Third Parties, Elections and Roll Call Votes
The Populist Party and the Late 19th Century U.S. Congress[1]

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Abstract

What effect do electorally successful third parties have on congressional roll call votes? While there is a widespread belief that third parties influence the policies of the major parties, there is little systematic evidence that this actually happens. This paper exploits the unique historical context surrounding the Populist Party formation in 1892 to identify the impact of the Populist Party's electoral success on congressional roll call votes related to Populist issues. The results are consistent with three claims. First, co-optation of the Populist Party's issues occurred even before the formation of the Party. Second, the co-optation of Populist policies was not related to the electoral success of the Party's candidates. Finally, any effect of the Populist Party's formation on roll call voting was likely to be through indirect means such as increasing the credibility of future third party challenges or mobilizing and educating the electorate to support Populist policies.

1. Introduction

The appearance of new political parties is a common phenomenon in all democracies. The conventional wisdom is that these new political parties enter when the established parties are being unresponsive to the interests of particular segments of the electorate (Inglehart (1977, 1990); Kitschelt (1994, 1989); Mazmanian (1974); Sundquist (1983); Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus (1984); Hug (1996); Rohrschneider (1993)). The new political parties gather electoral support by claiming to meet the policy demands of the electorate unsatisfied with the existing political alternatives. Thus, the new political parties help insure that the policies of electoral candidates do not stray too far from the preferences of the electorate.

Even in the United States, which has a stable two party system, new political parties are argued to affect representation. Empirically, third party candidates have appeared in elections to different levels of the U.S. government with varying electoral success (Bibby and Maisel (2003); Winger (1997); Herrnson (2002); Gillespie (1993); Haynes (1916)). Although these third parties often disappear after a few electoral cycles, the conventional wisdom in the American politics literature is that third parties influence policy by inducing the major party candidates to adopt policy positions that address the third party's demands (Herrnson (2002); Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus (1984); Hicks (1933)). Thus, as Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus write, "Third parties usually lose the battle but, through cooptation, often win the war."[1]

A common claim in the literature is that the major parties will co-opt a third party's policies only after the third party wins a substantial number of votes. The historian John Hicks writes, "Let a third party once demonstrate that votes are to be made by adopting a certain demand, then one or the other of the older parties can be trusted to absorb the new doctrine."[2] The third party's electoral success provides a signal to major parties about the

[1] Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus (1984)

[2] Hicks (1933). Fred E. Haynes writes, "The larger the number of votes cast for a third party the greater the probability that its issue will be adopted by one or both of the great parties rather than that its manifest strength will help it to displace or take a place alongside the established parties." (Haynes (1916), p3) Daniel

appeal of third party policies.[3]

Although numerous anecdotal accounts from presidential campaigns and party platforms support the perception that third parties are the "tail that wags the dog," there is little systematic empirical evidence to identify third party candidates as the cause for the co-optation of third party's policy positions by major parties.[4] The lack of evidence that co-optation would not have occurred in the absence of a third party has led to some skepticism regarding whether the third party was really the force behind the adoption of the third party's policies by one or more of the major parties. Beck (1997) writes:

> The issue is whether or not the Socialists' advocacy for twenty or thirty years of such measures as a minimum wage had anything to do with its enactment in the 1930s. Unfortunately, there is no way of testing what might have happened had there been no Socialist party. The evidence suggests, however, that the major parties grasp new programs and proposals in their "time of ripeness" when large numbers of Americans have done so and when such a course is therefore politically useful to the parties. (Beck (1997), p49)

However, Beck (1997) and others provide no evidence that co-optation of third party issues would occur in the absence of third parties. Thus, whether third party formation is necessary for major parties to adopt third party policies remains an open empirical question.

A. Mazmanian writes, "Usually after a strong showing by a minor party, at least one of the major parties shifts its position, adopting the third party's rhetoric if not the core of its programs." (Mazmanian (1974), p143) Paul Herrnson writes, "When a minor-party or independent candidate introduces an issue that proves to be popular, Democratic or Republican leaders are quick to co-opt it (Herrnson (2002), p18)."

[3]Hug (1996) provides a formal model to show how the electoral support of third parties can solve the informational asymmetry between interest groups and established parties.

[4]Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus (1984) cite a number of anecdotal accounts of presidential candidates adopting third party policies. For example, Henry Wallace's entry in the 1948 presidential election is thought to have made Harry Truman take a more liberal stance on civil rights. George Wallace's entry into the 1968 presidential election is perceived to have softened Richard Nixon's stance on racial integration. Ross Perot's entry in 1992 is argued to have induced Bill Clinton to co-opt the Reform Party's tough stance on deficit reduction.

Unlike previous studies which focus on presidential campaigns and party platforms, this paper addresses the question of the impact of third parties on major party policy positions by examining congressional behavior. Presidential elections provide only one observable third party challenge per election and few observable measures of changes in the presidential candidates' policy positions. In contrast, the cross-sectional variation in congressional districts allows us to test whether there are systematic differences between particular types of congressmen and the decisions to co-opt third party issues. Moreover, congressional roll call voting patterns provide an observable measure of whether congressmen changed their positions on third party policies after a third party is formed.

In this paper I focus on a particular case of third party entry – the Populist Party's entry into U.S. congressional elections in the late 19th Century. The research design in this paper identifies the impact of third party formation and electoral success by exploiting several features unique to the historical context surrounding the Populist Party's entry. From a measurement standpoint, the Populist case is attractive in that the constituencies that supported the Populist policies are identifiable with socio-economic measures. More importantly the events leading to the Party's formation provides a unique situation close to the counterfactural of what would have happened if the third party had not been formed.[5] Thus, this case provides a exceptional framework for testing the more general claims about third parties.

The results of the analysis in this paper suggest that activities such as mobilizing and educating the electorate, which are independent of the electoral success of third party candidates, are likely to be a large part of what causes established parties to co-opt third party policies and not the entry and electoral success of third party candidates. There is robust evidence that congressmen who represent districts with socio-economic characteristics commonly associated with support for Populist policies, adopted a more Populist roll call

[5]Although focusing on one case of third party entry limits the generalizability of the results, the unique features of the historical context surrounding the Populist Party's entry allows us to test several general hypotheses about the impact of third party entry that cannot be readily tested using other cases of third party entry.

voting positions during the period when the Populist issues became more salient. Contrary to claims in the literature, the Populist Party's formation influenced congressional roll call voting patterns even in districts without an electorally successful Populist candidate. Futhermore, congressmen began adopting the Populist policies in their roll call votes even before the national Populist Party was formed.

There is some evidence consistent with the argument that actual entry of a third party also has an impact on the existing actors' policy positions. The results do show that congressmen adopted roll call voting position more favorable to the Populist Party after the party's formation. Since the Populist Party was formed a full election cycle after the interest groups favorable to the Populist position began their mobilization and education campaigns, this further movement in congressional roll call voting patterns even after the Populist Party's formation is consistent with claims that third party formation facilitates the co-optation of third party policies.

The remainder of this paper will be divided into four sections. The next section provides a brief description of the historical context around the Populist Party's entry in 1892. This section highlights some of the features of the Populist case that allow us to test the various claims described above. The following section describes the different measures for district Populist preferences and the Populist electoral threat. The third section presents the specification and results. The final section concludes with a discussion of the results and what this study of the Populist Party may contribute to understanding about the impact of third parties in general.

2. The Populist Party Case

The Populist Party was formed in 1892. The research design in this paper takes advantage of the historical events leading up to the Party's formation to identify whether the formation of a third party was sufficient to change congressmen's roll call voting patterns. In particular the paper uses the fact that the core interest groups supporting the third party movement

raised the Populist policy demands more than two years before the Populist platform was even written. The announcement of the policy demands coincided with an effort to mobilize and educate the electorate about the demands. This interim period between the clear articulation of the Populist demands and the Populist Party's formation provides a unique opportunity to examine how congressmen responded to the electoral pressure to adopt the third party demands without having the third party present. Thus, we can test whether the social and political environment prior to the Populist Party's formation provided sufficient incentives for the established political actors to co-opt the Populist policies, even without the Populist Party being present.[6] If third party formation is not required for co-optation then congressmen representing districts with Populist preferences should adopt the Populist roll call voting position during the interim period before the official Populist platform was articulated.

This sequence of electoral mobilization and Populist demand articulation prior to the Party's formation also provides a framework for identifying whether third party entry facilitates the adoption of third party roll call voting positions by congressmen. According to the historical literature, the electorate was largely mobilized and educated about the Populist issues around the 1890 congressional election. If we assume based upon historical accounts that the main difference in the electoral pressures facing congressmen before and after the 1892 election was the Populist Party's formation, then any changes in congressional roll call voting patterns following the 1892 election was likely to reflect the impact of the Populist Party. This evidence would only be suggestive since the identification rests upon assumptions drawn from historical accounts.

[6]There are multiple reasons why congressmen would have an incentive to co-opt Populist policies even without the Populist Party being present. Powerful interest groups, such as the Farmer's Alliance, raise issues and influence public sentiment in favor of Populist policies. There may have simply been an exogenous shock to voter preferences. The game theoretical models of elections with an endogenous number of candidates find that the established actors should respond to third party electoral threats even before the third party actually enters (Palfrey (1984); Feddersen, Sened and Wright (1990); Osborne (1993); Shepsle (1990)).

Historical Background of the Populist Movement

According to most historical accounts, the Populist movement was an agrarian movement. The Populist Party, however, was largely perceived to be an outgrowth of the political and economic turmoil surrounding the rapid industrialization in the late 19th century (Nye (1959); Clanton (1990); McMath (1993); Goodwyn (1976, 1978); Sanders (1999)). During this period, members of the agrarian sector perceived themselves as being exploited by the east coast financial and industrial establishment that controlled the credit supply, the transportation lines, and the land surrounding the transportation lines.[7] The high fees on railroad usage and high interest rates on farm mortgages loans were viewed as evidence that the east coast establishment was extracting monopoly rents from farmers. This tension between the agrarian and the industrial sectors was accentuated by the long-term decline in the prices of agricultural goods and the short term economic downturns in the late 1880s. The Populist Party platform appealed to discontented agrarian interests by offering policies, such as regulating business and expanding the money supply, which addressed specific agrarian grievances.

The Populist Party was able to attract the discontented agrarian interests largely through the efforts of the grassroot agricultural and labor groups that organized and mobilized supporters for the Populist cause. In particular the National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, here after referred to as the Alliance, devoted a large amount of resources to educate the electorate about government policies that would help the economic situation of the farmers. The main policies advocated in the Populist platform had originated from policies promoted by the Alliance. Through the help of the Alliance, the agricultural electorate was informed not only about how specific government policies could affect their economic con-

[7]According to (Nye (1959), p9) one farm journalist wrote, "I cannot recall another conspiriacy in the history of mankind quite equal in colossal and criminal splendor to the profound and universal plot of Wall Street," a plot "to reduce the Midwest to vassalage." Similarly (Hicks (1961), p55) writes, "More and more the conviction settled down upon the farmer that he was the victim of "some extrinsic baleful influence." Someone was "walking off with the surplus" that society as a whole was clearly building up and that in part at least should be his."

dition, but also about how their representatives were voting on issues relevant to agrarian interests.

Although the conditions underlying the agrarian discontent had been building for many years prior to the Populist Party's formation, there are two key turning points that are particularly relevant for this study. The first turning point is the articulation of the 1889 St. Louis Demands and 1890 Ocala Demands, and the mobilization of Populist interests that followed these demands. After this point the major party actors faced tremendous interest group and constituency pressure to adopt Populist policies. The second turning point is the formation of the Populist Party platform in 1892. After this point the actual political party activities had commenced and the major party actors now faced credible third party challenges.

Although the St. Louis and Ocala Demands were separate events, at both meetings the same groups attended and essentially the same policy demands were articulated. In December of 1889, the agrarian interests, together with labor organizations such as the Knights of Labor, met in St. Louis and agreed upon a set of policy demands that were made to the national political parties. These demands included: 1) free coinage of silver; 2) abolition of national banks; 3) creation of sub-treasuries; 4) increased paper money circulation; 5) government ownership of railroads; 6) prohibiting land ownership by foreigners; 7) prohibition of futures in grain; and 8) a reduction of the nation's income to expenses (Haynes (1916), p233). In December 1890 the agricultural and labor organizations met again in Ocala to reaffirm their committement to the St. Louis demands with a few minor changes.[8] After the St. Louis and Ocala Demands were articulated, the agrarian and labor interests had a clear set of issues and policies by which to mobilize their members and to judge the major party politicians.

During and after the 1890 elections, the Alliance became particularly active in promoting

[8]Haynes (1916), p233 points to three changes in particular: 1) regulation of railroads and telegraphs was advocated instead of ownership; 2) the sub-treasury was dropped; and 3) a reduction in tariffs was demanded.

and educating the public about the St. Louis and Ocala demands. McMath writes:

> Virtually the entire spectrum of Alliance leadership embraced President Leonidas Polk's call to field paid lecturers in each congressional district in 1891. Delegates approved both the district lecture system and a network of Alliance and labor newspapers (the National Reform Press Association), which, jointly, would provide the informational base of a third party, with or without the name (McMath (1993), p141).

The Alliance was also active in educating voters about whether particular incumbent politicians were supporting the Alliance's policy positions. Shaw (1984) writes:

> [I]n April, 1890, the state Alliance Executive Committee drew up a list of eight principles by which it asked Alliancemen to judge political candidates. Did the candidate endorse railroad reform, the subtreasury plan, better schools, lower taxes, prison reform, and an end to national banks, trusts, and speculation? If not, the committee urged farmers to vote against him (Shaw (1984) p27).

The Alliance claimed responsibility for electing three Governors and numerous congressmen in the November 1890 election (Haynes (1916)).

Thus, to the extent that congressmen felt electoral pressure from their constituencies to adopt Populist demands, one could argue that this had largely occurred by the 1890 election or shortly thereafter. The economic grievances of the agrarian community were clearly being felt and voiced. Congressmen were already feeling pressure from their constituents to co-opt the Alliance issue positions even before the Populist Party was formed. In describing the mood in Congress after the 1890 election Josephson (1938) writes:

> [I]n the House...the same majority of Republicans who had voted reactionary measures in perfect discipline a year before now came close to passing a free-coinage bill, the resistance of the iron-willed Speaker, Reed, staving this off at the last hour. The rank-and-file politicians in Congress seemed unnerved by the uproar among their constituents. (Josephson (1938), p480-81)

By 1890 the Alliance claimed that it had membership of 3,000,000 (Haynes (1916), p231).

The second key event for the empirical analysis is the July 1892 endorsement of the Populist Party platform. According to most historical accounts of the period between the 1890 election and July 1892, there was a large degree of uncertainty about whether a third party should be formed or whether interest groups should continue to pressure the established parties. The Alliance leadership was generally against forming a third party (Hicks (1961)). An editorial written in the National Economist stated:

> A third political party will not be formed by these organizations. It is a nonpartisan movement in which each member may remain true to his party, but each one will see to it that this party continues true to him.[9]

Up until the national convention, many in the South continued to believe that the Democratic Party would adopt the Alliance demands. Hicks (1961) writes:

> Repeatedly President Polk of the Southern Alliance had declared his willingness to hold in line for the Democratic party the farmers under his control if only that party would "come out and take a stand squarely on the Alliance platform"; and with this pronouncement in mind many southern Alliancemen awaited the outcome of the Democratic nominating convention of 1892 before making their decisions. (Hicks (1961), p240)

However, in 1892 both parties nominated presidential candidates perceived to be not sufficiently sympathetic to the Populist cause. Furthermore, even office holders who were elected with the Alliance support were perceived to be more conservative than the Alliance membership (Sanders (1999), p128). Failing to sufficiently change the policy positions of the established parties, the agrarian and labor organizations met again in Omaha to formulate the Populist Party platform.

The 1892 Omaha Platform gave birth to the Populist Party but not to new issues or to an observable change in mobilization strategies. The Omaha platform essentially incorporated

[9] *National Economist* as quoted in Hicks (1961), p205.

most of the St. Louis and Ocala Demands. The historical literature, to my knowledge, does not indicate that there was any sudden change in preferences or voter mobilization activities other than what was associated with the introduction of the Populist Party. Thus, changes in congressional roll call votes related to Populist issues between the congress elected in 1890 and the congress elected in 1892 are likely to reflect the increase in the Populist electoral threat associated with the Populist Party's formation.

The credibility of the Populist electoral threat after 1892 is evident in the number of Populists successfully elected to non-presidential offices across different states. Between 1892 and 1896, the Populist Party won over forty House of Representative elections from about ten different states.[10] The Populist Party had enough support to control the state legislatures in two states (Kansas and Nebraska) and to win gubernatorial elections in four states (Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and South Dakota).

4. The Populist Electoral Threat

In examining the effect of third parties on congressional roll call votes, the main independent variable of interest is the degree to which congressmen faced electoral pressure to support Populist policies. Two types of electoral pressure are of particular interest. The first is the direct electoral threat, which is related to the Populist candidates' vote shares. Third party candidates' vote shares not only reveal the popularity of third party policies but also whether the third party vote could potentially change the electoral balance between the established parties. The second type of electoral pressure is the latent electoral support, which is related to the socio-economic characteristics of a district's electorate. The latent

[10]There is discrepancy in various sources as to which congressmen should be considered Populist. A number of congressmen ran on fusion labels or labels very close to Populists so it is unclear how they should be counted. Clanton (1999) and Gillespie (1993) list the numbers of Populist candidates and state of origin of the Populist Congressmen. With a few discrepancies, these two sources report Populists winning seats in Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.

electoral support is the degree to which a district's constituency could be mobilized to elect candidates who favor Populist policies.

The direct electoral threat is measured in three ways. The first measure is simply the vote share of the Populist candidate in a particular district.[11] This measure can be used to test the claim that established parties only co-opt third party issue positions when the third party reveals that such positions can attract votes. A Populist congressional candidate who wins a large vote share reveals that the Populist issue is "ripe" for co-optation by the established party congressman in that particular district.[12]

The second measure of the direct electoral threat is a dummy variable to indicate when the Populist candidate's vote share could provide the swing vote between the two major party candidates. When the Populist candidate's vote share is larger than the difference between the established parties' vote shares, established party candidates have an incentive to co-opt the Populist position, or risk losing the votes to the other established party candidate in the next election. In both of these cases the direct Populist electoral threat would be coded as a dummy variable.

The third measure of the direct electoral threat is a dummy variable to indicate when the Populist candidate has the second highest vote total. When a Populist candidate has the second highest vote total, the Populist issues would be the main dimension of partisan conflict forcing the established party candidate to respond to the electorate's demand for Populist policies.[13] The electoral data used for calculating the two direct electoral threat measures come from *Michael Dubin (1998) United States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997*

[11]Major party candidates who had a fusion label with the Populist Party are considered Populist candidates. This measure was also constructed by only including candidates that only had a Populist label.

[12]It is possible that voters may simply be voting against the status quo and not necessarily for the Populist Party's policies. However, interpreting Populist candidates' vote shares as a measure of direct electoral only requires that congressional candidates are not able to differentiate between protest and policy preference votes.

[13]The Popuilst vote could simply indicate a protest vote against the status quo. However, the candidates are not likely to have a way to differentiate between votes cast in favor of Populist issues versus votes cast against the status quo.

The Official Results.

The latent Populist electoral support is measured in two ways.[14] The first measure is the agricultural intensity of the district (i.e. the percentage of families involved in agriculture in 1890).[15] Since the Populist Party platform incorporated many demands by the agricultural interests and the main organizations supporting the party were agricultural interests (e.g. the Alliance), we would expect areas with a large portion of the electorate involved in agriculture would be particularly receptive to Populist appeals. The county level data are from the *1890 Census Statistics of Agriculture* and *ICPSR I00003 Historical, Demographic, Economic and Social Data: The United States, 1790-1970.*

The second measure of the latent Populist electoral threat is the interest rate on farm mortgages. In the economic history literature, the agricultural unrest at the turn of the 20th century is often closely tied to the high interest rates on farm mortgages (Sanders (1999); Stock (1984); Eichengreen (1984)). Areas with high farm mortgage interest rates are expected to be correlated with high Populist Party support for two reasons. First, agricultural interests viewed the high mortgage rates as part of the eastern establishement's efforts to extract monopoly rents from the vulnerable farmers. Second, the variation in interest rates reflects the variation in economic uncertainty and risk across regions. The agricultural protest during this period is commonly argued to be correlated with economic uncertainty (McGuire (1981); North (1974); Eichengreen (1984)). The county level data set is from the *1890 Census of Real Estate and Mortgages.*

[14] A third measure analyzed but not included in this paper is previous support for a third party. Since the Populist Party was also perceived as drawing support from groups which supported third parties in the past, congressmen might feel more threatened by Populist candidates when their constituents supported other third party candidates in the past. Propensity to vote for third parties is measured by the average vote for third party presidential candidates in the 1880, 1884, and 1888 elections. The results from this measure were statistically insignificant.

[15] Another measure would be participation in the major organizations supporting the Populist movement such as membership in the Alliance or Knights of Labor but that data has not been uncovered at the level of disaggregation necessary for this study.

A simple linear regression of county level Populist electoral support on agricultural intensity and farm mortgage interest rates illustrates how these two latent electoral threat measures are correlated with the actual electoral support for Populist candidates. The county level Populist electoral support is measured by the average vote share for the Populist presidential, governor, and congressional candidates between 1892 and 1895.[16] The coefficients on both measures of latent Populist electoral threats are statistically significant at the 1% level. The data set is from *ICPSR I00002, Candidate Name and Constituency Totals, 1788-1990*, which includes presidential, gubernatorial and congressional election data between 1788 and 1990.

Assuming that congressmen are responsive to their district preferences, changes in congressmen's roll call voting that are due to increases in Populist Party threats need to be separated from changes in congressmen's roll call voting that are due to changes in district characteristics. Two changes in district characteristics that are most relevant to this paper are changes in demographic characteristics and changes in economic conditions. These changes could occur both naturally over time and/or as a result of redistricting.

Because the Populist platform appealed primarily to the agrarian interests, the main demographic shift of interest is the change in proportion of the electorate engaged in agriculture versus manufacturing. An increase in agricultural intensity or a decrease in manufacturing intensity should lead congressmen to be more responsive to demands for Populist policies. Unfortunately, data on intertemporal changes in agricultural intensity is not available during this period, so the only measure of demographic change included in this analysis is the change in the proportion of the population engaged in manufacturing.[17]

Negative economic conditions are commonly perceived to be correlated with an increase in voter discontent with the established parties. Thus, poor economic conditions are expected to increase the propensity for voters to vote for the Populist Party (McConnell (1953);

[16]The regression is also run with the Populist vote share as the maximum Populist electoral support for the presidential, governor and congressional candidates.

[17]The number of families involved in farming is only available for the 1890 Census and not for the 1880 Census. Changing manufacturing intensity is measured by $\frac{Mfgworkers(1890)}{TotalPop(1890)} - \frac{Mfgworkers(1880)}{TotalPop(1880)}$

Stedman and Stedman (1950); Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus (1984); Gillespie (1993); Bibby and Maisel (2003); Hicks (1961)). Inter-temporal change in economic output is measured both by changes in farm output per farm and by changes in manufacturing output per manufacturing employee.[18]

The data used to measure the district characteristics comes from *ICPSR I00003 Historical, Demographic, Economic and Social Data: The United States, 1790-1970* and from the *1890 Census*. The county level data on district characteristics is available only in ten-year intervals, and thus only capture long-term trends in district characteristics. As above, the county level data is aggregated up to the district level.[19]

Changes in district characteristics due to redistricting will be measured by the change in a district's latent Populist electoral threat after the district boundaries are redrawn. Legislators who represent districts that have a higher latent Populist electoral threat after redistricting are expected to be more responsive to the Populist policy demands. Since redistricting was not likely to be done at random it is possible that district boundaries were redrawn to diffuse the Populist threat. Redistricting of this type would suggest that an increase in the Populist threat due to redistricting may not necessarily lead to a change in roll call voting patterns. A much larger proportion of the congressional districts were redistricted in 1892 as compared to 1890.[20]

Two measurement issues arise from aggregating county level data to the district level. First, a number of districts had boundaries that did not match the county boundaries. This was particularly a problem for more populated areas such as the urban counties. Only districts for which 90% of the district vote shares could be accounted for by complete counties

[18] $\frac{(FarmOut/Farm(1890))-(FarmOut/Farm(1880))}{FarmOut/Farm(1880)}$ and $\frac{(MfgOut/Worker(1890))-(MfgOut/Worker(1880))}{MfgOut/Worker(1880)}$ The number of families involved in farming is not available in 1880. The farm output per farm is potentially misleading since several families may have worked on the same farm. In comparing the number of farms versus the number of farm families in 1890, few counties appear to have much discrepancy between the two measures.

[19] Again districts for which the county level data is not available are simply listwise deleted.

[20] The substantive interpretation of the results presented in the next section are robust to whether the set of districts is restricted to those that were not redistricted.

are included in the analysis. The county level data are aggregated to the district level using *ICPSR Study I0001 Historical Election Returns* and the Martis (1982) *Historical Atlas of United States Congressional Districts*.[21] Second, a number districts whose boundaries were changed due to redistricting could not be matched across congresses. Only districts for which 50% of the population was the same across congresses were included in the analysis.[22] Limiting the sample in these ways raise concerns about selection bias, which would limit the external validity of the analysis.

5. Populist Entry and House Roll Call Votes

The dependent variable of interest is congressmen's votes on roll calls related to Populist issues. This is measured as the proportion of times a congressman votes in the Populist direction on roll call votes related to Populist issues. Each congressmen has a Populist score for each congress.[23]

The main challenge in creating this measure is in differentiating Populist from non-Populist roll call votes. The Populist roll call votes are selected using four basic criteria: 1)

[21]The ICPSR data and the Martis (1982) differed the counties contained in some electoral districts. The discrepancies were investigated and ultimately decided by which measure allowed the county level data aggregated to the district level to most closely resemble the district level data provided in Dubin (1997). When the aggregated county level data differed significantly from the Dubin data the districts were listwise deleted.

[22]The substantive results are robust to whether the sample is restricted to districts where there is no redistricting.

[23]The roll call votes can be combined into an index in any number of ways described in the cottage industry of scaling methods (Nominate, ADA, Heckman/Snyder, Clinton/Jackman/Rivers, Levitt, and ACU.) One of the most consistent findings in the literature is that there is surprisingly little variation in the estimates from these different scaling methods (Burden, Caldeira and Groseclose (2000); Clinton, Rivers and Jackman (2000); Heckman and Snyder (1997)). Thus, for the purpose of this paper, which requires an estimate of a dimension with a specific substantive interpretation over time, the count method is likely to outperform the existing more computationally-intense methods that do not account for the substantive interpretation of the indices.

Whether the roll call vote is related to the subset of demands which are constant between the St. Louis, Ocala, and Omaha Conferences; 2) Whether the debate in the Congressional Records indicates that the roll call vote has some connection to the Populist demands; 3) Whether the known Populist or Populist-type congressmen voted as expected on the roll call; 4) Whether exploratory factor analysis shows that the roll call votes all load on a similar dimension.[24] Only those roll call votes that satisfy the above criteria are used in this paper. The roll call votes used in this paper are listed in Table 1.

Table 1

In general, the selection process is relatively conservative in designating roll call votes as Populist-type votes.[25] The results are robust to minor changes in the roll call votes classified as Populist.[26]

[24]A fifth criteria is that the roll call votes had to take place before the election to the next congress. During this period a number of roll call votes were taken after the next election for the next congress had already been decided. Those who were not re-elected would most likely have different incentives when voting on these roll calls.

[25]Whether or not tariff reduction should be included as a Populist issue is open to some debate. Tariff reduction was clearly viewed as being in the interests of the constituencies targeted by the Populists. Tariff reduction was even included in the Ocala Demands in 1890. Peffer (1891) devotes a chapter of his book *The farmer's side* to arguing the negative impact of tariffs on the agricultural community. Nye (1959) writes, "The farmer sold in an unprotected market and bought in one protected by a tariff whose schedules were set in favor of Eastern industrial and financial interests." (Nye (1959), p8) However, the main argument against including tariff reduction as a Populist issue is that it was one of the main issue cleavages between the Democrats and Republicans (Bensel (1984, 2000)). Even though tariff reduction aligned with Populist interests, tariff reduction was not promoted as a Populist issue in an effort to separate the Populists from the established parties' platforms. The analyses in this paper are done both including and excluding tariff-related roll call votes. Also, if the tariff roll call votes are completely partisan then they will not affect much of the analysis below, which focuses on estimating changes in congressmen's roll call voting relative to the roll call voting of other congressmen within the same party.

[26]The roll calls that were held after the election to the next Congress are excluded from the study, but the results do not differ if the roll call votes are included in the study. In Table 1, these roll call votes are in bold type.

Figure 1 presents a box plot of the Populist roll call scores of congressmen in the congress elected after the articulation of the Populist platform in 1892. The congressmen are grouped by their partisan affiliations.[27] This figure shows that the distribution of the Democratic congressmen is closer to the Populist position than the distribution of Republican congressmen.

Figure 1.

The positions also match the descriptions of the parties in the historical literature.[28]

The Populist roll call scores is not merely measure of the partisan divide, but rather reveals an issue cleavage that crosses partisan boundaries. Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of the Populist roll call scores against first dimension DW-Nominate Scores, also for the congress elected after the articulation of the Populist Platform in 1892.[29]

Figure 2.

The DW-Nominate Scores are often interpreted as ideology or the main dimension of partisan conflict. The figure illustrates that the variation in the Populist roll call score differs from the variation in the DW-Nominate Scores. Including the first dimension DW-Nominate scores as a covariate does not significantly change the substantive interpretation of the main results.

[27] Fusion candidates are not included in the figure.

[28] Although the Republican Party in the West had previously been viewed as favorable towards reform, by the late 1880s the perception of the party had changed to one more closely connected to industrial and financial interests. A December 1892 editorial in *The Review of Reviews* stated:

> The Republican party was condemned because the voters believed that its policies had come to be too favorable towards the concentration of wealth...In the West, the Republicans were accounted more closely connected than the Democrats with corporate wealth in railroads, banks and capitalistic undertakings in general, and the Republican party suffered accordingly. (As cited in Haynes (1916) p269)

Although the Democratic Party was also viewed as having connections to industrial and financial interests, the party was known for containing factions that supported the Populist cause.

[29] See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for an explanation of DW-Nominate Scores. Using Heckman/Snyder first dimension scores in place of the DW-Nominate scores produces essentially the same scatterplot.

One potential methodological concern is that the presence of abstentions may bias the location of a congressmen's Populist position if the congressmen's abstentions are not random. Roll call votes with over a quarter of the congressmen abstaining were common during this period. Abstentions were a possible alternative strategy to deal with potential Populist threats.[30] In Appendix A there is some discussion about the potential biases that could occur from nonrandom abstention. Although the abstentions are found to be uncorrelated with the threat measures used in this paper, to insure more accurate estimates of congressmen's Populist positions, congressmen abstaining on over half of the roll call votes used to calculate the Populist position are dropped from the analysis.[31]

The relationship between Populist electoral threats and congressmen's roll call votes on Populist issues is estimated using a simple linear specification. Let i index district and let t index congresses. Let P_{it} be the proportion of times the congressman in district i votes in favor of the Populist position in congress t. Let T_i be a measure of the Populist electoral threat in district i. The specification is as follows:

$$P_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 P_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 T_i + \alpha_3 D_i + \alpha_4 R_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

The above model is estimated for congresses before and after the St. Louis/Ocala Demands (1889/1890) and the congresses before and after the Omaha platform (1892) separately. This model includes variables that measure changes in district characteristics between 1880 and 1890, D_i. The model also includes variables that measure changes in electoral threats due to redistricting, R_i. Shifts and stretches in the Populist roll call measures are accounted for by the constant term, α_0, and the coefficient on the Populist roll call score from the previous

[30] For example, congressmen not wanting to fall out of favor with their Alliance constituency and/or the railroad interests may have chosen simply to abstain.

[31] Another potential methodological concern with using roll calls as a measure of congressmen's positions on Populist issues is the distribution of the roll call cutpoints. The distribution of the cutpoints affects the degree to which congressmen's Populist positions can be differentiated. The more evenly the cutpoints are distributed across the Populist dimension, the more specific we can be about the congressmen's Populist positions. Counting congressmen's votes on Populist roll calls does not merely replicate the partisan divide, but rather reveals some issue cleavage that crosses partisan boundaries.

congress, α_1.[32][33]

The above specification is estimated separately for Democrats and Republicans. Only those districts where the parties retain control over the district across elections are included in the analysis.

Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the regressions of Democratic congressmen's Populist roll call voting position after the St. Louis/Ocala Demands on congressmen's Populist roll call voting position before the St. Louis/Ocala Demands, the various electoral threat measures and changes in district characteristics measures. Huber-White standard errors are reported in the table.

Table 2

The statistically significant coefficient on Populist roll call voting position in the previous congress suggests that there was stability in congressmen's roll call voting positions across these two congresses. The estimated coefficient on agricultural intensity is statistically significant in model (1). The estimated coefficients on interest rates on farm mortgages are statistically signiciant in models (2)-(4). The vote share for third parties potentially related to the Populist movement is also included in model (4), however, the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant.[34] These results are consistent with the claim that the

[32]A separate model that interacts the threat variables with incumbency status is also estimated to take into account the possibility that incumbents and replacements may react differently to the third party threat. The conventional wisdom is that changes in roll call voting behavior is more likely to occur through replacement than through incumbents changing their policy positions (Stone (1980); Clausen (1973); Fiorina (1974); Poole and Rosenthal (1997); Poole (1997)). The results of this model show that there was no statistically significant difference between incumbents and challengers' responses to the Populist electoral threat measures.

[33]Although the quantity of interest is change in Populist roll call score, the lagged Populist roll call score is included instead of having the dependent variable be the change in the Populist roll call score. This allows flexibility in that the Populist scores may not have exactly the same meaning in the two congresses. For discussion of why this is important see Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1999).

[34]The candidates running under a Farmer's Alliance , Union Labor or Reform party label were considered were coded as Populist-type candidates.

formation of a third party is not necessary for congressmen to co-opt third party policies in their roll call votes.

The positive and statistically significant coefficients on both agricultural intensity and farm mortgage interest rates most likely reflects the fact that Alliance activities and/or the potential third party threat mobilized the electorate in districts with high interest rates and/or agricultural intensities. As was discussed in section 4, this electoral mobilization increased after the 1889/90 St. Louis/Ocala Demands. The stronger correlation between interest rates and Populist roll call votes than between agricultural intensity and Populist roll call votes, is consistent with the belief that the electorate in areas that felt most exploited by the Eastern establishment were more likely to be receptive to the Populist policies. Thus, the difference in statistical significance of the coefficients on agricultural intensity and interest rate on farm mortgages potentially indicates that congressmen's votes on Populist roll calls were responsive to agricultural interests that faced relatively severe economic difficulties.[35]

Table 3 presents the same set of estimated coefficients as in Table 2 but for Republican congressmen.

Table 3

There is only weak evidence that the agricultural intensity is correlated with the change in congressmen's Populist roll call voting positions. In general, there is more variation in the Republican roll call votes on the Populist issues. However, with so few observations the statistical insignificance is not surprising.[36]

Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients from the regression with Democratic congressmen's Populist roll call votes after the 1892 Omaha Platform articulation as the dependent variable. The models in Table 4 include several different measures of the direct effect of the

[35]These results do not differ substantially depending upon whether or not Southern congressmen are included in the analysis. The results also do not differ depending upon whether the sample is restricted to districts whose demographics change as a result of redistricting.

[36]The small sample of Republican congressmen reflects the large partisan shift in congress that occurred during this period.

Populist electoral threat.

Table 4

The results in Tables 4 show no correlation between the changes in Populist roll call voting patterns and direct electoral threats from Populist candidates. This is true even if the Democratic congressman faced a Populist candidate with a high vote share or a Populist candidate with a vote share greater than the difference between the major party vote shares or a Populist candidate who had the second highest vote share. These results are not consistent with the claims in the literature that co-optation occurs in response to third party actors who reveal the demand for third party issue positions by attracting a large numbers of voters during the elections.

Table 4 shows that the coefficient on agricultural intensity is positive and statistically significant when included in the model. The coefficient on farm mortgage interest rates is positive and statistically significant only in model (2) which does not include the agricultural intensity measure. If the assumption that the mobilization and education of Populist policies had largely occurred by 1891, which is the perception given in the historical accounts, then it seems plausible to claim that one of the primary changes affecting roll call votes on Populist issues that occurred in the Congress following 1892 election was the introduction of the Populist Party. With this claim the coefficients on agricultural intensity and farm interest rates reflect the impact of the Populist Party on Democratic congressmen's roll call votes. The results in Table 4 are consistent with the argument that third party entry has an additional mobilization and educating effect on the electorate and also increases the credibility of a third party threat in the next election. The stronger correlation between agricultural intensity and Populist roll call votes than farm interest rates and Populist roll call votes, may suggest that Populist Party formation broadened the appeal of the Party's policies to a wider audience of agricultural interests.

Table 5 presents the same set of estimated coefficients as in Table 4 but for Republican congressmen.

Table 5

Unlike the results in Table 3, the interest rate on farm mortgages coefficient is statistically significant in all of the model specifications. The results suggest that even Republican congressmen began responding to the electoral demands for Populist policies. As with the Democrats after the St. Louis and Ocala Demands, the difference in the statistical significance of the coefficient on the agricultural intensity and interest rate variables potentially indicates that Republicans were most responsive when their agricultural constituents faced relatively severe economic hardship. However as in Table 3, the results are difficult to interpret with such a small sample size.

In almost all of the models the coefficients on the long term changes in district socio-economic characteristics are statistically insignificant. This may reflect poor measurement more than the effect of changes in these district characteristics. The one exception is the negative coefficient on percent change in farm output per farm in Table 5, which is consistent with the claim that voters support Populist policies in areas where the agricultural industry is economically depressed. Although not shown in the tables, the results in the above models are robust to whether these district characteristics are included or not.

In analyses not presented in this paper, the variation in the ballot was used to separate the third party threat from other social forces. The underlying assumption being that ballot can affect the cost of third party entry. However, during this period one of the main variations in ballot was whether the Australian ballot was used or not. There is no clear theoretical prediction as to how the adoption of the Australian ballot should affect the cost of third party entry.[37] The analysis using the Australian ballot were highly sensitive to the

[37] The ballot design potentially provided a means to identify the third party threat since there was variation in which states adopted the Australian ballot. If third party congressional candidates' electoral success were influenced by the ballot design then the influence of the third party threat could be separated from the influence of social forces. Unfortunately there is no clear prediction as to what type of ballot design would be more conducive to third party success. Evans (1916) suggest the non-Australian party ballots benefited the established party machines. Harvey and Mukherjee (nd); Rusk (1970); Ansolabehere, Hirano and Snyder (2004) also suggest that split ticket voting was more likely to occur under the Australian ballot providing

model specification and the dates chosen for the adoption of the Austrialian ballot. Further research into ballot access and ballot design could potentially provide the variation necessary to identify the effect of the third party formation.

7. Discussion and Conclusion

Do electorally successful third parties influence roll call votes on third party issues? The results in this paper show that the influence of third parties on roll call voting is not necessarily through the electoral success of these parties as is suggested in the literature. There is no evidence that congressmen adopt more Populist-type positions in their roll call voting after they face an electorally successful third party candidate. Furthermore the results show that the actual party formation is not necessary to lead congressmen to co-opt third party issues.

The results are consistent with the idea that third parties influence policy both by mobilizing and educating the electorate and by providing a potential electoral threat. While the mobilization and education could also be accomplished by interest groups, third parties differ from interest groups in that they can potentially provide a direct electoral threat when the established parties are being unresponsive to the third party issues. This is particularly true when one or both of the major parties are constrained from credibly adopting the third party position or are not a viable option. This suggests that perhaps the interest group activities are less likely to be influential without the shadow of a third party threat.

The results are also consistent with the idea that the actual formation may also have an effect on congressional roll call voting behavior. The research design in this paper only weakly identifies this direct influence of the Populist Party formation on congressional roll call votes. The data alone does not separate the influence of the third party formation from

further evidence that Australian ballot should be correlated with the third party electoral threat. However, others suggest that the Australian ballot could have restricted ballot access (Bibby and Maisel (2003); Epstein (1986)) and that third parties in the past may have benefited from being able to print their own ballots (Holt (1999) as cited in Bibby and Maisel (2003)).

other activities that could occur in the absense of the third party. The evidence in the paper requires that certain features of the historical context are true in order to support the claim that third party formation would have any direct influence on congressional roll call votes.

Although the paper focuses on one particular third party, the idea that major parties respond to the mobilization and education activities and the electoral threats of third parties and not only to the actual electoral success of third parties is not likely to be unique to the Populist Party case.[38] The results in this paper are consistent with the predictions from the general models of entry in the political economy and industrial organization literatures. In both of these literatures the threat of competition from new actors should provide sufficient incentives for the established actors to adjust their behaviors even before the new actor enters. Thus, for those concerned by the noticeable absence of electorally successful third parties in recent U.S. elections, the results in this paper suggest that the presence of "third parties" are still likely to be felt even when the actual third parties themselves do not materialize.

[38]Some preliminary analyses of the Green Party and Progressive Party movements suggests that there is little or no connection between the electoral success of these third party congressional candidates and the roll call voting behavior of the major party congressmen. However, further analyses should be done on these and other third parties.

Figure 1. Distribution of Congressmen on the Populist Dimension by Party



This figure presents box plots of the congressmen's Populist scores in the 53rd Congress broken down by party. The Populist scores of Democratic congressmen appears closer to the Populist congressmen's Populist scores than the Republican congressmen's Populist scores.

Figure 2. Scatter Plot of Congressmen's Populist Roll Call Scores Against Their DW-Nominate Scores



This figure illustrates that the variation in congressmen's Populist Roll Call scores differs from the variation in the traditional measures of congressmen's partisanship or ideology.

Table 1: Roll Call Votes Used to Make the Populist Score

	51st Congress		52nd Congress		53rd Congress	
Issue Area	Bill No.	Date	Bill No.	Date	Bill No.	Date
Silver/ Coinage	H511188	6/7/90	H521047	3/24/92	H531010	8/28/93
	H511212	6/25/90	H521049	3/24/92	H521137	6/29/92
			H521180	7/13/92	H532092	3/1/94
					H532093	3/1/94
					H532095	3/1/94
					H533023	2/7/95
					H532256	8/13/94
Railroad Regulation	H511259	7/17/90	H521049	3/24/92	**H533007**	**12/11/94**
	H511356	9/8/90	H521137	6/29/92	**H533020**	**2/2/95**
					H533040	**3/1/95**
Tariff/Tax Votes	H511169	5/21/90	H521092	5/2/92	H532257	8/13/94
	H511175	5/21/90	H521071	4/9/92		
	H511335	8/21/90	H521047	3/24/92		
Banking / Circulation	**H512011**	**12/3/90**	H521119	6/6/92		
	H511019	1/28/90				
Bankruptcy / Debt	H511065	2/15/90			H532003	12/8/93
	H511270	7/24/90				
	H511271	7/24/90				
Options/ Futures			H521117	6/6/92	H532201	6/22/94
					H532202	6/27/93

Table 2: Democratic Congressmen's Roll Call Voting Pre and Post St. Louis/Ocala Demands				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Score 51st Congress	0.557* (0.136)	0.597* (0.108)	0.579* (0.130)	0.580* (0.131)
Agricultural Intensity	0.336* (0.144)		0.052 (0.152)	0.054 (0.154)
Farm Interest Rates		0.045* (0.012)	0.045* (0.014)	0.045* (0.014)
Populist Vote Share				-0.016 (0.115)
%Δ Mfg Out p/c	-0.071 (0.082)	-0.130 (0.071)	-0.140 (0.075)	-0.140 (0.076)
%Δ Farm Out p/f	-0.009 (0.062)	-0.110 (0.066)	-0.095 (0.071)	-0.095 (0.072)
Δ Mfg Population	0.324 (1.762)	-1.807 (1.130)	-1.453 (1.584)	-1.446 (1.596)
Δ Ag Int Redist	-1.325 (1.292)		-2.792 (1.712)	-2.783 (1.733)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist		-0.194 (0.214)	-0.012 (0.374)	-0.012 (0.376)
Constant	-0.137 (0.095)	-0.058 (0.103)	-0.075 (0.105)	-0.075 (0.106)
R^2	0.406	0.454	0.467	0.467
Observations	99	99	99	99

Table 3: Republican Congressmen's Roll Call Voting Pre and Post St. Louis/Ocala Demands				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Score 51st Congress	0.109 (0.205)	0.227 (0.209)	0.033 (0.245)	-0.063 (0.263)
Agricultural Intensity	0.535* (0.206)		0.466 (0.231)	0.360 (0.203)
Farm Interest Rates		0.036 (0.032)	0.037 (0.032)	0.026 (0.033)
Populist Vote Share				1.252 (0.869)
%Δ Mfg Out p/c	0.126 (0.066)	0.017 (0.064)	0.114 (0.069)	-0.043 (0.153)
%Δ Farm Out p/f	0.226 (0.149)	0.230 (0.133)	0.196 (0.138)	0.209 (0.123)
Δ Mfg Population	0.114 (1.837)	-1.568 (1.745)	0.304 (1.979)	-0.796 (2.305)
Δ Ag Int Redist	0.492 (0.450)		1.250* (0.598)	0.809 (0.939)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist		-0.809 (0.635)	-1.033 (0.748)	-0.875 (0.745)
Constant	0.006 (0.107)	-0.017 (0.207)	-0.207 (0.216)	-0.086 (0.221)
R^2	0.330	0.270	0.367	0.454
Observations	38	38	38	38

Table 4: Democratic Congressmen's Roll Call Voting
Pre and Post Omaha Platform

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Score 52nd Congress	0.579*	0.731*	0.568*	0.576*	0.549*	0.575*	0.587*
	(0.155)	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.156)	(0.160)
Agricultural Intensity	0.790*		0.743*	0.751*	0.722*	0.744*	0.759*
	(0.166)		(0.200)	(0.199)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.196)
Farm Interest Rates		0.048*	0.010	0.012	0.012	0.018	0.012
		(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Populist Vote Share				-0.073			
				(0.140)			
Pop Vote > Close					0.040		
					(0.041)		
Populist 2nd Place						-0.052	
						(0.045)	
Close or 2nd Place							-0.033
							(0.039)
%Δ Mfg Out p/c	0.098	0.004	0.100	0.102	0.099	0.110	0.105
	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.093)
%Δ Farm Out p/f	-0.150	-0.298	-0.173	-0.165	-0.180	-0.162	-0.160
	(0.126)	(0.160)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Δ Mfg Population	-0.338	-5.086*	-0.517	-0.630	-0.606	-0.819	-0.645
	(2.101)	(1.319)	(2.150)	(2.152)	(2.118)	(2.139)	(2.171)
Δ Ag Int Redist	0.489		0.410	0.375	0.380	0.333	0.399
	(0.568)		(0.558)	(0.573)	(0.555)	(0.571)	(0.569)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist		-0.016	0.060	0.061	0.060	0.051	0.044
		(0.198)	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.160)
Constant	-0.113	-0.161	-0.152	-0.169	-0.150	-0.196	-0.179
	(0.107)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.132)
R^2	0.552	0.475	0.554	0.555	0.557	0.559	0.556
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126	126

Table 5: Republican Congressmen's Roll Call Voting
Pre and Post Omaha Platform

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Score 52nd Congress	0.553*	0.439*	0.373	0.371	0.370	0.339	0.370
	(0.247)	(0.208)	(0.262)	(0.269)	(0.262)	(0.255)	(0.207)
Agricultural Intensity	0.265		0.170	0.176	0.186	0.135	0.186
	(0.386)		(0.402)	(0.436)	(0.422)	(0.412)	(0.367)
Farm Interest Rates		0.126*	0.114*	0.112*	0.110*	0.132*	0.110*
		(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Populist Vote Share				0.017			
				(0.266)			
Pop Vote > Close					0.020		
					(0.089)		
Populist 2nd Place						-0.077	
						(0.098)	
Close or 2nd Place							0.020
							(0.097)
%Δ Mfg Out p/c	0.242	0.165	0.230	0.229	0.226	0.260	0.226
	(0.199)	(0.132)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.140)
%Δ Farm Out p/f	-0.302	-0.339*	-0.374*	-0.374*	-0.374	-0.382*	-0.374*
	(0.148)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.165)
Δ Mfg Population	-0.584	-0.289	0.570	0.599	0.589	0.384	0.589
	(2.838)	(2.068)	(1.812)	(1.865)	(1.837)	(1.884)	(2.520)
Δ Ag Int Redist	3.135		2.499*	2.469*	2.394	2.816*	2.394
	(1.632)		(0.820)	(1.150)	(1.180)	(0.921)	(1.489)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist		-0.588	-0.602	-0.607	-0.617	-0.590	-0.617
		(0.446)	(0.574)	(0.597)	(0.583)	(0.585)	(0.698)
Constant	0.017	-0.688*	-0.684*	-0.675*	-0.666	-0.760	0.666*
	(0.157)	(0.214)	(0.168)	(0.211)	(0.176)	(0.193)	(0.253)
R^2	0.401	0.539	0.598	0.598	0.598	0.603	0.464
Observations	37	37	37	37	37	37	37

APPENDIX A. Abstentions

Abstentions make up a significant part of the congressional roll call votes relevant to this paper. Abstentions could potentially cause measurement problems if the abstentions are not missing at random. If abstentions are disproportionately made by congressmen who support Populist measures, then treating abstentions as missing at random would bias congressmen's scores away from the Populist position. The bias in scores would be in the opposite direction if abstentions are disproportionately made by congressmen who oppose the Populist position. ADA scores assume that the abstention bias is against the liberal position so abstentions are counted as votes against the liberal position.

For the purposes of this paper the abstention bias is most damaging when the bias either changes or increases between congresses. This is of particular concern in this study since congressmen may respond to potential Populist threats by hiding their true preferences through abstentions rather than revealing their positions in Populist roll call votes. This could have the effect of making congressmen appear as if they are moving when their positions have not really changed. For example the score for a congressman who is against the Populist position in 3 out of 4 roll call votes would be 0.25. If that same congressman decides to strategically hide his anti-Populism from his constituents and abstains on 2 votes where he would have voted against the Populist position, then his score would change to 0.50. This congressman would appear to be moving towards the Populist position when he has not really changed his position at all. Thus, the abstention that is of particular concern is change in the abstention behavior of established party congressmen that are potentially threatened by a Populist candidate.

In measuring whether the abstention bias exists, abstentions need to be separated between abstentions due to unavoidable circumstances and abstentions due to strategic behavior. Due to technological reasons, abstentions were much more common in the late 19th Century than in the modern period. For example, visits to home constituencies and illnesses could force congressmen to take long leaves of absence. To differentiate between these two types of abstentions, strategic abstentions are assumed to be abstentions when the congressmen

voted in a proceeding or following a roll call vote "relatively close" in time to the roll call vote in question. Since roll call votes are not evenly spaced in time, a period of about a week is used to measure "relatively close" in time.

Changes in abstention behavior due to Populist threats is estimated using a simple ordinary least squares regression of abstentions in congress t on Populist score in congress $t-1$, abstentions in congress $t-1$, threat variables and interaction terms between the threat variables and the Populist score from congress $t-1$.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Abstentions}_t = \quad & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Populist Score}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{Abstentions}_{it-1} + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Threat}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Threat}_{it} * \text{Populist Score}_{it-1} + \epsilon_{is}\end{aligned}$$

If the coefficients on the threat variables and the Threat * Score Previous Congress variable are statistically significant, then these could indicate that the congressmen with particular stances on Populist issues are changing their behavior in response to the Populist threats.

The results of the regressions are presented in Table A. There is no evidence that abstentions were used strategically in response to Populist threats.

Table A: Democrat Abstentions by Congress						
	51st to 52nd Congress			**52nd to 53rd Congress**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Score 51st Congress	-0.463 (2.890)	0.201 (1.842)	0.954 (3.256)	1.247 (1.418)	-1.737 (2.259)	-0.375 (2.195)
Missing Votes 51st Cong	0.047 (0.089)	0.033 (0.083)	0.036 (0.086)	0.099 (0.065)	0.104 (0.069)	0.099 (0.067)
Agricultural Intensity	2.826 (5.550)		2.387 (5.789)	2.451 (2.671)		3.206 (2.760)
Interest Rate on Farm Mortgage		0.220 (0.239)	0.172 (0.228)		-0.151 (0.278)	-0.202 (0.280)
Ag Int * Prev Score	-3.397 (6.507)		-2.724 (6.615)	-3.425 (3.210)		-4.501 (3.419)
Int Rate * Prev Score		-0.294 (0.238)	-0.250 (0.212)		0.209 (0.329)	0.291 (0.332)
Constant	1.901 (2.424)	1.561 (1.735)	0.996 (2.626)	-0.084 (1.053)	1.943 (1.814)	1.004 (1.804)
Observations R^2	119 0.037	119 0.041	119 0.044	140 0.022	140 0.020	140 0.030

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