

# A Representation Theorem for Utility Maximization: Proofs

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- Our job is to show that, if choices satisfy  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  then we can find a preference relation  $\succeq$  which is
  - Complete, transitive and reflexive
  - Represents choices

## Theorem

*A Choice Correspondence can be represented by a complete, transitive, reflexive preference relation if satisfies axioms  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$*

- How should we proceed?
  - ① Choose a candidate binary relation  $\succeq$
  - ② Show that it is complete, transitive and reflexive
  - ③ Show that it represents choice

# Guessing the Preference Relation

- If we observed choices, what do we think might tell us that  $x$  is preferred to  $y$ ?
- How about if  $x$  is chosen when the only option is  $y$ ?
- Let's try that!
- We will **define**  $\succeq$  as saying

$$x \succeq y \text{ if } x \in C(x, y)$$

- **Remember this translation!**
  - Whenever I ask “what does it mean that  $x \succeq y$ ”
  - You reply “ $x$  was chosen from the set  $\{x, y\}$ ”
- Okay, great, we have defined  $\succeq$
- But we need it to have the right properties

- Is  $\triangleright$  **complete**?
- Yes!
- For any set  $\{x, y\}$  either  $x$  or  $y$  must be chosen (or both)
- In the former case  $x \triangleright y$
- In the latter  $y \triangleright x$

- Is  $\succeq$  **reflexive**?
- Yes! (though we have been a bit cheeky)
- Let  $x = y$ , so then  $C(x, x) = C(x) = x$
- Implies  $x \succeq x$

- Is  $\succeq$  **transitive**?
- Yes! (though this requires a little proving)
- Assume not, then

$$x \succeq y, y \succeq z$$

but not  $x \succeq z$

- We need to show that this **cannot happen**
- i.e. it violates  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$
- These are conditions on the data, so what do we need to do?
- Understand what this means for the data

- Translating to the data
  - $x \succeq y$  means that  $x \in C(x, y)$
  - $y \succeq z$  means that  $y \in C(y, z)$
  - not  $x \succeq z$  means that  $x \notin C(x, z)$
- Claim: such data cannot be consistent with  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$
- Why not?



- What would the person choose from  $\{x, y, z\}$
- $x$ ?
  - No! Violation of  $\alpha$  as  $x$  not chosen from  $\{x, z\}$
- $y$ ?
  - No! This would imply (by  $\alpha$ ) that  $y \in C(x, y)$
  - By  $\beta$  this means that  $x \in C(x, y, z)$
  - Already shown that this can't happen
- $z$ ?
  - No! This would imply (by  $\alpha$ ) that  $z \in C(y, z)$
  - By  $\beta$  this means that  $y \in C(x, y, z)$
  - Already shown that this can't happen

- If we have  $x \succeq y$ ,  $y \succeq z$  but not  $x \succeq z$  then the data cannot satisfy  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$
- Thus if  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are satisfied, we know that  $\succeq$  must be transitive!
- Thus, we can conclude that, if  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are satisfied  $\succeq$  must have all three right properties!

- Finally, we need to show that  $\succeq$  represents choices - i.e.

$$C(A) = \{x \in A \mid x \succeq y \text{ for all } y \in A\}$$

- How do we do this?
- Well, first note that we are trying to show that two **sets** are equal
  - The set of things that are chosen
  - The set of things that are best according to  $\succeq$
- We do this by showing two things
  - ① That if  $x$  is in  $C(A)$  it must also be  $x \succeq y$  for all  $y \in A$
  - ② That if  $x \succeq y$  for all  $y \in A$  then  $x$  is in  $C(A)$

# Things that are Chosen must be Preferred

- Say that  $x \in C(A)$
- For  $\succeq$  to represent choices it must be that  $x \succeq y$  for every  $y \in A$
- Note that, if  $y \in A$ ,  $\{x, y\} \subset A$
- So by  $\alpha$  if

$$\begin{aligned}x &\in C(A) \\ \Rightarrow x &\in C(x, y)\end{aligned}$$

- And so, by definition

$$x \succeq y$$

## Things that are Preferred must be Chosen

- Say that  $x \in A$  and  $x \succeq y$  for every  $y \in A$
- Can it be that  $x \notin C(A)$
- No! Take any  $y \in C(A)$
- By  $\alpha$ ,  $y \in C(x, y)$
- As  $x \succeq y$  it must be the case that  $x \in C(x, y)$
- So, by  $\beta$ ,  $x \in C(A)$
- Contradiction!

**Q.E.D.**

- Well, unfortunately we are not really done
- We wanted to test the model of **utility maximization**
- So far we have shown that  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are equivalent to preference maximization
- Need to show that preference maximization is the same as utility maximization

## Theorem

*If a preference relation  $\succeq$  on a finite  $X$  is complete, transitive and reflexive then there exists a utility function  $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  which represents  $\succeq$ , i.e.*

$$u(x) \geq u(y) \iff x \succeq y$$

- We are going to proceed using **proof by induction**
  - We want to show that our statement is true regardless of the size of  $X$
  - We do this using induction on the size of the set
  - Let  $n = |X|$ , the size of the set
- Induction works in two stages
  - Show that the statement is true if  $n = 1$
  - Show that, if it is true for  $n$ , it must also be true for any  $n + 1$
- This allows us to conclude that it is true for  $n$ 
  - It is true for  $n = 1$
  - If it is true for  $n = 1$  it is true for  $n = 2$
  - If it is true for  $n = 2$ , it is true for  $n = 3\dots$
- You have to be a bit careful with proof by induction
  - Or you can prove that all the horses in the world are the same color



- So in this case we have to show that we can find a utility representation if  $|X| = 1$ 
  - Trivial
- And show that if a utility representation exists for  $|X| = n$ , then it exists for  $|X| = n + 1$ 
  - Not trivial

- Take a set such that  $|X| = n + 1$  and a complete, transitive reflexive preference relation  $\succeq$
- Remove some  $x^* \in X$
- Note that the new set  $X/x^*$  has size  $n$ 
  - And that the binary relation  $\succeq$  restricted to this set is still complete, transitive and reflexive
- So, by the inductive assumption, there exists some  $v : X/x^* \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$v(x) \geq v(y) \iff x \succeq y$$

- So now all we need to do is assign a utility number to  $x^*$  which makes it work with  $v$
- How would you do this?

- Four possibilities

- ①  $x^* \sim y$  for some  $y \in X/x^*$ 
  - Set  $v(x^*) = v(y)$
- ②  $x^* \succ y$  for all  $y \in X/x^*$ 
  - Set  $v(x^*) = \max_{y \in X/x^*} v(y) + 1$
- ③  $x^* \precsim y$  for all  $y \in X/x^*$ 
  - Set  $v(x^*) = \min_{y \in X/x^*} v(y) - 1$
- ④ None of the above

- What do we do in case 4?
- We divide  $X$  in two: those objects better than  $x^*$  and those worse than  $x^*$

$$X_* = \{y \in X/x^* | x^* \succeq y\}$$

$$X^* = \{y \in X/x^* | y \succeq x^*\}$$

- Figure out the highest utility in  $X_*$  and the lowest utility in  $X^*$  and fit the utility of  $x^*$  in between them

$$v(x^*) = \frac{1}{2} \min_{y \in X_*} v(y) + \frac{1}{2} \max_{y \in X^*} v(y)$$

- Note that everything in  $X^*$  has higher utility than everything in  $X_*$ 
  - Pick an  $x \in X^*$  and  $y \in X_*$
  - $x \succeq x^*$  and  $x^* \succeq y$
  - Implies  $x \succeq y$  (why?)
  - and so  $v(x) \geq v(y)$
  - In fact, because we have ruled out indifference  $v(x) > v(y)$
- This implies that

$$v(x) > v(x^*) > v(y)$$

- And so
  - The utility of everything better than  $x^*$  is higher than  $v(x^*)$
  - The utility of everything worse than  $x^*$  is lower than  $v(x^*)$

- Verify that  $v$  represents  $\underline{\gamma}$  in all of the four cases
- That sounds exhausting
- I'll leave it for you to do for homework

**Q.E.D.**