Public sphere in Latin America: A map of the historiography

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References to the “public sphere” appear increasingly often in studies of Latin American history. The category is becoming natural without a debate about the consequences of its backdoor entrance into historians’ vocabulary. The purpose of this essay is to bring out its theoretical implications and to ask whether we can write a history of the public sphere in Latin America. The answer, I will argue, is a cautious yes. To prove that the field is not an invention requires care because it involves bringing together, probably against their will, historians who operate from different perspectives and on different regions, periods and themes; care is also advisable given the apparent differences between the literatures produced in Spanish and English. In arguing that there is a common ground for research in the field, the following pages will try to show that authors who work about the public sphere with ostensibly diverse methodologies share a set of questions and premises that amount, together, to a critical engagement with the theoretical model behind the category.

The scholars considered in the following pages share an interest in republican modernization, state formation and the emergence of civil societies which is implied in their use of “public sphere.” Otherwise, their agenda would not seem to depart from that of a broader crowd of historians who examine the relations between society, culture and politics in Latin America, yet centering their approaches on the notion of hegemony. This essay will argue that testing the coordinates first laid out by Jürgen Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and more recently elaborated by scholars working on the history of the public sphere in modern western societies, can

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1 I am in debt with Tom Klubock, Thom Rath, Federico Sor and Mary Kay Vaughan for their comments to earlier drafts. This paper was also discussed at the Columbia University’s Department of History graduate-faculty workshop and at the New School’s workshop of Latin American Studies. I thank Karl Wennerlind, Herbert Sloan, Claudio Lomnitz and Paul Gootemberg for their comments.
generate a productive dialogue across interpretive paradigms. The result will be the map of a province in recent Latin American historiography. As with any map, proximity will not mean identity, and while not covering the entire country, its coordinates could apply to areas beyond its margins—leaving to the user what direction to take.²

Such map is useful not only for historians. In the early twenty first century, the legacy of Latin American neo-liberal modernization, particularly the dismantling of welfare states in the wake of authoritarian regimes in the 1970s, gives a new centrality to civil society and to the political voices emerging outside the traditional channels of parties and corporative actors. During the 1990s liberalism and democracia sin adjetivos (i.e., “political” in the narrowest sense) seemed the way of the future, while Marxism was dismissed as another brick on the Berlin wall. At the same time, authoritarian technocrats invoked science (particularly economics) to impose drastic reforms on states and economies. Yet lately electoral upsets and social movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela express popular dissatisfaction at the high cost of modernization from above. The entrance of new actors into the public arena (ecologist peasants, indigenous movements, women and youth NGOs, among others) challenges established explanations of political behavior, requiring more sensitive tools to study the languages of dissent and mobilization. Scholars on the left have seen in Antonio Gramsci a way to reconcile Marxism with an awareness of civil society that was sorely lacking in revolutionary persuasions of earlier decades. Juan Carlos Portantiero, for example, argues that the left can address the 1990s “crisis of

²The danger, of course, is that of creating “a Map of the Empire that was the size of the Empire and coincided point by point with it un Mapa del Imperio, que tenía el tamaño del imperio y coincidía puntualmente con él.” “El rigor de la ciencia” in Jorge Luis Borges, Obras completas II 1952-1972 (Barcelona: Emecé Editores, 1996). This map will have Mexico as the apparent center. A result of my background, I hope it can be excused as a geographic convention.
values” and its own lack of “mass politics” by focusing its proposals “on the ‘public sphere,’ . . . as the locus for the autonomous organization of a self-managed or cooperative society.” This involves, for him, building “a new political culture not bound by the logic of the market or the logic of the state,” and a critique of the increasing fragmentation and privatization of life.³

Renewed concern about civil society underlines another reason why questions about the public sphere are useful today. Since the 1962 book until his most recent work, Habermas’s contribution has been guided by an inquiry about the emancipatory potential of politics—considered as a dialogue based on the use of reason and, consequently, unrestricted access and the absence of coercion. The normative implication of this definition requires a new look at the relationship between politics and culture. The task is today as urgent as ever since the electoral success of the right in the United States stems in part from a manipulation of cultural themes (labeled “morality” in exit polls) which seem to have greater impact on voters than economic rationality or the preservation of civil rights. Is it time for liberal scholars to reconsider the emphasis on culture and identity, that has presided over humanities during the last decades, and rescue the connections between meaning and social structure? Democrats and others on the left in the United States stress the need to react to Republican manipulation of culture by articulating more clearly the basic ideas about class and justice that are at the core of their political tradition since the New Deal.⁴


⁴ For Alan Brinkley “Democrats need to turn much of their attention away from culture and back toward class.” Alan Brinkley, "What’s Next? The mourning period is over. Now, four simple guidelines for
The goal of the following pages is to use the category of public sphere as a historiographical “detonator,” to borrow Habermas’s expression, rather than trying to build a new paradigm. The interdisciplinary use of the concept after the 1962 book indeed defies the “reification of lines of research into unrelated subsystems of knowledge” of contemporary academic work. Some historians, however, often read Habermas’s public sphere as a merely descriptive, Weberian ideal type rather than a key component of a broader theory. This is understandable if we keep in mind the obvious anachronism of the term “public sphere,” which was not in use until the twentieth century. Why not simply talk, then, about “publicity” or “public opinion”? One reason to go beyond a descriptive use is the need to engage contemporary attempts, cited above, to identify and understand the public sphere as a discrete realm of democratic life. And recognizing present needs does not preclude (quite the opposite) considering the full theoretical implications of the category. I propose that, for historians of Latin America, this specifically means bringing The Structural Transformation and subsequent ideas

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5 Arthur Strum, "A Bibliography on the Concept of Öffentlichkeit," New German Critique 61 (1994). Habermas refers to “seminal theories,” as those by Freud and Marx, that “inserted a genuinely philosophical idea like a detonator into a particular context of research” resulting in “hybrid discourses” that may be criticized from the academic establishment but could generate “new research traditions.”

about communicative action into a dialogue with the Gramscian concept of hegemony. In order to do that, it is useful to examine the multiple ways in which scholars of other regions have recast the initial formulation of the model. The following pages are less about theory, therefore, than about a historiographical response to a “detonator”; thus, they take “public sphere” beyond its descriptive function and examine its theoretical and methodological potential.

First, an outline of the model. Since the basic blueprint but particularly in recent usage of the category, “public sphere” refers to an unfinished historical transformation rather than a stable structure. Two processes, evolving at different rhythms, converged in the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere. The first was the gradual development of capitalist markets, requiring the reliable circulation of commodities and information. Literacy and print were central aspects of that circulation, as well as the development of national states that would regulate and guarantee exchanges. The second process was the emergence of spaces of social life, media and themes of discussion that brought together autonomous individuals who believed in their social and cultural equality. Courts, salons, newspapers, and cafes organized debates where private men and women used their taste and their reason to judge theater, literature, science and government performance. Personal reputations were the object of public critical questioning—even though the bourgeois ideal involved “bracketing” differences of status. At the convergence of both processes, the public sphere was the universally accessible conceptual space where private citizens came together to discuss matters of common interest, on the assumption that reason, the only requisite, was evenly distributed, and that their voices would have an

7 Habermas himself links the public sphere with his theory of communicative action at a “fundamental” level. Jürgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1997), 422, 41. Other scholars, mentioned below, have already suggested the need to confront analyses based on Gramsci and Habermas.
impact on public opinion. In doing so, they not only represented their private interests, but established a new bridge between three areas of life: the private realms of domesticity and work, the publicity required to exchange opinions with others in civil society, and the state. Revolutions in France and the American colonies marked the politicization of the public sphere, in a process that expanded geographically throughout the nineteenth century.

Political representation has since then continued to develop, although recurrent cycles of exclusion and authoritarianism remind us that the public sphere is an ideal as much as a reality, a normative as much as a descriptive framework. During the twentieth century, the development of mass media linked to stronger states and corporate interests exercised an increasing influence on the public sphere, furthering the privatization of life and the fragmentation of civil society to the extent that the survival of the public sphere as an autonomous and unitary space seemed precarious enough, by the end of the century, to become an object of discussion for those concerned with democracy and social justice. The chronology and boundaries of the entire process are blurry: the public sphere is also the site of continuing reflection about its own rules and membership, about the links between private and public, about collective and individual identities, and about the proper interaction among politics, culture and reason.8

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8 Habermas' initial definition is tentative and contains the diversity of issues outlined above: “The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason.” Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1991), 27. See also Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article," *New German Critique*, no. 3 (1974). On the historical character of the definition, see Moishe Postone, "Political Theory and Historical Analysis," in *Habermas and the public sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun, *Studies in contemporary German social thought* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).
The research questions that scholars have derived from this narrative offer the possibility of understanding politics beyond the dichotomy of a realm of power and institutions, and another of markets and interests. Asking about the public sphere helps place civil society in the void between political society and the market opened by traditional narratives. Parties and representation are important research themes but they are less useful in situations where political legitimacy itself becomes the object of debates, and people begin asking who speaks for them and why. What are the rules to include or exclude interlocutors from such debate? As we will see, historians of Latin America are bringing those questions to the earliest phases of the region’s independent life in order to explain the subdivision of polities after the end of colonial rule, in the process throwing light on the persistence of democracy in spite of inequality and violence.

What have these and other historians done to the model? Built upon the historiography available at the time, *Structural Transformation* does not always survive unscathed the close examination of graduate history seminars. Its empirical shortcomings have prompted research projects that test its descriptive uses, taking it as a canvass to be completed rather than as a critical engagement with existing master narratives. James Van Horn Melton, for example, looks closely at the conditions for the emergence of educated audiences, particularly the privatization of the domestic realm, in eighteenth-century Western Europe. He criticizes Habermas for the lack of chronological precision and the influence of a “rather conventional” Marxism in his assumptions about a bourgeois identity that later historiography has found elusive. The historical materialism of the Marxist Habermas, Melton argues, cannot be reconciled with the concern in the
Kantian Habermas about the progress of enlightenment. What in *Structural Transformation* was a sketch, in Melton’s work comes out as a detailed empirical agenda that includes the emergence of reading “publics,” the development of their critical judgment (first in theater then in literature), and the rise of spaces of sociability (salons, taverns, coffeehouses).

The most important historical qualification to the model is the recognition that, in practice, universal access to and statusBracketing within the public sphere were undermined by exclusions, mainly concerning gender and class. While Habermas had already noted the role of women in the literary public sphere, feminist scholars have examined gendered exclusions “from the standpoint of politics itself”—instead of unmediated effects of family and economic structures. For Joan Landes, women’s exclusion was an essential aspect of the public sphere emerged of the French Revolution. The model’s artificial distinction between public and private realms, she argues, reduces women’s intervention in public discussions to expressing particular, domestic concerns, leaving men to voice universal interests and reason. Other historians of enlightened Europe respond that women were indeed included to a “high degree,” and that the “public/private” dichotomy was less hermetic than authors like Landes and Sarah Maza

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were willing to recognize. For Keith Michael Baker and Harold Mah, exclusion was a contingent trait of the public sphere since the normative premise of universal access included women.\textsuperscript{13} Beyond the role of women, Habermas proposes that public and private were mutually constitutive categories. The invention of a self-contained realm of domesticity allowed the\textit{ bourgeois} to deny his own interests and become a universal\textit{ homme} outside that realm.\textsuperscript{14} The feminist critique, in other words, is an inevitable part of the theory itself. In order to understand the eventual exclusion of women from public opinion, in spite of their role in court life and salons, authors like Roger Chartier and Arlette Farge incorporate cultural analysis and an interest in language into an effort to understand historical constructions of reason and irrationality as key chapters of modern political history.\textsuperscript{15} Such research on the contingent quality of basic political and cultural categories brings together phenomena usually studied separately: elite and popular sociabilities and the emergence of diverse audiences and identities; the role of print and mass media in politics, but also of gossip and other oral forms; the changing symbolic and institutional values of representation, and the circulation of diverse cultural products.

The public sphere places these subjects at the intersection of economic, social, political and cultural domains isolated in traditional historical studies.\textsuperscript{16}

Public sphere in Latin American history

Historians of Latin America have not merely consumed the public sphere model, and the survey above fails to provide a useful guide into the increasingly rich historiography on the development of the public sphere in the region. Latin American history is a particularly promising arena to engage the category with other interpretive models because of the ongoing reappraisal of democracy in the region. Political change, for example, is increasingly understood as cultural change. Identity, particularly ethnic and racial identifications (largely untouched by the European debates as forms of exclusion from the public sphere), is more explicitly a terrain of debate through the vindication of indigenous rights and the return of national claims in the face of an aggressive capitalist modernization—although indigenismo and nationalism are no longer considered in opposition to globalized modernity but as specific appropriations of it. As a consequence, cultural historians have brought to the attention of the profession the need to consider the historical character and political meaning of cultures and identities. The category of the public sphere is useful in this context because it provides a sharper focus on politics than the notion of culture, and a potentially productive terrain to engage interpretive categories such as hegemony. By narrowing the discussion to specific questions about the relationship between meaning, communication and politics, the public sphere model has already proven its ability to detonate, or at least fuel, productive research agendas on culture and politics.¹⁷

¹⁷ A discussion of the implications of this from the point of view of Mexican history in Pablo Piccato, "Introducción: ¿Modelo para armar? Hacia un acercamiento crítico a la teoría de la esfera pública," in
François-Xavier Guerra’s work on the revolutions of independence in Spanish America, particularly *Modernidad e independencias*, placed the public sphere at the heart of the process of nation-building by suggesting that the birth of new nations out of Spain’s American kingdoms was the product of the emergence of multiple politicized public spheres in administrative and commercial centers after the 1808 crisis. Writing and reading had a sense of political urgency that did not come, as in Europe, from the brewing of bourgeois conversations in salons and coffee shops. In Guerra’s view, American subjects’ need to publicly judge governance, science and reason had its origins in the eighteenth century, when the Bourbons decided to treat their American domains as colonies, rather than kingdoms of the same status as those in the Peninsula. The reforms prompted Americans to express grievances that, although modern in their publicity, were couched in the egalitarian notion of a pact between subjects and crown. The conquest-era political centrality of municipalities returned in the eighteenth century in the form of a “pactist nostalgia” behind the first wave of unrest and the emergence of local *juntas*.

While in the past the rights of Creole and Spanish residents of American cities did not need to be defended publicly, suddenly they became the unifying theme of the politicization of public discourse and the expansion of the periodic press.  

Freedom of the press, *ayuntamiento* (city council) debates, and Creoles’ participation in the Cádiz courts were key political events because they created *pueblos*—or, more accurately, displaced the term’s meaning from the local to the national: towns

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were now peoples. New, politicized public spheres provided American *pueblos* with a common set of political vocabularies and objectives that fueled political mobilization for and against independence; they reached as far as the influence of the emerging political leadership in cities like Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Bogotá, in the process bringing together diverse populations into publics, and generating a sense of nationhood and unified “popular will.” If *el pueblo* was still a fiction constructed and represented by minorities, the debates and practices that constituted it, argued Guerra, are central objects of historical research. From a similar perspective, Carmen McEvoy characterizes the “political process of state building in Peru in the form of an intense dialogue in the cultural sphere.” From the beginning, the press pondered on the value of public opinion and tried to shape it, thus shifting relations between power and writing. In these studies, early Latin American public spheres become more relevant foci of research than the struggling states and fragmented civil societies evolving around them.

The above description contains an emphasis that is not central in *Modernidad e independencias*. While Guerra explicitly used the notion of the public sphere and referred to *Structural Transformation*, his direct historiographical inspiration came from the expanded history of “the political” proposed by François Furet and other historians of the

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French Revolution. Thus, while his range of interests is broad, Guerra follows Furet in focusing on the “cultural revolution that makes possible the creation of politics.”20 As does Furet, Guerra deemphasizes the “bourgeois” character of the public sphere and shows little interest in probing the interactions between elites and the rest of society: economic interests and class identities were subordinated to the arrival of republican culture and the onslaught of politicization; “sociabilidades,” as expressions of both public culture and traditional social links, replaced detailed socioeconomic analysis.21 The revolutions of independence, in Guerra’s view, were not great socioeconomic transformations yet heralded values eventually embraced by all strata. Thus, asking about the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere in terms of “social class” was less useful than, following Tocqueville, asking about the coming together of elites as a “cultural class.”22

A specific kind of cultural analysis defines this narrative, thus laying out the different views of the public sphere in Latin American history. Guerra looked at the

20 Guerra, Modernidad e independencias, 30. See François Furet, Penser la Révolution française (Paris: Gallimard, 1978). For Palti, Guerra’s use of Habermas lacked a “strong” critique of the public sphere model and failed to recognize Raymond Kosseleck’s work as a necessary antecedent. Furet and Cochin were decisive in Guerra’s work to strengthen that critique, without embracing “las teorías multiculturalistas ‘posmodernas.’” Elías José Palti, “Guerra y Habermas: ilusiones y realidad de la esfera pública Latinoamericana,” in Conceptualizar lo que se ve: François-Xavier Guerra historiador, homenaje, ed. Erika Pani and Alicia Salmerón (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2004), 466.
intersection of “culture,” which he defined by its autonomy from the socioeconomic realm, and politics, and concluded that modern elite sociabilities were the key to the Spanish American experience. With the public sphere, he claimed, emerged a group of “men of the word and the pen” who created public opinion.\textsuperscript{23} Literate, secular, enlightened, exposed to French influence through travel and reading, these men were at the forefront of “that cultural mutation which is modernity.”\textsuperscript{24} Disconnected from class relations and economic grievances or interests, Guerra’s modernization worked its way from elites “in a descending way to other social groups.”\textsuperscript{25} Modernity was, in Guerra’s perspective, coherent, socially restrictive, and unequivocal in the European direction of its “mutations.”

Looking at the vocabulary of republicanism, historians of the public sphere in Spanish America explore, in the words of Carmen McEvoy, a “cultural texture much more rich and complex than that provided by the classic liberal interpretation.”\textsuperscript{26} Republicanism itself is “the process of interaction between a vocabulary, associated to a specific ethos, and the sphere of public opinion,” incarnated in men “of the pen and the sword” like Juan Espinosa, author of a 1855 republican lexicon edited by McEvoy. Sociability here becomes a sharper category, that involves the social conditions for the

\textsuperscript{23} Guerra, \textit{Modernidad e independencias}, 17, 91, 234. For others, the Habermasian focus on “a new, autonomous, free, and sovereign public” implies a marked alternative from Furet’s Tocquevillian emphasis on associations and modes of sociability as the base for a modern public opinion. Chartier, \textit{Cultural Origins}, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{24} Guerra, \textit{Modernidad e independencias}, 52.


\textsuperscript{26} McEvoy, \textit{La utopía republicana}, 11.
production of fighting words: cultural markets, patronage by bureaucrats and other urban neighbors, and the work of printers as key cultural entrepreneurs. The results go beyond discourse. State building after independence, from this angle, was part of a larger civilizing process in which el pueblo went “from a rhetorical community to a political community.”

The focus on the language of politics in recent intellectual histories of early Latin American polities results in a critical reassessment of the teleology of modernization and a less optimistic account of a transition from old structures to partial modernity.

According to Rafael Rojas, while new audiences emerged as a consequence of enlightened discussions since 1808, political discourse continued to be generated “within viceroyal bodies and according to the corporative imaginary.” Hence, those audiences were not true expressions of modern citizenship. If the revolution of independence had any meaning as a “social movement,” argues Rojas, it was because of “the building of a modern public sphere”—paradoxically based on “secret societies, local conspiracies, armed bands, opinion groups, provincial assemblies and parliamentary factions” in Cádiz. Rojas echoes Guerra’s view of elites as creators and incarnation of el pueblo yet argues that independence cannot be characterized as a democratic “cultural mutation” but as a paradoxical renewal of monarchism through republicanism. Classical republicanism had been in the minds of modernizing elites, of course, but, claims Rojas, it was a largely traditional view of monarchical order that opened the public sphere. For José Antonio

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28 McEvoy, "Seríamos excelentes vasallos."
30 Rojas, La escritura, 35. See also Fernando Escalante, Ciudadanos imaginarios: Memorial de los afanes y desventuras de la virtud y apología del vicio triunfante en la República Mexicana: Tratado de Moral Pública (Mexico: Colegio de México, 1993). For recent studies of monarchist sentiment in Mexico see
Aguilar, this stress on the republican tradition, incarnated in local liberties and virtù with deeper roots than Enlightenment sociabilities, constitutes a critique of national narratives centered on liberalism and its “epidermic” anti-monarchism.\textsuperscript{31} Republicanism was less about democratic representation than about the pragmatic means to achieve balance between new and old powers.\textsuperscript{32}

This new interest in republicanism in Latin America involves an attempt to redraw disciplinary boundaries and vindicate the autonomy of the intellectual realm. For Elías José Palti, intellectual history provides a much-needed updating for a Latin American historiography that had remained at the margins of the linguistic turn.\textsuperscript{33} Palti locates public opinion at the center of a study of the connections between ideological conflict, public debates and vocabularies, and political legitimacy. Latin American public opinions expressed the hope of national unity but were also the product of fractious polities, yet understanding political discourse requires going beyond the analysis of

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discourse as expression of factional conflict and probing the conditions of possibility of enunciations. This is no longer about finding the right label (liberal, conservative, modern, traditional, republican, monarchical, etc.) but about apprehending the moment of “generalized politics” that followed independence, when even the basic principles of political order could be debated.\footnote{Elías José Palti, La invención de una legitimidad: Razón y retórica en el pensamiento mexicano del siglo XIX (Un estudio sobre las formas del discurso político) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005).}

Palti’s proposes a reconsideration of the arch of nineteenth-century political history. Mexican public opinion underwent a transformation from a predominantly oral “judicial public opinion” that worked as the tribunal of opinion, adjudicating debate through the accumulation of arguments rather than seeking an ultimate truth, to a more unified and autonomous “strategic” or “proselytistic” public opinion: explicitly partisan, more coherent and able, later in the nineteenth century, to finally build a stable legitimacy with a deliberate use of the “technology of writing.”\footnote{Elías José Palti, “La transformación del liberalismo mexicano en el siglo XIX: Del modelo jurídico de la opinión pública al modelo estratégico de la sociedad civil,” in Actores, espacios y debates en la historia de la esfera pública en la ciudad de México, ed. Pablo Piccato and Cristina Sacristán (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2005). See also chapters in Carlos Illades and Kuri Ariel Rodríguez, eds., Instituciones y ciudad. Ocho estudios históricos sobre la ciudad de México (Mexico City: FP-SONES-Uníos, 2000); Brian Connaughton, Carlos Illades, and Sonia Pérez Toledo, eds., La construcción de la legitimidad política en México (Mexico City: El Colegio de Michoacán-Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México-El Colegio de México, 1999). On France and public opinion see Baker, Inventing the French Revolution; Mona Ozouf, “Le concept d'opinion publique au XVIIIème siècle,” in L’Homme régénéré. Essais sur la Révolution française (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); Farge, Subversive Words.} Methodologically, this implies greater attention to the heuristic value of conflict and rhetoric. The judicial public opinion did not operate on the assumption of unanimity, Palti argues, but in an agonistic mode of constant defense and attack. Early ideologues despised political parties, which were supposed to discipline opinion, because reason had to be unencumbered by loyalties in order to judge the performance of government, however nasty the results; honesty and autonomy were more important than programmatic coherence. Power intervened in
public opinion later in the century by manipulating and creating news and subjects, and stressing social organization over autonomy. Such analyses throw new light on a nineteenth-century press that national histories had simplified to the confrontation between conservatives and liberals. Rhetoric becomes more than an aesthetic aspect of language: for Jorge Myers, the history of public opinion in Argentina is that of the Buenos Aires elite’s efforts to legitimize its rule and offer an alternative to the sacred authority monopolized by the pulpit. In the process, those elites hypostatized reason and

36 Palti, *La invención de una legitimidad*, 301; Elias José Palti, "La Sociedad Filarmónica del Pito: Ópera, prensa y política en la República Restaurada (México, 1867-1876)" (paper presented at the Construcciones impresas. Diarios, periódicos y revistas en la formación de los estados nacionales en América Latina y Estados Unidos (1820-1920), Buenos Aires, May 2002); Palti, "La transformación del liberalismo." Guerra, however, noted the importance of discussion to reach the “verdad social” in a process that links private and public realms and contradictory interests. Unanimity, as in Palti’s scheme, is only reached later. Guerra, *Modernidad e independencias*, 270-71, 73. For similar processes in Argentina, Palti, "Las polémicas." The “judicial” mode of public opinion provides a useful framework for the recent interest in the history of rhetoric from its colonial, mostly religious uses, to the nineteenth-century uses of oratory in the building of nationalism. Ivan Jaksic, *The Political Power of the Word: Press and Oratory in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2002).

made it a militant actor in the confrontation against barbarianism and the enemies of “las luces.”

Modernity, particularly in Guerra’s works, can become a limiting canvass that, for example, tends to leave aside a key pre-independence field of debate, source of rhetorical devises and sponsor of the expansion of printed media: religion. Religious education, social practices and associations, deeply rooted in the colonial period, remained essential in political and intellectual life throughout the nineteenth century—and they did not necessarily exclude democratic contents. Colonial debates and political disputes centered on theology (such as the confrontation between bishop of Puebla Juan de Palafox y Mendoza and the Jesuits in the seventeenth century) suggest the existence of a public sphere of sorts before independence. Further research on colonial-era debates and political dissent is probably a matter of expanding students’ ability to break codes (theology, Latin, canonical law, architecture, ritual practices) that national-era historians are reluctant to take on. The open-ended political analysis encouraged by the public

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sphere model might turn out be useful to explore the diversity and hierarchies of baroque political cultures.

¿Español o inglés?

Palti, Guerra, Myers and other researchers are indeed “transforming scholarly approaches to nineteenth-century Latin American political and intellectual history.” Yet there does not seem to be a strong dialogue between the practitioners of cultural history in the U.S and historians of the *esfera pública*, a conversation that would point to common research questions or an open confrontation of interpretive paradigms. It would be myopic to dismiss Guerra and others because their political affiliations depart from those of “progressive scholars.” A sounder, frequently cited reason is the teleological implication of Guerra’s emphasis on a dichotomy of tradition against modernity, yet this is not the case for all the studies cited above. Fundamentally, I believe, the reluctance of English-speaking cultural historians to talk about the public sphere stems from divergent views about the causality of cultural and political phenomena. Too easily U.S. Latin Americanists read “public sphere” as equivalent to “Enlightenment”—just another name for the same old liberal thematic. After all, Guerra wrote a history of elites that passed as

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41 Palti, "Recent studies."

42 The exclusive focus on “progressive scholars,” without a reference to Guerra, in Steve Stern, "Between Tragedy and Promise: The Politics of Writing Latin American History in the Late Twentieth Century," in Reclaiming the political in Latin American history : essays from the North, ed. G. M. Joseph (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 41. Guerra’s books are not mentioned in that volume and his influential *México: del antiguo régimen a la revolución* still awaits for an English translator. It is not easy to document the absence of a dialogue but the lack of works bringing together the authors mentioned in these pages might be evidence of it.

el pueblo but remained elites, while Rojas and Aguilar emphasize republicanism over democracy and other forms of representation. The risks are clear: skewing the traditional centrality of political parties in national narratives, as Palti proposes, adds nuance but may sacrifice an organizing guide to link institutions and socioeconomic interests.  

Try as they might to avoid it, however, these authors’ engagement with the public sphere forces them to address social mediations beyond the world of ideas. The results are mixed, since gender, class and other markers of difference are tangential to their research agenda. Rojas, for example, uses “marginality” to explain the ambiguous class character of insurgent pamphlet writers in Mexico. The poorly dressed authors who straddled high ideological discourse and plebeian audiences belonged in traditional sociabilities characterized by patronage, the old face-to-face communication of pulquerías, and the everyday closeness to “the vile populace”; highly educated, these pamphleteers nevertheless mocked the upper classes, thus defining their political role in terms of resentment. Intellectural histories of the public sphere à la Rojas are less likely to look for social actors, political parties and representative practices (which in his view were slow to be adopted in Mexican politics anyway), and more likely to stick to the

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46 Rojas, La escritura, 181, 70, 85. The marginality of those writers is debatable considering the enormous amount of publications they produced and the canonical stature of at least one of them, José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi. For a useful examination of Lizardi’s central place in Mexican ideas about citizenship and identity, see Robert McKee Irwin, Mexican Masculinities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
world of the literate public and its ability to open a “public space for the writing of a new imaginary.”

There is nothing intrinsic to the Habermasian model that would prevent it from linking questions about publicity and language with questions about gender, class, ethnicity, and about the power of markets and institutions to shape identities. The articulation of private interests in public was, after all, part of the historical development of the public sphere, as was the circulation of cultural products. We can find the complexity of the public/private divide in McEvoy’s interest in politicians’ ethics and in Palti’s and other authors’ view of judicial public opinion as the judge of characters and reputations. Further studies of the notion of honor could contribute in this direction. The interesting question about causality is not whether private interests were the basis of political debates, but what were the specific historical conditions (mostly notions of gender) that turned those interests into rational and national utterances.

The lack of a strong dialogue between political historiographies of Latin America in Spanish and English might therefore be an effect of editorial decisions (translations

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matter) rather than a symptom of fundamental differences. Several areas of research witness the development of common questions of relevance for cultural historians and those interested in the public sphere. Two seem particularly dynamic: the colonial legacy of the public sphere and the local, particularly urban dimension of its emergence.

Even if politicized and closely linked to revolution-era European vocabularies, the public sphere that emerged in Spanish America around 1808 was structured by colonial institutions and interests. I mentioned above the possibilities of religion as a theme to be analyzed from this perspective. “Colonial” here refers to several forces that transcended the severing of political ties: the notion of an original autonomy of American kingdoms and corporations, the reciprocal obligations between king and subjects that evolved into popular sovereignty after abdication, and the intense urban political life that only came to be registered in print late in the eighteenth century. These insights are outlined in Víctor Uribe’s synthesis “The Birth of the Public Sphere during the Age of Revolution.” If the Latin American public sphere was always politicized, that does not mean it appeared around the time of independence. Instead, argues Uribe, echoing William Taylor, it came to be during an “age of revolution” marked not only by 1789 but also by rebellions and conspiracies in Saint Domingue, Brazil, the Alto Peru and Colombia. Unlike in Europe, the stable historical development of markets and states was less important here than the social and political ferment resulting in new sovereign realms and diversifying trade links. Ayuntamientos, universities and other sites of learned debate, such as scientific

expeditions and economic societies, laid the foundation for a cultural class composed mainly of lawyers and *letrados* who went on to have important roles in the insurgent and loyalist bands in the 1810s.\(^{51}\) (Priests could also be added to the list, at least in Mexico.) Beyond those elites, recent explorations of Andean rebellions during this age have uncovered the strong ethnic component of revolutionary political engagement, republicanism and communal democracies.\(^{52}\)

Another decisive insight of histories of the public sphere in Latin America has been the recognition of the need to bring back politics into an urban scale. This means first that national and regional narratives can be studied in reference to *capitalino* elites’ ability (in their role of military and political leaders but also as “public opinion”) to mobilize other actors and to incorporate their claims into the “cultural revolution” of liberal republicanism. In Buenos Aires, Mexico City and Lima, public spheres were tied to routes of commodities and information, and to administrative life. Ventilating national conflicts in smaller cities was common from the early republic, as illustrated by the


widespread printing of political pamphlets and the participation of urban crowds in disputes about national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{53}

We have in Ángel Rama’s \textit{The Lettered City} a paradigmatic account of Latin American cities’ intellectual and spatial evolution. For Rama the \textit{letrados}—educated writers, often journalists or lawyers but also bureaucrats and academics—benefited during the colonial period from the separation between the baroque language of the state and the verbal freedom of popular culture. The separation between these two realms became problematic as education and the growth of cities (both in size and within \textit{letrados’} mental landscape) forced them to understand the relation between language and class. Rather than the sequence orality → technologies of writing proposed by Palti and implicit in other narratives of modernization, Rama argued that \textit{letrados’} “writing market” came first from politicians’ demand for speeches and laws and from a dynamic cultural marketplace around newspapers. With the modernization of late-nineteenth century cities, mass politics, education and urban transformations expanded the lettered city into a scale that broke with the social and intellectual structure of the original colonial urban design, pushing intellectuals to combine the literary appropriation of popular languages with the energy of propaganda.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, and in spite of their own


\textsuperscript{54} By the twentieth century, wrote Rama, “the lettered city had itself been transformed . . . from a handful of elite \textit{letrados} designing government policies in their own image, into a socially more heterogeneous group that retained a vision of itself as a cultural aristocracy but incorporated powerful democratizing cross-currents.” Rama, \textit{The Lettered City}, 112, 42-43, 88-89, 02-03, 04, 13. On transculturation, see “Los procesos de transculturación en la narrativa latinoamericana” (1974) in Angel Rama, \textit{La novela en América Latina: Panoramas 1920-1980} (Montevideo: Fundación Angel Rama Universidad Veracruzana, 1986). The dictorships of the 1970s, that forced Rama into exile, were an example of the manipulation of public opinion made possible by mass media, but also, a source of new literary creativity, as in earlier phases of the Latin American lettered city. “La censura como conciencia artística” (1979) in Angel Rama, \textit{La riesgosa navegación del escritor exiliado} (Montevideo: Arca, 1993), 233-48. Although I have found no evidence of any exchange between Habermas and Rama (Habermas’s book was published in Spanish in 1981, two years before Rama’s death in exile) it is clear their syntheses shared a concern about the future of
prejudices, *letrados* supported educational reform and succeeded, through literary nationalism, in creating an “informed citizenry” and “a discourse on the definition, formation, and collective values of the nation.”

Scholars, some of them explicitly engaged with Habermas, have enlarged the cast of city characters, particularly during the twentieth century. According to Diane Davis, for example, twentieth-century urban designers and administrators knew how the built environment could create mass audiences. In Mexico City, commerce in downtown areas was a key factor in the evolution of residential projects and in the politicization of *chilangos* as urban consumers. In downtown plazas (the semiotic center of Rama’s *ciudad letrada*) but also in restaurants, bars, *chicherías, cantinas, pulperías* and theaters, cities hosted multiple forms of oral and manuscript communication that judged private reputations and, therefore, citizen’s ability to be part of public opinion. Family and
democracy. There is no reference to Habermas in Rama’s diary. He had taken up German lessons in 1974, to be able to read Walter Benjamin in his language, so we can imagine an eventual coincidence. Angel Rama and Rosario Peyrou, *Diario, 1974-1983* (Montevideo, Uruguay: Ediciones Trilce, 2001), 34.


clientelistic networks, friendship but also enmity operated in this urban scale. The public sphere in these works is not only a physical space, but it is also one.

Living in town was constitutive of private interests: the rights of a town dweller were codified in ways that preceded and paralleled the rights of citizen of the nation. In this regard the “bourgeois” component of the public sphere refers in Latin America less to class identity than to the quality of *burgher*. *Vecindad* (literally, stable residence in a *pueblo* or city) was central in the colonial articulation of political rights and in post-independence societies where ethnic classifications no longer had legal strength. *Vecindad* did not refer only to residents but also integrated migrants by considering honor as a personal good earned through actions and the judgment of public opinion. Not surprisingly, when sovereignty reverted to *los pueblos* with independence, local institutions and physical spaces became key for citizenship: *vecinos* had to have an

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58 Mah warns about “spacialization” of the public sphere. Mah, "Phantasies ." This critique applies to Guerra and Lempérière, *Los espacios públicos*, but most recent studies do not seem to be too concerned about a dichotomy between spatial and conceptual “spheres.”

“honest way of living”—a requirement in Mexican constitutions that allowed local notables to adjudicate the right to vote.60

Citizenship remained problematic after written constitutions, and in the last fifteen years it has been one of the central themes of Latin American historiography. Encouraged by new evidence about vecindad and by the transition to democracy, authors have explored the contradictions of post-colonial regimes where political rights were supposed to be universal, yet access to political influence continued to be restricted.61 As their knowledge of nineteenth-century political practices and discourses sharpened, researchers have tackled mechanisms of political representation and exclusion, including and beyond elections, to explain the success or failure of regimes. Patronage had been the traditional argument to prove that democracy in Latin America was not so democratic and that little could be gained by reading constitutions. But, as research began to erode the images of dual, hierarchical societies, studies of electoral practices established the complex, locally determined interactions between “traditional” means of political action and the “modern” practices of the ballot box.62 Elections, however, could take research

60 Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2, 6; Annino, "El Jano bifronte"; Antonio Annino, "Cádiz y la revolución territorial de los pueblos mexicanos 1812-1821," in Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamérica, siglo XIX: De la formación del espacio político nacional, ed. Antonio Annino (Buenos Aires: FCE, 1995); Rojas, La escritura, 46. For examples of the continuity and importance of local sovereignties and communities in Mexico, see Andrés Lira, Comunidades indígenas frente a la ciudad de México: Tenochtitlan y Tlatelolco, sus pueblos y barrios, 1812-1919 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1995); Granados, "Calpultin decimonónicos."

61 See for example Peter F. Guardino, Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico’s National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996); Charles Walker, Smoldering ashes : Cuzco and the creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840, Latin America otherwise (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Hilda Sábatos, Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: Perspectivas históricas de América Latina (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999); Escalante, Ciudadanos imaginarios. For a contemporary perspective on the public sphere as a qualitative index of democracy, Phillip Oxhorn, "When Democracy isn't all that Democratic: Social Exclusion and the Limits of the Public Sphere in Latin America," in The North-South Agenda (Miami: North-South Center, University of Miami, 2001).

62 See Antonio Annino, ed., Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamérica, siglo XIX: De la formación del espacio político nacional (Buenos Aires: FCE, 1995); Hilda Sábatos, Alberto Rodolfo Lettieri, and Programa de Estudios de Historia Económica y Social Americana., eds., La vida política en la Argentina
only so far, as evidence suggested that most of the action was happening around, before and after the actual vote.

It is not surprising, then, that the same historians who worked on elections have turned their attention toward civil society as a more comprehensive focus of enquiry. In her introduction to a volume suggestively entitled *La vida política en la Argentina del siglo XIX: Armas, votos y voces*, Hilda Sabato refers to this “thematic explosion” brought about by Guerra and other political historians, in order to challenge nation and state as the natural points of departure for the study of politics, hence taking a closer look at “the relations between civil society and the political system.” In *The Many and the Few*, the key of those relations, and the most important factor to explain electoral outcomes, are civil associations. Based on a detailed contextualization of street-level practices in nineteenth-century Buenos Aires, Sabato sees the public sphere as a direct representation of specific social actors. Yet relation is not unidirectional: mechanisms of representation and the political identity of collective actors may change as a result of discussions in the public sphere, and it can fragment into multiple public spheres, although political society (elections and the state) ultimately remains the driving force behind the emergence of civil society. Thus, although Sabato was one of the first scholars to incorporate the public

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sphere into historical research in Latin America, she now cautiously characterizes the category as “controversial,” too closely connected to the European bourgeoisie and, in Latin America, to the state-building period of the second half of the nineteenth century.\(^6^5\)

Are civil society and the state the inevitable reference and ultimate rationale of the public sphere? Habermas and other authors have emphasized “communicative practice,” the dialogical building of meanings and voices, as a way to bridge the conceptual gap between civil society, the market, and politics. Examining the public sphere becomes in that perspective a central operation in the history of civil society—particularly as we try to understand the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, and to the mass media-dominated politics of contemporary Western societies.\(^6^6\) Sabato’s use of “civil society” as the realm of voluntary associations autonomous from the state gives priority to preexisting socioeconomic identities. But identities are changed by debate itself, by the contents and rules of actors’ intervention in the public sphere. Post-independence civic associations defined themselves in multiple ways: ethnically, ideologically, spatially, by trade. Class identity was not merely a condition for associative life, but the point of intersection of labor relations, individual and “intimate” interests, and the state as regulator of work—thus simultaneously referring to domestic, local,


\(^{66}\) Habermas, "Further Reflections," 452-55; Cohen and Arato, Civil society and political theory. Habermas uses the term “lifeworld,” rather than culture, to refer to the horizon of meaning that makes possible communicative action. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 43, 70; Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse, 37-43.
A public sphere-centered examination of civil society, in other words, avoids simplistic notions about the autonomy of the political or the subordination of culture to social relations, framing a historical interpretation of economic interests as they turn into political mobilization and debates.68

One example of the potential rewards of this agenda is Carlos Forment’s history of Latin American democracy. Based on an extensive database of civic associations and printed media in Mexico and Peru, Forment lays out the public sphere, along with political, economic and civil societies, as one of the “public terrains” on which Latin American democracy flourished during the nineteenth century. In his view, the public sphere makes possible communication between the other realms of democracy; if, for example, civil society is to have an impact on economic processes and decision-making it can only be through the public sphere.69 Dividing the terrain of the public sphere into “Literate,” “Oral” and “Visual” subfields,70 Forment builds a counter-intuitive history of democracy that fuses a Tocquevillian large narrative with a close look at “socio-moral practices.” The key thematic connection between these two dimensions, according to Forment, is that between passion, Catholicism, and civil society. The hypothesis could be stronger if supported by a close reading, that other historians will surely attempt, of the

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67 See a proposal to look at class in similar terms in Claudio Lomnitz, *Exits from the Labyrinth: Culture and Ideology in the Mexican National Space* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). See following section on the coincidences between this program and a Gramscian study of ideology and “subject positions.”

68 For a reflection on culture, ethnic identity, economic grievances, morality as “sites” for political discussion see Van Young, *The Other Rebellion*, 16-17, 90. Questions about economic and political behavior emerged as one of the centers of the debate about new cultural history of Mexico in History New Cultural, *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:2 (May 1999), edited by Susan Deans-Smith and Gilbert M. Joseph. See a useful analysis of the debates about civil society in Margaret R. Somers, "Narrating and Naturalizing Civil Society and Citizenship Theory: The Place of Political Culture and the Public Sphere," *Sociological Theory* 13, no. 3 (1995).

69 Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 18, 18n. This is similar to Sabato’s view of the role of the public sphere between state and civil society, and departs only in terms of emphasis from a public-sphere centered theory of civil society as in Cohen and Arato, *Civil society and political theory*.

70 Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 22.
self-referential, narrowly “political” debates that occupied much of the nineteenth century public sphere in those countries. Forment, after all, seeks to upset intellectual and political historians’ election- and elite- centered narratives, to the point of declaring municipal politics and elections of small importance. Such dismissal of the established narratives of politics (found also in Palti’s *La invención de una legitimidad*) can be justified by Forment’s breadth of the comparison (Mexico and Peru in the first installment, Argentina and Cuba to follow). The magnitude of the sample, the strictures of the taxonomy and his provocative stance toward political history’s received truths compel Forment to postulate, like Sabato, the existence of fragmented public spheres.\(^{71}\)

Fragmentation is a recurrent argument against a public sphere that Habermas postulated, above all, as unitary. The notion is invoked in such different ways (from geographical partition to fragmentation of discourses) that it deserves a serious reconsideration as the seemingly furthest limit of new research.\(^{72}\) Although besieged by politics, geography and class, Latin American public spheres continued to think of themselves as unitary, coterminous with the nation, and those who met in the public sphere felt entitled to use rational languages as part of a universalistic drive for coherence and clarity. Recent insights about local practices reveal commonalities behind the fragmented polities that emerged from the breakdown of the empire—such as *vecindad*—suggesting that the grand ideological design of “national” politics and the tightly-knit

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identities and narrow interests of “local” politics combined in creative ways. Sarah Chambers, for example, examines the connections between city and national politics, through “political debates [that] were often more raucous” than the idealized meeting of rational subjects of the enlightened model. Such debates took place in diverse social spaces (from upper class salons to plebeian bars), that nevertheless linked print and orality, and were the point of reference for political mobilization and public rituals. Claudio Lomnitz shows how regional and class fragmentation in Mexico made the development of a national public sphere a difficult undertaking, easily hijacked by intellectuals who claimed to speak for the popular will. His methodological response (ethnographic and historical research on regions, their overlapping cultural fields and their complex relationship with “the center”) accounts for the cultural and political implications of Mexican spatial segmentation.

Public sphere or hegemony?

Forment and Chambers suggest that the public sphere can detonate a dialogue between the works discussed above and historians of Latin America who, coming from a Gramscian interest in civil society and hegemony, have also examined the relationship between culture and politics. The works of historians like Mary Kay Vaughan and

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74 Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens*, 10-11, 244; Taylor, "Between Global Process."

Florecia Mallon, for example, question citizenship and pay close attention to political language. Vaughan’s work on education in Mexico coincides with public sphere-centered analyses in the emphasis on Mexican political culture’s greater inclusiveness after independence, and in the relevance of interactions between local and national actors established through a new political language. Mallon’s study of the intervention of popular actors in conflicts “over power and meaning” similarly stresses dialogues that shape national “metanarratives of political history.” These dialogues also establish the position of actors beyond mere economic relations. Language is historically relevant because relations between interlocutors are potentially mutable—at least when there is an open-ended exchange about political and social relations. In this perspective, the limit to the possibilities of dialogue (the inverted mirror of fragmentation) is power. An overarching divide of political actors as divided between dominant and subordinated makes power the ultimate ratio of meaning. This results in a vacuum between state and civil society that actors can only fill with pragmatic negotiations through mediators or heroic, counterhegemonic discourses.

Engaging these authors from the perspective of a history of the public sphere requires, first, a critical reconsideration of subalternity. Mallon and Vaughan and other...

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cultural historians have been accused of embracing an eclectic set of theoretical positions. But a look at a common reference, the Subaltern Studies Group in India, provides a few suggestive leads beyond those charges. The Group’s early project involved a critique of elitism in Indian historiography and an effort to rethink nationalism. While the Indian bourgeoisie, Ranajit Guha argued, failed to speak for the nation, the autonomous politics of “the people” (synonymous with “subaltern classes”) raised the need to critically understand the interaction between civil society and state in post-independence politics. Yet the Group’s recent turn toward Foucauldian study of discourse made it harder to document the notion of a true autonomy of popular politics, and took the initial critique of elitism into a more radical direction, against Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinking. For Dipesh Chakrabarty, the fragmentation of “realms of sovereignty” contradicts the hypothesis of unity (national or cultural). Ironically, the incommensurability of political languages implied in this insight does not operate when, as progressive intellectuals, Chakrabarty and others emphasize the dialogical character of their intellectual project—intended simultaneously to give voice to the subaltern, teach

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them how to be democratic, and learn politics from them.\textsuperscript{80} As others have noted, the shifting political project and the nebulous meaning of “Enlightenment” beg for a more explicit engagement with studies of the constitution of peoples, nations and citizenship—a set of questions that coincides, almost point by point, with the agenda of historians of the public sphere in Latin America.\textsuperscript{81}

As a central category for subaltern studies and recent cultural history of Latin America, hegemony has been a privileged way for historians to bring these questions together, as it simultaneously addresses the discursive character of the “continuous process” of producing meaning that is politics, and the inequality of power and antagonistic relationship between subordinated and dominant. It is a delicate balance: class identities are not fixed but relational and not necessarily anchored on relations of production; the role of coercion remains a necessary reference, yet the line between it and consent is always fine.\textsuperscript{82} In the Mexican “national space,” for example, Lomnitz refers to hegemony as something that is not exercised by a specific class, but only exists in cultural spaces structured by class domination. Those spaces, that begin at the local level but whose upper-most level is always national, are defined by common meanings enforced by class power—yet a class identity that is experienced, and studied, through the intertwined references of the circulation of cultural products, space, work, family, local and national ideologies.\textsuperscript{83} Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s influential


\textsuperscript{82} See Mouffe and Laclau, Hegemonía y estrategia, 125, 33, 44-45, 88.

\textsuperscript{83} Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, Las salidas del laberinto: Cultura e ideologia en el espacio nacional mexicano, 1. ed. ed. (Mexico City: J. Moritz : Planeta, 1995), 43, 44.
formulation of hegemony criticizes essentialized class identities and incorporates a Foucauldian interest in the dispersion of “discursive formations.” Yet they maintain the centrality of power (or class enforcement) in the production of meaning, shifting the key for the interpretation of debates staged in the public sphere beyond it, onto social relations that cannot be examined as discourse. From a perspective theoretically anchored on the notion of hegemony and a Gramscian view of language and power, Habermas is characterized by his “idealist” assumptions about the possibility of communication without coercion, thus making him unable to examine power relations.

How does this alternative between enforcement and dialogue as objects of analysis translate into historiographical practice? In studies like those of Vaughan, the stress is on negotiation, specifically around education, as a central mechanism of Mexican politics. Even if actors speak different political languages (the traditional, democratic building of consent at local levels and the rational, universalistic citizenship) they can find ways to translate an engage in common enterprises. Mallon’s study of patriotic resistance in the nineteenth century is one such example: Indians and city liberals found a common theme that served each others’ interests in fighting French intervention. “Negotiation” is useful as a descriptive tool but does not touch the problem of the fine line between consent and coercion. Mallon’s analysis reveals the different meanings of liberal doctrine, not only between national leadership and peasants but also across regions characterized by different kinds of caudillo leadership. Integrative struggles for the land coexisted with exclusionary legalism in an uneasy dialogue. Her work and that of other cultural historians is more concerned about establishing the

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84 Mouffe and Laclau, _Hegemonía y estrategia_, 151.
85 Peter Ives, _Gramsci's Politics of Language: Engaging the Bakhtin Circle and the Frankfurt School_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). Ives, however, makes no reference to _Structural Transformation_ in his discussion of Habermas.
material conditions and contexts for dialogues than that of other (intellectual) historians of the public sphere. Yet the result seems to be, at least in Mallon’s *Peasant and Nation*, a return to a diálogo de sordos where liberal state indigenismo is a caricature of the past it celebrates, and contemporary Indians just want to be left alone—leaving a reader who has just finished Palti or Forment’s books wondering how to explain the coherence and permanence of republicanism after independence into the twentieth century, and the rules and spaces that made possible a continued dialogue.\textsuperscript{86} References to the “hidden transcripts” behind these negotiations seem to doubt the sincerity of subaltern actors’ utterances in front of that state. Instead of an open-ended dialogue that eventually shapes political regimes and identities, a stress on negotiation reduces political exchanges to something similar to the bartering between tourists and markets sellers: full of melodrama and false courtesy, but ultimately guided by results and determined by inequality of power.\textsuperscript{87} The problem is that this conclusion denies the historicity of language (it does not matter if it changes since it refers to the same, unchanging power) and its ability to change social relations—examined by Gramsci himself.

\textsuperscript{86} Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru*, 24-25.

The central role of violence in the construction of Latin American polities is one field of research that promises to open new perspectives for the history of the public sphere in Latin America, and possibly beyond. Even if they doubt the sincerity of patriotism, Mallon and Vaughan see foreign interventions and revolutions as decisive moments in the integration of peasants into Mexico, either through nationalism or through the socially inclusive discourse of the post-revolutionary regime. Yet the military logic of these armed conflicts has not been included in cultural analyses of politics, in part because detailed studies of war in Latin America have traditionally been produced from a nationalist optic. The result is that violence tends to be interpreted as cathartic, irrational instants in national politics or in the best case as the framework for clientelistic mobilization. I would argue, however, that civil and military conflict is not out of the grasp of histories of the public sphere. In the history of Latin American public culture, concerns about honor, virtue and gossip did not preempt but, in fact, expected violence as a potential outcome of all exchanges. Utterances could be antagonistic, as in the judicial public opinion identified by Palti, and frequently lead to armed challenges against political regimes or individuals. Armed confrontations were not necessarily, as in Sabato’s view, non-“rational and ‘civilized’ means of expressing opinion”: violence was formalized in ways that allowed its continuity as a dialogue. Dueling is one example of the civilizing of violence among upper classes, but there are other battlefields where the expressive function of violence was part of discursive public exchanges, from polemics about the personal merits of veterans to historical debates about past military episodes. Codes of honor were not limited to the regulation of duels: during the late nineteenth century they provided a common language for political elites to gain legitimacy as
representatives of public opinion. Further examination of this language promises to bring about a better understanding of the exclusion of women from politics: not simply a “natural” condition of public life but an exclusion actively maintained by historical transformations of masculinity.\(^8\) Formalistic military pronunciamientos (rebel calls to arms issued from barracks) in nineteenth-century Mexico usually did not require actual fighting. The dialogical premise was that, even if actual combat could be unbalanced, heroism made all parties equal—as General Pedro María Anaya told the U.S. commander who had just defeated him in Churubusco, in 1847: “If I had ammunition you would not be here.”\(^9\) A gendered reexamination of caudillismo would undoubtedly throw new light on the constitution of new polities and probably help historicize natural notions about masculine power. Recent scholarly interest in masculinities in Latin America, for example, explores the use of male bodies and the public/private divide as key mechanism to secure gendered domination over public speech in the name of men’s “sacrifice.”\(^9\) Conversely, the enlightened “rational-critical debate” was a masculine


\(^9\) Michael Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (New York, Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books Distributed by MIT Press, 2002), 55, 57. See also Christian Thorne, "Thumbing Our Nose at the Public Sphere: Satire, the
faculty, yet it did not eliminate the centrality of sentiment and gossip in bringing together a diversity of spectators and speakers. Chambers’ focus on honor throws new light on the gendered nature of democratic life at the national level; the exclusion of women from the public sphere after independence, often lost to intellectual historians, corresponded with a redefinition of the manly virtues that shaped new democracies.

Such reexamination could build a Latin American critique of the centrality of the individual in the emergence of the public sphere. Looking at the contested divide between public and private, histories of the public sphere informed by gender are also histories of the ways in which individuals defined themselves (a history of the self, in other words, without a psychoanalytic substratum). Ethnographic research like Laura Graham’s study of communal assemblies shows how public discussions can avoid setting the focus on one voice; among the Xavante, decisions are the product of “a veritable collage of [simultaneous] voices” and “Individuals are dissociated from the content of their speech so that accountability does not reside with any particular speaker . . . but is distributed

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92 Exclusion never quite took away from women a “central role . . . in influencing popular opinion at the neighborhood level.” Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens*, 92.
throughout the polity.93 We can expect historians to draw inspiration from ethnographies in studying Latin American public actors’ fluid movement between the representation of multiple and overlapping electoral constituencies, regions, cities, extended families and individual interests.

One last realm in which public-sphere centered analysis can productively engage studies of hegemony is the constitution of publics. Publics are audiences that define discourses and debates, both political forces and objects of discussion, susceptible to reason as much as emotions. A Foucauldian archeology of discourse could provide useful descriptive tools for discursive fields but does not help understanding the coming together of diverse actors to become interlocutors. Two fields where this tension is currently played out are those of the histories of medicine and of crime and punishment. From important studies focused on law, science and institutions, researchers are now turning to a more comprehensive study of the interaction of those disciplines with social actors and practices, and of the ways broader audiences received and reshaped ideas about disease and transgression. Political history could take some cues from this research. Just as popular audiences engaged the “estado médico-legal” to produce their own combination of biological explanations and old justice in Argentina,94 citizens in the new republics became interlocutors of the discourse of liberalism. Their coming together to reshape democracy and citizenship would be easier to comprehend from a dialogical


perspective than from one that still assumes preexisting identities and clearly defined interests, and see class antagonism as a condition of public discourse. Forment shows how “counterpublics” emerged in nineteenth-century Peru as political discussion spread beyond the republic of letters, enabling “workers, artisans, indigenous peoples to enter the public sphere and broaden its agenda.” But “counterpublics” assumes one preexisting, opposed and normatively superior “public”—a “national” public which is not so often the object of central interest in studies of hegemony, as if the local were more tangible. But the public has a history in Latin America, too. As Sabato, Guerra and Annick Lempérière have noted, the category of el público was essential to nineteenth-century political language and conceptualization of legitimacy. It implied, we might argue, the existence of a public sphere where different voices would be heard, even if they involved multiple, specific publics fighting for their agendas in ways that hardly resemble the universal literate public imagined by Kant. As studies of the public sphere after independence show, politization created publics that imagined nations. Debates about credit and tariff policies, for example, defined a public of citizens who expressed

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95 At the intersection of a Foucauldian study and a Gramscian study of hegemony, the emphasis on “articulation” over “representation” proposes that the creation of meanings precedes that of social actors. Mouffe and Laclau, Hegemonía y estrategia, 124, 29, 42-43. See Michel Foucault, La arqueología del saber (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979); Habermas, "Further Reflections," 429. For the usefulness of Habermas to complete Foucault’s agenda, see Landes, Women and the Public Sphere, 7. See also Carlos Aguirre and Ricardo Salvatore, "Introduction: Writing the History of Law, Crime, and Punishment in Latin America," in Crime and Punishment in Latin America: Law and Society since Late Colonial Times, ed. Ricardo Donato Salvatore, Carlos Aguirre, and Gilbert M. Joseph (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 17; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1979); Warner, Publics and Counterpublics; Lean, "I Shot the Warlord."  
96 Forment, "La sociedad civil," 204-07.  
97 Sabato, "On Political Citizenship"; Lempérière, "Reflexiones." For the Western European version see Melton, The Rise. See also Sennett, The Fall of Public Man. “By the public use of one's own reason I understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world.” Emmanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?, 1784," http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kant-whatis.html.
their common interests in a dialogue with national authorities, sometimes with consequences for national unity.98

The interlocutors in those debates include workers talking to economists and national authorities, and also transnational actors. Studying publics and counterpublics, or hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses, however, does not require the existence of multiple public spheres, or of one that is irrevocably fragmented by class or other differences. I would argue that those publics are better understood historically if placed in the framework of one national public sphere. Studies of Latin American artisans in the nineteenth century, for example, show a sustained desire to speak rationally, in the name of a respectable working class, to a national audience. This is clearer for the twentieth century: labor historians have looked at the combination of experience and language, rather than the homogenizing impact of industrialization, behind the consciousness that made possible mass mobilizations.99 Working-class publics came together through discourses and debates that provided the conceptual means to think about common interests and to address the state. Were Argentine workers “los trabajadores” before Peronism? Recent studies examine Peronist efforts to create a political base through media and a language that incorporated groups traditionally excluded from the Argentine public sphere.

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public sphere on account of race, class and gender. The process made the intersections of class, gender, personal loyalty and nationalism legitimate objects of debate by a broad range of interlocutors. In *Doña María’s Story*, for example, Daniel James uses interviews to examine Peronist workers’ own reconstruction of their personal and collective historical role in “a newly enlarged public sphere.”

**Conclusion: Using the map against fragmentation**

If we stress violence and class, ethnic or gender divides, the national public spheres explored by Guerra seem to shrink beyond recognition. Historians of Latin American hegemonies use the category of fragmentation to explain the problem of the absence of coherent territories and polities, and weak bourgeois values in modern Latin America. Yet their valuable findings are not enough to dismiss the productive survey of the public sphere that others, also mentioned in these pages, have undertaken. In these accounts, multiple actors addressed the state and civil society, assuming (as a key part of their notion of citizenship) that they could be involved in dialogues in the public sphere, and that this public sphere was one, where all rational opinions counted. Access, reason, public/private, individuality, representation, vecindad: all these elements of the picture

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have their own history. The literature examined here leaves no doubt that their intersection in Latin America after independence was original and productive.

What made a meeting of wills possible was the shared goal of intervening in conversations that brought all members of the polity together. Independence meant the sudden politicization of publicity. Achieving an inclusive, non-coercive dialogue among old and new actors is still the object of ongoing struggles in Latin America. From the methodological point of view, the public sphere model offers a consistent framework to study the desire to have those conversations in a language that could be understood by all, in societies where languages as often separate as they unite. Since the theory casts a wide net over diverse phenomena, historians are justifiably wary of creating a new grand narrative that would rejuvenate enlightened homogenization and teleology. But the cost of doing nothing in the current historiographical landscape (that is, of accepting current disciplinary and theoretical divides) might be greater than the risk of testing new interpretive models against prevalent frameworks.

A critical Latin American perspective on the public sphere should incorporate gender, class and cultural difference, and account for a strong colonial and urban background. The result will challenge but continue to engage narratives of republicanism and liberalism. A dialogue between a Habermasian perspective and others based on Gramscian or Foucauldian theoretical models is not an impossibility, and will provide a common vocabulary for diverse subfields and traditions within Latin American historiography. In the territory surveyed here, historians’ idioms or national audiences may be less relevant, in the end, than their choices about research objects: broadening the definition of politics with a notion of culture as a purely symbolic realm may in the end
only add new thematic chapters to the elite-centered national histories dominating Latin American classrooms; too keen a search for fragmented discourses and counterpublics may break down history into plots that, although innovative, pose no threat to “important” themes. As a set of historical coordinates, a history of the public sphere in Latin America will advance the alliance of “small” research, on local politics and languages, privacy and bodies, with the “large” scale of inquiry about nationalism and representation. In order to do so, however, the category of public sphere will have to retain its unitary character, as the common, non-coercive realm for “people’s public use of their reason” that is central to its original formulation. Otherwise, the dialogue that interests researchers and gives political relevance to the model would become irrelevant, making the model itself the map of an island without a place.
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