Salvatore Nunnari

I am an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. My research is in formal political theory, political economy, and experimental political science. In particular, I use game theory and laboratory experiments to study legislative bargaining, the provision of public goods, and the effect of political institutions on economic and political outcomes. I am the Associate Director of the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences. I organize the Columbia Political Economy Seminar in the Spring and the Columbia Political Economy Breakfast in the Fall. You can find a short CV by clicking here.

Department of Political Science
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Mail Code 3320
New York, NY 10027

Phone: +1 212 851 0134
Email: snunnari [at] columbia [dot] edu
Google Scholar Profile



Published and Forthcoming Papers

Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey
American Economic Review, 2014, 104(9): 2858–2871, Online Appendix, NBER Working Paper No. 17926

Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey
American Political Science Review, 2012, 106(2): 407–429, Online Appendix


Working Papers

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments
Revise & Resubmit at the American Journal of Political Science

Turnout Across Democracies, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli
Revise & Resubmit at the American Journal of Political Science

Gambler's Fallacy and Imperfect Best Response in Legislative Bargaining, with Jan Zapal
Revise & Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior, Supplementary Material

The Political Economy of the U.S. Auto Industry Crisis
Revise & Resubmit at Economics and Politics

The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey

Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization, with Jan Zapal

Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions,
with Colin Camerer and Thomas R. Palfrey

Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy Across Political Regimes, with Vincenzo Galasso


Work In Progress

The Political Economy of Public Debt: An Experiment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey

Durable Coalitions: Public, Private, and Implicit Negotiations, with David Baron and Renee Bowen

Declared Choice: Citizen Strategies of Clientelism, with Simeon Nichter

A Theory of Power Wars, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli



I teach Political Economy of Institutions and Development (ECPS W4921) to undergraduates, and Laboratory Experiments and Formal Theories in Political Science (POLS G4371) to graduates. In the past, I taught courses in Business and Politics and Advanced Game Theory.


Op-Ed Articles

Legge elettorale: il diavolo si nasconde nei dettagli, Linkiesta, 02/02/2014

Perché Renzi e Berlusconi hanno scelto l’Italicum?, Linkiesta, 21/01/2014

Basta melina, quale legge elettorale volete?, Linkiesta, 04/01/2014

Un modello francese per l’Italia,, 07/06/2013

Non è tutta colpa del Porcellum,, 28/02/2013