Macro Colloquium Spring 2007 _
Coordinators:
Stefania Albanesi and Pietro
Reichlin
Logistics:
W
The colloquium is a venue
where graduate students interested in macroeconomics in the third year and
above present their research. Second year students are also encouraged to
attend. Research can be very preliminary. The audience provides feedback.
If you wish to attend the
colloquium or require further information, e-mail Stefania Albanesi.
Schedule
|
Date |
Speaker |
Topic |
|
1/17 |
No meeting |
|
|
1/24 |
No meeting |
|
|
1/31 |
Mai Dao |
International spillover of labor market policy in a Monetary Union
Abstract: Redistributive policies in the European Union are still decided exclusively on national level. However, growing concern about the future of the welfare state has induced policy makers and most recently researchersto argue for a coordination of social policy on the EU level. Using a micro-founded model, this paper explores possible channels of externalities of labor market policies, in particular tax progressivity, across countries in themonetary union. The model includes trades in two sectors with pricing asymmetries, union bargaining over the wage and an exogenous money supply at the union level. Domestic tax progression has a positive employment effect and a positive spillover effect on the other union member, essentially through increase of union-wide purchasing power. The results are more limited if capital mobility is introduced. Nevertheless, different externalities suggest that there is scope and need for coordination of redistributive policy at the union level. |
|
2/13 4.15-5.45 PM |
Mauro Roca |
Search in the Labor Market under
Imperfectly Insurable Income Risk For an
abstract, see here. This colloquium presentation will take place during the Money and
Macro seminar. |
|
2/14 |
No meeting |
|
|
2/21 |
No meeting |
|
|
2/28 |
Anton Korinek |
Dividend Taxation and Intertemporal Tax Arbitrage (with Joseph E. Stiglitz) Abstract: Dividend taxation makes it
costly for firms to distribute funds to shareholders; on the other hand, agency
problems limit the amount of funds that shareholders are willing to leave
with firms. Firms thus balance agency
costs and tax consequences to determine their optimal amount of working
capital. policy on
aggregate investment. New firms raise less equity and invest less the higher
the level of dividend taxes, in
accordance with the traditional view of dividend taxation. However, the
dividend tax rate is irrelevant for the investment
decisions of internally growing and mature firms, as postulated by the new
view of dividend taxation. Aggregate
investment is dominated by these latter two categories and therefore
unanticipated tax changes have only
insignificant real effects. reduce
investors' tax burden. This can significantly distort firms' cash balances
and by extension aggregate investment and output. expectations
about future regime changes and the ensuing dividend tax changes. This can
significantly change the
evaluation of any policy. |
|
3/7 |
No meeting |
|
|
3/14 |
Spring Break |
|
|
3/21 |
Gideon du Rand |
The Sensitivity of Fit of DSGE
models to Abstract match the
properties of atheoretical VARs various
very different techniques to convert the trended series to stationary ones.
This simple
experiment and finds that in the case of a simple three variable DSGE model,
the HP-Filter performs well in
uncovering |
|
3/28 |
Justin Svec |
Fiscal Policy under Consumer Uncertainty
Abstract: Set in the Lucas and Stokey
(1983) optimal taxation model, I characterize robustly optimal fiscal policy
when agents do not have rational expectations. More specifically, consumers are uncertain
about the probability
distribution governing the government spending shock and so apply robust
control. The benevolent government,
endowed with rational expectations, chooses a linear tax on labor and a debt
process to maximize consumer
welfare. I find that the government
would optimally set a history dependent allocation, breaking the direct
link between the government spending process and the labor tax. |
|
4/4 |
Kyung-Woo Lee |
Social Security and Private InformationAbstract: I study the pension system with the approach that have been used in a growing literature of new dynamic public finance. In an overlapping generation model where the productivity of individuals is a private information and a fraction of individuals lose their productivity when they get old, I characterize the constrained efficient allocation. The planner balances providing incentives against providing insurance so that a condition similar to the celebrated inverse Euler equation is satisfied in the constrained efficient allocation. Although the
pension
alone in general cannot attain the constrained efficient allocation, one can
find a combination of tax system
and a pension to implement the constrained efficient allocation. |
|
4/11 |
Luminita Stevens |
Clusters,
Factors, and International Business Cycles |
|
4/18 |
Demetris Koursaros |
Nominal
Rigidities and Search Unemployment Abstract: In this paper we analyze a
monetary model (MIU) with nominal rigidities and search unemployment. The value
of the composite good each period is a function of the employment rate,
because a higher employment rate contributes to a better quality composite
good. The price of the better composite good is also higher because of an
increase in the number of goods I the economy. Therefore inflation is not
only a function of the deviation of relative prices from the steady state,
but also a function of the deviation of employment from the steady state. My
goal by doing this exercise is to argue that monetary authorities, in their
attempt to fight inflation, must take into consideration that part of
inflation is linked with the quality of the composite good. This Part of
inflation is due to the increase in the number of goods (or quality) and does
not necessarily affect the relative prices, thus it is not distortionary. A Central Bank should take this into
consideration when conducting Monetary Policy. |
|
4/25 |
Yuki Teranishi |
Loan Contract in New Keynesian ModelAbstract: This paper investigates a new source of economic stickiness, staggered loan rate contract between a private bank and a firm. Simulation outcomes of the model show that the staggered loancontract can play an important role in making an economicfluctuation and in revealing a mechanism of economic persistence. We introduce this staggered loan contract mechanism into thestandard New Keynesian model in a tractable way. |