Research

Working Papers

"Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets" (NBER WP18573)
Alessandra Casella and Sebastien Turban (2012)

Abstract: We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demand enough votes to alone control a majority. The probability of a minority victory is independent of the size of the minority and converges to one half, foranyminority size, when the electorate is arbitrarily large. In a large electorate, the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is undone by the market.

"Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders" (NBER WP17847)
Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey and Sebastien Turban (2012)

Abstract: Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have di§erent, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results.

"Valuing Institutions: A Measure of the Bond Market’s Views of Term Limits in Developing Countries"
Sebastien Turban and Laurence Wilse-Samson (2013)

Abstract: We study the effect of changes to political institutions on the perception of country risk. In particular, we consider the impact of information about a change in executive term limits on a country’s bond spreads over 101 events in seven emerging markets. We uncover an interesting asymmetry. Investors respond significantly to news about restrictions on the length or number of terms an executive leader can serve, leading to lower country risk spreads over US Treasuries. The one day abnormal returns following news about a restriction of term limits is 2 percentage points below the prediction. Over ten days, the cumulative abnormal return is 5 percentage points. Both numbers are statistically significant. On the other hand, the response to an extension of executive terms in office is not significant in the long run. The result is robust to a non-parametric test. We find a more muted and less asymmetric response in private markets with a 2% abnormal return ten days after extensions, but no long-term effect of restrictions. The relation between investors' responses and countries’ institutions shows tentative evidence that reactions are muted in better institutionalized countries, and stronger when the judiciary signals its independence from the executive.

Work in Progress

"The Incumbency Advantage and the Challenger's Incentives" (Slides)
Sebastien Turban (2012)

Abstract: When an office-motivated challenger faces an incumbent with an inherent advantage, I show that when campaign platform are binding the challenger has an incentive to separate from the incumbent, and to not reveal his information to the voter perfectly.

"Pac Contributions and Congressional Power : A Look at the Impact of Committee Positions"
Sebastien Turban (2010)

Abstract: This paper is a preliminary analysis of the impact of power position in Congress on campaign contributions. I am using the committee organization of the House of Representatives as the main object of interest and compare the contributions received by committee chairmen and minority leaders to those received by the traditional power positions such as floor leaders and whips. Results show that floor leaders and whips receive far higher contributions, even if the history of Congress is considered to go towards an increase of the power of committees and subcommittees.

"Campaign Contributions and Institutional Organization : The Impact of Network Position in Congress"
Sebastien Turban (2010)

Abstract: This paper looks at the impact of network position on the level of campaign contributions received by members of the U.S. House of Representatives. We build a weighted directional network of the Representatives through detailed cosponsorship data. We then use measures of centrality derived from this network on contributions. PACs seem to contribute more to well-connected congressmen, do not care about the position of a legislator as an intermediary of communication, and consider clustering negatively. Another study through individual movement in the institution seems to show that the change in one congressman’s position, for example from floor leader to Speaker, affects differently the other representatives depending on their initial link to the congressman.

"The Minority Paradox"
Sebastien Turban (2010)

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that in a two-party system where a party has agenda power but requires defection from the opposing group to pass legislation, the majority might not be worse-off when losing seats. The US Senate is an institution which fits perfectly in this setting: in November 2010, the Democratic party kept its majority but lost 6 seats to the Republican party. In the model, the majority needs to reach across the aisle to pass legislation. The minority party has to spread a fixed punishment over all defectors, or punish a defector at random. Hence, minority centrists who defect en masse are better off than if they defect alone. If a larger minority party implies more centrists, the majority might have a better rate of success in attracting enough voters for its objectives

Slides available here, handout there

"Strategic response to polls in small-scale binary elections"
Sebastien Turban and Laurence Wilse-Samson (2010)

Abstract: We introduce polls into a cost-of-voting model where costs are heterogeneous. There is a partial underdog compensation e ect which rational voters would recognise and try to undo by lying. We consider equilibrium in the model with polls. Future work will consider whether by introducing a sucient cost of lying we can recover truth-telling. Furthermore, we suggest a future experiment which could test whether voters recognise the incentive to lie in the votes-with-polls game.

"Lying"
Sebastien Turban and Laurence Wilse-Samson (2010)

Description: In parallel with the paper on polls, we wrote a document describing the theoretical and empirical literature on cost of lying, and how it could be adapted to polls