A
recent Time magazine poll found that 71 percent of Americans who responded want
the government to place limits on the executive compensation at firms that
received bailout money. Yet accomplishing this task selectively is impossible
to do.
The government did appoint a czar of
executive compensation for these corporations, but he approved a $7 million
salary/$3.5 million bonus plan for the head of AIG, 80 percent of which is now
owned by taxpayers. Few workers, executives included, would agree to work for
less than the going rate. Executives are simply used to earning millions of
dollars, and there is little that either the czar or shareholders can do about
it unless Congress limits all executive compensation. But the chance of such
legislation passing is slim.
Why is limiting executive compensation so
difficult? Because executives have a seemingly unassailable argument -- market
forces -- that
Of course, market forces are cited not only
to justify outsized compensation for executives but also poverty wages for
workers. Textbooks claim that minimum-wage laws and union wages create
unemployment. Just what are these market forces, and should we let them
determine executive compensation and wages?
When British economists David Ricardo and
Adam Smith examined this question 200 years ago, they concluded that what a
person earns is determined not by what the person has produced but by that
person's bargaining power. Why? Because production is typically carried out by
teams of workers, managers and machines, and the contribution of each member
cannot be separated from that of the rest. A driver and a bus, for example,
generate $100,000 of income a year. The driver is paid $25,000. Is this because
the driver had transported 10 of the passengers without the bus while the bus
had transported 30 of the passengers without the driver? The driver's pay is so
small only because the driver is so weak at the bargaining table.
It was Smith who explained that the
bargaining power of each party is determined by the laws that the government
passes and the way that it enforces them, and that, as a rule, the government
sides with employers against employees. He was particularly concerned with
anti-unionization laws. Had he witnessed the largesse that boards of directors
are permitted to offer executives, and the government's behavior toward
executives in the current crisis, he probably would have added that the
government also sides with executives against shareholders and taxpayers.
Despite the logic of Ricardo and Smith's
explanation that it is power, not productivity, that
determines what people earn, the notion that people earn what they
"deserve" persists. It dates to the Haymarket riot of 1886 in
It was thus with a clear political agenda
that
In this view, if the government were to
raise wages by law, employers would have no choice but to fire workers, because
no employer can pay out more than the worker puts in. And if the government
were to set limits on executive compensation, the bright and the talented would
choose to work less or limit the level of their performance.
Evidence that
Corporate executives take a different
approach: picking the argument that suits them. When it comes to their workers'
wages,
Adam Smith got it right: The remedy for the
rule of power is the rule of law. We need new laws to check the unfair
distribution of the fruits of our labor. One such law could set a maximum ratio
at any given company between the highest executive compensation and the lowest
worker's wage. Another could set a minimum ratio for the division of income
between labor and shareholders. Still another could raise the minimum wage and
tie it to the median wage, which would make the minimum wage a consistent
living wage.
Overpaid executives take more than their
fair share and leave too little for the rest of us, threatening our health --
and that of society.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Moshe Adler teaches economics at
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