Consumer Choice 3

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GR6211 - Microeconomic Analysis 1

- We are now going to explore some other aspects of the consumer's problem
 - Preferences over budget sets and indirect utility
 - Cost minimization and duality
- These may seem a little wierd and esoteric
- But they will allow us to show some very beautiful and useful results

- Imagine that the consumer can choose to live in two different countries
 - In country 1 they would face prices p^1 and have income w^1
 - In country 2 they would face prices p^2 and have income w^2
- Which country would they prefer to live in?
- i.e. what are there preferences over budget sets?
 - which we can denote by \succeq^*

The Indirect Utility Function

- Here is one possibility
 - Figure out one of the best items in budget set 1 (i.e. $x(p^1, w^1)$)
 - Figure out one of the best items in budget set 2 (i.e. $x(p^2, w^2)$)
 - The consumer prefers budget set 1 to budget set 2 if the former is preferred to the latter
- i.e. we can define
 [→]*on the set of budget sets by

$$\begin{array}{rcl} (p^1, w^1) &\succeq & {}^*(p^2, w^2) \\ \text{if and only if } x^1 &\succeq & x^2 \\ & \text{for } x^1 &\in & x(p^1, w^1) \text{ and } x^2 \in x(p^2, w^2) \end{array}$$

- Can you think of reasons why this might not be the right model?
 - Temptation
 - Uncertainty
 - Regret

 If *≥* can be represented by a utility function we can define the indirect utility function

$$v(p,w) = u(x(p,w))$$

Properties of the Indirect Utility Function

• Property 1:

$$v(\alpha p, \alpha w) = v(p, w)$$
 for $\alpha > 0$

• Follows from the fact that $x(\alpha p, \alpha w) = x(p, w)$

- **Property 2:** v(p, w) is non increasing in p and increasing in w
 - Assuming non satiation

Properties of the Indirect Utility Function

• Property 3: v is quasiconvex: i.e. the set

$$\{(p,w)|v(p,w)\leq \bar{v}\}$$

is convex for all \bar{v}

- **Property 4:** If \succeq is continuous then \succeq^* is continuous
 - Follows from the Theorem of the Maximum

The Story of The Turtle

- From Ariel Rubinstein
 - The furthest a turtle can travel in 1 day is 1 km
 - The shortest length of time it takes for a turtle to travel 1km is 1 day
- No, we didn't know what he was on about either
- But bear with me...

The Story of The Turtle

- Is this always true?
- No! Requires two assumptions
 - **1** The turtle can travel a strictly positive distance in any positive period of time
 - **2** The turtle cannot jump a positive distance in zero time
- So much for zoology, what has this got to do with economics?

Expenditure Minimization

- It is going to be very useful to define **Expenditure** minimization problem
 - This is the **dual** of the utility maximization problem
- Prime problem (utility maximization)

choose
$$x \in \mathbb{R}^{N}_+$$

in order to maximize u(x)

subject to
$$\sum\limits_{i=1}^{N} p_i x_i ~\leq~ w$$

• Dual problem (cost minimization)

choose
$$x \in \mathbb{R}^N_+$$

in order to minimize $\sum_{i=1}^N p_i x_i$
subject to $u(x) \geq \bar{u}$

Expenditure Minimization

- Are these problems 'the same'?
- In general, no
 - Like the teleporting turtle
- However, if we rule out teleportation (and laziness) then they will be the same.
- What assumptions allow us to do that?



Theorem

If u is monotonic and continuous then

- if x* is a solution to the prime problem with prices p and wealth w it is a solution to the dual problem with prices p and utility v(p, w)
- if x* is a solution to the dual problem with prices p and utility u* it is a solution to the prime problem with prices p and wealth ∑ p_ix_i*

- The dual problem allows us to define two new objects
- The Hicksian demand function

$$h(p,u) = rgmin_{x\in X} \sum p_i x_i$$
subject to $u(x) \geq ar{u}$

- This is the demand for each good when prices are *p* and the consumer must achieve utility *u*
- Note difference from Walrasian demand
- The expenditure function

$$e(p, u) = \min_{x \in X} \sum p_i x_i$$
subject to $u(x) \geq ar{u}$

• This is the amount of money necessary to achieve utility *u* when prices are *p*

Properties of the Hicksian Demand Function

- Assume that we are dealing with continuous, non-satiated preferences
- Fact 1: *h* is homogenous of degree zero in prices i.e. $h(\alpha p, u) = h(p, u)$ for $\alpha > 0$
 - Follows from the fact that increasing all prices by α does not change the tangency conditions
 - i.e. the slope of the 'budget line' remains the same
- Fact 2: No excess utility i.e. u(h(p, u)) = u
 - Follows from continuity (why?)

Properties of the Hicksian Demand Function

- Fact 3: If preferences are convex then *h* is a convex set. If preferences are strictly convex then *h* is unique
 - Proof left as an (easy) exercise

Properties of the Expenditure Function

- Again, assume that we are dealing with continuous, non-satiated preferences
- Fact 1: $e(\alpha p, u) = \alpha e(p, u)$
 - Follows from the fact that $h(\alpha p, u) = h(p, u)$


• Fact 2: e is strictly increasing in u and non-decreasing in p

- Strictly increasing due to continuity and non-satiation
- Only non-decreasing because may already be buying 0 of some good
- Fact 3: e is continuous in p and u
 - Logic follows from the theorem of the maximum (though can't be applied directly)

Properties of the Expenditure Function

- Fact 4: e is concave in p
- This is quite an important and intuitive property
- Implies that if we look at how expenditure changes as a function of one price it looks like this ...

Properties of the Expenditure Function



- Think of a price increase from p_1 to p_2
- If the consumer couldn't change their allocation then expenditure would go from *e*₁ to *e*₃
- This is an upper bound on the true increase in expenditure.

- We will now put the above machinery to work to learn about the relationship between the various measures we have introduced
- This will also allow us to say something about the comparative statics of these functions for example how demand changes with price
- Before doing so, it will be worth reviewing a very useful mathematical result
 - The Envelope Theorem
 - See Mas-Colell section M.L

The Envelope Theorem

• Consider a constrained optimization problem

choose x in order to maximize f(x : q)subject to $g_1(x : q) = 0$ \vdots $g_N(x : q) = 0$

• Where *q* are some parameters of the problem (for example prices)

The Envelope Theorem

- Assume the problem has a solution for all q, and let
 - x(q) be (a) solution to the problem if the parameters are q
 - v(q) = f(x(q):q)
- Key question: how does v alter with q
 - i.e. how does the value that can be achieved vary with the parameters?

The Envelope Theorem

- Say that
 - Both x and q are single valued
 - There are no constraints
 - Everything is differentiable
- Chain rule gives

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial q} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \frac{\partial x}{\partial q}$$

• But note that if we are at a maximum

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} = 0$$

• and so

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial q} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial q}$$

• Only the direct effect of the change in parameters matters

• This result generalizes

Theorem (The Envelope Theorem) In the above decision problem

$$\frac{\partial v(\bar{q})}{\partial q} = \frac{\partial f(x(\bar{q}):\bar{q})}{\partial q} - \sum_{n} \lambda_{n} \frac{\partial g_{n}(x(\bar{q}):\bar{q})}{\partial q}$$

where λ_n is the Lagrange multiplier on the nth constraint

- We can now apply the envelope theorem to get some interesting results relating the various functions that we have defined
- First, the relationship between the expenditure function and Hicksian demand

Theorem (Shephard's Lemma)

Say preferences are continuous, locally non satiated and strictly convex then

$$h_l(p, u) = rac{\partial e(p, u)}{\partial p_l}$$

Proof. EMP is

$$\min \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i x_i$$

subject to $u(x) \ge u$

Applying the envelope theorem directly gives the result

Corollary

Assume h is continuously differentiable, and let

$$D_{p}h(p, u) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial h_{1}}{\partial p_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial h_{1}}{\partial p_{M}} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial h_{M}}{\partial p_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial h_{M}}{\partial p_{M}} \end{pmatrix}$$

Then

Proof.

- 1 Follows directly from previous claim
- **2** Follows from (1) and the fact that e is concave
- Follows from (1) and the fact that matrices of second derivatives are symmetric
- 4 Follows from the homogeneity of degree zero of h, so

$$h(\alpha p, u) - h(p, u) = 0$$

Differentiating with respect to α gives the desired result

Walrasian Demand and The Indirect Utility Function

Theorem (Roy's Identity)

Say preferences are continuous, locally non satiated and strictly convex then

$$\mathbf{x}_{l}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w}) = -rac{rac{\partial \mathbf{v}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{p}_{l}}}{rac{\partial \mathbf{v}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}}}$$

Proof.

Applying the envelope theorem tells us that

$$\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w})}{\partial p_l} = -\lambda x_l(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w})$$

also

$$\lambda = \frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial w}$$

• Perhaps more usefully we can relate Hicksian and Walrasian Demand

Theorem (The Slusky Equation)

Let preferences be continuous, strictly convex and locally non-satiated and u = v(p, w)

$$\frac{\partial h_l(p, u)}{\partial p_k} = \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial w} x_k(p, w)$$

 Proof. By duality, we know

$$h_l(p, u) = x_l(p, e(p, u))$$

Differentiating both sides with respect to p_k gives

$$\frac{\partial h_l(p, u)}{\partial p_k} = \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial w} \frac{\partial e(p, u)}{\partial p_k}$$

but we know that

$$\frac{\partial e(p, u)}{\partial p_k} = h_k(p, u) = x_k(p, e(p, u)) = x_k(p, w)$$

Walrasian and Hicksian Demand

- Why is this useful?
- Define the Slutsky Matrix by

$$S_{l,k} = \frac{\partial x_l(p,w)}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l(p,w)}{\partial w} x_k(p,w)$$

• The above theorem tells us that

$$S = D_P h(p, u)$$

- And so S must be negatively semi definite, symmetric and S.p = 0
- Also note that S is observable (if you know the demand function)
- It turns out this result is if and only if: Demand is rationalizable if and only if the resulting Slutsky Matrix has the above properties

Walrasian and Hicksian Demand

- It also helps us understand how demand for a good changes in response to its own prices.
- We now need one more theorem

Theorem (The Law of Compensated Demand) Assume preferences are continuous, locally non satiated and strictly convex, then for any p', p''

$$(p''-p')(h(p'',u)-h(p',u)) \le 0$$

Proof.

As h minimizes expenditure we have

$$p''h(p'',u) \leq p''h(p',u)$$

and

$$p'h(p'', u) \ge p'h(p', u)$$

Subtracting the two inequalities gives the result

Law of Compensated Demand

- An immediate corollary is that the compensated price elasticity of demand is non positive
 - An increase in the price of good / reduces the Hicksian demand for good /
- Back to the Slutsky equation we l = k we have

$$\frac{\partial h_l(p, u)}{\partial p_l} - \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial w} x_l(p, w) = \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial p_l}$$

- Does $\frac{\partial x_l(p,w)}{\partial p_l}$ have to be negative?
 - No! Giffen Goods
- But this can only happen if the income effect

$$\frac{\partial x_l(p,w)}{\partial w} x_l(p,w)$$

Overwhelms the substitution effect

$$\frac{\partial h_l(p, u)}{\partial p_l}$$