Tri Vi Dang

 

 

Lecturer in Economics

Department of Economics

Columbia University

 

Email: td2332@columbia.edu

Office phone: 212 8514005

 

 

 

Research interest: financial contracting; financial intermediation; financial crises; financial liberalization and economic transformation in China

 

Teaching: corporate finance; money and banking; private equity and hedge fund investing

 

 

 

Research

 

 

Graphical illustration of the papers on liquidity and information sensitivity [Site]

 

Graphical illustration of the papers with policy implications [Site]

 

Google Scholar Citation [Site]

 

 

Published Papers

 

Bargaining with Endogenous Information, Journal of Economic Theory 140 (2008), 339-354.

The responder of a take-it-or-leave-it offer can capture full surplus in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

 

Information Provision in Over-the-Counter Markets (with M. Felgenhauer), Journal of Financial Intermediation 21 (2012), 79-96. Lead Article

An oligopolistic market structure for rating services arises endogenously and it is welfare improving for security issuers to pay for rating services rather than investors.

 

Banks as Secret Keepers (with G. Gorton, B. Holmström and G. Ordonez), American Economic Review 107, No. 4 (2017), 1005-1029. [Online Appendix]

In order to create money-like securities banks must keep information about assets secret and hold loan portfolios with low information sensitivity while projects with high information sensitivity are financed in capital markets.

Media coverage: [Bloomberg], [Financial Times], [WSJ]

 

Market Sentiment and Innovation Activities (with Z. Xu), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.

We formalize a typical venture capitalists’ view and provide empirical evidences for the financing and sentiment spillover channels through which high market-wide sentiment (bubbles) stimulate R&D investments and patent productions.

 

 

Working Papers

 

Information Acquisition, Noise Trading and Speculation in Double Auction Markets

With endogenous information as markets become sufficiently large an efficient equilibrium allocation fails to exist.

 

Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström), UPDATED VERSION, 04/2015

Debt backed by debt collateral (debt-on-debt) is the optimal security in funding markets (such as repo, senior MBS, ABCPs, MMFs), but a change in macroeconomic fundamentals can cause information insensitive debt to become information sensitive and thus a collapse of trade.

 

The Information Sensitivity of a Security (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström), UPDATED VERSION, 03/2015

We derive a new characteristic of a security and discuss several applications.

 

Haircuts and Repo Chains (with G. Gorton and B. Holmström)

There are four joint determinants of repo haircuts, (i) the information sensitivity of collateral, (ii) the default probability of borrower, (iii) the intermediate liquidity needs of lender, and (iv) his default probability in a subsequent repo transaction.

 

Information Disclosure, Intertemporal Risk Sharing and Stock Prices (with. H. Hakenes)

Optimal Risk sharing through partial information disclosure can minimize the market value of the firm.

 

The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information (with F. Morath)

A transaction (profit) tax leads to more (less) private information production and decreases (increases) the probability of efficient trade in equilibrium.

 

Shadow Banking Modes: The Chinese versus US System (with H. Wang and A. Yao), previously entitled Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions, HKIMR Working Paper No. 22/2014.

We provide a theoretical analysis of Chinese shadow banking and show that the system is bank-centric, driven by asymmetric perceptions of implicit guarantees and relies on an intervening government as well as highlight the differences from the US system.

 

Bureaucrats as Successor CEOs  (with Q.He)

We quantify the tradeoffs of hiring bureaucrats as successor CEOs in 2,454 CEO turnovers in Chinese firms and consistent with the theoretical implications we show that bureaucrat firms (i) have positive abnormal announcement stock returns, (ii) negative long run returns, (iii) larger cross-sectional variance of long run returns, (iv) obtain more loans and government subsidies, (v) but experience increased rent seeking and weaker operating performances of management.

 

 

Work in Progress

 

Disruptive Regulation: Theory and Evidence (with H. Chen, H. Tu, and W. Xu)

 

Banking Relationships and the Transmission of Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (with Y. Bai, Q. He and L. Lu)

 

Insurance and the Extensive and Intensity Margin of Moral Hazard: Evidence from China (with J. Lai, I. Yan and X. Yi)

 

Insurance and Risky Asset Holdings of Chinese Households (with J. Lai, I. Yan and X. Yi)

 

The Real Estate Game in China: Theory and Test (with Z. Wang)

 

Policy Bank Bonds

 

 

Presentation Slides

 

Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises [Slides]

 

Banks as Secret Keepers [Slides]

 

Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions [Slides]

 

 

 

Teaching

 

 

Corporate Finance, Undergraduate Lecture Course

 

Money and Banking, Undergraduate Lecture Course

 

Private Equity and Hedge Fund Investing, Senior Seminar Course