

Colloquium on Cooperation and Security
Political Science G8864

Fall 2008
meets Thurs 2:10-4:00, IAB 1302
office hours: Weds 3:30 - 4:30 or by
appointment

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The study of cooperation is fundamental to the study of international relations. In the absence of a higher authority to enforce agreements, how do states manage to cooperate? This course examines theoretical approaches to conflict and cooperation in international relations, including the obstacles to cooperation under anarchy, and the possibility of surmounting those obstacles. The empirical focus of the course is on issues of cooperation in peace and security, for example, deterrence and crisis bargaining, the outbreak and conduct of war, war termination and maintaining peace, and alliance politics.

Prerequisites:

General familiarity with theories and literatures of international relations. Students who have not taken, or are not currently taking, the International Relations Field Survey (6801) should discuss with the instructor whether this course is appropriate.

Course Requirements:

Students are expected to come to class ready to discuss the week's readings.

Twice during the semester each student will prepare a short memo (2-4 pages double-spaced) briefly outlining the major themes of the session, raising questions for discussion in class, and suggesting a few testable hypotheses on the week's topic. These are due (to be posted to CourseWorks) no later than 5pm, two days before the relevant class (i.e., Tuesday for regularly scheduled sessions).

The major assignment for the course is a research paper. The paper should present publishable-quality original research on a topic related to cooperation and security. A statement of your proposed research question and hypotheses is due October 2. Presentations will take place on November 6 and November 13. For those who present on the 6th, the final paper is due November 10; for those who present on the 13th, the final paper is due November 14 (see below).

Late assignments, including memos, will be penalized by one third grade per day (i.e., an A paper or memo turned in 1 day late is an A-, 2 days late a B+, etc.) except in cases of medical or family emergency.

The written research paper will count for 40% of the grade, its presentation in class for 20%, each memo 10%, and participation in class for the remaining 20%.

Requirements for R credit: the two memos and participation in class discussion.

Schedule

Because I am expecting a baby in late November, we will operate on a compressed schedule. We will meet for two extra sessions early in the semester (dates to be arranged the first week of class), and will not meet for the last two weeks of class (November 20 and December 4). In the unlikely event that I cannot come to IAB for one or both of the presentation weeks (November 6 and November 13), we will make alternative arrangements.

Final papers are due quite early (November 10 and 14 depending on when you present), so that I can get you feedback and turn in grades before the baby arrives. I will relax my usually firm policy against incompletes for those who would prefer more time to write the paper, but it may take me quite some time to get comments and grades for those who choose this option. For those taking an incomplete, the paper must be turned in before the end of the summer (September 1, 2009). Please note that carrying too many incompletes can affect your eligibility to take comps.

Readings

The following books (readings marked with an asterisk (*) in the syllabus) have been ordered at Book Culture Bookstore, on 112th St., between Broadway and Amsterdam, many of the books we read short portions of are available there as well.

- Axelrod, Robert *Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books 1984).
Baldwin, David ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1993).
Bull, Hedley *The Anarchical Society* (Columbia University Press, 1977).
Cronin, Bruce *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (Columbia University Press, 1999).
Fortna, Virginia Page *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and The Durability of Peace* (Princeton University Press, 2004).
Olson, Mancur *The Logic of Collective Action* (Harvard University Press, 1965).
Oye, Kenneth ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton University Press, 1986).
Walter, Barbara F. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton University Press 2002).
Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999).
Weitsman, Patricia A. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford University Press, 2004).

Journal articles and most other readings are available online through e-journals <www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/ejournals/> or through electronic reserves on CourseWorks. All readings are on reserve at Lehman library or through e-reserves.

I assume that some readings will be familiar to you from 6801, please review them for the relevant weeks.

Session 1. Introduction and Course Logistics
September 4

I. Cooperation Theory in International Relations

Session 2. The Evolution of Cooperation under Anarchy
September 11

*Axelrod, Robert *Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books 1984). Chapters 1-3, 6-9.
(review from 6801)

Jervis, Robert “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978),
pp.168-214. (review from 6801)

*Oye, Kenneth ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton University Press, 1986). Chapters by
Oye “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy” (review from 6801)
Axelrod & Keohane “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy”

*Stein, Arthur “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” in Baldwin,
David ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 29-59.

Keohane, Robert “Reciprocity in International Relations” *International Organization* 40:1
(Winter 1986), pp. 1-27.

Jervis, Robert “Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,” *World Politics*, 40:3 (April 1988), pp.
317-349. (review from 6801)

Fearon, James “Bargaining Enforcement, and International Cooperation” *International
Organization* 52:2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305.

Majeski, Stephen J. “Asymmetric Power among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of
Cooperation in International Relations” *International Studies Quarterly* 48:2 (June
2004).

Session 3. Information, Credibility and Signaling, and Domestic Politics
September 18

Morrow, James “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics” in Lake, David and Robert Powell eds, *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 77-114.

Putnam, Robert “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460. (review from 6801)

Akerlof, George “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 54:3 (August 1970), pp. 488-500.

Farrell, Joseph and Matthew Rabin “Cheap Talk” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 103-18.

Fearon, James “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands and Sinking Costs” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:1 (February 1997), pp.68-90.

Schultz, Kenneth “Looking for Audience Costs” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:1 (February 2001), pp. 32-60.

Tomz, Michael “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach” *International Organization* 61:4 (Fall 2007), pp. 821-40.

Sesssion 4. Debates: Realism vs. Institutionalism, Offensive vs. Defensive Realism
[Date TBA, week of September 22]

Keohane, Robert "The Demand for International Regimes" in Krasner, Stephen ed.
International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 141-71.

*Baldwin, David ed, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*. Following chapters:
1 – Baldwin "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics" (intro)
5 – Grieco "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation"
7 – Snidal "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation"
11 – Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War"
12 – Grieco "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation"

Mearsheimer, John "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security* 19:3
(Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; responses by Keohane & Martin, Kupchan & Kupchan, and
Ruggie, and Mearsheimer's reply in *International Security* 20:1 (Summer 1995),
pp.39-69, 82-93 (review from 6801)

Lake, David "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions" *International Security*
26:1 (Summer 2001), pp.129-160.

Jervis, Robert "Realism, Liberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate" *International
Security* 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp.42-63. (review from 6801)

Glaser, Charles "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help" *Security Studies* 5:3 (Spring
1996), pp.122-63.

Schweller, Randall "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma" *Security Studies*
5:3 (Spring 1996), pp.90-121.

Kydd, Andrew "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other"
Security Studies 7:1 (Autumn 1997), pp.114-54.

Montgomery, Evan Braden "Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and
the Problem of Uncertainty" *International Security* 31:2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151-85. (See
also Correspondence in IS 32:1 (Summer 2007)).

Session 5. Collective Action, Order and the Construction of Cooperation and Conflict in the International System
September 25

*Olson, Mancur *The Logic of Collective Action* (Harvard University Press, 1965). Intro and chapters 1-2, pp. 1-65.

*Bull, Hedley *The Anarchical Society* (Columbia University Press, 1977). Chapters 1-3.

Watts, Sir Arthur “The Importance of International Law” in Michael Byers, ed. *The Role of Law in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.5-16.

Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” *International Organization* 54:3 (Summer 2000), pp. 421-456.

Johnston, A. Iain “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments” *International Studies Quarterly* 45:4 (December 2001) pp. 487-515. (review from 6801)

Wendt, Alex “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of State Politics” *International Organization* 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

*Cronin, Bruce *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (Columbia University Press, 1999) Chapters 1-2 and 6, pp. 3-38, 125-141. (review from 6801)

Bearce, David and Stacy Bondanella “Intergovernmental Organizations Socialization and Member-State Interest Convergence” *International Organization* 61:4 (October 2007), pp. 703-733.

Keene, Edward “A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making Against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century” *International Organization* 61:2 (Spring 2007), pp. 311-339.

II. Cooperation in Security Affairs

Session 6. War as a Problem of Cooperation

October 2

**** Research Proposal Due ****

Fearon, James “Rationalist Explanations for War” *International Organization* 49:3 (Summer 1995), pp.379-414. (review from 6801)

Reiter, Dan “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War” *Perspectives on Politics* 1:1 (March 2003), pp. 27-43.

Powell, Robert “War as a Commitment Problem” *International Organization* 60:1 (Winter 2006), pp.169–203.

Gartzke, Erik “War is in the Error Term” *International Organization* 53:3 (Summer 1999), pp.567-87 (review from 6801)

Posen, Barry “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” in Brown, Michael, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-24. (Originally published in *Survival*).

*Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999). Chapters:
1– Snyder & Jervis “Civil War and the Security Dilemma” (review from 6801)
8 – de Figueiredo & Weingast “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict”

Fearon, James “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict” in Lake, David and Donald Rothchild, eds, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 1998).

Thyne, Clayton “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50:6 (December 2006) pp. 937-961.

Session 7. Deterrence, Crisis Bargaining, and Reputation
October 9

Schelling, Thomas *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966). Chapter 2.
(note: not available online, whole book on reserve in Lehman)

Zagare, Frank C. "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16:2 (2004) pp. 107-141.

Trager, Robert and Dessislava Zagorcheva "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done" *international Security* 30:3 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 87-123.

Fearon, James "Signaling vs the Balance of Power and Interests" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38:2 (June 1994), pp. 236-69.

Jervis, Robert "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior" in Jervis, Robert and Jack Snyder, eds *Dominoes and Bandwagons* (Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 21-50.

Sartori, Anne "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes" *International Organization* 56:1 (Winter 2002), pp. 121-49.

Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith "Honest Threats: the Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:2 (April 2002), pp. 175-200.

Tomz, Michael *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries* (Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter 2, pp. 14-36.

Session 8. Arms, Arms Control and the Conduct of War
October 16

Schelling, Thomas and Morton Halperin *Strategy and Arms Control* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), Intro and chapters 1-3, pp. 1-39. (note: not available online, book on reserve)

Glaser, Charles “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming” *International Security* 28:4 (Spring 2004), pp. 44-84.

*Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*. Chapter 4 “Live & Let Live in Trench Warfare in WWI.”

Legro, Jeffrey “Which Norms Matter?” *International Organization* 51:1 (winter 1997), pp. 31-63.

Tannenwald, Nina “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo” *International Security* 29:4 (Spring 2005), pp. 5-49.

Rutherford, Kenneth “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines” *World Politics* 53:1 (October 2000), pp.74-114.

Morrow, James D. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” *American Political Science Review* 101:3 (August 2007), pp. 559-572.

Downes, Alexander B. “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: the Causes of Civilian Victimization in War” *International Security* vol 30:4 (Spring 2006), pp. 152-195.

Session 9. Negotiation and War Termination
October 23

Raiffa, Howard *The Art and Science of Negotiation* (Harvard University Press, 1982). Chapter 4 pp. 44-65.

Wittman, Donald “How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23:4 (1979), pp.743-763.

Goemans, Hein “Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:5 (October 2000), pp.555-579.

*Walter, Barbara F. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton University Press 2002), especially Introduction, chapters 1, 2, and 4, and one case study.

Schultz, Kenneth “The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?” *International Organization* 59:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 1-38.

Slantchev, Branislav L. “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations” *American Political Science Review* 97:4 (November 2003), pp. 621-632.

Session 10. Maintaining Peace
[date TBA: week of October 27]

*Fortna, Virginia Page *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and The Durability of Peace* (Princeton University Press, 2004). Intro, chapters 1 and 5.

Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen “Making and Keeping Peace” *International Organization* 59:2 (Spring 2005), pp. 261-292.

Quinn, J. Michael, T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence” *International Interactions* 33:2 (2007), pp. 167-193.

Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis” *American Political Science Review* 94:4 (December 2000), pp. 779-801.

Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management” *American Journal of Political Science* 47:2 (April 2003), pp. 318-332.

Sambanis, Nicholas “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature” *World Politics* 52:4 (July 2000), pp. 437-483

Tir, Jaroslav “Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions. *Journal of Peace Research* 42:5 (September 2005), pp. 545-562.

Session 11. Cooperation among Allies
October 30

Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser "An Economic Theory of Alliances" *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48:3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279.

Leeds, Brett Ashley "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties" *International Organization* 57:4 (November 2003) pp. 801-827.

Bearce, David H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States" *International Organization* 60 no.3 (Summer 2006) pp. 595-625.

Weber, Katya "Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transactions Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation" *International Studies Quarterly* 41:2 (June 1997), pp. 321-40.

*Weitsman, Patricia A. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* Stanford University Press, 2004, Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-37.

Gaubatz, Kurt "Democractic States and Commitment in International Relations" *International Organization* 50:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-39.

Barnett, Michael "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East" in Katzenstein, Peter, ed. *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 400-47.

Session 12. Research Paper Presentations
November 6

**** If you present this week, your final paper is due Monday November 10, by 5pm ****

Session 13. Research Paper Presentations
November 13

**** If you present this week, your final paper is due Friday November 14, by 5pm ****

Selected Additional Readings

Theory:

- Keohane, Robert *After Hegemony* (Princeton University Press, 1984).
- Milner, Helen "International Theories of Cooperation Among States: Strengths and Weaknesses" *World Politics* 44:3 (1992), pp.466-496.
- Fearon, James "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes" *American Political Science Review* 88:3 (September 1994), pp. 577-92.
- Weeks, Jessica "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve" *International Organization* 62:1 (January 2008), 35-64.
- Axelrod and Keohane in Baldwin ed *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.
- McGinnis, Michael "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30 (March 1986), pp.141-70.
- Morrow, James "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation," *International Organization* 48:3 (Summer 1994), pp. 387-423.
- Dai, Xinyuan "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," *International Organization* vol 59:2 (Spring 2005), pp. 363-398.
- Downs, George David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 379-406.
- Wagner, R. Harrison "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation" *American Political Science Review* 77:2 (June 1983), pp.330-346
- Bendor, Jonathan "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:4 (December 1993), pp.709-34
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101:4 (November 2007), pp. 709- 725.
- Keohane "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics" and "International Institutions: Two Approaches" in *International Institutions and State Power* (Westview 1989).
- Wendt's response to Mearsheimer's "False Promise" – "Constructing International Politics" *International Security* 20:1 (Summer 1995) pp.71-81.
- Katzenstein, Peter ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); chapters 1 (Katzenstein), and 2 (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein).
- Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett eds. *Security Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- Higgins, Roslyn "The Nature and Function of International Law" in *Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it* (Clarendon Press, 1994).
- George Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (1996) pp., 379- 406.

- Kenneth O. W. Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal "The Concept of Legalization" *International Organization* 54:3 (August 2000), pp 401-419.
- von Stein, Jana "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance" *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005) 611-622
- Snyder, Jack "Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War" *International Organization* 56:1 (Winter 2000), pp. 7-45.
- Taliaferro, Jeffrey "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited" *International Security* vol 25:3 (Winter 2000/2001), pp. 128-161.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Kydd, Andrew "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation" *International Organization* 54:2 (Spring 2000), pp. 325-57.

War:

- Schelling, Thomas *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1960).
- Barry O'Neill, "International Escalation and the Dollar Auction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30:1 (March, 1986), pp. 33-50.
- Rothchild, Donald and David Lake "Containing Fear: Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict" *International Security* 21:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
- Powell, Robert "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict" *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (2002), pp. 1-30.
- Slantchev, Branislav "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States" *American Political Science Review* 97, no 1 (February 2003), pp. 123-133.
- Reed, William "Information, Power, and War" *American Political Science Review* 97, no 4 (November 2003), pp. 633-641.
- Quester, George "Crises and the Unexpected" in Rotberg, Robert and Theodore Rabb eds, *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.127-45.
- Reiter, Dan "Exploding the Powder-Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars almost Never Happen" *International Security* 20:2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34.

Deterrence and Reputation:

- Mearsheimer, John *Conventional Deterrence* (Cornell University Press, 1983).
- Huth, Paul *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (Yale University Press, 1988). esp. Chapters 1-3.
- Danilovic, Vesna "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:3 (June 2001), pp. 341-69.
- Danilovic, Vesna "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:1 (February 2001), pp. 97-125.
- George, Alexander and Richard Smoke *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, 1974).

- Zagare, Frank "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment" *International Interactions* 21:4 (1996) pp. 365-87.
- Langlois, Jean-Pierre and Catherine Langlois "Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence" *International Studies Quarterly* vol 49:3 (2005) pp. 503-527.
- Morrow, James "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: a Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining" *AJPS* 33 (November 1989) pp.941-72.
- Gelpi, Christopher "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining"
- Leng, Russell "Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining" *JCR* 37 (March 1993) pp. 3-41.
- Nalebuff, Barry "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World" *World Politics* 43:3 (April 1991), pp. 313-335.
- Werner, Suzanne "Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement" *American Journal of Political Science* 44:4 (October 2000) pp. 720-732.
- Mercer, Jonathan *Reputation and International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Copeland, Huth, and Mercer. Debate on Mercer's book in *Security Studies* 7:1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 33-113.

Conduct of War and Arms Control:

- Jervis, Robert "Arms Control, Stability, and the Causes of War" *Political Science Quarterly* 108:2 (Summer 1993), pp. 239-253.
- Price, Richard "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo" *International Organization* 49:1 (Winter 1995), pp.73-103.
- Price, Richard "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines" *International Organization* 52:3 (Summer 1998), pp.613-44.
- Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald "Norms and Deterrence, the Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo" in Katzenstein, Peter, ed. *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.114-52.
- Paul, T.V. "Nuclear Weapons Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflict" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39:4 (December 1995), pp. 696-717.
- Bunn, George "The Status of Norms Against Nuclear Testing" *The Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1999), pp. 20-32
- Downs, George, David Rock and Randolph Siverson "Arms Races and Cooperation" in Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*.
- Gaubatz, Kurt "Changing Interests and Persistent Rules: The Protection of Non-Combatants in War" unpublished manuscript.
- Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46:1 (Winter 1992), pp. 101-146.
- Morrow, James "Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:2 (June 1991). pp. 245-265.
- Knopf, Jeffrey *Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy* (Cambridge University Press 1998).

- Gallagher, Nancy *The Politics of Verification* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
- Morrow, James D. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties" *International Organization* 55:4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 971-91.
- Gilligan, Michael J. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime" *International Organization* 60:4 (Summer 2004) pp. 935-967.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War" *American Political Science Review* 100:3 (August 2006), pp. 429-447.

War Termination and Maintaining Peace:

- Pillar, Paul *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton University Press, 1983).
- Mason, T. David, and Patrick J. Fett. "How Civil Wars End: a Rational Model Approach" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:4 (1996) pp.546-68.
- Walter, Barbara. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement" *International Organization* 51:3 (summer 1997) pp.335-364.
- Trumbore, Peter "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process" *International Studies Quarterly* 42:3. (September 1998), pp545-66.
- Gartner, Scott "I'm OK, You're OK, Let's Fight: An Organizational and Game Theoretic Model of War Termination"
- Goemans, Hein *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton University Press, 2000). Chapters 1-3, skim one or two case studies.
- Ikle, Fred *Every War Must End* (Columbia University Press, 1971).
- Keckskemeti, Paul "Political Rationality in Ending War" in Fox, W. T. R., ed. *How Wars End, Annals*, American Academy of Political and Social Science (1970).
- Rothchild, Donald *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Brookings Institution Press, 1997). Chapters 1-3, pp.1-85.
- Powell, Robert "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting" *American Journal of Political Science* 48:2 (April 2004) pp. 344-361.
- Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Walter "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence" *International Organization* 56:2 (Spring 2002), pp. 263-296.
- Werner, Suzanne "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement and Renegotiating the Terms" *American Journal of Political Science* 43:3 (July 1999), pp. 912-34.
- Licklider, Roy "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993" *American Political Science Review* 89:3 (September 1995), pp. 681-687.
- Fortna, Virginia Page and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 11 (2008).

Alliances:

- Oneal, John "Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO" *International Organization* 44:3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402.
- Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" *International Organization* 44:2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-169.
- Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, 36:4 (July, 1984), pp. 461-495.
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