Tri Vi Dang
Lecturer in Economics
Department of Economics
Office phone: 212 8514005
Research interest: financial contracting; financial intermediation; financial crises; financial liberalization and economic transformation in China
Teaching: corporate finance; money and banking; private equity and hedge fund investing
Google Scholar Citation [Site]
SSRN Papers [Site]
Graphical illustration of the research agenda on information sensitivity [Site]
Bargaining with Endogenous Information, Journal of Economic Theory 140 (2008), 339-354.
The responder of a take-it-or-leave-it offer can capture full surplus in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Information Provision in Over-the-Counter Markets (with M. Felgenhauer), Journal of Financial Intermediation 21 (2012), 79-96. Lead Article
An oligopolistic market structure for rating services arises endogenously and it is welfare improving for security issuers to pay for rating services rather than investors.
In order to create money-like securities banks must keep information about assets secret and hold loan portfolios with low information sensitivity while projects with high information sensitivity are financed in capital markets.
This paper formalizes a typical venture capitalists’ view and provides empirical evidences for the financing and sentiment spillover channels through which high market-wide sentiment (bubbles) stimulate R&D investments and patent productions.
The Information View of Financial Crises (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström), Annual Review of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
This paper summarizes the recent empirical evidences for the information sensitivity theory of debt and financial crises.
With endogenous information as markets become sufficiently large an efficient equilibrium allocation fails to exist.
Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström)
Debt backed by debt collateral (debt-on-debt) is the optimal security in funding markets (such as repo, senior MBS, ABCPs, MMFs), but a change in macroeconomic fundamentals can cause information insensitive debt to become information sensitive and thus a collapse of trade.
The Information Sensitivity of a Security (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström),
This paper derives a new characteristic of a security and discusses several applications.
Haircuts and Repo Chains (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström)
There are four joint determinants of repo haircuts, (i) the information sensitivity of collateral, (ii) the default probability of borrower, (iii) the intermediate liquidity needs of lender, and (iv) his default probability in a subsequent repo transaction.
Information Disclosure, Intertemporal Risk Sharing and Stock Prices (with. H. Hakenes)
Optimal Risk sharing through partial disclosure of information can minimize the market value of the firm.
Taxation, Information Acquisition and Trade in Decentralized Markets: Theory and Test (with X. Liu and F. Morath)
This paper shows that a transaction (profit) tax leads to more (less) private information production and decreases (increases) the probability of efficient trade in equilibrium and uses the introduction of a transaction tax in the Singaporean housing market as a quasi-natural experiment to provide supportive evidence for the transaction tax theory.
Shadow Banking Modes: The Chinese versus US System (with L. Liu, H. Wang and A. Yao), previous version entitled Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions, HKIMR Working Paper No. 22/2014.
This paper provides a novel and comprehensive set of market statistics and theoretical analysis of Chinese shadow banking and shows that the system is bank-centric, driven by asymmetric perceptions of implicit guarantees and relies on an intervening government as well as highlights the differences from the US system.
This paper derives an option value theory of a bureaucrat as successor CEO and conducts an empirical test based on 2,454 CEO turnovers cases in Chinese firms which shoes that bureaucrat firms have (i) positive abnormal announcement stock returns, (ii) lower long run returns, (iii) larger cross-sectional variance and skewness of long run returns, (iv) obtain more loans and government subsidies, (v) but experience increased rent seeking.
Banking Relationships and the Transmission of Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (with Y. Bai, Q. He and L. Lu)
This paper uses the liquidity crunch in the Chinese interbank lending markets in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment to show how relationship banking affects corporate borrowing.
Mandatory Pollution Abatement, Financial Constraint and Firm Investment (with Y. Wang and Z. Wang)
This paper provides a theory and empirical evidence which show that financial constraint and environmental awareness of consumers are determinants of whether mandatory pollution abatement regulation crowds out or stimulate corporate investment.
Work in Progress
Industry Risks and Equilibrium Bank Loan Contracts: Theory and Evidence from an Illegal Fundraising Raising Scandal (with Y. Li and J. Mo)
The Chinese National Team and the Information Sensitivity of Stocks (with W. Li and Y. Wang)
Corporate Narrative and Bank Lending to Technology Firms: Evidence from the 3+X Credit Program (with Y. Liu and X. Xu)
A Regulation Triggered Stock Market Panic and Who Runs First? (with H. Chen, H. Tu, and W. Xu)
When Insurance Reduces Risk-Taking: Theory and Evidence (with J. Lai, I. Yan and X. Yi)
Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises [Slides]
Banks as Secret Keepers [Slides]
Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions [Slides]
Corporate Finance, Undergraduate Lecture Course
Money and Banking, Undergraduate Lecture Course
Private Equity and Hedge Fund Investing, Senior Seminar Course