Feminine Resurrections: Gendering Redemption in the Last Novels of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky

Rebecca Stanton

Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov* (Brat’ia Karamazovy, 1880) and Tolstoy’s *Resurrection* (Voskresenie, 1899) offer tempting grounds for comparison, despite the aesthetic and ideological differences that separate the two works, and the consequent hazards with which any such comparison, however limited, must be fraught. Each is, of course, the last full-length novel of a nineteenth-century Russian literary giant. In each, a plot centering on a miscarriage of justice provides the fictional framework within which the author elaborates his moral philosophy. Each foregrounds the problem of sensuality, the aspect of human beings that makes them susceptible to temptation and Fall. And in each novel, temptation has a feminine face, appearing in the guise of an alluring orphan with a morally dubious past: Grushenka Svetlova in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Katiusha Maslova in *Resurrection*. It goes without saying that Katiusha and Grushenka are not the same character, any more than *Resurrection* and *The Brothers Karamazov* are the same book; a juxtaposition of these two “fallen women,” however, reveals some intriguing parallels, which form the object of the present investigation.

Surprisingly, the literary importance of these two characters is far from a settled matter; many critics have dismissed them as ancillary to the action of their respective novels. Grushenka, for example, gets lumped in with the rest of Dostoevsky’s women, who are said “not [to] have their own personal history,” but instead “enter into the heroes’ biography, constitute part of their fate.” Richard Curle dismisses her as “a shadowy figure” whose “personality fades into individual nullity,” whereas Victor Terras refers to her without qualification as “the heroine of the novel”, an evaluation somewhat borne out by Dostoevsky’s own original intention to name Book VII of *The Brothers Karamazov* (eventually titled “Alyosha”) after her. Katiusha, despite her

---

1 The court cases described in each novel are, moreover, loosely based on real events, which were recounted (separately) to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky by the jurist A. F. Koni (1844-1927). See Terras, *Karamazov Companion*, 8; and Opul’skaia, “Psikhologicheskii analiz v romane Voskresenie,” 315. (All translations from Russian are mine.)

2 Mochulsky, *Dostoevsky*, 601.


4 Terras, *Karamazov Companion*, 158.

prominence in *Resurrection*, is the subject of similar dissent: while L. D. Opul'skaia proclaims her “one of the highest achievements of Tolstoy’s realistic art,”⁵ John Bayley remains unconvinced, dubbing her a “selected and hypothetical” character whom the reader “cannot assimilate.”⁶ According to Viktor Shklovsky, “Katiusha Maslova’s perception of the world” is “the pivot of the plot.”⁷ (This assertion is supported by Tolstoy’s own revisions to his original manuscript; feeling it began “falsely” [lozhno], because it was “necessary to begin with her,” he rewrote the opening of the novel to place Katiusha at the center.)⁸ Michel Aucoutrier, however, denies her any independent role in the plot at all: “Whatever place Katiusha Maslova occupies, she is no more than the partner of Prince Dmitri Nekhliudov.”⁹

To dismiss Katiusha thus is to give the text only a superficial reading. While an argument of sorts can be made for the view that Grushenka is a “female counterpart” of Dmitri Karamazov—“a somewhat coarse, hot-blooded creature, capable of cruelties and of a craftiness altogether foreign to him, but having also much of his humanity”¹⁰—the plot of *Resurrection* turns precisely on the irreducible differences between Katiusha and Nekhliudov. However, what skeptical critics like Aucoutrier and Mochulsky correctly sense is that Grushenka never, and Katiusha rarely, appears “onstage” independently of the male characters whose perceptions dominate the narrative, and in relation to whom they are largely defined. (In fact, as we shall see, the male characters in each novel reveal as much about themselves through their relationships to these two highly symbolic women as they do through their own actions.) As a result of this dramatic subordination, it is easy to regard them merely as extensions of the more active male characters in their respective novels, without attending to the contributions they make to the narrative in their own right.

While Katiusha and Grushenka might appear to function merely as reflective surfaces, convenient targets for (and mirrors held up to) the moral weakness and subsequent repentance of the male characters whose perspectives dominate their respective novels, I shall argue that they are symbolically central to the stories they inhabit. Both are fundamentally stories about moral Fall and redemption; further, both novels grapple with the faith-challenging problem of innocent suffering, and both are severely critical of contemporary judicial institutions, the social mechanism whereby the suffering of the innocent (as well as the guilty) is often rationalized. A

---

⁵ Opul’skaia, “Psikhologicheskii analiz v romane *Voskresenie*,” 320.
⁸ Opul’skaia, “Psikhologicheskii analiz v romane *Voskresenie*,” 343.
⁹ Aucoutrier, “Qui est Nekhlioudov?” 9–14. (All translations from French are mine.)
¹⁰ Yarmolinsky, *Dostoevsky*, 386.
metaphysical linchpin of both novels is the hypocrisy of sinners sitting in judgment over sinners: the elder Zosima’s injunction “You cannot be any person’s judge” is echoed by Prince Nekhliudov’s final realization that all people are “always guilty before God and therefore not qualified to punish or correct others.” 11 Most importantly, in the world of each novel, selfless love—the opposite of self-righteous judgment—is what overcomes the spurious division of humanity into the righteous and the culpable. The Gospel-derived paradigm of the “fallen woman” encapsulates all of these themes in a single figure.

The “fallen woman” is one of those biblical archetypes whose mythic resonance vastly exceeds the space they actually occupy in Scripture. 12 Each of the two episodes from which the archetype is derived appears in only one of the four Gospels (Luke and John, respectively), but both are widely known and have inspired numerous artistic representations in a variety of media. In the first episode, Luke 7:36–50, a “woman who had lived a sinful life” anoints Jesus’s feet with perfume and is forgiven her sins, according to Jesus’s explanation, “for she loved much.” 13 In the second, John 8:1–11, Jesus is approached by a group of Pharisees who wish to punish an adulteress by stoning her to death (and, not incidentally, to entrap Jesus by forcing him to choose between sacred and secular judicial practices); he disperses these self-appointed judges with the famous line “Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.” 14 These two episodes advance two different arguments concerning the problem of the fallen woman: in the first, she is absolved of her sins on the basis that she is essentially good; in the second, she is absolved

11 Dostoevskii, 324 (VI.3); Tolstoi, 512 (III.28). All quotations from The Brothers Karamazov and Resurrection are taken from these editions, and appear in my own translation. Because multiple editions of both novels are available, for ease of reference I am providing the book and chapter numbers of each quoted excerpt in addition to the page number, as follows: (BK 324; VI.3), (R 512; III.28). Henceforth, these references will appear in parentheses in the body of the text.

12 The archetypal approach employed here owes a debt to the work of Northrop Frye, in particular The Great Code.

13 Luke 7:37, 47, New International Version. The “woman who had lived a sinful life” is equated in the Catholic, though not in the Orthodox, tradition with the disciple Mary Magdalene and, as such, has inspired a number of popular narratives focusing on the relationship between this woman (often taken to be a prostitute) and Jesus. The incident of the foot-anointing is the subject of canvases by Rubens (now in the Hermitage) and Poussin, among others.

14 John 8:7. I have kept this line in the form in which it is most often cited. The New International Version reads, “If any one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.” The episode of the woman taken in adultery enjoys a rich tradition as a painterly subject, including the giant canvas (1887–88) by Vasili Polenov that hangs in the Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow, as well as works by Lucas Cranach the Younger, Lorenzo Lotto, Nicolas Poussin, and Rembrandt van Rijn, among others.
on the basis that her judges are essentially bad (or at least, no better than she is). Thus, the fallen woman archetype simultaneously embodies two opposite conceptions of forgiveness, while she also attracts two mutually contradictory forms of love: *amor*, or erotic desire, and *caritas*, the love that forgives and saves. These tensions travel with her into the secular texts in which she appears.

In *Resurrection* and *The Brothers Karamazov*, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky use the fallen woman archetype to elaborate the critique of judging that is central to both novels. Implicit in Jesus’s injunction to the Pharisees, “Let him who is without sin cast the first stone”—a line which serves as one of the epigraphs to *Resurrection*, and which resonates both in Zosima’s “You cannot be any person’s judge” and in Nekhliudov’s “people … are always guilty before God”—this critique asserts that human justice is flawed and contingent, a fatally misguided attempt to play God that hinders the work of redemption by dividing people from one another. In the Gospel-based ethics explicitly referenced by both novels, the institutions of human justice are exposed as triply unjust: by placing sinners in judgment over sinners, they enshrine hypocrisy; by meting out punishment, they transgress upon divine authority; and, by enacting a simulacrum of justice, they allow both judger and judged to abdicate any further responsibility for the collective duty of redemption. (Tolstoy vividly illustrates these flaws in the scene of Katiusha Maslova’s sentencing: innocent of the crime for which she is sentenced, the professional prostitute is dispatched to Siberia, while her judges—mere amateur sinners—complacently disperse to their dinners and mistresses, and no further soul-searching is planned by either party.)

The evangelical symbol of the fallen woman not only incorporates a critique of judgment, but implies an alternative: universal access to forgiveness through unifying love. Two aspects of the “fallen woman” text make it a particularly fit vehicle for this message: first, the fallen woman’s dual relationship to forgiveness (she not only receives forgiveness, but must extend it to her persecutors; the moment of her pardon simultaneously discloses both the good that is in her and the bad that is in them), and second, her dual relationship to love. The paradox of the “sinful woman” (a phrase interpreted, in latter tradition, to mean “prostitute”) who anoints Jesus’s feet in Luke 7 is that her Fall, like her subsequent forgiveness, is a direct consequence of having “loved much”; the erotic love that brings perdition

---

15 Interestingly, it is precisely this famous utterance that Levin, in *Anna Karenina*, categorically repudiates: “Christ would never have spoken those words had he known how they would be misused!… I have a horror of a fallen woman. You are repelled by spiders and I by those creatures” (see Kujunžič, “Pardoning Woman,” 74). Much of Tolstoy’s *oeuvre*, indeed, can be seen as striving to work through this unreasoning “horror” to an understanding of the position taken by Jesus in John 8. See also Irina Reyfman’s essay on *Family Happiness* in this volume.
serves as a prototype for the wise love that brings salvation. Thus, on the one hand, the naïve first love between Katiusha and Nekhliudov, and (we can infer) between the young Grushenka and her Polish officer, even as it catalyzes their downfall, partakes of the sacred impulses—love for life, a sense of the oneness of things, an innate capacity for joy—that connect human beings to the divine. These impulses are destroyed by the subject-object relationships underlying both the sexual act and the act of judging. At the same time, as Edwina Jannie Cruise observes, “[Katiusha’s] profession, a constant reminder of her degradation and suffering, is in fact a prerequisite for her salvation,” an assessment that also applies to Grushenka in her role as a kept mistress. Finally, even the degraded, “fallen” incarnation of that original, joyful love—the sensual desire that Mitya and even Alyosha Karamazov feel for Grushenka, and that undoubtedly plays a role in Nekhliudov’s self-consciously noble desire to “resurrect” (and marry) Katiusha—can catalyze genuine moral transformation, as it does in the two Dmi-
tris, Karamazov and Nekhliudov.

According to the “fallen woman” text, then, the process of resurrection is one that, in a sense, comes naturally; the sinner’s salvation lies not in some fundamental transformation but rather in using her ordinary methods and instincts as a means to reconnect with that latent, better self whom she has abnegated at the moment of transgression, but from whom she is only provisionally estranged. The “sinful woman” in Luke 7 is glimpsed only as she completes this process, performing a small but selfless act of love (equivalent to Grushenka’s “onion” in BK VII.3), which earns her forgiveness. Katiusha and Grushenka, as heroines in nineteenth-century novels, must undergo a longer moral evolution before their stories can be resolved; we meet them at a midway point on a moral trajectory represented as extending well beyond the time frame of the novel at hand, launched by a fall long before the narrative opens and proceeding into a future left somewhat ambiguous by the narrator. The demands of novelistic characterization

16 The fundamentally erotic impulse underlying Nekhliudov’s desire to “make amends” by persuading Katiusha to marry him is revealed, as Robert Donahoo points out, by the sexual jealousy he experiences when she chooses to marry the convict Simonson instead (“Toward a Definition of Resurrection,” <<page number?>>). This choice, on Katiusha’s part, represents the real sacrifice that marrying Nekhliudov (whom she still loves) would not be, for either of them. (On this point, see also Nesterenko, “Rol’ i mesto khristianskoi propovedi,” 100-01.) In making this choice to marry at, rather than above, her social station, Katiusha also makes amends for her refusal, in first youth, to enter a similar marriage (which also would have prevented Nekhliudov’s seduction of her) on the grounds that “life with such laboring people would be hard for her after being spoiled by the sweetness of noble life” (R 12; I.2).

17 One of the features that sets Resurrection apart from Tolstoy’s other novels is the relative concentration of its plot compared to those of War and Peace and Anna Karenina: the bulk of the action (most of the first two volumes) occurs in a few weeks
compel each author to add detail and depth to the perfunctory outlines sketched in by the Evangelists, developing a more comprehensive portrait of the “fallen woman” that preserves her iconic function while also attracting the reader’s credence and sympathy. In this portrait, the symbolic content of the archetype expresses itself through physical, as well as psychological, details.\textsuperscript{18}

The starting-point of both images is the sable-browed beauty beloved of Russian folklore (Dostoevsky even calls it “Russian beauty,” \textit{russkaia krasota}; BK 152; III.10), with a tendency to plumpness which, while it contributes to the considerable sensual charms possessed by both heroines, appears somewhat vulgar and gross when contrasted with their bygone virginal slenderness. On the other hand, the very first adverbs used to characterize Grushenka, \textit{smeias’ i raduias’} (BK 152; III.10), contain the proof that her divine self has not been entirely extinguished: \textit{radost’}, joy, is one of the characteristics that links her with Alyosha (another being the epithet “angel,” which is applied to them both),\textsuperscript{19} and with the moral message of the novel as it is embodied in Zosima’s teachings. Joy is one of Katiusha’s leitmotifs too; and, in fact, the very same words, \textit{smeias’ i raduias’}, are applied to Katiusha at the pinnacle of her virtue, the Easter-service that immediately precedes her Fall, to describe—significantly—her eyes (R 68; I.15. I will discuss the significance of Katiusha’s eyes further below).

Both women, when the reader makes their acquaintance, are full-figured, though Grushenka is tall and Maslova short. Both also move with a characteristic grace, though not the same kind: where Grushenka’s movements are “soft” (miagkie) with a “feline inaudibility” (koshach’ia neslyshnost’, BK 152; III.10), Maslova’s carriage is erect (priamo, “straight,” like her gaze elsewhere in the novel) and her steps characteristically quick and efficient; this makes her awkward gait when first we see her, hampered by the

18 As Gina Kovarsky observes of Prince Myshkin in \textit{The Idiot}, “the moral and visual imaginations support one another, as do the moral and aesthetic functions.” The technique of looking Kovarsky ascribes to Myshkin, an “imaginative sympathy that allows a viewer or a reader to extrapolate from external signs to the inner worlds of others,” is arguably modeled by both Dostoevsky’s and Tolstoy’s narrators in their treatment of Grushenka and Katiusha. See Kovarsky, “Learning How to Look: Nastas’ia Filippovna in \textit{The Idiot},” in this volume.

19 See Terras, \textit{Karamazov Companion}, esp. 102, 343, 353.
heavy prison boots, all the more pathetic, and underlines how far she has fallen from her original promise (R 9; I.1). The difference in the two women’s movements parallels the different strategies they have evolved for managing their, seemingly universal, sex appeal. After a lifetime of being variously objectified (desired, pursued, betrayed, and vilified) by men ranging from Nekhliudov, through a string of employers, to the prison personnel and her fellow convicts, Maslova’s pride in her appearance and the male attention it attracts is mingled with weariness: while flattering and sometimes useful, this incessant and uninvited attention has brought her more ill-luck than good.\textsuperscript{20} Grushenka exploits her appeal more assertively, and with less apparent ambivalence; unlike Maslova, who “didn’t know how to save” and who naïvely left an early would-be patron for a ne’er-do-well (R 13; I.2), Grushenka has cannily remained faithful to the merchant Kuzma Samsonov and has learned to manage the money he allots to her (BK 346–47; VII.3). Moreover, Dostoevsky makes it clear that she wields her allure with great skill; her “onion” or signal act of pity, “sparing” Alyosha from the full onslaught of her seductive techniques, would carry little meaning if she did not pose a genuine threat to his chastity (BK 354; VII.3). The two authors thus characterize “fallenness” in slightly different ways: for Tolstoy, the state of being “fallen” equates to being the object of the male erotic gaze, whether by choice or not; for Dostoevsky, it seems to consist rather in choosing the erotic mode as the basis for one’s relationships, to the exclusion of other modes of interaction. (At the beginning of the novel, Grushenka is universally seen through the lens of her erotic appeal; her choice to use another mode with Alyosha after learning of Zosima’s death clearly represents a turning-point for her.) These differences in characterization are highlighted by their costume: Grushenka’s signature garments are her “sumptuous black silk dress” and “costly black cashmere shawl” (BK 153; III.10); Katiusha’s, a white apron. With her black attire and “feline” movements, Grushenka is presented as a seductive but malignant force—the black cat whose crossing of paths with the Karamazov family heralds schism and ruin. Katiusha, on the other hand, enters the space of the novel in the white-clad guise of the sacrificial virgin (R 9; I.1).

Though white is, as Marie Sémon notes, “the color of Katiusha,” this detail did not appear in early drafts of the novel but evolved over time, along

\textsuperscript{20} In her discussion of a much earlier Tolstoyan heroine, Masha in Family Happiness, Irina Reyfman remarks: “[Masha’s] initial fall consists of becoming the subject of the erotic desire of another man.” Though her situation is quite different, the same can be said of Katiusha: her “fallenness” is marked first and foremost by the fact that she is the object of the male erotic gaze, and it is this gaze that she must find a way to escape in order to be “resurrected” at the end of the novel. See Reyfman, “Female Voice and Male Gaze in Tolstoy’s Family Happiness,” \textit{\url{<page?>>}}, and—for a complementary analysis of “gaze” in Dostoevsky—Kovarsky, “Learning How to Look,” \textit{\url{<page?>>}}.
with other elements of her physical portrait. The amount of care Tolstoy devoted to designing Katiusha’s external appearance reflects an important difference between the narrative strategies he employs for Katiusha and Nekhludov, respectively; as Opul’skaia puts it, Katiusha’s mode is “not ... extended internal monologues and dialogues, dreams and reminiscences, but (to use Tolstoy’s own expression) ‘the spiritual life expressed in scenes,’” with a corresponding emphasis on non-discursive means of conveying her inner life, such as costume and countenance. This places her in marked contrast to Nekhludov, whose thoughts and feelings are presented in just such “internal monologues and dialogues” (often with pompous or defensive overtones). It is likely that Katiusha’s relative lack of discursivity—in which she resembles her Evangelical prototypes—accounts at least in part for her dismissal by (mostly male) critics. Arguably, however, Nekhludov’s words serve as an impediment rather than an impetus to his quest for redemption; he is constantly engaged in conversations that are governed by social convention rather than sincerity or truth, whereas Katiusha does not even speak up in self-defense when falsely accused of misbehavior with a hospital orderly. Rather, by silently transforming herself into the “good woman” that Nekhludov recognizes in her at their parting (R 502; III.25), she exposes the disproportionate ratio of talk to action in his program for reform.

Katiusha’s relative taciturnity forces the reader (and Nekhludov) to attend closely to the non-verbal elements of her characterization—the “singular, mysterious individuality that distinguishes [her] face from all others, making it individual, unique, unrepeatable” (R 41; I.9). This “mysterious individuality” of the face literally embodies a character’s psychological and spiritual individuality, according to V. V. Ermilov: “the spiritual and physical uniqueness (неповторимость) of the human personality are fused, for Tolstoy, into a single whole.” The depiction of this “mysterious link between the inner and the outer, the spiritual and the

22 Opul’skaia, “Psikhologicheskii analiz v romane Voskresenie,” 317. Both Sémon and Opul’skaia devote considerable attention to the evolution of Katiusha’s character and appearance over successive drafts of the novel, firmly establishing the importance the author placed on such seemingly “superficial” details as her clothes and hair, and showing how these physical details reflect aspects of the Katiusha within.
23 According to Cruise: “Katiusha requires little habilitation before beginning to practice spiritual love, for she is not confronted by the obstacle of reason that a Tolstoyan hero would find in himself [ whereas] Nekhludov [...] must study the scriptures and wrestle with his greater intellect before he can apply this model of love to his own life” (“The Ideal Woman in Tolstoi,” 285). In this, of course, he resembles Jesus’s male disciples (who require much more verbal persuasion than either of the “fallen women” depicted in the Gospels), as well as Tolstoy himself.
24 Ermilov, Tolstoi—romanist, 455.
physical” is the key to what Sénon calls the portrait fluent, a technique of characterization that fuses the character’s inner and outer states into a semblance of organic selfhood, comprehending both the fundamental continuity of personality and the changes taking place in his or her inner life.

Both continuity and change are rendered visible in Tolstoy’s portrait of Katiusha: her features, expressions, and deportment, while continually reinterpreted by Nekhludov and the narrator, nonetheless remain essentially constant, reminding the reader (and Nekhludov) that even at her lowest ebb, she is still the same person she was when she was “good,” and that therefore she can be good again. Of particular interest are her eyes, which are the feature Tolstoy most persistently evokes in successive, purposefully repetitive descriptions of Katiusha, and are clearly meant to serve as the proverbial window to her soul. The simplicity and sincerity that characterize her “natural” behavior are symbolized from the outset by her direct (priamo v glaza) gaze (R 9, 70; I.1, 15); later, her progress toward redemption from the fallen state in which Nekhludov has placed her is marked by a transition from avoiding his gaze to looking him in the eye. In her highest moment, as she kisses a beggar after the Easter-service, she does so with “joyfully shining” (radostno sianie; R 69; I.15) eyes that stand in subtle but pointed contrast to the “glittering, gay” (blestiaschii, veselyi; R 77; I.17) Shenbok, who comes the following day to whisk Nekhludov back to the “general debasement of military life” that has induced in him a “chronic state of psychotic egoism” (R 62; I.13). (Here, Tolstoy is employing a vocabulary rich in Evangelical significance: the word radost’ [joy] and its derivatives appear roughly forty times in Russian translations of the Gospels, whereas derivatives of veselie [merriment] appear only half-a-dozen times, generally in explicit association with the sensual pleasures of eating and drinking.) These contrasted synonyms (radost’ vs. veselie, sianie vs. blesk) are later used to underline Katiusha’s own fall into moral and sexual depravity, when the joyful shine in her eyes is replaced by a “glittering, evil gleam” (blestiaschii, nekhoroshi blesk; R 176; I.43). The echo of Shenbok in the new Katiusha’s

25 The leitmotifs of Katiusha’s portrait are her white clothing, her black ringlets, her direct gaze, her quick, efficient tread, her erect carriage, her attitude of readiness, her small, broad hands, her naïve smile, and her dark, squinting eyes; these features enable Nekhludov to recognize his Katiusha in the sullen defendant on whose jury he is serendipitously called to serve. Although these traits are present both in the virginal Katiusha and in her “fallen” alter ego Maslova, they create different impressions on the onlooker, depending on the prejudices of the latter: for example, the “expression of readiness not only in the face but the whole figure” (R 48; I.9), which in “Katiusha” betokened a becoming alacrity in the service of her benefactors, presents itself in “Maslova” as a mark of her squalid profession.

26 One can compare here the “politics of looking” that Irina Reyfman identifies in Family Happiness (see her essay in this volume). Katiusha, unlike Masha, seems to have Tolstoy’s permission to “look back” at the men who have dishonored her.
worldly “glitter” links the two characters in allegiance to a sordid world of egoistic sensualism and materialism, reinforcing our unfavorable impressions of both.

The difference between a joyful shine and an evil glitter is, of course, a matter of interpretation; Katiusha’s ocular sparkle itself remains constant, but its meaning varies in accordance with her moral state. The same is true of her famously enigmatic squint.27 On that fateful Easter-night, she is described as “squinting ever so slightly from the night without sleep” (a curious explanation for a squint already evident three years—and three chapters—before!); this slight disfigurement, a scar of piety, only renders her all the more charming. How different is Nekhliudov’s perception when he meets her in prison, after the trial: here, her squint is “scary” (strashno), conveying a “tense and malevolent expression” that fills him with despair (R 177; I.43).28

The moral regeneration of Katiusha will consist in restoring her to her true self, the prelapsarian “real” Katiusha whose image is stored in Nekhliudov’s memory, and of whom he strives to remind her. This spiritual regeneration will entail, in turn, the recuperation of those physical qualities that bespeak the integrity of her moral core. On the march to Siberia, she will shed prostitute-Maslova’s “ample bosom” and “unhealthy pallor” (R 9; I.1), regaining through hardship and exposure to the elements a version of the “graceful figure” and “blushing cheeks” she possessed in her innocent youth (R 70; I.15). Her essential features will also regain their original, innocent connotations: even before the departure for Siberia, when (thanks to Nekhliudov) she is working in the prison hospital—the first step on the path to restoring herself by caring for others—the “joyful shine” returns to her face (vse litso ee prosiialo radost’iu; R 284 II.13). Her tread will once again be quick and firm; her gaze, direct and calm; her curly hair, which used to escape a little from its braid in the childish days of hide-and-seek (R 57; I.12), and was

27 Martin Seymour-Smith (Fallen Women, 177) suggests that Maslova’s squint “substitutes for the element in her character (which Tolstoy cannot define) that enabled her to become a prostitute.” According to Ermilov (Tolstoi—romanist, 550), the squint symbolizes “the fact that her whole life has unfolded between different worlds,” and is brought to our attention precisely at “culminating” moments in Maslova’s spiritual life, when “she looks from within one world into another” as if gazing “somewhere off to the side, from the false, senseless life of physical reality ... into another, perhaps impossible life: a life in which love [Katiusha’s “human essence”] reigns supreme.” Katiusha’s crooked gaze thus offers a possible model for a “new way of seeing” (something like Tolstoy’s literary ostranenie), with the potential to overcome the conventional prejudices that substitute, in polite society, for moral discernment. It is not clear, however, how this interpretation—or, indeed, the squint itself—can be reconciled with Katiusha’s “direct” gaze when she is in a virtuous state.

28 The use of the word strashno here in connection with Katiusha/Maslova’s black (chernye) eyes hearkens back, as well, to the “something black and dreadful” (chto-to chernoe i strashnoe) of her seduction by Nekhliudov (R 77; I.17).
Feminine Resurrections

latterly allowed to fall over her forehead in coquettish ringlets (R 9; I.1), is henceforth to be completely covered with a kerchief (R 432; III.5). The “fluidity” of Katiusha/Maslova’s portrait in time (its capacity for both continuity and change) depends on the use of memory: specifically, on the reader’s access to Nekhliudov’s (and the narrator’s) memories of Katiusha, which give her portrait its perspectival depth, “unit[ing] the fluid moments of a life, its contradictory stages” and “gather[ing] up in the eternity of the person the separate fragments of a personality.” Tolstoy’s portrait fluent of Katiusha Maslova unites the physical trappings of two moral extremes: virginal purity—the young Katiusha is so squeaky-clean that at one point (R 64; I.14) the narrator compares her to the bar of soap she is holding!—and meretricious degeneracy. A similarly contradictory (though less extreme) set of characteristics may be seen at work in Dostoevsky’s portrait of Grushenka Svetlova.

Much as the reader’s impressions of Katiusha are usually mediated by Nekhliudov, Grushenka’s likeness is transmitted through the perceptions of Alyosha Karamzov. And like Katiusha’s, Grushenka’s first appearance in the text is laden with signifiers pointing both to her “sinful life” and to her potential for redemption. Alyosha’s first impressions of her are filtered through the Karamzov sensuality; he assesses her in terms of texture (everything about her is miagkoe), taste (her voice is slashchavy), and sound (her movements are neslyshnye), as well as visually (BK 152–53; III.10). These features, especially her “soft, even sugary” voice, suggest a certain un wholesomeness, yet the “peculiar over-sweetness” of Grushenka’s tone and movements is (Alyosha finds) contradicted by the “childlike, simple-hearted expression” (detskoe, prostodushnoe vyrazhenie) of her face and eyes. Moreover, she enters the room “laughing and rejoicing” (smeias’ i raduias’) —exactly like the young Katiusha Maslova at Eastertime. In Grushenka, as in Katiusha, this explicit association with “joy” (radost’) hints at her capacity for unselfish love, the prerequisite for resurrection.

Like Katiusha’s, Grushenka’s moral career is documented by changes in her physical appearance. The reader’s first opportunity to assess these is provided on her second appearance in the text, in the chapter “An Onion” (VII.3). The facts of her history are outlined only sketchily—Dostoevsky’s narrator, unlike Tolstoy’s, is far from omniscient—but her psychological development since her arrival in Skotoprigonovsk four years before can be deduced from the accumulation of adjectives describing, respectively, the former and current Grushenka: the former “slim, delicate, shy, timid, dreamy,

29 Katiusha’s slightly unruly curls may contain a coded reference to another famous literary rendering of a biblical figure—Milton’s Eve, whose hair, worn “[d]issheveld, but in wanton ringlets wav’d,” signals her vulnerability to sensual temptation (Paradise Lost, IV.306).

and sad girl of eighteen” is now a “plump, rosy beauty of the Russian type … proud and insolent” (BK 346; VII.3). This new Grushenka resembles the Maslova who appears before Nekhliudov et al. for trial: “plump,” “full-bosomed,” “erect” of deportment, having distilled a false dignity from her fallen state by clothing it in a semblance of volition. In both cases, what the reader “sees” is a remarkably consistent portrait of the fallen woman near the bottom of her moral parabola, shortly before the turning-point that marks the end of her “sinful life” and the beginning of her redemption.

The turning-point for Grushenka takes place in this encounter with Alyosha (himself at a moment of spiritual crisis), who hails her his “sister” in a speech reminiscent of Jesus in Luke 7: “You should rather look here, at her: do you see how she took pity on me? I came here to find a wicked soul … and found a true sister, I found a treasure, a loving soul” (BK 353; VII.3). Significantly, Alyosha, like Jesus (“Do you see this woman?” Luke 7:44), prompts his skeptical companion to look at the woman who is setting an unexpected example. Dostoevsky and Tolstoy have taken this call to visual attention and expanded it into an entire program of novelistic characterization, working to make Fall and redemption visible to the human, as well as to the divine, observer.

Grushenka’s moment of redemption, like Katiusha’s, involves not a radical change in her character and demeanor, but a reversion to her native simplicity and directness, which had been present in some measure (sensed by Alyosha as a “contradictory” aspect of her personality) all along. Most obviously and immediately, she sheds her “sugary” drawl in favor of a simple candor that Alyosha notes with approval. Further physical changes take place in her over the ensuing weeks, following Dmitri’s arrest. Like those undergone by Katiusha during the march to Siberia, these changes are outwardly due to physical hardship (a serious illness), but clearly reflect the transformation taking place in her on a spiritual level, as Alyosha’s assessment confirms:

She had changed greatly in the face, grown thinner and somewhat sallow… But in Alyosha’s view, her face had seemingly become even more attractive, and he loved to meet her eyes…. Something firm and sensible had intensified in her gaze. Some spiritual transformation made itself felt, and a kind of steady, humble, but good and unalterable resolution could be discerned in her. A small vertical wrinkle had appeared on her forehead between her brows, giving her charming face a look of concentrated thoughtfulness, almost austere at the first glance. Scarcely a trace remained of her former frivolity. (BK 563; XI.1, my emphasis)

The changes in Grushenka closely reflect those in Katiusha at the equivalent point of her trajectory (the steady, direct gaze, the new austerity in her figure
and complexion). The language in which Tolstoy’s narrator records the physical signs of Katiusha’s spiritual regeneration, using Nekhliudov’s perceptions as a frame of reference, is also strikingly similar:

[T]he change that had taken place in her showed itself in her looks. She had grown thin and sun-tanned, and seemed older; little wrinkles had appeared at her temples and around her mouth … and neither in her dress, nor in her hair-style, nor in her manner remained any sign of her former coquetry. (R 432; III.5, my emphasis)

This newfound seriousness in Grushenka and Katiusha, far from making them severe, is accompanied by a renewal of their prelapsarian gaiety. Katiusha, “her old self again,” responds to Nekhliudov “happily and naturally,” when he succeeds in visiting her in Tomsk (R 432; III.5). And Grushenka’s “youthful cheerfulness” in the face of “the calamity that had overtaken the poor girl” strikes Alyosha, even, as “strange” (BK 563; XI.1).

Both the seriousness and the good cheer, however, come about precisely as a result of the “calamity” (in both cases, significantly, a miscarriage of secular justice) that has befallen each of the two women. This new combination of gravity and levity is not so incongruous as it might appear—or, at least, no more so than the combination of sullenness and vivacity that characterized both women formerly. Indeed, the difference between the “almost impossible contradiction” Alyosha noticed in Grushenka’s personality at their first meeting, and the contradiction that strikes him as “strange” now, depends (like the difference between Katiusha’s “joyful shine” and “evil glitter”) on the interpretation of the beholder. Tolstoy and Dostoevsky use the perspectives of Nekhliudov and Alyosha respectively to teach the reader how to “see this woman” (Luke 7:44)—a skill that Nekhliudov and Alyosha must themselves learn, as both make crucial mistakes of interpretation at times in their observation of Katiusha and Grushenka.

So far, this chapter has focused on the techniques of portraiture that Tolstoy and Dostoevsky use to transform the biblical figure of the fallen woman into a fully-fledged novelistic character. Let us now examine the structure of the redemption narrative in which these two characters participate (and which, by their presence, they introduce into each novel). Each woman describes a moral trajectory resembling a parabola, in which an initial fall from grace leads to a “sinful life,” which in turn places her, eventually, at the mercy of flawed human judges. After an initial resentful response to the injustice perpetrated against her, she accepts not only her own unjust fate but also a share in the punishment meted out to another innocent sufferer. By choosing to shoulder this burden—and thus escaping the confines of mortal justice for the freedom of Christ-like self-sacrifice—she becomes a
model for others of unselfish love ("Do you see this woman?... [H]er sins, which are many, are forgiven, because she loved much").

This basic structure is elaborated by means of literary tropes inherited not only from the Gospels but from the secular literary canon, and in particular Karamzin’s “Poor Liza” ("Bednaia Liza," 1792), probably the most memorable implementation of the fallen woman plot in Russian literature before Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. The eponymous heroine of “Poor Liza” experiences a fall almost identical to that undergone by Katiusha and Grushenka: she is seduced by an aristocratic ne’er-do-well who exploits her natural predisposition to love for his own selfish ends, subsequently abandoning her to pursue personal glory and matrimonial opportunities more befitting his station—though not before adding insult to injury by attempting to buy his victim’s forgiveness for the sum of a hundred rubles. Thus betrayed and dishonored, Liza fails to achieve the redemption offered to her biblical antecedents, instead committing suicide by throwing herself into a pond. Earlier explorations of the fallen woman theme by both Dostoevsky and Tolstoy had borne the imprint of Karamzin’s pessimism: Liza’s namesake, the prostitute in Notes From Underground (Zapiski iz podpol’ia, 1864), is similarly betrayed and insulted (though on a much pettier scale) by Dostoevsky’s narrator, and Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina emulates Liza in resorting to suicide as the only way out of her “impossible position.”

It is not until their final novels that these two authors develop versions of the fallen woman archetype that depart from Karamzinian precedent by restoring the biblical archetype’s redemptive potential, even as they follow the model of Liza’s fall almost to the letter: like Poor Liza, both Grushenka and Katiusha are “ruined” at the age of seventeen by irresponsible young officers who seduce, then callously abandon them. (Katiusha even comes close to committing a Karamzinian

31 Luke 7:44–47. The operative moral construct here is the opposition between “playing God” (by attempting to impose morality in the form of law and judicial enforcement) and “imitating Christ” (the theological concept of imitatio Christi, which in the most literal sense—espoused by the Elder Zosima and enacted by both Grushenka and Katiusha—means suffering for the sins of others. The Gospel of John holds this out as the ultimate act of love, a quality with which both Grushenka and Katiusha are closely associated: “For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son... not to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him” (John 3:16–17)).

32 Obviously, these are selective examples; “the breadth of Dostoevsky’s interest in this feminine archetype,” in particular, is a matter of critical record (Moravevich, “Romanticization of the Prostitute,” 53). I cite these two examples specifically because of their ties to Poor Liza, which are a feature they share with Grushenka and Katiusha, but not with (say) Sonia Marmeladova or Natasha Rostova.

33 Dostoevsky’s narrator reports that Grushenka was “betrayed by someone at seventeen” (BK 346; VII.3). Tolstoy’s chronology is slightly muddled, but it seems that Nekhliudov seduces Katiusha a couple of months before either her eighteenth or her
suicide when, like Liza, she catches a glimpse of her erstwhile lover embedded in the social sphere she cannot enter; she changes her mind at the last minute when the child she is carrying—Nekhludov’s child, destined, like their love, to die in infancy—moves within her.) Struggling but failing to find an honest means of support, they learn to define themselves as the exclusively sexual objects to which social condemnation has reduced them.\(^{34}\) This process of commodification is completed by ostensibly well-meaning lovers who try, literally, to buy them: Nekhludov (exactly like Karamzin’s Erast) with a hundred-ruble note meant to purchase his own ease of conscience; Dmitri (much later in Grushenka’s more complicated story) with his other \textit{idée fixe}, the three thousand rubles that symbolize his shame before Grushenka’s rival, Katerina Ivanovna.

Two occurrences combine to provide the impetus for each of these literary fallen women to break out of her “sinful life” and achieve the redemption promised by her Evangelical prototype. The first of these occurrences, already discussed, is the crisis provoked by a miscarriage of secular justice in the world of the novel. The second is the unexpected opportunity, years after that initial betrayal, for the fallen woman to confront her former seducer—and, even more unexpectedly, to realize that she has transcended him both emotionally and spiritually. This realization is the precursor to the crucial moment in her evolution: forgiving her long-ago betrayer. This act of forgiveness is what frees Katiusha and Grushenka, finally, from the “sinful life” into which their respective seducers propelled them.

It is in breaking free from this life—in a sense, breaking the spell placed on them by their seducers—that Katiusha and Grushenka depart from the literary model offered by “Poor Liza.” Of course, they do not achieve beatitude overnight; both must overcome challenges to their resolve (one of which, \textit{nadrygo}, is discussed below), and both suffer from episodes of moral recidivism marked by a recourse to alcohol. Katiusha assuages first her discomfiture at re-encountering Nekhludov, then the shame of her memories, by “buying wine again and getting drunk with her companions” (R 196; I.48). Grushenka regresses spectacularly from her moral epiphany in “An Onion” during the subsequent episode of debauchery in Mokroe (BK VIII.7), although even here Dostoevsky is at pains to mingle the signs of relapse with signs of recovery, peppering her drunken babble with echoes of Zosima’s teachings, such as “I want to pray” (Zosima: “Whenever you are left

\(^{34}\) Cf. the Pharisee’s remark at Luke 7:39, “If this man were a prophet, he would know who and what sort of woman this is … she is a sinner”; and Alyosha’s initial reflections on Grushenka: “Here she was, this terrible woman—‘the beast,’ as Ivan had called her….” (BK 151; III.10).
alone, pray”); “The world’s a nice place” (Zosima: “Love the earth and everything on it”); “Though we’re bad, the world’s all right” (Zosima: “Brothers, have no fear of men’s sin…. Love all God’s creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it”); and even “Beat me, ill-treat me, do what you will with me…. And I do deserve to suffer” (Zosima: “Go at once and seek suffering for yourself … and you will understand that you too are guilty”) (BK 443, 325, 322; VIII.7–8, VI.3). In this way, Grushenka actively exemplifies her own claim—likewise an echo of Zosima—that “we’re bad and good, bad and good” (BK 443; VII.7–8).

As we have already seen, it is a hallmark of Grushenka’s portrait that she embodies these qualities simultaneously, whereas her Tolstoyan counterpart, in similar straits, vacillates between the two. Tolstoy’s characterization of Katiusha is able to encompass extremes of degeneracy and virtue, but alternately, just as his narrative focuses alternately on her and on Nekhliudov; Dostoevsky, shunning the absolutes Tolstoy embraces, mixes the “bad and good” in Grushenka in varying concentrations, never allowing either to dominate her persona exclusively, just as Grushenka never exclusively dominates the text in which she appears. This rhetorical subordination of Grushenka should not, however, be taken to mean that she is of merely subordinate importance. Rather, it is one of the ways in which Grushenka, like Katiusha, reflects the rhetorical structure of the narrative that contains her. In The Brothers Karamazov, interdependent characters and perspectives act upon one another like elements of a single complex sentence; in Resurrection, they retain a greater degree of independence from one another.

This sense of independence allows the reader to draw more confident conclusions about Katiusha than about Grushenka, whose behavior is often, as at Mokroe, ambiguous. In particular, Katiusha’s last appearance in Resurrection leaves us in no doubt that she has graduated into the ranks of the redeemed, whereas Dostoevsky leaves Grushenka’s prognosis less certain; at the end of The Brothers Karamazov, she is still, demonstrably, “bad and good,” although the emphasis has shifted decisively in favor of the latter. Important signs, however, suggest that Grushenka’s resurrection is—by Dostoevskian standards—as much a fait accompli as Katiusha’s. Like her Tolstoyan counterpart, Grushenka has passed the crucial test: not only has she forgiven the man who caused all her misfortunes, she shows him especial kindness and care. Katiusha, loving Nekhliudov anew, gives him up for reasons that, although complicated, are no longer based in the desire to punish him but rather in the desire to help him, as well as herself, toward redemption. (If she marries Nekhliudov, neither of them will be making the genuine sacrifice necessary to atone for their sins; she will be repeating her girlhood choice to pursue a life of ease instead of honest toil; he will, as Donna Orwin points out, merely be pursuing the conjugal life with her that he should have chosen in the first place—a prize he has surely forfeited through his earlier immoral
behavior. By marrying Simonson, she takes a decisive step away from that former life, spares Nekhliudov his quasi-sacrifice of self-imposed exile and hardship, and instead takes that sacrifice upon herself.) Meanwhile, Grushenka, though disillusioned in her “officer” (the titular “Former and Indisputable” lover of VIII.7), supports him with gifts of money and food—and, tellingly, manages to perform this charitable action without exciting a nadryn response. Moreover, also like Katiusha, she has made a decision to suffer, though innocent herself, on behalf of the guilty, choosing to accompany her intended husband (also innocent, or at least wrongfully convicted) into exile. These actions amply demonstrate Grushenka’s successful transition from “bad” to “good,” from sensuality and self-interest to love and self-sacrifice.

Against the background of these “success stories” about moral Fall and resurrection, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky also provide illustrations of would-be moments of redemption gone awry, “near misses” that serve to reinforce the singularity of Katiusha’s and Grushenka’s achievement and the importance of the quality, unstinting love, that enables it. One of these is the phenomenon Dostoevsky refers to as nadryn: a “twisted response” to charity in which the intended beneficiary opts, perversely, “to hurt himself in order to hurt others.”

This response is evoked when the would-be benefactor is, one might say, acting out of a desire to “help others in order to help himself”; thus, a vodka-emboldened Katiusha rejects Nekhliudov’s “self-sacrificing” offer of marriage, exposing the ulteriority of his motives: “You had your pleasure from me in this world, and now you want to get your salvation through me in the world to come!” (R 195; I.48)37; thus, too, Grushenka rejects Katerina Ivanovna’s conciliatory advances, instead offering her what she really wants: “Save [Dmitri], and I’ll worship you all my life” (BK 768; I.2). Both the nadryn-provoking act (“helping others so as to help oneself”) and the nadryn response (“hurting oneself so as to hurt others”) miss the mark because they fail to partake of the selfless love that prompts true self-sacrifice, “hurting oneself in order to help others.” Alone in their respective novels, Grushenka and Katiusha (whose professional pseudonym is “Love”) attain this spiritual level.38

35 Orwin, “Riddle of Prince Nekhludov,” 478.
36 Belknap, Structure of “The Brothers Karamazov,” 47.
37 Amy Mandelker poses the problem succinctly: “Maslova refuses to be the tool for Nekhludov’s redemption, as she had earlier been the tool for satisfying his sexual desire” (Framing Anna Karenina, 179) To allow herself to be used in this way—even after she has completely forgiven him—would be to accept once again the subject-object relations that spoiled their love in the first place.
38 I do not count characters who are represented as having already attained this level before the reader meets them, such as Zosima in BK or Marya Pavlovna in R.
In this vein, one cannot help but notice that the male characters in the two novels who announce the intention to suffer on behalf of others stop short of realizing this project. Dmitri Nekhludov, after spending an entire novel preparing to save his former sweetheart by marrying her, is unsure whether to be piqued or relieved at finding himself rejected for Simonson (whose enthusiasm for the endeavor rudely exposes both the triviality and the self-interest of Nekhludov’s planned “sacrifice”). Dmitri Karamazov’s zest for martyrdom likewise abates as he approaches the reality of a life sentence in Siberia, a prospect so awful that the Karamazovs prefer not even to name it, instead referring to it as “there.” While Dostoevsky’s narrator does not tell us what happened to Dmitri and Grushenka “in the end,” as the novel closes Dmitri is firmly resolved to evade, rather than embrace, his “cross”; indeed, it is not fully clear that the rather adventurous future he plans with Grushenka is not actually preferable, given their respective temperaments, to the staid conjugal existence they might have enjoyed had he been duly acquitted.

As each novel closes, then, it is left to these two initially discredited female characters to shoulder the respective “crosses” that originally seemed destined for their male counterparts, and, in so doing, to become each novel’s sole exponent of moral regeneration. While other characters occupy various rungs on the ladder to salvation, ranging from the saintly (Alyosha Karamazov; Maria Pavlovna) to the very debased or very ignorant, only Katiusha and Grushenka exemplify the very experience of salvation, the transition from sinner to saved. The reader leaves Dmitri Nekhludov poring over the Gospels, seeking (and, perhaps, finding) enlightenment in the written word—but Katiusha, his former object, has already left him far behind. He only reads the text; she embodies it. Reading the figures of Katiusha and Grushenka through the Evangelical fallen woman archetype, with her complex relationships to and embodiment of forgiveness and love, reveals the central importance of these two characters to The Brothers Karamazov and Resurrection. Far from being an “individual nullity,” “no more

Grushenka and Katiusha are unique in their respective novels as characters who enter “fallen” and leave “resurrected.”

39 The reader, of course, being only human and therefore venal, is apt to share Nekhludov’s disappointment. Nesterenko reports that Chekhov found the ending of the novel to be “uninteresting and false” (neinteresen i fal’shiv), and suggests that “Probably, Tolstoy’s hero, no less than his critics, would also have liked the story of him and Katiusha to have a more ‘eventful’ ending” (97, 102).

40 Here again, the “fallen woman” narratives of The Brothers Karamazov and Resurrection emulate their antecedent in Luke 7: cf. Jesus’s words to the Pharisee, “you gave me no water for my feet, but she has wet my feet with her tears… you gave me no kiss, but from the time I came in she has not ceased to kiss my feet,” etc. (Luke 7:44–45). The point is that the fallen woman, lacking education or even informed intent, instinctively acts from unselfish love; in contrast, the male disciples who attempt to follow Jesus require constant verbal elaboration of his teachings.
than the partner” of a more dynamic masculine protagonist, each of these fictional women emerges from her unpromising history of victimhood and degradation to play a crucial role in the novel she inhabits, ultimately embodying the philosophical and artistic concerns that lie at its very heart.

Works Cited

Primary Texts


Secondary Texts

Kovarsky, Gina. “Learning How to Look: Nastasia Filippovna in The Idiot.” In this volume.


Reyfman, Irina. “Female Voice and Male Gaze in Leo Tolstoy’s *Family Happiness*.” In this volume.


