Columbia University in the City of New YorkEconomics

 

          
          Yeon-Koo Che 

 

Professor 
Economics Department

Columbia University

420 West 118th Street, 1016 IAB
New York, NY 10027

Phone: (212) 854-8276
Fax: (212) 854-8059

cubmailyc2271@columbia.edu

                

                Photo: Diane Roy

 

 

 

RESEARCH

  Curriculum Vitae

 

 

WORKING PAPERS

 

Opinions as Incentives,” (with Navin Kartik), Revised, February 2008.

“Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership” (with Ian Gale), November 2006.

“Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions” (with Jinwoo Kim), September 2007, (supplementary material).

“Strong Collusion-Proof Implementation” (with Jinwoo Kim), July 2007.

“Strategic Judgment Proofing” (with Kathryn Spier), Revised, February 2008.

“Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure” (with Sergei Severinov), April 2007.

Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem:  A Dynamic Perspective” (with Jozsef Sakovics).

“Expanding ‘Choice’ in School Choice,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), July 2007, preliminary draft available on request.

Bidding with Securities:  Comment,” (with Jinwoo Kim), May 2008.

 

SOME RECENT PUBLICATION

 

Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment” (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior, (2007), 59, 240-259, (Instructions:  first-price auction, second-price auction).

"Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation" (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica, (2006), 74, 1063-1107.

 Caps on Political Lobbying:  Reply” (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review, (2006), 96, 1355-1360.

(see a comment by Kaplan and Wettstein on our original article). 

Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types” (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics, (2006), 1, 95 - 118.

“How to Divide the Possession of a Football?” (with Terry Hendershott), Economics Letters, forthcoming.

 The Role of  Lockups in Takeover Contests” (with Tracy Lewis), RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," (with Kathryn Spier), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.

A Dynamic Theory of Holdup” (with Jozsef Sakovics), Econometrica, (2004), 72, 1063-1103.

Competitive Procurement with Corruption” (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of Economics, (2004), 35, 50-68.

 Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions” (with Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior, (2004), 46, 383-397.

Optimal Design of Research Contests” (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review, (2003), 93, 646-671.

Optimal Incentives for Teams” (with S.-W. Yoo), American Economic Review, (2001), 91, 525-541.

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer” (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory, (2000), 92, 198-233.

Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting” (with Don Hausch), American Economic Review, (1999), 89, 125-147.

Caps on Political Lobbying” (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review, (1998), 88, 643-651.

 Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders” (with Ian Gale), Review of Economic Studies, (1998), 65, 1-21.

Hold Up Problem” (with Jozsef Sakovics), to appear in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition.

Procurement,” to appear in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition.

 


 

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Teaching:  Courseworks

    Law and Economics

 

    Industrial Organization III:  Market Design