University in the City of New YorkEconomics

          Yeon-Koo Che  

  최 연구 (in Korean)

Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory

Economics Department

Columbia University

420 West 118th Street, 1029 IAB
New York, NY 10027

Phone: (212) 854-8276
Fax: (212) 854-8059






   Curriculum Vitae


   Working Papers:


        Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets, (with Olivier Tercieux), July 2015, Supplementary Material.

        An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets, (with Olivier Tercieux), July 2015.
        Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets, (with Olivier Tercieux), June 2015.
        Optimal Design for Social Learning, (with Johannes Horner),
April. 2015, Supplementary Appendix.

        Stable Matching in Large Economies (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima), April. 2015, Supplementary Appendix.

        Disclosure and Legal Advice, (with Sergei Severinov), December 2014.

        Weak Cartels and Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Daniele Condorelli and Jinwoo Kim),  Nov. 2014.

        An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions, (with Syngjoo Choi and Jinwoo Kim), April 2011. 

The Role of Priorities in Assigning Indivisible Objects: A Characterization of Top Trading Cycles, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu),

 Nov 2010.

 Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem:  A Dynamic Perspective, (with Jozsef Sakovics).

    Selected Publication:


       Decentralized College Admissions, (with Youngwoo Koh), Feb. 2015, Supplementary Appendix. forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy       

          Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values, (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima), forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory

          Expanding ‘Choice’ in School Choice, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), forthcoming, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. Supplementary Notes. 
           Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital, (with Rajiv Sethi),  forthcoming, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.  
            [VOX-EU piece on the paper]  formerly titled, Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets:  the Case of Naked Default Swaps.   
           Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions:  a Network Flow Approach, (with Jinwoo Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), Econometrica (2013)
           Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms:  Theory and Applications, (with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom), American Economic Review (2013)
          Pandering to Persuade, (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik), American Economic Review, (2013), Supplementary Appendix.

            Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents, (with Ian Gale and Jinwoo Kim), Review of Economic Studies (2013),
                Supplementary Appendix.

Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice:  the Boston Mechanism Reconsidered, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), American Economic Review (2011)

Bidding with Securities:  Comment, (with Jinwoo Kim), forthcoming American Economic Review (2010)
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms, (with Fuhito Kojima), Econometrica (2010)

Opinions as Incentives, (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political Economy, (2009)

The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games, (with Terry Hendershott), The Economists' Voice, (2009)

Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim) Journal of Economic Theory, (2009)

Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation, (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica, (2006)

A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, (with Jozsef Sakovics), Econometrica (2004)

Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, (with Don Hausch), American Economic Review (1999)

Optimal Design of Research Contests, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review (2003)

Caps on Political Lobbying, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review (1998)

Caps on Political Lobbying:  Reply, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review (2006)  

Optimal Incentives for Teams, (with S.-W. Yoo), American Economic Review (2001)

Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types, (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics (2006)

Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, (with Ian Gale), Review of Economic Studies (1998)

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer, (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory (2000)

Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2007)

Strategic Judgment Proofing, (with Kathryn Spier), RAND Journal of Economics, (2008)

The Role of  Lockups in Takeover Contests (with Tracy Lewis), RAND Journal of Economics (2007)

Competitive Procurement with Corruption, (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of Economics (2004)

Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions, RAND Journal of Economics (1993)

   Lectures, Survey and Discussion:

"Beyond the Coasian Irrelevance," Lectures given for the 17th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory in 2006.

    Part 1:  Motivation and Overview
    Part 2:  Asymmetric Information
    Part 3:  Hold-up and Incomplete Contracts
    Part 4:  Externalities
    Part 5:  Wealth Constraints.
Hold Up Problem (with
Jozsef Sakovics), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, , Second Edition.

Procurement, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition.

Discussion of  ``Matching Markets: Theory and Practice'' by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, prepared for the 2010 World Congress of Econometric Society.
Brave New World of Market Design, (with Erin Cho), forthcoming, Korean Economic Review.

  한 국어 사이트:  칼럼, 인터뷰