Appalachia and American Public Opinion

Prepared for:
The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics
March 6-7, 2014

Steven White*

Abstract: Appalachia – historically a culturally and politically unique region of the United States – has been effectively ignored by contemporary political scientists. This paper provides a systematic assessment of Appalachian distinctiveness in public opinion in the 21st century. Using a unique set of variables coded specifically for this project, I argue Appalachian residents are somewhat more economically left, particularly on free trade preferences, but much more culturally conservative, especially on gay rights. This combination of positions is not represented in American party politics or elite discourse. The strongest variation emerges in the Central Appalachian counties of eastern Kentucky and its border states, where the greatest economic and educational disparities remain even today. I also suggest future research agendas on Appalachia and provide details on how to code Appalachia dummy variables using the National Annenberg Election Survey datasets.

> Mountain Republicanism should give pause to those who speak enthusiastically about imminent party realignments, who spin theories about the rational character of party attachments, and who talk about setting up a two-party system as though it could be made to order like a suit of clothes.
> -V. O. Key, Jr., 1949[1]

> Two weeks ago 41 percent of Democratic primary voters in West Virginia picked a prison inmate in Texas over Obama; tonight, he's being given a run for his money in Kentucky by "uncommitted."
> -*The New Republic*, 2012[2]

Appalachia "has been seen as both the essence of America and a place apart" (Williams 2002, 8). This is as true of political observers as anyone else. In his southern politics opus, Key gave the peculiar behavior of these mountain people – who insisted on voting Republican in the middle of the Solid South – only a few short pages of consideration (1949). In the most recent American presidential election, Appalachian antipathy to Barack Obama provided ample opportunities for political journalists to revisit the region's quirks, with accounts ranging from sympathy to perplexity (Coates 2012; MacGillis 2012; Potts 2012). Despite this revival of interest in the media, however, political scientists since Key have almost entirely ignored the 25 million residents of Appalachia. Despite calls for the discipline to pay attention to growing inequality in America (APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy) – and the existence of a robust literature on the politics of the American South (Black and Black 1992; Black and Black 2002; Kousser 2010) – Appalachia has somehow remained a place apart for scholars of American politics.

This paper has two goals. First, I make the general case that the discipline of political science should pay more attention to Appalachia. This will benefit the discipline generally, and the American politics subfield particularly, in several ways. Appalachia provides a new focus for scholars of

---

1   Key 1949, 285
2   MacGillis 2012

inequality and scholars of southern politics, as well as a new case of political attitudes that do not neatly fit into the shape of contemporary ideological polarization. The region also proves to be interesting for scholars of individual-level trade preferences interested in cultural determinants of anti-trade sentiments.

I then turn to a series of hypotheses about public opinion in Appalachia, which I test with a unique set of regional variables coded specifically for this project. In doing so, I provide an initial empirical assessment of attitudes in the region. In particular, I link *economic* issues of labor, trade preferences, and healthcare to *social* issues of gay rights, abortion, and affect towards religious minorities. I demonstrate that Appalachian residents in general are somewhat more to the left economically, particularly on free trade, but are vastly more culturally conservative than residents elsewhere in the country. This combination of issue preferences is not represented by American party politics. The strongest variation emerges in the counties of Central Appalachia, where the greatest levels of poverty and isolation remain.

As will be seen, researching public opinion in Appalachia comes with several hurdles. Methodologically, it requires data that is representative at the county level, which most national opinion surveys are not. Normatively, it is tricky to navigate the line between a careful empirical assessment and a portrayal that might come closer to stereotyping (as described in the next section, this is something media accounts have likewise faced). This paper uses a unique set of Appalachia variables coded using restricted county-level identifiers from the National Annenberg Election Survey data to overcome the first hurdle. In offering a careful assessment of the remaining regional effect once various compositional differences are accounted for, this paper hopes to be respectful of the second hurdle as well (I return to this issue in the conclusion).

I begin by providing a brief historical background on Appalachia, particularly through the lens of how the media has constructed the region for the rest of the nation. I then turn to a literature review,

primarily highlighting how Appalachia has been largely ignored by political scientists, as well as highlighting what studying the region might add to the discipline. I then turn to a series of hypotheses derived from this background. Using the survey data described, I test these hypotheses, and in doing so present the first empirical overview of contemporary Appalachian political attitudes. I conclude by relating these results to the broader theoretical concerns of political scientists, both in the American politics subfield and beyond. Several potential theoretical and methodological objections are then addressed in the Appendix.

Historical Background: The Media and Appalachian Political Development

The media has always played a role in defining Appalachia for those outside the region, beginning in the aftermath of the Civil War. During the war, whites in the Appalachian counties of the South were mixed in their feelings about the Confederacy. The black population of antebellum Appalachia was only about 10 percent, and while one in four white southerners overall owned slaves, in Appalachia probably fewer than one in ten did so. Many poorer Appalachian farmers resented wealthy slaveholding plantation owners, which led to pockets of pro-Union sentiment within the Confederate states, particularly in a cluster made up of southwestern Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and western North Carolina. Historical scholarship suggests about one-third of Appalachian whites were pro-Union, one third pro-Confederate, and a final third neutral (Straw 2006, 4-7). In the following decades, magazines like *Harper's* and *The Atlantic* began to publish stories of the "strange land and peculiar people" of the Appalachian mountains. The region was depicted by writers as "vastly out of step, culturally and economically, with the progressive trends of industrializing and urbanizing nineteenth-century America" (Billings et al. 1995, 1).

Yet industry was coming. Although historically agricultural, Appalachia eventually developed into a site for significant natural resource extraction. Technological advances, in conjunction with

3

national economic trends, led to a transformation of the Appalachian economy. Industrialization in the urban North created a vast market for coal and timber. Advances by mining companies allowed for much more intensive and deep forms of extraction than had been previously possible, while improvements in railroad and steam engine technology vastly expanded the ability to transport such materials out of the region (Shannon 2006, 70). By 1940, only about three-fifths of the labor force was agricultural (Ibid., 73).

Both New Deal policymaking and the economic boom caused by U.S. participation in World War II further propelled this trend. After the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, union organizing, particularly in the coalfields of eastern Kentucky and West Virginia, began to strengthen (Straw 2006, 16). This was the institutional underpinning of such later events as the early 1970s coal miner strike depicted in *Harlan County, USA*, which won the Academy Award for best documentary in 1977. The Second World War was "a watershed in Appalachian migration" (Obermiller et al. 2006, 240) Many moved to Michigan to work in the auto industry. Ypsilanti, Michigan, for example, came to be known as "Ypsitucky" due to the large number of Appalachian residents from Kentucky and other states that migrated there. Such migration coincided with increased incidences of racial violence during the war, but there are different accounts of Appalachian migrants' role in this. Obermiller et al. argue the 1943 Detroit race riot was "popularly, and incorrectly" blamed on these migrants (Ibid., 244). Fraser's description of how different subsets of the working-class responded to discontent within the United Auto Workers, by contrast, seems to be less forgiving. "There were Appalachian migrants raised on fundamentalist religion and racism who, once in Detroit, were sometimes recruited into the ranks of the Black Legon and Ku Klux Klan and evinced a deep, almost racial-religious antipathy to the Polish Catholics of the city's industry" (Fraser 1989, 72)

However, Appalachia would not rise to the center of national political attention until the 1960s and the War on Poverty. At the start of the decade, slightly more than one in three Appalachian

residents had income levels below the poverty line, compared to one in five elsewhere (Shannon 2006, 75). The 1960 presidential election "heralded the beginning of an intensive media scrutiny of Appalachia, its economic problems, and its people." This led to news media and television program coverage of Appalachia's problems, which were "accurate in an aggregate economic context," but "resented by thousands of residents who did not like the way the media portrayed them as isolated, backward, ignorant and pathetically impoverished" (Straw 2006, 18). This political interest was matched by books like Harry Caudill's *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, which brought Appalachia into further mainstream attention (Caudill 1962).

Appalachia again drew national political attention during the 2008 Democratic primary. During summer 2007, John Edwards made news by revisiting many of the Appalachia spots that were cast into the spotlight in the 1960s to highlight his campaign's focus on poverty. This coincided with Planned Parenthood's national conference in D.C., at which Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton spoke. Edwards sent his wife, Elizabeth Edwards, in his place. Although she was well-received by the audience, some feminist bloggers felt the Edwards campaign had slighted the pro-choice movement by the candidate's absence. This led to a debate within liberal circles about the relative merits of pro-choice and anti-poverty advocacy within contemporary progressive politics, bringing Appalachia back to the attention of national liberals once again (Goldstein 2007).

Appalachia actually became much more prominent after Edwards's exit from the campaign. Starting with the primaries of certain Appalachian states, there began to be speculation that Senator Obama was faltering with white Democratic voters in Appalachia, who had seemed to flock to Senator Clinton in suspiciously high numbers. Although an Obama primary victory seemed increasingly unstoppable, Clinton defeated Obama by a 41 percentage points margin in West Virginia on May 13 and a 36 percentage points margin in Kentucky on May 20. Media coverage again again took up the issue of Obama's perceived difficulties in Appalachia in the run-up to the 2012 general election,

suggesting these problems in "Hillary Country" might plague his reelection efforts (Seelye 2011).

Despite this renewed journalistic interest, however, political scientists have not been similarly attentive.

Literature Review: Appalachian Politics in State and Nation?

V. O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* is the definitive account of the Democratic Solid South in the 1940s. He does, however, dedicate one chapter to the then-fledgling southern Republican Party, and within that provides an interesting discussion of southern Appalachia with which to start. "It scarcely deserves the name of a party," Key wrote of the southern GOP. "It wavers somewhat between an esoteric cult on the order of a lodge and a conspiracy for plunder in accord with the accepted customs of our politics" (1949, 277) Along with black Republicans, presidential Republicans, and those individuals actually holding leadership positions within local Republican parties, one of Key's subsets of southern Republicans was the "mountain Republicans," principally concentrated in southwestern Virginia, western North Carolina, and eastern Tennessee (Ibid., 281). Tennessee's easternmost congressional district, for example, was represented by Republican Augustus H. Pettibone – who had fought in the Civil War as part of the Union Army – beginning on March 4, 1881, and has been held by Republicans ever since, even during the years of Democratic dominance.

Yet these Appalachian Republicans in the heart of the "solid" Democratic South were rather distinctive from the national GOP. "Traditional Republicanism in the hills has little in common with the manufacturing financial orientation of the party nationally," Key asserted. "To reflect faithfully its mountain constituencies the party would have to be more Populist than Republican in doctrine." Key also offered this assessment of how these mountain Republicans might complicate then-developing theories of partisan realignment. "Although the great issues of national politics are potent instruments for the formation of divisions among the voters, they meet their match in the inertia of traditional

partisan attachments formed generations ago," Key declared. "Present partisan affiliations tend to be as much the fortuitous result of events long past as the produce of cool calculation of interest in party policies of today" (Ibid., 285). Yet despite his normative commitments to a stronger two-party system (Ibid.) and a rational public (Key 1966), Key never went further than these few pages in explaining how Appalachia might complicate his analysis of southern, as well as national, politics.

While Key at least gave some attention to the region, contemporary political science research generally ignores Appalachia. There is a large literature on southern politics, but such research generally does not devote any attention to southern Appalachia. Kousser (2012), for example, offers a generally excellent overview of the southern politics literature, but in doing so neglects to mention Appalachia a single time. This is not a failure on his part, but rather a largely accurate reflection of work in the discipline (see also Black and Black 1992; Black and Black 2002). Indeed, it is reflective of my own work as well (White, forthcoming). Similarly, recent attention to the political ramifications of increasing income inequality has not brought Appalachia to the fore. To demonstrate this, I briefly review the last time the *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, and *Journal of Politics* published an article dealing with the region in a substantive way.

The *American Political Science Review* has not published an article on the region since 1968, when Jaros et al. examined Appalachia as a "subculture" through which to complicate a then-emerging literature on the political socialization of children (e.g., Jennings and Niemi 1968). They collected data on almost all school children grades 5-12 in Knox County, Kentucky. They found the students to be more negative in their assessments of the President and more generally cynical in their outlook towards politics than children at the aggregate level, who research had suggested were more positive in their political orientation. They argued this was due to parental transmission of political values to their children and not the result of family structure, particularly the large number of children with absent fathers (Jaros et al. 1968).

The most recent *Journal of Politics* article dealing with Appalachia is from 1981, when Goodsell examined an unspecified Appalachian county welfare office (Goodsell 1981). The *American Journal of Political Science* fares somewhat better by this metric, as a 2000 article by Lublin and Voss explicitly attempts to model Appalachian variation separately in an analysis of state legislative elections in the South. However, this is not the main point of their paper, which is instead about racial redistricting and political realignment as causes for the Democratic Party's electoral woes in the area (Lublin and Voss 2000).

One outlier is important to note: John Gaventa's *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Gaventa's book takes Central Appalachia as its object of study, and uses the region and its people to assess broader theoretical debates about the varied faces of power, and in particular why the inequalities of the Central Appalachian valley he studies are largely met with quiescence, rather than rebellion, by the workers who live there (Gaventa 1980). It has become widely known within political science, yet I argue only in a limited way: When Gaventa's book is cited, it is usually cited as a theoretical account of rebellion/quiescence, the faces of power, etc., and *not* in a manner that is Appalachia-specific. In summary, then, while Gaventa's book is deeply insightful in several ways, it has not spawned a political science literature on Appalachia in its aftermath.

While there is a dearth of scholarship on Appalachia by political scientists, this is not true of other disciplines. However, while enlightening in many respects, these scholars naturally focus on different questions than a political scientist might. Many scholars working within the interdisciplinary framework of Appalachian Studies, for example, have examined folklore, music, and literature produced in – and inspired by – the region. Sociologists and historians come closer to the interests of political scientists, with research by Billings and Blee (2000), Eller (2008), and others looking relatively similar to work by American political development researchers.

However, this paper proposes a new research agenda that is distinctly political science in nature.

8

I seek to provide an empirically grounded framework of Appalachian public opinion, which presently simply does not exist. While conjectures about Appalachian attitudes appear in the media, they are not backed up by county-level analysis of attitudes. I argue this is important for several reasons. First, and most generally, despite widespread understanding of how public opinion is often different in the South, there is no contemporary empirical work on Appalachian attitudes. As I will show, the size of Appalachian distinctiveness often eclipses southern distinctiveness. Second, public opinion Appalachia is an important case for those concerned with, among other things, the implementation and public reception of the Affordable Care Act. Kentucky stands out as the only rural, conservative state to be moving full steam ahead with implementation. Whether Appalachian attitudes might differ on issues related to health care is thus of clear concern to policymakers. Finally, as will be seen soon, Appalachia provides a theoretically interesting wrinkle for scholars of various subjects, including political tolerance and trade preferences. The latter, in particular, demonstrates the relevance of Appalachia to scholars beyond the realm of the American politics subfield, particularly scholars interested in the individual-level determinants of trade preferences.

Hypotheses

This stylized overview of media coverage and Appalachian history, in conjunction with the discussion of how the region has been systematically understudied by political scientists, leads to a series of testable hypotheses about contemporary public opinion in the region. Taken together, tests of these hypotheses will help elucidate the degree to which political attitudes in Appalachia differ on economic and social issues, and how such differences might tie together.

> **Hypothesis 1**: Appalachian residents will be more to the left economically than residents of other regions, once standard demographic and political control variables are accounted for.

There are several plausible reasons to expect Appalachian residents to have more liberal preferences on economic issues. Appalachia has traditionally had high levels of poverty, and is often associated – at least in popular imagination and some historical scholarship – with traditions of labor organizing in coal fields. Educational attainment still lags significantly behind the rest of the country, especially college completion rates. Overall, 76.8 percent of Appalachian residents have completed high school (compared to a national rate of 80.4 percent), while 17.6 percent have completed college (compared to a national rate of 24.4 percent). This might lead to a particular brand of economic liberalism rooted in a fear of being left behind in a globalizing economy.[3]

> **Hypothesis 2**: Appalachian residents will be more socially conservative than residents of other regions, once standard demographic and political control variables are accounted for.

There are likewise several plausible reasons to expect Appalachian residents to be more conservative on social issues. Appalachia is very rural and more traditionally Evangelical than America on average. About 52 percent of white Appalachian residents identify themselves as born-again Christians, compared to only about 35 percent elsewhere in the country.[4] However, survey data can only illustrate so much about religious belief. Overall, there is a greater tendency than elsewhere in the country towards "a type of religion that is not easily compartmentalized to Sunday mornings" (Wagner 2006, 182). Baptists represent the largest group in the region, although there is substantial variation beyond the more widely known Southern Baptist Convention. Missionary Baptists, for example, split off from SBC, considering them too modern. The "missionary" in their title places them against

---

3   "Poverty Rates, 2006-2010," http://www.arc.gov/reports/custom_report.asp?REPORT_ID=44
4   From the 2004 Annenberg survey

Primitive Baptists, who hold to Calvinist doctrines of spiritual predestination and thus reject missionary work.

My general expectation, then, is that Appalachian residents will be economically and culturally populist. This is a combination of issue positions that does not neatly fit into American party politics.

Hypothesis 3: The largest variation will emerge in the counties of Central Appalachia.

Central Appalachia – which is constituted by all of Appalachian Kentucky, as well as bordering counties in West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee – is the historical core of the region, and still suffers from the worst levels of hardship. According to the Appalachian Regional Commission, these counties are most likely to face "economic distress, with concentrated areas of high poverty, unemployment, poor health, and severe educational disparities."[5] In Appalachian Kentucky, which represents the vast majority of the subregion, only 62.5 percent of adults have graduated from high school. College completion rates are universally lower in Appalachia, but Appalachian Kentucky has the lowest rate of 10.4 percent. Appalachian Kentucky also has the highest poverty rate in Appalachia, at 24.4 percent. Many counties contain poverty levels over twice the national average, while two – Owsley County and Wolfe County – have poverty rates over three times the national average, at 41.5 and 42.2 percent respectively.[6]

Definitions, Data, Methods

In this paper, I defer to contemporary specialists on the region working within more traditional political and social history and define Appalachia as the 410 counties covered by the Appalachian Regional

5 "Appalachia's Economy," http://www.arc.gov/appalachian_region/AppalachiasEconomy.asp

6 "Poverty Rates, 2006-2010," http://www.arc.gov/reports/custom_report.asp?REPORT_ID=44; "Poverty Rates, 2006-2010: Appalachian Kentucky," http://www.arc.gov/reports/region_report.asp?FIPS=21999&REPORT_ID=44

Commission. This is "[c]ommonly accepted today as the political definition of Appalachia" (Edwards et al. 2006, xiv). About twenty-five million people live in this area, which begins in northeastern Mississippi and extends through northern Alabama and Georgia, western North and South Carolina, eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, the entire state of West Virginia, eastern Ohio, a small stretch of western Maryland, much of western and central Pennsylvania, and the part of New York state close to the Pennsylvania border. To be more specific, in terms of population, Appalachia consists of 64 percent of Alabama, 30 percent of Georgia, 28 percent of Kentucky, 4 percent of Maryland, 21 percent of Mississippi, 5 percent of New York, 18 percent of North Carolina, 17 percent of Ohio, 45 percent of Pennsylvania, 26 percent of South Carolina, 44 percent of Tennessee, 10 percent of Virginia, and 100 percent of West Virginia.

Since 2009, the ARC has divided Appalachia into five subregions: ***Northern Appalachia*** (all Appalachian counties in New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, as well as the northern half of the Appalachian counties in Ohio); ***North Central Appalachia*** (the remaining Ohio counties and the vast majority of West Virginia); ***Central Appalachia*** (all of Appalachian Kentucky, supplemented with small sections of bordering counties in West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee); ***South Central Appalachia*** (all North Carolina counties in the region, as well as the majority of Virginia and Tennessee counties which are not included in the Central subregion); and ***Southern Appalachia*** (all the Appalachian counties of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi). In order to explore variation within Appalachia, I again defer on definition to the ARC and utilize their five-unit subregional classification system.

One of the primary reasons Appalachia is not studied by public opinion scholars is surveys do not contain a variable identifying the region. Studying public opinion in Appalachia using national survey data requires (1) a dataset with a sufficiently large number of observations that subnational units as small as counties are observable, and (2) a sampling procedure that is still representative at such

subnational units. Standard surveys like the American National Election Studies and General Social Survey are disqualified by these criteria because of their cluster sample design and relatively small sample sizes. I use the 2004 and 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) data. The 2004 study consists of a national rolling cross-section of 81,422 interviews conducted between October 2003 and November 2004; the 2008 study consists of 57,967 interviews conducted between December 2007 and November 2008. The sampling procedure is random digit dialing. Although the NAES dataset does not contain Appalachia variables, I am able to construct these variables using county-level information requested from the Annenberg Public Policy Center.[7]

To assess ***economic attitudes***, I use the following dependent variables: a group affect measure of labor unions (0=warmest feelings to 10=coldest feelings; 2004 data); support for the federal government negotiating more free trade deals "like NAFTA" (1=yes, 0=no; 2004 data); and support for the current private healthcare system rather than implementing a government-run health insurance plan (1=current system, 0= government plan; 2008 data). To assess ***social attitudes***, I use the following dependent variables: a group affect measure of gay organizations (0=warmest feelings to 10=coldest feelings; 2004 data); support for gay marriage, civil unions, or no legal recognition of same-sex relationships (1= support for full marriage rights, 2 = support for civil unions only, 3 = no legal recognition; 2008 data); what level of restrictions should be placed on abortion (1=no restrictions, 2=in most cases but some restrictions, 3=rape or incest only, 4=no legal abortion; 2008 data); and a group affect measure of Muslims (0=warmest feelings to 10=coldest feelings; 2004 data).

My primary explanatory variables of interest are the Appalachia and sub-Appalachian variables. I also include dummy variables for the non-Appalachian South, the Border South, the Northeast, and the West. The Midwest is used as the base category. I estimate two models for each dependent variable.

---

7   The public datasets are available online from the Annenberg Public Policy Center:
   (http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/).

In Model 1, the general Appalachia variable is included. In Model 2, this variable is broken down into its five constituent parts: Northern Appalachia, North Central Appalachia, Central Appalachia, South Central Appalachia, and Southern Appalachia. To better isolate regional effects, I control for ideology (a 5-point scale from very liberal to very conservative), partisanship (dummy variables for Republicans and Democrats, where independents are the base category), gender (dummy variable for female), age, household income, education (dummy variables for high school or less and college degree, where some college is the base category), race (dummy variable for black, where white is the base category), ethnicity (dummy variable for Latino, where non-Latino is the base category), whether anyone in the household belongs to a union (non-union household is the base category), and size of residence (dummy variables for urban and rural areas, where suburban areas are the base category).

I treat group affect measures as continuous variables and estimate these models using OLS regression. Binary dependent variables are estimated using logistic regression. For the gay marriage and abortion questions, I allow for the qualitative nature of the ordered categories by using ordered probit models. I calculate marginal effects for variables of interest in the logistic regression models. Each marginal effect is the change in probability associated with that variable when all other explanatory variables are held constant.[8] The variables of theoretical interest are dummy variables: the marginal effect is the discrete change from zero to one, making substantive interpretation rather straightforward. I also calculate changes in probabilities, as well as average changes, for the ordered probit models.

Table 1 presents the OLS models of group affect. Table 2 presents the logistic regression results

---

8   The base categories for the dummy variables are: independent, some college, male, white, non-union, suburban; linear predictors are set at their means; and other dummy variables in the regional/state sets are set to 0 when computing each regional/state effect. One can always quibble with the specific values at which the controls are set, but the overall substantive interpretation of the marginal effects is not significantly changed by other specifications.

for trade and healthcare preferences. Table 3 presents the ordered probit results for gay marriage and abortion. Tables 4-6 repeat this analysis, but with the five Appalachian subregional terms taking the place of the general Appalachia variable.

<u>Results: Economic Issues</u>

Hypothesis 1 predicted Appalachian residents would be more to the left economically. This hypothesis is supported in some areas, but not in others. Appalachian residents are clearly more opposed to free trade deals, but no statistical relationship is found between the aggregate Appalachia variable and affect towards labor unions and opinions on federal intervention in health care.

Despite some historical scholarship suggesting a tradition of labor radicalism in the region, public opinion in contemporary Appalachia is not more supportive of labor (Table 1). The regional effect cannot be distinguished from the Midwestern base category. However, as this paper will later demonstrate, a different picture emerges when Appalachia is broken down into its constitutive subregions.

Free trade, however, is an area with clear Appalachian distinctiveness. Appalachian residents are substantially more likely to oppose new free trade deals. This is quite in contrast to the non-Appalachian South, where there is simply no regional effect (Table 2). This suggests there is something uniquely Appalachian about this resistance. The literature on free trade preferences has pointed to various factors that might influence trade attitudes. Education and income – common proxies for the factor endowments model – are included in all models anyway, so there is no additional specification here (for an empirical example showing the relationship between such endowments and free trade preferences, see Scheve and Slaughter 2001). I likewise include a measure of union membership. With this standard specification, the marginal effect for Appalachian residents is still a 7 percentage point decrease in the probability of supporting new free trade deals.

15

However, one possible additional variable is a measure of anti-foreign sentiment, particularly anti-Latino sentiment, as the question specifically compares future trade deals to NAFTA. To further assess the free trade result, I estimate a second model which adds a control variable for immigration attitudes (Table 2). This assesses whether the Appalachian difference is simply due to greater levels of nativism in the region. The regional difference is robust to the inclusion of the additional model term – the marginal effect decreases only slightly to 6 percentage points – suggesting something genuinely regional remains to this economic preference that cannot simply be reduced to the differential demographic composition of the region or general attitudes toward immigrants.

Finally, Appalachia residents are not distinguishable on general health care policy preferences (Table 2). One interpretive issue is in order, of course. This question was asked when health care policy was emerging as a topic of debate during the 2008 primary and general election campaigns. Debates over "Obamacare," as one particular plan came to be called, had not yet emerged. As such, it is possible if this question were repeated now – or asked with more specific wording – a different portrait of Appalachian attitudes might emerge. At this time, however, Hypothesis 1 cannot be fully supported, with the exception of the free trade issue.

Results: Social Issues

Hypothesis 2 predicted Appalachian residents would be more culturally conservative, which I measure by looking at gay rights, abortion access, and assessments of Muslims. This hypothesis is fully supported across all issue areas, although the results are especially sizable for the gay organizations group affect measure and attitudes toward gay marriage.

Appalachian residents are substantially more negative in their assessment of gay organizations (Table 1). The conservative effect of Appalachian residence is slightly larger than the liberal effect of living in the Northeast. It is nearly four times as large as the effect associated with the non-Appalachian

16

South, which is useful in demonstrating this anti-gay affect is not merely a "southern" effect. There is something extra about "Appalachian-ness." Indeed, the Appalachia coefficient is equal to the size of Republican partisanship.

Appalachian residents are similarly negatively disposed towards gay marriage (Table 3). The average change in probability associated with Appalachian residence is 8 percentage points, with a particularly large 12 percentage point increase in the probability of being in the most conservative (no legal recognition) position. This conservative effect of Appalachian residence is roughly the same size as the liberal effect of Northeastern residence, relative to the Midwestern base category. The Appalachian effect is about 2.5 times bigger than the non-Appalachian South effect, suggesting this is not simply the southern factor in a new guise.

A similar picture emerges for abortion attitudes, although on a slightly smaller scale (Table 3). The average change in probability associated with Appalachia is 4 percentage points, with the largest shift being a 6 percent decrease in the probability of taking the most liberal position. This is consistent with the anti-gay rights findings, but in this case the regional differences are not as dramatic.

Finally, Appalachian residents are more negative in their assessments of Muslims, but not quite to the degree they are for gay organizations (Table 1). The Appalachian coefficient is similar to the coefficient for the non-Appalachian South – both of which are much larger than the other regional coefficients. The Appalachian regional effect is similar to the size of Republican partisanship or a one-unit shift on the five-unit ideology scale.

Overall, then, Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported, but especially so for gay rights.

Results: A Closer Look at Central Appalachia

Hypothesis 3 predicted the strongest regional effects would exist for the Central Appalachian counties, primarily encompassing eastern Kentucky. This hypothesis is generally supported. In all but one case –

health care – the AIC value for Model 2 is lower than Model 1, suggesting the additional subregional terms provide a better model fit. In all but one of the remaining six models – the Muslims group affect model – the Central Appalachia coefficient is the largest. The size of the Central Appalachia effect is often comparable to, and sometimes eclipses, other variables like partisanship. This suggests Central Appalachia in particular combines support for labor and opposition to free trade deals like NAFTA with negative affect towards gay rights in particular. This is a combination of issue positions not commonly found in American party politics. Central Appalachia, then, serves as an interesting case study for public opinion scholars interested in extreme issue positions not grouped in a manner consistent with standard accounts of ideological consistency and partisan polarization.

In some cases, the single Appalachia variable is masking disparate effects in the region. This is particularly true for assessments of labor unions (Table 4). Despite no Appalachian distinctiveness in general, residents of Central Appalachia are substantially more positive in their assessments of unions. The coefficient for Central Appalachia in the labor group affect model is similar in size to partisanship. It is equivalent to a two-unit shift on the five-unit ideology scale.

While all parts of Appalachia are more opposed to free trade deals, the strongest opposition emerges in Central and South Central Appalachia (Table 5). The marginal effect for Central Appalachia is 14 percentage points, compared to 7 percentage points for the general Appalachia term in the previous model. This suggests residents of Central Appalachia are more pro-union and economically protectionist than the nation as a whole, as well as most other parts of Appalachia.

However, despite seeming proclivities towards at least some forms of economic leftism, Central Appalachia residents are not more liberal in their preferences for healthcare (Table 5). This is the only model where the AIC for Model 2 is larger than Model 1, suggesting the extra parameters do not offer a better fit. This can be interpreted in one of two ways. On the one hand, considering Kentucky's move towards Affordable Care Act implementation, it might be surprising. However, on the other hand, the

fact that opinions are at least not more *negative* than the base category might be sufficient to allow for that.

Central Appalachia again has the strongest effect in the gay organizations group affect model (Table 4). The Central Appalachia coefficient is huge in this model (1.17), which is slightly more than a one-unit shift on a ten-unit scale, relative to the Midwestern base category. This is over twice the size of the liberal relationship associated with residing in the Northeast, where gay marriage is increasingly common and attitudes are much more supportive. This is simply a massive effect for regional culture, especially since so many compositional factors are accounted for in the model (and if the base category were a more liberal region like the Northeast, the coefficient would be even larger).

Central Appalachia likewise is most opposed to gay marriage and abortion (Table 6). The average change associated with the subregion in the gay marriage model is 18 percentage points, including a 26 percent increase in the probability of taking the most conservative position relative to the moderate category.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates the relevance of Appalachia for scholars of American politics. I provide some evidence for greater economic leftism in Appalachia, but this is primarily true of the poorest counties in Central Appalachia. However, it does not extend to healthcare preferences. I provide much stronger evidence of substantially greater social conservatism in Appalachia, especially on gay rights – and, again, especially in the counties of Central Appalachia. This combination of issues – a particular type of economic leftism and very strong social conservatism – is relatively unusual in elite discourse, but seems more common in Appalachia. The link between economic and social preferences generally focuses on economic and social conservatism, but this more populist combination has been less studied.

The issues raised in this paper could be fruitfully applied to many research agendas in political

19

science. Studies of southern politics could benefit from further integrating the relationship between the South and Appalachia, two overlapping but distinctive regions of the country. This paper also suggests scholars interested in social issues, particularly evolving attitudes toward gay marriage, could complicate narratives assuming a trend towards inclusion by considering pockets of intense hostility, especially Central Appalachia.

The economic attitudes results can be linked more broadly to research agendas in comparative and international political economy accessing the individual level determinants of opposition to free trade, suggesting the importance of looking at "cultural" aspects rather than variables drawn strictly from the factor endowments and and specific factors models of preferences. Margalit (2012), for example, suggests anti-trade sentiments are often cultural, rather than strictly economic, in nature. These findings about Appalachia can be interpreted in a similar manner.

One problem facing writers discussing Appalachia is that such analysis might fall into the same issues that have plagued media accounts of the region. In particular, it is easy to slide from careful empirical analysis into stereotyping. For example, labeling Appalachian residents as disproportionately "protectionist" might play into the same stereotypes as postbellum writers who depicted them as out of step with modernization. However, a more nuanced analysis would suggest it is far from irrational for Appalachian residents to be skeptical of federal trade policy. Even economic policies that have positive impacts in the aggregate might be harmful to particular groups at the individual-level. A better understanding of this will help humanize theoretical assessments of economic preferences that seem "irrational" by mainstream standards.

Studying Appalachia presents a number of possible future avenues. Some scholars have started work on how the SES model of political participation applies in the Appalachian context (Cassese et al. 2012). There are several other possible topics to explore as well. American political development scholars could complement historical sociological scholarship by placing Appalachia into debates about

the development of the American welfare state and how "policies make citizens" (Campbell 2005). Finally, although the popular image of the region is one of white poverty, developing demographic shifts might complicate this going forward. Appalachia is in fact diversifying, at least in parts. This is especially true in Southern Appalachia, where the Latino population has gone from close to zero in 1990 to closer to 10 percent in some counties today. Although not huge relative to populations elsewhere in the country, the suddenness of the increase had coincided with white resentment towards new economic competitors and changes to the traditional cultural landscape of the region (for anecdotal evidence of this, see Preston 2009 for media coverage of Latino immigration to Appalachian Hamblen County, Tennessee). Paying attention to such developments will be important for scholars of contemporary racial and ethnic politics. The analysis presented here provides a useful baseline with which to compare future trends.

References

Arbour, Brian K. and Jeremy Teigen. 2011. "Barack Obama's 'American' Problem: Unhyphenated Americans in the 2008 Elections." *Social Science Quarterly* 92:3. 563-587.

Billings, Dwight B. and Kathleen M. Blee. 2000. *The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth and Hardship in Appalachia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Billings, Dwight B., Mary Beth Pudup, and Altina L. Waller. "Taking Exception with Exceptionalism: The Emergence and Transformation of Historical Studies of Appalachia." In Mary Beth Pudup, Dwight B. Billings, and Altina L. Wallter eds., *Appalachia in the Making: The Mountain South in the Nineteenth Century*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Black, Earl and Merle Black. 1992. *The Vital South: How Presidents are Elected*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

---. 2002. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2005. *How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cassese, Erin, Jeremy Zimmerman, and Lauren Santoro. 2012. "Political Engagement in Appalachia: Distinctive Regional Subculture or Confluence of Demographic Variables?" Paper presented at the 2012 meeting of the American Political Science Association annual meeting.

Caudill, Harry M. 2001 [1962]. *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*. Ashland: Jesse Stuart Foundation.

Coates, Ta-Nehisi. 2012. "White Resentment, Obama, and Appalachia." *The Atlantic*. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/white-resentment-obama-and-appalachia/257574/.

Edwards, Grace Toney, JoAnn Aust Asbury, and Ricky L. Cox. 2006. "Introduction." In Grace Toney Edawrds, JoAnn Aust Asbury, and Ricky L. Cox eds., *A Handbook to Appalachia: An Introduction to the Region*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Eller, Ronald D. 2008. *Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Fraser, Steve. 1989. "The 'Labor Question.'" In Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Goldstein, Dana. 2007. "Edwards 'Hiding Behind His Wife.'" *The American Prospect*. http://prospect.org/article/edwards-hiding-behind-his-wife.

Goodsell, Charles T. 1981. "Looking Once Again at a Human Service Bureaucracy." *Journal of Politics* 43(3). 763-778.

Jaros, Dean, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. 1968. "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture." *American Political Science Review* 62(2). 564-575.

Jennings, Kent M. and Richard G. Niemi. 1968. "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child." *American Political Science Review* 62(1). 169-184.

Key, V. O., Jr. 1949 [2006]. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

---. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Kousser, J. Morgan. 2010. "The Immutability of Categories and the Reshaping of Southern Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13. 365-383.

Lublin, David and D. Stephen Voss. 2000. "Racial Redistricting and Realignment in Southern State Legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4). 792-810.

MacGillis, Alec. 2012. "A Gift for Snickering Pundits: A Map." *The New Republic*. http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-stump/103584/gift-snickering-pundits-map.

Margalit, Yotam. 2012. "Lost in Globalization: Economic Integration and the Politics of Discontent." *International Studies Quarterly* 46. 484-500.

Obermiller, Phillip J., Michael E. Maloney, and Pauletta Hansel. "Appalachians Outside the Region." In Grace Toney Edawrds, JoAnn Aust Asbury, and Ricky L. Cox eds., *A Handbook to Appalachia: An Introduction to the Region*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Potts, Monica. 2012. "Pressing on the Upward Way." *The American Prospect*. http://prospect.org/article/pressing-upward-way.

Preston, Julia. 2009. "A Slippery Place in the U.S. Workforce." *New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/us/22immig.html.

Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54. 267-292.

Seelye, Katharine Q. 2011. "Obama is Facing a Replay of '08 Hurdles in 'Hillary Country,' Pa." *New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/us/politics/obama-faces-hurdles-in-hillary-country-in-pennsylvania.html.

Shannon, Thomas R. 2006. "The Economy of Appalachia." In Grace Toney Edawrds, JoAnn Aust Asbury, and Ricky L. Cox eds., *A Handbook to Appalachia: An Introduction to the Region*.

Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Straw, Richard. "Appalachian History." In Grace Toney Edwards, JoAnn Aust Asbury and Ricky L. Cox eds., *A Handbook to Appalachia: An Introduction to the Region*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Wagner, Melinda Bollar. 2006. "Religion in Appalachia." In Grace Toney Edwards, JoAnn Aust Asbury and Ricky L. Cox eds., *A Handbook to Appalachia: An Introduction to the Region*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 181-198.

White, Steven. Forthcoming. "The Heterogeneity of Southern White Distinctiveness." *American Politics Research*.

Williams, John Alexander. 2002. *Appalachia: A History*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Appendix

Here, I briefly address several potential theoretical and methodological objections to the analysis

presented in this paper.

One theoretical possibility is this is just partisanship. In other words, it's not that Appalachian

residents are more anti-gay rights, per se, but rather they are simply more likely to adhere to the

Republican Party in the 21st century. Certainly partisanship has a large impact on many political issue

attitudes. However, the "value added" to the model of including the Appalachia variables in addition to

partisanship is vast. The coefficients themselves are suggestive of this, but a comparison of the AIC

values also support the inclusion of the additional regional parameters. Indeed, in some cases

partisanship isn't even all that helpful (e..g, Democratic partisanship actually has no statistical

relationship with trade preferences, nor does self-placement on the five-point political ideology scale),

but the Appalachian term is. Finally, the "direction" of the Appalachia effect isn't consistently in the

conservative direction. While Appalachian residents are more culturally conservative in a manner

consistent with GOP issue positions, Appalachian antipathy to free trade is at odds with the Republican

Party's economics platform. Indeed, support for labor unions in Central Appalachia is especially at odds

with the core of the GOP's economic agenda.

Another theoretical possibility is that this is just "unhyphenated Americanism," as described by

Arbour and Teigen (2011). They describe how Americans who identify as ethnically "American"

tended to disproportionately reject Barack Obama's presidential candidacy in 2008, regardless of region

and other demographic characteristics. I certainly view this paper as complementary to their work. As

they note, many "unhyphenated Americans" reside in Appalachian counties, although not all do.

However, I argue the focus is sufficiently different to allow these two research agendas to peacefully

coexist. For scholars of state and regional politics particularly, I argue the geographical category of

Appalachia merits attention on its own right, regardless of what demographic characteristics it might

25

disproportionately contain. White ethnicity and geography are not the same substantive focus. Further, by looking at issues like anti-trade attitudes, this analysis likewise brings in new issues not covered by Arbour and Teigen's project, which is primarily about presidential vote choice. In conclusion, while I think their work is excellent, I think the study of Appalachia *per se* also merits attention, particularly for scholars of state and regional politics.

More specific to the trade models, one could also quite reasonably ask why education and income serve as proxies for factor endowments. I am at least partly willing to defer to specialists in the literature on free trade preferences, who have often used it in this way. However, even if education and income can have other sorts of effects on trade preferences, they still serve as a useful control variable, since I am really interested in the *additional* explanatory leverage gained by looking at residence in Appalachia, accounting for such other factors. What's really important to this analysis with reference to the trade models is not testing the factor endowments framework, per se, but rather assessing what Appalachian effect remains once many other competing explanatory variables are accounted for.

In terms of model specification, it might be the case that the Appalachia variable is capturing an almost entirely rural population, while the non-Appalachian South variable is including urban areas. Since there are control variables for size of place, this difference should roughly be averaged over. However, if only the rural, non-Appalachian South is compared directly to only the rural, Appalachian counties, the general pattern still holds. The difference between Appalachia and the non-Appalachian South is not simply a function of rural vs. urban differences in their composition. In particular, it is important to note that the strongest Appalachia effects are actually Central Appalachia, which is distinctive from both the non-Appalachian rural South as well as the Appalachian rural ex-Confederacy.[9] Rural eastern Kentucky is simply more anti-trade, more anti-gay rights, etc., than similar rural areas, I think.

---

9 The final version of this paper will have tables in the appendix with regression results.

Another concern deals with baselines and comparisons. In this paper, the "effect" of Appalachia – or subsets of it – is estimated with reference to a Midwestern baseline, and compared to other regional divisions. Another possibility is to compare Appalachia with another set of largely white, economically distressed areas, such as the Ozarks. However, while theoretically interesting, this is methodologically difficult because unlike Appalachia, the Ozarks are not defined by county boundaries. It is likewise not as politically salient (i.e., there was no federal initiative to define the Ozarks, as there was with Appalachia in the 1960s). I also think this is ultimately a different, albeit complementary, project to the one presented here. For scholars of state and regional politics, I think Appalachia *per se* is sufficiently important to merit its own paper.

Finally, one data concern is how NAES can be said to be representative at the county-level. The NAES is better than the ANES and GSS because the latter two surveys use a cluster sampling design, while the NAES uses random digit dialing. As such, while it is not necessarily the case that we should trust the disaggregated estimate of, say, Owsley County, Kentucky (because the N is far too small), we should be able to trust the disaggregated estimate of the 420 counties that make up "Appalachia," at least in the NAES (random digit dialing, plus a sufficiently large N, provides the best possible way to distinguish Appalachian residents, relative to non-Appalachian ones). This is not true for the ANES and GSS, because their cluster sample design is not designed to be representative at this level. Indeed, even state-level disaggregation would not necessarily be representative in the ANES and GSS datasets, while it would be in the NAES.

Table 1: OLS Models

	Labor Unions	Gay Orgs.	Muslims
Appalachia	-0.04	0.72***	0.33***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Non-Appalachian South	0.04	0.24***	0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Border South	-0.14*	0.20**	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Northeast	-0.04	-0.60***	-0.13**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
West	0.11*	-0.27***	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideology	0.34***	0.99***	0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democrat	-0.79***	-0.33***	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	0.47***	0.71***	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.20***	-0.52***	-0.29***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.01***	0.03***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household Income	0.18***	-0.07***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High School	-0.31***	0.49***	0.45***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
College Degree	0.09*	-0.52***	-0.41***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Black	-0.73***	0.88***	-0.13*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Latino	-0.71***	0.37***	0.43***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Union	-1.49***	0.16***	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Urban	-0.07	-0.25***	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Rural	0.08*	0.51***	0.28***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	2.57***	2.32***	3.62***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Adjusted R^2	.20	0.28	0.07
AIC	111750	123864	109837
Log lik.	-55856	-61913	-54899
N	24560	26163	23374

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: Logit Models

	Trade	Trade	Healthcare
Appalachia	-0.29***	-0.23***	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Non-Appalachian South	0.00	0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Border South	0.05	0.15*	-0.12
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Northeast	0.16***	0.19***	-0.16**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
West	0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideology	0.01	0.03	0.58***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democrat	-0.01	-0.08	-0.66***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	0.26***	0.19***	0.81***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	0.16***	0.27***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household Income	0.03***	0.02*	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High School	0.07*	0.05	-0.14**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
College Degree	0.34***	0.23***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Black	0.01	0.07	-0.45***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Latino	0.72***	0.56***	-0.26**
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Union	-0.46***	-0.49***	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Urban	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Rural	-0.17***	-0.11*	-0.14**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Restrict Immigration		-0.45***	
		(0.04)	
Constant	0.40***	0.55***	-2.93***
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Pseudo R^2	.04	.04	.19
AIC	60387	18797	18944
Log lik.	-30174	-9378	-9453
N	45371	14149	16988

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Gay Marriage	Abortion
Table 3: Ordered Probit Models		
Appalachia	0.32***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Non-Appalachian South	0.13***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Border South	0.13***	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Northeast	-0.30***	-0.20***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.15***	-0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideology	0.43***	0.39***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat	-0.10***	-0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Republican	0.38***	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.19***	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.01***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household Income	-0.04***	-0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
High School	0.21***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
College Degree	-0.14***	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Black	0.67***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino	0.21***	0.42***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Union	0.06***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Urban	-0.06***	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Rural	0.21***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Cut 1	1.12***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cut 2	2.18***	0.85***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cut 3		2.15***
		(0.04)
Pseudo R^2	.17	.11
AIC	63270	86066
Log lik.	-31615	-43012
N	34635	36885

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Subregional OLS Models

	Labor Unions	Gay Orgs.	Muslims
Northern Appalachia	0.02	0.58***	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
North Central Appalachia	-0.32*	0.61***	0.14
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Central Appalachia	-0.63***	1.17***	0.49*
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)
South Central Appalachia	-0.06	0.78***	0.63***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Southern Appalachia	0.16	0.78***	0.62***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Non-Appalachian South	0.05	0.25***	0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Border South	-0.06	0.19**	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Northeast	-0.04	-0.56***	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
West	0.13**	-0.26***	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Adjusted R^2	.20	.28	.07
AIC	111739	123863	109818
Log lik.	-55846	-61908	-54886
N	24560	26163	23374

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Control variables not shown due to space concerns.

Table 5: Subregional Logit Models

	Trade	Healthcare
Northern Appalachia	-0.25***	0.20*
	(0.05)	(0.09)
North Central Appalachia	-0.13	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.18)
Central Appalachia	-0.61***	-0.20
	(0.12)	(0.21)
South Central Appalachia	-0.57***	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.13)
Southern Appalachia	-0.13*	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Non-Appalachian South	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Border South	0.06	-0.11
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Northeast	0.15***	-0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.06)
West	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Pseudo R^2	.04	.19
AIC	60361	18947
Log lik.	-30157	-9450
N	45371	16988

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Control variables not shown due to space concerns.

Table 6: Subregional Ordered Probit Models

	Gay Marriage	Abortion
Northern Appalachia	0.25***	0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
North Central Appalachia	0.31***	0.15**
	(0.07)	(0.06)
Central Appalachia	0.67***	0.26***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
South Central Appalachia	0.29***	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Southern Appalachia	0.38***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Non-Appalachian South	0.14***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Border South	0.11***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Northeast	-0.29***	-0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.15***	-0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Cut 1	1.12***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cut 2	2.18***	0.85***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cut 3		2.14***
		(0.04)
Pseudo R^2	.17	.11
AIC	63256	86062
Log lik.	-31604	-43006
N	34635	36885

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Control variables not shown due to space concerns.