

TÜMER KAPAN

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Education:

2009 PhD Economics, Columbia University
Thesis Title: “*Essays on Household Bargaining*”
Fields: Microeconomics, Labor Economics, Industrial Organization
Advisor: Pierre-André Chiappori
2006 MPhil Economics, Columbia University
2005 MA Economics, Columbia University
2003 MA Economics, Bilkent University
2001 BSc Mathematics, Bogazici University
2001 BA Economics, Bogazici University

Professional Appointments:

July 2009– Associate, The Brattle Group
Jan. 2006 Visiting Scholar, Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, University of Copenhagen

Honors, Fellowships and Scholarships:

2008 GSAS Summer Research Fellowship, Columbia University
2007 Wueller Summer Award for Best Research Proposal, Columbia University
2006–07 Lewis A. Sanders Endowed Fellowship, Columbia University
2006 Wueller Award for Best 4th Year Research Proposal, Columbia University
2006 GSAS Summer Research Fellowship, Columbia University
2003–08 Department of Economics Fellowship, Columbia University
2001–03 Department of Economics Full Scholarship, Bilkent University

Research Papers:

“Property Division Laws: The Effects on Labor Supply and Household Bargaining”

This paper provides a framework for analyzing the impact of a change in property division law—a natural experiment that affects spouses’ bargaining power in a discrete manner—on household decision making. I focus on the House of Lords decision of 2000 (*White v. White*), which led to a more equitable division of assets between divorcing spouses in England and Wales, and estimate its effect on the intrahousehold resource allocation rule using the collective labor supply model. I show that this effect can be expressed as an ‘equivalent transfer’ of household nonlabor income. The ‘equivalent transfer’ concept is then used to demonstrate that the unobserved components of the underlying decision process, that is, the individual preferences and the household resource sharing rule, can be identified nonparametrically from changes in observed labor supply. Empirical analysis using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1991–

2006 reveals that married women reduced their labor supply after the law change. I also find some evidence that the household resource allocation process changed in their favor.

“Patriarchal Households are Unitary: New Evidence”

In this paper, I use the collective model to estimate a household demand system and test a fundamental implication of utility maximization, namely the Slutsky conditions on the demand matrix. This approach allows me to determine the number of decision makers in the household. Restrictions of utility maximization are almost universally rejected when the unitary approach is applied to multi-person households. Using the 1994 Turkish Household Survey, I document that unitary households—households whose demand can be rationalized with a single utility function—exist. The results are twofold. First, I reject the unitary model in the full sample of couples in favor of the two decision-maker model. Second, in a smaller sample from rural Eastern Turkey—where traditional values prevail—I find unique evidence in favor of the unitary model and no evidence of bargaining when women do not earn income outside the household. In contrast, when women have outside options, the unitary model ceases to be supported in favor of a two decision-maker model. The number of decision makers in the household changes depending on the presence of a teenage son (as opposed to a daughter).

“Individual Savings and Intra-Household Bargaining: An Intertemporal Framework” (in progress)

Professional Activities: Referee for *Econometrica*, *Review of Economic Studies*
Member, American Economic Association

Teaching Experience:

Columbia University

Summer 2007 **Instructor**, Microeconomics (Master)
Summer 2006 **Instructor**, Game Theory (Undergraduate)
Fall 2006 **Teaching Assistant**, Law and Economics (Undergraduate)
Spring 2006 **Teaching Assistant**, Economics of Uncertainty (Undergraduate)
Fall 2005 **Teaching Assistant**, Microeconomic Analysis (PhD)
Spring 2005 **Teaching Assistant**, Industrial Organization (Undergraduate)
Fall 2004 **Teaching Assistant**, Game Theory (Undergraduate)

Bilkent University

2001–03 **Teaching Assistant**, Game Theory, Econometrics, Financial Institutions and Markets

Bogazici University

2001 **Instructor**, Probability and Statistics

Languages: English (fluent), Turkish (native)

References:

Professor Pierre-André Chiappori Department of Economics Columbia University +1 212-854-6369 pc2167@columbia.edu	Professor Wojciech Kopczuk Department of Economics Columbia University +1 212-854-2519 wk2110@columbia.edu	Professor Bernard Salanié Department of Economics Columbia University +1 212-854-1677 bs2237@columbia.edu
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