

Senegal and Mali

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In mid-December 1983, hundreds of demonstrators—armed with spears, machetes, and hunting rifles, covered in protective charms, and chanting incantations to render them invulnerable to bullets—invaded the streets of Ziguinchor to call for the independence of a region in the southwest corner of Senegal—the Casamance.¹ The government responded with a heavy hand, leaving an official toll of 80 injured and 29 dead.² A handful of those retreating, led by veterans from the Senegalese army, under the banner of the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC), headed to the mangroves and dense forest of lower Casamance to set up rebel bases. They started military training and planning attacks on government positions. In doing so, they began a guerrilla war that has left thousands killed and the south of Senegal strewn with land mines. After 20 years of failed negotiations and aborted attempts at achieving military victory, no end to the war is in sight.

The civil war in Mali started very differently. On the morning of June 28, 1990, a small group of Libyan-trained fighters belonging to the *Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad* (MPLA), also hoping to gain independence for their region, Azawad, attacked a small government position in Tideremen in the far northeast of Mali. They killed four and gained control of a dozen automatic rifles. Moving southwest, the group attacked more government positions that same evening. In an attack at the town of Méneka, they seized 124 automatic rifles. These attacks were the beginning of a war that would engulf the region in intercommunal conflict, pitting northern “whites” against northern “blacks.” After extensive and broad-based negotiations, the war ended with a weapons-burning ceremony in 1996.

These two conflicts between north-south groupings in neighboring countries provide a rich environment in which to study both the causes of conflict and the determinants of war duration. In the study of conflict onset, these two relatively low-intensity conflicts allow us to analyze the extent to which insights developed in the study of larger wars extend also to smaller conflicts. Although the two wars are large enough to enter a number of civil war data sets, neither is coded as a civil war by

Collier and Hoeffler (2001). The five years of conflict in Mali likely produced at least 6,000–8,000 deaths³; the Casamance conflict has probably produced about 3,000–5,000 over 20 years.⁴ Rebel groups fighting smaller wars have similar economic concerns as those engaged in wars that end up as large conflicts, notably the need to recruit and to finance an organization. Yet macroeconomic information of relevance to small wars—such as the local distribution of natural resources, or the relative sizes of different groups in their local context—is no longer discernible once data are aggregated to the national level. Studying these conflicts using disaggregated data provides a way of checking whether the logic of theories that have been developed for large wars continues to function at a more microlevel.

To do so, we consider the predictions for war onset probabilities in Senegal and Mali that result from the Collier–Hoeffler core model, alongside predictions from a model developed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), and consider the evidence for the argument that these conflicts were driven by greed or local access to natural resource-based financing. As both wars are secessionist wars, we consider claims that these two zones are especially different from the rest of the country from which the rebels aim to secede, as well as arguments that focus on grievances and arguments that focus on opportunity-costs. We find no support for the greed hypothesis in either case, and we find mixed support for a grievance-based explanation for Casamance and strong support in Mali. We find support for opportunity cost arguments that focus on variation in state strength and local unemployment rates. Although we find spillover effects from neighboring countries, such as ideological support and interethnic solidarity, we do not find evidence that the movement of fighters across borders or regional arms markets were an important contributory factor to war onset in these cases. Whereas in the study of war onset we compare aspects of these two conflicts with ideas developed in the study of larger wars, we can use variation *between* these two conflicts to study war duration.

The two countries have similar geographies—more forested areas in the south and Sahelian or Saharan belts in the north—as well as similarly structured economies and ethnic demographics. In both cases, the rebel groups launched the conflicts ostensibly with a view to obtaining independence for their regions rather than to control the state. In both cases, the rebel groups have taken, to varying degrees, ethnic modes of organization. The roots of both conflicts predate independence. And in both cases, rebels have been able to draw on support from bordering countries. Yet although in Mali the war was of relatively short duration and was successfully ended through negotiation, in Senegal, the war has been protracted: Attempts at resolution have repeatedly failed. Explaining this variation is a central aim of this study. We do so by considering features of variation across the two countries that are missed by aggregate data.

One such point of variation is the location of the conflicts within the countries. Casamance—divided since 1984 into two administrative regions, Kolda and Ziguinchor—constitutes just 14 percent of Senegal’s landmass. It lies in the south of Senegal, in an agriculturally rich part of the country, cut off from Senegal’s capital,

Dakar, by the Gambia. The conflict in Mali, however, took place in the vast desert and mountainous regions of the far north of the country, a region—referred to as the “Azawad” by the rebel movements—that constitutes two thirds of the national territory but that is relatively poor in natural resources. Nomadic pastoralist populations, Tuareg and Arab,⁵ are concentrated in this area, living alongside long-established sedentary communities, notably the Songhoi. These differences in the location of the conflict have had implications for the sustainability of the struggles. In both cases, the types of resources available locally led to poorly centralized rebel organizational structures, which in turn have made a negotiated resolution difficult, but only in Casamance have sufficient resources been available to sustain a protracted military conflict.

Ethnic demographics also differ across the two countries. Whereas data that concentrate simply on the number and size of groups fail to distinguish between Senegal and Mali, the structure of ethnic divisions within Mali is perceived very differently from that within Senegal. In Mali, as for example in Sudan or Mauritania, ethnic groups are perceived to be aggregated broadly into two racial blocks, the whites (the Tuareg and the Arabs) in the north and the blacks in the south. In Senegal, racial divisions do not reinforce ethnic cleavages. These differences in the structure of ethnic divisions correlate with variation in the extent to which the conflicts have become ethnically polarized.

The political backgrounds of the countries provide another point of variation. The Casamance conflict originated within a country with a relatively robust democracy and a relatively strong state. Independence leader and later president, Léopold Sédar Senghor voluntarily stepped down from office in 1981. His successor, Abdou Diouf, also handed power over peacefully, this time after electoral defeat in March 2000 to Abdoulaye Wade. Throughout, the state has received strong support from France. In contrast, immediately after independence, the First Republic of Mali, led by Modibo Keita, set up a single-party socialist state. From 1968 a military regime led by Moussa Traoré governed a Second Republic until, faltering at the early stages of the rebellion, it was eventually overthrown in 1991. Although democratic institutions and a strong state are often described as facilitating conflict resolution, the experiences in Senegal and Mali suggest that these features may have insulated the state from international pressure to respond to the rebellion at home.

More broadly, the local geostrategic importance of the conflicts differs. We argue that although the Casamance conflict has typically had little negative impact beyond Senegal’s borders—and, if anything, has benefited neighboring countries—countries surrounding the north of Mali, Algeria in particular, have been fearful of similar rebellions at home and have been keen to intervene to bring the conflict to an end.

Many of these factors that we identify—the location of the conflicts relative to the national distribution of resources, the form of ethnic cleavages, and the geostrategic stakes—are points of variation that have, to date, been absent from cross-national quantitative studies of war duration. This chapter is structured as follows. For Casamance in Senegal and Azawad in Mali, we provide a narrative charting the

origins and course of the rebellion. We then consider, in turn, factors that led to the onset of the conflicts and those that determine conflict duration. A final section concludes.

Chronologies of Conflict

Senegal

PRELUDE TO REBELLION. Contemporary Casamance regional politics began with the 1947 founding of a political party, the MFDC, by a multiethnic group of leaders. The party, although not calling for outright independence, aimed to represent regional interests. President Senghor responded to the centrifugal threat of a regionalist party by co-opting much of the leadership into national political parties.⁶ The present MFDC, reborn at the beginning of the 1980s, now claims that in exchange for this co-optation, Senghor promised Casamance independence within 20 years of Senegal's own independence in 1960. More generally, there is a belief in the region that Senghor would invest heavily in the development of Casamance. The failure of the state to invest is often seen as a cause of rising frustrations in the early 1980s.⁷

Frustrations, which activists link to a lack of investment and to discrimination against Casamance populations with regard to education and land policies (and even to the treatment of the Casamance football team on the pitch), led to a series of peaceful demonstrations in the early 1980s. Capitalizing on these frustrations, the future leader of the MFDC, Fr. Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, in a speech delivered in August 1980, drew on colonial history to lay the ideological foundations for rebellion:

By what right did France, at the moment of Senegalese independence, attach Casamance to that country? Casamance has no link with Senegal, neither a historical link, nor an economic link nor an ethnic link. It was simply for bureaucratic convenience [for the French] that it was administered together with Senegal.⁸

SPEARS AND MACHETES. On December 26, 1982, the MFDC organized a peaceful march through the streets of Ziguinchor, culminating in the lowering of the Senegalese flag at key government buildings and the raising of a white flag in its stead. This time, Senegalese forces responded by violently dispersing the march, killing a number of activists and arresting many more.⁹

In anticipation of further problems, the government increased its security operations in the zone. These included a raid on a gathering in a sacred Diola forest on the outskirts of Ziguinchor in early December 1983. In reaction to the perceived violation of the forests, three of the gendarmes were immolated. These sacrifices were followed by more in an attempt to undo the damage to the forests.¹⁰ Through this act of cult, Casamance stumbled into a new stage of violent resistance. The political stakes

were raised when a few days later, 19 Casamançais were charged with attempting to subvert the state. Nine of them, including Diamacoune, were sentenced to 10 years for violating territorial integrity. With tensions mounting, a larger and more aggressive demonstration in Ziguinchor was again dispersed violently, leaving an official toll of 29 dead.

A group of those not killed or arrested left Ziguinchor to found a new armed branch of the MFDC, *Atika* (“warrior” in Diola), in the dense forests outside Ziguinchor, dedicated to achieving independence for the region.¹¹ At their head were veteran Senegalese army soldiers Sidy Badji and Léopold Sagna.¹² In moving to the *maquis*—or rebel base—the veterans and their followers were ill prepared for a violent struggle. Armed with traditional weapons and a small number of hunting rifles, most of the group had had no prior military training. And *Atika* had no military or political plan.

In fact, the group took almost no military actions until late 1986. Nevertheless, the government responded. By using an administrative reorganization, it removed the term “Casamance” from official usage. As steps toward appeasement, two Casamançais ministers were added to the cabinet. The mayor of Ziguinchor was replaced by a Casamançais.¹³ And public investments were reoriented toward the region.¹⁴ Dakar also placed the region under special governance with an army general assigned as governor for the region of Ziguinchor. Throughout the mid- and late 1980s, intelligence and torture were used to undermine the organization. Reflecting on the conflict in 1990, Mamadou Dia wrote:

Casamance [. . .] is under a state of emergency with a governor drawn from the army who has been granted full powers. Unable to put their hands on the guerrillas, the administration arrests civilians without evidence. [. . .] We are seeing a wall of silence even though the press is billed as free and independent. Ignoble things are happening. Young people, women, old men are being stretched naked on trees under the sun, tortured. All this to get dubious statements and admissions.¹⁵

Atika nonetheless continued its low-intensity actions through to the end of the 1980s, gaining in intensity only in 1989. At a moment when relations with neighboring Mauritania and Gambia were becoming strained, the MFDC stepped up its military campaign, using automatic rifles and hand grenades for the first time, attacking government positions on the Gambian border in the north and by the border with Guinea-Bissau in the south. The MFDC also brought insecurity into Ziguinchor, taking direct action against civilians,¹⁶ forcing the populations to take a position in favor of or against independence, and attacking people suspected of collusion with the Senegalese state. Meanwhile they established networks to manage recruitment and to collect “subscriptions” for the movement.

By this time the numbers in the *maquis* had, according to members of the MFDC, swollen into the thousands. The Senegalese army responded with crop destruction, internment, summary executions, and, in some cases, the clearance of entire villages.

In May 1990, the intensity of the fighting was such that the Senegalese army, pursuing rebels into Bissau, nearly sparked an interstate war, with direct engagement of Senegalese and Bissau troops on May 19–20. Casamançais refugees settled in the thousands in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, sheltered by cross-border coethnics and kin. Hundreds more internally displaced swelled the suburbs of Ziguinchor.

The step-up in government action against the rebellion coincided with a report by *Amnesty International* criticizing Dakar for the practice of torture between 1983 and 1989.

TREATIES AND DIVISION. The publication of the *Amnesty International* report was bad timing for a government that, faced with a collapsing tourist industry and a decline in government revenues, was financially reliant on the donor community. In late 1990, the government opted for dialogue.

First meetings were held between a commission of Casamançais members of parliament and a team of MFDC military leaders. These were followed up by meetings between the government and military leaders of the MFDC in Guinea-Bissau. The amorphous political leadership, largely in prison in Dakar, had limited participation. The accord that resulted from these meetings—the Bissau Accord of May 31, 1991¹⁷—was later bolstered by an amnesty law preventing any penal proceedings against any party in relation to the conflict. In principle, the war was over.

The Bissau Accord is an extraordinary document. Just one page in length, it contains three short lines of operative clauses stating that the parties agree to: “(1) The cessation of all armed activity; (2) The return of all armed forces and forces of intervention to their barracks; and (3) The free circulation of individuals and goods.” The missing element from this—and from all accords signed between 1991 and 2004—is a treatment of the stated fundamental concern of the MFDC: the constitutional status of Casamance.¹⁸ Despite accepting the accords, internal meetings—according to the files of the MFDC—were still resulting in motions for the immediate independence of Casamance.

In an attempt to manage these divisions, exchanges with the government led, for the first time, to the formal development of an organizational structure for the political wing of the MFDC. At a meeting in Cap Skirring, the *maquis* nominated Diamacoune as Secretary General.¹⁹ A follow-up meeting in April 1992 in Guinea-Bissau produced an agreement that gave rise to further dissension within the MFDC. In an organizational restructuring, the head of the *maquis* and the politically more moderate, Sidy Badji, took on the position of deputy secretary general, while more radical elements were expelled. Diamacoune soon thereafter denounced the accords and sided with the increasingly hard-line Léopold Sagna—who, taking over from Badji as head of the *maquis*, created a new focal point for militant rebels, the *Front Sud*.

Supporters of Badji, now grouped into the *Front Nord* and ostensibly abiding by the Bissau Accord, retired from military action. Keeping their weapons and maintaining effective control of a zone within the department of Bignona, the *Front Nord* has since been active in the timber and, reportedly, the cannabis industry (Evans

2002) and has, with government or donor support, been benefiting from a series of postconflict development projects.

RISE OF THE FRONT SUD. With the movement split, the Senegalese government took steps to consolidate its control over the situation on the ground,²⁰ increasing its military presence. By early 1993, close to a third of the Senegalese army, or about 5,000 troops, were stationed in Casamance.

After a yearlong lull in activities, the army began a new offensive with a bombing of villages in lower Casamance along the Guinea-Bissau border, and a rise in arrests and summary executions. The *Front Sud* extended its zone of operations into Kolda, an area previously relatively untouched by the war (Marut 1992, 225). It had numerous successes in attacking government positions, and in particular in ambushing army convoys. In one coup in February 1993, the MFDC launched rocket attacks on Ziguinchor airport.

The period was marked by an increase in attacks on civilians, a rise in banditry, and the increased reliance on financing from the natural resources of the region. Looting activities were centered on holdups of public transport vehicles and the pillaging of stores in Casamance villages. The MFDC killed civilians on the basis of their place of origin, on suspicion of collaboration with the government, or, occasionally, on the basis of their ethnic identity.²¹ They extended the zone of conflict to areas of high economic value, with fighting taking place in zones of importance to the cannabis and cashew nut industries,²² peaking in this period with the taking of areas adjoining those controlled by the pacified and economically successful *Front Nord*.²³ In parallel, Senegalese army units reportedly benefited economically from the conflict through their control of timber industries (Evans 2002). The Casamance economy was crippled, with a reduction of regional income at the beginning of this period of as much as 80 percent by some estimates.²⁴ By the late 1990s, violence against civilian populations became more widespread and more arbitrary with the introduction of land mines to the conflict from 1997.²⁵ The conflict, punctuated by attempts at negotiation in 1993²⁶ and 1997,²⁷ short lulls in fighting, and returns to violence—exacerbated at one point by the disappearance of four French tourists—produced occasionally relatively heavy losses for the army.²⁸ War-weary populations, traumatized by the high level of arbitrary attacks and killings and dubious of the prospects of victory, began to take explicitly propeace stances through marches and projects organized by nongovernmental organizations.

The relative success of the *Front Sud* in this period and the increased reliance on financing from looting was accompanied by a new set of internal divisions. One major division took place around the persons of Léopold Sagna and Salif Sadio. Sadio, a younger *maquisard* appointed to the position of Number 2, was widely held to be responsible for the growth in success of operations and rose as a rival to Sagna. After Sagna met with President Diouf, apparently undertaking fresh negotiations without consultations with the wider organization,²⁹ a radical wing of the MFDC moved to replace him with Sadio. Upon his return to the *maquis*, Sagna was “arrested” and has since probably been killed. Diamacoune continued to recognize Sagna as a military

leader and a group of Sagna loyalists still occupy *maquis* along the Bissau border. The Sagna faction has since divided into at least two parts, with one group working along the Bissau border and a second operating further to the north.

The strengths of these different factions during this period varied as a function of events in neighboring countries. Events in Guinea-Bissau in 1998–2000 provide a case in point. Ansoumane Mané, after being accused by President João Bernardo Vieira for trafficking arms to the MFDC, staged a revolt in June 1998. As a result, the theater of the Casamance conflict temporarily shifted to Guinea-Bissau: Senegal sent troops to oppose Mané while the MFDC sent hundreds of *maquisards* to support him.³⁰ The MFDC helped frustrate Senegal's efforts to capture Mané. Salif Sadio was a clear winner of the interlude. With the support of the now President of Guinea-Bissau, Ansoumane Mané³¹—playing the role of godfather to the Sadio grouping—Sadio grew in political and military strength³² and reportedly began to model himself on Charles Taylor. Partial reversal occurred, however, when, with the election of Kumba Yalla at the end of 1999 and the death of Mané in November 2000, Bissau moved to normalize relations with Dakar and launched attacks on Sadio's positions along the border.

A TOLERABLE STALEMATE. In March 2000, elections in Senegal brought a change in the executive. Expectations of a resolution to the conflict were high, as the new president, Wade, had claimed even in opposition that he would have the problem solved within three months of taking office.³³ Wade put a stop to any work being done by civil society groups, intermediaries, diplomatic or nongovernmental, attempting to deal with the conflict.³⁴ While claiming to put its faith in negotiations, the Wade government put a price on the head of Salif Sadio and continued to attempt to negotiate with the increasingly irrelevant Diamacoune.³⁵ The MFDC in contrast began pushing for greater internationalization of the process.³⁶ The result of Wade's maneuvers to date has been a peace accord signed in March 2001 and another in December 2004. These accords have had few substantive innovations on previous accords and, because of the divisions within the MFDC and the narrowness of the negotiations, have had difficulty in securing the broad support of the movement.

The MFDC is now going through an unprecedented level of organizational confusion with the armed wing divided into at least four factions and no consensus within the political wing either regarding how the MFDC should be structured or who the present leadership is. However, since the signing of the December 2004 agreement guns have been silent. Mines and small-scale pillaging still cripple the local economy and rebel fighters remain in their bases.

Mali

PRELUDE TO REBELLION. The rebellion in the north of Mali in June 1990 had historical antecedents. Previous attempts at rebellion, such as those in 1894 and 1916, had been met with harsh repression. But most immediate to Tuareg activists was the 1962 rebellion against the newly independent Malian State.³⁷ The repression of the

rising by the Keita regime included the sacking of the region of Kidal, the poisoning of wells, and the killing of an estimated 1,000 members of the Tuareg community, resulting in an exodus by nomad groups toward southern Algeria. As in Casamance, the government instituted military rule in the rebellious province. And until 1987, communication with the Adrar region in the north was cut and access to the zone was prohibited to outsiders.³⁸ The history of this rebellion in Mali provided fresh grievances: Many of those who took part in the 1990 rebellion were among those who had quit the country following the reprisals against the North; among them, many had had parents killed in 1962–63.

The numbers of Tuareg-in-exile swelled when a series of droughts—beginning in 1968 and reaching extreme levels in 1973–74 and in the late 1970s to mid-1980s (Bernus 1990; Clarke 1978; Keck and Dinar 1994)—destroyed their livestock. Tuareg and Arab groups moved to Algeria, Mauritania, and, especially, Libya. They were joined there by a new class of Tuareg intellectuals, who, benefiting from the tardy introduction of education to the transhumance zones found few employment opportunities within the Malian state.³⁹ The immigrating population in Libya increased greatly after Mouamar Ghadaffy invited Tuareg populations to Libya in 1980, pledging to help them to “liberate” their countries. In return for training, Ghadaffy gained fighters for his Islamic legion, active in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Chad.

Alongside training, emigrants in Libya engaged in political organization, founding the *Mouvement Tuareg de Libération de l'Adrar et de l'Azawad*, an organization dedicated to the liberation of the northern areas of Mali and Niger and the introduction of a popular republic *Jamahiriya*. In a move ostensibly promoted by Libya, the Malian section of the movement, splitting from the Nigerien section, transformed into the *Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad* (MPLA) in 1988 and came under the leadership of Iyad ag Ghali.⁴⁰

However, over the course of the late 1980s, Libya became an increasingly unwelcome place for Tuareg immigrants. The end of the oil boom led to a contraction in the demand for immigrant labor, and the defeat of Ghadaffy in Chad in 1986 led to the redundancy of Tuareg fighters. The government of Mali meanwhile, aware of Tuareg dissidents training in Libya, increased intelligence-gathering operations, arresting suspected returnees in early 1990.⁴¹ A clampdown by the Nigerien and Malian governments followed an outbreak of fighting with Tuareg in Tchintabaradene, Niger, in May. Fearing a destruction of the movement before the rebellion even started, the MPLA decided to strike.

REBELLION. In contrast to the improvised beginnings in Casamance, the war in Mali began as a planned action by a group coming from the outside with a political agenda and a military strategy. The war began in June 1990 with a string of attacks on government posts by members of the MPLA returning from Libya. The government responded with an attempted repetition of the repression of Kidal 30 years previously.⁴² Militarily, however, the MPLA turned out to be strong. In one battle at Tuxemene in September 1990, the movement defeated the army with up to

200 troops lost on the government side. The defeat increased the flows of young Tuareg and Arabs to join the *maquis*. By the end of the year, the *maquis* comprised an estimated 3,000 fighters.⁴³ Some bases, particularly in the west, were comprised almost entirely of volunteers who had never emigrated or trained in Libya. With an inferior command of the desert, and frustrated by a failure to engage directly with the rebels, the army struck at noncombatant Tuareg communities, staging a series of beatings and public executions. Criticism of the military response came both from the international community and from the south of Mali, where communities, already dissatisfied with the Traoré regime, were conscious of the marginalization of the northern zones.⁴⁴

In response, the government adopted a new approach. Drawing on its capital with traditional Tuareg leadership, it encouraged the traditional elites to try to resolve the problem in house. The chief of the *Iforas* group, Intalah ag Ataher, attempted an initial round of talks. At the same time, the government paper *L'Essor* ran articles quoting traditional Tuareg and Arab leaders proclaiming their support for the administration and the territorial integrity of the country, and their condemnation of the actions of what they claimed to be an unrepresentative minority.⁴⁵ These approaches produced considerable division within the MPLA, with some subsets forming alliances with traditional leaders and others insisting that their grievance was with the state and that they ought to negotiate directly with the state.

The government responded to the call for direct talks, accepting Algeria's demands to act as mediator. A hasty set of negotiations in Tamanrasset, Algeria, on January 5 and 6, 1991 ensued. Following a brief intervention by Algeria, the MPLA underwent a reorganization, now assuming the name *Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad* (MPA); it dropped the contentious "*Libération*," signaling even before the talks began a willingness to compromise. The Arab components meanwhile distinguished themselves formally from the larger movement taking the title *Front Islamique et Arabe de l'Azawad* (FIAA). In doing so, they became the first group to take an explicitly ethnic and religious title.

The accords that ensued seemed generous. They provided for a gradual demilitarization of the northern regions and the elimination of military posts and military activity, especially near Tuareg camp or pasture sites. And they provided for advanced administrative decentralization, according a "*statut particulier*" to the three regions of the North with a high degree of autonomy.⁴⁶ In terms of more material returns, the accords promised the creation of jobs through the replacement of the Malian army by civilians in the regional administration and the integration of insurgent combatants into the national army. The accords also promised an allocation of 47.3 percent of funds from the fourth national investment program to the North, dwarfing all previous investment allocations.

UNEASY PEACE. The Tamanrasset Accords led to a decline in organized violence. However, the regularity of seemingly isolated attacks suggests that neither the government nor the rebel groups had full command over their fighters.⁴⁷ The Traoré regime, having refused to publicize the terms of the Accords—fearing apparently that the accords would be interpreted as a surrender by the South—took contradictory

public stances, at one point denying on national radio that there would be any “*statut particulier*” for the North (Gaudio 1992, 191).

For reasons largely unconnected with the conflict, Moussa Traoré was overthrown on March 26, 1991. The transitional government, the CTSP, led by Amadou Toumani Touré, moved quickly to register its acceptance of the Tamanrasset Accords and assigned two seats in the CTSP to the MPA/FIAA. The transition in Bamako, however, was accompanied by a worsening of conditions in the North. Financing was not available to implement the terms of the accords. Frustration with the loss of status of the army and public concerns with the recently published Tamanrasset Accords, which were widely interpreted as giving autonomy to the North, led to more attacks conducted by dissatisfied sections of the armed forces, notably in Gao. Tuareg and Arab fighters, now with increased freedom of movement and still armed and frustrated at not seeing the material benefits of an ostensibly successful campaign, used their position to exact revenge and, through banditry, to make material gains. The army responded in kind. In one of the most publicized incidents, on May 20, 1991, the army, after rebel groups had left town, rounded up and executed an estimated 48 Tuareg and Arab traders and notables in the village of Léré.⁴⁸ By mid-1991 public displays of violence, such as the public burning of a nomad⁴⁹ or the destruction of premises owned by Arab traders, led to enormous refugee flows from the white settled as well as nomadic populations. By the end of the summer, Timbuktu was all but deserted by white groups. In areas where nomadic populations were killed or fled, sedentary populations benefited economically from the goods left behind, which, in the opinion of many in the rebel movements, implicated the black populations in these attacks.

With ex-combatants turning their attention from military targets to sources of revenue, sedentary populations increasingly became the victims of their actions.⁵⁰ And with a rise in polarization, the criterion used to select targets by the rebels was the same as that used by the army to vent their frustrations: race. The result in early 1991 was a gradual rise in interethnic violence and the first reporting of black defense militias.⁵¹

Throughout the rise in violence, the MPA retained its position of support for the application of the Tamanrasset Accords and formally maintained its cease-fire, responding to the rise in violence with increased levels of coordination with the government and with traditional Tuareg authorities. This conciliatory position placed great stress on the movement and led rapidly to greater fragmentation of the organization. The FIAA grouping returned to the *maquis* and by May a further group split to form the *Front Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azawad* (FPLA),⁵² frustrated both by the inaction of the MPA and by the ideological jettisoning of the principles of the rebellion. A second split, this time largely from the FPLA, produced a fourth movement, the *Armée Révolutionnaire pour le Libération de l'Azawad* (ARLA). Both groups, returning to the ideology of independence and employing a discourse of social revolution, rejected the Tamanrasset Accords.

The Tamanrasset Accords—imprecise, unimplemented, unpopular among the army and among sedentary populations, and rejected by fragments of the rebel groups—were quickly becoming irrelevant. The task of finding an alternative

political solution to the Tuareg problem was deferred in order not to complicate the August 1991 National Conference set to determine the constitution of the Third Republic. To address the problem, the government of Mali set up an international mediation team that began its work by facilitating the organization of the disparate groups into a coordinating body, the *Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad* (MFUA), and by running a series of consultative meetings in Algeria. Fighting raged in parallel with the meetings, with, in December, FIAA attacks on Timbuktu and the execution of Tuareg taken from the Ménaka market. Nonetheless, the meetings led to a new agreement, termed the *National Pact*, signed on April 11, 1992 in Bamako (Government of Mali 1992) and initialed by the leaders of three of the four factions forming the MFUA.

The pact, like the Tamanrasset Accords, contained a mixture of material benefits and political reforms. The material benefits for the fighters and their communities included jobs in the army and in the administration, investment promises, and support for small to medium sized enterprises, as well as two funds—one for civil and military victims and one for social assistance for victims of insecurity. The pact, explicitly recognizing the economic marginalization of the North, provided for a 10-year plan to “redress the economic, social and cultural inequalities between the North and the rest of Mali.”

The constitutional reforms, while not threatening the territorial integrity of Mali, did allow for considerable autonomy for the North. The decentralization provided for in the pact was at least as broad as that in the Tamanrasset Accords. It included not simply extensive control over issues of regional interest, but also envisaged a role for regions to be involved in international coordination and for cross-regional coordination, with provisions for redefining regional boundaries within the state.

Unlike the Tamanrasset Accords, the pact was a carefully developed document with well-specified institutional details and a timetable for implementation. Institutions to be set up to facilitate implementation included a high-profile *Commissariat du Nord*, a cease-fire commission, and, on the ground, mixed military patrols.

In practice, the National Pact suffered from problems similar to those of the Tamanrasset Accords. The Pact was developed with minimal consultation with the sedentary populations and, while members of the MFUA were to be allocated central roles in the transitional bodies, the pact contained no mechanisms to allow sedentary populations to be involved in its implementation.⁵³ Again, promises of material benefits were made without the resources in place to fulfill them.⁵⁴ The result was that implementation of the National Pact, like the implementation of the Tamanrasset Accords, was painfully slow.

The period following the signing of the pact was one of relatively low conflict intensity. As after Tamanrasset, the signing of the agreement was followed by a shift in regimes in Bamako, in this case with Konaré formally taking over as President of the Third Republic two months after the signing of the pact. A slow implementation of the pact, coupled with the failure of the leadership of the MFUA to discipline its forces, led to a return of banditry, which, in a familiar pattern, resulted in

reprisals against noncombatant Tuareg.⁵⁵ This time banditry was accompanied by fighting within the MFUA. As a result of poorly coordinated acts of banditry, fighting broke out between the FIAA and FPLA in late 1992.⁵⁶ Disagreements over how to allocate the benefits of the pact, notably positions within the army, seem to have had been “resolved” by a call by the MFUA to the government to increase the size of the pie. After negotiations in April and May 1994, the MFUA increased its demands for army positions for ex-combatants.⁵⁷

By early 1994 the continued insecurity and increasingly routinized banditry, coupled with seemingly extravagant demands for benefits exclusively for members of the MFUA, were wearing on the patience of sedentary communities. Problems became more complicated when, in April, increased tensions within mixed patrol units led to the shooting by integrated nomads of sedentary soldiers in their units.⁵⁸ Retaliatory action led to a collapse in the system of mixed patrols and the return of nomad soldiers to the desert.

INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT. On May 19, 1994, Captain Abdoulaye Hamadahmane Maïga, a member of the sedentary Songhoi community, deserted from the Malian army. Claiming frustration with the failure of the army to act effectively to restore security to the North, Maïga founded a civil militia: the *Ganda Koy* (literally: “masters of the land” in Songhoi). The formation of the *Ganda Koy* marked a transition of the war from a struggle directed against the central government to an intercommunal conflict. In this transition, ethnic and racial affiliation took center stage.

In one of their first actions on May 30, the *Ganda Koy* pursued and killed nine supposed cattle rustlers. In response, the MFUA head of the cease-fire commission, moved in on the *Ganda Koy* base at Fafa.⁵⁹ Encountering a regular army unit on their return, the MFUA forces were routed. There followed a rapid rise in race-based attacks and a steep escalation of violence. In August a leader of the FIAA declared “total war” and claimed responsibility for multiple attacks, many against civilians.⁶⁰ Attacks on the Tuareg and Arab communities continued apace. The escalation was accompanied by a new radicalization of political positions with new calls for an independent Azawad.⁶¹ Interracial tensions reached such a point that many of the few Tuareg who had been integrated into the government in Bamako from the time of Traoré now went into exile. By the end of 1994, peace could not have seemed more distant.

TERMINATION. Despite the seemingly impossible situation in late 1994, the conflict in Mali fell silent within one year. In March 1996 the *Ganda Koy* and the four member organizations of the MFUA disbanded at a ceremony that included the burning of 2,700 weapons.

There was some variation in the processes that led to the cessation of activities by the different groups. The MPA had, since 1991, retained close relations with the government and had been active only in policing activities within its zone of influence. The FIAA, the group involved in some of the most bitter tit-for-tat relations with

the *Ganda Koy* and seemingly the most opposed to a rapprochement, was eventually defeated, largely by military action. On January 17, 1995, their base in Tin Adema fell subsequent to action by the army, with the help of other MFUA organizations. Of the two more radical Tuareg groups, the ARLA imploded largely as a result of its defeat by the MPA. Its members split to join the MPA and the FPLA. In November 1994, the FPLA, financially exhausted, starting negotiating with the *Ganda Koy*. The negotiations, largely organized by community groups, soon included other groups from the MFUA and the communities from both sides, resulting in the signing of several accords throughout 1995. The accords provided for coordination between the sedentary and the nomadic communities to prevent banditry and to demilitarize the zone. For the brunt of the *Ganda Koy*, whose chief concern was the security of their economic activities, the accords were satisfactory.⁶²

While conflict is sometimes associated with a collapse in state strength, the increase in the capacity of the Malian state—particularly its capacity to control its own army—contributed to the termination of the conflict in Mali. The localized nature of the conflict, and the fact that at no point did the rebellion aim to overthrow the state, meant that the strength of the Malian state was not endogenous to conflict. In fact, during the mid-1990s there was a strengthening of the state, which finally began to receive support from the international community and to gain tighter control over its army. Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the Tamanrasset Accords, many elements of the army were acting independently of civilian control, in the mid-1990s there was a series of security sector reforms, including a U.S.-sponsored International Military Education and Training program to reformulate the role of the military in Mali's new democracy.⁶³ The result was an opportunity to improve relations with northern populations: The government replaced senior army commanders, and by the end of 1994 Konaré was able to withdraw troops from the region that had been involved in massacres.⁶⁴

While formally the terms of the *National Pact* remained in place, intercommunal meetings were used to respond to inadequacies of the agreement, leading ultimately to a division of the spoils (counted in jobs) that also benefited the sedentary populations.⁶⁵


Causes of Conflict

Lessons from Statistical Work

We begin our analysis of the causes of these conflicts by considering the predicted probability of war onset from two econometric models: the Collier-Hoeffler core model (figures 9.1 and 9.2) and the Fearon and Laitin model (figures 9.3 and 9.4).

The Collier-Hoeffler model predicts war onset risk using four time-varying variables—the share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP), and past levels of education, population, and per capita income growth—along with a number of time-invariant variables—notably the level of ethnic fragmentation and country size. The average predicted probability of war onset in a five-year period sub-

Figure 9.1 Probabilities of Civil War from the Collier-Hoeffler Model




Note: The solid line gives the predicted probability of civil war onset in Senegal and Mali based on estimates and data from Collier and Hoeffler (canonical equation). The shaded area records a 95 percent confidence interval around these predictions.

sequent to 1965 is around 3 percent in Mali and 4 percent in Senegal; the population frequency is 7 percent.

The level predictions of the model appear unsuccessful: The model predicts that these two countries have well-below-average probabilities of having conflicts (as defined by Collier and Hoeffler), despite the fact that both countries did indeed have sizable civil wars. The model does not appear to be successful in terms of comparative statics predictions either: The period in which the Casamance conflict actually started was a period in which the model predicted a below-average likelihood of civil war *even in terms of Senegal's already low probabilities*. Similarly, the period in which the war escalated—around 1990—corresponds to a dip in predicted probabilities. The model seems to perform better for Mali, with predictions peaking in the period in

Figure 9.2 Factors Contributing to Variation in the Probability of Civil War Outbreak in the Collier-Hoeffler Model




Note: This figure shows how the predicted probability of civil war differs from what it would have been had different variables from Collier and Hoeffler (2001) remained at their period average.

which the conflict did in fact break out; however, these predictions are, in absolute terms, very low throughout and never predict a conflict for any given year. Even so, it is reasonable to ask whether the changes in predicted probabilities that are observed are related to factors of importance to the conflicts.

We answer this question by considering a “decomposition” of the predicted probabilities in which we consider how changes in the time-varying explanatory variables account for changing predictions of war onset.⁶⁶ The decomposition for Mali shows that the peak in 1990 can be attributed in part to a continuing rise in popu-


Figure 9.3 Probabilities of Civil War from the Fearon-Laitin Model



Note: The marked line gives the annual predicted probability of civil war onset in Senegal and Mali based on estimates and data from the Fearon and Laitin model. The shaded area records a 95 percent confidence interval around these predictions. See Fearon and Laitin (2003) for details regarding the estimation of the model and data used.

lation and fall in education rates, but, most importantly, to a peak in the relative value of exported primary commodities to GDP. Similarly, the Senegal decomposition (figure 9.2) suggests that intertemporal variation in predicted probabilities is driven overwhelmingly by changes in the value of primary commodity exports. Primary commodity dependence may put a country at risk through a number of mechanisms, such as by increasing inequality, producing an economic structure with a low inten-

Figure 9.4 Factors Contributing to Variation in the Probability of Civil War Outbreak in the Fearon-Laitin Model



Note: This figure shows how the predicted probability of civil war differs from what it would have been had different variables from Fearon and Laitin (2003) remained at their period average.

sity of internal trade, or producing an economy especially vulnerable to terms of trade shocks (see Humphreys 2002; Ross 2002). In the next section we consider the greed mechanism suggested by Collier and Hoeffler—that control of (or the desire to control) primary commodities provides either the start-up capital or the motives for would-be rebels.

The predictions of the Fearon and Laitin model are presented in figure 9.3. This model predicts the probability of the outbreak of a conflict in any given year (rather than for a five-year period) based on the wealth and population of the country as well as a number of binary variables, notably whether or not the country is a semi-

democracy⁶⁷ or has had a large change in its political institutions.⁶⁸ As with the Collier and Hoeffler model, this model predicts both countries as having below-average chances of having a civil war. Although the comparative statics do not suggest conflict is particularly likely in Mali in 1990,⁶⁹ the model does predict that Senegal's chances of having a conflict rise dramatically in 1981—right before the conflict actually starts (although again the predicted probability of conflict is still extremely low).⁷⁰

To evaluate these predictions we again perform a decomposition (see figure 9.4).⁷¹ We find that the spike for Senegal in 1981 derives from just two features—institutional change in 1978 and an increase in oil exports in 1981—neither of which is obviously related to the Casamance conflict. In Fearon and Laitin's model, the political reform in 1978 classified Senegal as a semi-democracy, which increased the chance for conflict onset over the period 1979 to the present.⁷² This change in political institutions, though undertaken at a moment of institutional strength, is classified by Fearon and Laitin as a moment of political instability. The imputed instability leads to higher probabilities of war onset particularly in years 1979–81. The peak in 1981 arises from these effects coupled with the classification of Senegal as an oil-exporting country for that year.⁷³ Fearon and Laitin argue that oil producers have weaker state apparatuses and that the availability of oil revenue raises the value of taking the state. The revenues of the Senegalese state do not, however, derive primarily from oil; more importantly, oil revenues in Senegal in the period did not derive from domestic production but rather from re-exports (Enda-TM 1994). These less lucrative oil re-exports are a poor proxy for state strength. Moreover, the MFDC at no point aimed to gain control of this industry.⁷⁴

Greed

The aggregate data used in econometric work to measure the resources available to insurgents in Casamance—capturing fluctuations in the yields and price of fish, groundnuts, cotton, and oil re-exports—do not reflect the resources that are most relevant to the conflict. Although the expansion of some of these industries by *nordistes* working in Casamance has fueled the complaints of the Casamançais, none of these has been used to finance the war in Casamance and there has been no attempt by the *maquisards* to gain control of them. There are high-value, lootable natural resources in Casamance—notably cannabis, timber, and cashew nuts—but the chronology of the rebellion does not support the greed hypothesis with regard to these commodities either, because these resources increased in importance many years after the conflict began. Furthermore, although we argue that access to natural resources in the region has contributed to the duration and plausibly the intensity of the Casamance conflict, these resources were not accessed by the MFDC in the early stages of the rebellion, when the rebellion relied much more on subscriptions from local populations.

It is also difficult to make a case that the conflict in Mali was driven by the desire to control stocks of natural resources. Gold is Mali's third largest export after cotton and livestock, with a 1994 value of \$67 million, accounting for 20 percent of exports.

The country also has diamond deposits (van Oss 1994). Furthermore, the CH model suggests that variation in the value of primary commodities is largely responsible for the intertemporal variation in the predicted probability of war occurrence in Mali. There is, however, nothing linking these gold and diamond deposits directly to the conflict. Although there are gold and diamond deposits in the Adrar des Iforas, these remain untapped because of high extraction costs. Instead, gold is mined and exported in the south of the country, far from the conflict. At no stage was a bid made by any of the rebel groups to gain access to the mines or the revenues from them. The one lootable resource that did help fuel the war was cattle. Cattle are, however, typically “diffuse” both in their supply and their marketing and, although access to cattle may have motivated individual fighters, the difficulty in deriving a centralized revenue stream makes it implausible that cattle were an important motivation for the leaders of the rebellion.

Regional Specificity

The two conflicts, it seems, were not initiated with a desire to control lucrative natural resources. Nor did either rebellion at any stage attempt to gain, or claim to be fighting for, control of the state. The MFDC are fighting, they claim, for the independence of Casamance, or more precisely, for the recognition, not the granting, of the independence of the Casamance. The MPLA initially had a more complex project involving the piecing together of nomadic areas across a range of countries in the region. In both cases, the arguments that are used to justify the independence struggles rely on a notion that these regions are “particularly different.” An important comparative question then for the study of secessionist struggles is to what extent some regions, and not others, differ in ways that make bids for secession germane.⁷⁵ We turn now to consider the arguments that the exceptionalisms of the Casamance and the Azawad are politically relevant.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. We noted that Senegal and Mali share similar physical geographies with great internal ecological variation. With the political center of Senegal based in the north of the country and the political center of Mali based in the south, a shared feature of their political geographies is the fact that the would-be seceding regions are “distant,” constituting in each case the *most* remote region relative to the political center (at least in travel time). For all intents and purposes, Casamance is disjointed from the rest of the country, separated by the Gambia. An overland route through Senegal exists, but requires a 20-hour drive to bridge the 300 miles between Dakar and Ziguinchor. Otherwise transit from the north to Casamance passes either by sea or by air or through the Gambia. Casamançais nationalists liken the situation to that of East and West Pakistan and see in the map of Senegal a confirmation of the legitimacy of their struggle.⁷⁶ Their thesis finds some support in econometric work that finds that noncontiguity is positively associated with conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). A similar situation prevails in Mali. While again the north is formally contiguous with the south, the desert zones are relatively

inaccessible from the capital, although this is due to sheer distance and a lack of infrastructure rather than shape. Travel from Bamako to Gao by road takes approximately 35 hours, including an overnight wait for a ferry. If the Niger water levels are not right or the ferry is out of order, a trip to Timbuktu can take 48 hours, while travel to Kidal is likely to take four or five days.

COLONIAL HISTORY. While geography suggests a particularity to these regions, rebelling groups can also point to the fact that colonial administrators treated these regions as exceptional. Casamance had an ambiguous and now hotly contested administrative status under colonialism, especially from 1854 to 1939,⁷⁷ partly because, unlike other areas of the country, the French did not succeed in gaining full control over the area until early in the 20th century.⁷⁸ The north of Mali, a region of extended armed resistance, was also relatively late in coming under French control. Timbuktu was taken in 1894, followed by Gao in 1899 and the *Adrar des Iforas* only in 1909. The status of the North remained exceptional, being the only region of the country that remained under military rule up until 1958. Indeed shortly prior to Malian independence, the French entertained the idea of separating the North from the rest of the country with the formation of the OCRS.

We have then that in each case the conflicts that ensued were linked to a longer tradition of local resistance and special forms of governance. However, although econometric studies take account of histories of conflict postindependence, they fail to include measures of the degree and location of conflict during the colonial period. The exceptional histories of these regions are linked to the present conflict in at least four ways. First, variation in the histories of resistance in different areas signal prior motivations for armed struggle in these areas—fixed effects. Second, the fact that colonialism took so long to take hold in the region reduced the degree of homogeneity that was introduced in other regions of the countries under colonial rule.⁷⁹ Third, the history of conflict in the areas led to local militarization as well as—and this is particularly clear in the case of Azawad—to grievances resulting from past conflicts. Finally, the history of resistance can be used to motivate and legitimate new actions. Fr. Diamacoune, for example, makes use of the administrative history of Casamance, as well as of the history of resistance to colonial rule, to argue that Casamance was colonized by France independently of Senegal.⁸⁰

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION. Both Casamance and Azawad, while each ethnically diverse, have very different ethnic and religious demographics relative to those in Senegal and Mali more generally. Can the simple distribution of groups help explain the tendency for secessionism? Lower Casamance is the most ethnically heterogeneous region of Senegal, and, like Senegal as a whole, has a dominant—albeit internally fragmented—ethnic group, the Diola.⁸¹ Mali, like Senegal, is ethnically heterogeneous with a dominant group—the Bambara—active in the political center of the country. The Tuareg and Arabs, however, are almost entirely based in the northern regions, comprising a majority in the far north. The demographics are consistent with the notion that regional concentration within states that have another dominant group are especially prone to secessionist bids.

However, the argument for ethnic exceptionalism is weak. In neither country are these the only regions with local dominant groups; furthermore, in neither case is there an attempt to create a state with a permanent ethnic majority. The dominance of the Diola does not extend to the entire region, as Peuls and Mandinka dominate in upper and middle Casamance respectively, nor would Tuareg and Maure groups form a majority in an Azawad region that contains, particularly along the banks of the Niger, a large sedentary community composed mostly of Songhoi and Peul.

Nor do differences in religion help to explain the specificity of Azawad: nomadic and sedentary groups in the north are overwhelmingly Muslim within an entirely Muslim country. Casamance has more religious diversity than other parts of Senegal, with a large Christian population within a country that is 94 percent Muslim. Nonetheless, Casamance is not the only region with a Christian concentration⁸² and, more importantly, religion has not been an important organizing force in the conflict: The leadership of the MFDC has been both Muslim and Christian, seemingly without great attention being paid to the balance.

Of perhaps more importance is the *qualitative* nature of the differences between the ethnic groups. Although each country is ethnically heterogeneous, the Tuareg and Arab groups are often considered in Mali to be racially rather than simply ethnically distinct from other groups in the country and are referred to as whites or reds.⁸³ These perceived racial differences, absent in Senegal, have affected the course of the conflict. Interviews also suggest that racial differences motivated at least in part the desire for independence.⁸⁴

NATION. In both Casamance and Azawad, intellectuals working with the rebel groups argue that the struggles are for the independence not simply of a region but of a nation. The geographic and historical exceptionalism discussed above does not, however, imply the existence of the sense of “nationhood” that appears necessary to these movements as they motivate their struggles. In both cases, providing arguments for the existence of nations that correspond to the contested territories has been difficult. Intellectuals in the movements draw heavily on ethnic rather than regionally relevant motifs and have made little effort to develop more inclusive notions of an Azawad or Casamance nation corresponding to the regions being fought for.⁸⁵ The discourses attempt to found a notion of national identity upon characteristics of ethnic identities while refusing to identify nation with ethnicity. This strategy has been unsuccessful in both cases. In Casamance the movement has failed to generate support sufficiently broad so as to allow for the organization of mass actions such as electoral boycotts.⁸⁶ Nationalist aspirations in north Mali were short lived, even among the rebel leaders who rapidly adopted more “patriotic” positions.⁸⁷

Grievances

Arguments presented by rebelling groups to justify the onset of the conflicts in Senegal and Mali draw heavily on perceived grievances. In both cases, the list of grievances is

long. And indeed in both cases—at least in the early stage of the conflicts—there was widespread local recognition of the grievances that were articulated by the rebels. As, arguably, any groups can identify *some* grievances, our concern is to see whether there exists observable indicators of grievances that demonstrate that the grievances suffered in Casamance and Azawad are more pronounced than those in other parts of Senegal and Mali.

ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES. Casamance rebels complain of the economic treatment of the province since independence. The area does indeed suffer from severe poverty and underinvestment in infrastructure. Basic services are lacking: Casamance has only one hospital and no university. In many parts of the region, child malnutrition rates are high, and there is poor access to health services and drinking water.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the rebels argue, what wealth has been generated has been distributed unevenly, with *nordistes* benefiting disproportionately from Casamance's resources. They argue that Casamance has great potential for wealth but that the region remains poor due to extraction and a lack of investment in public goods by northerners.

The analytic question remains, however: To what extent are these grievances specific to Casamance? It turns out that many of the grievances are shared with other regions within Senegal, resulting from decades of development policy that has privileged the capital at the expense of the regions. From table 9.1 we see that, at least based on data produced by the Senegalese government prior to the outbreak of the conflict, Casamance was not the most badly treated region in the country. Although road infrastructure was essentially ignored, medical services were no worse than elsewhere, and government investment in telecommunications infrastructure, though worse than the regional average outside Dakar, made disproportionate gains in the 1960s and 1970s. Strikingly, with data available that distinguish between the two regions of Casamance, Kolda and Ziguinchor, we see that for a wide range of measures, Kolda ranks as one of the worst-off areas of the country, while Ziguinchor—the zone where fighting and recruitment is most concentrated—is one of the best off (see table 9.2), with particularly high levels of primary education.⁸⁹

Of more relevance perhaps, but more difficult to evaluate, are notions of a shortfall between economic expectations and economic outcomes. The sense of economic marginalization may arise from the sense that, on the basis of the fertility of the land,⁹⁰ the region ought to be *particularly* wealthy. Casamançais argue, for example, that investments in sugar cane and rice ought to have been undertaken in Casamance, where, they argue, these investments would have been more productive, rather than in other regions, notably in the Senegal river valley.⁹¹

A final salient aspect of economic grievances relates to the redistributive politics of economic development, and especially to the political economy of land rights. The *Loi sur le Domaine National*,⁹² introduced in 1964 but implemented in Casamance only in 1979, made the Senegalese state the formal owner of all nonprivatized land (Hesseling 1994, 243, 250). The law had repercussions throughout Senegal and was felt strongly among the Diola.⁹³ By treating land development as the primary criterion for private ownership, state-appointed rural councils used the law to reallocate

Table 9.1 Evidence on Economic Grievances Prior to 1982

Region	Population,		Surfaced roads (km)		Telephone lines		People per telephone line, 1978	Total and percentage increase in lines, 1962-78
	1978	1978	1972	1979	1962	1978		
Casamance	776	32,342	0	0	419	979	793	560 or 134%
Other regions								
CapVert (Dakar)	1,038	3,832	101	105	19,673	32,126	32	1,2453 or 63%
Diourbel	449	34,590	54	5	545	1,064	423	519 or 95%
Senegal River Basin	556	21,413	3	41	1,193	1,208	461	15 or 1%
Louga	438	10,9741		111	—	479	916	—
Eastern Senegal	299	42,826		0	121	335	895	214 or 177%
Sine Saloum	1,059	52,997	57	57	797	1,603	661	806 or 101%
Thies	733	28,207	159	167	1,041	2,648	277	1,067 or 54%
Senegal	5,353	13,691	374	486	23,789	40,442	132	16,653 or 70%
Source	GoS, 1979, Table 11	GoS, 1979, Table 11	GoS, 1979, p. 294	GoS, 1979, p. 294	GoS, 1979, p. 319	GoS, 1979, p. 319	Authors' calculation	Authors' calculation

Note: GoS = Government of Senegal.

Table 9.2 Evidence on Economic Grievances 1980s and 1990s

Region	Population (thousands), 2000	Average household Income (‘000 CFA), 1995	Human poverty index, 1999	Human development index, 2000	Primary school participation rates (%), 1991/92	% of population with access to drinking water, 2000	Gini coefficient measure of income inequality, 1995	Ethnic fractionalization, 1995	Between- group inequality, 1995	Male unemployment rate 1988, age 15–29
Casamance										
Kolda	797	805	62	41	40	27	.56	.58	22%	4
Ziguinchor	544	2,053	39	53	94	38	.71	.73	6%	16
Other Regions										
Dakar	2,327	3,773	30	62	93	93	.67	.74	0%	33
Diourbel	902	1,361	52	37	25	78	.63	.60	3%	6
Fatick	629	1,479	56	41	42	50	.62	.68	13%	3
Kaolack	1,101	1,936	52	41	37	49	.63	.55	4%	5
Louga	555	2,311	57	42	35	57	.62	.48	2%	5
St Louis	842	4,020	49	46	42	64	.81	.51	4%	16
Tambacounda	518	1,376	59	42	36	40	.64	.62	9%	5
Thiès	1,311	1,657	48	48	59	65	.64	.68	8%	10
All Casamance	1,341	1,456	53	43		32		.77	1%	8
All Senegal	9,527	2,597	44	43	56	64*	.70	.75	5%	13
Source	p. 16–25	ESM	BADIS	BADIS	RDP	BADIS	ESM	ESM	ESM	BADIS
			p. 51	p. 52	A2.4	p. 181				p. 129

a. Recorded as 64 but figure based on data above is 73.

Notes: ESM = *Enquête Sénégalaise Après des Ménages*, Government of Senegal Statistics Office, 1995; BADIS = *Banque de Données des Indicateurs Sociaux*, Government of Senegal Statistics Office.

land to nonresidents to be used for tourism, fishing, and orchards.⁹⁴ The reallocations, stressing economic productivity, took on a political, and in particular ethnic character, with a reported 6,000 cases of expropriation, primarily of Diolas and Mancagnes from lower Casamance.⁹⁵ Land politics are seen as one indication of a more general domination of the modern sector by northern groups, the impact of which was amplified by changing economic conditions. When falls in production in the 1970s led to the need to engage with the market, Diola producers in Casamance found that markets—in transport, fishing, and commercial agriculture—were already dominated by northerners.⁹⁶

It is difficult, however, to find data to compare the levels of unequal treatment in other regions of the country. To check the hypothesis that there exists politically relevant inequality within the region, we use household data from 1995 to estimate the total inequality in each region that can be explained by between-(ethnic)group inequality.⁹⁷ We find that, consistent with the complaints of the MFDC, the two regions of Casamance are among those with the greatest horizontal inequality—that is, in which income cleavages are most reinforced by ethnic cleavages. The between-group inequalities are driven by gaps between Wolof and Diola in the region of Ziguinchor and between Wolof and Peul in Kolda (see table 9.2).⁹⁸ As with other objective measures of economic grievances, however, this measure identifies the region of Kolda rather than the region of Ziguinchor—where in fact the conflict has concentrated—as the most conflict-prone region.

Economic grievances, dating back to the colonial period, are less ambiguous in northern Mali. Chief among these is the colonizer's drawing of boundaries through the desert. The drawing of national boundaries was of singular economic importance in the North—interrupting caravan routes and, at least formally, preventing access to traditional pasture zones, limiting the capacity of nomadic pastoralists to spread their risks. The effects of this compartmentalization became most strongly felt with independence and the breakup of French West Africa. In this regard decolonization had a deeper economic effect on the economic lifestyle of the Tuareg than did colonialism (Hawad 1990). The problem is attributed in part to differing conceptions of property between nomadic and sedentary communities—claims of traditional complementarities between nomadic and sedentary modes of production notwithstanding.⁹⁹ The legal apparatus assigning and protecting property rights developed by the Malian state, allowing the state to claim rights to unregistered land¹⁰⁰ and to land left fallow, was seen as privileging sedentary communities.¹⁰¹

The economic marginalization of the North subsequent to independence was felt as keenly by sedentary populations as by nomadic groups and was quickly acknowledged in the national press and by the transitional CTSP government.¹⁰² Even the Traoré government, attempting to demonstrate its dedication to the North by noting major investments in the area in the first *Livre Blanc* (1990), was only able to list a phosphate factory in Bourem and a salt project in Taoudenit, the latter in fact being a prison. Besides the lack of investments in the region, complaints center on inequalities in the provision of health and education in the regions. The data in table 9.3 support the view that in the early and mid-1990s, the North was not

Table 9.3 Socioeconomic Conditions by Region

Region	Population (%)	School attendance rates, 1995/96 (%)	Malnutrition 0–3 years; rates (%)	Vulnerability to extreme food insecurity 1996 (%)
Original data source	DNSI (Direction nationale de la statistique et de l'informatique) Commissariat au Plan			
	"Report on the analysis of the situation in Mali," UNICEF, 1996			
Kayes	14	35	38	0
Bamako	9	131	29	0
Koulikoro	16	44	41	0
Sikasso	17	38	44	0
Segou	18	37	41	0
The North				
Mopti	16	23	41	10
Timbuktu	6	23	41	28
Gao	4	31	41	61
Kidal	1	19	41	83
Total	100	42	40	7

Note: Based on data presented in WFP Country Program Mali (1999–2001), *Agenda Item 7*; FEWS = Famine Early Warning Systems Network.

just badly off in these regards, but was in an exceptionally poor condition relative to other regions of the country.

POLITICAL GRIEVANCES. Rebels argue that economic marginalization has been accompanied by political marginalization. The advent of independence is represented in Casamance as the simple replacement of one foreign-language speaking administration with another.¹⁰³ To demonstrate political exclusion, Casamançais point to a low proportion of Casamançais in public offices, especially heading up local and regional administrations (positions of governor or prefect); even the representatives of Casamance in the national parliament were disproportionately from the region of Saint Louis and the position of mayor of Ziguinchor was, before the rebellion, filled by a Toucouleur who was seen as a *nordiste*. Attempts to place Casamançais as governors in other regions were rejected. However, the case for political exclusion, at least at the center, is not entirely compelling. There is no evidence that Casamance has been treated worse than other regions in its political appointments, and indeed many prominent cabinet positions—such as minister of defense or minister of the armed forces—have been allocated to Casamance politicians throughout the postindependence period.

Again, the political marginalization of the nomadic groups in Azawad is more convincing. In Azawad, as in Casamance, independence was seen as a shift in the identity of the colonial power. But, largely in response to the Tuareg uprising of 1962, political marginalization in the North was exceptionally harsh. The North for much of the period was under military rule and governors appointed, if from the region (broadly defined), were drawn from the Songhoi group.¹⁰⁴ There was a total of just two Tuareg and two Arabs appointed as ministers in all postindependence cabinets up to 1990, with three of these appointed toward the end of the 1980s. In the same period, there were only two Tuareg officers in the Malian army; there were no Tuareg national heads of administrative departments within the civil service and there had been only one Tuareg inspector of education throughout the educational sector.

A final form of political marginalization, as articulated by the insurgents in Mali, relates to in-group politics. The insurgents, initially drawn from groups that had quit Mali after the droughts of the mid-1970s, felt socially marginalized by the Tuareg elites who remained behind. Tuareg elites had been given limited privileges by the Traoré regime and were held responsible for the diversion of food aid sent in response to the droughts.¹⁰⁵ The marginalization of the combatants from the traditional elites meant that the former had no access to the albeit limited channels of political communication that had been established by the state.¹⁰⁶

CULTURAL GRIEVANCES. Members of the MFDC stress cultural grievances more than economic grievances, noting prejudices encountered when dealing with *nordistes* in administrative positions in Casamance. They see the imposition of the Wolof—the *lingua franca* of the North—in the media, in the administration and in their schools, as a denigration of their own languages.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, besides economic marginalization, Tuareg groups complain of a denigration of their culture, epitomized

by the attempt by the Malian administration to replace the *Tamacheq* script, *Tifinagh*, with a Latin script.¹⁰⁸

Cultural disdain of this sort remains, however, difficult to measure, even within a single country and fails to feature in most cross-national econometric work. Fearon and Laitin (2003) failed to find evidence that state discrimination against minority languages or religions is associated with conflict. Yet no cross-national measures exist of attitudes that groups have toward each other. Stereotyping, existing prior to the outbreaks of the conflicts, nonetheless appear germane in both the Senegal and Mali cases, with, in both cases, the rebelling factions coming from groups that are negatively stereotyped. The stereotype of the Casamançais reported by compatriots is one of “forest people, pagans, palm-wine drinkers (or drunkards) and pork eaters.”¹⁰⁹ The image in the North of the working Diola is of the housemaid, at the lowest rank of the Dakar pecking order. Attitudes of “West Africans” to the Tuareg meanwhile were described thus by a Malian officer: “West Africans tend to view the Tuaregs as lazy, prone to violence and criminality, opportunistic, ethnically chauvinistic, and unpatriotic” (Keïta 1998, 9).

Opportunity

Plausibly, the onset of conflict may not be due to extraordinary grievances or atypical levels of greed, but rather to the fact that the costs associated with engaging in violent action happen to be unusually low. If this argument is correct, differences in the local availability of arms, variation in the relations that exist with neighboring countries, and variation in the degree of state strength and in local economic conditions may determine conflict onset.

ARMS. Explanations for conflict onset based on variation in opportunity costs suggest that, given that grievances are ubiquitous, the existence of a vibrant regional arms market or a drop in the cost of arms may determine rises in the chances of conflict. We find, however, that the onset of the conflicts in Mali and Senegal cannot be attributed to such features.

In both cases, the conflicts began before fighters had access to significant supplies of arms—the MFDC did not have any access to modern arms and automatic weapons until the very end of the 1980s, while the Tuareg fighters, despite having taken arms from Libya, in fact had had these arms stolen before the conflict began.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, when arms were accessed, they were largely accessed from nonmarket sources. In Casamance, arms transfers from regional governments have been more important than the regional arms market. In contrast, although for Mali there was a general availability of arms in the region¹¹¹ and arms could be bought from dealers in Mauritania and Algeria or from the *Polisario*, the majority of arms accessed, particularly in early stages, were taken from government stocks rather than from markets.¹¹²

TROUBLE WITH THE NEIGHBORS. Research has suggested that there is a contagion effect to civil wars—the likelihood of a civil war is increased by the existence of civil wars in neighboring countries (Sambanis 2001). A number of mechanisms

may lie behind this relationship—including ideological contagion, ideological support, and the availability of supplies, arms, and combatants. Many of these mechanisms serve to reduce the costs of conflict to belligerent groups.

In the region, the only conflicts that preceded Senegal's were the independence struggles, notably of Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry. Guinea-Bissau's struggle played a particularly important role. Early relations between Casamance and Guinea-Bissau developed in part *because* the two zones were under different colonial administrations. Casamançais resistors to French colonial rule took refuge in Guinea-Bissau or used the Portuguese-held area as a base and, in return in the 1960s and early 1970s, the independence movement PAIGC, used Casamance as a base during their own independence struggle. The first mechanism through which the Bissau struggle mattered for Casamance is through ideological contagion. The MFDC viewed the PAIGC as having been fighting for the same aims—the removal of a colonial power—and, importantly, as having been successful in their actions. The second mechanism is through intraethnic solidarity developed in part from a shared history of resistance. The debt to the Casamançais is used to explain the fact that, since the beginning of the revolt, the MFDC has expected to be able to use Guinea-Bissau as a location for bases, as a source of arms, and as a market for goods. A third mechanism, often cited but for which we have not found evidence, is that the MFDC has been able to access arms used by the PAIGC during their own struggle.

An important role model in the Malian case was provided by the conflict in Algeria in 1954–62. During the Algerian War of Independence, FLN representatives mounted information campaigns in the area, engaging in significant fund raising and awareness raising throughout the North, particularly in the Adrar and the region of Timbuktu. On an individual basis, Tuareg also participated in the Algerian conflict.

Conflicts in the region also lent ideological support to the fighters. The ideological support was derived from the commonality of the cause with those of other liberation fighters in Niger and Western Sahara in particular. These groups trained together in Libya and supported each other, with Niger—by providing refuge for Malian rebels—playing a role similar to that of Guinea-Bissau in the Casamance conflict.

There is evidence too that both arms and fighters spilled across borders. Arms originated from the conflicts in Chad, Western Sahara, and Niger, and also from the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania,¹¹³ while a small number of fighters also migrated to northern Mali after other conflicts in the region (Maïga 1997, 268).

But perhaps the most important neighborhood effect for Mali was the Libyan effect. Libya's impact on the conflict was not due to civil wars in Libya but rather to the international engagements of the country and the use it made of Tuareg fighters. By taking part in Libya's offensives, particularly in Chad, young Tuareg men were able to receive military training and developed both competence in and a commitment to the use of force. In turning their attention to problems at home, a violent campaign was the obvious option for them.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS. Consistent with the logic in Fearon and Laitin (2003), variation in state strength can help explain the timing of

conflict. Plausibly, Casamance rebels hoped to benefit from the moment of transition of power in Dakar to capitalize on transitory fragility of the Senegalese state.¹¹⁴ The change in leadership at the center also reflects a change in the manner in which the Casamance dossier was managed. Whereas Senghor, a Catholic Sérère, succeeded in negotiating effectively with discontented Casamançais, Diouf's response to the protests of December 1982 and 1983 was less sophisticated. Responding with a clampdown, he confirmed feelings of marginalization and helped to radicalize the movement. Sending one group fleeing to the forests, he stimulated the creation of the *maquis*, and sending another to prison in Dakar, he facilitated the organization of the political wing.¹¹⁵

Like Senegal, this was a period of political transition in Mali. In 1990, the government of the second republic was already going through a state of crisis, and indeed was to fall within seven months of the start of the rebellion.

Interviews in Mali suggest, however, that despite state weakness and the fact that government installations were poorly defended in northern Mali, the factor in the forefront of the minds of the leaders of 1990 was their rapidly declining status in exile. An important factor of timing in Mali seems to be the correlation between increased levels of education with economic downturn. Economic downturn reduced possibilities in Mali; more important, however, was the recession in Libya, where, with the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s, a concomitant decline in demand for immigrant workers, and the dissolution of the Islamic league, there was reduced demand for Tuareg immigrants, both military and intellectual. The downturn, combined with the increased levels of education among the immigrants, left, alongside the Tuareg soldiers, a class of nomad unemployed intellectuals no longer welcome in Libya.

As in Mali, a number of more local economic conditions of the mid-1970s seem important in Senegal. In response to the economic downturn faced by Senegal following the droughts of the mid-1970s, northerners turned more intensively to the resources of Casamance. This, too, was a difficult period for the Casamançais, with a decline in revenues and a local economy that was dominated by northern groups. As in Mali, as a result of higher levels of education in the region at least since the 1960s, by the early 1980s, the economic crunch left Casamance with intellectuals with poor employment prospects who rapidly articulated strong critiques of the center.¹¹⁶

Duration and Termination

Financing Rebellion

We find that the forms of financing available to the rebel organizations help to explain the duration of these two conflicts. A key aspect is the extent and exhaustibility of financing—whether or not the resources are sufficient to sustain an extended conflict. A second aspect is the control of sources of funding, whether control is held by sources with an interest in conflict perpetuation or in conflict resolution. A third key aspect is the impact of different forms of financing on rebel organizational structures.

Over the course of the conflict, the Casamance rebels have increasingly become financed by renewable sources that diminish the incentives for conflict resolution

and, plausibly, contribute to the fragmentation of the rebel organization. Although financed in the 1980s largely by subscriptions,¹¹⁷ by the 1990s, voluntary contributions were replaced by nonvoluntary war taxes, in cash or in kind, including looting and livestock rustling. At least since the early 1990s, however, natural resources—notably cannabis, cashew nuts, and timber—have been playing a central role in sustaining the *maquisards*. The cashew nut industry for the region has an estimated value of \$2.5 million,¹¹⁸ whereas the Gendarmerie reported the seizure of 106 tons of cannabis in 1999 valued at \$10 million.¹¹⁹ Control of the latter industry would likely shift in the absence of the conflict.¹²⁰ These resources are *diffuse* in the sense that they require no centralization either for their production or for exportation (see Le Billon 2001); they allow for subgroups to split and finance themselves independent of other factions. Nonetheless, income from these revenue sources does not appear to be evenly distributed within the MFDC.¹²¹ If common valuations of these trades are correct, the implication is that the conflict is a highly profitable endeavor for some elements of the MFDC leadership.

Unlike Casamance, north Mali, already the poorest area in the country, did not have the resources to sustain a protracted conflict. The financing of the Tuareg groups depended largely on lifting stocks of resources such as cattle and vehicles.¹²² Like the natural resources in Casamance, accessing these goods did not require centralized structures. But unlike the resources in Casamance, these goods were not to be replenished annually. Dwindling stocks left groups, including the leadership of the organizations, living increasingly from hand to mouth. In this context, a negotiated solution with the offer of a salary as part of the package was increasingly attractive.

In the Mali case, important funding came from voluntary sources. But these sources had an interest in war termination. Funding for the FIAA was drawn in part from financial capital from Arab traders in exile hoping to be able to return to the zones. The returns to these investments for the Arabs depended not on the duration of the conflict but on its termination. The *Ganda Koy*, operating from the towns rather than from bases, and functioning within the sedentary community, drew its financial support largely from the communities.¹²³ To the extent that the *Ganda Koy* was a service provider, a private supplier of violence, it was also called upon by communities and business interests to provide services of economic value not relating to the conflict, including occasionally taking action against other Songhoi communities.¹²⁴ Their freedom of action was limited by the demands of those communities. In particular, hard-core elements, unlike those in the Casamance, had no direct control over their sources of funding. Once communities and business interests reached agreements with rebel groups, radical elements that had a more racially motivated agenda lost their means of functioning.

Rebel Organization

Researchers have suggested that we should expect a positive relationship between the cohesiveness of a rebel organization and the duration of a conflict.¹²⁵ The experiences of Senegal and Mali, however, both suggest that if anything the *lack* of cohe-

siveness leads to longer conflicts. We contend that while cohesiveness may improve the fighting capacity of a group and thereby delay any military victory over the group by the government, in a context in which military victory is unlikely, cohesiveness may instead lead to an improved ability to reach a negotiated settlement.

The MFDC is a severely fragmented organization. The military wing of the MFDC is now divided into at least four armed factions, and the political wing, itself internally divided, is also divided from the military wing.

We noted that the resources of the region are such that subsections of the MFDC can benefit without need for a disciplined organization. In consequence, pressures to achieve cohesion within the movement are weak. Divergent preferences further motivated the splits. The two most important policy dimensions that we could expect to be the subject of MFDC-government negotiations are the constitutional status of the region and the allocation of resources to the region by Dakar. Although there may be some incompatibility between these two goals, all members of the MFDC claim that they want more rather than less of both. They differ, however, in their willingness to trade off political autonomy for economic resources. Hence, for example, the acceptance of the Bissau Accords by the *Front Nord* is interpreted by the government and local nongovernmental organizations as an opting by the *Front Nord* for the economic benefits that would accrue from peace and investment from the North over a continued struggle for independence.¹²⁶ In the language of the *Front Sud*, the *Front Nord* sold out. While the *Front Sud* claims a hard-line position vis-à-vis independence, similar divisions exist within it. The Sadio faction seems to have benefited more from the ongoing conflict and is less keen on the prospects of any form of negotiation with Dakar.¹²⁷

The disarray within the political wing is palpable—members of various political factions are quick to share their complaints about other parts of the organization with outsiders and coalitions are formed and overturned rapidly and publicly. Complaining of the lack of a constitution for the group, the political leaders are unsure of what procedures ought to be followed in order to accord weights to the different historical leaders, or when a self-proclaimed secretary general ought to be accepted or rejected. For a long time, Fr. Diamacoune was the only element in the political structure that all could agree upon, mainly for the symbolic role that he plays. The rebel priest was removed from the position of secretary general in August 2001. However, even though Fr. Diamacoune commands little authority *de facto* and *de jure*, negotiations have continued to pass largely through him.

Finally, there is a disarticulation between the political wing(s) and the military wing(s). Although the political wing supposedly sets the overall strategy for the movement, in practice the operations of the military wing are largely independent of it. And even though the political wing makes commitments on behalf of the military during negotiations, this is done frequently without consultation with the military wing and always without a structure to ensure compliance. Many of the political leaders of the MFDC are isolated from the *maquis* and have not been required to live with or to operate alongside the *maquisards*. Similarly, with the insulation of the military wing from the political wing, attempts by the government to co-opt political leaders have had little impact on the functioning of the *maquis*.

The mechanisms through which the fragmentation of the MFDC prevents effective negotiation include a failure on the part of the MFDC to formulate a coherent ideology and an inability to convince the Senegalese state that it can deliver what it offers. The movement suffers from the absence of a clear political project. The ideology of the MFDC is centered around the single word “independence.” In the absence of a debate within the MFDC regarding the *content* of independence, or what steps should be taken to achieve it, the result is that negotiators fall back to all-or-nothing demands.¹²⁸

The fragmentation of authority prevents the movement from being able to convince the government that it can deliver what it offers. A culture of unilateral bargaining has produced a series of failed accords. Although the literature on bargaining (e.g., Schelling 1960) suggests that fragmentation, by producing limited mandates, may strengthen a negotiator, this logic only holds when these limits still leave ratifiable options available to the negotiators. The constraints imposed by Sadio, however, seem to hinder the negotiation of any credible deal.¹²⁹

The lack of cohesiveness was at least as pronounced among the rebel groups of Azawad. Splits occurred within the movement during and immediately after the signing of the first accords. These splits occurred in part because of different evaluations of the importance of the goal of independence relative to economic benefits, but the splits also took place in part along geographic and subethnic lines. The goal of an independent Azawad was abandoned by the leadership of the MPLA, and gradually too by the brunt of the organization. A consequence was that the focus of negotiations shifted from policy-oriented politics to the attainment and division of private goods. Concurrently, groups affiliated with regions or traditional factions began forming, with a view to altering the share of the pie allocated to their zones. Unlike the Casamance case, however, there was no division between the political and military wings. The military leaders were active throughout the negotiations and the intellectuals who were central to the negotiations were expected to train militarily and take part in missions.

As in the Casamance case, the fractionalization did not lead to a military victory by the state over the groups. The lack of cohesiveness slowed the resolution of the conflict and played a role in transforming it from a rebellion into an intercommunal conflict. Nonetheless, in Azawad, unlike in Casamance, the different factions did succeed in 1992 and again in 1995–96 to overcome their fragmentation enough to be able to negotiate as a single entity with the government and to agree on a division of the spoils between them. The critical difference with the Casamance case was that by the mid-1990s the most important private benefits—access to jobs in the army and civil service and the securing of local investment—required a return to peace. The benefits of these goods could only accrue if the parties could jointly agree to an allocation and abide by its implementation. To this end, the rebels were required to produce a public good—coordinated security. As a result, the splits served to signal the determination and strengths of parties and affected the bargained allocation within the movement but did not preclude joint negotiation.

Ethnicity

The experience in Mali is consistent with the hypothesis suggested by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) that the relationship between ethnicity and violence is often one where, rather than ethnic hatred causing violent conflict, conflict becomes organized along ethnic lines because of reduced costs of organization within ethnic groups.

The salient features of ethnicity in Mali that help to explain the course of the conflict include the broad “racial” division between black and white groups and variation within the ethnic blocks and within the Tuareg group in particular. Ethnicity in Mali was used to organize fighting groups. Ethnic variation within the Tuareg groups helps to explain the fragmentation of the rebel movements, whereas variations in the relations between ethnic subgroups help to explain variation in the success of negotiations. Such variation is missed by methods used to capture ethnicity in econometric work on conflict.

Although the Tuareg and Arab fighters were ostensibly motivated primarily by the economic marginalization of the North—a subject of concern to sedentary and nomadic communities alike—and the rebels received some aid from black sedentary groups in the early stages, they made no effort to recruit outside the white populations.¹³⁰ Indeed, the organization of politics around race has a long pedigree in the North¹³¹ and was evoked explicitly by the *Ganda Koy*.¹³² Throughout the intercommunal conflict, each side accused the other of being motivated primarily by racism.¹³³

Why did race come to structure the conflict? In contrast with Casamance, an “ancient hatreds” explanation was very fast in appearing publicly in Mali.¹³⁴ The explanation has some merit. Some historical grievances in the region *are* structured along racial lines and what grievances exist appear to be more easily evoked across racial groupings rather than within them. One of the most common popular criticisms of the Tuareg is of their history as slave owners. Strikingly, however, almost all groups in Mali historically had slaves, and the Songhoi group in particular was as stratified as the Tuareg groups, with a caste of tradable slaves (*Ciré-bania*) and non-tradable slaves (*Horso*) (Maïga 1997, 102).¹³⁵ The relevant fact, however, is that slavery by the whites, unlike that by other populations, had a racial component. With slave relations *within* black populations more quickly forgotten, it has been the racial organization of slavery, rather than the fact of slavery per se that continues to inform attitudes representing the Tuareg as a barbaric group.

Phenotypical differences—a very imperfect proxy for ethnic self-identification in any case—are not, however, sufficient to account for ethnic polarization.¹³⁶ The Mali case suggests that polarization resulted in part from the effect that phenotypical differences can have strategic choices in environments with imperfect information. In Mali, racial coding was used to distinguish enemy from ally.¹³⁷ Race was used to structure recruitment. But race was also the organizing principle used to effect retaliation.¹³⁸ The result was the rapid creation of a new set of grievances and fears. Even if reprisals by the army may have been in part a response to the actions of the rebels, the effect for noncombatant white groups was an increased fear of the army, not of the insurgents, and the new grievances that resulted were held against the army. Most

importantly, the actions of the army helped convince whites who were slow to join the rebellion that they were now considered enemies of the state. In many cases, this meant that actual affiliation with the rebel groups was an optimal response. Similarly, the *Ganda Koy*, rather than mounting attacks on rebel bases, attacked light-skinned targets often indiscriminately.¹³⁹ The resulting dynamic was a cycle of tit-for-tat racial killings.

Qualitative divisions between subgroups and the variation in the relations between different subgroups across ethnic lines also help to explain both the fragmentation of the rebel movements and the variation in the course of negotiations. Tuareg populations can be divided vertically into a series of castes and spatially into a series of confederations and clans. The groups vary in their practices and in the extent to which their economic activity is dependent on exchanges with sedentary communities. These differences in part structured the divisions within the rebel groups. Furthermore, while much is made of the “economic interdependence” between the nomadic and sedentary communities,¹⁴⁰ in fact this interdependence varies across subgroups and the variation can help to explain the process of war termination.

The MPA drew its support largely from the *Kel Adrar* who operate far to the north and, except for market exchanges, have limited contacts with the sedentarists. In contrast, the FPLA drew support largely from the *Chamanammas* Tuareg clan, which has been based closer to the Niger river and has highly complementary exchanges with sedentary communities. The FIAA drew support from Arab traders who, if anything, are in direct competition with the traders supporting the *Ganda Koy*. This variation in economic relations across subgroups correlates with the different levels of violent engagement between groups during the conflict and the success of negotiations. The FIAA, beginning with plans to assassinate a list of leading Songhoi citizens in Timbuktu,¹⁴¹ was involved in the greatest levels of conflict with the sedentary community. The FPLA was successful in negotiating with the *Ganda Koy* and drew upon traditional community structures to facilitate its exchanges. The MPA meanwhile remained largely removed from the intercommunal aspect of the conflict.

It is less easy to find a relationship between ethnicity and duration in Casamance. Although the organization of the rebellion in Casamance has made use of ethnic institutions, the conflict has not yet become an ethnic conflict; so far there has not been an intercommunal dimension to the conflict and no significant self-defense militia have been formed. Even in attacks dubbed as ethnic by Senegalese and foreign media, the targets, when not arbitrary, have been determined on the basis of their regional origin rather than on the basis of their ethnicity alone.

Despite the claims by the MFDC that the movement is fighting for a nationalist and not an ethnic cause, the movement has been largely a Diola project, at least in its early phases.¹⁴² It is difficult to argue, however, that the predominance of a single group facilitated organization. The Diola form a highly internally fragmented grouping that has not in the past been successful at organizing for collective action. Furthermore, the MFDC has recruited also outside the Diola grouping, with non-

Diola leaders such as Salif Sadio controlling sections of the movement without relying on Diola institutions.

Terrain and Population Density

The two cases are consistent with the positive correlation between forest cover and conflict duration found in Collier et al. (2001). Mali has about 9 percent forest cover to Senegal's 38 percent. One plausible mechanism behind the correlation is that forest cover, by preventing access for the government to rebel bases, makes a decisive victory by the army more difficult. The forest cover in Senegal has been an aid to the members of the MFDC who have made strategic use of the thick forests running along the southern border to frustrate the Senegalese army. However, the desert areas in Mali posed the same problems of pursuit for the Malian army. Indeed, it appears that the Senegalese army, largely composed of Casamançais soldiers, was if anything more likely to venture into forested areas than was the Malian army to venture into desert and mountainous areas.¹⁴³ Hence, variation in forestry per se does not provide sufficient variation in the strategic advantage of the rebels to help explain variation in war duration between these countries. Rather we suggest that forest cover, along with other topographical features, by facilitating a guerrilla insurgency, can reduce the likelihood of a *military* victory. But whether or not this translates into longer wars will in turn depend on factors that affect the ability of groups to achieve a negotiated settlement.¹⁴⁴

We also fail to observe relevant variation when we consider the role played by population density. Political scientists, drawing on the logic of collective action, have argued that population density should have an impact on the likelihood and success of conflict—although whether the impact of density is to increase tensions, increase the group's ability to organize, or increase the government's ability to monitor it is a subject of some dispute.¹⁴⁵ The war in Mali took place in the least densely populated parts of Africa, with just 1.2 people per square kilometer and considerably less in the northern stretches.¹⁴⁶ The conflict in Senegal, however, took place in a relatively densely populated area of the country with 28 people per square kilometer.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, we found no relation between variation in population density and conflict duration. The original collective action problem was solved by Tuareg groups in concentrations outside of the country, whereas collective action problems have remained insoluble for Diola groups living in close proximity.

Negotiations: Government Strategies and International Actors

Government Strategies

The government of Senegal has used three approaches to respond to the Casamance conflict. A first response was to ignore the political nature of the conflict and to respond with force. That, and subsequent attempts to achieve a military victory have,

to date, failed. But with few exceptions the failures have been inexpensive for the government.¹⁴⁸

The second approach has been to address the “root causes” of the conflict. By unilaterally addressing some of the grievances that led to initial popular support for the campaign—including improvement in land allocation processes and the appointment of more Casamançais to positions of authority within the region—the government has narrowed the support base of the MFDC: Casamançais who were more concerned by the treatment of the area than by its constitutional status have stopped supporting the MFDC. Hard-core elements, including those who have passed through rituals swearing dedication to the cause, have not been convinced, nor have those who benefit materially from the conflict.

Finally, starting one decade after the conflict began, a series of negotiated settlements have been attempted, mostly with Fr. Diamacoune. To date, these have failed to address the constitutional concerns of the MFDC. And their negotiation, unlike the Malian case, has not involved broad consultations or public debate. By disallowing any deliberations over issues pertaining to the territorial integrity of the country, the government has probably succeeded in deflecting attention from the superficiality of the MFDC’s independence project, and, by preventing discussion of the relative merits of different degrees of regional autonomy, has added to the discrete nature of the bargaining space. The superficial nature of those negotiations that have taken place is reflected in the texts of the agreements, which rarely surpass a page of bullet points. The negotiations have, however, succeeded in containing the scale of the conflict by leading to splits in which one group stops fighting in return for economic benefits. In limiting discussions in these ways, the government has accepted the risk of prolonging the conflict in Casamance.

Plausibly, Dakar has been slow to respond to the conflict in Casamance because, for the most part, it has not been hurt by it. The conflict has mostly been relatively low intensity and with the actions of the MFDC being local in nature, the suffering has been felt most strongly locally.¹⁴⁹ According to government officials, the financial burden of the war on the Senegalese budget has been low.¹⁵⁰ And with some exceptions, such as in the early 1990s, the Senegalese state has not been put under pressure from the international community to resolve the conflict. Indeed, a hypothesis suggested by the Casamance case is that the war has lasted long *because* it is low intensity.

Because of domestic and international pressure, as well as the intensity of the fighting and the extent of the national territory involved, Malian governments have been much more proactive in seeking an end to the Azawad conflict. The government of Mali’s initial reaction in 1990, like that in Senegal, was to ignore the political aspects of the conflict—referring to the attacks as being the actions first of a group of “armed bandits” and then of “our lost brothers” (“*frères égarés*”). From June 1990, the Traoré government attempted to crush the rebellion militarily. However, following military defeats much more severe than any suffered by the government of Senegal, and facing an increasingly hostile population in Bamako, the government chose to resolve the problem through negotiations, and, with rapidly short-

ening time horizons, was content to offer promises of political and economic advantages to the Tuareg.

The Touré regime took office with much greater popular support than that available to Moussa Traoré. Under less pressure from the democratic movements in Bamako, Touré was able to take a more open position with respect to negotiations. In a strategy combining tough military action—the army had more free rein to strike rebel groups as well as civilian populations—with a series of much more inclusive meetings and dialogues, organized in concert with international mediators, the Touré government succeeded in obtaining broad agreement for the National Pact.

The strategy employed by Konaré, taking office in 1992, was consistent with that of Touré: maintaining military pressure; persistently engaging international actors—notably Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya—to maintain their support and to engage them to place pressure on the movements; and involving a very broad set of actors in a discussion of the contents of the accords. The strategy led eventually to agreements between the rebel movements and civil militias.

International Actors

The government and rebel groups in Mali, unlike those in Senegal, came under considerable international pressure to find a resolution to the Tuareg problem. France placed pressure on Mali from the beginning of the conflict. With France adopting a new hardened opposition to military regimes in Africa toward the end of the 1980s, relations between France and the Traoré government worsened. France ran a media campaign highlighting abuses by the Malian government and, reportedly, in supporting opposition groups in Bamako, it contributed to the fall of the Traoré regime. France's position with respect to the Casamance conflict has been less activist. Unlike its opposition to Traoré's military regime, France maintained strong relationships with Senegal and, with occasional exceptions, has not taken a prominent diplomatic position to help resolve the Casamance conflict.

Ultimate adherence to the agreements in Mali resulted in part from sustained international pressure on the rebel groups. Exposed to risks of similar conflicts within their own borders, none of the neighboring countries had interests in an extended conflict. Mauritania, Libya, and Burkina Faso each contributed to bringing the conflict to an end. Mauritania placed pressure on the movements to accede to agreements through its control over the 80,000 refugees inside its borders. With many of the Tuareg still in Libya, Libya had some control over incentives for Tuareg to move to join the movements in Mali. To prevent a swelling in the number of combatants, Ghaddafi acted to improve conditions for Tuaregs in Libya. Finally, Burkina Faso, with 35,000 Malian refugees and controlling the conditions for some of the FPLA leadership in exile, succeeded in bringing the FPLA in line with the other movements to accept the National Pact.

The greatest influence, however, was probably that exerted by Algeria. The Azawad conflict took place in a region bordering southern Algeria—a region home to Berber populations living in similar conditions to those of Tuareg groups in Mali.

With fears of a spread of the conflict to Algeria and fearful of the possibility of a Berber state on its borders, Algeria was strongly opposed to the independence of Azawad and keen for the conflict in Mali not to drag on. Algeria was able to place pressure on the movements because of its control over supply routes and over Tuareg exiles and refugees in Algeria. And, as a major supplier of oil as well as military and economic aid, Algeria was influential in Bamako. Its determined opposition took the issues of Azawad independence and territorial integrity off the agenda and thereby helped overcome a stumbling block that has plagued negotiations in Casamance.

Countries neighboring Senegal did not have the same fears of a spread of the conflict. With small Diola populations, there seemed to be little risk of copycat conflicts. Neither Guinea-Bissau nor Gambia had strong motivations to bring the conflict to an end. Indeed by many accounts, both countries have benefited from the war economy associated with the conflict—Guinea-Bissau, through the routing of cashew exports through the zone and by acting as a market to areas more isolated from Senegalese markets, and Gambia, through its involvement with the routing of cannabis and wood exports through the country (Evans 2002). The ambiguity of these countries toward the conflict has led to ill-fated diplomacy, and material support to MFDC fighters, many of whom have lived and operated, in different moments of the conflict, across the border in these neighboring states.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have described cultural and historical particularities that have shaped the conflicts in Senegal and Mali, contributing to an explanation both of their origins and of the variation in duration. Table 9.4 provides a summary of mechanisms linking explanatory variables to outcomes and reports arguments for which we have found evidence. In some instances we find that the logic developed in econometric work is supported by these cases; in many we find that the logic of the conflicts differs from what econometric work leads us to expect. Some mechanisms, we find, have been ignored in econometric work; whereas for others we find that the aggregate data that have been used fail to capture key points of variation taking place at the microlevel.

We have presented evidence relating to the claims of the rebel groups that their motivations derive from grievances. We find that the relevant grievances derive not from aggregate levels of inequality—as typically tested in econometric models—but from horizontal inequality: a correlation between the economic, political, and cultural factors on the one hand and membership of politically relevant groupings, either regionally or ethnically defined, on the other. In contrast, we have found no evidence for a greed-based explanation for the origins of the conflicts, although control over natural resources does help to explain the different lengths of the two conflicts. Nonetheless, economic arguments do apply. Economic opportunity costs faced by rebels seem to have been important in both cases: Both conflicts were sparked by groups with high unemployment rates and relatively poor economic prospects. And, the rebellions occurred at moments of national political instability—although in the

Table 9.4 Variables and Mechanisms of Civil War in Mali and Senegal

<i>Variable/Mechanism</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Senegal</i>
Onset		
Natural resources and the start of the conflicts		
• Provide start-up capital	×	×
• Rebels motivated by greed	×	×
Regional exceptionalism		
• Region is more “remote” from the political center than other regions	✓	✓
• Region has had a unique history of conflict and an exceptional colonial history.	✓	✓
• Region, unlike other regions, has concentrated ethnic or religious majorities.	×	×
• Region has a historically developed notion of a nation distinct from that of the rest of the country.	×	×
Grievances relative to other regions of the country		
• Economic grievance	✓	Mixed evidence
• Political grievances	✓	Mixed evidence
• Cultural grievance	✓	✓
Mechanisms through which conflicts in neighboring countries facilitated conflict		
• Ideological contagion	✓	✓
• Ideological support	✓	✓
• Intraethnic solidarity	✓	✓
• Access to arms	Limited	Limited
• Access to combatants	Limited	×
Factors affecting opportunity costs of conflict		
• Availability of arms	×	×
• Poor employment prospect	✓	✓
• Weakened State	✓	✓
Duration		
Mechanisms relating rebel financing to duration		
• Resources makes financing of conflict possible even without popular support.	×	✓
• Resource financing makes conflict more lucrative than peace for some groups.	×	Mixed evidence

(continued)

Table 9.4 Variables and Mechanisms (Continued)

<i>Variable/Mechanism</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Senegal</i>
• Resource financing reduces rebel cohesion; makes negotiations more difficult.	Mixed evidence	✓
• Resource financing signals viability of independent state and makes compromise on independence less attractive.	×	✓
• Financial backers sought a return to a “peace economy.”	✓	×
Topographical features		
• Make military victory less likely (desert, mountains, forests)	✓	✓
Ethnicity		
• Descent into interethnic conflict	✓	×
• Ethnicity has helped maintain group cohesion.	Mixed evidence	Mixed evidence
Interests of international actors		
• Benefited from war economy	×	✓
• Threatened by prospects of secession	✓	×

Senegal case this related to a change in leadership rather than to institutional change. In neither case, however, can we find evidence that the wars were caused in part by the availability of arms in the region.

In both cases, we found that international factors mattered for conflict onset. Guinea-Bissau, and its history of fighting for independence, played an important part as a role model for many MFDC fighters, and interethnic solidarity across the border opened access to MFDC fighters to ready military bases and armaments. In the case of Mali, we argued that the most important neighborhood effects resulted not from any civil conflict among its neighbors, but from features not presently considered in econometric work: the ideological and security priorities and the international military engagements of neighboring states.

In explaining the duration of the conflicts, we find that a fundamental difference between the two countries is that in Mali the insurgents belonged to the natural resource-poor part of the country, whereas in Senegal the rebels belonged to a natural resource-rich part of the country. This single point of variation, though unobservable from aggregate data, has had multiple implications. The variation in resources available to fighting groups has affected the extent to which the welfare of fighters depends on the termination of the conflict. In the language of political scientists (Zartman 1995), the variation in resources across the countries produced a “hurting stalemate” in only one of the countries. In Casamance, the stalemate seems tolerable

to sections of the warring parties, if not to the populations that they are affecting. The local distribution of resources has also affected the course of negotiations. In Senegal, the high value placed by both groups on the question of independence versus integration has led to a “discrete” bargaining space. In Mali, by contrast, the expected economic difficulties of an independent Azawad have produced a more “continuous” bargaining space, with multiple forms of autonomy and regionalization considered and attention shifting to jobs and the allocation of government expenditure.

Resources also relate to organizational structures and the prospects for collective action. Whereas in economic models of civil wars the ability of groups to solve collective action problems leads to shorter conflicts, the evidence from Senegal and Mali suggests the opposite relation, at least when military victory does not seem to be a viable option. Hence, we expect to see a negative term in the interaction between factors that facilitate collective action and factors that militate against negotiated resolutions. As suggested elsewhere (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2002), we find a relationship between the diffusion of resources and rebel group cohesion. In both cases, diffuse resources meant that there were weak financial consequences for the groups from their lack of cohesion. In contrast, we found that as stocks of lootable goods became exhausted, as in Mali, the economic benefits that fighters hope to achieve (especially government jobs) depend on the joint production of peace.

Ethnicity also has had implications for the duration of the wars that are not presently captured in econometric work. Our study suggests that although ethnic groups and ethnic divisions are constructed, not all differences are equivalent and, in particular, measures of ethnicity need to be enriched with some measures of distance between groups. Such measures need to account for the ability of individuals to *place* other individuals, either on the basis of phenotypical or behavioral characteristics of groups. We have noted that the intensity of intercommunal violence observed in Mali has not occurred in Senegal despite similar levels of criminality and violence, a similar imposition of costs on local populations, an identification of the rebellion with a particular ethnic group, and the existence of a rival large ethnic group in the area. We attribute this to variation in the form of ethnic differences in Azawad, relative to those in Casamance. The ease of placing individuals into friend or enemy categories has led, in northern Mali, to strategies that polarized groups around ethnic lines. Such strategies are more difficult in the more phenotypically homogenous Casamance.

A last point of variation between Mali and Senegal that explains variation in duration has been the geostrategic and commercial interests of external actors in the conflict. The interests of neighbors explain much of the pressure on both sides to negotiate in good faith in Mali and the lack of pressure on parties to the Casamance conflict. Information on the interests of neighboring states is difficult to measure and is presently absent from econometric work. The evidence from the Senegal and Mali cases suggests nonetheless that such variation features prominently in the calculations of governments and rebels.

Notes

1. See *Jeune Afrique Plus*, No. 10, January/February 1991.
2. The actual number of deaths among the insurgents is uncertain, with most of the bodies of the insurgents reportedly removed by the retreating group. The MFDC Web site reports more than 100 killed and 700 arrested.
3. The 6,000–8,000 figure is from Lode (1997); MFUA (see below) sources place the number of deaths on the nomad side alone at at least 8,000.
4. There is great uncertainty over the numbers of deaths in Casamance. As indicators of the human consequences, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates about 13,000 refugees in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in 2000, whereas the numbers of internally displaced are generally put at around 40,000. *Source*: Interviews in Dakar, June 2001.
5. A common term used in the region for Tuareg groups is the “*Kel Tamacheq*” or speakers of *Tamacheq*. The term “Maure” or “Moor” is commonly used in Mali to describe Arab groups. Since the group self-identifies as Arab, we use this term throughout the text. Collectively, Tuaregs and Arabs are termed “whites.”
6. Senghor subsumed the MFDC into his *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (BDS). The merger resulted in the formation of a more radical breakaway group, the *Mouvement Autonome de Casamance* (Autonomous Casamance Movement) led by Assane Seck. By 1956 Seck had joined Senghor’s *Bloc Populaire Sénégalais*.
7. In the words of Mamadou Dia, head of the Senegalese executive prior to independence: “The promises made in the early years of independence that Casamance would become the breadbasket of Senegal were not kept [. . .]. Twenty years after independence the regional economy is still blocked, is still an enclave, with hardly any links to the larger Senegalese markets.” “Senegal, by breaking its promises, left Casamance feeling betrayed and prepared to take fresh steps to move, pacifically, towards independence in 1982.” (Dia 1981)
8. Diamacoune, “*Message de la Reine Aline Sitoé*,” MFDC Archives.
9. The MFDC Web site reports 200 deaths and 400 arrests; a more likely figure reported in interviews by the leader of the armed wing of the MFDC, Sidy Badji, is three deaths among the protesters; other sources report only a single death among the gendarmes. *Jeune Afrique Plus* reported two gendarmes killed (January/February 1991, 23).
10. Other measures reportedly had to be taken to purify the sacred forests, sullied by intrusion by foreigners, notably the sacrifice of Ameth Kounda, an older resident of Ziguinchor who was taken and immolated in the forests on December 18 (*Jeune Afrique Plus*, No. 10, January/February 1991).
11. In some documents the MFDC date the founding of *Atika* to early 1984.
12. The MFDC’s files record 1,000 men joining the *maquis* on December 6, 1983, a date that would indicate the formation of the *maquis* after the immolation of the gendarmes rather than after the Ziguinchor march.
13. The previous mayor had in fact been born in Casamance, but with one Casamance Diola and one northern Toucouleur parent, he was broadly perceived as a representative emanating from the North (Foucher 2001).

14. According to Minister of Agriculture and Mayor of Ziguinchor Robert Sagna: "in the last decade [since 1983], no region has received as much investment." See: *Jeune Afrique Economie*, No. 170, August 1993.
15. *Sopi*, September 14, 1990.
16. These included the launching of grenades on Muslims in prayer at the Place de Gao, Ziguinchor, immolation of villagers in the sacred forests, holdups on thoroughfares, robbing boutiques, and burning homes.
17. Signed by Sidy Badji for MFDC and Médoune Fall, on behalf of the Republic of Senegal, and witnessed by two representatives of Guinea-Bissau, acting as guarantors.
18. April 17, 1992 (Cacheu); July 8, 1993 (Ziguinchor); December 25, 1999 (Banjul); December 2000; March 16 and 23, 2001 (Ziguinchor), December 30, 2004 (Ziguinchor).
19. MFDC Archives, *Chronologie des Rencontres Importantes*; accessed June 2001.
20. As part of the strategy, the government successfully organized a series of high-profile events in the region—such as the African Nations' Cup and a papal visit.
21. According to *Amnesty International* (1998), civilians were killed in this period for opposing the MFDC publicly, for participating in the 1993 elections, and for welcoming Diouf to their homes.
22. *Source*: Interviews with army personnel, Ziguinchor, July 2001. In one such operation the army set about trying to root the MFDC from Guidel valley, some 15 km from Ziguinchor. According to a senior Senegalese army officer, "the valley is strategically important to the *maquisards* because of the supply of cashew nuts and because the soil is good for growing profitable crops like cannabis" (*Le Soleil*, November 3, 1997, 9, 10).
23. Local nongovernmental organizations argue that the redeployment of *Front Sud* forces in the North is driven by a desire to control zones of cannabis production (Sindian, Diakaye, Baila, Marsassoum). *Source*: Interviews, Ziguinchor, July 2001.
24. *Jeune Afrique Economie*, May 1993, 167.
25. A small number of land mine victims were reported during the period 1988–96, but widespread use of mines began only in 1997. The highest level of reported victims from land mines occurred in 1998. See Handicap International (2000), see also *Jeune Afrique Economie*, May 1998, 127.
26. Hence, for example, seemingly from nowhere a new peace agreement, the Ziguinchor Accord, was signed on July 8, 1993. In a move that signaled a willingness to begin to consider the question of the constitutional status of Casamance, the parties asked France to make a statement on the legal history of Casamance. France appointed Jacques Charpy, who presented his report in December 1993, concluding that Casamance was, in fact, historically a part of Senegal. It was immediately rejected by the MFDC.
27. In 1997, France offered to intervene to help facilitate. Discussions started up in June but were abandoned after a rise in violence culminated in August in the massacre at Madina Mancagne of an elite army unit.
28. One confrontation during this period resulted in the death of 23 soldiers. The attack took place at Babonda; see, for example, "23 Militaires Tués en Casamance" (*Le Soleil*, August 3, 1995).
29. Adherents of Sagna explain this action by claiming that Sagna was in fact kidnapped by government forces.

30. According to leaders of the MFDC interviewed (July/August 2001), “the MFDC will never tolerate enemy troops taking positions in Guinea-Bissau or Gambia—this is an issue of the utmost importance for the security of the MFDC and the independence struggle.”
31. *Le Matin*, February 17, 1998.
32. Reportedly, the general thanked the MFDC through military aid. For the first time the *maquisards* gained access to heavy arms, 82-mm and 105-mm shells, heavy machine guns, and RPG 7s and 9s.
33. More specifically, Wade had claimed that it would take him three months to provide a definitive solution to this problem that has been causing Diouf headaches for a decade (*Jeune Afrique Economie*, May 1993, 167).
34. *AFP/Le Soleil*, August 8, 2001, 4. In limiting in particular the roles of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, Wade appears intent on limiting the extent to which the conflict is internationalized. *Walfadjri*, December 16–17, 2000, 2; *Sud Quotidien*, December 1, 2000, 4.
35. Meetings with Diamacoune since 2001 have been met with much criticism from inside the MFDC.
36. See, for example, the editorial in the MFDC’s *Journal du Pays*, January 2001: 48 and *Le Soleil*, December 2000: 20.
37. With independence ambitions, the 1962 rebellion attempted to revive an older project for managing an independent Saharan zone, the *Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes* (OCRS). The OCRS, as much a project of business interests in France hoping to gain rights to oil reserves as that of nomads attempting to avoid a dismemberment of their zones, had been opposed on both sides of the Sahara: by Algeria and Mali.
38. Bourgeot 1990.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Notably the title of the new movement dropped the reference to “Tuareg,” allowing for the easier integration of Malian Arabs.
41. This increase in government activities took a particularly callous form in April 1990. In an operation organized by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, returnees expelled from Algeria were enclosed in camps by the Malian army and prohibited from circulating, producing a humanitarian crisis. The army meanwhile, through arrest and torture, used the occasion for intelligence gathering (see, for example, the account in Gaudio 1992, 184).
42. Examples include the public beating of the chief of the Idnane group and public executions in Gao (Gaudio 1992, 186).
43. *Source*: Interviews, Bamako, July 2001.
44. Sedentary populations too, sympathetic to the rebellion, lent logistical support to the rebels in these early stages. See, for example, Lode (1997).
45. “Les cadres et chefs de fraction Tuaregs condamnent avec vigueur les actes criminels des bandits armés,” *L’Essor*, September 19, 1990.
46. The text provides for “local assemblies with legislative and executive branches that will regulate all economic, social and cultural issues that concerns them.”
47. In the first follow-up meetings to Tamanrasset in Gao on March 26, 1991, the government accused the rebel groups of failing to respect the cease-fire, pointing to two killings by the rebel groups (*Livre Blanc*, published in *Amawal*, No. 6, January 31, 1995).

- In contrast, nongovernmental sources point to a sustained series of killings by government troops (see, for example, Gaudio 1992).
48. See *Association de Réfugiés et Victimes de la Répression de l'Azawad* (1992). Contemporary newspaper reports recording the same story report a lower number of deaths—between 20 and 30.
 49. “Guerrilla, Satanisme et Paix,” *Aurore*, July 4–11, 1991.
 50. Interviewers note that in these early stages the targeted populations were southern blacks, while northern sedentary groups were largely spared.
 51. “Guerrilla, Satanisme et Paix,” *Aurore*, July 4–11, 1991.
 52. Plans to launch the FPLA began at the time of the signing of the Tamanrasset Accords. The choice of title indicated an intention to rejuvenate an older FPLA founded prior to the political independence of Mali.
 53. In one representative expression of the frustration, Mohomodou Atayabou, in an open letter complained that “the National Pact, designed and signed without consulting the true population of Gao and Timbuktu [. . .] is nothing more than the handing over of the zone to the *arabo-tamacheqs*.” (*Le Républicain*, No. 112, p. 3, November 1994). In fact the design of the new political institutions made no explicit mention of membership of the MFUA; Ethnic divisions *within* the North were entirely ignored by the document.
 54. At a moment when financial support from the international community would have been most beneficial, none was forthcoming. See Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998).
 55. See, for example, “Le Destin du Mali de doit pas être entre les mains d’un bandit ou d’un badaoud,” interview with Iyad ag Gahlli, *Aurore*, July 30, 1992.
 56. The disputes, threatening to pit Tuareg against Arabs, were resolved through negotiation by March 1993. Similar tensions arose between the ARLA and the MPA, this time driven both by class and ethnic divisions and by rivalry over control of turf. See: “Iyad nettoie le nord,” *Aurore*, April 28, 1994.
 57. Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998, 70).
 58. *Aurore*, “Le nord s’embrase,” April 28, 1994 and “Nord: le volcan qui dort,” May 5, 1994.
 59. In one account the leader, Zahaby—also a FIAA leader—attacked the base; in another, Zahaby’s attempts to arrest members of the *Ganda Koy* under his authority as a member of the cease-fire commission led to fighting.
 60. Including attacks on a market in Bamba. See articles in *Le Républicain*, July 27, 1994 and *L’Essor*, July 28, 1994.
 61. See “L’Indépendance totale de l’Azawad d’ici le 1er Janvier 1995,” *Le Tambour*, No. 61, November 8, 1994.
 62. The accords were less appealing to those with more racially motivated concerns. Cracks within the *Ganda Koy* were signaled by the departure at this time of the hard-line chief of staff and a group of loyalists.
 63. Keita (1998, 40).
 64. New, retrained army units, including mixed patrols, were put in place. These had less aggressive relationships with the local communities and were given a more humanitarian role (Keita 1998, 21).
 65. Lode (1997), Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998), and articles in *Tambour*, September 26, 1995 and October 3, 1995.

66. Because the model employed by Collier and Hoeffler is nonlinear, changes cannot be decomposed into the impact of changes in each of the variables. To approximate such a decomposition we measure for each variable the extent to which the predicted probability of civil war is higher or lower at the beginning of a given period than it would have been had that variable remained at its average level for that country. Hence, if $\hat{y}_{i,t} = f(x_{i,t}, x_{-i,t})$, we calculate for each t and each i , $f(x_{i,t}, x_{-i,t}) - f[E(X_{i,t}), x_{-i,t}]$.
67. The term used in Fearon and Laitin (2003) is “anocracy” and corresponds in practice to a score of between -5 and 5 on the combined Polity autocracy democracy scores (that range from -10 to 10).
68. Other binary variables include whether or not the country has just been founded, is noncontiguous, or has had a war in the previous year.
69. In the case of Mali, an increase in predictions occurs a year after the onset of the war as a result of the collapse of the Troaré regime, which counts as a moment of political instability and marks a period in which the Malian state is coded as a semi-democracy; the effect is dampened however, in the graph because of the effect of the ongoing war from 1990 onward.
70. Based on their battle deaths criteria, Fearon and Laitin code the Casamance conflict as a war in 1989.
71. In the Fearon and Laitin model, a conflict in the preceding period prevents the probability of the outbreak of a conflict in the next period; Fearon and Laitin code the conflict in Senegal and Mali as beginning in 1989, which explains the dip in predicted probabilities in each case from 1990 onwards.
72. In 1978, Senegal became a multiparty democracy with four parties competing in the legislative elections.
73. The dollar value of oil exports approximately doubled in 1981 (see, for example, EIU country data).
74. In principle, however, oil reserves off the coast of Casamance may have played a role in the thinking of the MFDC, but these reserves are unrelated to the rise in exports in 1981.
75. A more complete study would need to compare these countries with countries that have not had secessionist conflicts. This is beyond the scope of our case study; however, the study should help inform attempts to develop cross-nationally comparable measures of vulnerability to secession.
76. N’krumah Sané, making use of the political geography, wrote in the MFDC journal “Senegal and Casamance are in fact strangers to each other, just like the two rivers that they are named after. The two stretch to the Atlantic, but never cross each other’s paths” (*Voix de la Casamance*, December 1994, 47: 24).
77. After 1939 the French incorporated the “Territoire de la Casamance” into the rest of Senegal. See also the Charpy report and responses by Fr. Diamacoune (1995). The lateness of integrating the region resulted, according to Dominique Darbon, from the fact that “the French colonial administration never intended to join the Casamance to the rest of Senegal . . . indeed originally the Casamance was a trading area and there were no plans for it to be a colony at all” (Darbon 1988).
78. In 1917 the Governor General of French West Africa noted: “We have never managed to become masters of lower Casamance; In that area we are simply tolerated.” Van Vollenhoven, *Archives du Sénégal*, 13 G 384.

79. Indeed Foucher (2002) argues that the fact that the region preserved its traditions intact to a much greater extent than elsewhere in Senegal led the Senegalese state to attempt to capitalize on the Casamance by advertising it to tourists interested in a more exotic African experience than they were likely to find in Dakar or along *la Petite Côte*. Foucher argues that this “exoticization” helped to promote a Casamançais identity.
80. *Source*: MFDC correspondence with the French government, MFDC files.
81. Government of Senegal 1979, 24.
82. In this and in other aspects, the *Petit Côte* area of Senegal has much in common with Casamance.
83. Even though communities that are popularly classified as black in Mali, the *Haratines* and *Bellahs*—historically slaves or servants—also form part of the Arab and Tuareg communities.
84. White Malians register frustration at not being identified by non-Malians as Malian (*Source*: Interviews in Mali, July 2001). Black militia groups meanwhile argue that the rebellion was motivated by the refusal of whites to live in a majority black country.
85. Diamacoune’s nationalist discourse draws heavily on Diola motifs, frequently conflating Diola with Casamançais. See also discussions in Foucher (2002). Similarly, Tuareg intellectuals such as Aboubcarine Assadeck ag Indi justify the Azawad project with reference to the historic notion of a “Tuareg nation”—*Témoust*, in Tamasheq. For debates on the issue, see Claudot-Hawad (1987, 1990) and Bourgeot (1995).
86. In this context, President Wade argues that the massive acceptance of the new Constitution in January 2001 by referendum was an endorsement by the people of Casamance of their position inside the Senegalese state. “Wade Says Casamance Has Said ‘No’ to Independence,” PANA, January 21, 2001.
87. In one such instance, a leader of the FIAA described relations between the rebelling groups and the government thus: “This is about the children of a single country who at some stage have had their differences and who are now working at multiple levels to try to reestablish peace and confidence among the population.” See: “Iyad est à féliciter,” *Aurore*, May 5, 1994.
88. At 41 percent, the child malnutrition rate in Kolda is the highest in Senegal. In the Department of Sédhiou it takes an expected 85 minutes to reach a health clinic, as opposed to a national average of 40.
89. See also Foucher (2002).
90. It is estimated that Casamance alone could provide for the food needs of all of Senegal (EIU 2001, 22).
91. Andriamirado argues that these decisions were made for security reasons in response to the separatist threat; they were, however, interpreted locally as a slighting of Casamance; see “Violence en Casamance,” *Jeune Afrique Plus*, January/February 1991.
92. *Loi sur le Domaine National*, No. 64–46, June 17, 1964; *Journal Officiel*, 3690, July 11, 1964, 905.
93. Senegalese government minister Moctar Kébé, analyzing the causes for the revolt, argued that Casamançais failed to benefit from the provisions of the law in part because of contradictory conceptions of appropriate land use—with Casamançais valuing the sacred properties of land and the *nordistes* focusing on its economic value. Interview in *Le Soleil*, July 19, 1990, 11.

94. In fact the *Loi* and traditional land rights systems formally forbade the allocation of land to nonresidents.
95. This figure is given by Pierre-Xavier Trincaz, quoted in Omar Diatta, "Les Terrains de la Colère," *Sud Quotidien*, July/August 1991. The clearing out of the Kadior neighborhood in Ziguinchor to make way for the Socitour construction company in the 1970s was one example that was made public with a court case. After the failure of the action, plaintiffs played a prominent role organizing the December 26, 1982 demonstration. See Ansoumana Abba Bodian's open letter to the Public Prosecutor in Casamance, reproduced in the MFDC's *La Voix de la Casamance*, December 1994, 47: 13–15.
96. In particular, the trading sector was controlled by northerners; the profitable fishing industry was controlled by Sérères and Toucouleurs, while the Wolof had moved rapidly into commercial agriculture—particularly in the upper Casamance. Groundnuts were introduced to upper Casamance around 1935 (Marut 1992). According to Sall, crisis in the groundnut basin led to migrations from the north to Kolda, threatening local forests. In 1996–97 alone, 30 new migrant villages had been founded in rural Kolda (Sall 1997). Northern Islamic leaders meanwhile attempted to gain large areas of land for their *talibés* (Hesseling 1994, 252).
97. Using the decomposable GE(2) index.
98. This claim is based on data from the *Enquête Senegalaise Auprès des Ménages*, 1995.
99. A debate on rival property rights regimes took place in parallel to the conflict, with "Ganda Koy" representing private ownership and nomadic groups promoting instead "akall ohar" or "shared land." See "Irreductible rebelle hier, se redouvre des qualités d'homme de paix. Qui trompez-vous?" article signed by "M.A.B-M.S.C., member of Ganda Koy," *Le Tambour*, No. 46, July 26, 1994.
100. Government of Mali, *Code Domaniale et Foncier*, 1986.
101. Law dating from February 4, 1983 (see Poulton and agYousouf 1998, 32). Policies disfavoring nomadic lifestyles were in fact inherited from the older French system of "nomadic licences" (see Boilley 1999).
102. See, for example, *L'Aurore*, August 8–22, 1990.
103. Senegalese Minister Robert Sagna speaking on national radio Sud FM, November 1999.
104. Although three Tuareg governors were appointed to regions in the South.
105. Interviews by authors in Bamako 2001. See also "Tales of Timbuktu," *Newsweek*, February 17, 1992 and "Les Tuaregs paysans du Mali," *Le Monde*, January 25, 1990.
106. We find, however, no evidence to support the view that the Tuareg rebellion was primarily an uprising against traditional Tuareg societies. The rebels, we have seen, focused on military targets in the early stages and, except for limited fighting between factions, selected primarily out-group targets in later stages. Although purportedly assassination lists of traditional elites were composed in Libya, no concerted actions were in fact taken to forcibly remove the traditional elites.
107. Casamançais explain these prejudices by referring to ethnographic descriptions of the differences between Casamance and *nordiste* (Diop 1994; Diouf, 1994). These describe Casamance cultures, and the Diola in particular, as being founded on religious beliefs that are closely linked to the earth, rice, and the forests. They write that Diola culture is horizontally structured, individualistic, and radically egalitarian. Unlike the Wolof, the Diola have not fought politically for the goods of modernity and have not engaged

- aggressively with the modern economy. See Diouf (1994); see also Sidi Diop, *Le Populaire*, December 12, 2000, 5.
108. ag Mohamed (1994).
 109. *Source*: Multiple interviews, 2001.
 110. Left with a single automatic rifle, the first actions of the group were to get arms from the Malian army. *Source*: Interviews in Mali 2001.
 111. Due less to the domestic history of conflict than to the history of conflicts in neighboring countries since the mid-1970s, notably in Chad and Western Sahara.
 112. The most important raids included the initial attack on Ménéka and Touxmen, which gave the groups access to RPG 9s, grenades, heavy machine guns, and automatic weapons. Arms transfers were also made from the government of Mali to self-defense militias. Interviews with army officers, 2001; see also Keita 1998, 20.
 113. This route is somewhat indirect. In fact the Malian army armed self-defense groups around the Mali-Mauritania border who were being raided by Mauritians in reprisals for cattle thefts by Senegalese herders. Interviews with officers in the Mali army, Mali, 2001.
 114. The moment of Senghor's withdrawal from politics may also be relevant in light of reported deal making between the Casamance leadership and Senghor in the 1950s, in which Casamançais leaders claim that Senghor promised independence for Casamance around 1980. The disappearance of Senghor from the scene dashed any hopes that any such promise of independence would be honored.
 115. Indeed according to Diamacoune's account, the two most prominent early political leaders, Diamacoune and N'krumah Sané, were introduced to each other in prison after their arrest by the Senegalese authorities.
 116. See Foucher (2002) for more on the role of scholarization and the Casamance conflict.
 117. In the enthusiasm of the early 1980s, these contributions of approximately \$2 were made in exchange for membership cards and collections were organized in part by local communities. Even if in the heyday one subscription was paid by every single household, total revenues could not have surpassed \$100,000.
 118. Based on 10,000 tons of annual production and a per kilo price of \$0.25 (Interviews Casamance, July 2001 and EIU 2001), although the MFDC share by some accounts is as little as 3 percent (Evans 2002).
 119. Total annual volumes may be considerably higher. It is unclear how much of this trade is controlled by the MFDC. See Cissé (2001) and *Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues* (1997) for similar size estimates for other years.
 120. In particular, the illegal nature of the industry makes it difficult for belligerents to be guaranteed control over the industry in the absence of conflict.
 121. The organization seems unable to provide basic services to its members, such as access to medication and basic foodstuffs. There are multiple reports of a state of destitution in some of the *maquis*; and *maquisards* engage in small-time extraction—driven, seemingly by hunger, to hold up small shops and travelers and to steal bicycles and side-mirrors from cars. Indeed, in an unusual twist, the Diouf regime and army troops supported operations by Caritas to deliver food aid to the *maquis*. The inability of the organization to access heavy artillery until a very late stage in the struggle or to pro-

- vide public goods for the *maquisards* indicates either a poor centralization of financing or a stockpiling of financial revenues by a concentrated elite.
122. With tiny communities outside of West Africa, Diaspora financing was unavailable to the Tuareg groups. And there is no evidence of substantial flows from other Berber groups or from French sympathizers. Small transfers in cash and in kind were made from UNHCR sources via the refugee camps in Mauritania. The size of these supplies, never large, would fluctuate as a function of Mauritanian policy toward the camps.
 123. Two other sources of financing for the *Ganda Koy* were transfers from the Songhoi Diaspora, notably in Ghana (See “Le *Ganda Koy* dévoile son visage,” *Le Tambour*, No. 60, November 1, 1994) and, reportedly, from the government of Mali. The government of Mali denies claims that it helped to establish or fund the *Ganda Koy*. However, a representative of the *Ganda Koy* in Paris, Mahmoud Alpha Maïga, claimed in 1995 that “relations are very good between us and the army [. . .]. In fact, the deserting officers that joined the *Ganda Koy* continue to receive a salary from the Malian army.” See “Nouvel enlèvement des espoirs de paix dans le conflit Tuareg au Mali,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1995. Furthermore, at least some of the sedentary group militias were armed by the army (see, for example, Keita 1998, 20).
 124. See, for example, the protests by representatives of the sedentary population of one neighborhood in Tondibi regarding the use of *Ganda Koy* forces to support another neighborhood of Tondibi in a land dispute (*L'Indépendant*, No. 22, July 13, 1995, 3).
 125. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2001), for example, argue that “[many] rebel organizations face severe problems of maintaining cohesion: hence the much shorter duration of such wars.” As suggested by Nicholas Sambanis in comments on this paper, a useful distinction may be drawn between the ability of leaders of a given group to enforce orders, and the existence of multiple factions, each with their own leadership structures. Lack of the former type of cohesion may make military victory for the government more likely, whereas lack of the latter may prevent negotiated resolution. Our concern in this text is with the latter form of cohesion.
 126. The moderation of the wing and their position in favor of peace gave them access to government favors and the praise of the progovernment Senegalese press (Marut 1992, 222).
 127. *Source*: Interviews with fighters, Casamance 2001.
 128. In August 2001 Alexandre Djiba, hinting at some room for negotiation around the term claimed “we have been fighting for our independence for 18 years and in that period nobody [in the Senegalese administration] has asked us what we mean by the term.” (Interview, Banjul, August 2001.) See as an exception to the trend: Jean-Marie François Biagui’s contribution to the 1999 MFDC meetings “Territoire de Casamance.” www.ifrance.com/Casamance/Communication%20Lyon.htm.
 129. In a letter dated August 26, 2000 addressed to Diamacoune, Sadio, writing in the name of the *maquis*, recognized the authority of Fr. Diamacoune as head of the organization but set down what he took to be the limits of the mandate of the secretary general. Reaffirming a hard-line position, he wrote that the MFDC was struggling “for the national independence of Casamance, not for autonomy still less, regionalization . . .” (*Le Matin* December 2–3, 2000, 3).
 130. Indeed, Tuareg leaders now lament the fact that when black sedentary populations asked to join the rebel movements in early stages they were turned away. *Source*: Interviews, Bamako, July 2001.

131. Claudot-Hawad (1997) cites the *Rapport Politique du Cercle d'Agadez* that claims in September 1916 that the "Tuareg have no more reason to continue to exist than did the Redskins [in America]. Unfortunately the desert climate and the extraordinary camel present us with obstacles that the Americans did not have to face."
132. The name, *Ganda Koy*, literally means "masters of the land." As noted by one columnist, "the central objective of the *Ganda Koy*—as its name suggests in Songhoi, was to remind everyone that the sedentary populations were first occupants and the true owners of the region." (*L'Indépendant*, July 13, 1995, 22.) The *Ganda Koy* in the *Voix du Nord* (1992), accusing the "*rebelles-bandits-armés*" of themselves being racist, argued: "[T]hey have always been bandits, living from theft, harassment and brigandry. The people of the north are a foreign body in the social fabric [. . .] Let us close the border [with Mauritania], let us create a no-man's land 100 km wide, and let the army and the sedentary populations clean out the area." By 1994, the *Ganda Koy* had toned down its rhetoric and claimed to have a minority of Tuareg and Arab members. (See statements by Abdoulaye Hamadahamane Maïga, "Le *Ganda Koy*, la conscience noire s'impose," *L'Aurore*, September 1, 1994, 2.)
133. Tuareg intellectuals likened the militias to the Rwandese *genocidaires*, while the *Ganda Koy* likened the aims and methods of the rebelling groups to European fascism (see *Ganda Koy*, "Appel aux patriots maliens").
134. In one of the very first analyses published in the Malian press, an Algerian author provided a primordial explanation of the conflict, claiming that in the North there is "a hatred that can be easily re-awakened, once we know the history that separates the blacks, the 'ancient slaves' from the Tuareg, the 'ancient masters.'" (*L'Aurore*, August 8–22, 1990, 3, citing *Algerie Actualite*, July 19–25, 1990.)
135. Furthermore, the Tuareg group that was largely responsible for initiating the rebellion, the *Kel Adrar*, historically used slaves the least. In principle, the southern blacks in the Malian army, coming from areas with little contact with the North, should not have in been any more affected by the history of Tuareg and Arab slavery as by the history of slavery by the Songhoi or by black populations elsewhere in the continent. See Ibrahim ag Litny and Pierre Boiley, "Une Histoire Méconnue," *Tidmi*, No. 14, 6, February 21–27, 1995.
136. In particular, as is clear from the cases of Burundi and Rwanda, conflict may become highly ethnically polarized without sharp phenotypical differences. As a striking point of comparison, the contemporaneous conflict in Niger did not involve a grouping together of Tuaregs and Arabs but, rather, conflict between them.
137. In fact the ability to identify and classify people using phenotypical evidence is imperfect in Mali. Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998) describe groups whose "ethnic identity" has mutated from Tuareg to Moor to Songhoi; they note that inhabitants of the North speak multiple languages and that among the Tuareg there is considerable diversity in complexion.
138. Reporters in Mali noted "the soldiers [. . .] no longer distinguish between 'having white skin' and being a rebel." *L'Aurore*, "Etablir La Verité," Editorial, June 13, 1991. In explanation, one Malian officer argued that rebels put civilian populations at risk precisely in order to capitalize on the backlash against the inevitable army reprisals. This strategy is denied by rebel leaders. *Source*: Interviews, Bamako, Summer 2001.

139. Describing a strategy of retaliation, Omar Hamida Maïga of the *Ganda Koy* reported simply “if they killed 15 blacks [*nègres*], we then killed 20 *Tamacheqs*.” (Reported by Thomas Sotinel, *Le Monde*, January 31, 1996. <http://gouna.avenir.free.fr/tombouctou/fichiers/articles/horizons.htm>.) Justifying the strategy, the Paris representative of the *Ganda Koy* explained: “the Tuareg and Arab populations are more or less complicit in the rebellion. We are willing to assume the right to judge them and to punish them.” (“Nouvel enlèvement des espoirs de paix dans le conflit Tuareg au Mali,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1995.)
140. There is considerable evidence that the nomadic and sedentary communities were engaged in complementary production that gave rise to relationships based on gains from trade, complementary resource usage (with pastoralists accessing postharvest stubble on fields used by agriculturists), and also on the ability of the communities to engage in classic insurance activities. See examples given in Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998) and Maïga (1997).
141. December 15, 1991, see Poulton and ag Youssouf (1998, 63).
142. Explanations of the grievances motivating the struggle relate largely to specifically Diola concerns. Furthermore, the institutions used to recruit and organize—the sacred forests—are ethnic institutions. With access to the areas forbidden to noncoethnics, initiation rituals cannot cross ethnic lines. Interviews suggest that in practice these ceremonies have from the start been conducted almost exclusively in Diola forests.
143. Indeed when there were victories against the movements, such as the taking of the FIAA base, these occurred only with the aid of other rebel groups that had already ended their fight against the government.
144. An alternative mechanism suggested by the cases of Mali in Senegal is that forest areas are more “liveable” than desert areas and can support groups divorced from a productive economy longer.
145. Similar arguments based on *local* population density can be used to motivate a relationship between organization and the dispersion of population. Collier (2000) argues: “Geography matters because if the population is highly geographically dispersed, then the country is harder for the government to control than if everyone lives in the same small area.” In direct contradiction, King and Zeng (2001) argue that density makes conflicts more likely as “internal conflict requires people to be near others who might disagree.”
146. Government of Mali, 1994.
147. Government of Senegal, 2000.
148. The military costs incurred by the army due to the Casamance struggle are, according to the government at least, negligible.
149. According to the World Food Program, there are now 60,000 internally displaced people in Casamance. There were 32,684 displaced people in the Department of Ziguinchor alone between 1990 and 1996 and a further 2,299 in Oussouye. Recorded violence between August 1997 and January 1998 has included 132 land mine victims, 152 bullet wounds, and 16 grenade injuries. Economic costs include a 30 percent drop in rice production in the 1990s.
150. *Source*: Interviews, Dakar, June 2001.

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