Formal developments of normative theories typically claim that the guidance they give is universal: for any agent, and any way the world could be, there is a way she *ought* (according to that theory) to act. Yet when we consider an agent facing an open, indeterminate future, cases are possible in which what she ought to do depends on what she actually does. These situations follow the letter of the law while seeming to violate its spirit. A famous example, discussed by Gibbard and Harper (1978), comes from Somerset Maugham: while in Damascus, you learn that Death is coming to collect your soul. Your one option is to flee to Aleppo. But you are confident that Death never misses her quarry: if you flee to Aleppo, Death will be there. But if you stay in Damascus, Death will be there too.

If Death is going to Damascus, you should go to Aleppo, and if Death is going to Aleppo, you should go to Damascus. So for any way the world could be, there is a way you should act. Yet there is a clear sense in which there is nothing you can do: since Death's destination depends on yours, no act is such that you ought to have done it, *given that you do it*. The norms of rationality in cases of this structure—and cases with the opposite structure, where available acts deontically validate themselves—are the subject of much recent work in ethics, decision theory, and the metaphysics of persons. I show how a model theory for the natural language modals OUGHT and MAY can incorporate these notions of deontic validation and self-defeat. Because MAY tracks the concept of permissibility brought out by act-dependent cases, its inferential properties reflect the language-*independent* intuitions we have about choiceworthiness, in cases like Death in Damascus.

This theorizing makes contact with natural language in the form of my solutions to two infamous puzzles about deontic modal language, free choice permission (Kamp 1973) and Ross's puzzle (Ross 1941). Free choice permission is the apparent validity of the classically *invalid* inference from MAY(ϕ or ψ) to both MAY ϕ and MAY ψ, and Ross's paradox is the apparent *in*validity of the classically valid inference from OUGHT ϕ to OUGHT(ϕ or ψ). The first step to a unified solution to these puzzles is precisely to leverage the notion of permissibility corresponding to deontic self-validation. The second component is a generalization of classical logic. On my account, the interpretation of a disjunction depends on which of its atomic disjuncts are true at the actual state—where the 'actual state' can be keyed to the *future*-actual state an agent chooses when she acts. While classical consequence is preserved for sentences without modals, this analysis sets up a match between the act one brings about and the contents of statements describing that act's deontic status. This allows the stronger-than-classical conclusions of free choice permission to follow, and blocks the inference in Ross's puzzle. It also predicts the positive entailment properties of disjunction under OUGHT, while preserving the inviolability of the role classical disjunction plays in our reasoning. This intuitively appealing combination has, in previous work, proved difficult to achieve.

If my students had to describe me in one word, it would be "enthusiastic." I enjoy teaching undergraduates, and I have received high marks over my teaching career: a combined 6.4 out of 7 for "overall teaching effectiveness" across my six years as a graduate student instructor at Berkeley. In my speciality, Phil 100 (Writing in the Major), that number rises to 6.7 out of 7. I am frequently asked for letters of recommendation by former students, was invited twice by my undergraduates to residential faculty dinners during the year I taught at Harvard, and was twice invited to speak at the Undergraduate Phil Forum at Berkeley.

The aspect of teaching I focus on most is paper writing. I try to be upfront with students about aspects of philosophical writing they are disposed to find unusual, if not downright alien. Is it really true that philosophical competence is better demonstrated by tearing down an author's view than by defending it from objections? If one is convinced by what an author says, is it really valuable to trump up criticisms anyway?

These are questions that trouble undergraduates confronting philosophical writing, and I think they should be discussed before students start writing their first papers for a course. I ask the students to think about a court of law: why would pitting prosecution against defense be a good way of helping an impartial observer to discover the truth—rather than a good way to generate a lot of disingenuous talk? There are limitations to this analogy, but I think that acknowledging the parallel in both its flattering and unflattering aspects helps students to see the value of the craft. Berkeley undergraduates are wonderful idealists, and they are responsive to the idea that it is possible to focus on the practice of making clear objections and replies without feeling compelled to commit to views they do not quite believe in. When the class goes around the next bend, they discover they have new tools to articulate their old skepticism, and that suddenly, they can make the structure of argument work *for* their instincts, rather than against them. That is terrifically satisfying.

In addition to focusing on writing, an important part of my teaching centers around building a sense of community. To this end, I am unabashedly fond of name games. I begin each section by picking a true-false question about the course material. I aim to pick questions the students will not find easy to extract from the week's reading, and ones on which the class will be roughly split. Each person has to say his or her name, and answer the question; I take attendance with the names, while a tally of T's and F's goes up on the blackboard. (The floor is always open to those who wish to suggest that the right answer is "both" or "neither.") This opening helps the students to feel invested in the comments of classmates who have similar thoughts about the material. As a result, they get to know one another: I have found that by the end of each semester, I can lead the name game by asking them to give their *neighbor's* names, rather than their own.

Philosophy is a difficult subject to teach and to learn; my students have put a lot of hard work into the courses they have taken with me. I have found, on the whole, that they have responded to the difficulty, and to the prospect of having their work criticized, by rising to the challenge. I am very grateful for this, and for the trust they put in me. My students have made me a better philosopher in many ways; most of all, by bequeathing to me a healthy sense of whether one of my own arguments will pass the undergraduate smell test. As I have told them to imagine writing their papers for an intelligent friend, I imagine them when I am writing.

I am committed to supporting efforts towards diversity and inclusion in academic philosophy, in no small part because I have seen how my own work has benefited from the supportive environments these efforts foster. Through my years as a graduate student at Berkeley, I have been an active participant in UC Berkeley's PhilFemme, a group dedicated to supporting women in the Berkeley philosophy department. I have also been an invited participant in the first annual Graduate Student Women in Metaphysics Conference (2013), and the first Networking and Mentoring Workshop for Graduate Student Women in Philosophy, held at Princeton University last August. I look forward, in my own career, to helping to create such opportunities for others.

When I first began teaching at Berkeley, I focused on developing facility the material I was asked to discuss with my students. As I have become more at home in the field, however, new challenges to being an effective teacher have presented themselves, in a way that has brought home the importance of undermining stereotypes. The underrepresentation of women and minorities in philosophy is not only a topic of concern for many in the field; the basis of this underrepresentation is an area of active research. To take a prominent example, Sarah-Jane Leslie's research on gender gaps suggests—loosely speaking—that female participation in an academic discipline is inversely correlated with the degree to which skill in that field is perceived as a product of innate competence, rather than organization and effort. I believe that I have seen this dichotomy in action. When I first started teaching, I was (correctly) perceived by my students as inexperienced. Since appealing to one's greater age or authority is no way to establish trust, I made no effort to hide that, and undergraduates tended to interpret my facility with the material as the product of the same practices that would give *them* facility with the material. This was especially evident in logic; students' explicit line of reasoning was, "if she can do it, I can do it." Going by my teaching evaluations over the years, as I've become more at home with philosophical material, my command of it has come to appear less a product of premeditation and organization—even as my teaching scores have risen.

It's easy to see how this perceptual shift can have an effect on students, who are learning the material for the first time, and must themselves be organized and conscientious in order to succeed in a demanding class. Hence, a new challenge: to make sure they are still using the "if she can do it, I can do it" line of reasoning. For me, this involves remaining accessible to students, and showing, in particular, that organization is a *facet* of effort. This year, I am a fellow of the Berkeley Connect program, a one unit course which provides undergraduates with a chance to engage in open small-group discussion with other students who are passionate about philosophy. This has given me an opportunity to step back and focus on this aspect of being a philosopher. The Berkeley Connect syllabus is organized explicitly around practical questions regarding the major ("how do I make the most out of office hours?" "what are the challenges of speaking in class?"), and being a program fellow includes facilitating discussions about time management and other practical aspects of being a scholar. As we learn more about conditions that are correlated with underrepresentation, we can tailor our teaching to ensure that the community evolves towards greater inclusiveness.