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최 연구 (in Korean)
420
West
118th Street, 1016 IAB Phone:
(212)
854-8276 |
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Working Papers:
Efficient
Assignment
with
Interdependent
Values,
(with Jinwoo
Kim
and Fuhito
Kojima), New, Jan 2013.
Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: a Network Flow Approach, (with Jinwoo Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), Revised, Feb 2013.
Expanding
‘Choice’
in School
Choice,
(with
Atila
Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), Revised, Feb. 2012, Supplementary Notes.
Credit
Market Speculation and
the
Cost
of
Capital, (with Rajiv
Sethi), Revised,
Nov
2012.
[VOX-EU
piece on
the paper] formerly titled, Economic Consequences of
Speculative Side Bets: the Case of Naked Default Swaps.
An
Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions, (with Syngjoo Choi and
Jinwoo
Kim), April 2011.
Selected Publication:
Designing
Random
Allocation
Mechanisms:
Theory
and
Applications, (with Eric Budish, Fuhito
Kojima, and Paul Milgrom), American
Economic
Review,
forthcoming.
Assigning Resources to
Budget-Constrained Agents,
(with Ian
Gale and Jinwoo
Kim), Review
of
Economic
Studies (2013),
Supplementary Appendix.
Pandering
to
Persuade, (with Wouter Dessein
and Navin Kartik), American
Economic
Review, (2013), Supplementary
Appendix.
Resolving
Conflicting Preferences in School Choice:
the Boston Mechanism Reconsidered,
(with Atila
Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), American
Economic
Review (2011)
Bidding with Securities: Comment, (with Jinwoo
Kim), forthcoming American Economic Review
(2010)
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic
Serial and Random
Priority Mechanisms, (with Fuhito
Kojima), Econometrica
(2010)
Opinions as Incentives, (with Navin Kartik),
Journal
of
Political
Economy, (2009)
The
NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games,
(with Terry Hendershott), The
Economists' Voice, (2009)
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions,
(with
Jinwoo
Kim) Journal
of
Economic
Theory, (2009)
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,
(with
Jinwoo
Kim), Econometrica, (2006)
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup,
(with
Jozsef
Sakovics),
Econometrica (2004)
Cooperative Investments and the Value
of Contracting,
(with Don Hausch), American Economic Review (1999)
Optimal Design of Research Contests,
(with
Ian
Gale), American Economic Review (2003)
Caps on Political Lobbying,
(with
Ian
Gale), American Economic Review (1998)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply, (with Ian
Gale), American Economic Review (2006)
Optimal Incentives for Teams,
(with
S.-W. Yoo), American Economic Review (2001)
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When
Bidders Have
Arbitrary Types, (with Ian
Gale), Theoretical
Economics (2006)
Standard Auctions with Financially
Constrained Bidders,
(with Ian
Gale),
Review
of
Economic
Studies (1998)
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to
Budget-Constrained
Buyer, (with Ian
Gale), Journal
of
Economic
Theory (2000)
Asymmetric Information about Rivals'
Types in Standard
Auctions: An Experiment (with Jim Andreoni
and Jinwoo
Kim), Games
and
Economic
Behavior (2007)
Strategic Judgment Proofing,
(with
Kathryn
Spier), RAND
Journal
of
Economics, (2008)
The Role of
Lockups in
Takeover Contests (with Tracy Lewis), RAND
Journal
of
Economics (2007)
Competitive Procurement with Corruption,
(with
R.
Burguet), RAND
Journal
of
Economics (2004)
Design Competition through
Multidimensional Auctions, RAND
Journal
of
Economics (1993)
Lectures, Survey and Discussion:
"Beyond the Coasian Irrelevance,"
Lectures given for the 17th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic
Theory in 2006.
Part 1: Motivation and
Overview
Part 2:
Asymmetric Information
Part
3:
Hold-up
and
Incomplete
Contracts
Part
4: Externalities
Part 5:
Wealth Constraints.
Hold Up Problem
(with
Jozsef
Sakovics),
The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, , Second Edition.
Procurement, The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics,
Second
Edition.
Discussion of ``Matching Markets:
Theory and Practice'' by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez,
prepared for the 2010
World Congress of Econometric Society.
Brave New World
of Market Design, (with Erin Cho),
forthcoming, Korean
Economic Review.
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