Salvatore Nunnari

I am an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. My research is in formal political theory, political economy, and experimental political science. In particular, I use game theory and laboratory experiments to study legislative bargaining, the dynamic provision of durable public goods, and the effect of political institutions on economic and political outcomes. I am a member of the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences. Together with Alessandra Casella, I organize the Columbia Political Economy Seminar in the Spring and the Columbia Political Economy Breakfast in the Fall. On this page you can find details on my research and download my published articles and working papers. You can find a short CV by clicking here.


Department of Political Science
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Mail Code 3320
New York, NY 10027

Phone: +1 212 851 0134
Email: snunnari [at] columbia [dot] edu
Twitter: @snunnari
Google Scholar Profile


Published and Forthcoming Papers

Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey, American Economic Review, Forthcoming

Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey, American Political Science Review, 2012, 106(2): 407–429, Online Appendix


Working Papers

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments

Turnout Across Democracies, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli

The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey

Dynamic Policy Competition, Ideological Polarization and the Value of Veto Rights, with Jan Zapal

Gambler's Fallacy and Imperfect Best Response in Legislative Bargaining, with Jan Zapal, Revise & Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior, Supplementary Material

Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy Across Political Regimes, with Vincenzo Galasso

Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions, with Colin Camerer and Thomas R. Palfrey

The Political Economy of the U.S. Auto Industry Crisis

The Effects of Redistricting on Distributive Outcomes, with Michiko Ueda


Work In Progress

The Political Economy of Public Debt: An Experiment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey

Team Size Effects in Dynamic Contribution Games, with Florian Ederer and George Georgiadis

Dynamic Coalitions: Public Negotiation versus Back-Room Deals, with David Baron and Renee Bowen

A Theory of Power Wars, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli

Declared Choice: Citizen Strategies of Clientelism, with Simeon Nichter

The Economic Causes of Populism, with Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli and Luigi Guiso



I teach Political Economy of Institutions and Development (ECPS W4921) to undergraduates, and Laboratory Experiments and Formal Theories in Political Science (POLS G4371) to graduates. In the past, I taught courses in Business and Politics and Advanced Game Theory.


Op-Ed Articles

Legge elettorale: il diavolo si nasconde nei dettagli, Linkiesta, 02/02/2014

Perché Renzi e Berlusconi hanno scelto l’Italicum?, Linkiesta, 21/01/2014

Basta melina, quale legge elettorale volete?, Linkiesta, 04/01/2014

Un modello francese per l’Italia,, 07/06/2013

Non è tutta colpa del Porcellum,, 28/02/2013