Pegs and Pain

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Motivation

- History suggests that currency pegs are easy to adopt, but hard to maintain.

- **The Achilles’ Heel of Currency Pegs:** The combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and a currency peg creates rigidity in real wages, which makes countries highly vulnerable to negative shocks.

- Our question: How much extra unemployment and pain do currency pegs add to external crises?
Boon-Bust Cycle in Peripherical Europe: 2000-2011

Data Source: Eurostat. Data represents arithmetic mean of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, and Slovakia
Related Literature:

Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985 (gold standard theory of great depression, empirical)

Welfare cost of peg:
Kollmann, 2002 (small open economy with sticky prices, 4 shocks, monopolistic competition, incomplete markets, welfare costs of pegs < 1%)

Galí and Monacelli, 2005 (small open economy with sticky prices, small welfare costs of pegs)
The Gold Standard Hypothesis (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985)

Countries that left gold early enjoyed much more rapid recoveries than those that stayed on gold. This difference in performance was associated with earlier reflation of price levels in the countries leaving gold.

Gold Bloc: France, Belgium, Netherland, Italy

Sterling Bloc: (left gold early, 1931): United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway
Figure 2
Changes in Real Wages and Industrial Production, 1929–1935

IP\textsuperscript{1935} = 175.2 - 59.8 \text{Wage}_{1935}/\text{WPI}_{1935}
What the paper does:

• Build a traded-nontraded good small open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity and liability dollarization.

• Characterize aggregate dynamics under optimal exchange rate policy and under a currency peg.

• Quantify the costs of currency pegs in terms of unemployment and welfare.
Preview of Main Findings

• Currency pegs are extremely painful.

• They induce an average unemployment rate of 14 percent and lower aggregate consumption by 5 percent on average.

• The median welfare costs of pegs is 4–10 percent of consumption.
A Model of unemployment due to downward nominal wage rigidity

\[ W_t \geq \gamma W_{t-1} \]

\[ W_t = \text{nominal wage rate in period } t \]

\[ \gamma \geq 0 \text{ degree of downward wage rigidity} \]
Empirical Evidence on Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity — what is a plausible value for $\gamma$
Some Evidence that Nominal Wage Rigidity is One-Sided
# Probability of Decline, Increase, or No Change in Nominal Wages Between Interviews

U.S. data, SIIP panel 1986-1993, within-job changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interviews One Year apart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decline</strong></td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase</strong></td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gottschalk (2005)

Note. Male and female hourly workers not in school, 18 to 55 at some point during the panel. All nominal-wage changes are within-job wage changes, defined as changes while working for the same employer.
Distribution of Non-Zero Wage Changes, Hourly Workers, 1996-99

Evidence on the size of $\gamma$
Argentina 1996-2006

Nominal Exchange Rate ($E_t$)

Unemployment Rate + Underemployment Rate

Nominal Wage ($W_t$)

Real Wage ($W_t/E_t$)

Memo: Average annual CPI inflation 1998-2001: -0.86%
## Unemployment, Nominal Wages, and $\gamma$

**Evidence from the Eurozone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate 2008Q1 (in percent)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate 2011Q2 (in percent)</th>
<th>Wage Growth $\frac{W_{2011Q2}}{W_{2008Q1}}$ (in percent)</th>
<th>Implied Value of $\gamma$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>0.9982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** $W$ is an index of nominal average hourly labor cost in manufacturing, construction, and services. Unemployment is the economy-wide unemployment rate. Source: EuroStat.
The Model
Traded and Nontraded Goods

Traded goods, stochastic endowment: \( y_t^T \)

Nontraded goods, produced with labor: \( y_t^N = F(h_t) \)

The relative price on nontradables: \( p_t = \frac{P_t^N}{P_t^T} \)

Law of one price holds for tradables: \( P_t^T = P_t^* E_t \)

Nominal exchange rate: \( E_t \)

Assume that \( P_t^* = 1 \)
Firms in the Nontraded Sector

\[
\max_{\{h_t\}} \ p_t F(h_t) - w_t h_t,
\]

taking as given \( p_t \) and \( w_t \),

where \( w_t \equiv W_t/E_t \) is the real wage in terms of tradables.

Optimality condition (or the Supply of Nontradables):

\[
p_t = \frac{W_t/E_t}{F'(h_t)}
\]
The Supply of Nontraded Goods

\[ \frac{W_0}{E_0} = \frac{F'(h)}{p} \]
$E_t \uparrow$: A Devaluation Shifts The Supply Schedule Down

$(E_1 > E_0)$
Households

$$\max_{\{c_t^T, c_t^N, d_{t+1}\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t)$$

subject to

$$c_t = A(c_t^T, c_t^N)$$

$$c_t^T + p_t c_t^N + d_t = y_t^T + w_t h_t + \frac{d_{t+1}}{1 + r_t} + \phi_t$$

$$d_{t+1} \leq \bar{d}$$

- Workers supply $\bar{h}$ hours inelastically, but may not be able to sell them all. They take $h_t \leq \bar{h}$ as given.

- One first-order condition (Demand for Nontradables):

$$\frac{A_2(c_t^T, c_t^N)}{A_1(c_t^T, c_t^N)} = p_t$$
The Demand for Nontraded Goods

\[ \frac{A_2(c_0^T, F(h))}{A_1(c_0^T, F(h))} \]
A Contraction in Traded Absorption, $c^T_t \downarrow$, Shifts the Demand for Nontradables Down and to the Left

\[ \frac{A_2(c^T_0, F(h))}{A_1(c^T_0, F(h))} \]

\[ \frac{A_2(c^T_1, F(h))}{A_1(c^T_1, F(h))} \]

$(c^T_1 < c^T_0)$
Disequilibrium in the Labor Market

The following 3 conditions must hold at all times:

\[ W_t \geq \gamma W_{t-1} \]

\[ h_t \leq \bar{h} \]

\[ (\bar{h} - h_t) (W_t - \gamma W_{t-1}) = 0 \]
Currency Pegs and Unemployment

(Here assume that $\gamma = 1$)

\[ p = \frac{A_2(c^T_0, F(h))}{A_1(c^T_0, F(h))} \quad \frac{A_2(c^T_1, F(h))}{A_1(c^T_1, F(h))} \]

$p_0$ $p_{\text{PEG}}$ $p_{\text{OPT}}$

$h_{\text{PEG}}$ $\bar{h} = h_{\text{OPT}}$ $h$

$\frac{W_0}{E_0}$ \quad \frac{W_0}{E_1}$

$c^T_1 < c^T_0$ (negative shock) and $E_1 > E_0$ (optimal devaluation)
Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy

Set the (gross) devaluation rate, \( \epsilon_t = E_t / E_{t-1} \), to eliminate unemployment:

\[
\epsilon_t \equiv \max \left\{ 1, \frac{\gamma W_{t-1} / E_{t-1}}{\omega(c_t^T)} \right\}
\]

where \( \omega(c_t^T) \) denotes the full-employment real wage:

\[
\omega(c_t^T) \equiv \frac{A_2(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))}{A_1(c_t^T, F(\bar{h}))} F'(\bar{h}); \quad \omega'(c_t^T) > 0
\]

Dynamics Under Optimal Exchange Rate Policy

\[
v^{OPT}(y_t^T, r_t, d_t) = \max_{\{d_{t+1}, c_t^T\}} \left\{ U(A(c_t^T, F(\bar{h})) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t v^{OPT}(y_{t+1}^T, r_{t+1}, d_{t+1}) \right\}
\]

subject to \( d_{t+1} \leq \bar{d} \) and

\[
y_t^T + \frac{d_{t+1}}{1 + r_t} = d_t + c_t^T
\]
Currency Pegs

Set the (gross) devaluation rate to unity:

$$\epsilon_t = 1.$$ 

• **Implied labor allocation**

$$h_t \begin{cases} h & \text{if } \omega(c_T^t) \geq \gamma \frac{W_{t-1}}{E_{t-1}} \\ \text{solves} & \\ \frac{A_N(c_T^t, F(h_t))}{A_T(c_T^t, F(h_t))} F'(h_t) = \gamma \frac{W_{t-1}}{E_{t-1}} & \text{if } \omega(c_T^t) < \gamma \frac{W_{t-1}}{E_{t-1}} \end{cases}$$

• **Disequilibrium dynamics** cannot be expressed as the solution to a Bellman equation without additional state variables.

• **Solution Method:** Iteration of disequilibrium conditions over the (discretized) 4-dimensional state space \( \{ y_T^t, r_t, d_t, w_{t-1} \} \).
Calibration and Functional Forms

\[ U(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} \]

\[ A(c^T, c^N) = \left[ a(c^T)^{1-\frac{1}{\xi}} + (1 - a)(c^N)^{1-\frac{1}{\xi}} \right]^{\frac{\xi}{\xi - 1}} \]

\[ F(h) = h^\alpha \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\gamma)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>Degree of downward nominal wage rigidity (also 0.98-0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma^{-1})</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>Intertemp. elast. subst. (Reinhart and Végh, 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>Share of tradables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\xi)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>Intratemp. elast. subst. (González-Rozada et al., 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Labor share in nontraded sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\bar{h})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor endowment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>0.9375</td>
<td>Quarterly subjective discount factor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Driving Process:

Estimate the following AR(1) system using Argentine data over the period 1983:Q1—2001:Q3:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\ln y_t^T \\
\ln \frac{1+r_t}{1+r}
\end{bmatrix} = A \begin{bmatrix}
\ln y_{t-1}^T \\
\ln \frac{1+r_{t-1}}{1+r}
\end{bmatrix} + \epsilon_t,
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial Corr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($y_t^T, r_t$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Traded Output in Argentina 1983:Q1-2008:Q3

Note. Detrended and seasonally adjusted.
The Origin of a Crisis

Traded Output, $y_t^T$

percent deviation from mean
quarters since onset of crisis

Annualized Interest Rate, $r_t$

percentage point deviation from mean
quarters since onset of crisis
The Dynamics of a Crisis

Unemployment Rate, $1 - h_t$

Real (CPI) Wage, $W_t/P_t$

Annualized Devaluation Rate, $\epsilon_t$

Real Exchange Rate ($P^N_t/E_t$)

Trade Balance, $y_t^T - e_t^T$

Net External Debt, $d_t$

Currency Peg

--- Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy
The Debt-to-GDP Ratio During a Crisis

Debt to GDP Ratio, $d_t/(4(p_t c_t^N + y_t^T))$

- Currency Peg
- Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy
The Distribution of External Debt

![Graph showing the distribution of net external debt with two peaks, one labeled "Optimal Policy" and another labeled "Currency Peg". The x-axis represents net external debt, and the y-axis represents density. The graph compares the distribution under different policies.]
The Welfare Cost of Currency Pegs

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U \left( c_t^{\text{PEG}} (1 + \lambda(s_0)) \right) \mid s_0 \right\} = \mathbb{E}\left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U \left( c_t^{\text{OPT}} \right) \mid s_0 \right\}$$

where $s_0 = \{y^T_0, r_0, d_0, w_{-1}\}$. 

Median = 10.4 percent 
Mean = 12.3 percent
The importance of asymmetric wage rigidity for the size of welfare cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Wage Rigidity</th>
<th>Mean Welfare Cost of a Peg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only downward: ( W_t \geq \gamma W_{t-1} )</td>
<td>12.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric: ( \frac{1}{\gamma} W_{t-1} \geq W_t \geq \gamma W_{t-1} )</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Welfare Cost of Currency Pegs as a Function of the State Variables

Note. All states except the one shown on the horizontal axis are fixed at their unconditional means. Dashed lines indicate the mean of the state displayed on the horizontal axis.
Sensitivity Analysis (I)
The Welfare Costs of Pegs As a Function of $\gamma$

![Graph showing the welfare costs as a function of $\gamma$.]
Sensitivity Analysis (II)  
Endogenous Labor Supply

\[ U(c_t, h_t) = c_t^{1-\sigma} - 1 \frac{1 - 1}{1 - \sigma} \varphi + \frac{(\bar{h} - h_t)^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \theta )</th>
<th>( E\frac{\bar{h} - h_t}{h_t\varphi} )</th>
<th>Welfare Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \bar{h} = 3, \varphi = 4.4 \).
## Sensitivity Analysis (III)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameterization</th>
<th>Welfare Cost of a Peg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher patience ($\beta = 0.945$)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher intratemp. elast. subst. ($\xi = 0.88$)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher intertemp. elast. subst. ($\sigma = 2$)</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inducing the Efficient Allocation Through Fiscal Policy

- Maintain the peg (i.e., set $\epsilon_t = 1$).

- Subsidize wages at the rate, $\tau_t$, when real wage is 'too high':

$$\tau_t = \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{\omega(c_t^T)}{\gamma w_{t-1}} \right\},$$

$\omega(c_t^T) =$ flexible-wage real wage

$(1 - \tau_t)w_t =$ wage rate faced by firms

- Observation I: The optimal policy calls for fiscal expansion (not austerity).

- Observation II: The optimal policy calls for facilitating the expenditure switch, not for widespread increases in public spending. (e.g., it would be counterproductive to expand public absorption of tradables).
Summary of Main Findings:

- Large external crises call for large devaluations (over 100%).
  ⇒ We turn the sentence “Devaluations are contractionary” on its head and say instead that “Contractions are devalua-
tory.”

- The costs of currency pegs are large, both in terms of welfare (4 to 10% of consumption) and unemployment (up to 15%).
EXTRAS
Interest Rate in Argentina 1983:Q1-2008:Q3

Note. EMBI+ plus US treasury rate minus US expected inflation. Percent per year
Unemployment and Nominal Wages in Peripherical Europe

Unemployment, Estonia

Nominal Wage, Estonia

Unemployment, Greece

Nominal Wage, Greece

Unemployment, Ireland

Nominal Wage, Ireland

Unemployment, Portugal

Nominal Wage, Portugal

Unemployment, Spain

Nominal Wage, Spain

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Bulgaria, not on the Euro, but fixed exchange rate since June 2004;

Cyprus, on the Euro since 2008, fixed exchange rate since 1999;

Estonia, on the Euro since 2011, fixed exchange rate since 1999;

Greece on the euro;

Lithuania: not on the Euro, but fixed exchange rate with the Euro since Feb 2002;

Latvia: not on the Euro, but fixed exchange rate with the euro since Jan. 2005;

Portugal on the Euro; Spain on the Euro;
Slovenia: on the Euro since 2007, pegged to Euro since June 2004;

Slovakia: on the Euro since Jan 2009, prior to that Slovak koruna was NOT fixed, instead it **appreciated** against the Euro from 45 Slovak koruna to 30.