

Curriculum Vitae
Yeon-Koo Che
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ADDRESS

Department of Economics
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Rm 1016 IAB
New York, NY 10027
Phone: 212-854-8276; Fax: 212-854-8059.
E-mail: yc2271@columbia.edu
Home Page: <http://www.columbia.edu/~yc2271>

EDUCATION

Stanford University, Ph.D., 1991 (Advisor: Paul Milgrom)
University of Toronto, M.A., 1986
Seoul National University, B.Econ., 1984

EMPLOYMENT

Professor, Columbia University, 2005-
Professor, University of Wisconsin, 2000-2006;
Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1997-2000;
Visiting Professor, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona, Spain, 1998-1999;
John M. Olin Faculty Fellow, the Yale Law School, 1996;
Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1991-1997;
Consultant, RAND Corporation, 1989 Summer.

EDITORIAL POSITIONS

Editor: *Journal of Industrial Economics* (2003-).
Associate Editor: *Theoretical Economics* (2005-).
Associate Editor: *Journal of Economic Theory* (2008-).
Co-Editor: *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*
(1999-2003);
Associate Editor: *Journal of Industrial Economics* (2002-2003).
Editorial Board: *International Economic Journal* (1999-).
Editorial Board: *Korean Economic Review* (2005-)

GRANTS

National Science Foundation Grant, on "Market Design," 2007-2010.
National Science Foundation Grant, on "Holdup," 2003-2005.

National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant, on “Experiment on Asymmetric Information Auctions,” (with Jinwoo Kim) 2002-2003.
National Science Foundation Grant, on “Optimal Contest Design,” (with Ian Gale), 2000-2001.
National Science Foundation Grant, on “Team Incentives,” 1998-1999.
National Science Foundation Grant, on “Mechanism Design with Financial Constraints,” (with Ian Gale), 1996-1998.
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Grants, 1991-1993, 1997, 1999, 2002.
CSIC Grant (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica), 1998.
VA Grant on “Industrial Organization of Health Economics,” 1995.

PUBLICATION (Refereed Journals)

“Auctions with Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types: an Experiment,” (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2007), 59, 240-259.

“Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,” (with Jinwoo Kim), *Econometrica*, (2006), 74, 1063-1107.

“Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply” (with Ian Gale), *American Economic Review*, (2006), 96, 1355-1360.

“Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types,” (with Ian Gale), *Theoretical Economics*, (2006), 1, 95-118.

“How to Divide the Possession of a Football?” (with Terry Hendershott), *Economics Letters*, forthcoming.

“The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests,” (with Tracy Lewis), *Rand Journal of Economics*, forthcoming.

“Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer,” (with Kathryn Spier), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, forthcoming.

“A Dynamic Theory of Holdup,” (with Jozsef Sakovics), *Econometrica*, (2004), 72, 1063-1103.

“Competitive Procurement with Corruption,” (with Roberto Burguet), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (2004), 35, 50-68.

“Auctions with Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types,” (with Jinwoo Kim),

- Games and Economic Review*, (2004), 46, 383-397.
- “Optimal Design of Research Contests” (with Ian Gale), *American Economic Review*, (2003), 93, 646-671.
- “Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending,” *Contributions to Theoretical Economics*, (2002), 2, Article 3.
- “The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining,” *International Economic Review*, (2002), 43, 549-576.
- “Optimal Incentives for Teams,” (with Seung-Weon Yoo), *American Economic Review*, (2001), 91, 525-541.
- “The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer,” (with Ian Gale), *Journal of Economic Theory*, (2000), 92, 198-233.
- “Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities?: A Comment on De Fraja,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2000), 33, 195-205.
- “Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions” (with Ian Gale), *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2000), 30, 22-43.
- “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,” (with Don Hausch), *American Economic Review*, (1999), 89, 125-147.
- “Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments,” (with T-Y Chung), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1999), 30, 84-105.
- “Mechanism Design with a Liquidity Constrained Buyer: The 2×2 case,” (with Ian Gale), *European Economic Review*, (1999), 43, 947-957.
- “Section 365 and Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance” (with Alan Schwartz), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, (1999), 15, 441-467.
- “Standard Auctions with Financially-Constrained Buyers,” (with Ian Gale), *Review of Economic Studies*, (1998), Vol. 65, 1-21. (Reprinted in *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, edited by Paul Klemperer.)
- “Caps on Political Lobbying,” (with Ian Gale), *American Economic Review*, (1998), 88, 643-651.
- “Contests with Discontinuous Success Functions,” (with Ian Gale) in *Recent Developments in the Theory of Contests*, ed. Michael Baye, *Advances in Applied Microe-*

economics, 1998, 7, 1-13, JAI Press Inc.

“Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained,” (with Ian Gale), *Public Choice*, (1997), 92, 109-126.

“Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Does Withholding Information Deter Frivolous Suits?” (with Dietrich Earnhart), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1997), 28, 120-134.

“Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition,” (with Ian Gale), *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, (1997), Vol. 6, 175-200.

“Equilibrium Formation of Class Action Suits,” *Journal of Public Economics*, (1996), 62, 339-361.

“Expected Revenue of All-Pay Auctions and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints,” (with Ian Gale) *Economics Letters*, (1996), 50, 367-371.

“Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods,” *Journal of Industrial Economics*, (1996), XLIV, 17-24.

“Performance-Based Pricing for Nuclear Power Plants,” (with Geoffrey Rothwell), *Energy Journal*, (1995), 16, 57-77.

“Revolving Doors and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion,” *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1995), 26, 378-397.

“Buy-In through Gold-Plating,” *Economics Letters*, (1994), 45, 397-405.

“Second Sourcing and the Incentive for R & D Investment,” *Seoul Journal of Economics*, (1993), 6, 149-171.

“The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation,” (with Jong Goo Yi), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, (1993), 9, 399-424.

“Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions,” *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1993), 24, 668-680. (Reprinted in *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, edited by Paul Klemperer.)

“Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,” (with A. Mitchell Polinsky) *Rand Journal of Economics*, (1991), 22, 562-570.

OTHER PUBLICATION

“Procurement,” *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, forthcoming.

“Hold-Up Problem,” (with Jozsef Sakovics), *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, forthcoming.

“Financial Constraints in Auctions: Effects and Antidotes,” (with Ian Gale), in *Recent Developments in the Economics of Auctions*, ed. Michael Baye, *Advances in Applied Microeconomics*, (1996), 6, 97-120, JAI Press Inc.

“Buy-In and Gold Plating under Defense Profit Policy,” in *Essays in the Economics of Procurement*, eds. Bower, G. A., and Dertouzous, J. N., (1994), RAND: National Defense Research Institute.

WORKING PAPERS

“Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Ownership,” (with Ian Gale).

“Opinions as Incentives,” (with Navin Kartik).

“Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions,” (with Jinwoo Kim).

“Strategic Judgment Proofing,” (with Kathryn Spier).

“Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective,” (with Jozsef Sakovics).

“Expanding Choice in School Choice,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda).

“Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure” (with Sergei Severinov).

AWARDS AND HONOR

Shoemaker Fellow, (UW-Madison), 2004-2005;

Mary Claire Phipps Fellow, (UW-Madison), 2004-2005;

H.I. Romnes Prize, (UW-Madison), 1999;

John M. Olin Faculty Fellowship, Yale Law School, 1996;

Lynde and Harry Bradley Fellowship, Stanford University, 1990;

John Olin Law and Economics Fellowship, Stanford University, 1990.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

The 17th Jerusalem Summer School in Economics Theory: Invited Lecturer, 2006.

BK 21 Distinguished Lecturer, Sung Kyun Kwan University, 2004.
Econometric Society: Program Committee for the Far Eastern Meeting 2003.
International Summer School Invited Lecturer (Oberwesel, Germany), 2000.
John M Olin Invited Lecturer (USC Law School), 1999.

REFEREEING

National Science Foundation, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Economic Theory, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, BE Press Journal, Journal of Legal Studies, European Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Survey, Journal of Economics and Business, International Review of Law and Economics, Southern Economic Review, Economic Inquiry, Eastern Economic Journal, Seoul Journal of Economics.

TEACHING

GRADUATE COURSES:

Industrial Organization Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Topics in Microeconomic Theory

UNDERGRADUATE COURSES:

Law and Economics
Game Theory
Intermediate Microeconomics

RECENT SEMINAR

2007:

Brown University
Duke University
University of California - San Diego
American Law and Economics Conference (Harvard Law School)
IAE-University of Autonomia at Barcelona
University of Pompeu Fabra
GREQAM (University of Mediteranea in Marseille)
Paris School of Economics
University of Hong Kong Mini-Conference on Micro Theory
Yonsei University Mini-Conference on Micro Theory
Berkeley Law School

Stanford University
Harvard Market Design Workshop

2006:

Harvard University
Princeton University
University of Southern California
University of Michigan
Hong Kong Science and Technology University
Korean Economic Association Conference (Seoul National University)

2005:

Northwestern University (MEDS)
University of British Columbia
Stanford University (Economics and GSB Joint Seminar)
Columbia University (Law, Economics and Finance Seminar)
University of Virginia (Law School and Economics)
University of Pennsylvania
University of Toronto
SUNY-Albany
Soongsil University
Yonsei University.

2004:

The Stony Brook Conference on “Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints”
(Keynote Speaker)
UC-San Diego Mini-Conference on “Contract Theory.”

2003:

Duke University
Ohio State University
University of Florida
Fuqua School of Business
Columbia University,
Boston University
Vanderbilt University

STUDENTS ADVISED

PRINCIPAL ADVISOR: Kazumi Hori (Hitosbashi University, Japan, 2005), Jinwoo Kim (USC, 2003), Yasu Tamada (Keio University, Japan, 2002), Kyoungwon Rhee (KISDI, Korea, 2000).

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE: Changxiu (Sue) Li (Lehman Brothers), Unjy Song (UBC), Ming Li (Concordia University), Cheng-Tai Wu (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), Yeongkwan Song (KERI, Korea), Menesh Patel (Stanford Law School, student), Wei-jen Wen (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), David Vanness (Mayo Medical School), Jaeho Cheung (KIPF, Korea), Meng-Yu Liang (Western Ontario), Hyun-Ok Han (KERI, Korea), Soren Hauge (Ripon College), Li-Chen Hsu (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), Michael Conlin (Cornell), John Gale (Charles Rivers), Jee-Hyeong Park (Wayne State University), Valy Goepfrich.