Abstract

About 20 percent of countries have in place dual, multiple, or parallel exchange rates. Traditionally exchange controls have been viewed as a form of distortionary commercial policy. We show that they can also cause debt deflation. Both channels generate fiscal revenue. We study an optimal taxation problem of a government with chronic fiscal deficits and two distortionary instruments, money creation and exchange controls. We find that for plausible calibrations, exchange controls can generate sizable fiscal space. However, the optimal level of exchange controls is virtually zero. Adopting a policy that funds fiscal deficits through exchange controls results in significant welfare losses.

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1 Introduction

About 20 percent of all countries, especially in poor and emerging areas of the world, have in place dual, multiple, or parallel exchange rates (Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff, 2019). This paper investigates the fiscal implications of exchange controls for countries that experience chronic fiscal deficits financed with money creation. Exchange controls are akin to a tax on international trade (Bhagwati, 1978). Therefore, they compete with the inflation tax as an alternative source of fiscal revenue. The question we pose is what is the optimal monetary and exchange control policy for a government that faces an exogenous stream of public spending.

To address this question we embed exchange controls in a model of an open economy with a tradable and a nontradable sector. Both sectors use imported materials as inputs of production. A demand for money is motivated by a transactions cost that is increasing in money velocity. The government runs an exogenous stream of primary fiscal deficits. In addition, the economy is financially isolated from the rest of the world but the government owes an external debt denominated in foreign currency on which it pays interest. Because government obligations have a nontradable and a tradable component, total government obligations depend on the real exchange rate. Thus, exchange controls can generate fiscal space by altering the real exchange rate. This effect implies that exchange controls are not just a tax on net exports but can also create fiscal space through debt deflation. The latter channel has not been discussed in the related literature. The government finances fiscal imbalances with revenues generated by money creation and exchange controls.

In the model economy, exchange controls work as follows. The government obliges exporters to liquidate their foreign exchange earnings at the central bank in exchange for domestic currency at an exchange rate (the official exchange rate) that is below the market exchange rate. Thus, exchange rate controls act as a tax on exports. The government also supplies foreign exchange to importers at the official exchange rate. Therefore, exchange-rate controls also represent a subsidy on imports. However, to guarantee positive revenue from exchange controls, the government limits the amount of foreign exchange it makes available to importers. When this limit becomes binding, exchange controls turn from an import subsidy to an import quota, and as a result as the exchange rate gap increases official imports decline.

Due to the arbitrage opportunities created by the difference between the market and the official exchange rates, exporters and importers have incentives to circumvent exchange controls by smuggling goods in and out of the country and by under invoicing exports and over invoicing imports. Engaging in smuggling, however, entails a cost, which limits the
ability of firms to make arbitrage profits from the exchange-rate gap. We show analytically that if exchange controls are to generate fiscal revenue both legal and illegal trade must take place in equilibrium. In other words, when smuggling costs are so high that illegal trade is zero or when smuggling costs are so low that legal trade is zero, exchange controls fail to generate any fiscal revenue. Thus, a government wishing to collect revenues from exchange controls has to tolerate some contraband.

In the model, the government faces a tradeoff between financing the fiscal deficit with inflation or with exchange controls. We consider a benevolent government that maximizes the welfare of domestic households from a timeless perspective by choosing paths for inflation and exchange controls. We compare the outcome of the optimal policy with those of two alternative policy regimes. In one of these alternative regimes the government does not resort to exchange controls and finances the fiscal deficit entirely through inflation. In the other alternative regime, the government minimizes inflation and therefore maximizes fiscal revenues from exchange controls.

We calibrate the model to the Argentine economy. Over the past two decades, this country has experienced high inflation, persistent fiscal deficits, and two episodes of exchange controls. We find that the welfare maximizing government makes virtually no use of exchange controls. Under the baseline calibration, the Ramsey optimal exchange rate gap is only 3 percent. The resulting allocation is essentially the same as that of an economy without any exchange controls. Instead, the benevolent government finds it optimal to finance its chronic fiscal deficit almost entirely through seignorage revenue. The reason why the optimal policy does not make use of exchange controls as a fiscal instrument is not that this type of policy cannot generate sizable amounts of revenue. We show that a government that minimizes inflation can attain fiscal solvency with low inflation by financing most of the fiscal deficit with revenue from exchange controls featuring a three-digit exchange-rate gap. However, this policy is highly welfare reducing because it creates large relative price distortions, which result in a significant misallocation of factor inputs across sectors and a low provision of consumption goods. Under the baseline calibration, households require a 4.6 percent increase in consumption each period to be as well off in this economy as they are in the Ramsey-optimal economy.

To the best of our knowledge the present paper is the first attempt to frame the determination of exchange controls as the outcome of an optimal monetary and fiscal policy problem. The paper is related to two strands of literature. An early formulation of the functioning of a dual exchange-rate system using a non-optimizing framework and adaptive expectations is Argy and Porter (1972). Flood and Marion (1982) introduce rational expectations into the framework of Argy and Porter. These papers are primarily concerned with the ability
of a dual exchange rate system vis-à-vis a single exchange rate arrangement to isolate the country from domestic and external disturbances. Closer to the present analysis is Adams and Greenwood (1985) who incorporate a dual exchange-rate system in a two-period optimizing model with rational expectations. These authors show that the Ramsey optimal policy calls for the Friedman rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate and average inflation equal to minus the real interest rate) and no exchange rate controls. The key difference with the present study is that these authors assume that the government can set lump sum taxes endogenously to ensure fiscal solvency independently of the monetary or the exchange rate arrangement. In other words, unlike in the present study, these authors assume that the government need not rely on seignorage revenue or on revenues from exchange controls to balance the budget. It can be readily shown that their conclusion would also obtain in our framework were we to add lump-sum taxation as a policy instrument. More recently, Mosquera and Sturzenegger (2021) analyze an optimizing model in which exchange controls act as a tax on exports. They show that because these types of taxes are distorting, exchange rate controls are welfare reducing. However, Mosquera and Sturzenegger do not explore the fiscal consequences of exchange controls nor their optimal determination, both of which are at the core of the present investigation. Neumeyer and Espino (2023) augment a Krugman-style balance of payment crisis model with dual exchange rates and capital controls to study how these frictions affect the timing of the balance of payments crisis and the transitional dynamics of expenditure, the exchange rate gap, and interest rates.

The other body of work to which this paper is related is one that studies optimal monetary and fiscal policy when the government has access to distortionary taxation in the form of labor or capital income taxes. The focus of this literature is to characterize conditions under which the Friedman rule is optimal (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1991; Correia, Nicolini, and Teles, 2008; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004a,b). In the present paper, the fiscal instrument available to the government—exchange controls—is also distortionary, so the problem of the benevolent government can be framed in the same terms as in this literature. Thus, we contribute to this body of work by characterizing a realistic environment in which the Friedman rule is not supported as an optimal outcome.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the baseline calibration and characterizes the equilibrium effects of changes in the exchange-rate gap on key macroeconomic indicators of interest. Section 4 analyzes optimal monetary and exchange control policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model

We study a small economy open to international trade but isolated from international financial markets. The economy produces a nontradable good and an export good. Nontradables are produced with labor and imported materials, and export goods are produced with imported materials. Money is motivated by a transactions cost on consumption purchases. The government has a chronic fiscal deficit, which it finances with a combination of seignorage revenue (money creation) and revenue from exchange controls.

2.1 Households

The economy is populated by a large number of identical households with preferences given by

\[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t, h_t), \]  

where \( c_t \) denotes consumption in period \( t \), \( h_t \) denotes labor supplied in period \( t \), \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is the subjective discount factor, and \( U \) is the period utility function. Labor income is \( W_t h_t \), where \( W_t \) denotes the nominal wage rate. The household also receives in a lump-sum fashion a government transfer denoted \( \tau_t \) and profits from the ownership of firms denoted \( \phi_t \), both measured in units of consumption. A demand for money is motivated by assuming that consumption purchases are subject to a proportional transactions cost, denoted \( s(v_t) \), that is increasing in money velocity, \( v_t = P_t c_t / M_t \), where \( M_t \) denotes nominal money holdings and \( P_t \) is the price level. Households can trade a pure discount bond denominated in domestic currency, denoted \( B_t \), that pays the interest rate \( i_t \). Their sequential budget constraint is then given by

\[ [1 + s(v_t)] P_t c_t + M_t + \frac{B_t}{1 + i_t} = W_t h_t + P_t (\tau_t + \phi_t) + M_{t-1} + B_{t-1}. \]  

Letting \( a_t \equiv (M_t + B_t) / P_t \) denote real private asset holdings, \( m_t \equiv M_t / P_t \) denote real money balances, and \( w_t \equiv W_t / P_t \) denote the real wage, the budget constraint of the household expressed in units of consumption is given by

\[ [1 + s(v_t)] c_t + \frac{i_t}{1 + i_t} m_t + \frac{a_t}{1 + i_t} = w_t h_t + \tau_t + \phi_t + \frac{a_{t-1}}{1 + \pi_t}, \]  

where \( \pi_t \equiv P_t / P_{t-1} - 1 \) denotes price inflation.

The household chooses paths of consumption, labor, money holdings, and asset holdings to maximize the lifetime utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2), the
definition of money velocity

\[ v_t = \frac{c_t}{m_t}, \quad (3) \]

and to some no-Ponzi-game constraint. The first-order efficiency conditions associated with this maximization problem give rise to a money demand function of the form

\[ v_t^2 s'(v_t) = \frac{i_t}{1 + i_t}, \quad (4) \]

to the labor supply schedule

\[ -\frac{U_2(c_t, h_t)}{U_1(c_t, h_t)} = \frac{w_t}{1 + s(v_t) + v_t s'(v_t)}, \quad (5) \]

and to the Euler equation

\[ \lambda_t = \beta (1 + i_t) \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{1 + \pi_{t+1}}, \quad (6) \]

where

\[ \lambda_t = \frac{U_1(c_t, h_t)}{1 + s(v_t) + v_t s'(v_t)} \]

denotes the marginal utility of wealth. Under the assumption that \( v^2 s'(v) \) is increasing in \( v \), the optimality condition (4) implies that the demand for real money holdings, \( m_t \), is decreasing in the interest rate and proportional to consumption. In addition to generating resource losses (shoe leather costs), the transactions cost distorts the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure in favor of the latter (optimality condition (5)). This distortion is increasing in the nominal interest rate \( i_t \). Changes in the interest rate also distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption (optimality condition (6)).

### 2.2 Firms

Suppose that there is a representative firm that produces a nontradable consumption good and an exportable good. Output of the nontradable consumption good is produced using as inputs labor and imported materials, denoted \( q^x_t \). The production technology is of the form \( F(h_t, q^x_t) \). The exportable good is produced with imported materials, denoted \( q^x_t \), using the technology \( X(q^x_t) \). Both production functions, \( F(\cdot, \cdot) \) and \( X(\cdot) \), are assumed to be positive, increasing, and concave.

The world price of imported materials is assumed to be constant and equal to one, and the world price of the exported good in terms of imported materials (the external terms of trade), denoted \( p^x_t \), is exogenously given. Let \( E_t \) denote the market nominal exchange rate, defined as the domestic-currency price of one unit of foreign currency, and \( E_t^o \) the official
nominal exchange rate set by the government.

Firms are required to sell to the government the foreign currency generated by exports in exchange for domestic currency at the official exchange rate $E^o_t$. We refer to this type of exports as official exports and denote them $x^o_t$. Similarly, firms are obliged to acquire from the government the foreign currency needed to buy imported materials. We refer to this type of imports as official imports and denote them $q^o_t$. The government sells foreign currency at the official exchange rate $E^o_t$ to firms that wish to import. This exchange rate is in general cheaper than the market rate, $E_t$, so the government rations its quantity at the level $\bar{q}^o_t$, which the firm takes as given.

It is illegal to export or import goods outside of the official channel. However, firms can circumvent exchange rate controls by smuggling. Let $x^s_t$ and $q^s_t$ denote the amount of smuggled exports and imports. Smuggling carries a cost $C(x^s_t, \kappa_x) + C(q^s_t, \kappa_q)$ measured in units of consumption, where $\kappa_x$ and $\kappa_q$ are parameters representing the strength of barriers to smuggling such as the degree of enforcement of contraband laws. The function $C(\cdot, \cdot)$ is assumed to be positive, convex in its first argument, and to satisfy $C(0, \cdot) = 0$ and $C_2 > 0$.

Then, letting $\phi_t$ denote profits of the firm expressed in units of the consumption good, we have that

$$\phi_t = F(h_t, q^n_t) + \frac{E^o_t}{P_t}(p^x_t x^o_t - q^o_t) + \frac{E_t}{P_t}(p^x_t x^s_t - q^s_t) - w_t h_t - C(q^s_t, \kappa_q) - C(x^s_t, \kappa_x).$$ (7)

A positive value of $x^s_t$ can be interpreted as under invoicing of exports to customs authorities. A negative value of $x^s_t$ represents over invoicing of exports. Clearly, as long as $E^o_t < E_t$, it will not pay for the firm to over invoice exports as it would result in an avoidable loss. A positive value of $q^s_t$ represents under invoicing of imports and a negative value represents over invoicing of imports. As we will see, both under and over invoicing of imports are possible in equilibrium. In particular, the possibility of under invoicing of imports may arise in equilibrium even if $E^o_t < E_t$ because of rationing of foreign exchange at the official rate.

The firm chooses $x^s_t$, $x^o_t$, $q^s_t$, $q^o_t$, $q^n_t$, $q^x_t$, and $h_t$ to maximize (7), subject to

$$q^n_t + q^x_t = q^o_t + q^s_t,$$ (8)

$$x^o_t + x^s_t = X(q^x_t),$$ (9)

$$q^o_t \leq \bar{q}^o_t,$$ (10)

and

$$x^o_t \geq 0.$$ (11)
The firm takes the upper bound \( q^o_t \) on official imports as given, but, as will be clear shortly, \( q^o_t \) is endogenously determined in equilibrium, which introduces an externality. The nonnegativity constraint (11) states that the government does not allow firms to import the exportable good at the subsidized official exchange rate \( E^o_t \), as such imports would be smuggled out of the country at the market rate \( E_t \). Let

\[
\gamma_t \equiv \frac{E_t}{E^o_t} - 1
\]

denote the gap between the market exchange rate and the official exchange rate. We will refer to \( \gamma_t \) as the exchange rate gap.\(^1\) Let

\[
e_t = \frac{E_t}{P_t}
\]

Absent exchange rate controls and import restrictions, \( e_t \) represents the real exchange rate, that is, the relative price of the imported good in terms of the nontraded good. However, as we will discuss below, in the presence of exchange controls firms perceive a different real exchange rate.

Using these definitions to eliminate \( E_t \) and \( E^o_t \) and equations (8) and (9) to eliminate \( q^n_t \) and \( x^o_t \) from (7) and (11), the firm’s problem consists in choosing \( h_t, q^o_t, q^s_t, x^s_t \), and \( q^x_t \) to maximize

\[
F(h_t, q^o_t + q^s_t - q^x_t) + \frac{e_t}{1 + \gamma_t} [p^x_t (X(q^x_t) - x^s_t) - q^o_t] + e_t (p^x_t x^s_t - q^s_t) - w_t h_t - C(q^s_t, \kappa_q) - C(x^s_t, \kappa_x)
\]

subject to (10) and

\[
X(q^x_t) - x^s_t \geq 0.
\]

Letting \( \mu^q_t \) and \( \mu^x_t \) denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with (10) and (13), the first-order efficiency conditions with respect to \( h_t, q^o_t, q^s_t, q^x_t \), and \( x^s_t \), respectively, are

\[
F_1(h_t, q^o_t + q^s_t - q^x_t) = w_t,
\]

\[
F_2(h_t, q^o_t + q^s_t - q^x_t) = \left[ \frac{e_t p^x_t}{1 + \gamma_t} + \mu^x_t \right] X'(q^x_t),
\]

\[
F_2(h_t, q^o_t + q^s_t - q^x_t) = e_t + C'(q^s_t, \kappa_q),
\]

\[
F_2(h_t, q^o_t + q^s_t - q^x_t) = \frac{e_t}{1 + \gamma_t} + \mu^q_t
\]

\(^1\)In the related literature, the exchange rate gap is also referred to as the “parallel market premium.”
\[
\frac{e_t p_t^x}{1 + \gamma_t} + \mu_t^x = e_t p_t^x - C'(x_t^s, \kappa_x),
\]
and the nonnegativity and complementary slackness conditions

\[
\mu_t^q \geq 0, \quad (19)
\]
\[
\mu_t^x \geq 0, \quad (20)
\]
\[
\mu_t^q (q_t^o - q_t^x) = 0, \quad (21)
\]

and

\[
\mu_t^x [X(q_t^x) - x_t^s] = 0. \quad (22)
\]

Optimality condition (14) is a demand for labor. Equation (15) says that the value of the marginal product of imported materials must be the same in the nontraded sector and the export sector. Optimality condition (16) says that in producing nontradable goods the firm equates the marginal product of the imported input to the marginal cost of smuggling it, which is the sum of the market real exchange rate, \(e_t\), and the marginal smuggling cost, \(C'(q_t^s, \kappa_q)\). Condition (17) says that if the import constraint is not binding (\(\mu_t^q = 0\)), the firm also equates the marginal product of imported materials in producing nontradables to the marginal cost of imported materials through the legal market. When the firm’s legal imports are rationed (\(\mu_t^q > 0\)), the shadow marginal cost of importing materials through the legal market is larger than the official marginal cost. Finally, when the nonnegativity constraint on official exports is not binding (\(\mu_t^x = 0\)), condition (18) says that at the margin, the firm is indifferent between exporting through the official market or through contraband.

### 2.3 The Government

The government prints money, \(M_t\), issues discount bonds denominated in domestic currency, denoted \(B_t\), and in foreign currency, denoted \(B_t^*\), and makes transfers, \(\tau_t\). It also collects resources from the imposition of exchange controls. Its sequential budget constraint is then given by

\[
M_t + \frac{B_t}{1 + i_t} + \frac{\mathcal{E}_t B_t^*}{1 + i_t^*} + (\mathcal{E}_t - \mathcal{E}_t^o)(p_t^x x_t^o - q_t^o) = P_t \tau_t + M_{t-1} + B_{t-1} + \mathcal{E}_t B_{t-1}^*,
\]

where \(i_t^*\) denotes the interest rate paid by the government on its external debt and is assumed to be exogenously determined. The left-hand side represents the government’s sources of funds and includes revenues from exchange rate controls. The right-hand side represents the government’s uses of funds. Dividing the above expression through by the price level, \(P_t\),
and recalling the definition of real domestic assets, \( a_t \equiv (M_t + B_t)/P_t \), the sequential budget constraint expressed in units of consumption is given by

\[
\frac{i_t}{1 + i_t} m_t + \frac{a_t}{1 + i_t} + \frac{e_t B^*_t}{1 + \gamma_t} + \frac{e_t \gamma_t}{1 + \gamma_t} (p_t^x x^o_t - q^o_t) = \tau_t + \frac{a_{t-1}}{1 + \pi_t} + e_t B^*_{t-1}.
\]

(23)

The last term on the left hand side represents the fiscal surplus generated by exchange controls. We denote this source of fiscal revenue by \( s_t \),

\[
s_t \equiv \frac{\gamma_t}{1 + \gamma_t} e_t (p_t^x x^o_t - q^o_t).
\]

(24)

Given our focus on the case of a positive exchange-rate gap, \( \gamma_t > 0 \), it is clear from this expression that if the government is to generate any direct fiscal revenue from exchange controls, it must ensure a positive official trade balance, \( p_t^x x^o_t - q^o_t > 0 \). In equilibrium, exchange controls can also affect the government’s finances indirectly through their effects on endogenous variables such as the external real exchange rate, \( e_t \), and real balances, \( m_t \).

For simplicity, we assume that the bond denominated in domestic currency trades only in the domestic market and that the bond denominated in foreign currency trades only in the international market. Furthermore, we have in mind a government that is financially isolated from the international capital market. The government makes interest payments to the rest of the world, but cannot change its external debt position endogenously—to smooth transitory disturbances, say. Specifically, we set \( B^*_t = B^* \), where \( B^* \) is a constant. Thus, net investment payments expressed in units of the imported good, \( i^*_t (B^*/(1 + i^*_t)) \), are exogenously given.

Iterating the government’s budget constraint (23) forward, using (24) to replace \( e_t \gamma_t/(1 + \gamma_t) (p_t^x x^o_t - q^o_t) \), and using the household’s transversality condition, we can write

\[
\frac{a_{-1}}{1 + \pi_0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{i_t}{1 + i_t} m_t + s_t - \tau_t - e_t \frac{i^*_t B^*}{1 + i^*_t} \prod_{s=0}^{t-1} \frac{1 + i_s}{1 + \pi_{s+1}}.
\]

(25)

In the numerator on the right-hand side, the first term is seignorage revenue. The second term is the amount of resources the government extracts from the private sector through exchange controls. The third term is the primary fiscal deficit, and the last term is net international interest payments in units of consumption goods. Thus, equation (25) says that the government’s initial domestic real liabilities, \( a_{-1}/(1 + \pi_0) \), must be backed by the present discounted value of primary fiscal surpluses plus seignorage revenue and resources from exchange controls and net of international interest payments.

As explained earlier, we assume that the government provides some foreign exchange to
importers at the official exchange rate $E_t^o$. We make this assumption because we wish to capture the existing arrangement in Argentina—the economy on which we base the calibration of the model—during the two spells of exchange controls shown in Figure 1. The Argentine government rations the amount of foreign exchange importers can buy at the official exchange rate. Since fiscal revenue from exchange controls is positive only if the official trade balance, $p_t^b x_t^o - q_t^o$, is in surplus, we assume that the amount of foreign exchange the government offers to importers must be smaller than official exports. Specifically, we assume that the government imposes the following upper bound on purchases of foreign exchange at the official rate:

$$q_t^o = (1 - \rho_t)p_t^b x_t^o, \tag{26}$$

with $0 < 1 - \rho_t < 1$. The higher $\rho_t$ is, the more restricted legal imports will be. The government uses $\rho_t$ as a policy instrument. Note that firms take $q_t^o$ as exogenously given, but that in equilibrium it is endogenously determined. This feature introduces an externality into the model because firms do not internalize that by exporting more they could relax the import restrictions and buy more foreign exchange at the subsidized rate $E_t^o$. Firms understand that their collective exports raise the import limit $q_t^o$, but they also understand that individually they are too small to affect it.

Finally, we have in mind a situation of a country that is unable or unwilling to eliminate chronic primary fiscal deficits. Thus, we will assume that the path of primary fiscal deficits, $\tau_t$, is exogenously given. It follows that the government has three policy instruments at hand: the domestic interest rate $i_t$, the exchange rate gap $\gamma_t$, and import restrictions $\rho_t$. As it will become clear soon, the government can pick freely only two of these three instruments.

### 2.4 Equilibrium

In equilibrium the market for nontradable goods must clear. Formally,

$$[1 + s(v_t)]c_t + C(q_t^o, \kappa_q) + C(x_t^*, \kappa_x) = F(h_t, q_t^o). \tag{27}$$

Combining the budget constraint of the household (equation (2)), the budget constraint of the government (equation (23)), the definition of profits (equation (12)), and the market clearing condition in the nontraded sector (equation (27)) yields

$$p_t^b (x_t^o + x_t^*) - (q_t^o + q_t^*) - \frac{i_t^* B^*}{1 + i_t^*} = 0, \tag{28}$$

which says that because the country is financially isolated from the rest of the world, its
current account is nil up to changes in the external interest rate \( i_t^* \).

Conditions (3)-(5), (8)-(11), (14)-(22), (24), and (26)-(28) represent a static system of 16 equations and 4 inequalities in the 16 endogenous variables \( v_t, c_t, m_t, h_t, w_t, q_t^0, q_t^*, q_t^0, q_t^*, x_t^0, x_t^*, q_t^0, q_t^*, s_t, \mu_t^0, \mu_t^*, \) and \( e_t \), given policy variables \( \gamma_t, \rho_t, \) and \( i_t \), and exogenous variables \( p_t^0, i_t^*, \) and \( \tau_t \). This static system can be solved for the equilibrium values of the 16 endogenous variables as functions of the policy variables and the exogenous shocks. We summarize this result in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1 (Partial Equilibrium)** Letting

\[
\eta_t = \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_t & \rho_t & i_t \end{bmatrix}
\]

be the policy vector and

\[
\eta_t^* = \begin{bmatrix} p_t^0 & i_t^* & \tau_t \end{bmatrix}
\]

the vector of exogenous shocks, then in equilibrium the endogenous variables \( v_t, c_t, m_t, h_t, w_t, q_t^0, q_t^*, q_t^0, q_t^*, x_t^0, x_t^*, q_t^0, q_t^*, s_t, \mu_t^0, \mu_t^*, \) and \( e_t \) can be expressed as functions of \( \eta_t \) and \( \eta_t^* \). Thus, if \( x_t \) is any of the aforementioned endogenous variables, then, one can write

\[
x_t = x(\eta_t, \eta_t^*).
\]

The reason why the function \( x(\eta_t, \eta_t^*) \) is a partial equilibrium representation of the generic variable \( x_t \) is that the policy variables \( \gamma_t, \rho_t, \) and \( i_t \), which conform the policy vector \( \eta_t \), are not independent of one another in equilibrium. This is so because the intertemporal equilibrium conditions of the model must also be satisfied. Specifically, the intertemporal budget constraint of the government (equation (25)) and the Euler equation (6) introduce a restriction on the equilibrium path of the policy vector \( \eta_t \). Combining these two equations and letting \( \theta_t \equiv 1 + s(v_t) + v_t s'(v_t) \) denote the distortion in the consumption leisure decision of the household introduced by inflation, a competitive equilibrium can be defined as follows:

**Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium)** A competitive equilibrium is a scalar \( \pi_0 \) and a sequence of policy variables \( \eta_t \equiv [\gamma_t, \rho_t, i_t]' \) for \( t \geq 0 \) satisfying

\[
\frac{a-1}{1 + \pi_0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \frac{U_1(c(\eta_t, \eta_t^*), h(\eta_t, \eta_t^*))}{U_1(c(\eta_0, \eta_0^*), h(\eta_0, \eta_0^*))} \theta(\eta_t, \eta_t^*) \left[ \left( i_t m(\eta_t, \eta_t^*) \frac{i_t B^*}{1 + i_t} + s(\eta_t, \eta_t^*) - \tau_t - e(\eta_t, \eta_t^*) \right) \frac{i_t^* B^*}{1 + i_t^*} \right] \right\},
\]

and

\[
i_t \geq 0,
\]
given the initial stock of real government liabilities $a_{-1}$ and the sequence of exogenous shocks $\eta_t^* \equiv [p_t^* i_t^* \tau_t]^t$, for $t \geq 0$.

2.5 Exchange Controls and Competitiveness: Internal and External Relative Prices

In the presence of exchange controls, there are two real exchange rates, an internal one and an external one. The external real exchange rate, $e_t \equiv \mathcal{E}_t/P_t$, is the relative price of the imported good in terms of the nontraded good using the market exchange rate to convert foreign currency prices into domestic currency prices (recall that the foreign currency price of the imported good is assumed to be one). In the presence of exchange controls, this relative price is not economically relevant for domestic firms. The reason is that firms cannot purchase the imported good at the price $\mathcal{E}_t$ without having to pay a smuggling cost. The internal real exchange rate takes this distortion into account. It is defined as the relative price of the import good in terms of the nontraded good in the domestic market. The price of imports inside the country is $\mathcal{E}_t + P_t C'(q_t^s, \kappa_q)$. This is so because the imported good is not always available for purchase at the official exchange rate ($\mathcal{E}_t^o$), but is always available through smuggling, which requires paying the market exchange rate ($\mathcal{E}_t$) plus the marginal cost of smuggling ($P_t C'(q_t^s, \kappa_q)$). Thus the internal real exchange rate is given by $[\mathcal{E}_t + P_t C'(q_t^s, \kappa_q)]/P_t$, which can be written as

$$\text{internal real exchange rate} = e_t + C'(q_t^s, \kappa_q).$$

(30)

In words, the internal real exchange rate equals the external real exchange rate adjusted by the marginal contraband cost. The economic relevance of the internal real exchange rate for the firm is reflected in optimality condition (16), which says that firms equate the marginal product of imported materials in the production of nontraded goods to the internal real exchange rate. As we will see shortly when we introduce the government’s budget constraint, the external real exchange rate is economically relevant for measuring interest service on external debt in terms of nontradables.

Exchange rate controls distort not only the real exchange rate but also the terms of trade. The external terms of trade, $p_t^x$, is the relative price of the exported good in terms of the imported good in world markets. The small open economy takes the external terms of trade as exogenously given. However, internally, producers of export goods perceive a different relative price. The internal nominal price of the exported good is $\mathcal{E}_t^o p_t^x$ and the internal nominal price of the imported good is $\mathcal{E}_t + P_t C'(q_t^s, \kappa_q)$. Taking the ratio of these two prices,
the internal terms of trade can be written as

\[ \text{internal terms of trade} = p_t \frac{e_t}{(1 + \gamma_t)(e_t + C''(q_t^s, \kappa_q))}. \]

In the absence of exchange controls (\(\gamma_t = 0 \) and \(\bar{q}_t^s = \infty\)) the internal terms of trade are equal to the external terms of trade because smuggling and hence marginal smuggling costs are zero (\(C''(q_t^s, \kappa_q) = 0\)). Consider now the case of exchange controls (\(\gamma_t > 0 \) and \(\bar{q}_t^s \) finite). Using efficiency conditions (16) and (17) to eliminate \(e_t + C''(q_t^s, \kappa_q)\) from the definition of the internal terms of trade given above, we can write

\[ \text{internal terms of trade} = p_t \frac{e_t}{1+\gamma_t} + \mu_t q_t. \]

It is clear from this expression that the internal and external terms of trade are equal to each other if the import constraint (10) is slack (\(\mu_t^q = 0\)). On the other hand, when this constraint binds (\(\mu_t^q > 0\)), exchange controls deteriorate the internal terms of trade.

We conclude that exchange controls worsen the perceived competitiveness of the economy from the point of view of both the producers of nontradable goods (the internal real exchange rate depreciates) and the producers of export goods (the internal terms of trade deteriorate).

### 2.6 The Necessity of Legal and Illegal Trade

In this section we show that for exchange-rate controls to matter as a fiscal instrument (i.e., to be a useful vehicle to generate income for the government) it is essential that smuggling is costly but not prohibitively so. In other words, if the government is to collect any revenue from exchange-rate controls, contraband laws must be strict enough to guarantee some legal trade but also weak enough to guarantee some illegal trade. To show that both legal and illegal trade are necessary for exchange-rate controls to be fiscally relevant, we consider two polar cases. In one case, contraband laws are so strict that all international trade occurs through the legal channel. In the other case, contraband laws are so lax that all international trade occurs through the illegal channel. We show that in both cases, in equilibrium, exchange controls generate no fiscal revenue and the only instrument available to the government to achieve intertemporal solvency is the inflation tax.

#### 2.6.1 The Necessity of Illegal Trade

Consider first the case of strict enforcement of contraband laws. Specifically, assume that \(C(x, \kappa) = \infty, \forall x \neq 0\). In this case, the firm chooses not to smuggle goods in or out of the
country, that is,
\[ x^s_t = q^s_t = 0. \]

The resource constraint for tradable goods (28) then implies that the official trade balance, which now equals the trade balance, must satisfy
\[ p^x t - q^o_t = i^* t B^*/(1 + i^*_t). \]

Using this expression and the definition of \( s_t \) given in (24) to eliminate the official trade balance from the equilibrium intertemporal budget constraint of the government (29) yields
\[ \frac{a-1}{1 + \pi_0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \frac{U_1(c(\eta_t, \eta^*_t), h(\eta_t, \eta^*_t))\theta(\eta_t, \eta^*_t)}{U_1(c(\eta_0, \eta^*_0), h(\eta_0, \eta^*_0))\theta(\eta_0, \eta^*_0)} \left[ \frac{i_t m(\eta_t, \eta^*_t)}{1 + i_t} - \tau_t - \frac{e(\eta_t, \eta^*_t)}{1 + \gamma_t} \frac{i^*_t B^*}{1 + i^*_t} \right] \right\}. \]

This expression says that exchange-rate controls, \( \gamma_t \), have fiscal consequences only if they affect the equilibrium value of \( e_t/(1 + \gamma_t) \), \( m_t \), \( c_t \), \( h_t \), or \( v_t \). However, it turns out that, in the absence of smuggling, these variables are independent of \( \gamma_t \). To see this, note that in this case the objective function of the firm (12) becomes
\[ F(h_t, q^o_t, q^x_t) + \frac{e_t}{1 + \gamma_t} [p^x_t X(q^x_t) - q^o_t] - w_t h_t, \]
which depends on \( e_t/(1 + \gamma_t) \) but not on \( \gamma_t \) or \( e_t \) separately. The constraints of the firm—which under strict enforcement of contraband laws become \( q^o_t \leq \bar{q}^o_t \) and \( X(q^x_t) \geq 0 \)—feature neither \( e_t \) nor \( \gamma_t \). Thus, the optimality conditions of the firm depend on \( e_t/(1 + \gamma_t) \), \( w_t \), and \( \bar{q}^o_t \), but, again, not on \( e_t \) or \( \gamma_t \) separately. Further, neither \( e_t \) nor \( \gamma_t \) appear in the resource constraint for tradables (28), the resource constraint for nontradables (27), the demand for money (4), the supply of labor (5), or the definition of \( \bar{q}^o_t \) (26). It follows that the equilibrium values of \( v_t, c_t, m_t, h_t, w_t, q^o_t, q^x_t, \bar{q}^o_t, \) and \( e_t/(1 + \gamma_t) \) depend on the policy variables \( \rho_t \) and \( i_t \) but are independent of the exchange-rate gap \( \gamma_t \). This demonstrates the claim that in the absence of smuggling, exchange-rate controls do not generate any income for the government.

We summarize this result in the following proposition:

**Proposition 2 (Necessity of Illegal Trade)** If anti-contraband laws are strictly enforced \( (C(x, \kappa) = \infty \text{ for all } x \neq 0) \), then government revenue, \( i_t/(1 + i_t)m_t + s_t - \tau_t - e_t i^*_t B^*/(1 + i^*_t) \), and the real allocation, \( c_t, h_t, \) and \( v_t, \) are independent of the exchange-rate gap \( \gamma_t \).
2.6.2 The Necessity of Legal Trade

We now show that if the government fails to enforce contraband laws, then exchange-rate controls do not generate revenue for the government, and thus are not a useful instrument for achieving intertemporal solvency. Accordingly, suppose that $C(x, \kappa) = 0$ for all $x$. Then, if $\gamma_t > 0$, no exports will be channeled through the legal market,

$$x_t^o = 0.$$ 

On the other hand, the firm continues to desire to channel all imports through the official market, where the exchange rate is subsidized. However, because the upper bound on official imports imposed by the government, $\bar{q}_o^t$, is proportional to official exports (equation (26)), we have that official imports must be nonpositive, $q_o^t \leq 0$. But official imports can never be negative for $\gamma_t > 0$, because it would imply that the firm buys imported materials in the illegal market at $e_t$ and sells them in the legal market at $e_t/(1 + \gamma_t) < e_t$, making an unnecessary loss. Formally, this can be seen by combining efficiency conditions (16) and (17), which implies that $\mu_t^q > 0$. In turn, by the slackness condition (21), $\mu_t^q > 0$ and the fact that $q_o^t = 0$ imply that

$$q_o^t = 0.$$ 

Since the official trade balance, $p_t^e x_t^o - q_o^e$, is zero, so is the amount of direct revenue from exchange controls collected by the government, $s_t$ (see equation (24)). It remains to show that by changing $\gamma_t$ the government cannot collect resources indirectly by altering the equilibrium values of the variables that enter in its equilibrium intertemporal budget constraint (29), namely, $c_t$, $h_t$, $v_t$, $m_t$, and $e_t$. By efficiency conditions (15), (16), and (18), we have that $p_t^e X'(q_t^e) = 1$, which pins down $q_t^e$ independently of $\gamma_t$. In turn, the resource constraint for tradables (28) determines $q_t^o$ also independently of $\gamma_t$. Now, by (4), $v_t$ depends only on the policy variable $i_t$. Then, equilibrium conditions (5), (14), and (27) represent a system of three equations in three unknowns, $c_t$, $h_t$, and $w_t$, that is independent of $\gamma_t$. Finally, efficiency condition (16) determines $e_t$, again, independently of $\gamma_t$. This completes the demonstration that if the government fails to enforce contraband laws, then exchange-rate controls do not serve as a fiscal instrument. We summarize this result in the following proposition:

**Proposition 3 (Necessity of Legal Trade)** If anti-contraband laws are not enforced ($C(x, \kappa) = 0$ for all $x$), then government revenue, $i_t/(1 + i_t) m_t + s_t - \tau_t - e_t i_t^* B^*/(1 + i_t^*)$, and the real allocation, $c_t$, $h_t$, and $v_t$, are independent of the exchange-rate gap $\gamma_t$.

The intuition behind Propositions 2 and 3 is clear: If contraband costs are prohibitively high, then there is no black market in which the government could sell the foreign currency it
confiscates from exporters. On the other hand, if smuggling is costless, then no trade occurs at the official exchange rate, so, the government cannot confiscate any foreign currency.

3 Quantitative Analysis

Section 2.6 shows that in the extreme cases of strict enforcement of contraband laws and no enforcement of such laws, exchange-rate controls do not generate fiscal revenue. In fact, in those extreme cases the entire real allocation is independent of $\gamma_t$. In this section, we consider the intermediate case in which there is some enforcement of contraband laws that results in an equilibrium in which international trade occurs both through the legal and illegal markets. We discipline the cost of smuggling by requiring that the model replicates aspects of international trade observed in an actual economy with exchange controls. We establish that with an empirically plausible amount of enforcement of contraband laws exchange-rate controls have the potential to collect significant amounts of revenue for the government. A calibrated economy allows us to characterize quantitatively the tradeoff between financing the fiscal deficit through exchange-rate controls and financing it through seignorage revenue.

3.1 Calibration

Table 1 displays the calibrated parameters. The time unit is a quarter. Variables without a time subscript denote steady-state values.

We calibrate the policy parameters of the model to the Argentine economy during the period 2007 to 2021. This period includes two episodes of exchange rate controls, known as cepos cambiarios. We start the calibration period in 2007 because this year marks the beginning of the administration during which the first spell of exchange rate controls was implemented. Figure 1 displays the exchange-rate gap, $\gamma_t$, in Argentina during the two spells of exchange controls. The first cepo cambiario lasted from October 2011 to December 2015 and had an average exchange-rate gap of 45 percent. The second cepo cambiario started in September 2019 and was still in effect at the end of the sample with an average exchange-rate gap of 72 percent.

We set the steady-state value of the exchange-rate gap at 23 percent, $\gamma = 0.23$. This value is the average exchange rate gap observed in Argentina from January 2007 to December 2021. Drawing on the empirical estimate of the interest rate faced by Argentina in international capital markets presented in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), we set $i^*$ to 13 percent per year ($i^* = 1.13^{1/4} - 1$).

We assume that the production technologies of nontradable and exportable goods are of
Table 1: Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Exchange-rate gap, $\gamma = \mathcal{E}/\mathcal{E}_0 - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>Import limit at the official exchange rate, $q^o \leq (1 - \rho)p^x x^o$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$1.04^{1/4}$</td>
<td>Subjective discount factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_x, A_n$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Level of technology in the nontraded and export sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_x, \alpha_n$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>Import elasticity of output in the nontradable and export sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_h$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Labor elasticity of nontraded output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_q, \kappa_x$</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>Parameter of the smuggling cost function, $C(x, \kappa) = (\kappa/2)x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi_0$</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>Preference parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi_1$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>Parameter of transactions cost function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>Parameter of transactions cost function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D$</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>Parameter of transactions cost function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i^*$</td>
<td>$1.13^{1/4} - 1$</td>
<td>External interest rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B^*$</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>External public debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>Total domestic government liabilities, $a = m + b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^x$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>External terms of trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
<td>Primary fiscal deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>Off-the-book government revenue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Targeted Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$e^{\rho x^o}$</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>Recorded exports to output ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e^{B^<em>/(1+i^</em>)}$</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Share of foreign government liabilities in output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e^{(p^x x^o-q^o)}$</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>Recorded trade balance to output ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{\pi}{y}$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Fiscal deficit to output ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{b}{y(1+i)}$</td>
<td>1.31$^{1/4} - 1$</td>
<td>CPI inflation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{b}{y(1+i)}$</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>Ratio of domestic government debt to annual output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Steady state value of hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. The time unit is a quarter. The variable $y \equiv (1 + s(v))c + e(p^x x^o-q^o)$ denotes steady-state recorded real output.
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Gap: Argentina January 2002 to December 2022

Notes. The exchange-rate gap is the percent difference between the market exchange rate and the official exchange rate, both expressed as pesos per U.S. dollar. “Cepo cambiario” is the name given in Argentina to exchange-rate controls. The figure displays data over two spells of exchange-rate controls: cepo 1, which ran from October 2011 to December 2015, and cepo 2, which started in September 2019 and was still in place at the end of the sample (December 2022). Sources: market exchange rate, Ámbito Financiero; official exchange rate, Banco Central de la República Argentina; cepo dates, Ámbito Financiero (2020).

the form

\[ F(h, q^n) = A_n h^{\alpha_h} (q^n)^{\alpha_n} \]

and

\[ X(q^x) = A_x (q^x)^{\alpha_x} \]

We normalize \( A_n \) and \( A_x \) to unity. Following Uribe (1997), we set \( \alpha_h \) to 0.75. This value implies a share of labor in nontraded gross output of 75 percent. Based on the cross-country evidence on the average share of imported inputs in domestic production presented in Gopinath et al. (2007), we set \( \alpha_n = \alpha_x = 0.15 \). We normalize the steady state of the external terms of trade to one, \( p^x = 1 \).

We assume a period utility function of the form

\[ U(c, h) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} - \chi_0 \frac{h^{1+\chi_1}}{1 + \chi_1}. \]

We set \( \sigma = 2 \), which is a standard value for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution in business-cycle analysis. We set \( \chi_1 \) equal to 1/2. This value implies a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 2, which is commonly used in the calibration of open-economy business-cycle models (Mendoza, 1991). The parameter \( \chi_0 \) is a scaler, which
determines the steady-state value of hours worked. As explained below, we set it to ensure that in the steady state hours are normalized to 1. The implied value is 0.82. The subjective discount rate is assumed to be 4 percent per year, $\beta = 1.04^{-1/4}$.

We propose a transactions cost function of the form

$$s(v) = \frac{(A - D v)^{1+B}}{1+B}.$$  \hfill (32)

This functional form ensures that the demand for money has the following three characteristics: (i) a satiation point (i.e., a finite demand for money at a zero nominal interest rate); (ii) a Laffer curve for the inflation tax (i.e., an inverse-U shape for the relationship between inflation and seignorage income); and (iii) a unit income elasticity. These features are desirable because we estimate the demand for money over a period in which Argentina experienced wildly different inflation outcomes ranging from hyperinflation (1989 to 1991) to deflation (1998 to 2001). The transactions cost function (32) implies a demand for money of the form

$$\frac{m}{c} = A - \frac{1}{D} \left( \frac{i}{D(1+i)} \right)^{\frac{1}{B}}.$$  \hfill (33)

This demand for money gives rise to a Laffer curve for seignorage revenue, $i/(1+i)m$, with a peak at $i/(1+i) = D \left( \frac{AB}{1+B} \right)^B$. At the Friedman rule, $i = 0$, the demand for money is finite and equal to $A/D$.

We estimate the parameters $A$, $B$, and $D$ on Argentine data over the period 1960 to 2021 using nonlinear least squares. The estimation includes a dummy for the period 1991 to 2001 during which the Argentine peso was convertible to dollars at a one-to-one rate. During the convertibility period the money-to-output ratio experienced a significant discrete fall of about 45 percent in spite of the inflation rate being at the lowest level in the sample.\(^2\) The reason why real balances were low during this period is that the government lifted restrictions on the use of the dollar as a medium of exchange, as a store of value, and as a unit of account, which led to widespread currency substitution. These restrictions were later reinstituted.

There is no reliable quarterly data on consumption and nominal interest rates for Argentina over long time spans. For this reason, we use annual data, GDP as a proxy for consumption, and CPI inflation as a proxy for the nominal interest rate. Specifically, the proxy for the nominal interest rate is inflation plus a constant 4 percent. The reason for adding a constant is that the proposed money demand function is not defined for negative values of the nominal interest rate, a restriction that is relevant during the period 1998 to

\(^2\)Controlling for inflation, the fall in real money holdings during the convertibility period was 72 percent.
Notes. The notation is $m =$ real money balances, $y =$ real quarterly GDP, and $i =$ quarterly nominal interest rate. Dots and stars represent, respectively, data outside and during the convertibility period (1991 to 2001). Solid lines represent the estimated money demand function (left) and the Laffer curve (right). Seignorage is defined as $i/(1 + i)m/y$. The money demand function has the form given in equation (33). The estimated parameter values are shown in Table 1.

2001, in which Argentina experienced deflation. Data on the money base is taken from the Central Bank of Argentina. The source for nominal GDP is Kehoe and Nicolini (2021) for the period 1960 to 2017 and the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina for the period 2017 to 2021. The source for CPI inflation is the price index produced by INDEC, the government statistical office in charge of producing the Argentine consumer price index, except for the period 2007 to 2016, for which the source is Cavallo and Bertolotto (2016). The Cavallo-Bertolotto CPI index controls for the fact that for much of the period 2007 to 2016 INDEC underreported inflation figures. The parameter estimates are $A = 0.80$, $B = 1.95$, and $D = 1.77$.

Figure 2 displays the implied money demand function and the associated Laffer curve for seignorage income. The peak of the Laffer curve occurs at a quarterly interest rate of 106 percent. Given the assumed discount rate of 4 percent per annum, at the peak of the Laffer curve the monthly inflation rate is 27 percent. With this inflation rate, the government collects 7.9 percent of GDP in seignorage revenue.

We assume that in the steady state the inflation rate is 31 percent per year, $\pi = 1.31^{1/4} - 1$. 

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3We thank Emilio Zaratiegui for sharing this data.

4These parameter values are expressed in a form compatible with a demand for money observed at a quarterly frequency, so they can be used directly in the calibration of the model.
This value corresponds to average CPI inflation observed in Argentina over the calibration period for policy variables, 2007 to 2021. By the Euler equation (6), the steady-state domestic nominal interest rate, \( i \), satisfies \( i = (1 + \pi)/\beta - 1 \). Given the assumed values of \( \beta \) and \( \pi \), the implied steady-state nominal interest rate is 36 percent per year, or \( i = 0.08 \).

We assume that the smuggling cost function is the same in the export and import sectors, \( \kappa_q = \kappa_x = \kappa \), and adopt a quadratic functional form

\[
C(z, \kappa) = \frac{\kappa}{2} z^2,
\]

for \( z = q^*, x^* \). We could not find direct information on the cost of smuggling, although government detection and sanctioning of smuggling activity is regularly reported in the press during spells of exchange controls.\(^5\) We therefore adopt an indirect inference approach. We jointly calibrate \( \kappa \), \( B^* \), \( \rho \), and \( \chi_0 \) by simulated method of moments. The targeted moments are: (a) Official exports equal 17 percent of output, \( e p^* x^o/y = 0.17 \), where \( y \equiv c[1+s(v)] + e[p^* x^o - q^o] \) denotes output. This figure matches the corresponding observed value in Argentina over the calibration period. The source is IFS. (b) A net external debt of the government of 22 percent of annual GDP, \( e B^*/(1 + i^*)/(4y) = 0.22 \). This figure represents the average value of the Argentine government’s debt with external creditors as a fraction of GDP over the calibration period. The data source is the Argentine Ministry of the Economy. (c) An official trade balance to output ratio of 1.5 percent, \( e(p^* x^o - q^o)/y = 0.015 \), which matches the recorded average value observed in Argentina over the calibration period. The data source is IFS. And (d) an average level of hours of 1, \( h = 1 \).

Over the calibration period, the average primary fiscal deficit in Argentina was 2 percent of GDP, \( \tau/y = 0.02 \), and the average domestic government debt was 38 percent of GDP, \( [(a - m)/(1 + i)]/(4y) = 0.38 \). The data sources are IMF Fiscal Monitor and Argentine Ministry of the Economy, respectively.

\(^5\)For example, on February 12, 2023, Clarín, one of the main newspapers of Argentina, reported the government’s uncovering of an export under invoicing scheme involving 20 slaughterhouses. The strategy consisted in channeling meat exports through traders located in a third country (Cyprus, Uruguay, and the United States). These middlemen added no value added, but would simply buy meat from the slaughterhouses at a below-market price and then reexport it to other countries (including China, Chile, and Brazil) with a markup of about 30 percent. The profit, denominated in hard currency, would then be deposited in banks outside Argentina in accounts owned by the involved slaughterhouses, thereby avoiding having to render the foreign exchange at the central bank. In the same article, Clarín reports another underinvoicing strategy consisting in exporting regular beef (class C) as canned beef (class D or E). The price difference is again deposited outside Argentina, avoiding conversion to domestic currency at the official exchange rate by the central bank. The article indicates that the reported monthly exports of canned beef rose 70 percent, suggesting that this form of under invoicing of exports is widespread. According to the Argentine tax authority fines related to under invoicing of exports in the meat industry increased by 667 percent between the first and second halves of 2022.
The above calibration of the model provides values for all components of the government’s budget constraint (29) in the steady state: seignorage \((i/(1+i)m)\), revenue from exchange controls \((s)\), the primary fiscal deficit \((\tau)\), interest payments on external debt \((ei^*B^*/(1+i^*))\), and total domestic government liabilities \((a)\). As is well known, in general these numbers need not exactly satisfy the government budget constraint (Kehoe, Nicolini, and Sargent, 2021). The reasons why in general the government budget constraint will not be satisfied at the calibrated values include: (a) Argentina may not have been at exactly a steady state during the calibration period; (b) the different components of the budget constraint were taken from independent sources; and (c) the model does not allow for default or confiscation of financial assets, which is a recurrent phenomenon in Argentina. To circumvent this issue, we follow Kehoe, Nicolini, and Sargent and introduce a residual, denoted \(\delta\), to ensure that the government budget constraint is satisfied in the steady state. Thus, the steady-state government budget constraint becomes

\[
d^\beta - 1 = \frac{i}{1+i}m(\eta, \eta^*) + s(\eta, \eta^*) - \tau - e(\eta, \eta^*)\frac{i^*B^*}{1+i^*} + \delta, \tag{34}
\]

where \(\eta = [\gamma \rho i]\) and \(\eta^* = [p^x i^* \tau]\) and where we used the Euler equation (6) evaluated at the steady state to replace \(\pi_0\) by \(\beta(1+i) - 1\). The resulting value of \(\delta\) is 0.03. We keep this value constant for the remainder of the paper.

### 3.2 Fiscal Effects of Exchange Controls

Exchange controls affect the fiscal deficit through two channels. First, the exchange-rate gap \(\gamma\) represents a tax on official net exports \(p^x x^o - q^o\). Second, if the government has obligations denominated in units of tradables and in units of nontradables, then by affecting the real exchange rate \(e\), exchange controls can alter the real value of the fiscal deficit. In the present model the primary deficit \(\tau\) is a stream of nontradable goods, whereas interest on the external debt \((i^*B^*/(1+i^*))\) and revenues from the exchange rate gap \((\gamma/(1+\gamma)(p^x x^o - q^o))\) are streams of tradable goods. Movements in the real exchange rate change the relative importance of these components of the fiscal deficit. Thus, exchange controls are not just a tax on net exports but also create fiscal space through a debt deflation effect.

To gauge the ability of exchange controls to generate fiscal revenue, Table 2 displays the change in the fiscal space,

\[
fiscal\ space = s(\eta, \eta^*) - e(\eta, \eta^*)\frac{i^*B^*}{1+i^*} - \tau,
\]

as a fraction of output for selected values of \(\gamma\) and \(\rho\), holding the nominal interest rate \(i_t\) and
Table 2: Exchange Controls and Changes in the Fiscal Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$\rho$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Changes in the fiscal space are measured in percent of GDP and relative to the case $\gamma = \rho = 0$. The interest rate is kept constant at its baseline value.

The table shows that exchange controls can raise significant revenue for the government. The maximum revenue is close to 5 percentage points of GDP. This is a big number. It is two and a half times as large as the primary fiscal deficit observed in Argentina over the calibration period (2007 to 2021). The government generates this outcome by setting the exchange rate gap at 400 percent and by not providing any foreign exchange to importers at the official exchange rate ($\rho = 1$). The table further shows that a government that seeks to maximize fiscal revenue from exchange controls does not sell any foreign currency to importers at the official exchange rate regardless of the value of the exchange rate gap $\gamma$.

Finally, given $\rho$, there is an exchange-rate gap Laffer curve, in the sense that there is a value of $\gamma$ below which fiscal revenue is increasing in $\gamma$ and above which fiscal revenue is decreasing in $\gamma$.

Having established that exchange controls can be a powerful fiscal tool, a natural question that arises is what are the macroeconomic effects and welfare costs of using exchange controls to generate fiscal revenue. This will be the focus of the discussion that follows. The analysis will be performed in general equilibrium.

### 3.3 Macroeconomic Effects of Exchange Controls

In this section we study the general equilibrium effects of varying the exchange-rate gap $\gamma_t$. To this end, we consider equilibria in which the policy vector $\eta_t = [\gamma_t \rho_t \iota_t]$ is constant over...
Figure 3: Exports and Imports as Functions of the Exchange Rate Gap

Notes. The vertical dotted lines mark the average value of \( \gamma \) during each of the two spells of exchange-rate controls that took place during the calibration period, 45 percent in the first episode and 72 percent in the second. The policy variable \( \rho_t \), the exogenous variables \( \tau_t \), \( i_t^* \) and \( p_t^* \), and total domestic government liabilities, \( a_t \), are held constant at their baseline values shown in Table 1.

time. We keep the import restriction \( \rho_t \) fixed at its baseline value (\( \rho_t = \rho = 0.088 \)). We also keep fixed at their baseline values the vector of exogenous shocks and the real value of total government liabilities (\( \eta_t^* = \eta^* \) and \( a_t = a \)). The assumption that \( a_t \) is fixed implies that the government does not use a one-time jump in the price level to inflate away part of its domestic liabilities to cover changes in the present discounted value of fiscal revenues induced by changes in the exchange-rate gap \( \gamma \). Instead, the government finances these imbalances by adjusting the flow of seignorage revenue. Thus, although the nominal interest rate is constant across time, it is potentially different for different values of \( \gamma \). Specifically, for a given value of \( \gamma \), \( i \) adjusts to satisfy the steady-state intertemporal budget constraint of the government, equation (34).

Figure 3 displays the equilibrium effects of changing the exchange rate gap \( \gamma \) on exports and imports. The exchange rate gap is akin to a tax on legal exports. Consequently, when \( \gamma \) increases, firms move away from legal exports and toward smuggling or under invoicing of exports (\( x^o \) falls and \( x^s \) increases). The figure shows, however, that the increase in illegal exports does not fully offset the fall in legal exports. As a result, total exports, \( x^o + x^s \),
At the same time, the exchange rate gap $\gamma$ represents a subsidy on legal imports. The larger the exchange rate gap is, the larger the incentive to over invoice legal imports will be ($q^o > q^n + q^x$ or, equivalently, $q^s < 0$). Firms have an incentive to over invoice imports, that is, to exaggerate their foreign exchange needs to the central bank to profit from the difference between the official and the market exchange rates. The positive relation between $\gamma$ and $q^o$ occurs for values of $\gamma$ below 5 percent (not shown in Figure 3). For values of $\gamma$ greater than 5 percent, the relation between $\gamma$ and $q^o$ turns negative (bottom left panel of Figure 3). This is because the incentive to import through the official channel and the disincentive to export through the official channel are so large that the import constraint becomes binding, $q^o = \bar{q}^o = (1 - \rho)p^x x^o$. That is, the government starts to ration the provision of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate to importers. At this point, exchange controls turn from an import subsidy to an import quota. The larger is the exchange rate gap $\gamma$, the smaller legal exports will be and therefore the more stringent the import quota $(1 - \rho)p^x x^o$ will be. Thus, paradoxically, as the subsidy on official imports increases (i.e., as $\gamma$ increases), official imports decline.

For exchange rate gaps larger than 12 percent ($\gamma > 0.12$), the supply of foreign exchange at the official rate is so scarce that importers stop over invoicing ($q^s$ ceases to be negative) and begin to smuggle intermediate materials into the country ($q^s$ becomes positive). In other words, for $\gamma > 0.12$ the amount of imported materials used in production exceeds the amount of official imports ($q^n + q^x > q^o$), or illegal imports are positive. The larger $\gamma$ is, the larger the amount of smuggled imports will be. However, as the figure shows, the increase in illegal imports as $\gamma$ goes up is not large enough to offset the fall in legal imports. As a result, as $\gamma$ increases, total imports, $q^o + q^s$, fall.

In sum, Figure 3 shows that both total imports and total exports are decreasing functions of $\gamma$.\footnote{For values of the exchange-rate gap $0 < \gamma < 0.05$, not shown in Figure 3, total exports, $X(q^x)$, and total imports, $q^x + q^n$, are independent of $\gamma$. For this range of values of $\gamma$, both the import restriction and the nonnegativity constraint on official exports are slack ($q^o < (1 - \rho)p^x x^o$ and $x^o > 0$). The production of export goods is efficient and determined by the condition $p^x X'(q^x) = 1$, so $q^x$ is independent of $\gamma$. The amount of imports used in the production of nontradables, $q^n$, is also independent of $\gamma$ and determined by the condition $p^x X(q^x) = q^x + q^n + i^* B^*/(1 + i^*)$.}

For exchange rate gaps larger than 12 percent ($\gamma > 0.12$), the supply of foreign exchange at the official rate is so scarce that importers stop over invoicing ($q^s$ ceases to be negative) and begin to smuggle intermediate materials into the country ($q^s$ becomes positive). In other words, for $\gamma > 0.12$ the amount of imported materials used in production exceeds the amount of official imports ($q^n + q^x > q^o$), or illegal imports are positive. The larger $\gamma$ is, the larger the amount of smuggled imports will be. However, as the figure shows, the increase in illegal imports as $\gamma$ goes up is not large enough to offset the fall in legal imports. As a result, as $\gamma$ increases, total imports, $q^o + q^s$, fall.

In sum, Figure 3 shows that both total imports and total exports are decreasing functions of $\gamma$.\footnote{The intuitive discussion of Figure 3 abstracts from the fact that the interest rate, $i$, which changes with $\gamma$, does affect imports and exports. Changes in the nominal interest rate distort the labor-consumption decision (efficiency condition (5)). In turn, changes in employment affect the production of tradable and nontradable goods, and thus also exports and imports. However, these effects happen to be small, so that movements in exports and imports are dominated by changes in $\gamma$.} Put differently, as the exchange rate gap widens, the economy becomes more closed to international trade.
Figure 4: The Real Exchange Rate, the Terms of Trade, and the Trade Balance as Functions of the Exchange Rate Gap

Note. See notes to Figure 3.
as the gap between the market exchange rate and the official exchange rate widens. This is a consequence of the binding import restriction. When import restrictions are binding, the official trade balance is proportional to official exports, \( p^o x^o - q^o = \rho p^o x^o \). And because \( x^o \) is decreasing in \( \gamma \), so is the official trade balance. This effect has negative fiscal consequences, because the official trade balance is the base of the exchange-control “tax” (see equation (24)). The figure shows that the decline in the official trade surplus is offset by an increase in the smuggling trade balance \( \rho^s x^s - q^s \). The reason this is so is that by the market clearing condition (28), the country’s overall trade balance surplus must equal interest payments on external debt. As the latter payments are independent of \( \gamma \), a declining official trade balance must be perfectly offset by an increasing smuggling trade balance.

The exchange-rate gap distorts the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. The top right panel of Figure 4 shows that as exchange rate controls become more stringent, the internal terms of trade deteriorate, that is, imported goods become more expensive relative to exported goods in the domestic economy. Put differently, as exchange rate controls increase, exporters perceive that they become less competitive in international goods markets. This is because as \( \gamma \) increases, they receive less income for their external sales and because they have to pay higher marginal smuggling costs for imported inputs. The deterioration of the internal terms of trade explains why the economy becomes more closed with tighter exchange controls. The bottom left panel of Figure 4 shows that as the exchange rate gap increases, the internal real exchange rate, \( e + C'(q^*, \kappa q) \), depreciates, that is, as \( \gamma \) increases, producers of nontradable goods find that imported materials become more expensive relative to the final good they produce. The increase in the domestic price of imports results from higher marginal smuggling costs as the dependence of firms on smuggled imports increases with \( \gamma \) (recall the discussion around Figure 3). By contrast, the external real exchange rate appreciates \( (e \) falls) with \( \gamma \). Movements in this relative price are not relevant for producers in an economy with exchange controls but do matter for the government. The appreciation of the external real exchange rate caused by higher values of \( \gamma \) has positive and negative fiscal consequences. On the positive side, it reduces the value of interest payments on the external debt in terms of consumption goods \( (e i^* B^*/(1 + i^*) \) falls). On the negative side, all else equal, the appreciation of the external real exchange rate reduces the value of fiscal revenues from exchange controls \( (e \gamma/(1 + \gamma)(p^o x^o - q^o) \) falls).

The fiscal consequences of changing the exchange-rate gap are displayed in Figure 5. The fiscal space, \( s - \tau - e i^* B^*/(1 + i^*) \), improves with the exchange rate gap \( \gamma \) through two channels, a tax channel and a debt deflation channel. The tax channel is displayed in the top left panel of the figure. This panel shows that revenue from exchange controls, \( s = \gamma/(1 + \gamma)e(p^o x^o - q^o) \), is increasing in the exchange-rate gap. This source of fiscal revenue
can be interpreted as the product of a tax rate, $\gamma / (1 + \gamma)$, and a tax base, the official trade balance expressed in units of the consumption good, $e(p^x x^o - q^o)$. As $\gamma$ increases the tax rate increases but the tax base falls (recall that both $e$ and $p^x x^o - q^o$ fall with $\gamma$). However, the tax base declines proportionally less than the tax rate rises, resulting in increased fiscal revenue from exchange controls. The debt deflation channel is displayed in the top right panel of Figure 5. As $\gamma$ increases, the value of external interest payments in terms of units of consumption, $e_i^* B^* / (1+i^*)$, falls (recall that the external real exchange rate $e$ appreciates with $\gamma$). Jointly the tax channel and the debt deflation channel raise the fiscal space by 1 percentage point of GDP when $\gamma$ increases from near 0 to 1.

Consider now the effects of increasing exchange rate controls on the nominal interest rate, $i$, inflation, $\pi$, and seignorage revenue, $i / (1+i)m$, which are shown in the bottom panels of Figure 5. We have already shown that the fiscal space increases with $\gamma$. This means that a widening of the exchange rate gap allows the government to rely less on seignorage revenue to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint (29). As a result, as $\gamma$ increases, inflation falls and the government lowers the nominal interest rate. This connection between inflation and exchange controls is the key trade off explored in this paper. In section 4, we study how a Ramsey planner resolves this trade off.
Figure 6: Hours, Wages, Consumption, and Welfare as Functions of the Exchange Rate Gap

Figure 6 that employment increases with the exchange-rate gap. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The fall in the nominal interest rate resulting from an increase in $\gamma$ induces households to remonetize (recall that by equation (4) money velocity is decreasing in the nominal interest rate). In turn, by efficiency condition (5), the fall in money velocity reduces the distortion in the labor-consumption margin stemming from the transactions cost, $1+s(v)+vs'(v)$, which causes an expansion in the supply of labor. The increase in the supply of labor results in a fall in the real wage (top right panel of Figure 6).

Figure 6 also shows that consumption is a nonmonotonic function of the exchange rate gap. Changes in $\gamma$ have positive and negative effects on $c$. They depress private consumption for two reasons. First, as the exchange rate gap increases, the economy suffers from a shortage of intermediate inputs for the production of consumption goods ($q^n$ falls). Second, as the exchange rate gap widens, smuggling increases, which is resource consuming ($C(x^*,\kappa_x)$ and $C(q^*,\kappa_q)$ both go up). The positive effects of an increase in $\gamma$ on consumption stem from the fall in transactions costs associated with the decline in the interest rate. This results in a hump-shaped relationship between consumption and $\gamma$ (bottom left panel of Figure 6). However, for most values of the exchange-rate gap considered in Figure 6 consumption falls as the exchange-rate gap increases.
Because consumption is decreasing and labor is increasing in the exchange-rate gap (bottom right panel of Figure 6). Overall, the negative welfare effect of exchange-rate controls occur because exchange rate controls, by discouraging the use of traded intermediate inputs, cause a misallocation of resources away from imports and toward labor effort.

The present analysis therefore suggests that at least for the calibration considered although exchange rate controls can compete with inflation as a source of fiscal revenue, the latter is a less costly instrument in terms of welfare. In the next section, we sharpen this result by characterizing the optimal policy when a benevolent government chooses optimally the exchange-rate gap $\gamma$, the degree of import restrictions $\rho$, and the nominal interest rate $i$.

4 Optimal Exchange Controls

We assume that the government chooses the path of the policy instruments $i_t$, $\gamma_t$, and $\rho_t$ in a benevolent fashion, that is, aiming to maximize the lifetime welfare of the representative household. We also assume that the government can commit to its policy announcements. Further, as in much of the literature on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, we assume that policy is optimal from the timeless perspective. Under the maintained assumption that the fundamentals $p_t^e$, $i_t^e$ and $\tau_t$ are constant over time, optimality from the timeless perspective amounts to assuming that policy supports a steady state in which the stock of real domestic government liabilities, $a_t$, is constant over time at a value, $a$, determined in the indefinite past. Thus, the Ramsey optimal equilibrium is defined as follows:

**Definition 2 (Ramsey Policy from the Timeless Perspective)** A Ramsey optimal equilibrium from the timeless perspective is a policy triplet $(\gamma, \rho, i)$ that maximizes

$$U(c(\eta, \eta^*), h(\eta, \eta^*))$$

subject to

$$a \beta^{-1} - 1 = \frac{i}{1 + i} m(\eta, \eta^*) + s(\eta, \eta^*) - \tau - e(\eta, \eta^*) \frac{i^e B^*}{1 + i^e} + \delta$$

and

$$i \geq 0,$$

given $a$, where $\eta \equiv [\gamma \rho i]$ and $\eta^* \equiv [p^e i^e \tau]$.

The Ramsey problem does not admit a closed form solution. It is a complex maximization problem because both the objective function and the constraints feature functions of the
policy triplet \((\gamma, \rho, i)\) that are themselves the solution to a system of a relatively large number of equalities and inequalities (see the analysis in section 2.4). Accordingly, we solve the Ramsey problem numerically. All structural parameters as well as the real value of domestic government liabilities \(a\) and the exogenous fundamentals \(p^x, i^*, \tau\) take the values shown in Table 1.

We compare the Ramsey optimal policy to two alternative policies. One is a policy without exchange-rate controls or import restrictions \((\gamma = \rho = 0)\). Under this policy, the government collects no revenue from exchange controls, and fiscal solvency is attained solely through seignorage revenue. The second alternative policy we consider is one in which the government aims to minimize inflation. This policy tries to capture the fact that one possible rationale for exchange controls in emerging countries with chronic fiscal deficits is their use as a substitute for inflationary finance. This policy regime is formally defined as follows:

**Definition 3 (Minimum-Inflation Equilibrium from the Timeless Perspective)** The minimum-inflation equilibrium from the timeless perspective is a policy triplet \((\gamma, \rho, i)\) that solves the problem

\[
\begin{align*}
\min \pi \\
\text{subject to} \quad a \frac{\beta^{-1} - 1}{1 + i} = \frac{i}{1 + i} m(\eta, \eta^*) + s(\eta, \eta^*) - e(\eta, \eta^*) \frac{i^* B^*}{1 + i^*} + \delta, \\
1 + \pi = \beta(1 + i), \\
i \geq 0,
\end{align*}
\]

given \(a\), where \(\eta \equiv [\gamma \rho i]\) and \(\eta^* \equiv [p^x i^* \tau]\).

Table 3 displays the predictions of the model. The main result is that the optimal policy (column 2) calls for virtually no exchange controls. The optimal exchange rate gap is only 3 percent \((\gamma = 0.03)\) and import restrictions are low \((\rho = 0.15)\). Consequently, total revenue from exchange controls is virtually nil \((0.2\%\) of GDP). The benevolent government relies almost exclusively on inflation to finance the budget. Under the optimal policy the annual inflation rate is 35.6 percent and seignorage revenue is 2.7 percent of GDP. Quantitatively, the optimal policy looks much like the policy without exchange controls (column 1 of the table).

The reason why the social planner does not rely on exchange controls to finance the budget is not that this instrument is incapable of collecting significant amounts of resources, but that it is a highly inefficient way of doing so. Specifically, the third column of Table 3
Table 3: Optimal Exchange Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No Exchange Controls</th>
<th>Optimal Exchange Controls</th>
<th>Minimum Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exchange-rate gap $\gamma$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>import restrictions $\rho$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest rate (%/yr)</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inflation (%/yr)</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seignorage (% GDP)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revenue FX controls (% GDP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welfare cost (% consumption)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. FX controls stands for exchange controls. Revenue from FX controls is defined as follows. Let $z \equiv s - ei^*B^*/(1 + i^*)$ and $z^0$ be the value of $z$ in the absence of FX controls ($\gamma = 0$ and no import controls, shown in column 1). Similarly, let $y^0$ be the value of $y$ in the absence of FX controls. Then revenue from FX controls as a percent of GDP is defined as $100(z - z^0)/y^0$. The welfare cost of a given policy is computed as the percentage increase in consumption each period required to make households as well off under the given policy as under the optimal one.

shows the policy that obtains from a government that minimizes the inflation rate.$^8$ The inflation-minimizing government follows the Friedman rule ($i = 0$) and therefore collects no seignorage revenue. Instead, it collects 3 percent of GDP from exchange controls. It does so by increasing the exchange rate gap from 3 percent to 87 percent ($\gamma$ increases from 0.03 to 0.87) and by reducing exchange rate based import subsidies ($\rho$ increases from 0.15 to 0.52). About 60 percent of the increase in fiscal revenue from exchange controls stems from an increase in $s$ (the tax on the official trade balance induced by a positive exchange-rate gap).

The rest of the increase in revenue from exchange controls comes from debt deflation, that is, from a decline in the value of net external interest payments in terms of consumption ($ei^*B^*/(1 + i^*)$), caused by an appreciation of the external real exchange rate (a fall in $e$). In achieving this real appreciation, import restrictions play a central role. The reason is that when $\rho$ is large, firms must rely heavily on materials imported at the market exchange rate (smuggled materials), which are more expensive than materials imported at the official exchange rate.

Financing a sizable part of the budget through exchange controls is highly welfare reducing. The bottom row of Table 3 shows that households require a 4.57 percent increase in consumption each period to be as well off under the minimum-inflation policy as under the optimal one.

$^8$We assume that the inflation minimizing government has lexicographic preferences. Specifically, it first minimizes inflation and then maximizes welfare. The welfare dimension of its preferences matters because, as it turns out, the zero lower bound on the interest rate ($i = 0$), which produces the minimum possible level of inflation, is a feasible equilibrium attainable by multiple values of the policy pair ($\gamma, \rho$).
4.1 Optimal Exchange Controls and Changes in Fundamentals

Figure 7 displays the optimal value of the policy triplet \((\gamma, \rho, i)\) as a function of the terms of trade, \(p^x\), the external interest rate, \(i^*\), and the primary fiscal deficit, \(\tau\). The changes in fundamentals considered are significant, \(\pm 30\) percent for \(p^x\), \(\pm 10\) percentage points for \(i^*\), and -1 to 8 percent of GDP for \(\tau\). The optimal adjustment of policy to changes in fundamentals is intuitive. An improvement in the terms of trade is associated with a reduction in both exchange controls and the nominal interest rate. The reason is that as \(p^x\) increases, the economy expands, requiring lower tax rates to collect the resources needed to balance the budget. By contrast, increases in the primary deficit or in the interest on the external debt both require an increase in tax rates to ensure fiscal solvency.

The figure shows that the key result of the paper that the benevolent government does
Table 4: Sensitivity of Optimal Exchange Control Policy to Changes in Structural Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Optimal Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>$A = 0.80$</td>
<td>$i$ 41.1, $\pi=35.6$, $\gamma=0.03$, $\rho=0.15$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low money demand</td>
<td>$A = 0.54$</td>
<td>$i=79.4$, $\pi=72.5$, $\gamma=0.12$, $\rho=0.20$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High money demand</td>
<td>$A = 1.07$</td>
<td>$i=26.6$, $\pi=21.7$, $\gamma=0.02$, $\rho=0.14$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legalized parallel import market</td>
<td>$\kappa_q = 0$</td>
<td>$i=10.9$, $\pi=6.6$, $\gamma=0.12$, $\rho=1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure export tariff</td>
<td>$\kappa_q = 0$, $\kappa_x = \infty$</td>
<td>$i=1.7$, $\pi=-2.3$, $\gamma=0.17$, $\rho=1$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. The table displays the optimal values of $i$ = nominal interest rate (percent per year), $\pi$ = inflation rate (percent per year), $\gamma$ = exchange-rate gap, and $\rho$ = degree of import restrictions for different values of the parameter $A$ defining the intercept of the demand for money and the parameters $\kappa_q$ and $\kappa_x$ defining the cost of smuggling.

The optimal value of the exchange rate gap remains small as $p^*, i^*$, and $\tau$ change. The largest movement in the optimal value of $\gamma$ obtains in the case in which the primary fiscal deficit $\tau$ is in the range 6 to 8 percent of GDP, or 3 to 4 times the value observed over the calibration period. Even in this extreme territory of fiscal deficits, the optimal exchange rate gap remains below the average value observed over the calibration period ($\gamma = 0.23$).

To maintain fiscal solvency the social planner resorts primarily to changes in seignorage. In turn, the government brings about changes in seignorage through changes in the nominal interest rate—and inflation, recall that $1 + \pi = \beta(1 + i)$. Interestingly, the government does use changes in the degree of import restrictions, $\rho$, as a fiscal instrument. The purpose of restricting imports is to depress the external real exchange rate, $e$, and thereby reduce the real value of external interest payments in terms of consumption goods, $ei^*B^*/(1 + i^*)$.

### 4.2 Optimal Exchange Controls and Structural Parameter Changes

A key element of the model is the demand for money. The reason is that the demand for money represents the base of the inflation tax. The larger the demand for money is, the easier it will be for the government to collect resources via the inflation tax and the less it will need to rely on exchange controls. Conversely, the smaller the demand for money is, the harder it will be for the government to collect revenue with the inflation tax and the more it will have to rely on exchange controls. Table 4 confirms this intuition. It displays the optimal policy for three values of the parameter $A$, measuring the intercept of the demand
for money: the baseline value, a smaller value equal to two thirds of the baseline value, and a higher value equal to four thirds of the baseline value. When $A$ takes the smaller value, to balance the budget the government needs more inflation (73 percent per year instead of 36 percent), a larger exchange rate gap ($\gamma$ 0.12 instead of 0.03) and more import controls ($\rho$ 0.20 instead of 0.15). By contrast, when $A$ takes the larger value, the government finds it optimal to balance the budget with less inflation (22 percent instead of 36 percent) and with little use of exchange controls ($\gamma$ 0.02 and $\rho$ 0.14).

Two other structural parameters that are key for determining the tradeoff between financing the fiscal deficit with money creation or with exchange controls are the smuggling cost parameters $\kappa_q$ and $\kappa_x$. Suppose it is legal to use the parallel exchange rate market for imports, that is, $\kappa_q$ is equal to zero. Table 4 shows that in this case the government finds it optimal not to sell foreign exchange at the subsidized rate to importers ($\rho = 1$). This is intuitive because absent smuggling costs, if $\gamma > 0$, there exists a pure arbitrage opportunity consisting in importing at the subsidized exchange rate, $E^s$, and re-exporting at the market exchange rate, $E$. This arbitrage opportunity induces firms to use the subsidized exchange rate until the import constraint, equation (10), is binding. This implies that the marginal cost of imports faced by the firm is the market exchange rate regardless of the import quota parameter $\rho$. In turn this means that imports and exports are independent of $\rho$. Consequently, subsidizing imports leaves the real allocation unchanged but reduces fiscal revenues. So, at the optimum, the government eliminates this subsidy by setting $\rho = 1$. Without import subsidies using up government resources the exchange rate gap $\gamma$, which is now a tax on official exports, becomes a more powerful fiscal instrument. Indeed, the Ramsey optimal value of $\gamma$ increases from 0.03 to 0.12. However, this increase is modest relative to the exchange-rate gaps observed in the two spells of exchange-rate controls that took place during the calibration period. The increase in revenue from exchange controls allows the government to rely less on seignorage revenue. Consequently, the optimal inflation rate declines significantly from 35.6 to 6.6 percent year.

Suppose now that in addition to imports at the market exchange rate being legal, smuggling exports is prohibitively expensive ($\kappa_q = 0$ and $\kappa_x = \infty$). This case, shown in the bottom line of Table 4, captures the conventional interpretation of exchange controls as a tax on exports. Now changes in the exchange rate gap do not alter incentives to underinvoice exports. So $\gamma$ becomes an even more efficient instrument to collect fiscal revenue than in

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*Formally, when $\kappa_q = 0$, equilibrium conditions (16) and (18) imply that the import restriction (10) is binding, that is, $q^o_t = (1 - \rho_t)p^x_t x^o_t$. The other conditions describing equilibrium given policy (see Proposition 1), with the exception of equation (24) defining fiscal revenue from exchange controls, depend only on total imports, that is, on the sum of $q^o_t$ and $q^s_t$, but not on $q^o_t$ or $q^s_t$ individually, and furthermore are independent of the policy variable $\rho_t$.\footnote{Formally, when $\kappa_q = 0$, equilibrium conditions (16) and (18) imply that the import restriction (10) is binding, that is, $q^o_t = (1 - \rho_t)p^x_t x^o_t$. The other conditions describing equilibrium given policy (see Proposition 1), with the exception of equation (24) defining fiscal revenue from exchange controls, depend only on total imports, that is, on the sum of $q^o_t$ and $q^s_t$, but not on $q^o_t$ or $q^s_t$ individually, and furthermore are independent of the policy variable $\rho_t$.}
the case just discussed, in which imports in the parallel market are legal but $\kappa_x$ takes its baseline value. Intuitively, the Ramsey government raises the exchange rate gap. However, the optimal value of $\gamma$, 0.17, continues to be small relative to observed values. The greater ability of exchange controls to collect fiscal revenue allows the government to make practically no use of the inflation tax. The optimal value of the interest rate is near the Friedman rule (1.7 percent per year) and inflation is negative.

Overall, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that the finding that the optimal level of the exchange-rate gap is low, is robust to variations in the structural parameters pertaining to the demand for money and the costs of smuggling.

5 Conclusion

Each year a sizeable number of emerging countries, especially high-inflation countries, resort to exchange controls. This type of policy acts as a tax on net exports and, as we demonstrate, also deflates the real value of external public debt. Exchange controls therefore represent a source of revenue for the government. However, they also lead to misallocation of factor inputs across sectors of production and create incentives for smuggling, which entails resource costs. Thus, a government that runs chronic fiscal deficits faces a tradeoff between financing them with inflation, which also creates distortions, and financing them with exchange controls.

The present study evaluates this tradeoff in the context of an equilibrium model calibrated to an emerging economy that has experienced large exchange controls and high inflation. It finds that the policy tradeoff is resolved overwhelmingly in favor of no exchange controls. The optimal allocation is virtually identical to one without any exchange controls, with the government financing the chronic fiscal deficit through the inflation tax.

The reason why a benevolent government does not use exchange controls as a fiscal instrument is not that this policy tool cannot generate sizable fiscal revenue. In fact, in the calibrated economy, the government could finance the entirety of the fiscal deficit with exchange controls and induce a low-inflation equilibrium. However, this policy comes at a high welfare cost relative to the optimal one. One possible interpretation of this result is that governments that implement exchange controls may be driven by political considerations that lead them to prioritize avoiding extreme levels of inflation over economic efficiency. This type of political equilibrium could emerge if the former is more easily perceived by the public as a failure of policy. This type of analysis is beyond the scope of the present investigation and thus left as a suggestion for future research.
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