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List of Papers by Topics
Market Design/Matching
Expanding
‘Choice’ in School Choice, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda),
(2008)
Asymptotic
Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms, (with
Fuhito Kojima), (2008)
Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions, Rand Journal of Economics (1993)
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation, (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica (2006)
How to Divide the Possession of a Football? (with Terrence Hendershott), Economics Letters (2008)
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim), Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Auction Theory
Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions, Rand Journal of Economics (1993)
Expected Revenue of All-Pay Auctions and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints, (with Ian Gale), Economics Letters (1996)
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, Review of Economic Studies (1998)
Competitive Procurement
with Corruption, (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of
Economics (2004)
Optimal Design of Research Contests, (with Ian L. Gale), American Economic Review (2003)
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types, (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics (2006)
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2006)
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment, (with James Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
How to Divide the Possession of a Football? (with Terrence Hendershott), Economics Letters (2008)
The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests, (with Tracy Lewis), Rand Journal of Economics (2008)
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation, (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica (2006)
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim), Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Bidding
with Securities: Comment, (with
Jinwoo Kim), May 2008.
Contract Theory/Mechanism Design
Revolving Doors and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, Rand Journal of Economics (1995)
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, (with Donald Hausch), American Economic Review (1999)
Mechanism Design with a Liquidity Constrained Buyer: The 2×2 Case, (with Ian Gale), European Economic Review (1999)
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer, (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory (2000)
Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities?: A Comment on De Fraja, Games and Economic Behavior (2000)
Optimal Incentives for Teams, (with Seungwon Yoo), American Economic Review (2001)
Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending, Contributions in Theoretical Economics (2002)
Optimal Design of Research Contests, (with Ian L. Gale), American Economic Review (2003)
A Dynamic Theory of Hold-Up, (with Jozsef Sakovics), Econometrica (2004)
Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation, (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica (2006)
Contractual
Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective, (with Jozsef
Sakovics) (2008)
Procurement,
The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition.
Hold Up Problem,
(with Jozsef Sakovics), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition.
Corporate Finance
Section 365 and Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance, (with Alan Schwartz), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1999)
The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests, (with Tracy Lewis), Rand Journal of Economics (2008)
Strategic judgment proofing, (with Kathryn E. Spier), Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Experimental Economics
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment, (with James Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
Industrial Organization
Customer Return Policies
for Experience Goods, Journal of
Industrial Economics (1996)
Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition, (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, (1997)
Law and Economics
Decoupling Liability:
Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, (with A. Mitchell Polinsky), Rand Journal of Economics (1991)
The Role of
Precedents in Repeated Litigation, (with Jong Goo Yi), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1993)
Equilibrium Formation of Class Action Suits, Journal of Public Economics (1996)
Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Does Withholding Information Deter Frivolous Suits? (with Dietrich Earnhart), Rand Journal of Economics (1997)
Section 365 and Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance, (with Alan Schwartz), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1999)
Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments, (with T-Y Chung), Rand Journal of Economics (1999)
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, (with Donald Hausch), American Economic Review (1999)
The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining, International Economic Review (2002)
A Dynamic Theory of Hold-Up, (with Jozsef Sakovics), Econometrica (2004)
The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests, (with Tracy Lewis), Rand Journal of Economics (2008)
Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement: Divide and conquer, (with Kathryn E. Spier), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2008)
Strategic judgment proofing, (with Kathryn E. Spier), Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Ownership, (with Ian Gale), Law and Economics Workshop (2007)
Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure, (with Sergei Severinov), Discussion Papers (2007)
Political Economy/Contest Theory
Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained, (with Ian Gale), Public Choice (1997)
Contests with Discontinuous Success Functions, (with Ian Gale) in Recent Developments in the Theory of Contests, ed. Michael Baye, Advances in Applied Microeconomics (1998)
Caps on Political Lobbying, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review (1998)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review (2006)
Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions, (with Ian Gale), Games and Economic Behavior (2000)
Optimal Design of Research Contests, (with Ian L. Gale), American Economic Review (2003)
Opinions as incentives, (with Navin Kartik), Discussion Papers (2007)