Tri Vi Dang

 

 

Lecturer in Economics

Department of Economics

Columbia University

 

Email: td2332@columbia.edu

Office phone: 212 8514005

 

 

 

Research interest: financial contracting; financial intermediation; financial crises; financial liberalization and economic transformation in China

 

Teaching: corporate finance; money and banking; private equity and hedge fund investing

 

 

 

Research

 

 

Google Scholar Citation [Site]

 

SSRN Papers [Site]

 

Graphical illustration of the research agenda on information sensitivity [Site]

 

 

Published Papers

 

Bargaining with Endogenous Information, Journal of Economic Theory 140 (2008), 339-354.

If information is endogenous the responder of a take-it-or-leave-it offer can capture full surplus in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

 

Information Provision in Over-the-Counter Markets (with M. Felgenhauer), Journal of Financial Intermediation 21 (2012), 79-96.

An oligopolistic market structure for rating services arises endogenously and it is welfare improving for security issuers to pay for rating services rather than investors.

 

Banks as Secret Keepers (with G. Gorton, B. Holmström and G. Ordonez), American Economic Review 107 (2017), 1005-1029. [Online Appendix]

In order to create money-like securities banks must keep information about assets secret and hold loan portfolios with low information sensitivity while projects with high information sensitivity are financed in capital markets.

Media coverage: [Bloomberg], [Financial Times], [WSJ]

 

Market Sentiment and Innovation Activities (with Z. Xu), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53 (2018), 1135-1161.

This paper formalizes a typical view of venture capitals and provides empirical evidences for the financing and sentiment spillover channels through which high market-wide sentiment (bubbles) stimulate R&D investments and patent productions.

 

The Information View of Financial Crises (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström), Annual Review of Financial Economics 12 (2020), 39-65.

This paper summarizes the recent empirical evidences for the information sensitivity theory of debt and financial crises.

 

Does Lending Relationship Help or Alleviate the Transmission of Liquidity Shocks? Evidence from a Liquidity Crunch in China (with Y. Bai, Q. He and L. Lu), Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming.

During the liquidity crunch in the Chinese repo markets in 2013 the stock prices and subsequent investments of firms with outstanding loans are more adversely affected than firms without loans but among the firms with loans the effects are mitigated if the lenders are large state-owned banks or foreign banks.

 

 

Working Papers

 

Information Acquisition, Noise Trading and Speculation in Double Auction Markets

With endogenous information as markets become sufficiently large an efficient equilibrium allocation fails to exist.

 

Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström)

Debt backed by debt collateral (debt-on-debt) is the optimal security in money and debt funding markets (e.g. demand deposits, MMF, repo, ABCPs), but a change in macroeconomic fundamentals can cause information insensitive debt to become information sensitive and thus a collapse of trade.

 

The Information Sensitivity of a Security (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström),

This paper derives a new characteristic of a security and discusses several applications.

 

Haircuts and Repo Chains (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström)

There are four joint determinants of repo haircuts, (i) the information sensitivity of collateral, (ii) the default probability of borrower, (iii) the intermediate liquidity needs of lender, and (iv) his default probability in a subsequent repo transaction.

 

The Empirical Information Sensitivity of Treasury Bonds and Stocks (with W. Li and Y. Wang)

This paper proposes an empirical measure of information sensitivity and shows that (i) long term Treasury bonds without credit risks are as information sensitive as the S&P500 index, (ii) government stock purchases during the Chinese stock market crash in 2015 reduce the information sensitivity of intervened stocks by 16% compared to other stocks and (iii) financial analysts produce less information production about less information sensitive stocks.

 

Taxation, Information Acquisition and Trade in Decentralized Markets: Theory and Test (with X. Liu and F. Morath)

This paper shows that a transaction (profit) tax increases (reduces) the information sensitivity of trades, leads to more (less) private information production and decreases (increases) expected trading volume and uses the introduction of a transaction tax in the Singaporean housing market to provide empirical evidences for the information sensitivity transaction tax theory.

 

Shadow Banking Modes: The Chinese versus US System (with L. Liu, H. Wang and A. Yao), previous version entitled Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions, HKIMR Working Paper No. 22/2014.

This paper provides a comprehensive set of market statistics and theoretical analysis of Chinese shadow banking and shows that the system is bank-centric, driven by asymmetric perceptions of information sensitivity and relies on an intervening government as well as highlights the differences from the US system.

 

Information Disclosure, Intertemporal Risk Sharing and Stock Prices (with. H. Hakenes)

Optimal Risk sharing through partial disclosure of information can minimize the market value of the firm.

 

Managing China’s Stock Markets: The Economics of the National Team (with W. Li and Y. Wang)

Government stock purchases during the Chinese stock market crash in 2015 reduce the volatility and trading volume of stocks but also the price informativeness.

 

The Option Value of a Bureaucrat as Successor CEO: Theory and Test (with Q. He)

This paper derives an option value theory of a bureaucrat as successor CEO and provides consistent evidence based on 2,454 CEO turnovers cases in Chinese firms which shoes that bureaucrat firms have (i) positive abnormal announcement stock returns, (ii) lower long run returns, (iii) larger cross-sectional variance and skewness of long run returns, (iv) obtain more loans and government subsidies, (v) but experience increased rent seeking.

 

Mandatory Pollution Abatement, Financial Constraint and Firm Investment (with Y. Wang and Z. Wang)

This paper provides a theory and empirical evidence which show that financial constraint and environmental awareness of consumers are determinants of whether mandatory pollution abatement regulation crowds out or stimulate corporate investment.

 

 

Work in Progress

 

The Role of Corporate Narrative in Bank Lending to Technology Firms: Evidence from the 3+X Credit Program (with Y. Liu, L. Wu and X. Xu)

 

Bad Apples and Loan Pricing in Affected Industries: Evidence from a Corporate Fundraising Scandal (with Y. Li and J. Mo)

 

A Regulation Triggered Stock Market Panic and Who Runs First? (with H. Chen, H. Tu, and W. Xu)

 

When Insurance Reduces Risk-Taking: Theory and Evidence (with J. Lai, I. Yan and X. Yi)

 

 

Presentation Slides

 

Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises [Slides]

 

Banks as Secret Keepers [Slides]

 

Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions [Slides]

 

 

 

Teaching

 

 

Corporate Finance, Undergraduate Lecture Course

 

Money and Banking, Undergraduate Lecture Course

 

Private Equity and Hedge Fund Investing, Senior Seminar Course