최 연구 (in Korean)
118th Street, 1016 IAB
Kojima), New, Jan 2013.
Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: a Network Flow Approach, (with Jinwoo Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), Revised, Feb 2013.
Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), Revised, Feb. 2012, Supplementary Notes.
Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital, (with Rajiv Sethi), Revised, Nov 2012.
[VOX-EU piece on the paper] formerly titled, Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets: the Case of Naked Default Swaps.
An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions, (with Syngjoo Choi and Jinwoo Kim), April 2011.
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications, (with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom), American Economic
Assigning Resources to
Gale and Jinwoo
Pandering to Persuade, (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik), American Economic Review, (2013), Supplementary Appendix.
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the Boston Mechanism Reconsidered, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), American Economic Review (2011)
Bidding with Securities: Comment, (with Jinwoo
Kim), forthcoming American
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms, (with Fuhito Kojima), Econometrica (2010)
Opinions as Incentives, (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political Economy, (2009)
The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games, (with Terry Hendershott), The Economists' Voice, (2009)
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim) Journal of Economic Theory, (2009)
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation, (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica, (2006)
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, (with Jozsef Sakovics), Econometrica (2004)
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, (with Don Hausch), American (1999)
Optimal Design of Research Contests, (with Ian Gale), American (2003)
Caps on Political Lobbying, (with Ian Gale), American (1998)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply, (with Ian Gale), American (2006)
Optimal Incentives for Teams, (with S.-W. Yoo), American (2001)
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types, (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics (2006)
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, (with Ian Gale), Review of Economic Studies (1998)
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer, (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory (2000)
Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
Strategic Judgment Proofing, (with Kathryn Spier), RAND Journal of Economics, (2008)
The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests (with Tracy Lewis), RAND Journal of Economics (2007)
Competitive Procurement with Corruption, (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of Economics (2004)
Design Competition through
Multidimensional Auctions, RAND
Lectures, Survey and Discussion:
"Beyond the Coasian Irrelevance,"
Lectures given for the 17th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic
Theory in 2006.
Part 1: Motivation and
Part 2: Asymmetric Information
Part 3: Hold-up and Incomplete Contracts
Part 4: Externalities
Part 5: Wealth Constraints.
Hold Up Problem (with Jozsef Sakovics), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, , Second Edition.
Procurement, The New Palgrave Dictionary
Discussion of ``Matching Markets:
Theory and Practice'' by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez,
prepared for the 2010
World Congress of Econometric Society.
Brave New World of Market Design, (with Erin Cho), forthcoming, Korean Economic Review.
한국어 사이트: 칼럼, 인터뷰