

# Cloud Provider Connectivity in the Flat Internet

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## ABSTRACT

The Tier-1 ISPs have been considered the Internet’s backbone since the dawn of the modern Internet 30 years ago, as they guarantee global reachability. However, their influence and importance are waning as Internet flattening decreases the demand for transit services and increases the importance of private interconnections. Conversely, major cloud providers – Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft – are gaining in importance as more services are hosted on their infrastructures. They ardently support Internet flattening and are rapidly expanding their global footprints, which enables them to bypass the Tier-1 ISPs and other large transit providers to reach many destinations.

In this paper we seek to quantify the extent to which the cloud providers’ can bypass the Tier-1 ISPs and other large transit providers. We conduct comprehensive measurements to identify the neighbor networks of the major cloud providers and combine them with AS relationship inferences to model the Internet’s AS-level topology to calculate a new metric, hierarchy-free reachability, which characterizes the reachability a network can achieve without traversing the networks of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. We show that the cloud providers are able to reach over 76% of the Internet without traversing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, more than virtually every other network.

## CCS CONCEPTS

• **Networks** → **Logical / virtual topologies**; *Public Internet*; *Network architectures*; **Topology analysis and generation**.

## KEYWORDS

Internet topology, AS relationships, Routing, Traceroute, BGP

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Internet flattening, the shortening of paths between destinations due to more densely connected topology [29, 39, 57], has fundamentally altered the Internet’s structure over the past decade. Today the preponderance of Internet traffic is generated and transmitted by a handful of networks, and it is essentially invisible to the traditional Internet hierarchy because it transpires over private interconnects [71, 87, 115, 118]. The increased interconnectivity between networks bypasses the transit networks which comprise the traditional hierarchical Internet’s upper echelons, such as the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, thereby reducing reliance on their services and putting them under increasing economic pressure [91].

Contributing to transit networks’ decline in revenue, traffic volume, and relevance is an increasing dependence on top cloud provider networks, especially Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft. The cloud providers have well-provisioned WANs to convey tenant traffic [83], interconnect with thousands of other networks [8, 26], support service requirements at any scale, and are deploying Points of Presence (PoPs) and datacenters at a rapid pace [121]. Many businesses, including several of the Internet’s largest companies [11, 35, 56, 73], host their frontend and/or backend systems on (multiple [119]) cloud provider infrastructure(s).

With the increased reliance on cloud provider infrastructures and shift away from transit [91], it is essential to understand to what extent the cloud providers are able to operate independently from the traditional Internet hierarchy and facilitate connectivity to public facing services hosted on their infrastructures. Specifically, we are interested in understanding how close the cloud providers are to individually achieving global reachability without traversing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. The extent to which the cloud providers can bypass the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs has implications for future connectivity between networks, network resilience, the cloud providers driving further changes to the Internet’s topology, and predicting future changes that impact the cloud and transit provider networks.

Despite undergoing much scrutiny, the Internet’s topology and routing remains relatively opaque due to shortcomings in existing measurement techniques and routing policies being considered proprietary. Prior studies examined cloud provider connectivity, such as showing an order of magnitude more direct connectivity for cloud providers than earlier work [26]. Others explored how central large content providers and CDNs are to the Internet [22, 23], basing their comparison on the connectivity of the Tier-1 ISPs. The studies look at the cloud providers’ degree of connectivity and the shortening of paths, but they do not examine the networks the cloud providers use to deliver traffic (e.g., whether they bypass the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs). There are metrics to measure the influence of a network on the Internet, such as customer cone (the set of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that an AS can reach using links to

customer networks [64]) and transit degree (the number of unique neighbors that appear on either side of an AS in adjacent links [64]). The metrics are focused on how many networks an AS can provide transit services for, but do not capture how or where much of the Internet’s traffic flows because they lack visibility into edge (*e.g.*, cloud) network connectivity [25, 77, 115].

Our first contribution is to quantify the degree to which the cloud providers can bypass the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs when serving publicly facing cloud-hosted services. To do so, we model an AS-level topology graph and calculate the number of networks that are reachable by the cloud providers without traversing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. Our model combines AS relationship data from BGP feeds [15] with comprehensive traceroute measurements from inside each cloud provider to identify neighbors (§4). Combining the two datasets overcomes the shortfalls of each, presenting a more thorough view of cloud provider connectivity than prior studies [22, 23, 26]. Google and Microsoft validated that 85-89% of our inferred neighbors are correct (§5).

We use the modeled topology to introduce a new metric, *hierarchy-free reachability*, that quantifies the level of independence the cloud providers are able to achieve by measuring the number of networks which are still reachable without the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. We show that the cloud providers are more independent than virtually every other network (§6), and each has the potential to reach at least 76% of networks without traversing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs at the time of our measurements. We also examine which networks the cloud providers use to reach destinations when bypassing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs (§7). The cloud provider’s independence also has security implications; Tier-1 ISPs are known to propagate routing leaks [96], and their large footprints help to unwittingly propagate attacks with widespread effects. We show that the cloud providers’ independence also protects them from the effects of route leaks (§8).

Our second contribution is a detailed examination of how the cloud providers are able to achieve such a degree of independence from the large transit providers despite their different strategies for establishing connectivity to other networks (§9). We examine the infrastructure of the cloud providers, specifically PoP deployment and proximity to large user populations. We consolidate multiple public data resources, such as network maps, providers’ online PoP listings, Peering DB [81], and rDNS information to generate topologies for the four cloud providers and many Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. We show that the deployment strategies are closely tied to proximity to user population centers and that the similarities between the cloud provider and Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs’ deployments help to enable the cloud providers’ independence.

## 2 BACKGROUND

### 2.1 The Good Old Hierarchical Internet

The conventional view of the Internet is a tiered, hierarchical topology where edge networks comprise the hierarchy’s basal layer [29, 39, 57, 64]. At the apex are the Tier-1 ISPs which have large global networks and are fully interconnected with each other [57, 114]. Key to the hierarchical topology is the concept of *transit*. A network is a *transit provider* if it allows traffic from external sources to traverse its infrastructure to reach external destinations. Lower tiers

pay higher tier networks for transit services to access the rest of the Internet. The Tier-1 ISPs establish *settlement-free peering* agreements amongst themselves, meaning they interconnect with each other and do not charge each other for transit. These agreements assure the Internet’s *global reachability* property.

The protocol for exchanging reachability information between networks is BGP. A network, or AS, establishes a *neighbor* relationship with another AS. These interconnected neighbors exchange information about the destination IP *prefixes* each is willing to transport traffic towards. Any pair of ASes are free to establish neighbor connections between themselves if they both agree to do so.

### 2.2 Internet Flattening

An amalgamation of factors converged to drive Internet flattening. One factor was the rise of *Internet eXchange Points* (IXPs) and *colocation facilities* (colos) [24, 70], which facilitate inter-AS connectivity through public (shared capacity and peering) or private interconnections (dedicated AS-to-AS peering and capacity also known as Private Network Interconnects (PNIs)) [3]. The increased direct connectivity available at IXPs reduces transit costs and affords improved control over routing, utilization, and performance [26, 89].

Parallel to IXP growth, cloud and content providers made substantial investments towards expanding their global footprints. The cloud providers deploy PoPs at IXPs and colocation facilities for closer proximity to user ISPs. They are also deploying enormous datacenters at a rapid pace; for example, Microsoft doubled the number of datacenter locations (a.k.a regions) across the globe from 2015 - 2018 [121]. Finally, they built massive private WANs to interconnect their datacenters and PoPs, investing billions of dollars towards network infrastructure [90] and collectively now own or lease approximately 50% of global undersea fiber capacity [13].

Not all cloud providers have private global WANs, and not all cloud providers route tenant services across their WAN. Each of the four providers we focus on have an expansive, global private WAN and route at least some tenant traffic across their WANs [119]. By default, Amazon tenant traffic egress/ingresses near the datacenter rather than using their WAN, but Amazon does offer services to route tenant traffic across its WAN [4].

With the capital investment in infrastructure, the cloud providers now function as total service environments. Even some of the largest online companies (*e.g.*, Netflix, Apple, Spotify, Lyft) rely heavily on the cloud providers, and some are beginning to use the features of multiple cloud providers [56]. Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft are the marketplace’s top players [91, 116].

### 2.3 AS Topology Graphs

Analyzing the Internet at the AS-level is an area of considerable research. Methods to create an AS-level topology rely on the assumption that most interconnects between a pair of ASes can be classified as either Peer-to-Peer (p2p) or Customer-to-Provider (c2p) (p2c depending on perspective) [36]. For p2c relationships, a customer pays a provider to carry its traffic to other networks. In a p2p relationship the two peer ASes inform each other of routes through their customers, not provider or other peer networks.

Links are classified based on the *valley-free* assumption, meaning each path consists of zero or more c2p links, zero or one p2p links,

followed by a segment of zero or more p2c links. Models often assume that networks prefer to use p2c links over p2p and prefer p2p over c2p [37]. The current state of the art algorithm for inferring AS relationships to construct AS-level topology graphs is Problink [53]. An implication of valley-free routing is that many p2p links are only visible to an AS and its customers. Since topologies are built from a small number of Vantage Points (VPs), they are unable to see p2p links from other parts of the Internet.

### 3 GOALS

The cloud providers continue to expand their WANs, PoPs, and peering footprints, and more services depend on their infrastructures, we want to understand their independence from the traditional Internet hierarchy to reach the rest of the Internet. To determine the cloud providers' independence we need to answer:

**Goal 1: To what extent are the cloud providers able to bypass the Internet hierarchy when serving their cloud tenant traffic?** (§§ 6 to 8) Extensive interconnectivity between ASes reduces transit costs and improves control over routing, utilization, and performance [26, 46, 68, 89]. It also renders the traffic invisible to all but the parties involved. To understand the cloud providers' independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, we need to identify the cloud providers' connectivity and develop a method to quantify their potential to deliver hosted services without traversing the networks of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs.

**Goal 2: What are the characteristics of the cloud providers' PoP deployment strategies?** (§9) During the decade of Internet flattening, the cloud providers were able to deploy massive networks to support delivering hosted services. To interconnect with more remote networks, the cloud providers had to expand their infrastructure and establish PoPs around the world. To understand how the cloud providers are able to achieve independence, we seek to understand the geographic coverage and proximity to user populations of cloud and transit providers' network PoP deployments.

## 4 MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY

To evaluate the extent and impact of the cloud provider's interconnectivity, we consolidate multiple datasets and measurements.

### 4.1 AS Topology Graph and Measurements

We determine reachability between different networks by modeling the AS-level topology of the Internet. There are shortfalls to using either of the two most common tools for mapping Internet topologies: BGP feeds and traceroutes. By combining the two sources, we leverage the benefits of each while minimizing their weaknesses.

**AS-level topology graph.** BGP feeds lack visibility into edge network connectivity [25, 32, 77] and routing policies [5, 77] based on the number and location of the BGP monitors. Despite bias and shortfalls, BGP feeds provide a high level of visibility and completeness for c2p links and those of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs [41, 53, 64, 77]. There is considerable prior work for constructing AS-level topologies from BGP feeds [36, 37, 52, 53, 64, 77]. We use the CAIDA September 2020 AS-Relationship dataset based on public BGP feeds that also incorporates Ark traceroute data for generating our topology graph [15].

**Augmenting the AS-level topology graph with traceroutes from the cloud.** Publicly available BGP feeds have good coverage of Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs [77]. However, they have limited visibility into edge network interconnectivity; peering connections at the edge are only visible to the two directly connected networks and are invisible to BGP monitors further up the Internet's hierarchy [25, 77, 115]. Even though the CAIDA dataset incorporates traceroute data, the vantage points are not embedded within any of the cloud provider networks [17]; unless the VP is inside the cloud provider network, it will miss a considerable number of the cloud providers' peers [26, 32, 77]. Since BGP feeds fail to capture most edge network peering sessions, we augment our topology model.

To provide a more complete picture of cloud providers' connectivity we issue traceroutes originating inside the cloud provider networks. Traceroutes also suffer bias and can deliver distorted router-level paths. The logical location of VPs or the number of locations limits visibility into available paths [32]. Additionally, dropped packets, unresponsive hops, or load balancing can result in inferring false links [62, 65, 108]. We only consider the directly connected neighbors of the cloud providers from our traceroutes; we do not augment the AS-level topology graph with information gleaned beyond the cloud provider's neighbors.

We add p2p links into the topology graph between the cloud AS and neighbor ASes identified in the traceroute measurements. Since BGP feeds have a high success rate identifying c2p links [53, 64, 77] but miss nearly all edge peer links [77], we can safely assume newly identified links are peer links. When a connection identified in a traceroute already exists in the CAIDA dataset, we do not modify the previously identified link type.

**Issuing and analyzing traceroutes.** We create VMs in multiple locations per cloud provider (12 for Google, 20 for Amazon, 11 for Microsoft, and 6 for IBM). From each VM we issue ICMP traceroutes, using Scamper [60], to every routable IPv4 prefix. We restrict our measurements at each VM to 1000 pps to avoid rate limiting. We also conduct smaller sets of supplemental traceroutes to look for path changes by selecting one prefix originated by each AS [19].

To sanitize our traceroute dataset and identify neighbors we iteratively map IP addresses to ASes, first using PeeringDB for any IP addresses where it contains a mapping, then the Team Cymru IP-to-ASN mapping tool [99], and finally whois to identify the owning AS. We use PeeringDB as our primary source because we focus on identifying peerings, and some peering routers use addresses that are not globally routable but may be in PeeringDB as they are useful to configure peerings. For example, we saw several unresolved IP addresses in the 193.238.116.0/22 range, which is not announced in BGP but belongs to NL-IX and is used by IXP members [82]. We will demonstrate in Section 5 that this supplement makes a significant difference. We only retain traceroutes that include a cloud provider hop immediately adjacent to a hop mapped to a different AS, with no intervening unresponsive or unmapped hops.

By combining our traceroute-inferred cloud peers with those visible in the CAIDA dataset, we observe many more peers than are seen in the CAIDA dataset alone: 333 vs. 1,389 peers for Amazon, 818 vs. 7,757 for Google, 3,027 vs. 3,702 for IBM, and 315 vs. 3,580 for Microsoft. BGP feeds do not see 90% of Google (open peering policy) and Microsoft (selective peering policy) peers. Both Amazon and

IBM have selective peering policies, and CAIDA alone identified a higher fraction of Amazon and IBM’s neighbors, but did not detect 76% and 19%, respectively.

**2015 datasets.** As a comparison point, we also use data from prior work in 2015 (§6.5). For our reachability retrospective, we need both an AS-relationship dataset and a comprehensive traceroute dataset outbound from the cloud providers for the same time period. We used the CAIDA AS-relationship dataset from September 2015 [14] and the traceroute dataset from a prior study which also issued traceroutes outbound from cloud provider VMs to the rest of the Internet [26]. We used the same methods we applied to our data to combine the past CAIDA and traceroute datasets to create a historical AS-level topology map.

## 4.2 PoP Topology Maps

To understand the similarities between the cloud and large providers’ PoP deployment strategies, we construct city-level topology graphs. We use network maps provided by individual ASes when available [1, 9, 31, 48, 75, 79, 80, 92, 94, 98, 102, 104, 106, 107, 110, 112, 123]. Prior work on topology maps posited that since networks are trying to provide information and sell their networks, the maps would only be published if accurate [30, 55]. We also incorporate router locations from looking glass websites if available [47, 50, 51, 58, 74, 78, 93, 97, 100, 101, 103, 105, 109, 111, 122].

We combine the maps with two additional information sources. The first source is to incorporate data from PeeringDB [81]. Data from PeeringDB is generally reliable, as shown in prior works [59], and is considered trustworthy and authoritative by many operational networks, including some of the Internet’s largest [12].

The second source is router hostnames, since the hostnames often encode location information hints such as airport code or other abbreviations [63]. To gather hostnames, we issued reverse DNS (rDNS) requests for every IP address announced by the cloud providers and Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. To identify which hostnames belong to routers, we first manually issued traceroutes to random IP addresses within each AS to find candidate hostnames. When an AS has rDNS entries, we found that router hostnames were very clearly distinguished from non-routers (e.g., NTT router hostnames belong to `gin.ntt.net`). We used two methods to extract location information from router hostnames. The first was to manually inspect each set of hostnames and generate a regular expression to extract locations. The second method was to resolve aliased IP addresses/hostnames using `midar` [18, 54], then use the aliases as input for `sc_hoiho` to generate a naming convention regular expression [61, 63]. We had identical results for the two methods, except several ASes produced no results from `sc_hoiho` due to a low number of alias groups.

The two rDNS methods did not uncover any PoPs that did not appear in PeeringDB or the available maps, lending support to their completeness. We see that there are varying degrees of publicly available data. AT&T for instance provides a map and rDNS data, but no entries in PeeringDB. Also notable, Amazon has a network graph and an active presence in PeeringDB, but it does not have any router hostnames in rDNS. For networks that did respond to rDNS entries, only 73% of PoPs had rDNS entries. Detailed PoP and rDNS entry numbers are available in Table 3, in Appendix C.

## 4.3 Population and AS Type

One of the main reasons for Internet flattening is to improve performance of users accessing hosted services [26], so we want to assess how cloud provider reachability relates to user populations. We use data provided by the Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC), which uses ad-based measurements to estimate the number and percentage of Internet users in an AS [2]. CAIDA classifies AS into three types [16]: content, transit/access, or enterprise. If CAIDA identifies an AS as transit/access and the AS has users in the APNIC dataset, we classify it as access.

Second, we examine the cloud providers’ geographic PoP deployment strategy relative to user populations. We use the latest population density data [34], which provides per square kilometer population counts, and topology graphs (§4.2), to estimate population within different radii of network PoPs.

## 4.4 Limitations

**Many virtual cloud interconnects are invisible to the Internet hierarchy.** Discovering an interconnect between networks requires having a VP that uses a route that traverses the link. Because p2p links are not announced to providers, observing them requires having a VP in one of the peers or one of their customer cones. Cloud providers generally do not have customers, and they peer with many ASes at the edge which lack any or many customers, and so these links tend to be invisible to traditional mapping efforts, which lack VPs in cloud providers and most edge ASes.

By using a VP in the cloud, we observe the cloud provider’s links that are made available to public cloud tenants. However, it is also possible for a cloud provider peer to connect to the cloud but NOT make it available to public cloud tenants, instead only using the interconnect to access private cloud resources and/or the cloud provider’s hosted service (e.g., Office 365) [67, 119]. In particular, Virtual Private Interconnections (VPIs) [10, 27, 66, 119], are often configured to be private to let cloud customers, even those without their own AS, have direct access to their own cloud resources (but not to other VMs hosted in the cloud) without traversing the public Internet. VPI can be facilitated by cloud exchanges, which allow any customer to form virtual peering sessions with any participating cloud provider at any of the cloud exchange’s facilities [119]. These private VPIs will be invisible to our measurements.

Recent studies discussed VPIs and noted that existing methods are not capable of identifying these types of connections [118, 119]. VPIs represent a complementary aspect of cloud provider networks that do not commonly carry traffic from general publicly facing cloud hosted services, so we view them as out of scope and they would not be a target of our measurements.

**Cloud providers can interfere with measurements,** manipulating header contents, rate limiting measurement traffic, or denying traffic based on protocol or content. For example, Google is known to drop packets with IP Options enabled [42] or to manipulate TTL values for different networking services such as Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs) [45]. Cloud providers also tunnel traffic between nodes [85, 117], which can make it difficult or nearly impossible to know the physical path between their internal hops.

Filtering or manipulation by the cloud providers can render traditional measurement techniques impotent. For example, prior work

could not issue traceroutes from Microsoft [26] or from Google’s standard networking tier [8]. In our paper, the key property we infer from traceroutes is the set of ASes neighboring the cloud providers. In Section 5, we describe validation provided by Microsoft and Google demonstrating that 85–89% of neighbors we infer are correct, suggesting that manipulation had little to no impact on our key results. Close inspection of geographic and other patterns in our traceroutes also suggests we are correctly inferring borders.

**Underestimating reachability of other networks** which are not our measured cloud providers, Tier-1 ISPs, or Tier-2 ISPs. By combining neighbors identified in traceroutes with the data from BGP data feeds, we are able to get a more complete view of the cloud providers’ connectivity. However, since BGP feeds are estimated to miss up to 90% of edge network peer connections [25, 77], it is likely that we underestimate the interconnectivity for other networks (e.g., Facebook or Apple). Comprehensively identifying the number of peers for other non-cloud networks is challenging due to measurement budgets and a lack of vantage points, so an efficient method to uncover other edge networks’ neighbors is an area for future research.

## 5 VALIDATION OF NEIGHBOR INFERENCES

**Validation of final results.** Most of our paper’s results depend on the set of peers we infer for the cloud providers. To validate this data, we requested validation from each cloud provider. Microsoft and Google provided feedback regarding true and false positives – whether ASes we identified as neighbors are actual neighbors or not – as well as false and true negatives – whether ASes we identified as *not* neighbors are actual neighbors or not. For both cloud providers, the feedback indicated that the false discovery rate (FDR),  $FP/(FP + TP)$ , was between 11–15%. For the false negative rate (FNR),  $FN/(FN + TP)$ , the rate was higher, although Google could not provide an exact rate; Microsoft data showed 21%, meaning the cloud providers have even more neighbors which we did not see in our measurements. Any approach that, like ours, relies on traceroutes from the cloud, has inherent limitations. The cloud providers have many more PoPs than cloud datacenters to measure from, and so cloud-based measurements cannot necessarily uncover every path used from every PoPs. Microsoft verified that a number of peers that we missed – false negatives – only provide routes to a single PoP, far from cloud datacenters, so those paths are unlikely to ever be used from available VPs.

Additional information from Microsoft helps put these results in perspective. Microsoft has an order of magnitude more peers from IXP route servers than direct peers (bilateral IXP peers and PNI peers), and most peers missed by our measurements are route server peers, potentially including “invisible” links which are challenging to identify (§4.4). However, from the cloud providers’ perspective, not all peers are equal. The huge number of route server peers in total handle only 18% of Microsoft’s global Internet traffic, while the much smaller number of direct peers handle 82%. Like other networks, Microsoft prefers direct over router server peers for capacity and reliability reasons [88, 89]. Microsoft confirmed that we identified direct peers that account for 93% of Microsoft’s direct peer traffic (i.e.,  $93\% \times 82\% = 76\%$  of global traffic). The route server peers that we identified account for some additional portion of

global traffic from the 18% sent to such peers, but Microsoft was unable to provide per-peer traffic volumes for route server peers.

This validation suggests that we identify the vast majority of cloud provider peers and, in particular, of the important peers by traffic volume, while introducing a modest amount of noise in terms of false positives. Since our key metrics rely on and demonstrate that the cloud providers are very well connected to many peers, the fact that we identify most important peers, only have a small fraction of extra peers (false positives), and have fewer extra peers than missed peers (false negatives) suggests that our conclusions on overall connectivity likely fall somewhere between a slight overestimate and (more likely) a slight underestimate.

**Iterative improvement to reach final results.** The cloud providers provided feedback to us over multiple iterations, which helped to improve our accuracy. Our initial neighbor sets for each cloud provider had FDR of ~50% and FNR of 23–50%. Microsoft provided us with a few example destinations that were causing false inferences. We used the feedback to refine our methodology in ways we detail in the rest of this section, eventually reaching the final methodology and final numbers we use in the rest of the paper (reflecting 11% FDR and 21% FNR). We used the improved methodology to update our results for other cloud providers, and Google indicated that the updated results improved our accuracy to 15% FDR and substantially fewer false negatives, essentially serving as an independent validation of the improvements.


We investigated causes for inaccuracy and discovered an incorrect assumption. We initially assumed that, in identifying neighbors from traceroutes, a single unknown or unresponsive hop between the last cloud provider hop and the first resolved non-cloud provider hop was unlikely to be an intermediate AS, so we inferred a direct connection between the cloud provider and the first resolved hop’s AS. This proved to be the leading cause for inaccuracy. When the hop is unresponsive, we now simply discard the traceroute.

In our measurements, the far more common scenario is that the intermediate hop responded, but its IP address was not resolvable using the Team Cymru IP-to-ASN mapping tool. Manually inspecting individual examples revealed that unresolved IP addresses were registered in whois and frequently belonged to IXPs but were not advertised globally into BGP. To resolve these hops to ASes, we now use PeeringDB (when an AS lists the IP address) or whois information. Adding these steps decreased our FDR for Microsoft to 8% and our FNR to 34%.

To identify additional location-specific neighbors, we added VMs in additional locations beyond our initial set, reaching the numbers reported in Section 4.1. Measurements from the additional locations reduced our FNR to 24%, but increased our Microsoft FDR to 16%.

Our final step was to prefer the PeeringDB IXP IP address dataset for AS resolution over Team Cymru’s. Manually inspecting false negatives revealed examples of IXP addresses whose prefixes are advertised globally into BGP, so they resolved to an IXP AS using Cymru. However, PeeringDB resolved the individual IP to another AS present at the IXP. Adding this step improved both rates. Microsoft data indicated our FDR lowered to 11% and FNR to 21%.

There exist opportunities to tune methodology to different trade-offs between false positives and false negatives. For example, there are networks where an unresolved hop does belong to the same AS



**Figure 1: An example topology for calculating reachability.** From the cloud provider perspective, the topology depicts the types of transit providers which are restricted for provider-free reachability (①, §6.2), Tier-1-free reachability (②, §6.3), and hierarchy-free reachability (③, §6.4). The shaded availability depicts the final calculation for which an AS is reachable (e.g., ISP A is reachable for provider-free reachability, but not for Tier-1-free reachability.)

as the first resolved hop. As another example, Amazon uses early exit for most tenant traffic, rather than routing tenant traffic across their WAN, and so measurements from different Amazon locations often use different routes to the same destination. So, issuing measurements from more locations tends to decrease false negatives (uncovers more peers) but also can increase false positives as errors accumulate as more measurements are issued. Improving neighbor identification, especially since the cloud providers have far more PoPs than datacenters, is an open problem.

## 6 CLOUD PROVIDER INDEPENDENCE

In this section we describe our process for calculating the cloud providers' potential to bypass large transit providers. We examine the cloud providers' reachability while bypassing three sets of transit providers: their individual transit providers (§6.2), also the Tier-1 ISPs (§6.3), and additionally the Tier-2 ISPs (§6.4). We also examine reachability for the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs while bypassing each other in order to provide a means of gauging the cloud providers' degree of independence and examine the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs independence from one another. We calculate how reachability has changed during the past five years (§6.5), how it compares to customer cone (§6.6), and who the cloud providers are unable to reach under our constraints (§6.7).

### 6.1 Quantifying Reachability

Here we discuss how we use the AS-level topology graph to calculate the cloud providers' potential to reach the rest of the Internet while bypassing different sets of transit provider networks. We use the topology graph (§4.1) and a BGP simulator to simulate route propagation on the Internet while enforcing valley-free routing and common routing policies: preferring customer over peer links and preferring peer over provider links [37]. We allow all paths tied for best to propagate, without breaking ties. Enforcing best practice routing policies helps ensure that the emulated paths reflect paths traffic is likely to actually take [5] (we show that our simulated paths do follow paths seen in traceroutes in Appendix A).

We classify a given origin AS,  $o$ , as reachable by any individual AS,  $t$ , if the origin announces a prefix and  $t$  receives the announcement. The route is propagated over the topology graph  $G$

(§4.1), in order to model best practice route propagation. We define the reachability for  $o$  as the subset of individual ASes in the topology graph that receives a valid path,  $p$ , to  $o$ . More precisely,  $\text{REACH}(o, G) = \{t \mid p_t \neq \emptyset, \forall t \in G\}$ . We generally calculate reachability for the full, augmented AS-level topology graph  $I$  (§4.1) or for subgraphs where we exclude a set of nodes, for example  $I \setminus T_1$  to restrict routes from propagating through the Tier-1 ISPs.

To assess the degree of the cloud providers' independence and potential to bypass the Internet hierarchy, we calculate reachability by propagating routes from an origin network,  $o$ , through all networks except three sets of transit providers: the given origin's transit providers ( $P_o$ ), Tier-1 ISPs ( $T_1$ ), and Tier-2 ISPs ( $T_2$ ). By not propagating routes through the three sets of transit providers, we use a subgraph of the full Internet topology. So, we define the reachability determined using the resultant Internet subgraph as hierarchy-free reachability:  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o \setminus T_1 \setminus T_2)$ . We examine how bypassing each additional set affects reachability.


For example, consider calculating reachability from the cloud provider's perspective in the topology depicted in Fig. 1 for all three sets of transit providers. The origin, which in this case is the cloud provider, announces prefixes in each separate scenario. To calculate provider-free reachability, announcements from the origin are not allowed to propagate via its providers (①, §6.2) which results in a reachability of five ASes since the cloud can reach all peers and their customers (all ovals except white). For Tier-1-free reachability, we additionally do not propagate announcements via the Tier-1 ISPs (②, §6.3) which reduces the cloud provider's reachability to four ASes, as ISP-A (in light gray) becomes unreachable. Finally, for hierarchy-free reachability announcements are also not propagated via Tier-2 ISPs (③, §6.4) which reduces the cloud's reachability to two due to its p2p links with user ISPs 2 and 3 (in dark gray).

### 6.2 Bypassing Transit Providers

We first examine reachability when a given network bypasses its transit providers, as identified in the CAIDA dataset. More specifically, we calculate  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o)$ , which we refer to as *provider-free reachability*. We exclude the given network's transit providers because one goal of increasing extensive interconnectivity is to reduce transit costs [26, 46, 68, 89]. The cloud providers aggressively pursue interconnectivity, and we want to assess the independence their connectivity affords them. Restricting origins to not use their transit providers will not affect the Tier-1 ISPs' reachability, since they have no transit providers and instead mutually peer to achieve global reachability. For the other networks, reachability while bypassing their transit providers shows their reachability based on the richness of their peering connections.

The results can be seen for each **cloud**, **Tier-1**, and **Tier-2** in Fig. 2. The Tier-1 ISPs have the maximum possible reachability (69,488 ASes). Figure 2 also shows there are two non-Tier-1 ISPs which have full reachability: PCCW (AS 3491), and Liberty Global (AS 6830). PCCW and Liberty Global have no transit providers, according to the CAIDA dataset, but they are not defined as Tier-1 ISPs in the dataset we use [120]. Google has nearly full reachability, even though they have three transit providers in the September 2020 dataset [15]: Tata (AS 6453) and GTT (AS 3257) which are Tier-1 ISPs, as well as Durand do Brasil (AS 22356). Even without





**Figure 2: Reachability for the cloud providers, Tier-1, and Tier-2 ISPs, sorted by descending hierarchy-free reachability.** The stacked bars represent reachability calculated using multiple subgraphs of the Internet topology: excluding per network transit providers (provider-free reachability, §6.2,  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o)$  for **cloud**, **Tier-1**, and **Tier-2**), also bypassing Tier-1 ISPs (Tier-1-free reachability, §6.3,  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o \setminus T_1)$  for **cloud**, **Tier-1**, and **Tier-2**), and also bypassing Tier-2 ISPs (hierarchy-free reachability, §6.4,  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o \setminus T_1 \setminus T_2)$ , **cloud**, **Tier-1**, and **Tier-2**). Since the Tier-1 ISPs do not have providers, their reachability depicts the maximum possible (69,488 ASes). The cloud providers are among the least affected by each reachability constraint, demonstrating their ability reach a large portion of the Internet while bypassing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs.

the use of their transit providers, there are only 174 networks that Google cannot reach when bypassing its transit providers.

The other cloud providers – Microsoft (64,475 ASes), IBM (63,927 ASes), and Amazon (62,831 ASes) – are able to reach a large portion of networks when bypassing their individual transit providers. Their calculated reachability is slightly lower than, but still comparable to most of the Tier-2 ISPs (e.g., Hurricane Electric at 66,279 ASes). Amazon is affected the most by removing transit providers since they have 20 according to CAIDA, but they are still able to reach 90.0% of all ASes. This reinforces intuitions about the extensive reach of the cloud providers’ peerings.

### 6.3 Bypassing the Tier-1 ISPs

Next we consider independence from the Tier-1 ISPs in addition to transit providers, more specifically we calculate  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o \setminus T_1)$ . We refer to this calculation as *Tier-1-free reachability*. We select the Tier-1 ISPs because they are considered to be the top of the traditional Internet hierarchy [53], and one of the originally identified goals of Internet flattening was to bypass the Tier-1 ISPs [39], so we want to analyze the cloud providers ability to bypass them in particular. Even though the Tier-1 ISPs cooperate to provide global reachability, they still compete for customers so we want to examine their potential to bypass each other. The results for each **cloud**, **Tier-1**, and **Tier-2** can be seen in Fig. 2.

Since the Tier-1 ISPs all peer with each other, they all see a decrease in their reachability compared to bypassing only individual transit providers, where they had reachability to the entire Internet. Some Tier-1 ISPs see a much greater reduction than others. Level 3 (AS 3356) sees the lowest decrease in reachability of 4,929 ASes, while Orange (AS 5511) sees the largest decrease of 14,334 ASes. Overall, the varied decrease in calculated reachability shows that

some individual Tier-1 ISPs more aggressively pursue interconnectivity outside of the Tier-1 ISPs than others and/or they have a larger number of customers.

The Tier-2 ISPs see a slightly larger decrease in reachability than the Tier-1 ISPs, but most have a reachability that is equivalent with the Tier-1 ISPs, indicating they, too, have a high degree of independence from the Tier-1 ISPs. Some of the Tier-2 ISPs see little decrease in reachability when bypassing the Tier-1 ISPs relative to when bypassing their providers. For example, KCOM’s providers are all Tier-1 ISPs and KCOM has few peer relationships with any Tier-1 ISP outside of their transit providers. As a result, they see a greater reduction in reachability from provider-free reachability than Tier-1-free reachability. Most Tier-2 ISPs do see a decrease, with Hurricane Electric (AS 6939) only seeing a decrease of 4,805 ASes, while KDDI (AS 2516) sees a decrease in calculated reachability of 14,634 ASes. This shows that some of the Tier-2 ISPs are more independent from the Tier-1 ISPs than others.

The cloud providers are amongst the least impacted. Google (62,439 ASes) can still reach 89.9% of ASes; Amazon (57,096 ASes) has the lowest calculated reachability of the four but is still able to reach 82.2% of ASes while bypassing their transit providers and the Tier-1 ISPs. Google’s calculated reachability decreased the most, by 6,875 ASes, while Microsoft had the lowest and only declined by 3,427 ASes. This difference is due to Google peering with 15 Tier-1 ISPs, while Microsoft counts 7 Tier-1 ISPs as transit providers.

### 6.4 Hierarchy-free Reachability

We consider bypassing the Tier-2 ISPs in addition to the Tier-1 ISPs and a given network’s transit providers. More specifically, we calculate *hierarchy-free reachability* as  $\text{REACH}(o, I \setminus P_o \setminus T_1 \setminus T_2)$ . We include the Tier-2 ISPs because they are also large regional or

global transit providers, they are highly connected, and the cloud providers use several as transit providers. For example, Hurricane Electric is considered a Tier-2 ISP but is consistently in the top 10 networks based on customer cone size [15], and top two for transit and node degrees [53]. The Tier-1 ISPs also rely on Tier-2 ISPs as customers (§6.4 and Appendix B). The set of Tier-1 ISPs is not universally agreed upon, so we select the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs as defined in prior work [53].

Results for each **cloud**, **Tier-1**, and **Tier-2** are in Fig. 2. We can see that a handful of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs saw less impact to their calculated reachability than when bypassing only transit providers or when bypassing transit providers plus Tier-1 ISPs. For example, of the Tier-1 ISPs, Level 3 (AS 3356), Telia (AS 1299), and Cogent (AS 174) had a greater reduction when bypassing other Tier-1 ISPs. Level 3 once again had the lowest decrease in calculated reachability at 3,405 ASes. There are a handful of Tier-1 ISPs whose reachability incurs an enormous decrease when bypassing the Tier-2 ISPs, indicating they rely heavily on those networks to reach many destinations (we examine two examples in Appendix B).

Amongst the Tier-2 ISPs, Hurricane Electric (AS 6939 with 2,493 ASes) and Vocus (AS 4826 with 3,328 ASes) saw less reduction in reachability than when bypassing the Tier-1 ISPs and transit providers. This shows these networks have more potential to bypass the Tier-2 ISPs than the Tier-1 ISPs.

Once again, the cloud providers were amongst the least impacted, indicating they have a high degree of independence from the Tier-2 ISPs also. Google's decrease was the lowest at only 3,517 ASes, while Amazon's was the greatest at 5,735 ASes. Overall, the cloud providers are amongst the least impacted by each change, demonstrating that they have a high degree of freedom from each group of transit provider networks. Similarly, Hurricane Electric and Level 3 show little impact to their reachability, highlighting their independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs.

**Hierarchy-free reachability for Top 20 ASes.** If we expand our calculations for reachability and examine the top 20 ASes by hierarchy-free reachability (Table 1, 2020 results on right side), six of the networks are **Tier-1 ISPs** and two are **Tier-2 ISPs**, alongside four **other transit** providers, whereas the top 20 for customer cone are almost exclusively transit networks (not shown).

The rest of the top 20 networks by hierarchy-free reachability are a mixture of major **cloud** providers and **other cloud/content** providers. Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft occupy three of the top five, and all four are in the top twenty positions, including the third spot which is occupied by Google. This confirms our initial hypothesis that the cloud providers have a high degree of independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. These results also show there are a considerable number of networks with a high level of independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, although edge networks are likely brought down due to lack of visibility [115].

## 6.5 Reachability over Time

We also want to examine to what degree the cloud providers' independence has evolved in the five years since the scope of their interconnectivity was identified in prior work [26]. We were provided access to the traceroute data from the prior work [26], which allowed us to apply our methodology for calculating hierarchy-free

2015			2020		
#	Network (AS)	Reachability (%)	#	Network (AS)	Reachability (% change)
1	Level 3 (3356)	43,413 (83.4%)	1	Level 3 (3356)	61,154 (90.2%, 6.8)
2	Google (15169)	42,347 (81.7%)	2	HE (6939)	58,981 (87.0%, 6.2%)
2	HE (6939)	41,876 (80.8%)	3	Google (15169)	58,922 (86.9%, 5.2%)
4	Cogent (174)	39,113 (75.5%)	4	Microsoft (8075)	57,357 (84.6%, 22.0%)
5	StackPath (12989)	39,068 (75.4%)	5	IBM (36351)	55,714 (82.2%, 10.4%)
6	WV Fiber (19151)	38,756 (74.8%)	6	Cogent (174)	55,049 (81.2%, 5.7%)
7	RETN (9002)	37,796 (73.0%)	7	Zayo (6461)	54,489 (80.4%, 11.5%)
8	NTT (2914)	37,543 (72.5%)	8	Telia (1299)	54,324 (80.1%, 8.9%)
9	IBM (36351)	37,203 (71.8%)	9	GTT (3257)	53,388 (78.7%, 8.7%)
10	IPTP (41095)	37,048 (71.5%)	10	SG.GS (24482)	53,157 (78.4%, 9.7%)
11	Telia (1299)	36,906 (71.2%)	11	COLT (8220)	52,256 (77.1%, 12.9%)
12	iiNet (4739)	36,846 (71.1%)	12	G-Core Labs (199524)	51,820 (76.4%, 27.4%)
13	Init7 (13030)	36,814 (71.1%)	13	NTT (2914)	51,374 (75.8%, 3.3%)
14	MTS PJSC (8359)	36,786 (71.0%)	14	Wikimedia 14907	51,204 (75.5%, 25.7%)
15	Telstra (10026)	36,322 (70.1%)	15	Core-Backbone (33891)	51,110 (75.4%, 12.7%)
16	GTT (3257)	36,238 (70.0%)	16	WV FIBER (19151)	51,083 (75.3%, 0.5%)
17	PCCW (3491)	36,109 (69.7%)	17	TELIN PT (7713)	50,919 (75.1%, 18.6%)
18	TDC (3292)	36,001 (69.5%)	18	Amazon (16509)	50,867 (75.0%, 17.3%)
19	Swisscom (3303)	35,772 (69.1%)	19	Swisscom (3303)	50,758 (74.9%, 5.8%)
20	Zayo (6461)	35,686 (68.9%)	20	IPTP (41095)	50,606 (74.6%, 3.1%)
20	Microsoft (8075)	32,436 (62.6%)			
206	Amazon (16509)	29,905 (57.7%)			

**Table 1: Comparison of hierarchy-free reachability for the top 20 networks, from September 2015 and September 2020. We apply the same methodology to calculate hierarchy-free reachability for each dataset (§§ 4.1 and 6.1). We can see that Google was one of the most independent networks, even in 2015. The other three cloud providers have dramatically increased their ability to bypass Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs over the past five years.**


reachability by combining the prior traceroute data and the CAIDA dataset from September 2015 which contains 51,801 ASes. The 2015 dataset did not include traceroutes for Microsoft. Also, the dataset applied its own IP to AS mapping, which likely has a non-trivial percentage of false positives based on our validation efforts with the cloud providers (§5). This likely causes us to overestimate the cloud providers' 2015 reachability, but it provides us a rough estimate for comparing the changes over time.

Comparing the percentage of reachable ASes for each of the top networks (Table 1), most have gained 5-6% in reachability, showing that independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs is increasing. One notable change is that in 2015, only Google (#2) and IBM (#9) appear in the top 20. We can see that over the past five years, Amazon and Microsoft have significantly increased their independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. We analyzed and compared the differences in path length from these two datasets, which is in Appendix E. Even though the cloud providers increased reachability, it has had little impact on the distributions of their path lengths, as their rate of adding new peers has trailed the Internet's expansion.

## 6.6 Hierarchy-free Reachability versus Customer Cone

There are various metrics for examining properties of the Internet and its networks. One is customer cone, which for "AS X is the set of ASes that X can reach using only p2c links... an indication of the market power of an AS" [53]. Even though customer cone is effective at measuring the number of ASes that the Tier-1 ISPs and other large networks provide transit for, it fails to capture the increased interconnectivity amongst networks and the shifting





**Figure 3: Comparison of hierarchy-free reachability (y-axis) and customer cone (x-axis) calculations using the September 2020 CAIDA dataset for all ASes. Both metrics are a count of the total number of qualifying ASes; note the x-axis is in log scale. There are considerably more ASes with hierarchy-free reachability comparable to that of the large provider networks, confirming the scale of flattening’s impact on reachability.**


traffic patterns across those interconnections. As a result, it is not representative of a network’s importance in a flattened Internet.

To examine whether customer cone still reflects the importance of various networks, we calculate hierarchy-free reachability for every AS on the Internet, which we compare against their customer cone. This can be seen in Fig. 3, with hierarchy-free reachability on the y-axis and customer cone for each AS on the x-axis, in log scale. The figure depicts the four cloud providers (blue circles), Tier-1 ISPs (red square), Tier-2 ISPs (green diamonds), content providers (small orange circles), provider networks (purple diamonds), access networks (gray circles), and all other networks (brown X).

Other than the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, which have both high hierarchy-free reachability and large customer cones, there is little correlation between the two metrics. Although customer cone captures aspects of the influence and market power of an AS, it is not designed for and is not capable of capturing Internet flattening’s effect on a network. For example, Sprint (AS 1239) is #32 for customer cone and is considered a Tier-1 ISP. However, their hierarchy-free reachability rank is 2,978. Without the other Tier-1 ISPs, Sprint relies heavily on a handful of Tier-2 ISPs to reach many destinations. For additional details regarding examples of low hierarchy-free reachability for Tier-1 ISPs, please see Appendix B.

There are relatively few networks that possess a large customer cone; there are 8,374 networks with hierarchy-free reachability  $\geq 1,000$ , but only 51 networks with a customer cone  $\geq 1,000$ . One reason for so few networks with a large customer cone is that there is little incentive for a network to incur the costs of purchasing transit from multiple providers beyond a primary and secondary provider. Another reason is that establishing direct connectivity to cloud and content providers is free<sup>1</sup> and is supposed to provide improved performance [7, 8, 26], so the majority of traffic no longer flows through transit providers [71, 87, 115, 118].

Hierarchy-free reachability shows that a considerable number of networks have high reachability when bypassing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, which suggests that customer cone—dominated by the



**Figure 4: The number of unreachable ASes for the top four cloud providers and top eight transit providers when bypassing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. The unreachable networks per provider are separated into four types (§4.3). The numbers in each bar is the percentage of unreachable networks that type represents for the given provider. Google, IBM, and Microsoft focus their peering efforts on reaching access networks.**


large tier 1 and 2 networks—does not paint a complete picture of influence.. Customer cone is a top-down transit provider-centric view, while hierarchy-free reachability provides a method to gauge directness of connectivity to edge networks. Customer cone captures which ASes an AS can reach following only p2c links. Hierarchy-free reachability also considers which ASes an AS can reach via its peers, since a goal of peering connectivity is to bypass the hierarchy and bring together lower tier networks to exchange traffic.

## 6.7 Unreachable Networks

We have seen that the cloud providers have a high degree of independence from the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. Here we examine what types of networks the cloud providers, Tier-1 ISPs, and Tier-2 ISPs are unable to reach when bypassing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. Network types are classified into four categories (§4.3) as seen in Fig. 4: **content**, **access**, **transit**, and **enterprise**.

Examining which types of networks each provider is unable to reach when bypassing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs can reveal their peering strategies. Google, IBM, and Microsoft focus their peering efforts on reaching user (access) networks. Hurricane Electric, which has an open peering policy while most large transit providers’ peering policies are restrictive, more closely resembles Google, IBM,

<sup>1</sup>Connectivity is free in terms of data transferred. Purchasing ports and space in an IXP or colo do incur charges.



**Figure 5: Example topology for calculating reliance. Ties are not broken, so  $t$  will receive three best paths to reach the origin,  $o$ :  $x \rightarrow u \rightarrow o$ ,  $x \rightarrow v \rightarrow o$ , and  $y \rightarrow w \rightarrow o$ . Since  $x$  appears in two best paths received by  $t$ ,  $\text{RELY}(o, x) = 2/3$  AS, whereas reliance for  $u$ ,  $v$ ,  $w$ , and  $y$  is  $1/3$  AS.**

and Microsoft’s percentages than other Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. Amazon’s percentages more closely resemble those of the other transit providers, with fewer unreachable networks in the enterprise and transit categories compared to the other three cloud providers.

## 7 HOW CLOUDS REACH OTHER NETWORKS

After examining the extent of the cloud providers’ reachability, we also want to analyze the degree to which the cloud providers rely on other ASes to reach the rest of the Internet and whether the cloud providers’ efforts to bypass the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs has shifted their reliance onto other networks.

### 7.1 Calculating Reachability Reliance

To calculate reliance we use all simulated paths tied for best according to the Gao-Rexford model, without breaking ties. We define the reliance  $\text{RELY}(o, a)$  of any origin,  $o$ , on any other individual AS,  $a$ , as the fraction of best paths received in which  $a$  appears for every individual network  $t$  to  $o$ . For example, consider the topology in Fig. 5 where an individual network,  $t$ , receives three best paths to reach  $o$ , with one AS,  $x$ , appearing in two best paths. In this example,  $o$ ’s reliance on  $x$  is  $2/3$  AS and  $\text{RELY}(o, t) = 1$ .

In assessing reliance, there are two extreme conditions. The first is a purely hierarchical Internet topology with no peering links between networks except for those between the Tier-1 ISPs. In such a topology, every network relies on its transit provider(s) for the full Internet, and each of the Tier-1 ISPs for a portion of the Internet depending on which Tier-1 ISP the AS (or its transit provider) connects to. For example, if we considered Google in the fully hierarchical network, and consider only one of its providers, Tata (AS 6453) [15], its reliance on that transit provider would be 69,488, and Google’s reliance on the set of other Tier-1 ISPs would be 54,887 ASes ( $69,488 - 14,601$ , which is Tata’s customer cone).

The other extreme is a completely flat network, where every network is fully meshed and there are only peering connections between networks. Any individual network would only use each network to reach that network, meaning every network has a reliance of 1AS on every other network. We assume that in this topology networks do not provide transit for others.

### 7.2 Cloud Provider Reliance

We map reliance for the four cloud providers after calculating hierarchy-free reachability (§6.4), where the cloud providers bypass their individual transit providers, Tier-1 ISPs, and Tier-2 ISPs. Figure 6 shows the cloud providers’ reliance on individual ASes (x-axis,

Cloud	#1 (AS, RELY)	#2 (AS, RELY)	#3 (AS, RELY)
Amazon	Durand do Brasil (AS 22356, 5889.6)	Rostelecom (AS 12389, 1508.7)	Bharti Airtel (AS 9498, 1220.2.1)
Google	Rostelecom (AS 12389, 716.6)	Lighttower Fiber (AS46887, 686.6)	Colt (AS 8220, 587.3)
IBM	Bharti Airtel (AS 9498, 1483.4)	Rostelecom (AS 12389, 1197.6)	Colt (AS 8220, 770.1)
Microsoft	Lighttower Fiber (AS46887, 727.8)	PJSC (AS 3216, 715.4)	Bharti Airtel (AS 9498, 711.3)

**Table 2: For each cloud provider, the table shows the top three networks in terms of reliance. There are some networks that show up in the top three for more than one cloud provider.**

using intervals of 25 for bins and readability), and the number of ASes that have a specific reliance (y-axis, in log scale).

Overall, we can see the cloud providers generally have low reliance on any individual network. The cloud providers have a reliance of  $\leq 600$  for all but a handful of networks. IBM and Amazon are the only two cloud providers with reliance  $\geq 800$  for any network. The top three reliance per cloud provider can be seen in Table 2. Amazon has the highest reliance on any individual network, 5,889 ASes for Durand do Brasil (AS 22356) (not shown in Fig. 6 for readability), but they also had the fewest number of neighbors.

Gauging where the cloud providers are with respect to the two extreme hierarchies (fully meshed and fully hierarchical), we can see that the cloud providers’ reliance is closer to a completely flat topology than hierarchical. The cloud providers do still have a handful of networks they rely on, but their reliance on other networks is much closer to 1 than it is to the other extreme.

## 8 RESILIENCE TO ROUTE LEAKS

We examined cloud providers’ extensive interconnectivity and the degree to which it enables them to bypass the traditional Internet hierarchy. One of the implications of this independence is that the cloud providers should have a level of protection from certain types of networking attacks, such as improved security against route leaks—when a network announces another network’s IP address space and attracts its traffic—which have been reported to disrupt cloud provider services and operations [43, 72, 84, 96].

### 8.1 Methodology

In this section we evaluate a cloud provider’s resilience to route leaks (and prefix hijacks, which are intentional malicious route leaks) using simulations. We configure our simulation of route propagation (§4.1) such that a *misconfigured* AS is leaking the same prefix announced by a cloud provider and compute which route is preferred by every other AS. We assume transit networks apply no route filters beyond valley-free routing and that the leaked routes have the same prefix length as the legitimate routes, so the two routes compete for propagation based on AS-path length. We compute all paths tied for best according to the Gao-Rexford model, without breaking ties, and consider an AS as *detoured* if any one of its best routes are towards the misconfigured AS. This makes our results a worst case analysis and bypasses the need for identifying a single best route for ASes in the Internet, which is challenging




Figure 6: Histogram for the cloud providers’ reliance on different networks. We can see that  $RELY = 1$  for the majority of networks for each of the cloud providers, and they have low reliance on all but a handful of networks. Amazon is the lone cloud provider that has high reliance (5,889 ASes) on a single network, Durand do Brasil (AS 22356) (not pictured for readability).

due to insufficient information to perform tie-breaking [5, 40]. We use the same 2015 and 2020 datasets used in previous sections.

## 8.2 Resilience vs Peering Footprint

We run simulations where each cloud provider’s routes are leaked by a misconfigured AS. We also consider the cloud provider under different announcement configurations. We run 5000 simulations per configuration, choosing the misconfigured AS at random. Fig. 8 shows the cumulative distribution function for the fraction of detoured ASes across all simulations for Google in the 2020 topology.

The misconfigured AS always leaks routes to all its neighbors. The announce to all line shows results when Google announces its routes to all neighbors. For comparison, the average resilience line shows the average fraction of ASes detoured for a random (legitimate) origin AS and a random misconfigured AS, estimated across 40,000 random pairs of origin and misconfigured ASes. Our results show Google’s footprint provides significantly stronger resilience compared to a random origin AS.

Manually inspecting cases where the leaker successfully leaks more than 20% of ASes found leakers with multiple well-connected providers (e.g., Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs). Google peers with many networks, so their routes are *less* preferred whenever the misconfigured AS is a customer of Google’s peers. To verify this, we also show results for a scenario where Google announces to all its peers, and all of Google’s peers deploy filters such that they discard routes for Google’s prefixes that they receive from any network other than Google, a.k.a. \*peer locking\* [76]). Peer locking only allows the leaked routes to propagate through ASes that do not peer with Google, which significantly limits the extent of the leak. In fact, we find 77% of misconfigured ASes cannot leak Google prefixes to the Internet ( $x = 0$ ) as all their upstreams peer with Google.

Figure 8 also shows results simulating Google only announcing its prefixes to Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs (including its provider in the September 2020 dataset [15], Tata). This scenario ignores Google’s rich peering with lower tier and edge ASes, and shows significantly reduced resilience against route leaks. In fact, as Google peers with most Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs (instead of buying transit), Google’s resilience in this configuration is worse than that of a random origin

AS. While adding peers improves resilience against route leaks as it makes routes shorter, changing a relationship such that an AS receives a route from a peer rather than from a customer *decreases* resilience as it makes announcements less preferred.


Figures 7a to 7d are similar to Fig. 8 and show the fraction of ASes detoured when Microsoft, Amazon, IBM, and Facebook announce their routes under different configurations. The ‘average resilience’ line is the same in all graphs. The results show that all cloud providers are resilient to route leaks. Peer locking is slightly more effective for Google due to their larger peering footprint and having few transit providers; conversely, we note other cloud providers would be more resilient to leaks if they announced their routes only to Tier-1, Tier-2, and providers.

## 8.3 Fraction of Users Impacted


Figure 9 shows the fraction of users whose ASes have detoured routes for different route announcement configuration from Google. Figure 9 is similar to Fig. 8, but weights detoured ASes by their estimated population, as given by APNIC’s population database [2]. Results are similar to the fraction of ASes detoured, with a slight skew to the left, indicating that some of the ASes that are detoured serve a relatively small fraction of users.

## 8.4 Resilience over time


Figure 10 shows the fraction of detoured ASes when Google announces routes to all its peers, and compares results for the topology in 2015 and 2020. Although Google’s peering footprint grew between 2015 and 2020, we find that the resilience against route leaks decreased slightly. We identify two possible explanations for this result. First, although Google’s peering footprint grew, Google also turned some of its providers into peers. As discussed earlier, more peers increase resilience, but turning providers into peers decreases resilience. Second, Google’s peering footprint was already substantial in 2015 [20]. Most of the new peers are small ASes at the edge of the Internet’s topology, which provide less protection against route leaks (e.g., stub networks transit traffic for no other AS). We find similar small resilience changes for Amazon and IBM (omitted).




**Figure 7: Cumulative fraction of detoured ASes announced under different scenarios by Microsoft (Fig. 7a), Amazon (Fig. 7b), IBM (Fig. 7c), and Facebook (Fig. 7d).**




**Figure 8: Cumulative fraction of detoured ASes when Google announces routes under different scenarios while a random misconfigured AS leaks one of Google’s prefixes. The results show that Google’s peering footprint makes it resilient against route leaks.**



**Figure 9: Cumulative fraction of users in detoured ASes when Google announces routes under different scenarios. The results show that Google’s peering footprint protects a large fraction of the user population from route leaks.**



**Figure 10: Cumulative fraction of detoured ASes when Google announces routes to all its peers in the 2015 and 2020 Internet. Results show small improvement in resilience, as Google reduced its number of providers and most new peers are small edge ASes.**



**Figure 11: PoP deployment locations, with a 500km radius, overlaid on population density per km [34], for the cloud providers (purple circle), transit providers (green circles), or both (blue circles). Both cohorts focus their deployment strategies near high population density centers, with the transit providers having more unique locations than the cloud providers.**

## 9 CLOUD PROVIDER POP DEPLOYMENTS CHARACTERISTICS


The cloud providers have built large, private networks to help achieve their extensive interconnectivity and reachability. We now shift to examining their networks’ characteristics in terms of PoP deployment locations and proximity to user populations. We obtain the PoP locations by consolidating publicly available datasets (§4.2).

During the past ten years, the major cloud providers shifted investments towards delivering their own content rather than relying on the public Internet and large transit providers for that task. One of our goals is to analyze characteristics of the cloud provider networks in comparison to each other and those of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, since the cloud providers claim their WANs provide premium performance compared to transit networks [4, 44, 69]. The Tier-1 ISPs depend on each other to provide global reachability, but some are regionally focused, as are some Tier-2 ISPs, so we examine the networks both collectively as well as individually.

**Geographic deployment.** Figure 11 depicts the PoP deployment locations of the cloud and transit providers. The figure shows a 500 km radius around the PoP locations of the cloud providers (purple circles), transit providers (green circles), or both (blue circles). The PoPs are plotted over the world’s per km population density [34]. We can see that the cloud providers have a similar deployment strategy to the Tier-1 ISPs, but have primarily deployed around large population centers and are highly concentrated in North America, Europe, and Asia. The cloud providers’ PoPs are a subset of the transit providers, except two locations, Shanghai and Beijing, where the cloud providers are present but transit providers are not. The Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs have over a dozen locations where the cloud providers are not present, and have a larger deployment presence in South America, Africa, and the Middle East.

**Proximity to user populations.** We also examine the percentage of population that falls within a 500, 700, and 1000 km radius of each PoP since large cloud and content providers use those distances as benchmarks for directing users to a close PoP [21, 88]. We can see the difference in population coverage per distance in Fig. 12 per continent grouped by type (Fig. 12a) and per provider (Fig. 12b). Collectively the cloud providers are slightly behind for population coverage worldwide, with a difference of 4.49% at 500km, 4.26% at 700km and 5.45% at 1000km (Fig. 12a), but the higher number of PoPs does not gain much for the transit providers in terms of population coverage. The cloud providers have dense coverage in Europe and North America, and similar coverage to transit providers in Oceania and Asia despite the areas’ geographic challenges, which include the relatively large distances between locations and the requirement to run undersea cables [28, 95]. Individual cloud providers cover larger populations than individual transit providers (Fig. 12b), with Amazon, Google, and Microsoft covering a higher percentage of population than other networks besides Sprint.





**Figure 12: Percent of population within 500/700/1000 km of PoPs per provider type per continent (Fig. 12a) and per provider (Fig. 12b).**

## 10 RELATED WORK

Other work identified flattening [29, 39] and the growing role of hypergiants, networks that host, generate, and/or distribute most Internet content [57]. One effort identified hypergiants using information contained in PeeringDB [12]. Another looked at whether the hypergiants should be considered part of the Internet’s core [22, 23]. We focus on major cloud providers to evaluate their connectivity and how they reach other networks. We show the cloud providers have higher reachability than all but a handful of networks.

Past studies analyzed flattening and cloud providers [7, 8, 26, 113]. One recent study examined the interconnections of Amazon, especially across VPI at cloud exchanges to identify their peering infrastructure [118]. Our initial methodology (§4) for identifying peer networks was virtually identical to these past studies. We then refined our methods based on validation from the cloud providers (§5), and we use our measurements of connectivity to explore the impacts of the discovered neighbors by incorporating them into the AS-level topology graph to show how the cloud providers’ interconnectivity enables them to reach a significant portion of the Internet, even when bypassing Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs.

Web hosting has consolidated onto a handful of hosting providers (e.g., Google, Amazon, and Cloudflare to name a few). Only 17.5% of the most popular IPv4 and 8.3% of IPv6 sites are hosted on the sites’ own address space (e.g., YouTube on Google) [49]. Prior work

shows the extent of web hosting consolidation [49], and the cloud providers are amongst the largest infrastructures supporting consolidation. We do not look at the amount of consolidation, but our work shows how the sites hosted on the cloud providers’ infrastructures benefit from the cloud providers’ interconnectivity to bypass the hierarchical Internet.

The state of the art for annotating AS peering relationships is ProbLink [53], which seeks to improve the accuracy of AS-Rank [64]. We do not seek to improve or modify these algorithms, but use their datasets to construct our AS-level Internet topology, and combine the clique discovered by the two algorithms in order to identify the prevalent transit providers to bypass in our analyses using the AS-Level topology.

AS-Rank and other works seek to create metrics that identify the level of influence and importance of various networks based on different attributes. Customer cone and transit degree from AS-Rank measure importance based on how much transit a network provides, while node degree only looks at the raw number of neighbors for a given network, not the impact of those neighbors [64]. Other work investigated which ASes demonstrate high “inbetweenness” on the Internet [33]. However, the study did not enforce realism (e.g., valley-free routing); enforcing best practice routing policies helps ensure that the emulated paths reflect paths traffic is likely to actually take [5].

## 11 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Hierarchy-free reachability presents a method to quantify the impact and extent of Internet flattening by examining the potential of networks to bypass the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. Even though transit services still provide critical redundancy to cloud and content providers, the four major cloud providers can reach a significant portion of the Internet without relying on the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. At the time of our measurements, their potential to do so is greater than all but a handful of networks. The potential to bypass the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs decreases transit providers’ relevance and affects the flow of traffic on the Internet. Additionally, hierarchy-free reachability shows there are thousands of networks which are also able to reach a sizable portion of the Internet without traversing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, an insight that is not captured in other metrics which seek to measure networks’ importance to the Internet. As the structure and interactions of ASes on the Internet shifts, we should continue to assess and re-evaluate the metrics we use to determine the influence of individual ASes. We must also continue to refine and validate our tools and methodologies for mapping the Internet and its interconnections. Continued research into networks that benefit from flattening and consolidation can improve our understanding of impacts on users and the Internet.

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## A SIMULATED PATHS REFLECT ACTUAL PATHS

Our methods for quantifying reachability and reliance use simulated prefix announcements based on a generated AS-level topology graph. The topology graph was modeled from the CAIDA AS relationship dataset [15], which we augmented with additional neighbors based on traceroute measurements from VMs hosted in each of the cloud providers (§4.1). Since we are simulating the AS-level topology and networks' routing policies, we want to verify that our simulated paths reflect actual paths taken by traffic.

We compared all the paths tied for best, plus alternate paths, calculated by our model against the paths taken by our traceroute data sourced from inside each cloud provider's network while removing invalid traceroutes (§4.1). We also did not consider traceroutes that did not reach the destination AS. Overall, our simulated paths contained the true path for 73.3% of the traceroutes from Amazon, 91.9% from Google, 82.9% from IBM, and 85.4% from Microsoft. We hypothesize that the reason for Amazon's lower percentage is due to the fact that they do not allow tenant traffic to traverse their backbone by default, so there is more variation in the actual paths taken from Amazon because hosted VMs are not allowed to use directly connected neighbors at a distant PoP.

## B CASE STUDY: EXAMINING TIER-1 RELIANCE ON TIER-2 NETWORKS

In §6.4, we saw that the cloud providers have low reliance on any individual network, which is also reflected by their high hierarchy-free reachability. Most Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs have high hierarchy-free reachability, however, there were a small number of Tier-1 ISPs that had a sizeable reduction in hierarchy-free reachability when bypassing the Tier-2 ISPs in addition to the other Tier-1 ISPs. The Tier-1 ISPs are supposed to be the backbone of the Internet, so we want to examine the reliance of the hierarchy-free reachability outliers to understand why their reachability decreases so significantly, and to compare the differences in their peering strategies versus the cloud providers and other Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs.

Sprint (AS 1239) saw the greatest decrease, and Deutsche Telekom (AS 3320) saw the second greatest decrease. Sprint declined from 55,385 when bypassing the Tier-1 ISPs to 32,568 when also bypassing the Tier-2 ISPs, while Deutsche Telekom declined from 55,990 when bypassing the Tier-1 ISPs to 33,307 when also bypassing the Tier-2 ISPs. To determine why they see such a decline in reachability, we calculated the reachability reliance for each to determine which of the Tier-2 ISPs had the greatest effect on Sprint and Deutsche Telekom's reachability.

To calculate reliance, we map the reliance based on Sprint and Deutsche Telekom's reachability results using Tier-1-free reachability (bypassing the other Tier-1 ISPs, §6.3). Under closer examination, without the other Tier-1 ISPs Sprint relies primarily on Hurricane Electric, PCCW, Comcast, Liberty Global, Vodafone, and Telstra. Bypassing only these six Tier-2 ISPs reduces Sprint's reachability to 35,199, which covers almost the entire decrease in their reachability.

Deutsche Telekom has a strong reliance on several Tier-2 ISPs, primarily: Hurricane Electric, PCCW, Comcast, Liberty Global, Vodafone, and RETN. Bypassing these six Tier-2 ISPs reduces

Network (AS)	# Graph PoPs	# Router/Interface Hostnames	% rDNS
NTT (2914)	49	7166	100
Hurricane Electric (6939)	112	5613	99.1
AT&T (7018)	39	11020	92.3
Tata (6453)	94	5470	90.4
Google (15169)	56	29833	89.2
PCCW (3491)	69	948	85.5
Vodafone (1273)	31	4618	83.9
Zayo (6461)	36	2878	83.3
Sprint (1239)	95	2270	67.4
Telxius (12956)	60	628	66.7
Telia (1299)	121	10073	65.4
Microsoft (8075)	117	7195	45.3 <sup>2</sup>
Telecom Italia Sparkle (6762)	78	2669	39.7
Orange (5511)	30	701	26.7
Amazon (16509)	78	0	0.0%

**Table 3: Percentage of PoP locations for each network that were confirmed using rDNS. Some networks actively maintain rDNS and PeeringDB records and have high confirmation percentages. Overall, we were able to confirm 73% of the PoPs we identified creating our topology graphs using rDNS, which shows a lack of information available in rDNS.**

Deutsche Telekom's reachability to 35,743, which covers almost the entire decrease in their reachability.

This highlights the starkly different strategies for some of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. Sprint and Deutsche Telekom, for example, rely heavily on the hierarchical topology to establish interconnectivity and for reachability, while others (*e.g.*, Level 3) have diversified their connectivity and reduced their reliance on individual networks. It also shows that Sprint and Deutsche Telekom's reliance are closer to the purely hierarchical structure than the cloud providers and other Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs.

## C POP AND RDNS ENTRIES


We combined available topology maps, PeeringDB, and rDNS data to construct a PoP level map of the cloud providers, Tier-1 ISPs, and Tier-2 ISPs. The number of PoPs and the percentage visible in rDNS can be seen in Table 3.

## D GEOLOCATION PROCESS

Since geolocation databases are known to be inaccurate, especially for routers [38], we geolocated traceroute IP addresses with an approach similar to the active geolocation technique from RIPE Imap [86] and identical to prior work [8]:

- (1) We derive candidate locations for IP address  $X$ , by determining its ASN  $ASN_X$ , and finding the set of  $\langle facility, city \rangle$  locations listed for  $ASN_X$  in PeeringDB [81]. If there are location hints in rDNS, we only use candidates locations that match it.

<sup>2</sup>Private conversation with a Microsoft operator regarding the low rDNS coverage. The operator confirmed that the lack of rDNS coverage data was not due to incorrect maps, but due to the lack of rDNS entries.



**Figure 13: Comparison of path length to reach destination networks from Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft in 2015 and 2020 (number of hops is number of inter-AS links, so one hop indicates direct peering from cloud provider to destination network; Microsoft 2015 traceroute data not available). The path lengths are weighted in three ways: as percent of total networks, as percent of networks hosting users, and as percent of users they host [2]. Path length has remained relatively stable over time, even when weighted by population.**

- (2) For each candidate  $\langle facility, city \rangle$  we identify a RIPE Atlas VP within 40 km of the city and in an AS that either has a presence in the facility or is in the customer cone [64] of an AS with a presences in the facility. We select one at randomly if multiple VPs fit the criteria. We use RIPE Atlas ground truth data to avoid VPs with suspicious locations [38].
- (3) We ping  $X$  from each VP, and if it measures an RTT of at most 1 ms (maximum distance of 100 km based on the speed of light in fiber), we assume  $X$  is in the VP's city.

## E PATH LENGTH OVER TIME

The increased interconnectivity and reachability over time should also shorten the paths for cloud providers to reach networks and users. To examine the changes over time, we analyze AS path length based on methods used for other analysis in this paper: we create an AS-level topology graph for 2020 using our traceroute dataset and for 2015 using the traceroute dataset from prior work [26], in both cases augmented with the contemporaneous CAIDA AS relationship datasets [15] (§4.1) and AS population data [6]. The 2015 traceroute dataset applied its own IP to AS mapping pipeline, which was more similar to our preliminary approach than to our final approach and so likely has a higher number of false positives based on our validation efforts with the cloud providers (§5). We then emulate each cloud provider announcing a prefix using the full AS-level topology graph<sup>3</sup> and categorize the best paths into bins of 1, 2, or 3+ AS hops (where 1 hop indicates a direct link from cloud provider to a network).

Figure 13 shows the number of path hops for Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft to reach all other networks on the Internet in 2015 (green bars) and 2020 (blue bars). The main result from the prior work was to examine how close the cloud providers were to access networks (§4.3), so we also examine path hop length for only user (eyeball) networks in 2015 (red bars) and 2020 (yellow bars). We also weight the eyeball networks by user population (§4.3) to investigate whether Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft have shorter paths to users (light blue bars for 2015 data and purple bars for 2020 data).

<sup>3</sup>The CAIDA Dataset classifies Cloudflare (AS 13335) as a provider of IBM. Our traceroutes only see it providing transit for a small number of destinations, but in simulation Cloudflare appears in the majority of AS paths. We remove it from the IBM calculations in order for our emulated paths to better reflect actual paths. The classification of Cloudflare as a transit for IBM does not affect any of our other calculations or results.

Comparing the green and blue bars, the amount of direct connectivity varies across cloud providers, but each individual cloud provider's direct connectivity as a percentage of all ASes is relatively similar over time, despite their increased interconnectivity (§6.5). Google's percentage of direct paths actually went down, but this is not due to decreased interconnectivity. Rather, the cloud providers have not increased their peerings as quickly as the Internet has expanded. While Google went from 6,397 to 7,757 neighbors, the Internet expanded from 51,801 to 69,999 ASes. Trends across time are similar when restricted to eyeball networks as when considering all networks, with each cloud provider generally shifting in the same direction for both sets but by a larger percentage of eyeball networks. If we examine the cloud providers' path lengths with respect to users and weight the networks by population, we see more noticeable changes. Google has a slight increase in direct connectivity when weighted by user population, going from 57.05% in 2015 to 61.62% in 2020. Amazon and IBM show slight decreases relative to user populations, and the percent of user population they can reach with direct paths is less than half of Google's: 18.74% (2015) and 17.83% (2020) for Amazon, and 24.35% and 19.44% for IBM. This result reinforces what we see in Section 6.7, where Google showed the best connectivity to access networks, as well as intuition, given that Google hosts popular first-party services for users.