Evaluation of the Impact of the BRA-KDP Program

Evaluation Framework
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1 Introduction

1.1 Reintegration in Aceh: the BRA-KDP program

The Helsinki MoU of 15 August 2005, which attempted to end the conflict between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM), contained provisions for reintegration assistance to former combatants and GAM members, former political prisoners, and conflict victims. Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency: BRA) was established in February 2006 to oversee the reintegration program, and has developed a series of programs targeted at key population groups.

Approximately US$ 60 million of BRA’s funds will be channeled through the Community-Based Assistance for Reintegration of Conflict Victims program (hereafter, BRA-KDP) which uses the network of the GoI/World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), to deliver block grants to communities.

The program will be implemented over a two year period from August 2006. Over two phases, BRA-KDP will cover every rural village in Aceh: around 5,700 villages in total, covering 221 sub-districts in 18 districts. In the 2006 Round, 1,724 villages covering 67 sub-districts in 17 districts are being targeted. BRA selected sub-districts with higher levels of conflict and a good performance record in KDP. A second round will cover the remaining rural villages in Aceh.¹ All villages within the selected sub-district will receive block grants ranging from Rp. 60 million (approximately US$ 6,700) to Rp. 170 million (approximately US$ 19,000), depending on the intensity of past conflict in the sub-district and the village population size.

The program allows communities to identify and prioritize what the block grants directly transferred to the communities will be spent on. The planning cycle is simple. First, a number of information meetings to advertise the program are held at the sub-district and village level. After this, villagers hold a number of meetings facilitated by KDP facilitators: first, to map out who has been the most affected by the conflict in their village; second, to develop and prioritize proposals to be funded; third, to approve proposals; and, finally, to account for project implementation. The program works on the same “open menu” as regular KDP. This means that communities can propose almost any kind of project; beneficiaries can be the entire community, a group of villagers, or particular individuals, depending on the community’s decision. In

¹ The ‘2006 round’ refers to villages primarily funded out of BRA’s 2006 budget. This round started in October 2006, with money disbursed to sub-districts in December 2006 and to villages from February-May 2007. The ‘2007 round’ refers to villages funded from BRA’s 2007 budget. This round is envisioned to begin mid-2007, running until mid-2008.
BRA-KDP, the final decision on which proposals are funded comes at the village meetings, determined by the assembled villagers themselves.

1.2 **Objectives of the BRA-KDP Program**

The primary focus of BRA-KDP is to assist conflict-affected communities in improving their living conditions through provision of small projects that accord with their needs. It also encourages people to overcome mistrust of government that is a result of the conflict by delivering tangible outputs that fit with communities’ priorities. Equally important is the process by which villagers identify, prioritize and implement their projects. A World Bank study on the efficacy of KDP suggests that by applying the principles of participation, transparency, local choice and accountability, community-driven development programs help improve inter-group and state-society relations, helping areas to be more immune to violent conflicts.² It is also hypothesized that delivering funds in a transparent way aimed at generating consensus over who benefits will be less likely to trigger fresh conflict than other targeting approaches. BRA-KDP is an attempt to apply the community-driven development approach for reintegration with the hope that it will improve relations between different groups such as ex-GAM combatants, IDPs, MILITIAS (anti-separatist front members) and communities, and to improve relations between these groups and other villagers and the local state.

**Objectives of the Program**

- Deliver quick assistance to conflict-affected villagers in a transparent and accepted manner to help stabilize the security situation and ensure reintegration funds do not lead to new conflict
- Enhance productive economic activities or activities that improve conflict victims and communities’ living conditions through economic or community infrastructure projects
- Enhance community participation and involvement in deciding priority activities that help address peace-building and reconstruction
- Promote cohesion and a culture of peace in villages and develop and strengthen the development of institutions in villages for this purpose

1.3 The Empirical Basis for Post-Conflict Reintegration Programs

There is an increasing consensus among actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction that interventions aimed at disarming rebel movements, demobilizing troops, and reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, on the one hand, and community-based programs to engage the population in organizing and implementing development activities, on the other, are critical to stabilizing the security situation and consolidating transitions from war to peace.

Despite such consensus, there have been few attempts to assess empirically the efficacy of many conflict- and reintegration-related interventions, or to empirically test the hypotheses implicit in their approach. Surprisingly few rigorous assessments have been made as to whether programs aimed at promoting social cohesion and development in post-conflict situations actually do so. Studies have tended to take the form of ‘lessons learned’ assessments from individual case studies. Where comparisons have been made across countries, there has been little attempt to isolate programmatic impacts from other contextual variables, there tends not to be any variation in key explanatory variables, or comparison of outcomes in countries or areas that have and have not received interventions.

Further, even fewer assessments exist that explain why reintegration programs are successful or not, and what accounts for variation in impact across areas. The result is that policy-makers and program designers have very weak theoretical and empirical foundations upon which to construct responses.

This is particularly worrisome because of the vast differences in contexts in which post-conflict programs have been implemented and/or recommended. Most analytical and operational conflict resolution and post-conflict work has focused on weak or failed states, where governments do not function below the national level and markets are non-existent or seriously distorted. Yet even if a given program in such a state has been shown to be effective, there is very little evidence or policy prescription which tells development workers what to do in contexts where the state is still strong, markets operate and conflict is present in only part of the territory.

1.4 Evaluation and Research Program for BRA-KDP: Broad Strategy

BRA-KDP is thus accompanied by a robust evaluation and research program that assesses the efficacy of the community-driven reintegration program in Aceh. This program is designed to provide important lessons that will have applicability to other post-conflict contexts, in particular where the state is still functional and where resentment against the state provided a basis for the conflict.

The evaluation and research program has the following objectives:

- First, to understand whether the community-based reintegration program worked, by measuring individual and community impacts beyond the disbursement of funds and
Second to understand why it worked (or not), by exploring elements of program design that contributed to its success (or failure) and assessing local factors that are associated with variation in impacts, including the placement of other programs. This will allow us to understand what interventions are necessary in addition to the community-based program for successful outcomes.

A diversity of strategies will be employed to identify these impacts:

- The evaluation will exploit the near random assignment of villages into 2006 Round and 2007 Round cohorts to identify the main impacts of the program. Sustainability of impacts for 2006 Round villages will be tracked over time.
- The impact of specific elements of program design will be assessed either through (a) the randomized assignment of “treatments” to a subset of villages and/or (b) a careful matching of “treatment” and “control” villages made possible because of the selection process used to determine the allocation of resources provided to villages.
- Assessment of the impact of local factors on program efficacy will be made by controlling for other ‘context variables’, such as history of conflict, placement of other programs, etc.

Table 1 summarizes the main research questions to be answered, the corresponding core research strategies, and a listing of the major data sources used to answer each question. Some of these questions will be answered by assessing outcomes in 2006 Round locations, with 2007 Round locations serving as controls. Other questions—in particular related to elements of program design—will draw on 2007 Round locations for both treatment and control. Note that for each question we examine both the hypotheses described in Sections 2 and 3 below and a set of contextual questions described in Section 4. Thus we seek to address not simply whether an aspect of the program has a given effect but also under what circumstances are effects likely to be stronger or weaker.
### Table 1: Summary of Identification Strategies and Data Sources

<table>
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<th>Question</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>2007 HH Survey (see 6.1.1)</th>
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<th>Village Participation Form (see Error Reference)</th>
<th>PL Forms (see 6.1.5)</th>
<th>2007 - 2008 GAM hiring survey (see 6.1.6)</th>
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<th>Round assessed</th>
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<td>4. How durable are these program impacts (for each of 1, 2 and 3 above)?</td>
<td>2006 Round / 2007 Round Comparisons [Regression Discontinuity]</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How Does the Size of Community Block Grants Matter?</td>
<td>Full sample analysis using allocation thresholds</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Variation in assignment of PLs within each sub-district</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
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2 Evaluating the Overall Impact of the Program

The fundamental question for the evaluation of the 2006 Round is whether the BRA-KDP program is contributing to the welfare of conflict-affected people and promoting the reintegration process in Aceh. We will use the random or near-random variation that will produce two distinct treatment groups (villages that were targeted for the 2006 Round and villages that were targeted for the 2007 Round) and a control group for each (respectively: villages that were not targeted in the 2006 round and villages that were not targeted in either round) to evaluate program impacts in three distinct areas:\(^3\)

- Welfare of the conflict victims and conflict-affected communities
- Reintegration and social cohesion
- Trust in local government and state-society relations

The key measures used to estimate program impact are drawn from the 2007 and 2998 Household surveys.

In addition to measuring program impact we will draw on data from the 2008 household survey to measure the durability of impact.\(^4\)

2.1 Does Participation in BRA-KDP Improve the Welfare of the Conflict Victims and Conflict-Affected Communities?

An important issue in evaluating BRA-KDP is to determine whether the program improves socio-economic conditions, especially for conflict victims. In post-conflict settings, severely conflict-affected communities often have needs for immediate livelihoods support such as capital, fishing/farming equipment, and income generation activities. Indeed, field findings suggest that the top priority need for many communities in Aceh is livelihoods support, and many villagers note that provision of capital, among other forms of livelihoods support, would best enable them to rebuild the losses they suffered from the conflict.\(^5\) This theme therefore explores the actual and perceived impact of the program on conflict victims’ and conflict-affected communities’ socio-economic welfare.

\(^3\) Note: we cannot assess the overall impacts of villages that received the program for the 2007 round because we have no control locations, as all villages which do not receive the program for the 2007 round will have already received the 2006 round.

\(^4\) Let \(y_{jt}\) denote an outcome measure for an observation in group \(j \in \{0,1\}\) in period \(t \in \{0,1\}\). Let the program effect be given by \(\beta\) and assume this effect to be constant over time. Let \(\sigma\) denote a common shock to all observations in period 1 and let \(\delta \in \mathbb{R}\) denote the level of durability of program impact (full persistence is given by \(\delta=1\)). Then \(\beta = y_{10} - y_{00}, \Delta_0 = y_{01} - y_{00} = \beta + \sigma, \Delta_1 = y_{11} - y_{10} = \delta \beta + \sigma - \beta, \) and hence an estimate for \(\delta\) is given by \(\hat{\delta} = [y_{00} + y_{11} - y_{01} - y_{10}]/[y_{00} - y_{10}] + 2 = [\Delta_1 - \Delta_0]/\beta + 2.\) The Null that \(\hat{\delta}=1\) is equivalent to the null that \(\Delta_0 = \beta + \Delta_1\) or that \(y_{11} = y_{01}.\)

Who is a Conflict Victim?

A mechanism for determining who is (and is not) a conflict victim is critical to the measurement of program impacts on household welfare. Two approaches will be used.

- First, in all 2007 Round villages BRA-KDP facilitators will work (as part of their initial meetings) to determine who among the population has been most-affected by conflict. Based on criteria developed by BRA, villages will divide all village households into different categories based on levels of conflict-affectedness. Anyone who satisfies any of the following three criteria would be categorized as the most-affected: (i) death in the immediate family; (ii) disappearance of immediate family members; and/or (iii) physical disability (missing body parts or permanent disability) of immediate family members. The community can define other categories based on the local contexts. This categorization should be exhaustive in the sense that each household falls within one and only one of the three or four categories. The accuracy of this listing will be verified at the village level through an audit in a random sample of 400 2007 round villages.

- Second, for both 2006 and 2007 Round locations, household and village survey data will be used to construct individual and village level measures of conflict affectedness based on objective criteria (such as mortality and injuries).

Hypotheses

H 1: Socio-economic welfare will be higher and welfare improvements will be greater in BRA-KDP target villages than in villages without BRA-KDP.

H 2: In particular, socio-economic welfare levels and gains among conflict victims will be higher in BRA-KDP target villages than in villages without BRA-KDP.

H 3: [Durability] 2006 Round welfare gains will continue to be observed in 2008.6

Measures

The measures used to test these hypotheses will come from multiple sources (detailed in Section 6) including survey data and project data. The most important measures for testing these hypotheses will include:

- Expenditure/income levels among conflict victims and non-conflict victims.
- Access to socio-economic services among conflict victims and non-conflict victims.

Assessing Impact

If we find that welfare among households, and particularly among conflict victims, is higher in BRA-KDP villages than in non-BRA-KDP villages, we will interpret this as evidence of program success with respect to economic outcomes. 2006 program impact measures will be drawn from the 2007 Household survey.

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6 A more precise statement of durability hypotheses is given in Footnote 4.
We will not, however, have data on process and project implementation from the control villages for comparison purposes.

2.2 Does Participation in BRA-KDP Improve Social Cohesion?

Sustaining peace in Aceh will require the reintegration of former combatants and political prisoners into rural villages. Where reintegration is smooth, social cohesion can be re-built providing a basis for a virtuous reinforcing cycle of development and security. The community-based BRA-KDP program may have positive or negative impacts on reintegration. By introducing inclusive and collective decision-making and problem solving, BRA-KDP may positively enhance the reintegration of different community members such as ex-GAM combatants, anti-separatist groups (such as the militias), and IDPs. Conversely, BRA-KDP may create new tensions or exacerbate existing conflicts/tensions by introducing competition over limited resources. If the process is seen as unfair and non-transparent, favoring certain groups of people, it strengthens the divide among different groups and potentially creates conflicts. Moreover, if people tend to formulate proposals among people with similar attributes (for example, MILITIAS), it could strengthen the divide. We will explore how people's perceptions of the relationship between different groups change over time, types of tensions/conflicts that emerge or subside, and what the main sources of these tensions/conflicts are. Does the BRA-KDP program provide for increased collaborative interaction between different groups and enhance social cohesion in the community? Or does it create new tensions/exacerbate existing tensions resulting from contestation over limited resources?

**Hypotheses**

H 4 Communities will be better able to solve local collective action problems in villages in which BRA-KDP programs have been established.

H 5 Disputes will be less likely to escalate in villages in which BRA-KDP has implemented programs.

H 6 Associational life will be more developed in villages in which BRA-KDP has operated.

H 7 [Community Perspective on Reintegration]: Communities will be less resentful of benefits targeted at ex-GAM combatants, militias, and IDPs in villages in which BRA-KDP has worked and more accepting of their participation in the social, economic and political life of the village.

H 8 [Individual Perspective on Reintegration]: Social, economic and political reintegration of ex-GAM combatants, militias, and IDPs will be greater in villages in which BRA-KDP has established programs.

H 9 [Durability]: Cohesion gains from the 2006 Round will endure through 2007-2008.

**Measures**
Measures used to test these hypotheses will come from the 2007 Household Survey, an events dataset from the Aceh Conflict Monitoring project and an ex-combatant survey conducted in 2007. In addition, a key strategy for evaluating levels of social cohesion will come from experimental games embedded in the survey (see Section 6).

**Survey data:** Levels of trust, acceptance and social interaction between different groups
**Survey data:** Number of public goods initiatives and degree of associational activity in communities
**Survey data:** Perceptions of safety
**Survey data:** Incidence of reported elite capture and/or corruption
**Conflict event data:** Location of conflicts
**Behavioral Data:** Cohesion as measured in the public goods games

### Assessing Impact
If we find that, when comparing BRA-KDP villages to those yet to receive a program, perceptions of social tension among ex-combatants, returnees, and community members are lower, the level and breadth of engagement in associational activity is greater, and that rates of contribution to an experimental public goods game are higher, we will interpret this as evidence of program success with respect to the promotion of social cohesion.
2.3 Does Participation in BRA-KDP Improve Trust in Local Government and State-Society Relations?

In a post-conflict context, it is crucial for the government to win people’s trust to regain legitimacy and have them reengage in a constructive dialogue. This is particularly true in Aceh where the government is associated with previous oppression and where people are generally skeptical of government’s intentions. If properly implemented, BRA-KDP provides a channel for the government to demonstrate tangibly their ability to address the people’s needs and show that they care for its people. More broadly, it can contribute to creating a sense of stabilization by demonstrating the tangible benefits of a peace process even to remote communities. If the program is not implemented fairly, transparently and in a timely manner, however, it risks further alienation of the populace, potentially creating space for anti-government elements to win them over. The evaluation will explore whether BRA-KDP contributes to increasing trust in government, and compare its impact with other development projects implemented by the government. It will also look at which group’s trust increases more than others (if any), and if so why. Does BRA-KDP help increase the community’s trust in local government? Are there any specific groups whose trust increases more than others?

**Hypotheses**

H 10 Trust in the ability of local government to deliver services/benefits will be greater in villages in which BRA-KDP has been in operation.


**Measures**

Again, drawing on data from household surveys in particular, outcomes measures will include:

**Survey data:** Comparative trust measures (in BRA, in government, and in donors)

**Survey data:** Perceived benefits deriving from the program

**Survey data and Behavioral Data:** Community perception of local government, especially: willingness to pay taxes

**Assessing Impact**

If we discover higher levels of trust in government and greater confidence about the future prospects for development and security among 2006 BRA-KDP villages than among those communities to be covered in the 2007 Round, we will consider this as evidence of program success with respect to the cultivation of higher levels of trust in government.
3 Evaluating Individual Components of Program Design

As part of a strategy for measuring the efficacy of community-based reintegration programs, it is also important to assess the relative contribution of particular variations in program design that are believed to be essential to a successful program. In the context of the BRA-KDP evaluation, we expect to focus on four key questions central to the effective implementation of CDD programs:

1. How does the impact of the program depend on the size of the budget provided to communities?
2. To what extent do participatory, inclusive decision-making processes produce outcomes that are reflective of the interests of community members? How does this depend on program staff?
3. How does program implementation depend on the extent of formal engagement with combatants?
4. What interventions can help ensure effective targeting of conflict victims?

These questions will be answered by looking at villages in the 2007 Round through either (a) random allocation of treatments (questions 2, 3 and 4), or (b) looking at pre-existing variation in the program – (question 1).

3.1 How Does the Size of Community Block Grants Matter?

A natural question that arises in the design of post-conflict reintegration program relates to the question of scale. What level of investment is required in order to produce the desired program impacts? Moreover, how do increases in the investments provided by donors shape the implementation of community-based projects? In a severely conflict-affected region, it may make sense to provide larger block grants because the needs are so profound. However, it may be the case that larger amounts of aid do not return significant additional benefits or that increases in assistance generate a set of perverse consequences including greater community tension and higher levels of corruption.

Since block grant size was determined based on sub-district level conflict intensity, we are in a position to assess the impact of grant size on a range of outcomes as part of the BRA-KDP evaluation. We can create matched pairs of villages that have the same population size and exposure to conflict, but have different block grant allocations because they are in sub-districts with different conflict intensities. We explore whether the size of block grants differentiates the outcome of the program while accounting for contextual differences.
Hypotheses

H 12: Villages with larger block grants will experience greater welfare improvements.
H 13: Villages with larger block grants will have greater participation and community oversight.
H 14: Villages with larger block grants will pay higher prices for goods and labor.
H 15: Villages with larger block grants will experience higher levels of conflict as the economic stakes are higher in community decision-making.
H 16: Villages with larger block grants will have higher levels of corruption in program implementation.
H 17: Villages with smaller block grants will be aware of grants sizes in other areas and report concerns of inequity concerns.

Measures

The key measures for this analysis include the following:

Survey data: Households’ expenditure/income levels (living standards), access to socio-economic services
Survey data: Conflict victims’ expenditure/income levels (living standards) and access to socio-economic services
Survey data: Reported levels of satisfaction with the program
FD data: Qualities of those that contest for community leadership positions
Project data and survey data: Incidence of reported elite capture and/or corruption
Accounts data: Prices paid for project inputs
3.2 Does Formal Involvement of ex-Combatants Foster Reintegration?

Motivation. Reports from the field suggest that in communities in which KPA/GAM is not constructively engaged in BRA-KDP, the result is increased intimidation of KDP facilitators and/or extortion attempts of community projects. With the shift to community-based reintegration programs, and away from a singular focus on combatants and their factions, an effective strategy for giving combatant organizations a stake in the reintegration and development process is essential. More broadly there has been a consensus that the economic reintegration is key to peacebuilding in post conflict areas and this is now a central issue in the design of demobilization and reintegration programs around the world. There is however little evidence that access to employment does in fact facilitate reintegration.

Intervention: To shed light on these issues, BRA-KDP will hire KPA/GAM in sub-districts taking part in the 2007 Round (50 sub-districts). There will be 3-4 new PLs per sub-districts in each of the 50 targeted sub-districts for the 2007 round depending on the number of villages within the sub-districts. Of those, 1-2 PLs will be selected from KPA/GAM and 2-3 from ordinary civilians (to ensure that KPA/GAM PLs do not make up a majority in any area). An additional 175 KPA/GAM will be hired for other jobs related to the program (e.g. monitors, security guards). The breakdown looks as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Group</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 GAM</td>
<td>75 Non-hired PL-quality GAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-PLs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175 GAM</td>
<td>175 Other Non-hired GAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 GAM</td>
<td>Non-hired 250 GAM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main analysis will be at the individual level, examining the question as to whether employment opportunities result in greater reintegration possibilities for individual former combatants into civilian life. In conjunction with the randomization of PLs to villages within subdistricts (See section 3.3) this assignment of jobs allows us to identify the extent to which the use of ex-GAM facilitators affects program operation positively or negatively at the village level.

Selection of ex-GAM. The selection of ex-GAM will be undertaken as follows. In all 2007 round areas there will be a hiring process. The criteria for hiring individuals for these positions will be set by KDP, BRA and the World Bank but should include the following:

- Junior high school (SMA) degree
- Aged 20-50

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7 Sub-districts with more than 30 villages will get 4 new PLs while sub-districts with less villages get 3 PLs.
Subject to these criteria the application process is open to all individuals. At the subdistrict level, KPA/GAM will draw up lists of candidates who satisfy the above criteria. The list should be twice the length of the target number of recruits for each subdistrict. On average KPA/GAM should be asked to provide lists of 10 qualified combatants in each subdistrict. The actual employees will be selected by lottery. After selection of candidates, KPA/GAM in consultation with KDP facilitators will allocate individuals to particular jobs based on best fit.

Once the list of potential ex-KPA/GAM employees has been identified, basic background data (livelihoods, acceptance, ties to faction, etc.) will be collected on each ex-combatant through a self-administered survey. These data will provide the baseline measurement of outcomes against which program impacts (at the individual-level) can be assessed.

After one year, we will carry out a targeted survey to assess the impact of the employment program on outcomes for ex-combatants through a survey of the 250 ex-KPA/GAM who were employed, as well as the additional 250 who were not employed.

**Hypotheses**

H 18: Formal employment of KPA/GAM members in BRA-KDP programs improves individual social, economic and political reintegration outcomes.

H 19: Villages in which GAM members are employed by the BRA-KDP program are less likely to suffer extortion attempts.

**Measures**

In addition to the outcome measures described in Sections 2.1-2.3, the key measures for this analysis include the following:

- **Survey Data**: Levels of participation of different groups in program activities
- **Survey data**: Levels of satisfaction with the program by different groups
- **Conflict Events Data**: Level of conflict/presence of latent conflict
- **Household Survey**: Reported incidence of extortion attempts by KPA/GAM
- **Employee survey**: Individual ex-combatant reintegration measures (ties to former faction, degree of community acceptance, welfare, acceptance of democratic process)
3.3 Do KDP Facilitators Have a Major Influence on Village Decisions?

Motivation. A major rationale for the use of inclusive, participatory decision-making processes in BRA-KDP is the expectation that these approaches produce outcomes that reflect the priorities of the community, thereby increasing social cohesion and reducing the risk of future conflict. Moreover, an effective facilitator is believed to be able to sensitize the community to the needs of conflict victims, resulting in better targeting. Recent research, however, has suggested that participatory processes can sometimes generate outcomes that are more a reflection of the priorities of the facilitator than of the community.

We work out how inclusive and consultative these participatory processes are in practice by using a method of random assignment of BRA-KDP field assistants (PLs) to villages (within sub-districts). This random assignment of PLs to villages serves two purposes:

1. It allows us to explore how the demographic profile of a facilitator—for example, gender, age, extent of exposure to conflict, or place of residence shapes the outcomes of community decision-making processes.
2. It allows us to undertake a quality evaluation of individual facilitators. If facilitators are not randomly assigned to villages then consistently poor outcomes that occur under the leadership of a given facilitator can be attributed to characteristics of the communities with which s/he is affiliated. If however there is random assignment then poor quality outcomes can be causally attributed (with a given level of confidence) to the actions undertaken by a given facilitator.

Random assignment of PLs to villages allows us to address the following hypotheses:

H 20: The choice of projects and quality of implementation will depend on the identity of facilitators assigned to organize the decision-making process. In particular: conflict victims will be more likely to benefit if facilitators themselves are conflict victims; Women’s participation will increase, and projects proposed by women will be more likely to be chosen, when facilitators are women; Extortion attempts by KPA/GAM will be less frequent where facilitators have a good relationship with the KPA/GAM leadership.

H 21: The degree to which conflict victims or local political elites are satisfied by projects

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8 As an example of such a technique see: Humphreys, Macartan, Martin Sandbu and William Masters (2006.) “The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations: Results from a Field Experiment in São Tomé and Príncipe.” World Politics, 58(4).
selected will be depend on the identity of the PLs.

H 22: PL Influence can be attributed to the technical knowledge or facilitation skills of PLs rather than through the imposition of PL preferences.

H 23: The level of consensus reached in village meetings will depend on the identity of facilitators assigned to organize the decision-making process.

**Measures**

The key measures for this analysis include the following:

- **Project Data**: Project choice and fund allocation data. Types of funded projects and # of beneficiaries who are conflict victims and women
- **Survey data**: Outcome data on conflict victims’ welfare and satisfaction with program outcomes.
- **Survey data**: Incidence of extortion attempts by KPA/GAM
- **Survey data**: Reported beliefs about role of PL; changes in beliefs regarding preferred projects
- **Participation data**: Levels of participation of different groups in program activities
3.4 Do BRA-KDP Activities Aimed at Improving Targeting to Conflict Victims Work?

The BRA-KDP program is designed to target conflict-affected victims. Across village targeting is largely ensured by setting village block size grants in relation to the estimated conflict affectedness of each area. More difficult however is to ensure that within villages the grants are used to support conflict victims. Conflict victims mapping and small group meetings are built into the programming cycle to ensure that conflict-affected individuals are in a position to generate proposals and have them fairly evaluated by the community. But the actual decisions about how to spend the money are made by villages as a whole. Since much of the funding for the 2006 round was used for distributable goods (private goods such as support for livestock farming or small trade), it is especially important to be able to ensure that, within villages, conflict victims are indeed the key beneficiaries of the project.

**Intervention.** The research strategy allows the program to (a) evaluate whether or not victims are indeed benefitting from the allocations made in the villages; and (b) evaluating whether key intervention designs ensure better targeting of victims. The strategy has the following elements.

An **audit** is applied with a 50% probability in 800 of the 1283 villages. The remaining 483 villages will receive no audit. A total of 400 audits will in fact be undertaken. The audit serves the following functions: (1) to measure the extent to which victim lists accurately represent the true conflict victims and (2) to revise the village lists accordingly to accurately reflect the set of conflict victims. These audits are done as due diligence measures by the World Bank. In addition to serving this function there is also an opportunity to assess the impact of the audit on victim categorization using differences in outcomes between the 800 exposed and the 483 non-exposed villages. This can be done using data such as the length of lists, as an indicator of list inflation, or other outcomes such as satisfaction as measured by survey data and conflict as measured by events data.

A **victims veto** intervention is piloted in a random subsample of 200 of the 400 audited villages. This veto is used to ensure that victims are accurately targeted in the actual choice of projects. The veto is provided to the group of most-affected conflict victims (as certified by the audit). Proposals are not accepted for funding unless formally approved by a meeting of conflict victims using majority voting. By providing a veto to conflict victims this intervention empowers them and helps further guarantee that resources go to their intended purposes. By providing the veto in a random subset of villages this approach allows for the direct measurement of the impact of the veto on village decisions (whether or not the veto is in fact employed).
Hypotheses

H 24: Village lists accurately reflect the set of conflict victims.

H 25: Villages that are subject to audit will produce more accurate conflict victims lists as proxied by a greater female/male ratio.

H 26: Conflict victims in villages that are subject to audit will report greater levels of satisfaction with the outcomes of the BRA-KDP process.

H 27: Villages with a conflict victim veto will allocate a higher share of resources to benefit conflict victims.

H 28: Village level conflict will be no higher in communities with a conflict victim veto.

Measures

The key measures for this analysis include the following:

Victim List Data: The size and composition of conflict victim lists

Project Proposal Data: Types of funded projects and the number of beneficiaries who are conflict victims and women

Participation Data: Levels of participation of different groups in program activities

Survey Data: Conflict victims’/women’s expenditure/income levels and access to socio-economic services

Survey Data: Levels of satisfaction with the program by different groups
4 Evaluating the Impact of Contextual Factors

The BRA-KDP program will provide assistance to nearly 6000 villages across Aceh. These villages differ from one another on a number of dimensions that might affect how the program unfolds and how projects are ultimately implemented. As part of the evaluation effort, we will also ask: In what environment are community-based approaches to reintegration most likely to work and under what conditions will they not work? We expect to look at factors related to the external environment, including role and attitudes of elites, numbers of people to be reintegrated, etc. to figure under what circumstances the CDD approach to reintegration is most likely to work. This is key for determining the extent to which the lessons learned to Aceh can be applied to other contexts.

In addition, we anticipate examining how BRA-KDP programs interact with other on-going reintegration initiatives. What other reintegration programs are necessary to complement the community-based approaches/what combination of programs works best? We plan to look at how different types of reintegration programs (either CDD or individually targeted) and post-tsunami reconstruction projects interact, and examine whether they differentiate the outcome of BRA-KDP, and if so, which types of programs have what kind of impact on the outcome of BRA-KDP.

The core hypotheses are:

**History of Program Exposure**

H 29: Areas with longer history of KDP will have better participation and collective problem solving capacity, hence BRA-KDP is more likely to have positive impact.9

**Context**

H 30: [History of conflict] The impact of BRA-KDP is invariant to the level of conflict intensity.

H 31: [Wealth] The impact of BRA-KDP is invariant to the level of village wealth.

H 32: [Population flows] The impact of BRA-KDP is invariant to the numbers of GAM returnees or IDPs from other places.

H 33: [Discontent] Program impacts will be weaker in villages with high number of ex-GAM returnees, militias and IDPs that have not received their assistance.

H 34: [Divisions] Program impact will be weaker in villages where ethnic/identity cleavages (including affiliation to GAM/MILITIAS) are pronounced are more likely to experience increased tension.

H 35: [Inequality] Program impact will be weaker where there is a high level of within-village inequality.

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9 The KDP conflict research conducted before showed that positive impacts of the program on conflict resolution and social relations improved markedly as KDP stayed in areas for longer periods of time.
H 36: [Negotiation] Program impact will be greater in communities in which there is a prior culture of negotiation and consensus-seeking.

Other reintegration programs

H 37: [Program Complements] Program impact will be greater in communities there is (i) BRA assistance to GAM and other individually targeted reintegration programs, or (ii) IOM assistance to prisoners and combatants, or (iii) IOM psycho-social support.

H 38: [Program Substitutes] Program impact will be weaker in communities there are (i) other community-based reintegration programs (IOM program, USAID, UNDP); and (ii) Tsunami programs.

Measures

The measures used to examine heterogeneity in program effect are in large part to be collected at the village level. Outcome variables are those described in previous sections; key covariates include:

- Village background: History of Program Exposure, History of conflict, Population flows
- Village political structures: Local Power Structures, Local conflict management mechanisms
- Village social structure: Wealth, Inequality

- Data on other programs will be collected from two sources. First, questions on other programs operating in the village will be recorded on the village profile form. Second, a dataset will be created noting key (reintegration and development) programs present in different areas. This will include information from BRA, Dinsos, IOM, USAID, as well as from the broader tsunami and development monitoring work by the World Bank.
5 Complementary Qualitative Studies for the BRA-KDP Evaluation

For questions that cannot be answered sufficiently through the strategies detailed above, additional qualitative analyses will be conducted. Note that these analyses will focus on issues related to BRA-KDP and not on broader reintegration/conflict issues. There are four proposed studies:

1. **Role of gender:** What kind of role women play in reintegration and how we can maximize their positive influence?

2. **Role of information:** How different information levels impact the program, as well as how people get their information, and how much impact the type of information filtered through different people’s interests differentiates the outcome of the program.

3. **Issue of victimhood:** How “victims” are defined, the power relations that play out in determining victimhood, and whether this process pronounces existing cleavages. It also looks at to what extent the benefits reached what communities define as “conflict victims”, especially in villages where conflict victims are a minority.

4. **KDP facilitators’ conflict management strategies:** Compilation of cases of different ways KDP facilitators managed conflicts over BRA-KDP program.

6 Tools and Data Resources

A mix of tools and data resources will be employed to assess impacts as part of the BRA-KDP evaluation. The research will entail the collection of new quantitative and qualitative data, plus the utilization of data from existing surveys.

6.1 New Quantitative Data to be Collected

6.1.1 Household and Ex-Combatant Livelihoods Surveys [2007 & 2008]

The major instruments for assessing impact will be **household surveys** (short and long versions) to be conducted mid-2007 and mid-2008, and a parallel **ex-combatant livelihoods survey**, conducted in rural areas where BRA-KDP will work over the two years and fifty matched control sub-districts.10 The first household and combatant surveys will act as a baseline for 2007 round villages (with control locations allowing for isolation of program impacts) and will enable assessment of 2006 round impacts.

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10 The surveys are the same, except that there is an additional module of questions for combatants. Similarly, informants (combatants and non-combatants) in 2006 treatment areas will answer an additional module of questions compared to those in control locations (see below).
The second household survey will allow for an assessment of the impacts of the 2007 round, variation in 2007 round impacts, and for tracking of impacts over time of the 2006 round.\textsuperscript{11}

The primary purpose of the quantitative household survey is to gather information on key variables to: (i) assess how villages treated in the 2006 round differ from those scheduled for treatment in the 2007 round (treatment and control), and (ii) provide a baseline to measure change over time (before and after for 2007 round villages, and the durability of impact for 2006 round villages). The surveys will include detailed measures of household welfare, social cohesion, and attitudes toward government as well as information.

A parallel survey of ex-combatants will be conducted in concert with the first round of the household survey in 2007. The survey will be used to gather information about individual ex-combatant experiences of social, political, and economic reintegration. This data will enable an assessment of the impact of formal efforts to employ ex-combatants on individual-level reintegration trajectories as well as to produce co-variates used to analyze the impacts of GAM employment on reintegration. The survey will also provide data for a separate study on GAM livelihoods.

In all, three related survey instruments will be used as summarized in the Table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module #</th>
<th>Module</th>
<th>Main Household Survey</th>
<th>Short Household Survey</th>
<th>GAM Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Survey Identifier Information</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Household Roster</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Household Wealth</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Individual Level Behavior And Attitudes</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Project Evaluation [For All]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Post- Bra-PPK Module [Only For Areas With Bra-POK]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Recruitment [March 1998 – August 2005]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>TNA Module</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Tax and Cohesion Games</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><em>Approximate Implementation Time</em></td>
<td>90 minutes</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Households and Ex-combatant Sampling

\textsuperscript{11} For other data sources to be used, including an outline of the accompanying qualitative work, see the attached Evaluation Framework.
The sample for the household survey is determined jointly with the strategy for allocating treatment. It has the following characteristics.

- **Overview: Sampling of sub-districts, villages and informants.** The survey will be implemented in 167 rural sub-districts in Aceh. Sub-districts and intervention type are used as strata with 1 in 8 villages from each sub-district randomly selected for enumeration subject to a floor of one village per sub-district. 6 non-combatant informants will be selected per village. These include the following (Table 4):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Districts</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BRA-KDP 2006 round locations</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BRA-KDP 2007 round locations</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Control locations</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>167</strong></td>
<td><strong>535</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Within Village Sampling (Group I Rural Subdistricts)** Within villages 6 households will be randomly selected. Systematic random sampling will be used to select households. In smaller villages (<300 households) all households in each village will be counted \(n\) and assigned a number, the sampling interval will be given by \(k=N/n\) and a starting household, \(h\), will be selected by randomly choosing a number between 1 and \(k\). Within each cluster households \(h, h+k, h+2k, \ldots h+5k\) will be selected. In larger villages (>300) households, a central location will be chosen and a random direction will be selected. All households within 30 m of the ray from the center to the village boundary along the random direction will be counted and assigned a number and sampling will proceed as above. This sampling should be done by the enumeration team when visiting the villages, with procedures for this included in the training. Each village is sampled with probability 1/8. A household \(i\) from a town of \(n_i\) households has a sampling probability of \(6/8n_i = 3/4n_i\).

- **Subject selection.** The head of household or spouse of head of household is asked to enumerate a listing of all current household members. From this list an individual is randomly sampled from among the full roster of household members between ages 18 and 60 (including the household head and spouse). This member of the household is the primary subject. The primary subject may consult with other household members to establish factual data for Modules II and III of the survey but the remaining attitudinal and behavioral modules are to be completed on a one-on-one basis. Note that the subject selected may or may not be an ex-combatant.

The procedures for the shorter sample are identical subject to the following features:

- **Within Village Sampling (Group II Rural Subdistricts and Urban Areas)** There are an estimated 1,387 villages in the 54 rural sub-districts and 462 villages in the 17 urban sub-districts. With a 1/8 sampling proportion, approximately 174 Group II villages 58 urban
villages will be selected.\textsuperscript{12} Within each of these one household will be sampled. A household $i$ from a site with $n_i$ households has a sampling probability of $1/n_i$.

- **Subject selection (Group II Rural Subdistricts and Urban Areas):** Within each (Group II) selected village, one male non-combatant will be randomly selected and surveyed using the same method as used in Group I areas but conditioning on male non-combatants. A total of 174 surveys will thus be conducted.

The sample for the ex-combatant study is as described in Table above. It has the following characteristics:

- **Within village sampling:** Within each selected village an exhaustive list of all ex-combatants is to be compiled through consultations with village leaders and GAM/KPA representatives. The total number of ex-combatants in every village will be recorded. For the purposes of the survey, an ex-combatant will be defined as someone:
  - That identified as a member of TNA at the time of MoU
  - That actively served in and carried a weapon with the TNA for a period of no less than three months since 1998
  - That has lived in the present village for a period of not less than one month.

- **Sampling proportion.** Three out of every five ($q = .6$) ex-combatants should be surveyed in each village, with a floor of one per village. Each ex-combatant in villages with more than one ex-combatant is therefore selected with probability $(1/8) \times q = .075$. The total number of ex-combatants in every village will be recorded. The number of ex-combatants selected is a proportion ($q = 0.6$) of the population of ex-combatants in a given village, with a floor of one ex-combatant in cases where there is only one ex-combatant in the village. To deal with integer problems the set of subjects will be selected using a table as described in Annex C.

- **Caps.** Caps on the number of ex-combatant interviews are established for each of the three groups of sampling units as described above. Sub-districts will be surveyed in a random order to avoid introducing sampling biases in the case that 70 ex-combatants are reached before all villages are surveyed. The caps, based on the estimated population distribution are given by: 850 in Group I rural areas, 70 in group II rural areas and 80 in urban areas.

### 6.1.2 Behavioral Data 1 (within HH survey)\textsuperscript{13}

Among the three distinct themes that BRA-KDP aims to impact, namely welfare of the conflict victims, social cohesion, and people’s trust in local government, data for the latter two is not easily obtained through household surveys. To complement the survey, the non-combatant survey will include three behavioral questions asked of each subject. The first two games try to get at the levels of social cohesion within the community, and the third game aims to measure the community’s trust towards the local government.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} World Bank will prepare a list of these villages.

\textsuperscript{13} The games will be finalized after piloting.

\textsuperscript{14} These behavioral games will be piloted by the World Bank team in the coming weeks and will be amended as necessary. Budget estimates should include costing for the full games, but costings (and hence budgets) may have to be amended after
These “behavioral” questions involve reading a script to the subject, providing the subject with a sum of money, and asking the subject to make an allocation of the money at his discretion to a third party. The implications for the enumerators are that they will be required to carry small sums of money and be relied upon to implement faithfully the decisions made by the subjects. All three games will be played with the same non-combatant subjects (heads of households) randomly selected to complete the household survey in the 535 rural villages (for a total of 2,835 subjects). \(^{15}\)

The first game, a basic *Prisoner’s Dilemma* game, will be played by 5 subjects in each village randomly selected out of the 6 household survey respondents. Each subject will be given Rp. 10,000 and asked to decide whether to keep the money or contribute it towards a group of four other anonymous players (the other individuals in the village who have been selected as survey respondents). Subjects will be told that if they contribute to the group, the researchers will double the total amount contributed, which will then be distributed equally across all those who contributed once all interviews in the village have been completed. Higher contribution rates will be interpreted as an indicator of preference for community goods (over individual goods) and social cohesiveness. Enumerator teams will be asked to carry up to Rp. 100,000 (Rp. 10,000 * 5 subjects * 2) per village to implement this game.

The second game will be a variant on the first Prisoner’s Dilemma game *but with sanctions* i.e.-identities of the participants will be disclosed. The purpose of this game is to capture how and why individuals participate in group activities. The same five members of the village will be asked to play, but this time they will be told they will find out the identities of the other participants at the end of the game. Those who choose to participate will again be given Rp. 10,000 and will decide whether to keep the money or contribute it to the group. As in the first game, the amount contributed to the group will be doubled and then divided equally among contributors. In this variant, however, higher contribution rates capture how public disclosure and community sanctioning influences willingness to contribute. As in the first game, enumerators will be asked to carry up to Rp. 100,000 (Rp. 10,000 * 5 subjects * 2) per village.

The third game is a *Willingness to Pay* game, designed to assess how subjects think about local government. All six subjects in each village will be given Rp. 10,000 and told that they can keep the money for themselves or contribute a portion of that amount (Rp. 2,000) to the district government (Bupati’s office). Subjects are informed that other randomly selected, anonymous individuals will be playing this game as well. Higher levels of contribution are indicators of higher levels of trust in local government. The payment is directly equivalent to a voluntary tax and willingness to pay is a direct behavioral measure of trust in government. Enumerators will have to carry Rp. 60,000 (Rp. 10,000 * 6 subjects) per village to implement this game.

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\(^{15}\) The games will not be implemented in urban areas.
6.1.3 Participation Data (Village Participation Form)

Since a primary purpose of the BRA-KDP process is to give community members an opportunity to participate in determining how funds are allocated, it is important to investigate how patterns of engagement in the decision-making process vary across groups and facilitators. To facilitate a substantive investigation of how participatory decision-making processes work in practice, we will develop a Participation Form that allows for the detailed recording of information about attendance and participation in village-level meetings. Our expectation is that this participation data will be collected at all of the BRA-KDP village meetings in all 2007 Round villages.

6.1.4 Village Profile

Each village facilitator in each village will be charged with completing a one page village profile document capturing key village level information used for the analyses in Section 4. Information will be collected on history of program exposure, history of conflict, population flows, village political structures (local power structures, conflict management mechanism), as well as on village demographics and social structure (population, wealth, inequality, and sources of revenue). Additionally, data will be collected on other international aid programs underway in that village.

6.1.5 PL Data

Each PL (in the 2006 Round and 2007 Round villages) will be charged with completing a profile form to collect basic information on the PL such as background demographics, conflict exposure and attitude to community decision making and investment priorities.

6.1.6 GAM Employee Data

In addition to the PL Data form, modules from the household survey (including the ex-GAM module) will be administered to each of the ex-GAM individuals nominated by KPA for the program, as described in Section 3.2). This data collection effort is in addition to the ex-combatant survey since it targets a different population, namely the population of ex-combatants eligible for the GAM employment treatment rather than the full cross section of ex-GAM combatants. These two samples may intersect in which case these two data sources should be linked.

6.2 Existing Quantitative Data Sources to be Expanded

6.2.1 MIS data on BRA-KDP process and program outputs

We expect that BRA-KDP MIS data will be the key source for measures related to project activities. These measures would include:

- Continual recording of proposals submitted, projects funded, and number of targeted
beneficiaries (within information that facilitates distinguishing of proposals and projects submitted by conflict victims, women, returnees, etc.)

- Reports from facilitators and monitoring missions on project-related conflicts, corruption, and extortion attempts by village
- Synopsis of village accounts: prices paid for different types of goods etc.

6.2.2 Measurement of Distribution of Benefits
The project collects data on who is deemed to be a conflict victim in the community, and who benefits from the program (including who is a conflict victim and who is not). For the former, data collected in the 2006 Round was not always done so in a uniform way. In the 2007 Round as before, the village meetings will be used to develop a locally-appropriate definition for conflict victim. The most conflict-affected group, however, will be defined using objective criteria (BRA criteria) which include: (i) death in the immediate family; (ii) disappearance of immediate family members; and/or (iii) physical disability (missing body parts or permanently disabled) in the immediate family. A new format will be created giving the full listing of the names of conflict victims for each village, and more info on the criteria used for categorizing people as victims, or for distinguishing between different categories of victims. Data will be recorded on each conflict victim (i.e. name, criteria for victimhood) enabling an assessment of whether such individuals participated in community meetings, submitted proposals, and had those proposals funded by their community. Such data will be essential for determining the impact of efforts to improve program targeting through additional support for the most affected conflict victims.

6.2.3 Complaints Mechanism
Regular data will be gathered through the BRA-KDP complaints mechanism regarding concerns raised about process and implementation in each village.

6.2.4 Events Data
Conflict events data is captured by the Aceh Conflict Monitoring process.16

6.2.5 Other Pre-existing Data to be Utilized
Other pre-existing data to be utilized will include:
- Database on where KDP has been, and where KDP is this year
- Database with information on placement of other programs (including levels of disbursement by area of diyat, housing assistance, money to GAM, and other donor programs)
- Governance and Decentralization survey (GDS)
- APEA data on governance performance

16 Two local newspapers are monitored with conflict incidents coded and recorded. See monthly updates at www.conflictanddevelopment.org
• SUSENAS poverty data (including STAR panel)
• PODES
• KDP Aceh village survey (infrastructure and social data)
• Conflict intensity index data (including number of returning combatants, prisoners, perceptions of safety data, etc., data from damage assessment, etc.)
7 Implementation Plan

Proposed timeframe, outputs, and staffing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month(s)</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May – June 2007</td>
<td>Hire project coordinator to be based in Aceh</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop survey instruments</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Design sampling strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop protocols for MIS data collection on conflict victims, participation in village meetings, extortion attempts, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formalize contract with survey firm</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss strategy (especially pilots) with government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June – July 2007</td>
<td>Visit of Macartan and graduate student assistants to Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot and pre-test survey instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop protocols for 2007 Round interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July – August 2007</td>
<td>Randomization of Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rollout of household survey</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate student assistant in Aceh to help conduct oversight on survey along with project coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation of 2007 Round interventions (randomized facilitators, hiring of ex-GAM PLs, technical assistance for conflict victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Interim report on BRA-KDP impacts (December 2007)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2008</td>
<td>Rollout of second household survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td><strong>Final report on BRA-KDP impacts</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Team

The work will be led by the Conflict and Development team, within the Social Development Unit of the World Bank Office Indonesia. It will be developed and implemented in close coordination with BRA and KDP management.

Task team leader for the evaluation is Patrick Barron, coordinator of the World Bank post-conflict program. An Evaluation Manager will provide day-to-day coordination reporting to Patrick Barron. Senior advisors for the study are Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University) and Jeremy Weinstein (Stanford University). Makiko Watanabe (World Bank Indonesia) will lead the preparation of the pilots. Yuhki Tajima
(Harvard University, consultant World Bank) will lead the livelihoods study. Members of the Conflict and Development team and other short-term consultants will conduct the qualitative aspects of the evaluation. Other researchers and research assistants will also support this work including Laura Paler (Columbia University) and Cecilia Mo (Stanford University).

9 Papers

A range of policy-focused and academic papers and a book will be produced from the evaluation program. Precise focus of papers will be determined as the study commences but may include the following:

Policy Papers

- “Impacts of community-based approaches to reintegration” (from 2006 Round data)
- “Using community-based approaches for assisting conflict victims: impacts and design considerations” (from 2006 and 2007 data)
- “Involving former combatants in reintegration programming”
- “Targeting conflict victims: lessons from BRA-KDP”

Academic Papers

- [Overall impact]. “Does participatory budgeting improve social cohesion.”
- [Budget size] “Evidence for (or against) a local Dutch Disease effect”
- [GAM - project] “Can ex-combatants become partners in development?”
- [GAM - jobs] “Does employment aid reintegration?”
- [Targeting] “Political auditing: the relative merits of fire alarms and whistle-blowing”
- [Facilitators] “How participatory is participatory budgeting? Evidence on leadership effects from a field experiment in Aceh”
10 Annex:

10.1 Power Analysis

Data collected in the Household survey will be put to usages for multiple analyses and as a result we will have considerably more power for some uses than for others. Power calculations depend on various unknowns, most importantly the distribution of errors across units and the size of the true program effects. The following graphs however given an indication of the power we can expect with a sample of 6 individuals given a data generating process of the following form:

\[ Y_{jki} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 T_j + u_j + \varepsilon_{jki} \]

where \( T_j \) is an indicator for whether or not an observation in village \( j \) receives treatment, \( u_j \sim N(0, \tau^2) \) is a village specific error and \( \varepsilon_{jki} \sim N(0, 1) \) is an individual specific error. We ignore subdistrict specific error terms for these graphs and focus instead on village specific clustering. In the analyses that follow we report the power associated with identifying a treatment effect given \( \gamma_1 = .25 \) (standard errors) as \( \tau^2 \) varies from 0 to 1. The graphs report power for each of the two overall project impact studies given sampling proportions of .1 and .125.

![Figure 1: Power Analysis: Village Sampling Proportions of .1 (N=2571) and .125 (N=3214)](image)

As seen above with a sampling proportion of .125 we estimate sufficient power to estimate a .25
standard deviation effect for a cross cluster variance of up to approximately .5. This sampling proportion yields sample sizes as described in the Table below.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Sample Size}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
Subdistricts & Villages & Surveys \( q = .125 \) \\
\hline
2006 Round & 67 & 1719 & 1289 \\
2007 Round & 50 & 1283 & 962 \\
2007 Control & 50 & 1283 & 962 \\
Other & 54 & 1387 & 0 \\
Total & 5672 & 5672 & 3214 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The power analysis for the GAM jobs intervention is simpler under the assumption that the impact of the employment works at the level of the individual ex-combatant and is not clustered by sub-district.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\caption{Power analysis: GAM jobs}
\end{figure}

With 250 employed GAM we estimate that we have sufficient power to detect an effect of approximately .25 of a standard deviation. Figure 2 shows how power for this intervention depends on the number of GAM jobs provided.

\textsuperscript{17} Note that this graph does not condition on conflict intensity; it implicitly assume that allocation is random. Non-random allocation will reduce power.