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Kelvin J. Lancaster
Professor of Economic Theory 420 West 118th Street, 1016 IAB Phone: (212) 854-8276 |
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RESEARCH
Working Papers:
Expanding ‘Choice’ in School Choice, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu
and Yosuke Yasuda), New, December 2008, Supplementary notes.
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of
Ownership, (with Ian
Gale), January 2009.
Contractual Remedies to the Holdup
Problem: A Dynamic Perspective, (with Jozsef Sakovics).
Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure,
(with Sergei
Severinov), April 2007.
Selected Publication:
Resolving Conflicting
Preferences in School Choice: the Boston
Mechanism Reconsidered, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu
and Yosuke Yasuda), forthcoming, American
Economic Review.
Bidding with Securities: Comment, (with Jinwoo Kim), forthcoming, American
Economic Review
Asymptotic Equivalence of
Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms, (with Fuhito Kojima), Econometrica (forthcoming)
Opinions as
Incentives, (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political
Economy, (2009)
The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime
Games, (with Terry Hendershott), The
Economists' Voice, (2009)
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim) Journal of Economic Theory, (2009)
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,
(with Jinwoo Kim),
Econometrica, (2006)
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, (with Jozsef Sakovics),
Econometrica (2004)
Cooperative Investments and the Value
of Contracting, (with Don Hausch), American
Economic Review (1999)
Optimal Design of Research Contests,
(with Ian Gale),
American Economic Review (2003)
Caps on Political Lobbying, (with Ian Gale), American
Economic Review (1998)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply, (with Ian Gale), American
Economic Review (2006)
Optimal Incentives for Teams, (with
S.-W. Yoo), American Economic Review (2001)
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When
Bidders Have Arbitrary Types, (with Ian Gale), Theoretical
Economics (2006)
Standard Auctions with Financially
Constrained Bidders, (with Ian Gale), Review
of Economic Studies (1998)
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to
Budget-Constrained Buyer, (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory (2000)
Asymmetric Information about Rivals'
Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior
(2007)
Strategic Judgment Proofing, (with
Kathryn Spier), RAND Journal of
Economics,
(2008)
The Role of Lockups in Takeover
Contests (with Tracy
Lewis), RAND Journal of Economics
(2007)
Competitive Procurement
with Corruption, (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of
Economics (2004)
Design Competition through
Multidimensional Auctions, RAND Journal of
Economics (1993)
New Palgrave:
Hold Up Problem (with Jozsef Sakovics),
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
, Second Edition.
Procurement, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
Second Edition.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMICS
Theoretical Economics
Journal of Economic Theory
Teaching: Courseworks
Law
and Economics (W4615)
Market
Design (E6600)