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WESTERN INTERESTS, ISRAELI UNILATERALISM, AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

NEVE GORDON AND YINON COHEN

This essay analyzes the impact of Israeli unilateralism—specifically that of its settlement project—on the two-state solution. After exploring the relationship between unilateralism and power, the authors show, inter alia, that in-migration has accounted for about half the settlement growth since the international embrace of the land-for-peace formula in 1991, that the level of in-migration does not fluctuate according to government composition (right or left), and that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have spurred rather than inhibited settlement expansion. The essay is framed by a contrast with the Palestinian bid for full UN membership, rejected as unilateralism by the Western powers but in fact aimed at undercutting Israeli unilateralism and creating the conditions for meaningful negotiations.

PRESIDENT MAHMUD ABBAS'S failed bid for recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations raises a number of pressing questions about unilateralism and the role it has played in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. U.S. President Barack Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel as well as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (the Quartet representative) rejected the Palestinian appeal, arguing that unilateral actions should be avoided. Even though the refusal to recognize a Palestinian state may have appeared convincing to those who believe in the significance of negotiations and the importance of resolving conflicts through dialogue and agreement, these leaders' denunciation of Abbas's unilateralism was actually disingenuous since it ignored two issues central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the totally unequal power relations between Israelis and Palestinians, and the fact that unilateral actions have been a defining component of the conflict from its very inception.

These two issues are, of course, related, and investigating them can help clarify the role unilateralism has played in the Israeli-Palestinian relations. The important question, we believe, is why, how, and to what end

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unilateralism has been used, and not merely whether it should be used. President Abbas did not introduce unilateralism into this conflict but rather was trying to radically change the way it is deployed as well as its objectives. His appeal therefore warranted a much more favorable response from Western leaders. Moreover, not only did these leaders' reaction to the Palestinian bid for recognition ignore the power differential between the two parties and the history of unilateral actions, but it also negated their own countries' declared policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

UNILATERALISM AND POWER

A resolution reached through negotiations requires a certain degree of parity in order to work. If one side has all or most of the power—and if there are no external checks and balances—then this powerful side is likely to dictate the terms of both negotiations and the terms of their outcome. The prospects that such unequal negotiations could ultimately succeed in achieving a mutually agreeable accord are also therefore dim, unless the weak side believes the price it would pay for bowing down at the negotiating table would be much lower than the price it would pay for refusing to settle. Furthermore, a wide gap in the power differential between the two parties leads to unilateral actions because the party that wields the power does not need to—and consequently is usually unwilling to—consult the other party when making policy choices that affect both sides. This, as we show below, leads the weaker party to adopt a unilateral approach as well.

When one examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is obvious that the disparity between the rival sides is great. Israelis have a state with robust institutions, a well-equipped military considered by many to be the most capable in the region, and a thriving economy with a strong export component made up of high-tech, pharmaceutical, and military industries. Israel also controls all of the borders and therefore the movement of Palestinians living in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and continues to hold central aspects of sovereignty over the territory ranging from the Jordan Valley to the Mediterranean Sea.

The Palestinians, by contrast, have weak institutions, their security forces are poorly trained and ill-equipped, and even though their economy has been experiencing growth in the past few years, it is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Per capita GDP in purchasing power parity in the occupied Palestinian territories was about \$2,900 in 2008, while in Israel it was over \$27,000.¹ Moreover, Palestinian society continues to be internally divided despite the recent Fatah-Hamas agreement that President Abbas will head an interim unity government whose role will be to facilitate elections and rebuild the Gaza Strip (February 2012).²

The power differential between Israelis and Palestinians has clearly influenced every aspect of the conflict and helps explain the failure of

negotiations. In what follows, however, we concentrate on how such inequality has encouraged unilateral actions and has consequently prevented the sides from reaching a resolution.

UNILATERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

It has been claimed that the occupation itself is a unilateral Israeli act, but for the purposes of argument the occupation is here considered as a state of affairs that can be either sustained or overcome through a series of actions. These actions, in turn, can be carried out unilaterally or through cooperation. One could argue that over the course of almost forty-five years of occupation a number of actions have been carried out in a cooperative manner, including certain security collaborations between Israelis and Palestinians. Yet, for the most part, the interaction between the two sides has been characterized by unilateralism.

Even though the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was a unilateral act of returning captured territory, Israeli unilateralism has mostly involved the confiscation of Palestinian land, the construction of settlements, the transfer of Jewish Israeli citizens to the occupied Palestinian territories, and the deployment of violence against the Palestinian population. The Palestinians, in turn, have also adopted unilateral tactics in an attempt to overcome the occupation. Suicide bombings are a paradigmatic example of unilateralism. The first is the unilateralism of the powerful; the second is the unilateralism of the weak. And one could even argue that the cycle of unilateral acts has engendered the current deadlock.

President Abbas's unilateral bid for recognition was, perhaps paradoxically, employed to undercut the existing impasse that was created by the vast power differential between the two parties. An analysis of possible future scenarios as well as developments on the ground suggests that Abbas's move was an attempt to alter the existing power imbalance so as to make room for meaningful negotiations.

FUTURE SCENARIOS

The source of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be summed up in one short phrase: one land, two people. Accordingly, then, this conflict can be resolved in one of two ways: either the two people can share one land or, alternatively, the land will have to be divided between the two people.

The one-state solution can manifest itself in one of two possible ways. The first is similar to the existing situation, whereby Israel has supreme authority over the territory between the Jordan Valley to the Mediterranean Sea, and a large percentage of the indigenous people residing in this territory do not have citizenship and are thus deprived of their basic rights. This is an apartheid situation, and there is widespread

agreement among world leaders, Palestinians, international civil society, and liberal Israelis that this situation cannot be sustained over time.

The second one-state solution refers to the democratic binational state, and it too would preserve the existing borders. This version of the one-state solution could follow several models. One model entails a power-sharing federal government led by Palestinians and Israeli Jews and a liberal form of separation of powers. This model would likely have to underscore the notion of “parity of esteem,” one of the core concepts of the Northern Ireland peace process—namely, the idea that each side respects the other side’s identity and ethos, including language, culture, and religion³—and perhaps some form of internal territorial partition with porous borders.

Despite growing interest in the binational model, there persists an international consensus that the two people should divide the land. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 explicitly calls for partition, while Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 implicitly endorse a two-state solution through their requirement that Israel withdraw from the land it occupied in 1967. Moreover, the two-state solution has been the vision informing all diplomatic negotiations over the past two decades, from the Madrid Conference in 1991 through Oslo, Wye, Camp David, Taba, and the road map, and it has also been the idea behind such peace initiatives as the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Plan, the Geneva Initiative, and the Saudi or Arab plan.⁴ More recently, President Obama emphasized the U.S. position supporting two states, saying at the State Department that

the United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine. The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states. The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their full potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.⁵

Leaders of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have made similar declarations in the past.

While numerous obstacles have prevented the two parties from reaching an agreement based on partition, for many years three issues have stood out as the key points of contention: borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. Regarding borders, there is currently an international consensus that the 1967 borders should serve as a reference point, with possible one-for-one land swaps so that ultimately the total amount of land that was occupied in 1967 would be returned to the Palestinians. There is also a broad international consensus with respect to Jerusalem, which would have to be divided according to the pre-1967 partition lines, again with certain land swaps to guarantee that each side has control over its

own religious sites and large neighborhoods. Finally, Israel will have to acknowledge the right of return of Palestinian refugees, but with the following stipulation: while all Palestinians would be able to return to the fledgling Palestinian state, only a limited number, agreed upon by the two sides, would be allowed to return to Israel; additionally, in adherence with UN General Assembly Resolution 194, compensation for lost property would be extended to all refugees, not just those who opt not to return. Resolving these issues according to the international consensus clearly requires the dismantling of most Israeli settlements and the return of the majority of Jewish settlers to Israel.

The major difficulty is that Israel is unwilling to accept the basic terms for resolving these three issues; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

If the idea is the division of land between the two peoples, Israel cannot continue to settle this land unilaterally while carrying out negotiations.

said as much before the Israel Knesset and in his address to Congress less than two weeks later.⁶ The Palestinians, in turn, decided not to wait any longer. They intimated that their bid for recognition was their last attempt to salvage the two-state solution. Their argument was straightforward: if the idea is the division of land between the two peoples, then Israel cannot continue to settle the contested land


unilaterally while carrying out negotiations. President Abbas accordingly made a bold declaration. But then, as many people expected, his initiative was derailed by the powers that be.

One important question about the unfolding events is whether President Obama, Chancellor Merkel, former Prime Minister Blair, and other leaders acted sensibly when they refused to accept the Palestinian bid for recognition. Examining developments in the occupied Palestinian territories since Israelis and Palestinians began negotiations based on land for peace (October 1991) reveals that, insofar as these leaders believe that dividing the land into two states is the solution, their refusal to support Abbas was clearly against their countries' own policies and, rightly understood, national interests.

ISRAELI UNILATERALISM: THE CASE OF SETTLER GROWTH

On 30 October 1991, Israelis and Palestinians (who were part of a Jordanian delegation because Israel was still unwilling to recognize them as legitimate actors) met for the first time to negotiate peace. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for a settlement founded on Israel's withdrawal from the land it occupied during the 1967 war in exchange for peace, served as the basis for the Madrid Conference. At the time, there were 132,000 settlers in East Jerusalem and 89,800 settlers in the West Bank. Twenty years later, the numbers of settlers in East Jerusalem had increased by about 40 percent, while the settlers in the West Bank, according to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics,

Figure 1: West Bank Settler Population, 1991–2010



Source: “Sources of Population Growth by District, Population Group and Religion,” *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, different years.

The top line is the **actual** growth of the West Bank (WB) Jewish population (natural growth plus net immigration into the West Bank). The middle and bottom lines are **expected** growth of the West Bank settler population. Both assume that during 1991–2010 net immigration into the West Bank was zero. The first assumes that the annual natural growth rate was equal to the **average among West Bank settlers** during 1989–91 (3.3%, middle line). The second assumes that the annual natural growth rate was equal to **the average for the entire Israeli Jewish population** during 1991–2010 (1.26%, bottom line).

more than tripled, indicating that the number of Jewish settlers living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank is over 500,000 today.⁷

These numbers suggest that Israel has exploited the power differential between the two parties in order to alter the facts on the ground so as to render a two-state solution unviable. This kind of unilateralism has been carried out incrementally over time and from an international perspective has, consequently, often been so subtle that its effects have not always been noticed immediately. While the deployment of violence tends to receive much more media attention both internationally and locally, the movement of settlers from Israel to the occupied Palestinian territories has actually been the most insidious kind of unilateralism in this conflict because its purpose is to undermine the possibility of a Palestinian polity.

To better understand the role of this particular kind of unilateralism and how it has been used to entrench the occupation, we need to determine what precipitated the population’s dramatic growth. As Figure 1 reveals, the major increase was not a result of natural growth (births minus deaths) but rather was due to the movement of Jewish citizens from Israel to the West Bank during the two decades of peace negotiations.

If the settler population had increased according to the natural growth rate of the Israeli Jewish population (an annual average of 1.26 percent for the 1991–2010 period), there would have been only 113,919 Jewish settlers in the West Bank in 2010 (bottom line) instead of 311,100 settlers (top line). In 1991, the settler population in the West Bank had,

however, a high percentage of young families, many of them religious, and consequently their average natural growth rate in the three years preceding 1991 (3.3 percent) was nearly three times the national level.⁸ If one takes into account this natural growth rate (3.3 percent) and extrapolates it onto the settler population during the following twenty years (1991–2010), the Jewish population in the West Bank in 2010 should have amounted to a little more than half of its actual number today (middle line). Put differently, as shown in Figure 1, about half the Jewish settlers (approximately 150,000) currently living in the West Bank either migrated or are the offspring of those who migrated to the region after peace negotiations began in 1991. This analysis indicates that the major increase in population over the past twenty years has not been the result of natural growth but rather of the migration of Jews across the Green Line.

THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX EFFECT

The Israeli government, the settlers, and popular and even some scholarly writers tend to present settlers as recalcitrant actors who operate against Israeli policy. Actually, however, the settlers could not have built a single house and settled a family in it without government support, which has included providing infrastructure for the settlements and outposts (e.g., electricity, water, and roads) and different kinds of subsidies and benefits to the settler population. An analysis of the increase of Jewish settlers in the West Bank over the past twenty years reveals that the different governments have invested considerable resources to continue transferring Jewish citizens to the occupied Palestinian territories.

The effort to settle ultra-orthodox (Haredi) Jewish citizens in the West Bank best illustrates the government's unilateral settlement policy and helps underscore the profound impact this kind of unilateralism has had on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁹ In 1991, when Israelis and Palestinians met in Madrid, there were five ultra-orthodox settlements in the West Bank: Beitar Illit, Matityahu, Immanuel, Ma'ale Amos, and Asfar (Meizad). These settlements had all been established between 1981 and 1985 and were part of a settlement initiative carried out by a Likud-led government. By the time of Madrid there were only 4,620 ultra-orthodox Jews living in these settlements, amounting to less than 5 percent of the settlers and just over 1 percent of the ultra-orthodox community in Israel at the time. Since then, the number of ultra-orthodox Jewish settlers has increased dramatically. Of the 311,000 settlers currently living in the West Bank, approximately 100,000 are ultra-orthodox Jews, thus indicating that they have grown eighteen-fold and are the major cause of exponential growth of Jews in the region.¹⁰

Two crucial points help clarify why the ultra-orthodox community became a significant part of Israel's unilateral efforts to reinforce the settlement project. The first involves the low socioeconomic status of this community, which explains the relative ease of transferring ultra-orthodox

Jews to the West Bank. The second has to do with their high birthrate and underscores the momentous demographic impact this population has had on the settlement project, an effect of which all Israeli governments have been well aware.

Ultra-orthodox Jews are the poorest segment of Israeli society, and therefore it has been relatively easy to encourage them to move to the West Bank. According to a recent report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,¹¹ the poverty rate of ultra-orthodox Jews is 60 percent, much higher than the poverty rate for the general population (20 percent) and even higher than the poverty rate of Palestinian citizens of Israel (50 percent).

Both Likud- and Labor-led Israeli governments appear to have taken the socioeconomic status of ultra-orthodox Jews into consideration and in the early 1990s began encouraging this sector to move to the occupied Palestinian territories, offering them housing at a considerably lower price than in Israel, opening ultra-orthodox schools, and providing the new settlers with subsidized social services and transportation. Accordingly, ultra-orthodox Jews moved to the West Bank en masse.

It has not only been easy for Israeli governments to move ultra-orthodox Jews to the West Bank, but, as all Israeli governments correctly assumed, once they arrived in their new homes, the ultra-orthodox Jews helped extend the settlement project by high birthrates. While children younger than eighteen years old constitute one-third of Israel's population, they make up nearly two-thirds of the population in the two largest ultra-orthodox settlements, Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit.¹² Beitar Illit has the highest percentage of children in the country, higher even than Bedouin communities like Tel-Sheva and Rahat known for their high birthrates.¹³ In 2002, the natural growth rate among the ultra-orthodox Jews of Israel was 7 percent, much higher than the 1.2 percent for all Jewish Israelis during the same year.¹⁴ At

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this pace, the ultra-orthodox community in the West Bank will double its number and reach nearly 200,000 within a decade, and this number is only accurate if the migration from Israel stops and the population increase is limited to natural growth, which, judging by the past, is extremely unlikely.


Politically, it is important to note that Israel's unilateral actions have had an impact not only on the Palestinian population but also on the ultra-orthodox community. In 1991, most of the ultra-orthodox political parties were in favor of a land-for-peace initiative based on Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. The vast majority of ultra-orthodox Jews who moved to the West Bank during the past two decades did not do so for ideological reasons, but rather because the conditions created by the Israeli government enabled them to make ends meet in the West Bank. Currently, about 15 percent of Israel's ultra-orthodox community

lives in the West Bank (much higher than the 1 percent in 1991)¹⁵ and many more in occupied East Jerusalem. Accordingly, the claim that the two largest ultra-orthodox settlements are located fewer than three miles from the 1967 border and could be included in a one-for-one land swap deal ignores a crucial aspect: the impact these new settlers have had on the way the ultra-orthodox community as a whole, including its political parties, conceives of the West Bank. It is, in other words, at least partly due to these settlers that the ultra-orthodox parties—that is, Shas (eleven members of Knesset) and United Torah Judaism (five members)—have come to reject negotiations and a two-state settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967.

ALL ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS HAVE SUPPORTED THE SETTLEMENT PROJECT

While many have claimed that Israel has attempted to populate the contested West Bank with more Jews while it was carrying out negotiations with the Palestinians, we have demonstrated that the growth was indeed primarily due to the migration of Israeli citizens to the occupied Palestinian territories. The isolation of migration from the overall population growth enables us to discredit the assumption that Likud-led governments were the ones that encouraged the growth of the settlement project, while Labor-led governments were more likely to arrest the

Figure 2: Jewish Net Migration to West Bank by Government Coalition, 1991–2010



Source: “Sources of Population Growth by District, Population Group and Religion,” *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, different years.

increase in settler population growth. As Figure 2 illustrates, the level of migration has not fluctuated despite the changing composition of the Israeli government (Likud-led or Labor-led). Rather, the one clear pattern is a decline (nearly 40 percent) in annual immigration from an average of 7,200 settlers during 1991–2000 to 4,400 during 2001–10.¹⁶ Several factors have undoubtedly contributed to this decline, but it appears that the second intifada, which erupted in late September 2000, increased levels of violence during the past decade, and the extended pauses in the negotiations can help explain the pattern.

The 1990s were characterized by ongoing negotiations beginning with the Madrid talks in 1991–93, followed by the Oslo peace negotiations in 1993–2000. During these years, Labor leaders, such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak, enabled the settlements to expand beyond natural growth, while carrying out negotiations with the Palestinians. The failed Camp David summit and the second intifada brought an end to the decade of intense negotiations, and in the post-2000 years there have been only two periods of negotiations: the road map (2003) and the Olmert-Abbas talks (2006–08). During these years of low-intensity negotiations and relatively high levels of violence, annual immigration to the West Bank declined sharply. It is interesting that the gradation of Jewish population growth in the West Bank (Figure 1, top line) has not declined during the past decade despite the decline of immigration, a fact that can be explained by the high birthrate of the ultra-orthodox population. Although further research needs to be carried out, it appears that thus far negotiations have enhanced settlement activity, especially when they were accompanied by a decline in Israeli and Palestinian violence. This leads to the surprising conclusion that negotiations may have actually helped Israel entrench the occupation, a fact that can help explain why Palestinians no longer put their trust in negotiations, while Israel is generally in favor of lengthy negotiations and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has recently stated that it conditionally accepts the Quartet's proposal for reentering talks with the Palestinians.¹⁷

THE NEW UNILATERALISM

All of this brings us back to President Abbas's unilateralism. Before approaching the United Nations, Abbas was well aware that land can readily be returned with the signing of a settlement between two parties, but when the land is populated and hundreds of thousands of people have to be evacuated as a result, withdrawal becomes much more difficult. He recognized that Israeli decision makers of all stripes appreciate this reality and yet he also knew that, without exception, all of them have carried out unilateral acts to expand the settlement project. As we have shown, every Israeli prime minister since 1991 has played a role in

undermining the land-for-peace formula. At the same time that he placed his bid for statehood, Abbas also acknowledged that Palestinian unilateralism in the form of violence has not advanced his people's cause. And, finally, he seemed to be acutely aware that peace will not be achieved without the deployment of external pressure to offset the power imbalance between the two parties.

This did not leave President Abbas with many options. In the past, Palestinians have reacted toward Israel's occupation in one of three ways: waited, negotiated, or actively resisted the occupation. Waiting, Abbas realized, entails the occupation's entrenchment. Negotiations have historically been shaped by the vast power differential between the two parties and consequently have not engendered any substantial gains for the Palestinians. The data we present suggest that negotiations have actually helped facilitate the process of settlement expansion. Finally, Palestinian violence, which is also a form of unilateralism, appears to have led to a decline of Jewish migration to the West Bank but has not advanced the Palestinian cause in any other way and, in numerous respects, has harmed it.

President Abbas was therefore in a bind. Every day that passes the settler population grows, and yet Prime Minister Netanyahu has been unwilling to reinstate a settlement freeze. This means that Israeli unilateralism continues unimpeded and, in effect, makes the two-state solution less and less feasible. Reading the political map for what it is, Abbas decided to initiate a new approach.

Years of experience had undoubtedly taught him that a series of factors, not least of which is the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, prevents both Republican and Democratic administrations from exerting pressure on Israel, and that European countries do not have either the will or the ability to apply such pressure. Abbas consequently decided to adopt a new strategy. He indeed chose the unilateral route, but he was using unilateralism in a surprisingly new and peaceful way so as to achieve different objectives. If until now unilateralism was deployed to entrench or overcome the occupation through rights-abusive acts, Abbas adopted the unilateral approach to inject external pressure as a means of altering the power differential between Israel and the Palestinians and in this way set the stage for meaningful negotiations.

The objective was therefore not to undercut negotiations, as President Obama intimated, but rather to enter negotiations from a slightly more balanced position. Israeli unilateralism, in other words, has driven the Palestinians to choose the unilateral path; the only difference is that Abbas's new unilateralism aimed at creating the necessary conditions for advancing a fair peace agreement, whereas the objective of Israel's unilateral acts in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has been to destroy it.

All of the foregoing raises the question about the international community's position with respect to President Abbas's bid for recognition, the

conflict, and the two-state solution. It is fairly obvious that time is on the side of the one-state solution, in its apartheid variant. As the years pass and the Jewish settler population continues to grow, the likelihood of achieving a viable two-state solution diminishes. The Palestinian appeal to the United Nations might indeed have been the last chance to rescue the two-state solution. Therefore, the decision of President Obama and other Western leaders to reject the Palestinian request was inimical to the stated policies and implicit interests of the United States government and the European Union member states—that is, resolving the conflict through a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders. Ironically, through their refusal to countenance the Palestinians' admission to the United Nations, Obama and other world leaders are helping to create the conditions for a paradigm shift from the two-state solution to the one-state formula.

ENDNOTES

1. *CIA World Factbook*, 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html>.

2. Joshua Mitnick, " Hamas Rift Opens over Fatah Deal," *The Wall Street Journal*, 13 February 2012.

3. Simon Thompson, "Parity of Esteem and the Politics of Recognition," *Contemporary Political Theory* 1 (2002), pp. 203–20.

4. The Nusseibeh-Ayalon Plan is a series of principles for putting a permanent end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was initiated by Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh and was launched in June 2003. It was published in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 2 (Winter 2004), p. 158, and is available at http://www.peacelobby.org/nusseibeh-ayalon_initiative.htm. The Geneva Initiative was launched a few months later on 1 December 2003, following two years of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, led by Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabo. The Geneva Initiative is a more nuanced document and offers concrete solutions for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It differs from the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Plan particularly on issues regarding Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 2 (Winter 2004), pp. 81–101, and at <http://www.geneva-accord.org/>. The Arab peace

initiative has had two phases. It was drafted by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and first presented at the Beirut Summit of the Arab League in 2002. This initiative is different from the two others in that it addresses the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole and offers Israel peace agreements and full normalization with the Arab countries once it has withdrawn from the territories it occupied in the 1967 war, resolves the Palestinian refugee problem according to the recommendations proposed in UN General Assembly Resolution 194, and accepts the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. Only ten of the twenty-two Arab leaders showed up at the 2002 Beirut Summit, which in many respects undermined the proposal's objective of offering Israel normalization with the Arab world. However, in 2007 all the Arab member states except for Libya endorsed the plan during a two-day summit in Riyadh. In addition, the Palestinian Authority voted in favor, while Hamas's representative abstained. The 2002 Arab League statement on the plan is in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002), p. 182, and the complete initiative is available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/arab_initiative.htm#ai.

5. Text of Obama's 19 May 2011 statement in *Journal of Palestine*

Studies 41, no. 1 (Autumn 2011), pp. 212–14.

6. Netanyahu's statements of 16 May 2011 and 24 May 2011 in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 1 (Autumn 2011), pp. 206–07, 209–12.

7. Numbers for East Jerusalem are based on calculations carried out by the Foundation for Middle East Peace, <http://www.fmep.org/>. Numbers for Jewish settlers in the West Bank at the end of 1991 and 2010, respectively, are from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, "Sources of Population Growth by District, Population Group and Religion," *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1993 (Table 2.7) and 2011 (Table 2.4).

8. Average natural growth rates for the Israeli Jewish population in 1991–2010 and for the settler population 1989–91 were calculated by us, based on the figures published by the annual *Statistical Abstract of Israel* in different years. The expected lines in Figure 1 were carried out by taking the actual number of settlers in 1991 and subjecting it to annual growth of 1.26 and 3.3 percent, respectively, for the period 1991–2010.

9. Ultra-orthodox Jews known in Israel as *Haredi* are more observant than modern orthodox Jews, they have their own educational institutions, and they vote en masse for their own parties (in the last Knesset they had two parties). For an analysis of their performance in the last elections, see Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, "Stability in the Haredi Camp and Upheavals in Nationalist Zionism: An Analysis of the Religious Parties in the 2009 Elections," *Israel Affairs* 16, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 82–104.

10. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010, "Localities, Their Population and Additional

Information," http://cbs.gov.il/reader/pop_in_locs/pop_in_locs_e.html.

11. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2009*. Volume 2009/21–January 2010, Supplement No. 3 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009).

12. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, "Selected Data for International Child Day," Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 17 November 2009.

13. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, "Selected Data."

14. Norma Gurovich and Eilat Cohen-Kastro, "Ultra-Orthodox Jews Geographic Distribution and Demographic, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Population in Israel 1996–2001," Working Papers Series No. 5, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004.

15. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics does not have a precise estimate of the size of the ultra-orthodox population and the figures it provides of ultra-orthodox Jews living in Israel and the West Bank in 2009 range between 630,000 and 795,000. Taking into account the natural growth rate of 7 percent, the ultra-orthodox living in the West Bank constituted 12 to 15 percent of the total ultra-orthodox population in 2010. For a discussion of the Central Bureau of Statistics estimates, see <http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1171794> (in Hebrew).

16. Calculations based on Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, "Sources of Population Growth, by District, Population Group and Religion." *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Panel 2.4 revised, http://cbs.gov.il/reader/cw_usr_view_SHTML?ID=801.

17. Jeffrey Heller, "Israel Accepts Quartet Call for Peace Talks," Reuters, 2 October 2011.