3 will hold, given rectangular support of the original discrete instruments.

**Proposition.** Let each $Z_j$ have $M_j$ ordered points of support $z_{1j} < z_{2j} \cdots < z_{M_j}$ and let $\tilde{Z}_m^j = 1(Z_{ji} \geq z_m^j)$. If $P(Z_i = z) > 0$ for $z \in (Z_1 \times Z_2 \times \cdots \times Z_J)$, then Assumption 3 holds with $\mathcal{F}$ the family of all subsets of $\mathcal{M} := \{\tilde{Z}_m^j\}_{j \in \{1 \ldots J\}}$ containing at most one $Z_m^j$ for any given $j \in \{1 \ldots J\}$.

**Proof.** See Appendix D. 

\[ \blacksquare \]
The above proposition allows us to make use of Assumption 3* in cases where discrete instruments are mapped to binary instruments via Proposition 4. To illustrate, consider a case with a single discrete instrument $Z_1$ having three levels $z_1 < z_2 < z_3$ and instruments $2 - J$ binary. Proposition 4 shows that if $Z_1 \ldots Z_J$ satisfies $VM$ then so does the set of $J + 1$ instruments $\tilde{Z}_2, \tilde{Z}_3, Z_2, \ldots Z_J$ where $\tilde{Z}_2 = 1(Z_1 \geq z_2)$ and $\tilde{Z}_3 = 1(Z_1 \geq z_3)$. In this case there are $2^J - 1$ “redundant” simple compliance groups vis-a-vis Assumption 3, since for any $S \subseteq \{2 \ldots J\}$: $\tilde{Z}_2; Z_3 Z_S = \tilde{Z}_3 Z_S$.

In this example, the vector $\Gamma_i$ would contain all non-null subsets of $\{\tilde{Z}_2, \tilde{Z}_3, Z_2, \ldots Z_J\}$ that do not contain both of $\tilde{Z}_2$ and $\tilde{Z}_3$. In general, $\mathcal{F}$ can be constructed by considering all subsets of the instruments, and for each subset considering all possible assignments of a value to each instrument, with one fixed value for each instrument omitted from consideration throughout. Provided rectangular support on the original instruments, Assumption 3* then follows with this choice of $\mathcal{F}$, for which a generalized version of Theorem 1 can be stated:

**Theorem 1*. The results of Theorem 1 holds under Assumption 3* replacing Assumption 3, where now $\Gamma_i := \{Z_S\}_{S \in \mathcal{F}, S \neq \emptyset}$, $\lambda := \{E[c(S), Z_i]\}_{S \in \mathcal{F}, S \neq \emptyset}$ and again $h(Z_i) = \lambda' \Sigma^{-1}(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])$ with $\Sigma := \text{Var}(\Gamma_i)$, for any family $\mathcal{F}$ satisfying Assumption 3*.

*Proof. Identical to that of Theorem 1, except as noted therein.

Theorem 1* may also be useful in other cases in which the practitioner has auxiliary knowledge that some of the compliance groups are not present in the population. In such cases, Assumption 3* may hold even without rectangular support among the instruments.

### B Identification with covariates

This section discusses how one can accommodate, in a nonparametric way, covariates that need to be conditioned on for the instruments to be valid. In practice, it is often easier to justify a conditional version of Assumption 1:

$$\{(Y_i(1), Y_i(0), G_i) \perp Z_i \mid X_i\}$$

where $X$ are a set of observed covariates unaffected by treatment. In this section I discuss identification and considerations for estimation in such a setting. I maintain that vector monotonicity continues to hold for a set of binary instruments, as VM is expressed in Assumption 2. This implies that the direction of “compliance” is the same regardless of $X_i$, since the condition in Assumption 2 holds with probability one.

If Assumption 3 and Property M each hold conditional on $X_i = x$, then Theorem 1 implies that we can identify $\Delta_c(x) := E[\Delta_i | C_i = 1, X_i = x]$ for $\Delta_c$ satisfying Property M, from the distribution of $(Y_i, Z_i, D_i) | X_i = x$. In particular, the function $h(z)$ from Theorem 1 will now depend on the conditioning value of $X_i$:

$$h(Z_i, x) = \lambda(x)' \text{Var}(\Gamma_i | X_i = x)^{-1} (\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i | X_i = x])$$
for each \( x \in \mathbb{X} \), where recall that \( \Gamma_i \) is a vector of products \( \Gamma_{Si} \) of \( Z_{ji} \) within subsets of the 
ins
tri
ts, where \( S \) indexes such subsets. Here we define \( \lambda(x)_{S} = E[c(g(S), Z_i)|X_i = x] \) 
– which is identified – for each simple compliance group \( g(S) \). Under these assumptions, 
we have that \( \Delta_c(x) = E[h(Z_i, x)Y_i|X_i = x]/E[h(Z_i, x)D_i|X_i = x] \).

If the support of \( X_i \) corresponds to a small number of “covariate-cells”, it might be 
feasible to repeat the entire estimation on fixed-covariate subsamples, to estimate \( \Delta_c(x) \) 
for each \( x \in \mathbb{X} \). If the number of groups is large, or if \( X_i \) includes continuous 
variables, estimation of \( \Delta_c(x) \) could still in principle be implemented by nonparametric regression 
of each component of \( \Gamma_i \) on \( X_i \) as well as nonparametrically estimating the conditional 
variance-covariance matrix \( \text{Var}(\Gamma_i|X_i = x) \) (Yin et al. (2010) describe a kernel-based 
method for this). The vector \( \lambda(x) \) can also be computed via nonparametric regression.

Furthermore, when the object of interest is simply the unconditional version of \( \Delta_c \), 
the conditional quantities become nuisance parameters. Notably, they can be integrated 
over separately in the numerator and the denominator of the empirical estimand. To see 
that this, write:

\[
\Delta_c = E[\Delta_i|C_i = 1] = \int dF_{X|C}(x|1)\Delta_c(x) = \int dF_{X|C}(x|1)E[h(Z_i, x)Y_i|X_i = x]/E[h(Z_i, x)Y_i|X_i = x] = \int\frac{1}{P(C_i = 1)}dF_xE[h(Z_i, X_i)Y_i|X_i = x] = \frac{E[h(Z_i, X_i)Y_i]}{E[h(Z_i, X_i)D_i]}
\]

where we have used Bayes’ rule and that \( P(C_i = 1|X_i = x) = E[h(Z_i, x)D_i|X_i = x] \) (and 
hence \( P(C_i = 1) = E[h(Z_i, X_i)D_i] \) as well). This provides a VM analog to a similar 
result that holds under IAM. In that context, Frölich (2007) shows that this fact can deliver 
\( \sqrt{n} \)-consistency of a nonparametric analog of the Wald ratio.

Note that by the conditional version of Corollary [1] we have that:

\[
\Delta_c = \frac{E[\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A \{E[Y_i|Z_i = z, X_i]\}]}{E[\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A \{E[D_i|Z_i = z, X_i]\}]}
\]

if we define \( \tilde{\lambda}(x) \) to have component \( \lambda(x) \) for any \( S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\} \), \( S \neq \emptyset \) and 0 for \( S = \emptyset \), and 
we let \( \cdot \) indicate vector representations of functions over \( z \in Z \). If the CEFs of \( Y \) and 
\( D \) happen to both be separable between \( Z \) and \( X \), i.e \( E[Y_i|Z_i = z, X_i = x] = y(z) + w(x) \) 
and \( E[D_i|Z_i = z, X_i = x] = d(z) + v(x) \), then the expression simplifies:

\[
\Delta_c = \frac{E[\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A \{y(z) + w(X_i)\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A1\}]}{E[\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A \{d(z) + v(X_i)\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A1\}] = \frac{E[\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A \{y(z)\}]}{E[\tilde{\lambda}(X_i)'A \{d(z)\}]}
\]

where \( 1 \) is a vector of ones and we have used that \( \tilde{\lambda}(x)'A1 = 0 \) for any \( x \). This follows from 
the definition of the entries: \( A_{S,z} = \sum_{j_{S}(z_{j_{S}}) = S}(-1)^{|f|} \) where \( z_0 \) is the set of components 
of \( z \) that are equal to zero. For any \( S \neq \emptyset \), the identity \( \sum_{f \subseteq S}(-1)^{|f|} = 0 \) implies that 
\( [A1]_S = \sum_{z_{i_{S}} \subseteq S} \sum_{f \subseteq (S-z_{i_{S}})}(-1)^{|f|} = 0 \). The first component of \( A1 \), corresponding to \( S = \emptyset \), does not contribute since the first component of \( \tilde{\lambda}(x) \) is always zero, by construction.
Now, since each $\lambda_S(x)$ is defined as $E[C_i = 1| G_i = g(S), X_i = x]$, its expectation delivers the unconditional analog: $\lambda_S := E[C_i = 1| G_i = g(S)] = E[\lambda(X_i)S]$. Thus we can write $\Delta_c = \frac{\lambda'}{\lambda} \frac{A'(y(z))}{A'(d(z))}$. This shows that in this separable case the estimand that identifies $\Delta_c$ is essentially unchanged from the baseline case without covariates, aside from the need to control semiparametrically for $X_i$ to obtain the functions $y(z)$ and $d(z)$. The estimates reported in Section 6 use this result, with $w(x)$ and $v(x)$ taken to each be linear.

C Regularization and asymptotic distribution

In this section I propose a regularization procedure for the estimator, to improve its performance in small samples. I then show asymptotically normality of the regularized estimator and give an expression for the variance, based on a result from Imbens and Angrist, 1994.

C.1 Regularization of the estimator

Recall from Section 5 that the simple plug-in estimator of the All Compliers LATE in fact only uses data at two points in $Z$. This issue can be seen as a near collinearity problem: when there are few observations in the points $\bar{Z}$ and $\bar{Z}_c$, the $n \times |\mathcal{F}|$ design matrix $\Gamma$ will have singular values that are close to zero (to see this, note that $\Gamma' = A^{-1}n \cdot \text{diag}\{P(Z_i = z)\}A^{-1})$. This observation suggests that the issue might be mitigated by employing a ridge-type shrinkage estimator (see e.g. Hoerl and Kennard, 1970). Accordingly, we allow a sequence of regularization parameters $\alpha$:

$$\hat{\rho}(\hat{\lambda}, \alpha) = \left((0, \hat{\lambda}')(\Gamma' + \alpha I)^{-1}\Gamma'D\right)^{-1}(0, \hat{\lambda}')(\Gamma' + \alpha I)^{-1}\Gamma'Y$$

(10)

The estimator $\hat{\rho}(\hat{\lambda}, \alpha)$ with a choice of $\alpha > 0$ establishes a floor on the singular values of the matrix $\Gamma$.

In the case of the ACL, Corollary 1 can be leveraged to show that $\alpha > 0$ allows the estimator to make use of the full support of $Z_i$, rather than just the two points $\bar{Z}$ and $\bar{Z}_c$. But ridge regression comes at the expense of some bias. Proposition 10 below yields a means of navigating this trade-off to choose $\alpha$ in practice. In particular, I propose choosing $\alpha$ to minimize a feasible estimator of the conditional MSE $E[(\hat{\rho}(\lambda, \alpha) - \Delta_c)^2| Z_1 \ldots Z_n]$.

**Proposition 10.** Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, $E[(\hat{\rho}(\lambda, \alpha) - \Delta_c)^2| Z_1 \ldots Z_n]$ is, up to second order in estimation error and a positive constant of proportionality:

$$\hat{\lambda}'(\Gamma' + \alpha I)^{-1}\{\Gamma'(\Omega_Y + \Delta_c^2\Omega_D - 2\Delta_c\Omega_{YD})\Gamma$$

$$+\alpha^2(\beta_Y^2 + \Delta_c^2\beta_D^2 - 2\Delta_c\beta_Y^2\beta_D)\} (\Gamma' + \alpha I)^{-1}\hat{\lambda}$$

(11)

where $\hat{\lambda} := (0, \hat{\lambda}')$, $\beta_Y := E[\Gamma_i|G_{i|}]^{-1}E[\Gamma_iY_i]$, $\beta_D := E[\Gamma_i|G_{i|}]^{-1}E[\Gamma_iD_i]$, and $\Omega_{VW} = E[(V - \beta_V\Gamma)(W - \beta_W\Gamma')(\Gamma)]$ for $V, W \in \{Y, D\}$, and all expectations are assumed to exist.
Furthermore, if \( \hat{\alpha}_{mse} \) is chosen as the smallest positive local minimizer of the following estimate of the above:

\[
\hat{M}(\alpha) := (0, \hat{\lambda})'(\Gamma'\Gamma + \alpha I)^{-1} \left\{ n\hat{\Pi} + \alpha^2(\hat{\beta}\hat{\beta}') \right\} (\Gamma'\Gamma + \alpha I)^{-1}(0, \hat{\lambda})'
\]

with \( \hat{\beta}_V := (\Gamma'\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma'V \) for each \( V \in \{Y, D\} \), \( \hat{\Pi} := \frac{1}{n} \sum_i (Y_i - \hat{\beta}_Y \Gamma_i - (0, \hat{\lambda})'(D_i - \hat{\beta}_D \Gamma_i))^2 \Gamma_i \Gamma_i' \) and \( \hat{\beta} := \hat{\beta}_Y - (0, \hat{\lambda})'(0, \hat{\lambda})' \hat{\beta}_D \) then

\[
\hat{\alpha}_{mse}/\sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{p} 0
\]

provided that \( \hat{\lambda} \xrightarrow{p} \lambda, (0, \lambda')\Sigma^{-1}(\beta_Y + \Delta_c \beta_D) \neq 0 \).

**Proof.** See Appendix D. \( \square \)

The proposed data-driven choice \( \hat{\alpha}_{mse} \) estimates the unknown quantities in Eq. (11) based on an initial guess of \( \alpha = 0 \), and then minimizes with respect to \( \alpha \). This can be seen as a “one-step” version of a more general iterative algorithm in which a value \( \alpha_t \) is used to compute the function \( \hat{M}(\alpha) \), which is then minimized to find \( \alpha_{t+1} \) and so on until convergence. I implement the single-step version in Appendix C and find that it indeed improves estimation error considerably for the simulation DGPs considered.

The reason that my proposed rule evaluates \( \hat{\alpha}_{mse} \) as a local minimizer of \( \hat{M}(\alpha) \) rather than a global minimizer, is that the function \( \hat{M}(\alpha) \) is always positive but approaches zero as \( \alpha \to \infty \). This stands in contrast with the standard case of ridge regression in which regularization bias always grows with \( \alpha \), eventually dominating any efficiency gains from increasing it further. In the present case, the vector \( \hat{\beta} \) as defined above and \( (0, \hat{\lambda})' \) are orthogonal (in sample as well as in the population limit), and thus the “(squared) bias” term vanishes as \( \alpha \to \infty \), along with the variance of the regularized estimator (this is roughly analogous to ridge regularizing a vector of regression coefficients when their true values are all zero). Nevertheless, the function \( \hat{M}(\alpha) \) does have a well-defined local minimum that achieves a lower value than \( \hat{M}(0) \) at some strictly positive \( \alpha \) (see Appendix D for details), and this local minimum is shown to provide a helpful guide to choosing \( \alpha \) in the simulations of Appendix C. Note that the condition \( (0, \lambda')\Sigma^{-1}(\beta_Y + \Delta_c \beta_D) \neq 0 \) in Proposition 10 rules out a knife-edge case in which the Hessian of \( \hat{M}(\alpha) \) is zero when the other arguments of \( \hat{M} \) are evaluated at their probability limits.

### C.2 Asymptotic distribution

Consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator \( \hat{\rho}(\hat{\lambda}, \alpha) \) follows in a straightforward way from the results thus far. In particular, with \( \alpha = 0 \) the asymptotic variance can be computed as a special case of Theorem 3 in Imbens and Angrist (1994). In our setting, we can view estimation of \( h(z) \) as a parametric problem \( h(z) = g(z, \theta) \) where the parameter vector \( \theta \) is the mean and variance of \( \Gamma_i \), along with the vector \( \lambda \):

\[
\theta = (\mu_{\Gamma}, \Sigma, \lambda)' = (\{\mu_{\Gamma,l}\}_l, \{\Sigma_{lm}\}_{l \leq m}, \{\lambda\}_l)' \text{ with } l, m \in \{1 \ldots |\mathcal{F}|\}
\]
Then \( \hat{\rho}(\lambda, \alpha) = \frac{\text{Cov}(g(Z_i, \hat{\theta}), Y_i)}{\text{Cov}(g(Z_i, \hat{\theta}), D_i)} \), where \( \hat{\theta} \) solves a set of moment conditions \( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \psi(Z_i, \hat{\theta}) = 0 \) given explicitly in the theorem below.

Theorem 2 below allows \( \alpha_n > 0 \) provided that the sequence converges in probability to zero at a sufficient rate. By Proposition 10, we obtain this rate for the “one-step” minimizer of the feasible MSE estimate given in Eq. [11].

**Theorem 2.** Under the Assumptions of Theorem 1, if \( \alpha = o_p(\sqrt{n}) \) then

\[
\sqrt{n}(\hat{\lambda}, \alpha_n) - \Delta_i \overset{d}{\to} N(0, V)
\]

where \( V = e_1\Pi^{-1}\Omega(\Pi')^{-1}e_1 \) (i.e. the top-left element of \( \Pi^{-1}\Omega(\Pi')^{-1} \)) with:

\[
\Omega = \begin{pmatrix}
-E[D_i g(Z_i, \theta)] & -E[g(Z_i, \theta)] & E[U_i d_0 g(Z_i, \theta)] \\
-E[D_i] & -1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & E[d_\theta \psi(Z_i, \theta)]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
\Pi = \begin{pmatrix}
E[g(Z_i, \theta)^2] & E[g(Z_i, \theta)U_i] & E[g(Z_i, \theta)\psi(Z_i, \theta)]' \\
E[g(Z_i, \theta)U_i] & E[U_i^2] & E[U_i \psi(Z_i, \theta)]' \\
E[g(Z_i, \theta)U_i \psi(Z_i, \theta)] & E[U_i \psi(Z_i, \theta)] & E[\psi(Z_i, \theta)\psi(Z_i, \theta)']
\end{pmatrix}
\]

so long as \( \Omega \) and \( \Pi \) are finite and \( \Pi \) has full rank, with the definitions:

\[
U_i := Y_i - E[Y_i] - \Delta_i(D_i - E[D_i])
\]

\[
\theta = (\mu, \Sigma, \lambda)' = (\{\mu_i\}_i, \{\Sigma_{im}\}_{i \leq m}, \{\lambda\}_i)'
\]

\[
g(z, \theta) = \lambda' \Sigma^{-1}(\Gamma(Z_i) - \mu_\Gamma)
\]

\[
\psi(Z_i, \theta) = ((\Gamma(Z_i) - \mu_\Gamma)', \{((\Gamma(Z_i) - \mu_\Gamma)(\Gamma_{m}(Z_i) - \mu_{\Gamma, m}) - \Sigma_{im})_{i \leq m}, \{\alpha_i(Z_i) - \lambda_i\}_i)''
\]

Here \( \Gamma(Z_i) = (\Gamma_1(Z_i) \ldots \Gamma_{|F|}(Z_i))' \) where \( \Gamma(Z_i)_i = Z_{S_i,i} \) for some arbitrary ordering \( S_i \) of the sets in \( F \), and \( c_i(z) = c(g(S_i), z) \) (and thus \( P(C_i = 1|G_i = g(S_i)) = E[c_i(Z_i)] \)).

**Proof.** See Appendix D

\[\Box\]

### C.3 Simulation study

This section reports a Monte Carlo experiment in which the regularized estimator proposed above is compared against its unregularized version and 2SLS. I proceed in two steps. In a first simulation involving three binary instruments, I demonstrate the practical importance of regularization. A second simulation with two binary instruments highlights the potential dangers of using 2SLS.

**Three instrument DGP:**

We first let \( J = 3 \), and put equal weight \( P(G_i = g) = 0.05 \) over each of the 20 compliance
groups. To introduce endogeneity, I let $Y_i(0) = G_i \cdot U_i$ where the $G_i$ are numbered arbitrarily from one to 20 and $U_i \sim Unif[0,1]$. The treatment effect within each group $g$ is chosen to be constant and equal to $g$, so that

$$Y_i(1) = Y_i(0) + G_i + V_i$$

with $V_i \sim Unif[0,1]$. With this setup, $ACL = 10$.

For the joint distribution of the instruments, I consider two alternatives, meant to capture different extremes regarding statistical dependence among the instruments:

1. $(Z_{1i}, Z_{2i}, Z_{3i})$ generated as uncorrelated coin tosses
2. (1) followed by the following transformation: if $Z_{2i} = 1$ set $Z_{3i} = 0$ with probability 95%

I let the sample size be $n = 1000$, and perform one thousand simulations. Our primary goal is to compare the estimator $\hat{\rho}(1,1,\ldots,1,\alpha)$, where $\alpha$ chosen by the feasible approximate MSE minimizing procedure described in Section 5 to the simple Wald estimator of $ACL$ ($E[Y_i|Z_i = (111)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (000)]$)/($E[D_i|Z_i = (111)] - E[D_i|Z_i = (000)]$), which is equal to $\rho(1\ldots1,\alpha = 0)$. I also benchmark both estimators against fully saturated 2SLS. I stress that 2SLS is not generally consistent for the ACL (or any convex combination of treatment effects) under vector monotonicity. Nevertheless, given the popularity of 2SLS and its desirable properties under traditional LATE monotonicity, it is important to know if and when the proposed estimator $\hat{\rho}(\lambda,\alpha)$ outperforms 2SLS in practice.

Figure 4 shows the results for the first DGP, where the $Z_j$ are independent Bernoulli random variables with mean 1/2. We see that with the good overlap of the points $\bar{Z} = (1,1,1)$ and $\bar{Z} = (0,0,0)$ (which are each equal to 1/8), the Wald estimator performs well. For this DGP, the procedure to choose $\hat{\alpha}_{mse}$, minimizing MSE, results in small values with high probability. Hence the regularized estimator $\hat{\rho}(1,1,\ldots,1,\hat{\alpha}_{mse})$ according to Proposition 10 is very close to the Wald estimator (recall that they are identical when $\alpha = 0$). However, my estimator does deliver a slightly smaller RMSE, as expected, at the cost of some bias. Fully saturated 2SLS happens to also perform well for this DGP.

![Figure 4](image_url)

**Figure 4:** Monte Carlo distributions of estimators, for the first DGP ($Z$ uncorrelated coin tosses) with three binary instruments. “Reg. Est.” indicates $\hat{\rho}(1,\ldots,1,\hat{\alpha}_{mse})$. The vertical line shows the true value of ACL.
Figure 5 shows the results for the second DGP, where I modify the joint distribution of \((Z_1, Z_2, Z_3)\) to impose \(E(Z_{3i}|Z_{2i} = 1) = 0.05\). In this case, the Wald estimator performs comparatively poorly. We see that regularizing the estimator to use the full sample rather than just the points \(\tilde{Z} = (1, 1, 1)\) and \(\tilde{Z} = (0, 0, 0)\) can help considerably.

Figure 5: Monte Carlo distributions of estimators, for the first DGP \((P(Z_{3i}|Z_{2i} = 1) = 0.05)\) with three binary instruments. “Reg. Est.” indicates \(\hat{\rho}(1, \ldots, 1, \hat{\alpha}_{max})\). The vertical line shows the true value of ACL.

### Two instrument DGP:

Note that in both Figures 4 and 5, fully saturated 2SLS (regression on the propensity score) performs well, in the latter case actually outperforming both of the alternative estimators. This is despite the fact that it is not consistent for the \(ACL\), and is in general not even guaranteed to be consistent for \(\Delta_c\) for any choice of the function \(c(g, z)\).

To demonstrate that 2SLS can in practice perform very poorly under vector monotonicity, I below report results from an additional simulation in which \(J = 2\).

For this simulation, the DGP is as follows. Among the six possible compliance groups under vector monotonicity, I give units a 90% chance of being \(Z_1\) complier and a 10% chance of \(Z_2\) complier. The treatment effect is set to 2 for \(Z_1\) compliers, and \(-8\) for \(Z_2\) compliers, resulting in an \(ACL\) of unity. I generate negatively correlated binary instruments (with correlation of about \(-0.1\)) from a multivariate normal. In particular, with

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
Z_1^* \\
Z_2^*
\end{pmatrix} \sim N\left(\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -0.8 \\ -0.8 & 1 \end{pmatrix}\right)
\]

I set \(Z_{1i} = 1\) when \(Z_{1i}^*\) is over its median and \(Z_{2i} = 1\) when \(Z_{2i}^*\) is over its median. I again let the sample size be \(n = 1000\), and perform a thousand simulations.

Figure 6 shows that in this case, 2SLS is indeed outside of the convex hull of treatment effects, despite having high precision. The proposed regularized estimator clearly outperforms both of the alternatives for this DGP.
D Proofs

This section provides proofs for the formal results presented in the body of the paper.

D.1 Proof of Proposition 1

To simplify notation take each ordering $\geq_j$ to be the ordering on the natural numbers $\geq$, without loss. The two versions of VM are:

**Assumption VM (vector monotonicity).** For $z, z' \in Z$, if $z \geq z'$ component-wise, then $P(D_i(z) \geq D_i(z')) = 1$

**Assumption VM’ (alternative characterization).** $P(D_i(z_j, z_{-j}) \geq D_i(z'_j, z_{-j})) = 1$ when $z_j \geq z'_j$ and both $(z_j, z_{-j})$ and $(z'_j, z_{-j}) \in Z$

The claim is that $VM \iff VM'$.

- **VM $\implies$ VM’**: immediate, since $(z_j, z_{-j}) \geq (z'_j, z_{-j})$ in a vector sense when $z_j \geq z'_j$

- **VM’ $\implies$ VM**: consider $z, z' \in Z$ such that $z \geq z'$ in a vector sense, i.e. $z_j \geq z'_j$ for all $j \in \{1 \ldots J\}$. Then by $VM'$ and connectedness of $Z$, then for some ordering of the instrument labels $1 \ldots J$:

$$P \left( D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z_1 \\ z_2 \\ \vdots \\ z_J \end{array} \right) \geq D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z'_1 \\ z_2 \\ \vdots \\ z_J \end{array} \right) \right) = 1 \quad P \left( D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z'_1 \\ z_2 \\ \vdots \\ z_J \end{array} \right) \geq D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z'_1 \\ z'_2 \\ \vdots \\ z'_J \end{array} \right) \right) = 1 \quad \text{etc...}$$

and thus:

$$P \left( D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z_1 \\ z_2 \\ \vdots \\ z_J \end{array} \right) \geq D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z'_1 \\ z_2 \\ \vdots \\ z_J \end{array} \right) \geq D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z'_1 \\ z'_2 \\ \vdots \\ z'_J \end{array} \right) \geq \cdots \geq D_i \left( \begin{array}{c} z'_1 \\ z'_2 \\ \vdots \\ z'_J \end{array} \right) \right) = 1$$
D.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Let \( P(z) := E[D_i|Z_i = z] \) be the propensity score function. By the law of iterated expectations and Assumption 1:

\[
P(z) = \sum_{g \in G} P(G_i = g|Z_i = z)E[D_i(Z_i)|G_i = g, Z_i = z] = \sum_{g \in G} P(G_i = g)D_g(z)
\]

By VM, \( D_g(z) \) is component-wise monotonic for any \( g \) in the support of \( G_i \). As a convex combination of component-wise monotonic functions, \( P(z) \) will thus also be component-wise monotonic.

In the other direction, note that by PM if \( P(z_j, z_{-j}) > P(z'_{j}, z_{-j}) \), then we must have that \( P(D_i(z_j, z_{-j}) \geq D_i(z'_{j}, z_{-j})) = 1 \). Thus component-wise monotonicity of \( P(z) \) with respect to some collection of orderings \( \{ \geq_j \}_{j \in \{1 \ldots J\}} \) implies \( P(D_i(z_j, z_{-j}) \geq D_i(z'_{j}, z_{-j})) = 1 \) for all choices of \( j \in \{1 \ldots J\} \), \( z_j \geq_j z'_{j} \) and \( z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j} \). This is the equivalent form of VM stated in Proposition 1.

D.3 Proof of Proposition 4

Let \( \tilde{Z} \) be the set of possible values for the new set of instruments \( (\tilde{Z}_2, \ldots, \tilde{Z}_m, Z_{-1}) \). Since \( P(\tilde{Z}_m = 0 & \tilde{Z}_m = 1) = 0 \) for any \( m > n \), we can take \( \tilde{Z} \) to only consist of cases where for all \( m: \tilde{Z}_m \) is composed of all zeros for the first \( m - 1 \) entries, and then ones for \( m + 1 \ldots M \). Note that fixing \( Z_1 \) is equivalent to fixing \( \tilde{Z}_2 \ldots \tilde{Z}_M \).

If \( Z \) is connected, then the \( \tilde{Z} \) given above is connected. Then, by Proposition 1, we simply need to show that for any \( Z_{-1} = (Z_2, \ldots, Z_J) \) and \( \tilde{Z}_{-m} = (\tilde{Z}_2, \ldots, \tilde{Z}_m, \tilde{Z}_{m+1}, \ldots, \tilde{Z}_M) \) such that \((0, \tilde{Z}_{-m}, Z_{-1}) \in \mathcal{Z} \) and \((1, \tilde{Z}_{-m}, Z_{-1}) \in \mathcal{Z}: \)

\[
D_i(1, \tilde{Z}_{-m}; Z_{-1}) \geq D_i(0, \tilde{Z}_{-m}; Z_{-1})
\]

where the notation \( D_i(a, b; c) \) is understood as \( D_i(d, c) \) where \( d \) is the value of \( Z_1 \) corresponding to \( \tilde{Z} \) with value \( a \) for \( \tilde{Z}_m \) and \( b \) for \( \tilde{Z}_{-m} \). For any \( \tilde{Z}_{-m} \) satisfying \((0, \tilde{Z}_{-m}, Z_{-1}) \in \mathcal{Z} \) and \((1, \tilde{Z}_{-m}, Z_{-1}) \in \mathcal{Z} \), switching \( \tilde{Z}_m \) from zero to ones corresponds to switching \( Z_1 \) from value \( z_{m-1} \) to value \( z_m \). Since

\[
D_i(1, \tilde{Z}_{-m}; Z_{-1}) - D_i(0, \tilde{Z}_{-m}; Z_{-1}) = D_i(z_{m}, Z_{-1}) - D_i(z_{m-1}, Z_{-1}) \geq 0
\]

by vector monotonicity on the original vector \((Z_1 \ldots Z_J) \), the result now follows.

D.4 Proof of Proposition 3

For any fixed \( z \), write the condition \( D_g(F)(z) = 1 \) as

\[
\{ D_{g(F)}(z) = 1 \} \iff \bigcup_{S \in F} \{ D_{g(S)}(z) = 1 \} \iff \text{not } \bigcap_{S \in F} \{ D_{g(S)}(z) = 0 \}
\]

which can be written as

\[
D_g(z) = 1 - \prod_{S \in F} (1 - D_{g(S)}(z)) = \sum_{f \subseteq F: f \neq \emptyset} (-1)^{|f|+1} \prod_{S \in F} D_{g(S)}(z)
\]

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Let $z(z) = \{j \in \{1 \ldots J\} : z_j = 1\}$ represent $z$ as the subset of instrument indices for which the associated instrument takes the value of one. Then, using that for a simple compliance group $D_g(S)(z) = \mathbb{1}(S \subseteq z(z))$:

$$
D_g(z) = \sum_{j \subseteq F : j \neq \emptyset} (-1)^{|j|+1} \prod_{s \in F} D_g(S)(z)
$$

$$
= \sum_{j \subseteq F : j \neq \emptyset} (-1)^{|j|+1} \cdot D_g((\bigcup_{s \in F} s))(z)
$$

$$
= \sum_{j \subseteq F : j \neq \emptyset} (-1)^{|j|+1} \cdot \left( \bigcup_{S \subseteq z(z)}^{S \subseteq z(z)} \right)
$$

$$
= \sum_{j \subseteq F : j \neq \emptyset} (-1)^{|j|+1} \cdot \sum_{S' \subseteq z(z)} \sum_{\emptyset \subset f \subseteq F : (\bigcup_{s \in F} s) = S'} (-1)^{|j|+1}
$$

$$
= \sum_{S' \subseteq z(z)} \sum_{\emptyset \subset f \subseteq F : (\bigcup_{s \in F} s) = S'} (-1)^{|j|+1}
$$

Thus, letting $s(F, S') := \left\{ f \subseteq F : (\bigcup_{s \in F} S') = S' \right\}$, we have $D_g(F)(z) = \sum_{S' \subseteq z(z)} \left[ \sum_{s \subseteq z(z) \subseteq s} [M_j]_{F,S'} D_g(S)(z) \right]$,

where the sum ranges over non-null subsets of the instruments $\emptyset \subset S' \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}$ and $[M_j]_{F,S'} = \sum_{f \in s(F, S')} (-1)^{|j|+1}$.

**D.5 Proof of Lemma 1**

Any indicator $\mathbb{1}(Z_i = z)$ for a value $z \in \{0,1\}^J$ can be expanded out as a polynomial in the instrument indicators as $\mathbb{1}(Z_i = z) = \prod_{j \in z_1} Z_{ji} \prod_{j \in z_0} (1 - Z_{ji}) = \sum_{f \subseteq z_0} (-1)^{|f|} Z_{(z_1 \cup f),i}$, where $(z_1, z_0)$ is a partition of the indices $j \in \{1 \ldots J\}$ that take a value of zero or one in $z$, respectively. With $J = 2$ for example,

$$
((1 - Z_{11})(1 - Z_{21}), Z_{11}(1 - Z_{21}), Z_{21}(1 - Z_{11}), Z_{11}Z_{21}) = (1, Z_{11}, Z_{21}, Z_{11}Z_{21}) A = (1, \Gamma') A
$$

where $A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & -1 & -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$. Denote the random vector of such indicators $Z_i$. Then

$$
(1, \Gamma') A = Z_i', \quad \text{with the matrix of coefficients } A_{S,z} = \sum_{f \subseteq z_0} (-1)^{|f|}. \text{ The matrix } A \text{ so defined must be invertible, because any product of the instruments } Z_{Si} \text{ for } S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\} \text{ can similarly be expressed as a linear combination of the components of } Z_i, \text{ where we define } Z_{bi} = 1. \text{ Specifically, } Z_{Si} = \sum_{z \in z} \mathbb{1}(\forall j \in S, z_j = 1) \mathbb{1}(Z_i = z).
$$

Consider the matrix

$$
\Sigma^* := E[(1, \Gamma')'(1, \Gamma')] = A^{-1} E[Z_iZ_i'] A^{-1} = A^{-1} diag\{P(Z_i = z)\} A^{-1}
$$
where $E[3,3']$ is diagonal since the events that $Z_i$ take on two different values are exclusive. Since $A^{-1}$ exists, the rank of $Σ^*$ must be equal to the rank of $\text{diag}\{P(Z_i = z)\}$, which is in turn equal to the cardinality of $Z$. Assumption 3 thus holds if and only if $Σ^*$ has full rank of $2^j$. Note that although $A^{-1}$ diagonalizes the matrix $Σ^*$, it does not provide its eigen-decomposition, as $A^{-1} \neq A'$ ($A$ is not orthogonal).

Now we prove that $Σ^*$ has full rank whenever $Σ$ has full rank, and vice versa. Note that $Σ = \text{Var}(Γ_i)$ has full rank if and only if $\omega E[(Γ_i - ET_i)(Γ_i - ET_i)]\omega = E[\omega'(Γ_i - ET_i)(Γ_i - ET_i)]\omega > 0$, i.e. $P(\omega'(Γ_i - ET_i) = 0) < 1$ for any $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^{2^j-1}/\{0\}$. Similarly $Σ^*$ has full rank if $P((\omega_0,\omega)'((1, Γ_i) = 0) < 1$ for any $\omega_0 \in \mathbb{R}, \omega \in \mathbb{R}^{2^j-1}$ where $(\omega_0, \omega)$ is not the zero vector in $\mathbb{R}^{2^j}$. But if for some $\omega$, $\omega'(Γ_i - ET_i) = 0$ w.p.1., then we also have $(\omega_0, \omega)'(1, Γ_i) = 0$ w.p.1. by choosing $\omega_0 = -\omega E[Γ_i]$. In the other direction, note that $(\omega_0, \omega)'(1, Γ_i) = 0$ w.p.1. implies that $\omega T_i = -\omega_0$ and hence $\omega'(Γ_i - ET_i) = -\omega_0 - \omega'ET_i = -\omega_0 - E[\omega'Γ_i] = -\omega_0 + \omega_0 = 0$.

D.6 Proof of the Appendix Proposition

Introduce the notation that $\sqcup$ indicates inclusion of a new set among a family of sets (while $\cup$ continues to indicate taking the union of elements across sets).

For any $S \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ that contains both $Z^j_m$ and $Z^j_{m'}$ for some $j$ and $m < m'$, $g(F \sqcup S)$ and $g(F \sqcup S/\{Z^j_{m'}\})$ generate the same selection behavior for any Sperner family $F$ on all of $Z$ (this can be seen by mapping the implied selection behavior back to the original discrete instrument $Z_j$). Thus, we can take $\mathcal{G}$ to exclude such $S$ without loss of generality.

Now, consider the family $\mathcal{F}$ of all $S \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ that contain at most one $Z^j_m$ for any given $j$. By the above, this choice of $\mathcal{F}$ satisfies Assumption 3b*. Suppose it did not satisfy Assumption 3a*. Then, there would need to exist a non-zero vector $\omega$ such that $P\left(\sum_{S \in \mathcal{F}} \omega_S Z_{S_i} = 0\right) = 1$ with $Z_{S_i} := \prod_{(j,m) \in S} Z^j_m$. This would imply non-invertibility of $Σ^* := E[(1, Γ_i)(1, Γ_i)']$, where $Γ_i := \{Z_{S_i}\}_{S \in \mathcal{F}, S \neq \emptyset}$ by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1 ($Γ_i$ and a vector of indicators for all $z \in Z$ are each related by an invertible linear map), which in turn contradicts the assumption of full support. Note that invertibility of $Σ^*$ is again equivalent to invertibility of $\text{Var}(Γ_i)$ as before.

D.7 Proof of Theorem 1

We first note that any measurable function $f(Y)$ preserves Assumption 1, that is

$$(f(Y_i(1)), f(Y_i(0)), G_i) \perp Z_i$$

and Assumptions 2-3 are unaffected by such a transformation to the outcome variable. Thus, we continue without loss with $Y_i$, $Y_i(1)$ and $Y_i(0)$ possibly redefined as $f(Y_i)$, $f(Y_i(1))$ and $f(Y_i(0))$ respectively.

Note that the function $h(\cdot)$ given in Theorem 1 has the property that $E[h(Z_i)] = 0$, for any distribution of the instruments. Consider the quantity $E[Y_iD_ih(Z_i)]$ for a function $h$ having this property. By the law of iterated expectations, and the independence
assumption:
\[
E[Y_i D_i h(Z_i)] = \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[Y_i D_i h(Z_i) | G_i = g] \\
= \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(1) D_g(z) h(Z_i) | G_i = g] \\
= \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(1) | G_i = g] E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)]
\]

(12)

where \(D_g(z)\) denotes the selection function for compliance group \(g\). Similarly,
\[
E[Y_i(1 - D_i) h(Z_i)] = \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(0)(1 - D_i) h(Z_i) | G_i = g] \\
= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \{ E[Y_i(0) | G_i = g] E[h(Z_i)] \\
- E[Y_i(0) | G_i = g] E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)] \} \\
= \sum_g -P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(0) | G_i = g] E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)]
\]

(13)

where we have used that \(Z_i \perp (Y_i(0), Z_i)\) and \(E[h(Z_i)] = 0\).

Combining these two results:
\[
E[Y_i h(Z_i)] = E[Y_i D_i h(Z_i)] + E[Y_i(1 - D_i) h(Z_i)] = \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)] \Delta_g
\]

(14)

where \(\Delta_g := E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | G_i = g]\). By the law of iterated expectations, we also have that
\[
E[D_i h(Z_i)] = \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)]
\]

(15)

Note that in all of Equations (12), (13) and (14), the weighing over various groups \(g\) is governed by the quantity \(E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)]\). It can be seen that never takers and always takers receive no weight, since \(E[D_{n.t}(Z_i) h(Z_i)] = E[0] = 0\) and since \(E[D_{a.t}(Z_i) h(Z_i)] = E[h(Z_i)] = 0\).

Let \(\mathcal{F}\) denote the set of non-empty subsets of the instrument indices: \(\mathcal{F} := \{S \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, J\}, S \neq \emptyset\}\), and recall that these correspond each to a simple compliance group \(g(S)\), where \(D_{g(S)}(Z_i) = Z_{S_i}\). I first show that for any \(\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{F}}\), Assumption 3 allows us to define an \(h(Z_i)\) such that \(E[D_{g(S)}(Z_i) h(Z_i)] = E[Z_{S_i} h(Z_i)] = \lambda_S\). Note that since \(E[h(Z_i)] = 0\), this is the same as tuning each covariance \(\text{Cov}(Z_{S_i}, h(Z_i))\) to \(\lambda_S\) (c.f. Proposition 5). In particular, consider the choice \(h(Z_i) = (\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])' \Sigma^{-1} \lambda\), where recall that \(\Gamma_i\) is a vector of \(Z_{S_i}\) for each \(S \in \mathcal{F}\).

\[
(E[h(Z_i)], \Gamma_{i1}, E[h(Z_i), \Gamma_{i2}], \ldots, E[h(Z_i), \Gamma_{ik}])' = E[(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i]) h(Z_i)] \\
= E[(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])'] \Sigma^{-1} \lambda \\
= \Sigma \Sigma^{-1} \lambda = \lambda
\]

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We can understand the algebra of this result as follows. Let $V = \text{span}\{Z_{S_i} - E[Z_{S_i}]\}_{S \in \mathcal{F}}$. $V$ is a subspace of the vector space $\mathcal{V}$ of random variables on $Z$, with the zero vector being a degenerate random variable equal to zero. Since the matrix $\Sigma$ is positive semidefinite by construction, Assumption 3 is equivalent to the statement that for all $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{F}}/\{0\}$, $\omega' E[(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])']\omega = E[|\omega'(\Gamma_i - E[\Gamma_i])|^2] > 0$: i.e. $P \left( \sum_{S \in \mathcal{F}} \omega_S(Z_{S_i} - E[Z_{S_i}]) = 0 \right) < 1$ for all $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{F}}/\{0\}$. In other words, the random variables $(Z_{S_i} - E[Z_{S_i}])$ for $S \in \mathcal{F}$ are linearly independent, and hence form a basis of $V$.

Since $V$ is finite dimensional, there exists an orthonormal basis of random vectors of the same cardinality, $|\mathcal{F}|$, where orthonormality is defined with respect to the expectation inner product: $\langle A, B \rangle := E[A B]$. It is this orthogonalized version of the $Z_{S_i}$ that affords the ability to separately tune each of the $E[h(Z_i)Z_{S_i}]$ to the desired value $\lambda_S$, without disrupting the others.

Note that under Assumption 1:

$$\Delta_c = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \left\{ \frac{P(G_i = g)P(C_i = 1|G_i = g)}{P(C_i = 1)} \right\} \cdot \Delta_g = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \frac{P(G_i = g)P(C_i = 1|G_i = g)}{\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} P(G_i = g)P(C_i = 1|G_i = g)} \cdot \Delta_g$$

Comparing with Equations (14) and (15), the equality $\Delta_c = E[h(Z_i)Y_i]/E[D_i h(Z_i)]$ follows (provided that $P(C_i = 1) > 0$) if the coefficients match. That is: $E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)] = P(C_i = 1|G_i = g)$, for all $g \in \mathcal{G}^*$. By the above, this is guaranteed under Property M if we choose $\lambda_S = P(C_i = 1|G_i = g(S)) = E[c(g(S), Z_i)]$, since the quantity $E[D_g(Z_i) h(Z_i)]$ appearing in Eq. (14) is linear in $D_g(Z_i)$. The same logic follows for causal parameters of the form $E[Y_i(d)|C_i = 1]$ for $d \in \{0,1\}$, using Equations (12) and (13) and

$$E[Y_i(d)|C_i = 1] = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} P(G_i = g|C_i = 1)E[Y_i(d)|G_i = g, c(g, Z_i) = 1]$$

$$= P(C_i = 1)^{-1} \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} P(G_i = g)P(C_i = 1|G_i = g)E[Y_i(d)|G_i = g]$$

by independence. Note that the quantity $\lambda_S$ for each $S$ can be computed from the observed distribution of $Z$.

To replace Assumption 3 with Assumption 3* from Appendix A simply replace $\mathcal{F}$ as defined here with a maximal $\mathcal{F}$ from Assumption 3a*.

D.8 Proof of Corollary 1 to Theorem 1

The proof of Lemma 1 shows that $(1, \Gamma') A$ is a vector of indicators $\mathbf{1}_h^*$ for values of $Z$, where $A$ is the matrix with entries given in Corollary 1, which is invertible, and $\mathbf{1}_h$ is a vector of indicators $\mathbf{1}(Z_i = z)$ for each of the values $z \in Z$. We can thus write $h(Z_i)$ from
Thus, for any such \( (0, \lambda') E[(1, \Gamma_i')'(1, \Gamma_i')]^{-1}(1, \Gamma_i') \)

\[
= (0, \lambda') E[A'^{-1} A'(1, \Gamma_i')'(1, \Gamma_i') A A^{-1}]^{-1} A'^{-1} 3_i \\
= (0, \lambda') A E[3, 3_i] 3_i.
\]

This is useful because \( E[3, 3_i'] \) is diagonal, since the events that \( Z_i \) take on two different values are exclusive: \( E[3, 3_i'] = \text{diag}\{P(Z_i = z)\}_{z \in Z}. \)

Now, for \( V \in \{Y, D\}, E[h(z)V_i] = (0, \lambda') \text{diag}\{P(Z_i = z)\}_{z \in Z}^{-1} E[1(Z_i = z)V_i]\}_{z \in Z} = (0, \lambda') A E[V_i|Z_i = z]\}_{z \in Z}. \) Thus \( (0, \lambda') A \) describes the coefficients in an expansion of \( E[h(z)V_i] \) into CEFs of \( V_i \) across the support of \( Z_i. \)

### D.9 Proof of Proposition 6

#### D.9.1 VM case

The if direction is most straightforward. From Proposition 3 we have that for any \( z \in Z \)

\[
\mathcal{D}_g(z) = \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} [M_J]_{F(g), S} \cdot \mathcal{D}_g(S)(z)
\]

Thus, for any such \( c(g, z) \):

\[
c(g, z) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} [M_J]_{F(g), S} \cdot \mathcal{D}_g(S)(h_k(z)) - \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} [M_J]_{F(g), S} \cdot \mathcal{D}_g(S)(l_k(z))
\]

\[
= \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} [M_J]_{F(g), S} \cdot \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mathcal{D}_g(S)(h_k(z)) - \mathcal{D}_g(S)(l_k(z)) \right\}
\]

\[
= \sum_{S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}, S \neq \emptyset} [M_J]_{F(g), S} \cdot c(g(S), z)
\]

for any \( z \in Z \). To finish verifying Property M, we need only observe that \( c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0 \) for all \( z \) since \( \mathcal{D}_g(h_k(z)) = \mathcal{D}_g(l_k(z)) \) for any \( h_k, l_k \) when \( g \in \{a.t., n.t.\}. \)

Now we turn to the other implication of the Proposition, that any \( c \) satisfying Property M has a representation like the above. For shorthand, let \( c^{-1}(z) \) indicate the family of \( S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\} \) such that \( c(g(S), z) = 1 \). The following Lemma establishes that the family \( c^{-1}(z) \) and its complement are each closed under unions:

**Lemma.** Let \( c \) be a function from \( G \times Z \) to \( \{0, 1\} \) satisfies Property M. If \( A \in c^{-1}(z) \) and \( B \in c^{-1}(z) \), then \( A \cup B \in c^{-1}(z) \), and if \( A \notin c^{-1}(z) \) and \( B \notin c^{-1}(z) \), then \( A \cup B \notin c^{-1}(z). \)

**Proof.** If the sets \( A \) and \( B \) are nested, then the result follows trivially. Now suppose neither set contains the other, and consider the Sperner family \( A \cup B \) constructed of the
two sets \( A \) and \( B \). By Property M and using Proposition \( \mathbb{3} \)

\[
c(g(A \cup B), z) = \sum_{\emptyset \subset S' \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}} \left[ \sum_{f \subseteq \{A, B\}} (-1)^{|f| + 1} c \left( \bigcup_{S \in f} S, z \right) \right] c \left( \bigcup_{S \in f} S, z \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_{\emptyset \subset f \subseteq \{A, B\}} c \left( \bigcup_{S \in f} S, z \right)
\]

\[
= c(g(A), z) + c(g(B), z) - c(g(A \cup B), z)
\]

In the first case, if both \( A \) and \( B \) are in \( c^{-1}(z) \), then we must have \( c(g(A \cup B), z) = 1 \) to prevent \( c(g(A \cup B), z) \) from evaluating to 2, which contradicts the assumption that \( c \) takes values in \( \{0, 1\} \). In the second case, when both \( c(g(A), z) \) and \( c(g(B), z) \) are zero, we must have \( c(g(A \cup B), z) = 1 \) to prevent \( c(g(A \cup B), z) \) from evaluating to -1. \( \square \)

As a consequence of the Lemma, since \( c^{-1}(z) \) is a finite set, there exists a member \( S_1(z) \) of \( c^{-1}(z) \) that satisfies \( S_1(z) = \bigcup_{S \in c^{-1}(z)} S \) (similarly, there exists a \( S_0(z) = \bigcup_{S \in c^{-1}(z)} S \) with \( S_0(z) \notin c^{-1}(z) \)). All members of the family \( c^{-1}(z) \) are subsets of \( S_1(z) \), and all \( S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\} \) that are not in \( c^{-1}(z) \) are subsets of \( S_0(z) \).

Let \( z \) take some fixed value, and beginning with the set \( S_1 = S_1(z) \), define a sequence of sets \( \{S_1, S_2, S_3, \ldots\} \) as follows:

\[
S_{2k} = \bigcup_{S' \subseteq S_{2k-1}; S' \notin c^{-1}(z)} S' \quad \text{and} \quad S_{2k+1} = \bigcup_{S' \subseteq S_{2k}; S' \subseteq c^{-1}(z)} S'
\]

where we take \( \bigcup_{S' \in \emptyset} S' \) to evaluate to the empty set. This sequence provides a characterization of the family \( c^{-1}(z) \) as follows. For any \( \emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\} \):

\[
c(g(S), z) = 1(S \in c^{-1}(z))
\]

\[
= 1(S \subseteq S_1) - 1(S \subseteq S_1) - 1(S \subseteq S_2 : S \notin c^{-1}(z))
\]

\[
= 1(S \subseteq S_1) - (1(S \subseteq S_2) - 1(S \subseteq S_2 : S \notin c^{-1}(z)) - 1(S \subseteq S_3 : S \notin c^{-1}(z)))
\]

\[
= \ldots
\]

\[
= \sum_{n=1}^{N} (-1)^{n+1} \cdot 1(S \subseteq S_n) + (-1)^N \cdot \begin{cases} 1(S \subseteq S_N : S \subseteq c^{-1}(z)) & \text{if } N \text{ even} \\ 1(S \subseteq S_N : S \notin c^{-1}(z)) & \text{if } N \text{ odd} \end{cases}
\]

for any natural number \( N \).

Think of the power set of \( S_1 \) as a “first-order” approximation to the family \( c^{-1}(z) \). However, in most cases this family is too large, as there will be subsets of \( S_1 \) that are not found in \( c^{-1}(z) \). Define \( S_2 \) to be the union of all such offending sets. The power set of \( S_2 \) now provides a possible “overestimate” of the family of offending sets (since they are
all in $2^{S_2}$) and hence removing all subsets of $S_2$ as a correction to be applied to $2^{S_1}$ as an estimate of $c^{-2}(z)$ will overcompensate: we will have removed some sets which are indeed in $c^{-1}(z)$. We thus define $S_3$ analogously, whose power set provides an approximation to the error in $S_2$ as an approximation to the error in $S_1$, and so on.

Does this process of over-correction eventually terminate, so that the final remainder term is zero? Note that for any $n$: $S_n \subseteq S_{n-1}$. If $S_n = S_{n-1} \neq \emptyset$, then we have a fixed point $S$ where $\bigcup_{S' \subseteq S: S' \in c^{-1}(z)} S' = \bigcup_{S' \subseteq S: S' \notin c^{-1}(z)} S'$. But by the Lemma, this would imply that $S$ is a member both of $\{S' \subseteq S : S' \in c^{-1}(z)\}$ and of $\{S' \subseteq S : S' \notin c^{-1}(z)\}$, and therefore that both $c(g(S), z) = 1$ and $c(g(S), z) = 0$, a contradiction. Thus, $S_n \subset S_{n-1}$, and $|S_n|$ is a decreasing sequence of non-negative integers that is strictly decreasing so long as $|S_n| > 0$. It must thus converge to zero in at most $|S_1|$ iterations, so that $S_n = \emptyset$ for all $n \geq |S_1|$.

Without loss, we can terminate the sequence on an even term, since $1(S \subseteq \emptyset) = 0$ for any $S \supseteq \emptyset$. Let $2K$ denote the smallest even number such that $S_n = \emptyset$ for all $n > 2K$, for a fixed $z$. Thus, we have for any $\emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}$:

$$c(g(S), z) = \sum_{n=1}^{2K} (-1)^{n+1} \cdot D_{g(S)}(S_n) = \sum_{k=1}^K D_{g(S)}(S_{2k-1}) - D_{g(S)}(S_{2k})$$

where $2K \leq |S_1| \leq J$, and we have used that $D_{g(S)}(S') = 1(S \subseteq S')$ for any $S'$.

Now recall that we have left the dependence of each of the sets $S_n$ (as well as the integer $K$) on $z$ implicit, and have also adopted the notational convention of $D_{g}(S)$ as a shorthand for $D_{g}(z)$ where $z$ is a point in $\mathcal{Z}$ that takes a value of one for exactly the instruments in the set $S$. To obtain the notation of the final result, define for each $k = 1 \ldots K$ the point $u_k(z) \in \mathcal{Z}$ to have a value of one exactly for the elements in $S_{2k-1}$ for that value of $z$, and $l_k(z) \in \mathcal{Z}$ to have a value of one exactly for the elements in $S_{2k}$ for that value of $z$. We may thus write, for any $\emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}$ and any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$:

$$c(g(S), z) = \sum_{k=1}^{K(z)} D_{g(S)}(u_k(z)) - D_{g(S)}(l_k(z)) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} D_{g(S)}(u_k(z)) - D_{g(S)}(l_k(z))$$

where we let $K$ be the maximum of $K(z)$ over the finite set $\mathcal{Z}$, and we define $u_k(z)$ and $l_k(z)$ to each be a vector of zeros whenever $k > K(z)$. For each $z$, the relations $u_k(z) \geq l_k(z)$ and $l_k(z) \geq u_{k+1}(z)$ component-wise now follow from $S_n \subseteq S_{n+1}$.

Now we may apply Property M to construct $c(g, z)$ for any of the non-simple compliance groups as well. Recall that Property M says that $c(g(F), z) = \sum_{\emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}} [M]_{F,S}$.
\( c(g(S), z) \) for all \( z \), for any Sperner family \( F \). Thus:

\[
c(g(F), z) = \sum_{\emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}} [M_j]_{F,S} \cdot \sum_{k=1}^{K} \{ D_{g(S)}(u_k(z)) - D_{g(S)}(l_k(z)) \}
\]

\[
= \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{\emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}} [M_j]_{F,S} \cdot D_{g(S)}(u_k(z)) - \sum_{\emptyset \subset S \subseteq \{1 \ldots J\}} [M_j]_{F,S} \cdot D_{g(S)}(l_k(z))
\]

\[
= \sum_{k=1}^{K} D_{g(F)}(u_k(z)) - D_{g(F)}(l_k(z))
\]

Finally, note that \( D_{g}(u_k(z)) = D_{g}(l_k(z)) \) for any \( g \in \{a.t., n.t.\} \) so the following expression holds for all \( g \in \mathcal{G} \):

\[
c(g, z) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} D_{g}(u_k(z)) - D_{g}(l_k(z))
\]

**D.9.2 IAM case**

Now I prove that representation from Proposition 6 also holds under IAM. Note that under IAM Property M places no restriction beyond \( c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0 \) since there is no perfect linear dependency between the functions \( D_g(z) \) to worry about. Under IAM, each \( g \in \mathcal{G}^c \) can be associated with an integer \( m \in \{1, 2 \ldots 2^J - 1\} \) and characterized directly as \( 1(g = m) = D_g(z_{m+1}) - D_g(z_m') \), where \( z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_{2^J} \) is any fixed ordering of the points that is weakly increasing according to the propensity score \( E[D_i|Z_i = z_m] \). Thus, for any function \( g : \mathcal{G} \times Z \to \{0, 1\} \) such that \( c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0 \):

\[
c(g, z) = \sum_{m=1}^{2^J-1} c(m, z) \cdot (D_g(z_{m+1}) - D_g(z_m'))
\]

\[
= \sum_{k=1}^{K} D_{g}(u_k(z)) - D_{g}(l_k(z))
\]

with \( K = 2^J-1 \) where for each \( z \) we let \( l_k(z) = z_m \) and we let \( u_k(z) = \begin{cases} z_k & \text{if} \ c(k, z) = 0 \\ z_{k+1} & \text{if} \ c(k, z) = 1 \end{cases} \).

Note that if any set of consecutive \( c(k, z) = c(k+1, z) \ldots c(k+T, z) \) are all equal to one, then one can drop \( T - 1 \) of these terms as the inner terms will all cancel leaving \( D_{g}(u_{k+T}(z)) - D_{g}(l_k(z)) \). Thus we may take without loss \( K \leq 2^J/2 = 2^{J-1} \) (corresponding to the case where \( c(1, z) = 1, c(2, z) = 0, c(3, z) = 1 \) etc.).
D.10 Proof of Corollary 2 to Theorem 1

Using independence and Property M:
\[
E[h(Z_i)D_i] = \sum_g P(G_i = g) E[h(Z_i)D_g(Z_i)] \\
= \sum_g P(G_i = g) E\left[h(Z_i) \left( \sum_S [M_J]_{F(g),S} D_{g(s)}(Z_i) \right) \right] \\
= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \sum_S [M_J]_{F(g),S} P(C_i = 1 | D_{g(s)}(Z_i)) \\
= \sum_g P(G_i = g) P(C_i = 1 | G_i = g) \\
= P(C_i = 1)
\]

D.11 An Equivalence Result

The proofs of Proposition 7 and 9 will make use of the following equivalence result:

**Proposition 11.** Let the support \( Z \) of the instruments be discrete and finite. Fix a function \( c(g,z) \). Let \( P_{DZ} \) denote the joint distribution of \( D_i \) and \( Z_i \). Then the following are equivalent:

1. \( \Delta_c \) is (point) identified by \( P_{DZ} \) and \( \{\beta_s\}_{s \in S} \), for some finite set \( S \) of known or identified (from \( P_{DZ} \)) measurable functions \( s(d,z) \), and \( \beta_s := E[s(D_i, Z_i)Y_i] \)

2. \( \Delta_c = \beta_s \) for a single such \( s(d,z) \)

3. \( \Delta_c = E[t(D_i, Z_i, Y_i)] \) with \( t(d,z,y) \) a known or identified (from \( P_{DZ} \)) measurable function

4. \( \Delta_c \) is identified from the set of CEFs \( \{E[Y_i | D_i = d, Z_i = z]\} \) for \( d \in \{0, 1\} \), \( z \in Z \) along with the joint distribution \( P_{DZ} \)

**Proof.** See Supplemental Material.

In saying that a parameter \( \theta \) is identified by some set of empirical estimands, I mean that the set of values of \( \theta \) that are compatible with the empirical estimands is a singleton, regardless of the distribution of the latent variables \( (G_i, Y_i(1), Y_i(0)) \) – for all \( P_{DZ} \) within some class (note that the marginal distribution of \( G_i \) must also be compatible with \( P_{DZ} \)). For example, by writing the estimand of Theorem \( \sum_{z \in Z} \frac{P(Z_i = z) h(z; P_{DZ})}{E[h(Z_i; P_{DZ})]} \cdot E[Y_i | Z_i = z] \), where we make explicit that the function \( h \) depends on \( P_{DZ} \), it is clear that for any \( \Delta_c \) satisfying Property M and under Assumptions 1-2, \( \Delta_c \) is identified in the sense of item 4., for all \( P_{DZ} \) with the properties: i) the marginal distribution of \( Z_i \) satisfies Assumption 3; and ii) \( E[h(Z_i; P_{DZ})D_i] > 0 \).
D.12 Proof of Proposition 7

By Proposition 11, we know that if $\Delta_c$ is identified from a finite set of IV-like estimands and $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$, it can be written as a single one: $\Delta_c = \beta_s$ with $s(d, z)$ an identified functional of $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$. Now, using that $Y_i = Y_i(0) + D_i \Delta_i$ where $\Delta_i := Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$:

$$\Delta_c = \beta_s = \left\{ E[s(D_i, Z_i)Y_i(0)] + E[s(D_i, Z_i)D_i\Delta_c] \right\}$$

$$= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \left\{ E[s(D_g(Z_i), Z_i)Y_i(0)|G_i = g] + E[s(D_g(Z_i), Z_i)D_g(Z_i)\Delta_i|G_i = g] \right\}$$

$$= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \left( E[s(D_g(Z_i), Z_i)] \right) E[Y_i(0)|G_i = g]$$

$$+ \sum_g P(G_i = g) \left( E[s(D_g(Z_i), Z_i)D_g(Z_i)] \right) E[\Delta_i|G_i = g]$$

$$= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \left( E[s(1, Z_i)D_g(Z_i)] \right) \Delta_g$$

where we’ve used independence, and that the crossed out term must be equal to zero for every $g$ by the assumption that $\beta_s = \Delta_c$ for every joint distribution of compliance groups and potential outcomes compatible with $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$ in some class (it is always possible to translate the support of the distribution of $Y(0)$ and $Y(1)$ by the same constant without affecting $\Delta_i$). Finally, $s(D_g(Z_i), Z_i)D_g(Z_i) = s(1, Z_i)D_g(Z_i)$ with probability one, establishing the final equality.

Recall that from Equation 3 that $\Delta_c$ can also be written as a weighted average of group-specific average treatment effects $\Delta_g = E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G_i = g]$ as:

$$\Delta_c = \frac{1}{P(C_i = 1)} \sum_g P(G_i = g)E[c(g, Z_i)] \cdot \Delta_g$$

Since $\beta_s = \Delta_c$ holds for any vector of $\{\Delta_g\}$ across all of the $g$ for which $P(G_i = g) > 0$ is compatible with $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$, we can match coefficients within this group to establish that $E[c(g, Z_i)] = P(C_i = 1)E[s(1, Z_i)D_g(Z_i)]$. This set of weights satisfies Property M, since for any $g \in G^c$:

$$E[c(g, Z_i)] = P(C_i = 1)E[s(1, Z_i)\sum_S [M_j]_{F(g), S}D_{g(S)}(Z_i)]$$

$$= \sum_S [M_j]_{F(g), S} \left( P(C_i = 1)E[s(1, Z_i)D_{g(S)}(Z_i)] \right)$$

$$= \sum_S [M_j]_{F(g), S} \cdot E[c(Z_i, g(S))]$$

If this holds for any distribution of $Z_i$ satisfying Assumption 3, then we must have $c(g, z) = \sum_S [M_j]_{F(g), S} \cdot c(g(S), z)$ for all $z \in Z$. To see this, consider a sequence of distributions for $Z_i$ that converges point-wise to a degenerate distribution at any single point $z$, but satisfies Assumption 3 for each term in the sequence. Applying the dominated convergence theorem to $E[c(g, Z_i)] - \sum_S [M_j]_{F(g), S} \cdot E[c(g(S), Z_i)] = 0$ along this sequence, we have that $c(g, z) = \sum_S [M_j]_{F(g), S} \cdot c(g(S), z)$. We can apply a similar argument to
establish that \(c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0\) for all \(z \in Z\) given that \(E[c(g, Z_i)] = P(C_i = 1)E[s(1, Z_i)D_g(Z_i)]\) and \(E[s(1, Z_i)] = 0\).

### D.13 Proof of Proposition 11

In the Supplemental Material, I show that with two binary instruments, if PM holds but not VM or IAM, then \(G\) consists of seven compliance groups, whose definitions are given in the Supplemental Material. We suppose that all 7 groups are possibly present, and the practitioner has knowledge of \(E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z]\) for all eight combinations of \((d, z)\), as well as the joint distribution of \(D_i\) and \(Z_i\). This is equivalent to knowledge of \(E[Y_i|D_i = Z_i = z]\) and \(E[Y_i(1-D_i)|Z_i = z]\) for all \(z \in Z\) and the joint distribution of \((D_i, Z_i)\). Point identification from these moments is in turn equivalent to point identification from a finite set of IV-like estimands, by Proposition 11.

Using Supplemental Material Table 2, these eight moments can be written in matrix form as

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
E[Y_i|D_i = 0, Z_i = 0] \\
E[Y_i|D_i = 0, Z_i = 1] \\
E[Y_i|D_i = 1, Z_i = 0] \\
E[Y_i|D_i = 1, Z_i = 1]
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

for some labeling of the instrument values, where the groups “reluctant defiers” and “odd compliers” are defined in the Supplemental Material. If this equation is written as \(b = Ax\), where \(b\) is the 8 \& 1 vector of identified quantities, and \(x\) the 14 \& 1 unknown vector of potential outcome moments (note the matrix \(A\) here is not the same as the matrix \(A\) defined in Corollary 1), then \(ACL\) can be written as

\[
ACL = \frac{1}{1 - p_a - p_n} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & -1 & -1 & -1 & -1 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} ' x \quad (16)
\]

ACL is identified only if the vector \(\lambda\) is in the row space of matrix \(A\) (the column space of \(A'\)), which follows from the proof of \(4 \rightarrow 2\) in Proposition 11. This can be readily verified not to hold, since

\[A'(AA')^{-1}A \lambda \approx \begin{pmatrix} 1.45 & 0.82 & 0.82 & 0.73 & 0.73 & 0.18 & 0 & -1.45 & -0.73 & -0.73 & -0.82 & -0.82 & 0 \end{pmatrix}
\]

where \(A'(AA')^{-1}A\) is the orthogonal projector into the row space of \(A\) (which has full row rank). Since the RHS of the above is not equal to \(\lambda\) (given explicitly in Eq. 16), \(\lambda\) is not in the row space of \(A\).
D.14 Proof of Proposition 10

Write the parameter of interest $\Delta_c$ as $\theta_Y/\theta_D$, where for $V \in \{Y, D\}$, $\theta_V = \hat{\lambda}_V \beta_V$ with $\beta_V := E[\Gamma, \Gamma']^{-1}E[\Gamma'V]$ and $\hat{\lambda} = (0, \hat{\lambda}')$. Denote the estimator $\hat{\beta}(\lambda, \alpha)$ as $\hat{\Delta}_c$ for shorthand. It takes the form $\hat{\Delta}_c = \hat{\theta}_V/\hat{\theta}_D$, where $\hat{\theta}_V := (0, \hat{\lambda}')' \Gamma \Gamma + K)^{-1} \Gamma'V$, and $K = \alpha I$. I keep the notation in terms of $K$ as the first part of the argument below will go through with any diagonal matrix of positive entries, allowing a different regularization parameter corresponding to each singular vector of $\Gamma' \Gamma$. Write each $\hat{\theta}_V := (0, \hat{\lambda}')' \hat{\beta}_V^*$ where $\hat{\beta}_V^*$ is the ridge-regression estimate of $\beta_V$, and let $\hat{\beta}_V = (\Gamma' \Gamma)^{-1} \Gamma' V$ be the unregularized regression coefficient estimator.

Consider the conditional MSE $M = E[(\hat{\Delta}_c - \Delta_c)^2 | \Gamma]$. It can be rearranged as:

$$M = E \left[ \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_V}{\theta_D} - \frac{\theta_V}{\theta_D} \right)^2 \right] = \frac{1}{\theta_D^2} E \left[ (\hat{\theta}_V - \theta_V - \hat{\Delta}_c(\hat{\theta}_D - \theta_D))^2 \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta_D^2} E \left[ (\hat{\theta}_V - \theta_V)^2 + \hat{\Delta}_c^2(\hat{\theta}_D - \theta_D)^2 - 2\hat{\Delta}_c(\hat{\theta}_V - \theta_V)(\hat{\theta}_D - \theta_D) \right]$$

where the first term in the above is viewed as an approximation that ignores terms that are of third or higher order in estimation errors. The asymptotic rate at which the approximation error captured by the $R_n^m$ converges to zero is considered explicitly at the end of this section.

Let $Z = (\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \Gamma' \Gamma$ and notice that $\hat{\beta}_V^* = Z \hat{\beta}_V$. Using that $E[\hat{\beta}_V | \Gamma] = \beta_V$ (as $\Gamma_i$ includes all products of the instruments the CEF must be linear) for $V \in \{Y, D\}$:

$$E \left[ (\hat{\beta}_V - \beta_V)(\hat{\beta}_W^* - \beta_W) | \Gamma \right] = Z \left[ (\hat{\beta}_V - \beta_V)(\hat{\beta}_W^* - \beta_W) | \Gamma \right] Z' + (Z - I) \beta_V \beta_W' (Z - I)'$$

$$= (\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} (\Gamma' \Omega_{VW} \Gamma + K \beta_V \beta_W' \Gamma K)(\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1}$$

where we define the $n \times 1$ vector $U_V = V - \Gamma \beta_V$ and $\Omega_{VW} = E[U_V U_W' | \Gamma]$. Thus, total conditional MSE is, by Equation (17):

$$M \approx \frac{1}{\theta_D^2} \hat{\lambda} (\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \left\{ \Gamma' (\Omega_Y + \Delta_c^2 \Omega_D - 2 \Delta_c \Delta_Y D) \Gamma' + K \left( \beta_V \beta_Y + \Delta_c^2 \beta_D \beta_D' - 2 \Delta_c \beta_Y \beta_D' \right) K \right\} (\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \hat{\lambda}$$

This development follows and generalizes that of Hoerl and Kennard (1970), who consider MSE optimal regularization via ridge regression for estimating a single regression vector, under homoscedasticity. Our case targets the ratio $\hat{\theta}_V/\hat{\theta}_D$ rather than a vector of regression coefficients, and also allows for heteroscedasticity.

We now prove that $\alpha/\sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{p} 0$ if $\alpha$ is chosen to minimize the following “single-step”
estimator of the MSE (ignoring the positive factor of $\theta_D^{-2}$ that does not depend on $K$):

$$
\hat{M} := \hat{\lambda}(\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \left\{ \Gamma' \left( \hat{\Omega}_Y + \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right)^2 \hat{\Omega}_D - 2 \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right) \hat{\Omega}_{YD} \right) \Gamma + K \left( \hat{\beta}_Y \hat{\beta}_Y' + \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right)^2 \hat{\beta}_D \hat{\beta}_D' - 2 \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right) \hat{\beta}_Y \hat{\beta}_D' \right) \right\} (\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \hat{\lambda}
$$

where $\left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right)$ is the un-regularized estimator of $\Delta_\Sigma$. The problem can be re parameterized as a choice of $b := \alpha/n$, where

$$
\hat{M}(b) := \hat{\lambda}' \left( \frac{\Gamma' \Gamma}{n} + bI \right)^{-1} \left\{ \frac{1}{n} \Gamma' \left( \hat{\Omega}_Y + \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right)^2 \hat{\Omega}_D - 2 \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right) \hat{\Omega}_{YD} \right) \Gamma + b^2 \left( \hat{\beta}_Y - \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right) \hat{\beta}_D \right) \left( \hat{\beta}_Y - \left( \frac{\hat{\theta}_Y}{\hat{\theta}_D} \right) \hat{\beta}_D \right)' \right\} \left( \frac{\Gamma' \Gamma}{n} + bI \right)^{-1} \hat{\lambda}
$$

$$
:= m(b, \hat{\Pi}, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}, \hat{\lambda})
$$

where $\hat{\Pi} := \frac{1}{n} \sum_i (U_{Y,i} - \hat{\beta}_Y / \hat{\theta}_D U_{D,i})^2 \Gamma_i \Gamma_i'$, $\hat{\beta} := (\hat{\beta}_Y - \hat{\theta}_Y / \hat{\theta}_D \hat{\beta}_D)$, and $\hat{\Sigma} := \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \Gamma_i \Gamma_i'$. Note that $\hat{\beta} \xrightarrow{p} \beta := \beta_Y - \Delta_\Sigma \beta_D$, $\hat{\Sigma} \xrightarrow{p} \Sigma^* := E[(1, \Gamma_1')(1, \Gamma_1')]$, $\sqrt{n} \left( \hat{\Pi} - \Pi \right) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, V)$ for some $V$ provided that the variance of $(U_{Y,i} - \hat{\theta}_Y / \hat{\theta}_D U_{D,i})^2 \Gamma_i \Gamma_i'$ exists, where $\Pi := E[(U_{Y,i} - \hat{\theta}_Y / \hat{\theta}_D U_{D,i})^2 \Gamma_i \Gamma_i']$. The function $m$ is

$$
m(b, \Pi/n, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda) = (0, \lambda') \left( \Sigma^* + bI \right)^{-1} \left\{ \Pi/n + b^2 \beta \beta' \right\} \left( \Sigma^* + bI \right)^{-1} (0, \lambda')'
$$

We wish to show that $\sqrt{n} b = \alpha/\sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{p} 0$, when $b$ is chosen as the smallest positive minimizer of $m(\cdot, \hat{\Pi}/n, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}, \hat{\lambda})$. The strategy will be to show that $nb \xrightarrow{p} X$ where $X$ is a finite degenerate random variable. Since $\Pi$ and $\beta \beta'$ are positive definite, it is clear that $m(b, \Pi/n, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ is weakly positive for any choice of $b$. Further, $m(b, \Pi/n, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ is typically strictly positive at $b = 0$, and it can also be seen that $\lim_{n \to \infty} m(b, \Pi/n, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda) = 0$ (see Section C.1 for discussion). However, $m$ is generally not monotonically decreasing in between, as we shall see below.

Observe that $b = 0$ minimizes $m(b, 0, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ with respect to $b$ regardless of the values of $\beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda$, where $0$ is a $k \times k$ matrix of zeros (the dimension of $\Pi$), since $m(\cdot)$ is always positive and when its second argument vanishes can be made equal to zero by choosing $b = 0$. Furthermore, $b = 0$ is a local minimizer when $\Pi/n = 0$, since $m_b$ vanishes when evaluated at $(0, 0, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$—see below, while the second derivative of $m$ with respect to $b$, evaluated at $(0, 0, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$, is equal to

$$
(0, \lambda') \Sigma^{-1} \beta \beta' \Sigma^{-1} \lambda = ((0, \lambda') \Sigma^{-1} \beta)^2
$$

up to a strictly positive constant. We have assumed that the quantity in parentheses is non-zero. By the implicit function theorem, there then exists a unique function $g(\Pi/n; \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ such that $g(0; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}, \hat{\lambda}) = 0$ and $m_b(g(\Pi/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}, \hat{\lambda}), \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}, \hat{\lambda}) = 0$, in a
neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$ of the probability limits $(0, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ of $(\hat{\Pi}/n, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \hat{\lambda})$, and this function is continuously differentiable with respect to all parameters, (including, in particular, the elements of $\Pi$). Since the second derivative of $m$ is strictly positive at $(0, 0, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)$ and continuous with respect to all arguments, $\mathcal{N}$ can furthermore be chosen such that the critical point at $(g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda), \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)$ is always a local minimum within $\mathcal{N}$.

Since for any realization of $\hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda$:

$$m_0(0, 0, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) = \frac{2\lambda(\hat{\Sigma}^* + bI)^{-1}}{\left\{bI - b^2(\hat{\Sigma}^* + bI)^{-1}\right\}} \hat{\beta}'(\hat{\Sigma}^* + bI)^{-1} \hat{\lambda} \bigg|_{b=0} = 0$$

we see that $m$ has a critical point at $b = 0$ for values $(0, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)$ of the other arguments. By uniqueness of the function $g(\Pi/n; \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$, this implies then that $g(0, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) = 0$. By the mean value theorem, we can write

$$g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) = g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) - g(0, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) = \frac{\partial}{\partial x} g(\text{vec}(cn^{-1}\hat{\Pi}); \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) \cdot \text{vec}(\hat{\Pi})$$

for some $c \in [0, 1]$, where $\text{vec}(\Pi)$ denotes the vectorization $x$ of the matrix $\Pi$, and we let $\frac{\partial}{\partial x} g(x; \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ denote a gradient of $g$ with respect to that vector (recall that existence of the derivative is a consequence of the implicit function theorem). By continuity of $\frac{\partial}{\partial x} g(x; \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda)$ and the continuous mapping theorem then,

$$n \cdot g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda) \xrightarrow{p} \frac{\partial}{\partial x} g(0, \beta, \Sigma^*, \lambda) \text{vec}(\Pi) \tag{18}$$

which is a finite scalar.

To complete the proof, we now simply note that with probability approaching unity, $(\hat{\Pi}/n, \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)$ is within the neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$, and thus if $b$ is chosen as the smallest positive local minimizer of $m(b, \hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)$ we have that $b = g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)$. We have now established the result, since for any $B > 0$:

$$P(|\alpha/\sqrt{n}| > B) \leq P(|\alpha/\sqrt{n}| > B \text{ and } b = g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)) + P(b \neq g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda))$$

$$= P(|n \cdot g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)| > \sqrt{n}B) + P(b \neq g(\hat{\Pi}/n; \hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}^*, \lambda)) \xrightarrow{n \to 0} 0 + 0$$

Finally, I consider the error involved in the approximation made to Equation (17). Write this as:

$$R_n := R_n^m + R_n^m = \frac{1}{\theta_D^2} \hat{\lambda}'(\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \left\{(\hat{\Delta}_c^2 - \Delta_c^2)(\Gamma' \Omega_D \Gamma + K \beta_D \beta_D' K) \right\} (\Gamma' \Gamma + K)^{-1} \hat{\lambda}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\theta_D \cdot n^{3/2}} \cdot \hat{\lambda} \left(\Gamma' \Gamma + \frac{K}{n}\right)^{-1} \left\{\sqrt{n}(\hat{\Delta}_c^2 - \Delta_c^2) \left(\frac{\Gamma' \Omega_D \Gamma}{n} + \frac{K}{\sqrt{n}} \beta_D \beta_D' K \sqrt{n}\right) - 2\sqrt{n}(\hat{\Delta}_c - \Delta_c) \left(\frac{\Gamma' \Omega_D \Gamma}{n} + \frac{K}{\sqrt{n}} \beta_D \beta_D' K \sqrt{n}\right) \right\} \left(\Gamma' \Gamma + \frac{K}{n}\right)^{-1} \hat{\lambda}$$

Provided that $\alpha/\sqrt{n} \xrightarrow{p} 0$ as above, we will show in Theorem 2 that $\hat{\Delta}_c$ is $\sqrt{n}$-consistent for $\Delta_c$. In this case, the approximation error term is $O_p(n^{-3/2})$.  

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D.15 Proof of Theorem 2

When \( \alpha_n = 0 \), the result follows from Theorem 3 of Imbens and Angrist (1994). To see that \( o_p(\sqrt{n}) \) regularization has no asymptotic effect, note that

\[
(0, \hat{\lambda}')'(\Gamma'\Gamma + \alpha I)^{-1}\Gamma'Y = (0, \hat{\lambda}')'(\Gamma'\Gamma + \alpha I - \alpha I)(\Gamma'\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma'Y
\]

and similarly for \( D \), thus:

\[
\rho(\hat{\lambda}, \alpha) = (0, \hat{\lambda}')'(\Gamma'\Gamma)^{-1}\Gamma'Y - \alpha(0, \hat{\lambda}')'(\Gamma'\Gamma + \alpha I)^{-1}\Gamma'Y
\]

and thus the asymptotic distribution of \( \sqrt{n}(\hat{\rho}(\lambda, 0) - \Delta_c) \) is the same as that of

\[
\sqrt{n} \left( \frac{\text{Cov}(g(Z_i, \hat{\theta}), Y_i)}{\text{Cov}(g(Z_i, \hat{\theta}), D_i)} - \Delta_c \right),
\]

provided that \( \alpha_n / \sqrt{n} \to 0 \) (in which case the second term above is \( o_p(n^{-1/2}) \)).