Salvatore Nunnari

I am an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. My research is in formal political theory, political economy, and experimental political science. In particular, I use game theory and laboratory experiments to study legislative bargaining, the provision of public goods, and the effect of political institutions on economic and political outcomes. I am the Associate Director of the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences. I organize the Columbia Political Economy Seminar in the Spring and the Columbia Political Economy Breakfast in the Fall. You can find a short CV by clicking here.

Department of Political Science
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Mail Code 3320
New York, NY 10027

Phone: +1 212 851 0134
Email: snunnari [at] columbia [dot] edu
Google Scholar Profile



Published and Accepted Papers

Turnout Across Democracies, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli
American Journal of Political Science, Accepted, Replication Data, NBER Working Paper No. 20451

Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey
American Economic Review, 2014, 104(9): 2858–2871, Online Appendix, NBER Working Paper No. 17926

Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey
American Political Science Review, 2012, 106(2): 407–429, Online Appendix


Working Papers

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments
Revise & Resubmit at the American Journal of Political Science

Gambler's Fallacy and Imperfect Best Response in Legislative Bargaining, with Jan Zapal
Revise & Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior, Supplementary Material

The Political Economy of the U.S. Auto Industry Crisis
Revise & Resubmit at Economics and Politics

The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey

Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization, with Jan Zapal

Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions,
with Colin Camerer and Thomas R. Palfrey

Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy Across Political Regimes, with Vincenzo Galasso


Work In Progress

The Political Economy of Public Debt: An Experiment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey

Durable Coalitions: Public, Private, and Implicit Negotiations, with David Baron and Renee Bowen

Declared Choice: Citizen Strategies of Clientelism, with Simeon Nichter

A Theory of Power Wars, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli



I teach Political Economy of Institutions and Development (ECPS W4921) to undergraduates, and Laboratory Experiments and Formal Theories in Political Science (POLS G4371) to graduates. In the past, I taught courses in Business and Politics and Advanced Game Theory.


Op-Ed Articles

Legge elettorale: il diavolo si nasconde nei dettagli, Linkiesta, 02/02/2014

Perché Renzi e Berlusconi hanno scelto l’Italicum?, Linkiesta, 21/01/2014

Basta melina, quale legge elettorale volete?, Linkiesta, 04/01/2014

Un modello francese per l’Italia,, 07/06/2013

Non è tutta colpa del Porcellum,, 28/02/2013