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SELECTED WORK by Topics
Matching Theory and
Market Design:
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic
Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms, (with Fuhito
Kojima), Econometrica (forthcoming)
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School
Choice: the Boston Mechanism
Reconsidered, (with
Atila
Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), New, September
19.
Expanding
‘Choice’ in School Choice, (with Atila
Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), New, December 2008,
Information and
Organizations:
Opinions as Incentives, (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political
Economy, forthcoming.
Optimal Incentives for Teams, (with S.-W. Yoo), American
Economic Review (2001)
Collusion-Proof
Mechanism Design:
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,
(with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica, (2006)
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo
Kim) Journal
of Economic Theory, (2009)
Mechanism Design
with Budget Constraints:
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When
Bidders Have Arbitrary Types, (with Ian Gale), Theoretical
Economics (2006)
Standard Auctions with Financially
Constrained Bidders, (with Ian Gale), Review of Economic
Studies (1998)
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to
Budget-Constrained Buyer, (with Ian Gale), Journal
of Economic Theory (2000)
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of
Ownership, (with Ian
Gale), January 2009.
Incomplete Contracts
and Hold-up:
Contractual Remedies to the Holdup
Problem: A Dynamic Perspective, (with Jozsef
Sakovics).
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, (with Jozsef
Sakovics), Econometrica (2004)
Cooperative Investments and the Value
of Contracting, (with Don Hausch), American
Economic Review (1999)
Hold Up Problem (with Jozsef
Sakovics), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
Second
Edition.
Contests:
Optimal Design of Research Contests,
(with Ian Gale),
American
Economic Review (2003)
Caps on Political Lobbying, (with Ian Gale), American
Economic Review (1998)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply, (with Ian Gale), American
Economic Review (2006)
Auctions and
Procurement:
Bidding with
Securities: Comment, (with Jinwoo
Kim), May 2008
Design Competition through
Multidimensional Auctions, RAND
Journal of Economics (1993)
Asymmetric Information about Rivals'
Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (with Jim Andreoni
and Jinwoo Kim), Games
and Economic Behavior (2007)
Competitive Procurement
with Corruption, (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of
Economics (2004)
Procurement, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
Second Edition.
Law and Economics:
Lawyer Advising in
Evidence Disclosure, (with Sergei Severinov), April
2007.
Strategic Judgment Proofing, (with
Kathryn Spier), RAND Journal of Economics, (2008)
Exploiting Plaintiffs
through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, (with Kathryn E. Spier), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2008)
The Role of Lockups
in Takeover Contests (with Tracy Lewis), RAND Journal of
Economics
(2007)