Economics G6253: Theory of Industrial Organization

Yeon-Koo Che

• General Information:
  Class Hours: W 4:10pm-6:00pm
  Place: 501 International Affairs Building
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• Grading:
  1. About 4-5 problem sets (group work allowed)
  2. Final Take Home Exam (group work Not allowed)

• Useful Books

READING LIST

Lecture 1: Monotone Comparative Statics Methodologies


Lectures 2: Hold-Up and The Theory of the Firm


**Lecture 3: Static Models of Oligopoly**

Tirole, ch. 5.


Lecture 4: Product Quality and Product Differentiation

*Tirole, ch. 2, 7.
*Salop, 1979, ”Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” BJE, 10, 141-156.

Lecture 5: Repeated Games and Collusion

Tirole, Chapter 6.
*Green and Porter, 1984, ”Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,” EMA, 87-100.
Lecture 6: Dynamic Models of Oligopoly


Lecture 7: Consumer Search, Switching, Advertising, and Privacy

Tirole, ch. 2, 7.


*Bagwell and Ramey, 1994, ”Coordination Economies, Advertising and Search Behavior in Retail Markets,” AER, 84, 498-517.

Bagwell, “Advertising,” Forthcoming, Handbook of IO


**Lecture 8: Tying and Vertical Foreclosure/Separation**


Bolton and Whinston, 1990?, “Vertical Foreclosure and Supply Assurance,” RES


**Lecture 9: Vertical Restraints I**

* Tirole, ch. 4.


Lecture 10: Vertical Restraints II

* Segal and Whinston, 2000, Naked Exclusion: Comment, AER, 90, 296-309


Lecture 11: Managerial Incentives and Financial Contracting


Lecture 12: Price Discrimination

*Tirole, ch. 3.


Holmes, T., 1989, "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly," AER, 244-50.


*Deneckere and McAfee, 1997, "Damaged Goods," JEMS.

Gale and Holmes, 1992, "Advance-Purchase Discounts and Monopoly Allocation of Capacity," AER.


Lectures 13 and 14: Auctions and Procurement


