TERRORISM, CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES, AND POST-WAR STABILITY: HYPOTHESES AND (VERY) PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

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Abstract

How does the use of terror tactics by one or both sides affect the likelihood of negotiations or the chances for their success? Are terrorist wars more likely to end with the defeat of one side rather than a compromise outcome? Are conflicts that involve terrorism any more or less likely to resume than others? The use of terror seem to make peace close to impossible in some cases (the Palestinian Intifada), but in other conflicts peace is achieved despite the use of terrorist tactics (as by the ANC in South Africa). This paper takes a first cut at answering these questions. Conflicts in which terrorist tactics are used by rebels are compared to those in which rebels chose other strategies. This comparison allows for a systematic study of the effects of terrorism on important questions of war termination and post-war reconstruction.

The paper defines and discusses measurement of terrorist rebel groups, enumerates several hypotheses about the effects of terrorism on the outcome of civil wars and the stability of peace in their wake, and presents preliminary findings from statistical analyses. The paper (tentatively) concludes that terrorism does make settlement harder to achieve, but that it has no large effect on the stability of peace (due to selection effects). It debunks the hypothesis that terrorism is effective for rebels – rebels who choose terrorist tactics fare no better in terms of the outcomes achieved on the battlefield or at the negotiating table than those who eschew such tactics.

No nation can negotiate with terrorists.
For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.
President George W. Bush[1]

We do not negotiate with terrorists. We put them out of business.
US Press Secretary, Scott McClellan[2]

A peacemaker walks up to the left side of a line. A terrorist walks up to the right side of the line. The peacemaker introduces himself. The terrorist kills him.

A peacemaker walks up to the left side of the line. A terrorist walks up to the right side of the line. The peacemaker asks, "why did you kill my friend?" The terrorist kills him and rapes his wife.
...
A peacemaker walks up to the left side of the line. A terrorist walks up to the right side of the line. The peacemaker says, "I'll pay you $1000 if you stop attacking us." The terrorist agrees to the deal, takes the $1000, and kills him.
... [and so on].[3]

Many governments have a stated policy never to negotiate with terrorists. The rationale

for this position is obvious – terrorism must never be rewarded with concessions, negotiations

would set a dangerous precedent, and even sitting down to talk with terrorists can grant them

political legitimacy. But, of course, what governments say in this regard and what they actually

do are very different. Examples of negotiations between governments and terrorists are

plentiful: the South African government negotiated a deal with the African National Congress

(ANC), the British government negotiated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Spain has

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[1] April 4, 2002, the Rose Garden. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/ 20020404-1.html (accessed July 25, 2008).

[2] January 19, 2006, at the White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/ 20060119-6.html (accessed July 25, 2008).

[3] Hurricane Harry, HH Blowhard, blog "How to Negotiate with Terrorists" August 12, 2006. http://hurricaneharry.blogspot.com/2006/08/how-to-negotiate-with-terrorists.html (accessed July 25, 2008).

negotiated with Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Israel has negotiated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Sri Lanka with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and so on.[4]

As these examples suggest, much of the use of terrorism as a tactic takes place in the context of civil wars, yet the study of terrorism and the study of civil wars have generally proceeded in isolation from one another.[5] This paper compares civil wars that involved terrorist rebel groups with those that did not as a way of trying to merge insights from the two literatures.[6]

It is motivated by a series of questions about terrorism and the potential for the stable termination of civil wars: how does the use of terrorism affect the likelihood of negotiations or the chances for their success? Are terrorist wars more likely to end with the defeat of one side rather than a compromise outcome? Are they more likely to yield favorable outcomes for the rebel side as the "terrorism works" literature would suggest? Are conflicts that involve terrorism any more or less likely to resume than others? The use of terror seems to make peace close to impossible in some cases (the Palestinian Intifada and the Sri Lankan civil war), but in other

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[4] Neumann 2007; Moran 2006. Much of the literature on bargaining with terrorists examines negotiations over hostages. See for example, Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart 1987; Bapat 2006; Lapan and Sandler 1988.

[5] One exception is Sambanis 2008. Sambanis notes that "most terrorist events take place in countries affected by civil war" (p.2), though he goes on to draw distinctions between terrorism and civil wars.

[6] The paper was first presented at a festschrift panel in honor of Martha Crenshaw. As a scholar of civil wars, but a former student of Martha's, the panel gave me an opportunity to address the impact of terrorism in civil wars. Note that I am guilty of Audrey Cronin's charge of conducting research on terrorism as a newcomer to the field with only a beginner's knowledge of the existing scholarship. Cronin 2006, p.7. I would thus be particularly grateful for suggestions from those of you who have worked on terrorism longer than I as to read and where to look as I move forward with this project.

conflicts peace is achieved despite the use of terrorist tactics (as in South Africa or Northern Ireland). This paper takes a first cut at answering these questions. Conflicts in which terrorist tactics are used by rebel groups are compared to those in which rebels use strategies of violence other than terrorism.[7]

While the most systematic studies of terrorism make comparisons across terrorist organizations[8], to my knowledge, studies of the effects of terrorism, for example, on the question of "whether terrorism works?" have not compared conflicts in which terrorism is used to those in which it is not.[9] But this comparison is necessary if we want to understand the effects of terrorism on important questions of war termination and post-war reconstruction.

The paper proceeds in five sections. The next section spells out why we might expect civil wars that involve terrorism to be different in terms of their outcomes and the stability of peace in their aftermath. The following section discusses definitional and data issues and explains how I code whether rebel groups are "terrorist" or not. I then present preliminary findings from statistical analyses of the outcome of civil wars and the duration of peace. The last two sections outline some tentative conclusions and directions for further research.

Hypotheses

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[7] For the purposes of this paper, I limit myself to looking at the effects of rebel use of terrorism rather than the use of terror tactics by the government (state terrorism). I thus sidestep for now the question of whether the definition of terrorism should be limited to non-state actors. On definitions, see more below.

[8] For example, Bapat 2006; Bapat 2007; Cronin 2006; Jones and Libicki 2008; McCormick 2003 and the literature reviewed therein; Shapiro 2008.

[9] On this question, see, for example, Abrahms 2006 (and his brief review and critique of the literature on this question, pp.44-46); Kydd and Walter 2006;Pape 2003.

As the excerpt from "Hurricane Harry's" blog quoted at the beginning of the paper suggests, the common view is that attempting to make peace with terrorists is futile, they are simply not trustworthy enough. As Bapat points out, terrorists face a credibility problem in any attempted negotiations. Governments are mistrustful of them and expect them to break their promises.[10] This is true for all rebel groups to some extent; rebels and governments are deadly enemies after all. However, we might reasonably expect the problem to be particularly severe for those groups who use terrorist tactics. They are likely to be seen as beyond the pale morally and particularly hardline and ruthless.

Terrorist rebel groups may also be particularly suspicious of the government in any potential negotiations to end the conflict. This may be, in part, due to a selection effect; only particularly hardline groups choose terrorist tactics. But it could also be induced by this choice. Having committed terrorist attacks, rebels may not believe that they will be accepted into a peaceful post-war political order. Government promises of amnesty or of a power-sharing role for rebels may therefore not be credible to terrorist rebel groups.[11]

Higher levels of mistrust and the commitment problems that go along with them have implications for the ability of groups engaged in civil war to settle their conflict. According to this line of thought, civil wars in which rebels engage in terrorism should be particularly unlikely to end in negotiated settlement.

H1. Negotiated settlement is less likely in civil wars involving terrorist rebel

groups.

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[10] Bapat 2006, p. 214.

[11] Rebel groups sometimes force recruits (and especially abductees) to commit particularly atrocious acts, for example killing family members, so that they will not believe amnesty or reintegration into society is possible.

The same set of problems may also affect the stability of peace after the fighting stops. Even if the parties can overcome their commitment problems and reach a negotiated deal, the deep levels of mistrust engendered by terrorism may make these settlements less likely to hold. Both sides, and the population at large, may be particularly unwilling to make the kinds of compromises needed to implement peace. And misunderstandings or misperception of each others' intentions are particularly likely when levels of mistrust are highest. The security dilemma will be most severe when trust is lowest. Actions that one side takes to protect itself will thus be interpreted in the worst possible light by the other side, and this can easily lead to a spiral that takes a country back to war.

> *H2a. Peace will be less stable after civil wars in which terrorist tactics are used*
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> *than after other civil wars.*

On the other hand, selection effects may counteract this relationship. For the stability of peace to become an issue, the war must end, at least temporarily. And for that to happen, either one side must have been able to defeat the other, in which case peace is likely to be relatively stable,[12] or the parties must be able to overcome the commitment problem to reach an agreement, in which case we might expect it to be less of an obstacle to maintaining peace.

> *H2b. The use of terrorist tactics will have no large effect on the stability of peace.*

Another line of thought leads to a rather different hypothesis. The effectiveness of

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[12] On the relationship between military victory and stability see, for example, Licklider 1995; Toft 2007; Fortna 2008, p.116.

terrorism has been debated in the literature,[13] but, as noted above, none of these studies compare conflicts in which terrorism is used to those in which it is not. If "terrorism works" then we should see a difference in the outcomes of civil wars in which it is used as a tactic and those in which rebels refrain from terrorism. Specifically, we should rebels who use terrorism obtaining better outcomes, on average, than those who do not. That is, we should see fewer outright victories for governments, and more rebel victories or negotiated settlements. While negotiated settlements may be less favorable from the rebels' perspective than victory, in many cases rebels are fighting to gain concessions (such as autonomy) at the negotiating table, so a settlement represents at least a partial victory for rebels. As the old adage has it, for rebel groups, not to lose is to win. For example, the South African conflict ended in a negotiated settlement that enshrined a political victory for the ANC and other anti-apartheid activists.

> *H3. Rebel victories and settlements should be more likely, and government*
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> *victories less likely, when rebels use terrorism than when they do not.*

We need to be careful in evaluating this hypothesis, however. Rebels choose their tactics strategically, not at random. Presumably, they choose to engage in terrorism when they think it will be most effective, or when other options are closed to them. These selection effects must be taken into account when evaluating whether terrorism "works." If rebels are more likely to engage in terrorism against democracies, for example,[14] and if democratic governments are more

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[13] Abrahms 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006.

[14] Stanton 2008 argues that rebels are more likely to use terrorist tactics (what she refers to as strategies of coercion, see below) against democratic governments. Cronin 2006, p.31 argues that democracies have particular trouble repressing terrorist groups, and Crenshaw 1981, p.383 argues that democracies are less willing to prevent and police terrorism, creating a permissive cause for terrorism. However, she goes on to argue that a more direct cause of terrorism is the lack of opportunities for political participation, implying that terrorism should be less likely in democracies. Note that many of the causes of terrorism outlined by Crenshaw apply to political

likely to prevail in civil wars,[15] then unless we control for regime type, we will underestimate the

effectiveness of terrorism. Similarly, if terrorism is a "weapon of the weak"[16] and is only chosen

by rebel groups whose militarily capacity is relatively feeble, failure to take this into account

may make terrorism look less effective than it really is.

Definitions and Data

Defining terrorism is notoriously difficult;[17] as the cliché goes, one person's terrorist is

another's freedom fighter, and this is perhaps particularly true in the context of civil wars.

Because it is such a loaded term, its definition is highly fraught and therefore contested. As

McCormick notes, the terrorist label is often used "not to define but to defame."[18] The

definitions used in the empirical literature on terrorism attempt to overcome this problem by

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violence and civil war more generally. Her arguments may thus apply more to the question of
why some groups rebel rather than why some rebel groups choose terrorism as their strategy.
Indeed, Lai 2007 draws explicitly on work used to explain the onset of civil war, including
Fearon and Laitin 2003 to develop an argument about what states are most likely to produce
terrorism. Other work has debated the relationship between democracy and transnational
terrorist attacks. See for example, Eubank and Weinberg 1998, who find terrorism more likely
in democracies, Drakos and Gofas 2006, who find a weak statistical link, and Li 2005, who finds
democracies are less prone to transnational terrorism. However, none of these studies address
home-grown terrorism of the type examined here. Sambanis 2008 suggests that political
freedom reduces terrorism, but he excludes from analysis terrorism that occurs in the context of
civil wars.

[15] Democracies are more likely to win interstate wars (Reiter and Stam 2002), but their ability to
prevail in civil wars appears to be much more limited. On civil war outcomes, see DeRouen and
Sobek 2004; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Enterline and Balch-Lindsay 2002.

[16] Crenshaw 1981, p.387. Note, however, that Stanton 2008 (pp. 88-89, 228-230) finds only
weak support for the hypothesis that weaker rebel groups will be more likely to use terrorist
tactics than stronger rebel groups.

[17] The running tally of definitions of the term was at 273 as of 2007. Stohl 2007, p.258.

[18] McCormick 2003, p.473.

establishing relatively objective criteria for defining terrorism.

Of these attempts, the broadest definitions of terrorism are not particularly useful for our purposes here because they encompass all rebel groups in all civil wars. For example, the original version of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD1) "employed a broad definition of terrorism: the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation."[19] The State Department definition of "terrorist activity" is similarly broad: "any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any [of a number of activities including, inter alia,] the use of any ... explosive, firearm, or other weapon ... with the intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property."[20] Under these broad criteria, any rebel group is by definition a terrorist group and we therefore cannot distinguish between those civil wars in which terrorism is used as a tactic and those in which it is not.

Some of the literature on terrorism distinguishes between it and guerilla warfare or insurgency,[21] but this distinction is not generally well-defined, and it leads us to the opposite

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[19] http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/methodology.htm (accessed 8/1/08).

[20] Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (accessed 7/24/08). Note that to be included on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), which a number of researchers use to identify terrorist groups (e.g., Kydd and Walter 2006 and Abrahms 2006), a group must 1) be foreign (i.e., not American), 2) engage in terrorist activity, as defined here, or terrorism (see definition in footnote [25] below), **and** 3) threaten the security of US nationals or the national security if the US." So the FTO list is in no way a comprehensive or even representative list of terrorist groups.

[21] For discussions, see Schmid and Jongman 1988, esp. pp. 13-18; and Silke 1996.

problem. Cronin writes that "terrorism and insurgency are not the same, but they are related"

and notes that terrorist groups can "escalate to insurgency or even conventional war,"[22]

suggesting that terrorism is a lower level of violence than insurgency or civil war. Guelke also

notes that in common usage, the term terrorism often refers to lower levels of violence or

violence in the context of peace rather than war, that is, in stable (and especially democratic)

societies.[23] If terrorism is defined as violence of a lower order than civil war, then by definition,

no rebel groups in full-fledged civil wars are terrorists, and again we cannot distinguish among

groups that use terrorist tactics from those that do not.[24]

Many definitions of terrorism stipulate that violence be targeted at non-combatants or

civilians. For example, Kydd and Walter define terrorism "as the use of violence against

civilians by nonstate actors to attain political goals."[25] In her discussion of the definition of

terrorism, Cronin lists among "aspects of the concept that are fundamental, " the deliberate

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[22] Cronin 2006, pp.31-32.

[23] Guelke 1995, pp. 30-31. This distinction becomes hard to maintain in "the war on terror" when everything regarding terrorism is a state of war. And obviously having the regime type of the country involved be part of the definition of terrorism makes it impossible to examine whether democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism than other types of states (but I digress).

[24] Similarly, Sambanis 2008 looks for ways of conceptualizing civil wars and terrorism as distinct phenomena.

[25] Kydd and Walter 2006, p.52. The State Department's definition of terrorism (as opposed to "terrorist activity" also includes the stipulation that violence be "perpetrated against noncombatant targets." http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (accessed 7/24/08) However, according to the Federation of American Scientists, the interpretation of noncombatant is interpreted very broadly to include military personnel who are unarmed or off duty at the time of the attack, or attacks on military installations or armed military personnel if a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, as well as attack on civilians. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/index.html (accessed 8/1/08).

targeting of the innocent.[26] Thus we might distinguish between those rebel groups that

deliberately attack civilians from those that do not.

However, as Stanton's research shows, almost all rebel groups (and almost all

governments involved in civil wars) attack civilians in some way or another. The most common

strategy of civilian targeting is what she refers to as "control" – the use of "violence as a means

of coercing civilian cooperation and deterring civilians from providing aid to the opponent."[27]

According to her data, which cover 1989-2005, there are only three rebel groups not coded as

using this particular strategy of violence against civilians.[28] In other, words, targeting civilians,

at least to some extent, is ubiquitous.[29] We thus need to know more about how, and how often a

rebel group targets civilians.[30]

Another common criterion in definitions of terrorism is that the violence be aimed at

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[26] Cronin 2002/2003, pp.32-33. The other fundamental characteristics for Cronin are terrorism's political nature, nonstate character, and its seeming randomness.

[27] Stanton 2008, p.31.

[28] The three exceptions are: FRUD in Djibouti (1991-1994); the rebel military faction in Guinea Bissau (1998-1999); and Polisario in Morocco (1975-1989). These rebel groups did not engage in high levels of other forms of violence against civilians either, although FRUD abducted civilians, the military faction in Guinea Bissau tortured civilians and shelled civilian residential areas, and all three of these groups used landmines. Email correspondence with author, 7/30/08.

[29] Note that Stanton codes only well-established patterns of violence against civilians, a single incident that might be attributed to individual criminal action does not qualify. Similarly, she does not count cases in which one side accuses the other of a particular form of violence against civilians but no third party confirms it. For these and other reasons, her data if anything undercount the use of violence against civilians. Stanton 2008, Chapter 3.

[30] As Abrahms 2006, p.55 notes, the State Department FTO list "does not distinguish between (1) groups that focus their attacks primarily on civilian targets and (2) those that mostly attack military targets, but occasionally attack civilians." Abrahms finds that this distinction is important for understanding the effectiveness of terrorism, because the latter groups ("guerilla groups" as opposed to "civilian-centric terrorist groups" in his terminology) achieve success far more than the former.

influencing not the immediate victims of the violence but some wider audience. The violence is thus often described as "symbolic" or aimed at communicating a political message.[31] As Crenshaw puts it, terrorism "targets the few in a way that claims the attention of the many."[32]

Depending on how broadly one interprets this criterion, it might help us distinguish rebel groups that use strategies of terrorism from those that do not. To the extent that all belligerents in civil wars use violence to get the other side to bargain with them (or to concede defeat altogether), all rebels use violence to communicate a political message to leaders on the other side. However, under a narrower interpretation of this criterion, we might distinguish between more direct uses of violence to degrade the enemy's capabilities or to control territory, for example, from uses that are meant to impose costs so as to signal commitment to the fight and thereby convince the opponent that making concessions is preferable to continued fighting.

Here the distinctions Stanton draws between different strategies of violence against civilians is particularly valuable. She distinguishes strategies of "coercion" from the abovementioned control (and other strategies, such as cleansing or destabilization) by focusing on the "the use of violence as a means of forcing the opponent to take a particular desired action – to agree to negotiations, to reduce its war aims, to make concessions, to surrender." This strategy is "intended not to coerce civilians themselves, but to coerce *the opponent* into making concessions" (her emphasis).[33] Her operational measure of this type of violence accords with our general-use sense of the term "terrorism." She codes:

whether or not a rebel group used bombs to attack civilian targets during the

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[31] Crenshaw 1981, p.379; McCormick 2003, p.474.

[32] Crenshaw 1995, p.4.

[33] Stanton 2008, pp. 34-35.

course of the civil war; here [she refers] not to artillery bombings or shelling of towns or cities, but to the use of smaller scale bombs, such as car and bus bombs, suicide bombs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to attack very specific civilian targets – often buses, restaurants, markets, and other public areas in a town or city.[34]

For the purposes of this paper, then, I define *terrorist rebel groups* as those who use symbolic violence against civilians with the aim of coercing the government to make political concessions.   This definition is narrower than other definitions of terrorism, so as to distinguish among rebel groups. For example, it excludes groups who engage in violence against civilians only using what Kydd and Walter refer to as a strategy of intimidation in which particular civilians are targeted to convince them to support the terrorist organization rather than the government.[35]

Using this definition does not yield a comprehensive list of all terrorist organizations, as many such organizations are involved in conflicts that do not meet the definition of a civil war, and therefore are not classified here as rebel groups. Civil wars are defined here, following Doyle and Sambanis, as armed conflict between the government of an internationally recognized state and one or more politically organized opposition groups who mount effective resistance against the state; violence must cause more than 1,000 deaths and take place primarily within the country's borders.[36] Thus terrorist groups in conflicts that do not meet the 1,000 battle death standard are not included, nor are those who attack primarily across borders rather than in their

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[34] She does include in this measure the use of suicide bombs or IEDs to attack military bases or convoys, only "cases where bombs were aimed at unambiguously civilian targets." Ibid., p.17.

[35] Kydd and Walter 2006, pp. 66 ff. This strategy is much the same as the one Stanton refers to as control (see above).

[36] Doyle and Sambanis 2006. See also Sambanis 2004.

home state – many transnational and international terrorist groups are thus excluded.

As such, the selection of cases examined here includes mostly ethnonationalist/separatist organizations. It may also include some religious/"sacred" groups, but many of them will be excluded, as will many leftist and rightist terrorist groups (to use Cronin's typology).[37] These groups are therefore not necessarily representative of all terrorist groups, specifically, they may be more likely to have clear political or territorial goals that are more easily negotiable than the goals of other types of terrorist organizations.[38] In other words, this selection should bias results away from finding a negative effect of terrorism on negotiated settlement.

By using civil wars as the universe of cases, there may be another selection effect at work. In some cases a group already involved in a civil war may be choosing whether to use terrorist tactics. But in other cases, whether a group that engages in terrorism is involved in a civil war may depend on the government's response.[39] It takes two to tango; only if the government responds to terrorism (and other attacks by the rebel group) with sufficient military force for the conflict to be coded as a civil war will the group end up in the data used here. Most very small terrorist groups are not included in these data, nor are virtually all of those that do not combine terrorist attacks against civilians with at least some attacks on government military forces.

How do the data used here compare to those usually used in the terrorism literature? The

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[37] Cronin 2002/2003, p.39. There are, however, some cases in the data of ideologically driven terrorist rebel groups, such as the FMLN in El Salvador, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and the Communist insurgency (NPA) in the Philippines.

[38] Ibid, p.40. See also Jones and Libicki 2008. Cronin argues elsewhere that ethnonationalist/separatist groups also have the longest lifespans. Cronin 2006, p.13.

[39] Sambanis 2008, pp. 33-34.

newer version of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD2) shies away from a definition, instead

taking an inclusive approach to what the database covers and coding a number of criteria that

researchers can use to screen the data for their own purposes.[40] Inclusion of an incident in the

data requires all three of the following criteria: that it be 1) intentional; 2) violent (including

violence against property); 3) committed by a subnational actor (i.e., only non-state terrorism

included); plus any two of the following criteria: that it be 4) aimed at a political, economic

(other than pure profit), religious, or social goal; 5) intended to coerce, intimidate, or convey a

message to a larger audience other than immediate victims; 6) not permitted by international

humanitarian law, especially the law against targeting non-combatants.[41] The first four criteria

are true of attacks by all rebel groups. The definition of terrorist rebel groups that I use here

requires that both the fifth and sixth criteria also be met, and under relatively narrow

interpretations.

The other large databases of terrorism used frequently in the empirical literature are

ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) and the RAND-MIPT

(Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) data. The former database focuses on

international and transnational terrorism, requiring for inclusion that the ramifications of an

event "transcend national boundaries." While it is not entirely clear how this criterion is

interpreted, it presumably excludes a number of rebel groups whose fight and support is entirely

domestic to their own country. The RAND-MIPT data covers some domestic terrorism, but only

after 1998 (coverage of international terrorism goes back to 1968). These data are also no longer

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[40] The GTD data set has taken over and builds on the Pinkerton collection of terrorist data.

[41] CETIS (Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies), Global Terrorism Database GTD2
(1998-2004) Codebook, pp. 10-11. Available at http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/gtd2_codebook.pdf .

available publicly.[42]

Operationally, then, I use Stanton's coercion variable, discussed above, to code whether a rebel group uses terrorist tactics. Stanton's strategies of destabilization and cleansing, which she distinguishes from coercion, also sound like terrorism to some degree. These involve attacks on civilians intended to destabilize a country or to force people to flee by terrorizing the population. However, Stanton's operational coding of these strategies involve massacres and scorched earth campaigns (burning homes and crops), which, while involving "terror" are farther from our intuitive understanding of terrorism than the acts she codes under coercion.[43] Thus, not all who "terrorize" are "terrorist" – groups like the RUF in Sierra Leone or the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda are not coded as terrorist. Note, therefore, that terrorist groups like the ANC might be considered morally preferable to non-terrorist groups like the RUF.[44]

Of the 85 rebel groups in Stanton's data set, 25, or just under 30% engage in terrorist attacks on civilians. These include groups generally classified as "terrorist" by other sources, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Taliban in Afghanistan (after 2003), the FARC and ELN in Colombia, the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, and so on. Given the time bounds of the data (1989 to 2005) and the requirement that the conflict be classified as a civil war, Stanton's list of rebel groups classified as terrorist overlaps significantly with Crenshaw's list of terrorist groups.[45]

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[42] http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/ (accessed August 18, 2008).

[43] Moreover, some of the groups that engage in these strategies are also coded as engaging in coercion (Stanton's strategies are not mutually exclusive), so will be included in our list of terrorist rebel organizations in any case. An example is the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

[44] On judging the relative morality of terrorism, see Crenshaw 1983, p. 3.

[45] Crenshaw 1991, pp. 76-77. The lists are the same for almost all groups that were active before 1989 (i.e., early enough to be captured in Crenshaw's analysis). The only exceptions are as

One advantage of using Stanton's data to code terrorist rebel groups rather than the databases more commonly used in the terrorism literature is that this minimizes some of the well-known geographical biases in the terrorism data, particularly their over-representation of terrorism in Western democracies and under-representation or spotty coverage of groups in Africa and other strategically less important (to the US) places.[46]

Because I am interested, in part, in the effects of terrorism on the stability of peace after civil wars, I use data compiled for a study of the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace in the aftermath of civil conflict. These data build on data on civil wars collected by Doyle and Sambanis,[47] but include many more short-lived spells of peace. For all conflicts in the Doyle and Sambanis list for the period from 1989 to 1989, I added any break in the fighting of at least one

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follows: There are three groups classified by Stanton as using coercion that are not on Crenshaw's list: the ANC in South Africa, the PKK in Turkey, and the Shanti Bahini in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Both the ANC and the PKK are often included in analyses of terrorist groups and they show up in the MIPT data on terrorist incidents as responsible for multiple attacks (15 and 68 attacks, respectively). The Shanti Bahini (aka PCSJSS) is included in MIPT for only one attack, against a splinter group (the UPDF) in 2005, after the civil war proper had ended. However, not only is the Chittagong Hill Tracts an obscure conflict, not generally well reported on in the sources used to code terrorism data bases such as MIPT, but the conflict also ended before MIPT began systematic coverage of domestic terrorism in 1998 (for more on the conflict see Fortna 2008). Other than groups that ceased operations before Stanton's data begins in 1989, or groups involved in conflicts not big enough to be classified as civil wars (e.g., the ETA in Spain), the only groups on Crenshaw's list that are not classified as using coercion by Stanton are 3 groups in Guatemala (the EGP, FAR, and MANO), and the Croatian National Resistance. Stanton codes only for the URNG in Guatemala, but codes it as well as the Croatian rebels as not using terrorist tactics. The URNG is included for only three attacks in the MIPT data, hardly a sustained campaign of terror, while Croatian rebels do not show up at all. However these conflicts end before MIPT began collecting information on domestic terrorism.

[46] Stohl 2007. Jake Shapiro notes, for example, that the MIPT data on domestic terrorism is quite spotty and idiosyncratic for places not well covered in the Western press. For example, almost half of the domestic incidents reported in Africa occur in Algeria alone. Email correspondence with author, August 11, 2008.

[47] Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006.

month. Inclusion of these ultimately failed attempts to maintain peace is important to avoid truncating the dependent variable.[48] There are 94 cases in the data set from 59 civil wars. Of these, 7 are not coded by Stanton, so the universe of cases for analyses here that combine the two data sets is 87 cases (see appendix for list of cases). Of these, 21 (24%) are coded as including terrorist rebel groups.[49]

There are some limitations to using these data for analyses of war outcomes, however; limitations I hope to remedy in future research. Specifically, use of these data misses two types of cases that may affect conclusions about the effect of terrorism on war outcomes. The first are cases in which rebels take power, but the war continues uninterrupted because former government forces continue fighting. In these cases, who is the government and who are the rebels flips, but there is no end to the war. These cases represent rebel victories of a sort (the rebels succeed in taking power), and are coded as such in the Doyle and Sambanis data, but obviously they are not full victories as the former government continues to contest the issue. The only notable case of this in the time period examined here occurs in Afghanistan when the Taliban take Kabul in September 1996 and the Northern Alliance becomes the new rebel group.[50] In this case, Stanton codes neither the Taliban (before they are rebels again in 2003) nor

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[48] For more on these data, see Fortna 2008.

[49] Where civil war dates do not match up closely, I use Stanton's coding only if the conflicts included here fall within the dates in her data. Where her data includes a single case for a war that the Fortna data split into two or more cases because of short-lived breaks in the fighting, I use her coding for all of the relevant observations. It is possible that some rebel groups who used terrorism in some parts of the war did not do so in others, but Stanton's impression, having coded the data herself, is that this is very rare, with two exceptions – the PKK (Turkey) only began bombing civilian targets after 1993; the MILF (Philippines) after 1986 (email correspondence with author, July 25, 2008).   In these cases, I only code the group as terrorist after these dates.

[50] Another related case is Somalia in which the government disintegrates but fighting continues among other factions. This is arguably a case of government defeat with no concomitant rebel

the Northern Alliance as using terrorist tactics so this is not an omitted case of terrorist rebel victory. Adding it to the data would thus not change the results presented below.

More serious is the fact that the Fortna data omit cases in which fighting is ongoing as of January 1, 2000. For some cases, the war and the rebel group does appear in the data because of an earlier, failed, cease-fire (as with the Angola-UNITA case), but in others there are no breaks in the fighting over the ten year period examined, so the conflict does not appear in the data at all (as with Colombia). Of these, there are approximately thirteen that come to an end before 2005 (when Stanton's data collection ends), and twenty-two that are ongoing as of 2005. Of the first set, none involve terrorist rebel groups. Interestingly, however, of those that are still ongoing, sixteen involve rebels who use terrorist tactics and only six with rebels who do not. More on this point below.

A final limitation is not specific to the use of the Fortna data. Most data sets on civil war likely over-count negotiated settlements, and the data used here are no exception. These data consider four possible outcomes: government victory, rebel victory, truce, or settlement. These categories are considered mutually exclusive, but some settlements enshrine political victories for one side or the other. The above-mentioned success of the ANC in South Africa is an example of something one might properly consider a rebel victory that is coded as a settlement. The settlement reached in Sierra Leone also masks the fact that the RUF rebel group was for all intents and purposes militarily defeated when it signed the Abuja agreements in 2000/2001. Ideally, to test hypothesis 3, we would want to know not just whether a settlement was reached

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victory. The fighting after the government collapse is not included in most data bases on civil war because there is no recognized government.

but which side it favored.[51]

Because of these limitations, the findings presented below, especially those on outcomes

(that is, tests of hypotheses 1 and 3), should be considered very preliminary.

(Very) Preliminary Results

Consider first the effect of terrorism on civil war outcomes. Hypothesis 1 suggested that

settlements would be less likely where terrorism is used by rebels. Hypothesis 3 suggested that

both settlements and especially rebel victories would be more likely, and government victories

less likely where rebels choose terrorism.

Table 1 shows a simple bivariate cross-tab of war outcomes by whether or not rebels

used terrorist tactics. As noted above, there are four possible, mutually exclusive, war outcomes:

government victory, rebel victory, truce, or settlement. The distinction between the latter two

categories is as follows. Settlements (also known as peace treaties) require agreement on the

fundamental issues of the war, while truces may involve a cease-fire agreement, an agreement on

a political process of negotiation that does not itself settle the key issues of the contest, unilateral

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[51] Ongoing data collection efforts for the War Initiation and Termination (WIT) project are an attempt to resolve this problem. Preliminary data for interstate wars that disaggregate political and military outcomes, coding each on a continuum, are described in Fazal et al. 2006. Data collection on civil wars is still underway. Fearon and Laitin 2007 have coded civil war outcomes along a slightly more fine-grained scale, distinguishing between complete victories and more partial ones. However, the overlap between the cases they code and the cases used here is relatively narrow (only 35 cases, including only 9 with terrorist rebel groups). The discrepancies are due in part because their data does not include relatively short lived breaks in the fighting, thus excluding many cases of interest, and in part because their project was part of the Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State Failure project) so they employ the PITF list of civil wars. Many of the end dates used by PITF do not match those used in other civil war data sets (including other data compiled by Fearon and Laitin) and thus cannot be used here. An examination of the cases that do overlap does not suggest that using their coding would change the (tentative) conclusions reached here – if anything their coding might strengthen the finding that terrorism is not particularly effective.

cease-fires, or cases where the fighting simply fizzles out with no agreement (and no clear military winner).

[Table 1 about here]

This cursory look at the data shows weak support for hypothesis 1. As hypothesized, settlements are less prevalent (achieved in 24% of the cases) where terrorism is used than when it is not (32% of cases). This difference is not statistically significant, however: $(P(\chi^2)=.49)$. Interestingly, truces are more prevalent where terrorism is used. This bivariate comparison shows no support for hypothesis 3, in fact just the opposite appears to be true. Rebels are significantly **less** likely to win when they use terrorist tactics, in fact, there are no cases in these data in which a terrorist rebel group emerged victorious. As already noted, settlements are if anything less likely. And government victories are more likely, again the opposite of what hypothesis 3 predicts. These last relationships are not statistically significant, but there is certainly no support for hypothesis 3 in the simple cross-tab.

However, as discussed above, rebel strategies are not chosen at random, and there are some reasons to think that rebels might choose terrorism when they are less likely to prevail. The simple bivariate comparison could thus be hiding the true relationship. In order to take this into account, we need to control for other factors that might affect civil war outcomes, particularly things that might make it harder for rebels to win.

Table 2 shows the results of multinomial logit regressions with controls included to deal with this issue. Regime type (measured using the average Polity score of the country over the five years before the war)[52] is included because there are reasons to think there is a link between democracy and the use of terrorism. I also include several variables that tap into the relative

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[52] Marshall and Jaggers 2002.

strength of the government and rebels. Government army size is the most straightforward of these; rebels should have a harder time beating larger armies, all else equal.[53] A measure of mountainousness is included because rough terrain makes it easier to wage a successful insurgency against the government. Contraband is a dummy variable coded 1 if the rebels finance their fight through contraband sources such as drugs or diamonds.[54] I also include controls for whether rebels are fighting for control of the central government (revolutionary war aims) as opposed to secession or autonomy for a particular region,[55] the duration of the war (measured in years), the human cost of the war (measured as the natural log of the number of people killed, including battle and civilian deaths, plus the number of refugees and internally displaced by the fighting), and whether the fighting involved multiple factions as opposed to a simple fight between one rebel group and government forces.[56] Because there are multiple cases from some conflicts, representing separate breaks in the fighting, not all of the cases are independent of each other. I therefore calculate robust standard errors (RSE) with cases clustered by conflict.

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[53] This variable is from Doyle and Sambanis 2000.

[54] The mountains and contraband variables are from Fearon and Laitin 2003.

[55] These data are also from Fearon and Laitin 2003. The results reported here compare center-seeking wars with exit/autonomy seeking and ambiguous or mixed cases. Including the ambiguous cases with the center-seeking wars makes little difference to the results (there are too few cases in this middle category to examine it on its own). I also checked results when Sambanis and Zinn's 2002 measure of secessionist conflict was used instead. In other tests (results not shown), I control for whether the war is an identity based conflict, fought along ethnic, religious or other identity lines as opposed to ideology. These two variables are highly correlated (-0.53) so I do not include them together. The war aims variable is more likely to affect whether terrorism is used. Stanton 2008. In none of these variations do the basic findings change substantially.

[56] All of these variables are from Doyle and Sambanis 2000.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 shows the effects of each of these variables on the probability of government victory, rebel victory, and settlement, all measured relative to truces (the omitted category). This multivariate analysis confirms the impression from the cross-tab that hypothesis 3 is incorrect, and provides modest support for hypothesis 1. As the results in the third column show, the use of terrorism by rebels makes it harder for the parties to reach a peace settlement, as predicted by hypothesis 1. This negative coefficient is not quite statistically significant at traditional 0.05 levels (p>|Z| = .155).[57] Thus, while we cannot have complete confidence in a negative relationship between terrorism and settlements, we can be about 85% sure of this result. Note also that the data used here cover the full universe of cases, not a sample, making questions of statistical inference much less difficult.

Controlling for the fact that terrorism might be used where rebels have a particularly low likelihood of victory does not rescue hypothesis 3, however. Terrorism makes rebel victory particularly unlikely; this effect is very large and statistically significant. Government victories are, if anything, more likely when rebels use terrorist tactics. This positive effect is not significant, but we can nonetheless reject hypothesis 3 and its prediction of a negative relationship, with a fair level of confidence.

One possible objection to these findings is that the data set used here adds a number of short-lived attempts at peace to standard lists of civil wars. These cases include outcomes that, by definition, did not stick. While this is a virtue for analyses of the duration of peace, it might skew our analysis of war outcomes – the outcomes coded for these cases do not represent the

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[57] Note that the comparison here is settlements relative to truces. If one compares settlements to all other outcomes combined, the effect of terrorism is similar (Coef. = -1.33, P>|z| = 0.16 in a logit regression using the same variables as table 2).

final outcome of the war. That so many cases (almost half of them) end in a truce is a result of these additions. To check whether this is in fact skewing results, I dropped cases of the most short-lived spells of peace, first all those in which peace lasts fewer than three months (which drops 12 cases, 10 of them truces) then all those in which peace lasts less than one year (which drops 30 cases, 21 of them truces, along with 6 settlements and 3 rebel victories).[58] This reduces the number of cases, making it harder to estimate the model, but it does not fundamentally change the results for the effect of terrorism on outcomes: hypothesis 1 still fares quite well (in fact the negative result becomes statistically significant), while hypothesis 3 can be easily rejected (results not shown).

Turn now to an evaluation of the effects of terrorism on the stability of peace. Table 3 shows a simple cross-tab of whether or not the war resumes by whether or not rebels used terrorism. This quick look at the data supports hypothesis 2b rather than 2a. There is no support for the notion that wars in which terrorism is used are more likely to resume, in fact they may be slightly less likely to resume (though not significantly so: $P(\chi^2)=.36$). Only 52% of terrorist civil wars start up again, while 63% of non-terrorist wars do so.[59]

[Table 3 about here]

Once again, however, the bivariate results might be misleading. There may be variables that affect both whether terrorism is used and the stability of peace that could lead to spurious conclusions. Also, this two-by-two table does not take into account the fact that the dependent

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[58] I also tried dropping only those cases in which peace lasts less than three months or 1 year, respectively, **and** in which there is a later case coded in the data.

[59] This measures whether the conflict had resumed as of 2005, the difference is slightly larger (45% to 62%), though still not statistically significant, if one looks only at resumption within five years of a cease-fire.

variable is censored: we know whether peace has lasted to date (or to 2005 in these data), but do not know if it will continue to hold. As the recent fighting in Georgia illustrates, peace continues to be fragile in many of the cases examined here, and can fail at any time.[60]

Table 4 shows the results of a Cox proportional hazards model estimating effects on the duration of peace. This model is one of a class of duration models designed to evaluate effects on how long something, in this case peace, lasts, taking the censored nature of the data into account.[61] The duration of peace is measured from the date of a cease-fire to the resumption of war, if any, between the same parties. The data are censored as of the beginning of 2005, so for each case in the data set we have at least five years to observe whether peace holds. I control for the same variables as before, now adding controls for the outcome of the war.[62]

The table reports hazard ratios rather than coefficients. Hazard ratios are interpreted relative to 1. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates no effect, a hazard ratio significantly lower than 1 indicates that the variable reduces the hazard, or risk, of another war, a hazard ratio significantly higher than 1 indicates that the variable increases the risk of renewed fighting. For example, a hazard ratio of 0.5 cuts the risk of another war in half, while a hazard ratio of 2.0 doubles the risk. In other words, small numbers are good for peace, big numbers are bad for peace. As in table 2, cases are clustered by conflict for the purposes of calculating robust standard errors.

[60] In these data, the observation for the Abkhazia conflict is censored at the beginning of 2005 with peace having held for over 10 years, since May of 1994. The Ossetia conflict is similar, although it is dropped from the analysis here because it is not included in Stanton's data set.

[61] The Cox model used here makes no assumption about the underlying hazard function (that is, it does not assume that peace gets easier or harder to maintain over time, or even that this is monotonic). Results are similar if a Weibull model, which is more restrictive, but sometimes more accurate with small data sets, is used.

[62] On the relationship between these variables and the duration of peace after civil wars, see Fortna 2008.

[Table 4 about here]

The results in table 4 confirm our impressions from the bivariate analysis. There is no evidence that the use of terrorist tactics makes peace harder to maintain. If anything, just the opposite is true. The hazard ratio for terrorist rebel groups is less than, though not significantly different from, 1, providing support for hypothesis 2b (that there is no effect) and debunking hypothesis 2a.[63] Given that the parties have managed to stop fighting, whether through victory by one side, truce, or treaty, terrorism has little effect on the duration of peace. This could be the result of selection effects, in which only those conflicts where the commitment problems raised by terrorism are overcome make it to this point in the analysis. Or it could be that all civil wars involve severe commitment problems and mistrust; the use of terrorism does not necessarily make this problem worse. Given the support for hypothesis 1, above, the former explanation seems more likely, but only further research will disentangle these accounts.

Tentative Conclusions

The preliminary analyses provided here indicate support for some of our hypotheses and debunk others. Hypothesis 1, that the use of terrorist tactics will create commitment problems making it harder for parties in a civil war to reach a settlement, is fairly well supported. However, there is no support for hypothesis 2a, that these same commitment problems will lead to less stable peace should the war end. Rather hypothesis 2b seems to be on the mark, that

[63] Interestingly, robustness checks playing around with model specification and alternative measures of some variables indicate that it is possible to generate a significant effect, with terrorism associated with significantly **longer** peace. This happens, for example, if peacekeeping is controlled for, and if an alternative measure of war costs (that does not include refugees and IDPs, but only those killed) is used. This may be the result of non-linearities in the data, however, rather than a true stabilizing effect of terrorism. On this problem, see Achen 2005.

selection effects mean that the use of terrorism will have no significant effect on the durability of peace, given that the parties have reached a cease-fire of some sort. Hypothesis 3 is also disproved here. There is no evidence, at least for the period covered here,[64] that terrorism "works" – when we compare rebel groups who choose terrorist tactics to those who do not, the former fare no better in terms of the outcomes of the war. And this is true even when we account for the fact that terrorism may be chosen by relatively weak rebel groups.

As noted above, none of these analyses include ongoing wars. And as we have seen, wars still ongoing as of 2005 are more likely than the average civil war to involve terrorist rebel groups. What are the implications of this fact? It could be that this represents a secular trend (so to speak) such that terrorism is becoming more frequently used, but this does not appear to be the case – the correlation between the start date of civil wars and the use of terrorism is in fact negative. Rather, it is likely that wars in which terrorism is used are particularly likely to last a long time and therefore to be ongoing.

This suggests additional support for hypothesis 1. In these cases, neither side has been able to defeat the other, but despite these long, drawn-out stalemates, the parties have been unable to reach a political settlement, or even a truce, to end the fighting. Inclusion of these cases in the analysis would thus likely strengthen support for the notion that terrorism makes civil wars particularly difficult to settle. One might argue that the prevalence of terrorism in these ongoing wars offers a bit of support for hypothesis 3 as well. The use of terrorism appears to make it possible for rebellions to last for a very long time. If one considers that not losing is a

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[64] Note that because the data cover only 1989-1999, some notable cases of successful anti-colonial rebel movements that used terrorism (such as Algeria) are excluded (thanks to Jim Walsh for pointing this out). Whether the findings reported here will hold up over a longer time period that includes the Cold War and the anti-colonial struggles of the '50s and '60s (or for that matter the post-9/11 period) must await further data collection.

form of success for rebels, then this suggests terrorist rebels are doing relatively well. They are at least avoiding defeat. However, I do not think this is what most of the literature that argues terrorism works has in mind. Terrorism is not working well enough for these group to win either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.

The data limitations discussed in the second section of the paper mean that any definitive conclusions, particularly about war outcomes, are premature. But we can come to some tentative or preliminary conclusions. The use of terrorism by rebel groups appears not to be effective for winning wars outright, or for gaining political concessions through negotiations. It does seem to make for longer, harder to settle conflicts. But if the parties are able to end the fighting, either through military victory or an agreement to stop fighting, terrorism does not seem to make peace harder to keep.

Directions for Future Research

These same data limitations point to the most immediate directions for future research. The data need to be updated to include wars that have ended since 2000, both those coded as ended by Stanton (through 2004) and those that have ended since then. Perhaps even more important will be the inclusion of ongoing wars so that the effect of terrorism on prolonging wars and making their termination more difficult can be examined empirically. This will require analysis of the duration of war as well as its outcome and the duration of peace in its aftermath. These efforts to update and expand the data will also allow for at least preliminary comparison of the effects of terrorism before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Coding the use of terrorism by rebel groups before 1989 will also allow for stronger inferences (see footnote [64] above).

Supplementing the statistical analysis begun here with qualitative analysis that compares civil war cases that involve terrorist groups with those that do not involve terrorism will allow for deeper and more nuanced conclusions about whether and how terrorism affects the processes of war termination and the stability of peace.

Finally, the research agenda begun here could be expanded to address a number of broader questions. One set of questions relate to the kinds of strategies that can be used to build stable post-war societies. For example, are mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions or war crimes trials more important in cases where terrorism has been employed? How does the use of terrorism affect conflict resolution strategies such as power-sharing or peacekeeping? A second set of questions pertains to the use of "terror" by governments and the relationship between government and rebel strategies. The analysis here has focused exclusively on the use of terrorism by rebels, but government strategies of violence against civilians, and against terrorist rebel groups, are also likely to affect the duration and outcome of civil wars and the stability of peace in their aftermath. Finally, and more broadly, there are questions about whether the most important differences are those between the use and non-use of terrorism in civil wars, or those about the treatment of civilians more generally, such that terrorism is not much different in its effects than other strategies that "terrorize" civilians, such as ethnic cleansing or destabilization.

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Table 1. Bivariate Comparison: War Outcomes by Use of Terrorist Tactics

Rebels	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Truce	Settlement	Total
Not Terrorist	5 7.6 %	12 18.2%	28 42.4%	21 31.8%	66
Terrorist	3 14.3%	0 0%	13 62.9%	5 23.8%	21
Total	8 9.2%	12 13.8%	41 47.1%	26 29.9%	87

Table 2. Multinomial Logit: War Outcomes

	Government Victory		Rebel Victory		Settlement	
	Coef. (RSE)	P>|z|	Coef. (RSE)	P>|z|	Coef. (RSE)	P>|z|
Terrorist Rebels	**2.305 (1.862)**	**.216**	**-37.481 (2.326)**	**.000**	**-1.547 (1.087)**	**.155**
Democracy (pre war)	-0.073 (0.160)	.650	-0.366 (0.161)	.023	-0.044 (0.086)	.605
Mountains	0.424 (0.415)	.306	-0.314 (0.377)	.405	-0.389 (0.291)	.181
Government Army Size	0.005 (0.002)	.007	0.006 (0.002)	.006	-0.003 (0.001)	.065
Contraband	4.026 (1.898)	.034	1.426 (1.358)	.294	3.234 (0.953)	.001
Rebel Aims – Center	4.280 (1.603)	.008	5.415 (1.519)	.000	1.676 (0.938)	.074
Duration of War	-0.201 (0.093)	.032	0.079 (0.079)	.314	0.151 (0.068)	.026
Cost (deaths + displaced)	-0.403 (0.308)	.192	0.353 (0.328)	.281	-0.313 (0.206)	.128
Factions	-1.019 (1.325)	.442	-0.888 (1.318)	.500	-0.206 (0.936)	.826
Constant	-0.676 (3.834)	.860	-7.899 (5.833)	.176	3.583 (3.032)	.237

Truce is the base outcome.
N = 69
Pseudo R^2 = 0.409
Log Pseudolikelihood = -49.969

Robust Standard Errors (RSE) calculated with cases clustered by conflict.

Table 3. Bivariate Comparison: War Resumption by Use of Terrorist Tactics

Rebels	Peace Holds	War Resumes	Total
Not Terrorist	24 36.4%	42 63.6%	66
Terrorist	10 47.6%	11 52.4%	21
Total	34 39.1%	53 61.9%	87

Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Effects on the Duration of Peace

	Hazard Ratio (RSE)	P>|z|
Terrorist Rebels	**0.703 (0.494)**	**.616**
Government Victory	0.093 (0.080)	.006
Rebel Victory	0.378 (0.214)	.086
Treaty	0.184 (0.084)	.000
Democracy (pre war)	1.067 (0.058)	.227
Mountains	0.948 (0.134)	.706
Government Army Size	1.000 (0.000)	.557
Contraband	3.275 (1.563)	.013
Rebel Aims – Center	1.252 (0.616)	.648
Duration of War	0.981 (0.032)	.553
Cost (deaths + displaced)	1.193 (0.206)	.308
Factions	1.157 (0.480)	.725

N = 69
Log Pseudolikelihood = -119.08

Robust Standard Errors (RSE) calculated with cases clustered by conflict.

Appendix: List of Cases

Conflict	end date	outcome	renewed war?	terrorist
Afghanistan-Mujahideen	25apr1992	Victory-Rebels	1	0
Afghanistan-Taliban	07mar1993	Settlement	1	0
Algeria-FIS/AIS	15oct1997	Truce	0	1
Angola-Unita	31may1991	Settlement	1	0
Angola-Unita	20nov1994	Settlement	1	0
Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh	31aug1993	Truce	1	0
Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh	16may1994	Truce	0	0
Bangladesh-CHT Shanti Bahini	01aug1992	Truce	0	1
Myanmar-Karen (KNU)	28apr1992	Truce	1	0
Myanmar-Karen (KNU)	15jun1995	Truce	1	0
Cambodia-Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF	23oct1991	Settlement	0	0
Central African Rep.- military factions	25jan1997	Settlement	0	0
Chad-CSNPD, FARF	11aug1994	Settlement	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville-Cobras	15oct1997	Victory-Rebels	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville-Ninjas	29dec1999	Truce	1	0
CongoD.R./Zaire-AFDL	17may1997	Victory-Rebels	1	0
Djibouti-FRUD	28feb1992	Truce	1	0
Djibouti-FRUD	26dec1994	Settlement	0	0
Egypt-al Gamaa al-Islamiyya	15sep1997	Truce	0	1
El Salvador-FMLN	16dec1992	Settlement	0	1
Ethiopia-Eritrea	21may1991	Victory-Rebels	0	0
Ethiopia-ideology EPRP, TPLF, EPDM, OLF	21may1991	Victory-Rebels	0	0
Georgia-Abkhazia	27jul1993	Truce	1	0
Georgia-Abkhazia	14may1994	Truce	0	0
Guatemala-URNG	26apr1991	Truce	1	0
Guatemala-URNG	20mar1996	Settlement	0	0
Guinea-Bissau-mil. faction	26aug1998	Truce	1	0
Guinea-Bissau-mil. faction	02nov1998	Settlement	1	0
Guinea-Bissau-mil. faction	03feb1999	Truce	1	0
Guinea-Bissau-mil. faction	07may1999	Victory-Rebels	0	0
India-Assam (ULFA)	20apr1991	Truce	1	1
India-Assam (ULFA)	17dec1991	Truce	1	1
India-Sikh	31dec1993	Victory-Govt	0	1
Indonesia-Aceh (GAM)	31dec1991	Victory-Govt	1	0
Indonesia-E. Timor (Fretilin)	25oct1999	Victory-Rebels	0	0
Iraq-Kurds (KDP, PUK)	01mar1993	Victory-Rebels	1	0
Iraq-Kurds (KDP, PUK)	15oct1996	Victory-Rebels	0	0
Iraq-Shia (SCIRI)	15dec1993	Victory-Govt	0	0
Israel-Palestine (Fatah, Hamas)	13sep1993	Settlement	1	1
Liberia-NPFL	28nov1990	Settlement	1	0
Liberia-NPFL	17aug1996	Settlement	1	0
Mali-Tuaregs	06jan1991	Settlement	1	0
Mali-Tuaregs	31mar1995	Settlement	0	0

Moldova-Dneister Rep.	21jul1992	Settlement	0	0
Morocco-Western Sahara (Polisario)	06sep1991	Truce	0	0
Mozambique-Renamo	04oct1992	Settlement	0	0
Nicaragua-Contras	19apr1989	Settlement	0	0
U.K.-N. Ireland (PIRA)	31aug1994	Truce	1	1
U.K.-N. Ireland (PIRA)	10apr1998	Settlement	0	1
Pakistan-Mohajirs (MQM)	15oct1999	Truce	0	0
Papua New Guinea-Bougainville Rev. Army	15mar1990	Truce	1	1
Papua New Guinea-Bougainville Rev. Army	21jan1991	Truce	1	1
Papua New Guinea-Bougainville Rev. Army	10oct1997	Truce	0	1
Peru-Sendero Luminoso	31dec1996	Victory-Govt	0	1
Philippines-Communists (CPP/NPA)	31dec1995	Truce	1	1
Philippines-Mindanao (MNLF, MILF)	07nov1993	Truce	1	1
Philippines-Mindanao (MNLF, MILF)	31dec1990	Truce	1	1
Philippines-Mindanao (MNLF, MILF)	02sep1996	Settlement	1	1
Russia-Chechnya	01jun1996	Truce	1	0
Russia-Chechnya	23aug1996	Truce	1	0
Rwanda-RPF	31jul1992	Truce	1	0
Rwanda-RPF	04aug1993	Settlement	1	0
Rwanda-RPF	18jul1994	Victory-Rebels	1	0
Senegal-MFDC (Casamance)	08jul1993	Truce	1	0
Sierra Leone-RUF	30nov1996	Settlement	1	0
Sierra Leone-RUF	07jul1999	Settlement	1	0
Somalia-USC faction (SNA)	27jan1991	Victory-Rebels	1	0
South Africa-ANC	26apr1994	Settlement	0	1
Sri Lanka-LTTE (Tamils)	07jan1995	Truce	1	1
Sri Lanka-JVP	29dec1989	Victory-Govt	0	0
Sudan-SPLA	01may1989	Truce	1	0
Sudan-SPLA	28mar1995	Truce	1	0
Sudan-SPLA	15jul1998	Truce	1	0
Sudan-SPLA	15apr1999	Truce	1	0
Tajikistan-UTO	27jun1997	Settlement	0	0
Turkey-Kurds (PKK)	20mar1993	Truce	1	0
Turkey-Kurds (PKK)	01sep1999	Victory-Govt	0	1
Uganda-Kony	15feb1989	Truce	1	0
Uganda-LRA	15jul1992	Victory-Govt	1	0
Yemen-South Yemen	10jul1994	Victory-Govt	0	0
Bosnia-Croats (HVO),Serbs (BSA)	01jan1995	Truce	1	0
Bosnia-Croats (HVO),Serbs (BSA)	14dec1995	Settlement	0	0
Yugoslavia-Croatia	03jan1992	Truce	1	0
Croatia (serbs)	30mar1994	Truce	1	0
Croatia (Serbs)	12nov1995	Truce	0	0
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (KLA)	12oct1998	Truce	1	0
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (KLA)	09jun1999	Victory-Rebels	0	0