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WORKING PAPERS
“Property
Division Laws: The Effects on Labor Supply and Household Bargaining” PDF
Abstract: This paper provides a
framework for analyzing the impact of a change in property division law–a
natural experiment that affects spouses’ bargaining power in a
discrete manner–on household decision making. I focus on the House of
Lords decision of 2000 (White v.
White), which led to a more equitable division of assets between
divorcing spouses in England and Wales, and estimate its effect on the
intrahousehold resource allocation rule using the collective labor supply
model. I show that this effect can be expressed as an ‘equivalent transfer’
of household nonlabor income. The ‘equivalent transfer’ concept is then
used to demonstrate that the unobserved components of the underlying
decision process, that is, the individual preferences and the household
resource sharing rule, can be identified nonparametrically from changes in
observed labor supply. Empirical analysis using the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) for 1991–2006 reveals that married women reduced their labor
supply after the law change. I also find some evidence that the household
resource allocation process changed in their favor.
“Patriarchal
Households are Unitary: New Evidence” PDF
Abstract. In this paper, I use the
collective model to estimate a household demand system and test a
fundamental implication of utility maximization, namely the Slutsky
conditions on the demand matrix. This approach allows me to determine the
number of decision makers in the household. Restrictions of utility
maximization are almost universally rejected when the unitary approach is
applied to multi-person households. Using the 1994 Turkish Household
Survey, I document that unitary households—households whose demand can be
rationalized with a single utility function—exist. The results are twofold.
First, I reject the unitary model in the full sample of couples in favor of
the two decision-maker model. Second, in a smaller sample from rural
Eastern Turkey―where traditional values prevail―I find unique
evidence in favor of the unitary model and no evidence of bargaining when
women do not earn
income outside the household. In contrast, when women have outside options,
the unitary model ceases to be supported in favor of a two decision-maker
model. The number of decision makers in the household changes depending on
the presence of a teenage son (as opposed to a daughter).
“Individual Savings and Intra-Household
Bargaining: An Intertemporal Framework” (in progress)
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