Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature*

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Abstract
Following closely the practice of peacekeeping, the literature on the subject has come in one small wave and then two larger ones. The first wave, during the Cold War, includes classic works focusing mainly on peacekeeping in wars between states. The second wave, at first inspired by the boom in peacekeeping shortly after the end of the Cold War, soon reflected disillusionment and focuses largely on failure and dysfunction, despite significant cases of success. The third and most recent wave also reflects a resurgence in peacekeeping but is newly concerned with systematic and methodologically rigorous analysis (both quantitative and qualitative) of basic empirical questions about the effects of peacekeeping and the sources of peacekeeping outcomes. Recent empirical studies have demonstrated peacekeeping’s effectiveness in maintaining peace, but related questions persist concerning the use of force, transitional administrations, which organizations most effectively keep peace, perspectives of the “peacekept,” and effects on democratization.
INTRODUCTION
Following closely the practice of peacekeeping, the literature on the subject has come in three waves—one small and two larger. Peacekeeping was invented during the Cold War, but its use exploded only after the rivalry between the superpowers ended. More missions deployed from 1988 through 1993 than had in the previous four decades. At the same time, peacekeeping evolved from a practice used primarily between warring states to a tool used to maintain peace after civil wars as well. A perceived crisis in peacekeeping, beginning in June 1993, was the result of well-publicized dysfunction, failure, and paralysis, first in Somalia, and then in Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia, despite many successful missions elsewhere. A lull followed, with very few new, important missions launched until 1999. After attempts to reform the practice of peacekeeping (epitomized by the Brahimi Report, described below), peacekeeping rebounded; a number of major missions were initiated from 1999 to 2004. There are more peacekeepers deployed around the world currently than at any time in the past.

The literature has followed these ups and downs. A few classic works on peacekeeping were written during the Cold War, but one could hardly call the body of work a “literature” until the explosion of interest in the 1990s. Within this new wave of literature, brief optimism about the practice of peacekeeping in the first years of the post–Cold War era was followed by a period of soul-searching and pessimism about its limitations and faults. A third wave of peacekeeping studies emerged in the mid-2000s. Although the literature as a whole remains largely descriptive and prescriptive, the latest wave of works on peacekeeping has matured considerably, becoming more theoretical and, perhaps most significant, much more methodologically rigorous.

Until this most recent wave, the literature was unable to answer the most basic question about the impact of peacekeeping: Does it keep peace? The early literature consists largely of descriptions of the general practice and principles of peacekeeping, or of detailed case histories. Although many of these case studies discuss the role of peacekeepers in keeping peace, or failing to do so, they necessarily rely on (often implicit) counterfactuals. Only in the past few years has the literature concerned itself with any variation between success and failure, or, more fundamentally, between peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping cases, that could give more systematic analytical leverage over basic empirical questions about the effectiveness of peacekeeping or the causes of peacekeeping outcomes. The emerging consensus within these new, more systematic studies is much more optimistic than the tenor of the preceding wave, indicating that peacekeeping does indeed help keep peace.

In short, the intellectual history of the literature with respect to the issue of peacekeeping’s effectiveness could be described as follows: first, a long period including the sporadic studies during the Cold War; second, the newfound interest in peacekeeping in the 1990s, which turned quickly to a focus on failure, dysfunction, and unintended consequences; third, the advent of systematic qualitative and quantitative studies that have tested peacekeeping’s impact empirically, showing that despite its limitations, peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool. The more theoretically and methodologically mature studies of the most recent wave have allowed more serious debate and analysis of related questions on peacekeeping effectiveness: whether peacekeeping is best conducted by the United Nations or by other organizations or regional actors; the effectiveness of the use of force; whether and when more intrusive and longer-term transitional administrations are effective; and the impact of peacekeeping not only on stable peace but also on other goals, such as democratization. The newer studies have also included more nuanced analysis of effects on local political actors and local populations. These issues have not yet been
addressed definitively but represent active research agendas and fruitful avenues for future research as the literature continues to mature.

This essay provides a roughly chronological intellectual history of the study of peacekeeping. It is by no means comprehensive, as the literature is too vast to cover exhaustively. Instead we focus here primarily on the major trends in the literature, and what it tells us about the effectiveness and effects of this policy tool.

WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING?

The term peacekeeping generally refers to the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security. Some studies of peacekeeping include efforts to contain or terminate hostilities (e.g., Walter & Snyder 1999, Greig & Diehl 2005, Gilligan & Sergenti 2007), or even to prevent hostilities (e.g., Rikhye 1984, pp. 1–2), whereas others restrict the definition to efforts to prevent the recurrence of war once a ceasefire is in place (e.g., Hillen 1998, Fortna 2008a, Howard 2008). The definition of peacekeeping has also changed over time, as has the practice. The definition in the 1990 edition of The Blue Helmets (United Nations 1990, p. 4), the UN’s review of operations, notes that peacekeeping personnel deploy “without enforcement powers” and refers specifically to “international peace and security” (our emphasis). Interestingly, the preface of the 1996 edition, written by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, drops the definition altogether (United Nations 1996). By this time, peacekeeping was firmly established as a technique for maintaining peace in internal as well as interstate conflicts, and the line separating peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions had blurred considerably. However, some studies continue to restrict the definition of peacekeeping to consent-based missions that are authorized to use force solely for self-defensive purposes, as opposed to peace enforcement missions. Findlay (2002), for example, makes this distinction, using the term peace operations to cover both types of mission. In UN lingo, this distinction separates Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions, in reference to the relevant parts of the UN Charter. Technically, however, these labels are misnomers, as nowhere does the UN Charter refer to the practice of peacekeeping. Even though peacekeeping has now become a central activity of the UN, it was a practice improvised after the Charter was written, and in many ways fell between the activities discussed in Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld famously described peacekeeping as “chapter six and a half.”

As peacekeeping was adapted for use in civil conflict zones, it evolved far beyond monitoring ceasefire lines and troop withdrawals or interposing personnel between opposing national armies to include many more civilian tasks: human rights monitoring, monitoring and running elections, monitoring and training police forces, providing humanitarian assistance, and assisting with the rebuilding of judicial institutions. In terms of military-related tasks, peacekeepers moved from merely observing troop movements after interstate wars to actively assisting with troop demobilization, reintegration, retraining, and the construction of national military forces after civil wars. Many studies thus distinguish between “traditional” peacekeeping and “multidimensional” missions (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis 2000, 2006; Findlay 2002; Fortna 2008a; Howard 2008). Most recently, the UN has begun to call the more complex peacekeeping operations “integrated missions.” These missions are designed in conjunction with the UN development and humanitarian agencies, and seek to go beyond shorter-term peacekeeping to include elements of longer-term postconflict economic, social, and political development or “peacebuilding.”

Most studies restrict their analysis to peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN, but others (e.g., Rikhye 1984, Dobbins et al. 2003, Bellamy & Williams 2005, Fortna 2008a) include peacekeeping missions...
mounted by regional organizations or other coalitions of states. Such missions are often authorized and legitimized by a UN resolution, as, for example, in Bosnia, Liberia, and Afghanistan.

THE CLASSICS: PEACEKEEPING STUDIES DURING THE COLD WAR

Among the early studies of peacekeeping, some focused on the prospects for improving or developing peacekeeping as an effective tool of conflict resolution (e.g., Bloomfield 1964, Cox 1967, Fabian 1971, Wiseman 1983, International Peace Academy 1984). However, most of these classics consist primarily of detailed case histories. The Wainhouse compendiums (1966, 1973), for example, provide detailed accounts of all the international peace observation missions and peacekeeping missions, respectively, undertaken before those books were published. Burns & Heathcote (1963) survey the early missions in the Middle East and then thoroughly dissect the searing experience of the UN in the Congo. Higgins (1969–1981) provides a four-volume set of cases, including relevant documents, from the first four decades of peacekeeping. Pelcovits (1984) and Mackinlay (1989) focus on peacekeeping in Middle East cases.

Rikhye (1984) similarly provides rich descriptions of the various missions mounted by the UN and by regional organizations. His book is organized around the functions of peacekeeping (e.g., peace observation, separation of forces, and maintaining peace), and although he does not set out to assess the effectiveness of peacekeeping as such, his case studies provide implicitly counterfactual arguments about how peacekeeping helped to keep peace (see, e.g., pp. 94, 99–100).

Despite their titles, Rikhye’s *Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (1984) focuses much more on the politics, particularly between the superpowers, involved in launching (or not) peacekeeping missions and their management, whereas James’ *The Politics of Peacekeeping* (1969) presents something much closer to a causal theory of how peacekeeping might work. James discusses the practical political limits of peacekeeping, given the propensity of either the parties to the conflict or the superpowers to thwart peacekeepers’ efforts. He focuses much more explicitly than most of the literature, either during this era or subsequent ones, on what would now be called the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping. He describes, often in colorful metaphors, the myriad ways that peacekeepers can serve to “patch-up” conflicts or provide “prophylaxis” against things getting worse or violence recurring, as well as some methods for “proselytism” of changing regimes or state policies. (See also James 1990.) Although these studies include some cases of peacekeeping in internal conflicts (in the Congo and Cyprus, for example), their focus on interstate peacekeeping reflects the fact that for its first 40 years, peacekeeping was used primarily to keep peace between states, not within them.

Early attempts to test empirically the effect of peacekeeping (among other efforts by the UN) on conflict management also focus on interstate conflict. These studies present contradictory findings, most likely because of methodological limitations. Studies by Haas and his colleagues (Haas et al. 1972, Haas 1986) and by Wilkenfeld & Brecher (1984) examine both conflicts in which the UN was involved and those with no UN involvement, avoiding the problem of the vast majority of the literature, not just in this era but until quite recently, which examines only peacekeeping cases. Haas reports UN military operations to be generally successful, but the measure of success is coded only for disputes referred to the UN, making a direct comparison or assessment of the UN’s effects impossible. Wilkenfeld & Brecher make a direct comparison and find that UN involvement makes agreement more likely than when the UN is not involved, but that the UN has no effect on the recurrence of crises. In other words, the UN is good at making peace but not at keeping it. However, despite the fact that they explicitly
study selection effects, noting that the UN tends to get involved in the most serious cases. Wilkenfeld & Brecher do not adjust for this when concluding that the UN has little effect in preventing the recurrence of crises. It would be 15–20 years before studies directly compared peacekeeping and nonpeacekeeping cases, taking the nonrandom selection of peacekeeping into account.

**BOOM AND BUST IN THE 1990s**

With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping came into its own as an important international instrument for ending wars and maintaining peace primarily within, rather than between, states. With the end of the superpower rivalry, the deadlock in the UN Security Council eased, producing agreement in a number of areas, and very often in peacekeeping. For almost a decade, from the second half of 1978 through 1987, the UN fielded not a single new peacekeeping mission (and only 13 in the period of 1948–1978)—but from 1988 to 1993, the UN launched a staggering 20 new missions. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* was the central policy document, outlining a series of activities for which the UN should be responsible, from peacekeeping to peace enforcement to peacebuilding (United Nations 1992). This text directly reflected the optimism and confidence of the UN Secretariat at the time. There was a pervasive sense that finally, after decades of disagreement, the UN would be instrumental in resolving disputes across the globe.

But the optimism faded quickly in the face of several debacles. First, in Somalia, in June 1993, 24 Pakistani troops under the UN flag were killed, followed by 18 US Rangers (deployed under the US flag), one of whom was brutally dragged through the streets in front of live TV cameras, as depicted in the movie *Black Hawk Down*. This pivotal event was followed by devastating failures in Rwanda, Angola, and Srebrenica (in Bosnia), where genocide, mass killing, and ethnic cleansing raged while UN peacekeepers helplessly looked on. Most of the scholarly literature reflecting on the 1990s, as well as most newspaper and policy analyses, focuses on these crushing cases of failure despite many significant cases of peacekeeping success: for example, in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Eastern Slavonia (a region of Croatia). Books with such hyperbolic titles as *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (Jett 1999), *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s* (Fleitz 2002), and *Peacekeeping in the Abyss* (Cassidy 2004), and a seminal article in *Foreign Affairs* called “Give War a Chance” (Luttwak 1999), epitomize the pervasive sense of pessimism.


In addition to the focus on failure, this wave of the peacekeeping literature is characterized by its lack of attention to systematic causal arguments (similar to the early works in peacekeeping). In general, this wave of the literature is not particularly concerned with explanation or positive social science analysis, nor are the debates particularly cumulative. Instead, the literature of this period tends to explore different themes associated with peacekeeping. Most are edited volumes with excellent, detailed case studies (Durch 1993, 1996; Weiss 1995; Brown 1996; Otunnu & Doyle 1998; Crocker et al. 1999). The practitioners of peacekeeping also began to move into the business of analysis, with major works by peacekeeping architects Brian Urquhart (1972, 1987) and Marrack Goulding (2002); Secretaries-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1997) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1999); and articles by top-level UN diplomats...


All of the works mentioned above develop either implicit or explicit arguments about why peacekeeping fails (or in the rare analysis, succeeds). They tend to be extremely rich in description, and in making suggestions for policy changes, but the use of social science tools for comparing cases is scarce (with the notable exception of Diehl 1993).

Reflecting the pessimistic mood in the policy-oriented literature has been the tenor of the works in “critical theory,” which also focus primarily on the historical period of peacekeeping in the 1990s. The critical turn emerged in opposition to “problem-solving theory” (Bellamy 2004, p. 18) and was critical in the sense of being interested in exploring the negative side effects and consequences (both intended and unintended) of peacekeeping. See, for example, analyses by Debrix (1999), Whitworth (2004), and Mendelson (2005); and a special edition of the journal *International Peacekeeping* edited by Pugh (2004).

Meanwhile, the UN had all but turned away from peacekeeping after the debacles in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and Srebrenica. From late 1993 to 1998, the organization fielded only one new large mission, in Eastern Slavonia. There were several smaller missions, but none with the breadth or mandate of those of the previous era. The pessimism of the mid-to late 1990s affected both the practice and the study of peacekeeping.

**THE POSITIVE TURN IN PRACTICE AND IN THEORY**

With the close of the decade, however, the political tide shifted back in favor of peacekeeping. After scathing, self-critical UN reports on the genocides in Rwanda (Carlsson et al. 1999) and Srebrenica (Annan 1999), a more positive mood began to envelop the UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had previously served as the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and thus was intimately familiar with and interested in the issues, had won a second term. His stature as a trusted hand at peacekeeping was matched by that of the new US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, who had played a pivotal role in securing the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999). While the top-level
leadership expressed general support for UN peacekeeping, of the many peace processes under way across the globe, four in particular lurched toward agreements, with opposing sides expressing an interest in having the UN play a central peacekeeping role. In 1999 alone, four large missions with robust mandates were launched in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and East Timor. These were followed by another wave of missions of substantial size and mandate in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Haiti in 2003–2004. As of the end of 2007, an unprecedented number of UN peacekeepers (more than 83,000) were deployed around the world.

The new operations came in tandem with discussions, and institutionalization, of the “Brahimi Report” (UN 2000). This report and subsequent reforms were named for the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who was the chair of a panel in 2000 to draft a comprehensive review of all aspects of UN peacekeeping. The report articulated a strategic perspective on peacekeeping (one matching means to ends and resources to challenges). It ushered in a doubling of the staff of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York; streamlined processes of procurement and logistics; and created a renewed sense at UN headquarters that the UN could “say no” to operations it deemed underfunded or given an inadequate mandate (as in Iraq).

The positive mood around UN headquarters coincided with a positive (in the social science sense of the word) turn in peacekeeping research. This work has attempted to address, in a more explicit and social scientifically rigorous way than past scholarship on the subject, basic empirical questions such as whether peacekeeping makes peace more durable, and why some missions are more successful than others. These questions have been addressed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. As noted above, much of the second-wave literature on peacekeeping examines cases where peacekeepers were deployed, not cases in which no such intervention occurred, making it impossible to assess empirically the “value added” of peacekeeping. Statistical surveys of all wars have solved this problem.

A few of these quantitative studies have examined peacekeeping in its “traditional” interstate setting. Diehl et al. (1996) argue that UN intervention has no effect on the recurrence of interstate conflict. Fortna (2004a), however, finds that “peace lasts substantially longer when international personnel deploy than when states are left to maintain peace on their own” (p. 517). (For studies of the durability of peace after interstate war more generally, see Werner 1999, Fortna 2004c, Werner & Yuen 2005.) Even fewer studies examine peacekeeping in both interstate and civil wars or explicitly compare the two settings. Many assume that peacekeeping is more difficult and therefore will be less successful in civil wars (e.g., Diehl 1993, Weiss 1995), but the few studies that examine peacekeeping in both interstate and civil wars (Heldt 2001/2002, Fortna 2003) show that peacekeeping is at least as effective in civil conflicts as in interstate ones.

The bulk of the quantitative work on peacekeeping’s effects focuses on civil wars (perhaps not surprisingly, as most of the current need for peacekeeping is in internal conflicts). It is now possible to say that these studies have reached a consensus, and it is an optimistic one. One or two studies cast doubt on the effectiveness of peacekeeping in general (e.g., Dubey 2002), and several distinguish between the effects of peacekeepers on making peace in the first place and on keeping it once it is established, finding that peacekeepers are not so good at the former (Greig & Diehl 2005, Gilligan & Sergenti 2007). [Note the contrast to Wilkenfeld & Brecher’s (1984) findings, discussed above.] However, the finding that peacekeeping makes civil war much less likely to resume once a ceasefire is in place has emerged as a strongly robust result in the quantitative literature. Using different data sets and statistical models, and covering slightly different time periods, a
number of studies (Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Hartzell et al. 2001, Walter 2002, Fortna 2004h, United Nations 2004, Doyle & Sambanis 2006, Gilligan & Sergenti 2007, Fortna 2008a) find that peacekeeping has a large and statistically significant effect on the duration of peace after civil wars. In other words, despite its limitations and the dysfunction highlighted in the previous wave of studies, peacekeeping keeps peace surprisingly well. Although in some cases peacekeepers have trouble leaving (e.g., Cyprus or more recently Kosovo) for fear that war will re-erupt as soon as they leave, peacekeepers have generally been quite good at establishing self-sustaining peace that lasts after the mission departs. Examples are found in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Croatia, and the West African peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau. (For a discussion of the implications of this distinction for testing peacekeeping’s effects, see Fortna 2008a, ch. 5.) In short, peace is substantially more likely to last, all else equal, when peacekeepers deploy—and even after they go home—than when belligerents are left to their own devices.

Many of these studies of peacekeeping’s effects on the recurrence of war have explicitly addressed, albeit in different ways, the fact that all is not equal. Peacekeeping is not employed at random; it is endogenous to other factors that affect whether peace lasts. Instrumental variables to deal with this endogeneity are hard to come by. Gilligan & Sergenti (2007) use matching techniques to handle endogeneity, and Fortna (2008a, especially ch. 2) engages in extensive analysis of where peacekeepers go so as to control for possible spuriousness.

This question, where peacekeepers go, is interesting in its own right (e.g., Gilligan & Stedman 2003). It has been examined quantitatively and qualitatively, on its own and within larger studies of the effects of peacekeeping. Much of this literature has focused, understandably, on the interests of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (the “P-5” in UN jargon) as determining where peacekeepers go (de Jonge Oudraat 1996, Jakobsen 1996, Gibbs 1997, Beardsley 2004, Mullenbach 2005; see also Durch 1993, pp. 22–23; Diehl 1993, p. 86). Others emphasize the interests of the international community in remaking war-torn societies as liberal democratic states (Andersson 2000, Marten 2004, Paris 2004), or in responding to a humanitarian impulse (Jakobsen 1996, Gilligan & Stedman 2003, Beardsley 2004). Few of these studies examine the selection process from the standpoint of the belligerents themselves, even though consent-based peacekeeping, by definition, requires the acceptance of the parties to the conflict (the perspectives of the “peacekept” are discussed below). Fortna (2008a) is one exception, arguing that the demand for peacekeeping from local actors is just as important as the supply from the international community.

Of particular interest to the question of peacekeeping’s effectiveness is whether peacekeepers tend to undertake easier cases or harder ones. If the former, then the putative effects of peacekeeping may be spurious—peacekeepers cannot make much of a difference if they go only where peace is likely to last in any case. However, if peacekeepers tend to go to more difficult situations, then successful cases of peacekeeping are all the more noteworthy (Howard 2008). Carter (2007) argues the former, that the UN strategically selects cases where the probability of success is high, and some of the findings of Gilligan & Stedman (2003) would suggest that peacekeeping is more likely in easier cases. De Jonge Oudraat (1996) argues the opposite, however, and Fortna (2004a,b, 2008a) finds empirically that peacekeepers select into the most difficult cases.

The turn toward rigorous research design has not been limited to quantitative studies; it has affected qualitative research on peacekeeping as well, and more and more the two types of analysis are conducted together. For example, Doyle & Sambanis (2006) combine statistical findings with case studies of peacekeeping success and failure. Noting that
peacekeeping generally has a positive effect on civil war outcomes, Howard (2008) asks why some missions fail while many others succeed. She employs qualitative methods to compare systematically the set of most similar, completed UN peacekeeping missions, defining success in terms of both mandate implementation and the ability of domestic institutions to function after the departure of the peacekeeping mission. The central finding is that “organizational learning”—that is, increasing ability to gather and disseminate information, engage with the local population, coordinate among units, and provide strong leadership—while a peacekeeping mission is deployed in the field, is one of three necessary sources of success. Fortna (2008a) uses quantitative analysis to test whether peacekeeping has an effect and qualitative analysis (fieldwork and interviews) of both peacekeeping and nonpeacekeeping cases to examine how it has an effect, i.e., the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping.

OPEN QUESTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Having established that peacekeeping works in general, the literature is turning to secondary questions. These include the relative effectiveness of different types of peacekeepers, the tools of peace enforcement and transitional administrations, links between peacekeeping and democratization, and perspectives of the “peacekept.” Each is explored below.

Peacekeeping by Whom?

Although the UN has deployed more peacekeeping operations than any other organization or single state, it has never had a monopoly on peacekeeping. Debates over who should undertake peace operations are as old as peacekeeping itself (the issue arose, for example, over the Arab League’s involvement in Palestine in 1948 and the Organization of American States mission in the Dominican Republic in 1965). However, with the launching of a number of non-UN missions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially those of NATO in Kosovo and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in several conflicts in West Africa, the issues of who does and who should keep peace have reemerged. There has been a lively policy debate on this topic (reviewed by Bellamy & Williams 2005), but the empirical study of the question remains embryonic. Durch & Berkman (2006) assess the strengths and weaknesses (in terms of legitimacy, military effectiveness, etc.) of various providers of peacekeeping, including the UN, NATO, various regional and subregional organizations, states, coalitions of states, and even private firms. Bellamy & Williams (2005) evaluate a number of recent non-UN missions along similar lines. Quantitative comparisons include those of Heldt (2004), who finds no difference in the success rate of UN and non-UN missions, and of Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2007), who find UN operations to be much more effective than non-UN missions. Clearly, more research is needed on this topic, particularly research that disaggregates non-UN missions.

Peace Enforcement

Related to the question of who keeps peace is who enforces peace, and how peace enforcement might be done most effectively. Whereas peacekeeping is primarily a task of implementing long-negotiated peace agreements, peace enforcement generally concerns the use of limited force until the noncooperative party is defeated or agrees to a peace agreement—as occurred, for example, in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire. In all of these cases, single states (e.g., Australia, the United Kingdom) or regional organizations (e.g., NATO, ECOWAS) used force, often with the endorsement of the UN, in order to stop the fighting and pave the way for less coercive,
multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations. Howard (2008) argues that, contrary to those who advocate for the development of a force capacity within the UN, the emerging division of labor—with regional organizations and single states enforcing peace, and the UN conducting the follow-on peacekeeping—is both effective and legitimate.

A number of US-led interventions have been conducted in the name of postconflict stability or nation-building, which are often included in the category of peace enforcement. The current, troubled, and much-discussed efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have cast a shadow over examinations of the effectiveness of the use of force to secure peace. In general, in this literature, policy considerations tend to overshadow social scientific explorations.

Marten (2004), in comparing several recent peace enforcement operations with colonial efforts of the past, provides a forceful and provocative argument for why attempts by the West to remake foreign polities in their own image falter, despite good intentions. However, this work focuses only on descriptions of the cases of failure, and thus misses the cases of success (e.g., in Sierra Leone) and possible sources of that success. Similarly, von Hippel (2000), O’Hanlon (2003), and Dobbins et al. (2003) provide masterful descriptions of US attempts to enforce peace, while Findlay (2002) traces the history of the use of force by the UN and the development of norms about the use of force by the organization. These works are concerned less with causal explanation than with policy recommendations.

Finnemore (2003) provides a constructivist theoretical understanding of why military intervention in the name of peace (humanitarian intervention) has become the norm in international relations. Mirroring Finnemore’s theoretical argument concerning the changing purposes of military intervention, in 2006, the UN Security Council ratified the “establishment of the foundations for a new normative and operational consensus on the role of military intervention for humanitarian purposes” (Thakur 2002, p. 323) by passing a resolution on “the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (United Nations 2006). The resolution was cited in the UN’s decision in August 2007 to send a peace enforcement mission to Darfur. The current conventional wisdom (emerging in part from the Brahimi process) holds that more robust peacekeeping missions mandated under Chapter VII are more effective at keeping peace than are Chapter VI missions. However, Fortna (2008a) finds no strong difference between the effects of Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions. She argues that this is because most of the causal mechanisms through which peacekeeping influences the parties to a conflict are nonmilitary, having instead to do with political and economic leverage, signaling intentions, and preventing accidental escalation, inter alia. While clearly there is a lot of movement in both the practice and theory of peace enforcement, the literature remains inconclusive about the conditions under which force may be most effective in the context of keeping peace.

**Transitional Administrations**

Another important issue in peacekeeping relates to the most intrusive of the multidimensional or integrated missions: UN transitional administrations (also called transitional authorities). Transitional administration mandates generally resemble those of typical multidimensional peacekeeping operations, but with the added requirement that the UN hold executive authority over the state administration. Sometimes this means the UN mission merely has veto power over the decisions of a transitional government (as in Namibia). At the other end of the spectrum, the UN is asked to take over the very governing of the state (as in East Timor), putting members of the international civil service in executive, legislative, and judicial positions that would usually be held by the
citizens of the state in question. Although transitional administration has become a major topic of discussion in the literature and in policy circles (see Chopra 2000, Marten 2004, Paris 2004, Pouligny et al. 2007), it has only been attempted (in its modern form) in five places—Namibia, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Kosovo, and East Timor—rendering social scientific generalizations somewhat difficult. In all these cases, the UN sought to play the role of “benevolent autocrat” (Chesterman 2004), violating the norms of sovereignty and democracy with the goals of establishing sovereignty and democracy.

The central debate in the transitional administration literature is over the extent to which third-party actors may be able to build states for others. Some authors argue that longer, more concerted efforts at delaying the disruptive effects of democratization and marketization are more conducive to long-term peacebuilding (Paris 2004), whereas others argue that such attempts mirror the negative aspects of colonial occupations of the past (von Hippel 2000, Marten 2004, Edelstein 2008). Questions center on both moral concerns (e.g., which actors may hold legitimate authority in a state?) and practical considerations (e.g., is the UN, or any third party, physically capable of governing another country?). Both practical and moral questions are related to effectiveness, and we do not yet have definitive answers. The real-world trend appears to be that the UN is moving away from attempting to launch new transitional administrative missions. (Tiny and dysfunctional Haiti would have been an obvious recent candidate, but as per the Brahimi reforms, the UN “said no.”) However, outside the domain of the UN, the US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq mirror quite closely those of transitional administrations, with the same moral and practical considerations under debate.

**Peacekeeping and Democratization**

A closely related debate concerns the effects of peacekeeping on democratization. Second only to stable peace, democratization is a core goal of the international community when it undertakes peacekeeping missions, whether transitional administrations or less intrusive forms of peacekeeping (Andersson 2000, Ottaway 2002, Paris 2004). However, the effectiveness of peacekeeping in fostering democracy is contested in the existing literature. Wantchekon (2004) argues that impartial peacekeepers provide one of the conditions for democracy to emerge from civil war. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) contend that peacekeeping helps to foster at least a minimal level of democracy as a condition of a negotiated settlement in which factions agree to disarm in return for political participation. Both Heldt (2007) and Pickering & Peceny (2006) find empirical support for the notion that UN intervention fosters a transition to democracy.

Others, however, argue that peacekeeping has negligible or even detrimental effects on democracy. Gurses & Mason (2006) find no significant effect of UN peacekeeping on democratization. Marten (2004) proposes that peacekeepers should limit their goals to providing stability and not try to transform societies. “The notion of imposing liberal democracy abroad is a pipedream,” she writes (p. 155). Weinstein (2005) holds that outsiders’ attempts at state- and democracy-building can impede the development of strong and democratic political and economic institutions, and that in some cases at least, postwar societies would be better off left to their own devices in a process of “autonomous recovery” (see also Wantchekon & Neeman 2002). Bueno de Mesquita & Downs (2006) argue that intervention, including that by the UN, is unlikely to lead to democracy and may even lead to its erosion. Fortna (2008b) finds that peacekeeping has no clear effect on postwar democratization because positive and negative effects cancel each other out. Although peacekeeping promotes stable peace, which in turn enables democracy to take root, it also thwarts democratization by crowding out indigenous processes of political
development and by removing war itself as an incentive to democratize.

Some of the differences in findings result from differences in research design—whether the study examines change in democracy scores or a country crossing a threshold to democracy, whether the study includes only civil wars or also interstate conflicts, whether the study examines only peacekeeping or intervention more broadly, etc. The empirical debate over the effects of peacekeeping on democracy in war-torn states remains to be resolved.

**Perspectives of the “Peacekept”**

The vast majority of the literature on peacekeeping focuses on the peacekeepers rather than the “peacekept.” This term, coined (to our knowledge) by Clapham (1998), refers to the parties to the conflict—government and rebel decision makers, as well as the greater population—among whom peacekeepers are attempting to keep peace. That the success of peacekeeping depends on the political will of the parties to the conflict is acknowledged; indeed it has become something of a cliché in the peacekeeping literature. But there the attention to these parties usually ends. A few studies have started to rectify this problem.

Clapham (1998) argues that peacekeepers and the peacekept often have very different perspectives. For example, whereas peacekeepers prioritize a nonviolent conflict resolution process, the peacekept care more about the substance of who wins what. Peacekeepers see themselves as providing solutions to conflicts, while the peacekept see them as bringing resources, including resources that can be manipulated by the peacekept. Peacekeepers think in the short term; the peacekept think about the long term.

Fortna (2008a) interviews government and rebel decision makers to obtain their perspective on whether and how peacekeeping affects the incentives of the peacekept and the information on which they base decisions. Pouligny (2006) focuses less on decision-making elites, providing instead an account of the perceptions local populations have of peacekeepers intervening in their countries (see also Talento 2007). Other studies have begun to assess the effects of peacekeeping at the micro level, for example by surveying both ex-combatants who were exposed to UN peacekeepers and those who were not (Humphreys & Weinstein 2007, Mvukiyehe et al. 2007). However, in general, analyses from the vantage point of those on the receiving end of peacekeeping operations have only just begun to develop.

**CONCLUSION**

The peacekeeping literature has emerged in three waves: one smaller and two larger. Studies in the first wave focus on the traditional operations during the Cold War, when peacekeeping was primarily used as an instrument to monitor ceasefires between formerly warring states. These studies come to contradictory findings about the effectiveness of peacekeeping. After the end of the Cold War, and the explosion of peacekeeping practice in civil wars, came the second wave of literature, which focuses largely on peacekeeping failures and negative effects. Works in these first two waves do not generally draw on systematic quantitative or qualitative methods to compare and evaluate cases, focusing instead on somewhat arbitrarily selected case study descriptions and analyses. By the turn of the millennium, a third wave began to crest. This literature has been much more careful in its use of systematic research methods and has come to much more robust findings about the positive effects of peacekeeping, and the sources of success and failure. Since this third wave emerged, the peacekeeping literature has also branched out into related debates about who does, and ought to do, peacekeeping; the pros and cons of peace enforcement; the contradictions of transitional administrations; the links between peacekeeping and democratization; and the perspectives of the peacekept. In
contrast to the consensus on the effectiveness of peacekeeping for maintaining peace after civil war, these new directions in the literature are, to date, far less conclusive. However, they should make for important and lively future developments in the peacekeeping literature, extending our knowledge of this important policy tool.

**SUMMARY POINTS**

1. The literature on peacekeeping has reflected the practice of peacekeeping, coming in waves as the number of peacekeeping missions has risen and fallen.

2. Until the most recent wave, the literature focused on description and policy prescription, but was unable, owing to methodological limitations, to answer basic empirical questions such as whether peacekeeping works or what distinguishes successful cases from unsuccessful ones.

3. In the most recent wave, the literature has matured and become much more methodologically sophisticated, employing both quantitative and methodologically informed qualitative analysis.

4. A consensus has emerged from this analysis: Peacekeeping is quite effective; that is, it makes peace much more likely to last.

**FUTURE ISSUES**

1. *Who should keep peace?* Who keeps peace most effectively, the UN, regional organizations, or state-led coalitions? Are different tasks (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, transitional administration) better performed by different international actors?

2. *The use of force.* Is force required to protect vulnerable populations? Empirically, are missions with more robust mandates more effective?

3. *Transitional administration.* Can the international community foster sovereignty and democracy by violating sovereignty and democracy? What are the long-term effects of administration by the international community?

4. *Peacekeeping and democratization.* Does peacekeeping foster the growth of democracy, inhibit it, or both? What are the long-term effects of peacekeeping on democratization?

5. *Perspectives of the peacekept.* How is peacekeeping viewed by decision makers and populations within the countries to which peacekeepers deploy? What are the effects of peacekeeping at the micro level? Can regional variations within countries, or among individuals in war-torn states, be explained by exposure to and interaction with peacekeepers?

**DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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Contents

State Failure
   Robert H. Bates ................................................................. 1

The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization
   Johan P. Olsen ................................................................. 13

The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis
   Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter ................................................................. 39

What the Ancient Greeks Can Tell Us About Democracy
   Josiah Ober ................................................................. 67

The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts
   Ran Hirschl ................................................................. 93

Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings
   Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff ................................................................. 119

The Role of Politics in Economic Development
   Peter Gourevitch ................................................................. 137

Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons from Reforms of the 1990s
   Ethan Scheiner ................................................................. 161

The New Empirical Biopolitics
   John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing ................................................................. 183

The Rule of Law and Economic Development
   Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede ................................................................. 205

Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral State
   Marie Gottschalk ................................................................. 235

Private Global Business Regulation
   David Vogel ................................................................. 261

Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature
   Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard ................................................................. 283
Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse
Vivien A. Schmidt ................................................................. 303

The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization
Kenneth M. Roberts ............................................................... 327

Coalitions
Macartan Humphreys ............................................................. 351

The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory
Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren .............................................. 387

What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?
Peter Nannestad .............................................................. 413

Convenience Voting
Paul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter A. Miller, and Daniel Toffey .............. 437

Race, Immigration, and the Identity-to-Politics Link
Taeku Lee ................................................................................. 457

Work and Power: The Connection Between Female Labor Force Participation and Female Political Representation
Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth ........................................... 479

Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science
Dennis F. Thompson .............................................................. 497

Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?
Diana C. Mutz ............................................................................ 521

The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks
Elisabeth Jean Wood ........................................................................ 539

Political Polarization in the American Public
Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams ......................................... 563

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 7–11 .................. 589
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 7–11 ........................... 591

Errata

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