NATO: Strengths and Weaknesses

by Massimo Salvadori

The defense budgets of the NATO countries, together with other expenditures directly or indirectly incurred for the purpose of discouraging aggression, total nearly $200 billion in less than five years, spent by nations whose gross national income is less than $500 billion a year.

For Europeans, of course, the burden has been heavier than for Americans, partly because their economies are weaker and partly because of the enormous losses they incurred during World War II. Taxation is high (the commonplace saying that the French do not pay their taxes is nonsense; France may have some tax evasion, but it is, after Britain, the most heavily taxed nation in the world); consumer goods are less abundant than they would have been without rearmament; housing has lagged; long-term military service has had an adverse effect on families and careers.

Are these sacrifices justified in terms of NATO achievements? Anyone who remembers the situation in 1948-49 realizes, in the first place, that among Europeans living on this side of the Iron Curtain (whether in NATO or non-NATO countries) there is today a feeling of security in contrast to the fear and panic of five years ago. A major armed conflict seems a relatively remote possibility; invasions and subsequent "liberations" weigh less heavily on the minds of Europeans. This sense of security produces its own set of problems, such as greater stress on Europe's autonomy, some anti-Americanism (not dangerous, but distasteful), and neutralism; however, life improves as fear decreases.

Second, the new sense of security has been accompanied by a spurt of energy which, together with American contributions involving a good deal more than gifts and loans of billions of dollars, has aided in promoting a greater economic recovery than anyone could have predicted a few years ago. There is still a great deal of poverty and suffering, especially in the four southern NATO countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey), and tens of millions of people are more aware of their misery than of the progress achieved. Nevertheless, progress has taken place. Western Europe has made good the staggering losses caused by World War II, and in every country the level of both industrial and agricultural production is higher than it had been in 1939.

Third, Western Europe has achieved a re-
If communists had been satisfied with en-
force, it had to be met with a corre-
responding show of force. So far there
are about 50 NATO divisions on this
development are considerably fewer than
in the other side, but they are already
equipped with a potential aggressor
to think twice before starting a con-
lict. By the time the rearmament
program has been completed, the
NATO European and Mediterrane-
ian areas will be relatively secure.

No Community Yet

NATO success has been greater in
terms of military preparedness than
in terms of the political and psycho-
logical gains on which, in the long
run, even military success must rest.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion postulated the existence of or
coming into existence of a North At-
lantic community composed of like-
minded nations cooperating without
need of formal political institutions.
Today it looks as if there is less of a
community than there was in 1949.
To Europeans it seems as if a strong
pull is drawing Americans westward
to Asia; at the same time free conti-
nental Europe is being pushed into
neutralism by a multiplicity of fac-
tors, while the two Commonwealth
countries, Britain and Canada, try
to hold the whole fabric to-
gether.

The failure to create a community
is made evident by the fact that to
all intents and purposes Article 2 of
the North Atlantic treaty, which was
inserted in order to provide the or-
organization with its ideological basis,
has become a dead letter. One of the
chief reasons for this is the fact that
the political picture has changed con-
siderably in most NATO countries
during the last five years. Many of
the conservatives now in the saddle
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PARIS—Observed from 3,000 miles, the psychological attitudes of Americans toward the problem of negotiating a peaceful understanding with the U.S.S.R. appear wiser and more in harmony with views prevalent in Europe than they appear at home.

In essence, this dominant psychological attitude, reflected most vividly in the opinions of leading United States Senators, has been that negotiation, unless conducted according to American rules, would contribute nothing to peace and might only strengthen the position of the Kremlin. At present the same attitude prevails among professional foreign affairs officials in France and Britain. In the main, the European spokesmen who favor negotiation are men in political office, like Paul Reynaud, French deputy prime minister, and Sir Winston Churchill, British prime minister. Among the motives which affect their views is a desire to give Frenchmen and Englishmen hope that the tax burden they must carry to maintain armaments will be reduced.

Are Negotiations Worthwhile?

The intensity of the manner in which these elected officials advance their views gives the impression in the United States that all Europe is demanding conferences with the Russians. This impression is incorrect. In French and British cabinet meetings, at the British Labor party conference at Margate the end of September and in the Council of Europe, the dominant theme has been that while negotiation with the Soviets would be desirable, it is more important for Western countries to remain strong and to maintain their alliance with the United States. In France, at least, indifference toward negotiations is due primarily to the belief that the Soviet Union itself is not interested in negotiation. Therefore, it is reasoned, to press seriously for conferences now would either be a waste of time or call for dangerously excessive concessions on the part of the West.

During September and October the United States, by a series of official statements, gave the impression that it was becoming increasingly interested in negotiations. Despite rebuffs from Moscow, the Eisenhower Administration, in unison with Britain and France, has continued to propose conferences with the Kremlin on Germany and Austria. It has gone further by hinting that the major Western powers should work out a mutual security pact with the U.S.S.R., on the assumption that Soviet hostility toward the West may be based on fear—a thesis advanced recently by British Prime Minister Churchill and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The ironic result of this new American interest in getting along with the Russians is that European support has been strengthened for policies originally based on the belief that there was no way to get along with the Russians—notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the creation of the European Defense Community, with the European army symbolizing, among other things, German rearmament. Kind words for the United States are not rare nowadays. One meets few Europeans who agree with the American approach to Asia; but the American attitude toward Europe does not at the moment arouse much European criticism. The common attitude is that if the United States is willing to sound out Russia, the United States is the generous-minded type of nation with which it is fruitful and safe to be allied.

Despite this new trans-Atlantic understanding, it remains doubtful whether the government of any nation within the Western alliance could base a policy on either all-out strengthening of defenses against the Soviets or on agreement with the Kremlin.

Economics and Defense

In the United States, for example, the economy-minded Congress has insisted on reducing military expenditures and foreign aid, yet, guided by nationalistic sentiments, is opposed to any moves for conciliation of the Russians. After Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, for example, hinted that the United States might be interested in a treaty guaranteeing Russia from invasion, Senator William F. Knowland of California, Republican leader in the Senate, announced that he objected to such a treaty. His statement left the impression that whatever reassuring suggestions Secretary of State John Foster Dulles makes for Europeans, these suggestions will not be transformed into real policy.

This attitude in the United States has been noticeable during the past six years. On October 5, 1945, when James F. Byrnes was Secretary of State, he said: "I confess that I do believe that peace and political progress in international affairs as in domestic affairs depend upon intelligent compromise." His faith in com-

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FOREIGN POLICY FORUM

Should U.S. Continue Point Four?

THE "bold new program" pro-
claimed by President Truman to aid underdeveloped areas has been
generally acclaimed as the most suc-
cessful American program in the
struggle to win the minds of men
and enlist their goodwill and aid
against Communist tyranny. Operat-
ing in 35 countries, American know-
how has been translated into deeds
to relieve human misery and to
raise the standard of living of the
people of these underdeveloped areas.
As Paul Kennedy of The New York
Times put it, "Travelers from Asia
and the Near East have said that
Point Four has done more to change
the attitude toward the United States
there than the entire expenditure of
life and treasure on the Korean
peninsula. Dramatic as were the re-
results of the food packages distributed
to East Berlin, they were miniscular
compared to the steady but unpub-
lized achievements in Asia by Point
Four."

Point Four and the Cold War

The economy- and political-minded
Eisenhower Administration, real-
zizing that Point Four will always be
known as a Truman program, has
recently made fundamental changes
in this program—both from the ad-
ministrative point of view as well as
from the point of view of basic phi-
losophy. It has removed Point Four
from the State Department and
placed it in a new Foreign Opera-
tions Administration under Harold
E. Stassen. This new office will now
embrace the Economic Cooperation
Administration (Marshall plan) and
the Mutual Security Administration,
which is predominantly concerned
with the military and economic stra-
tegy of the cold war.

Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles and Mr. Stassen have an-
nounced their intention of liquidat-
ing direct government participation
in the technical assistance program
and have suggested that this phase
of the program be turned over to
private educational, religious and
service organizations. Government
technical assistance will henceforth
be given in return for mutual securi-
ty assistance. In other words, Point
Four has been subverted to an instru-
ment in the military and economic
strategy of the cold war. One-fourth
of the Point Four administrators have
been dismissed, and morale among
the staff has been destroyed.

These actions, recently publicized,
threaten to undo the goodwill and
friendship already achieved under
the program. Private agencies have
announced that they do not have the
funds, nor personnel, to carry on
such an extensive program. More-
ever, they doubt the wisdom of these
actions and say that the basic philo-
sophy and the cooperative perform-
ce of the Point Four program may be
destroyed by these changes. In June
1952 the Advisory Board to the Point
Four administration specifically rec-
ommended that it contain "no indica-
tion that it should be related directly
or indirectly to military activities
abroad." The board believes there is
a fundamental distinction between
the philosophy underlying Point
Four and the philosophy underlying
programs of military assistance. Like-
wise, Dr. Walter W. Van Kirk, ex-
ceutive director of the Department
of International Justice and Goodwill
of the National Council of Churches,
said, "There is genuine concern
among many people of our churches
that United States technical assis-
tance programs, for maximum ac-
ceptability and effectiveness abroad
and for continuing support at home,
should be kept as clear as possible
from political and military involve-
ments."

"Two and a Half" Program

Despite these protests, the Eisen-
hower Administration has proceeded
with its watered-down Point "Two
and a Half" program, ignoring the
disapproval of the private agencies,
its Advisory Board and even of ex-
erts in the field of foreign technical
assistance. Jonathan B. Bingham,
deputy-administrator of the Point
Four program, 1951-53, has declared:
"When Mr. Dulles suggested to the
House Appropriations Committee
that perhaps eventually it [Point
Four] could be done by private agen-
cies, he was either telling the com-
nittee what he thought it wanted to
hear or else he was revealing a total
misconception of the magnitude of
the job."

Other considerations also lead to
doubts about the recent changes.
Point Four was successful because
there were no strings attached to it.
Tying it up with military strategy
will result inevitably in the subordi-
nation of the technical assistance pro-
gram. Even if there is a conscious
effort to maintain technical assistance
at a high level, the fact that recipient
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by Phelps Phelps

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Dominican Republic, as first civilian governor of Samoa,
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Altruism or Self-Interest?

This may be surprising, but it is completely understandable. Confusing and contradictory official statements and absence of candor on the part of official sponsors of the program have not made for understanding of the purposes and objectives of the program and have led to suspicion that it is a newfangled Yankee device of economic imperialism—possibly a modern version of the "white man's burden" theme. Thus, official propaganda directed toward the altruists describes Point Four in terms of a national benevolence for the underprivileged of the earth—a "down to earth" program for combating man's ancient enemies of hunger, disease and poverty, requiring personnel who are "almost missionaries." But for the hardheaded there are attractive brochures explaining how the program will produce vast markets for American manufactures at the same time that it serves as a means of winning friends for America and influencing peoples away from communism.

Now, it should be plain that whatever its effects, a program cannot at the same time be both disinterested and self-interested, both altruistic and shrewdly political. Moreover, despite pious protestations to the contrary, it is difficult to explain how one sovereign government can conduct a philanthropy on the territory of another. Governments—at least among the older societies—are created and exist to serve the national interest. It is not easy to persuade the peoples of the East to believe in a contrary view. In any case, no one in India, for instance, has suggested that the Indian government engage in a program of disseminating in this country the technics and arts of that ancient civilization for the benefit of the American people and at the expense of the Indian taxpayer. Nor has anyone suggested that the French government undertake to diffuse French culture and technics among the Appalachian highlanders or the inhabitants of Tenth Avenue, splendid as French culture may be.

The main objection to Point Four, both at home and abroad, and a latent cause of suspicion, is the false notion it spreads as to the actual sources of American political and economic vitality. Point Four is dedicated to a rising standard of living as the chief hope of a suffering humanity. Overlooking the phenomenon that communism breeds on hunger and poverty and that the antidotes are such things as DDT, artificial insemination of cattle, steel plow-points, and bigger jackasses.

Point Four Heresy

Here, of course, is the heresy of Point Four—the notion that all human ills are traceable to economic conditions and that human well-being depends upon the standard of living. "Greater production is the key to peace and prosperity," declared Mr. Truman in proposing his Point Four. "For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and skills to relieve the suffering of these peoples." Thus at a stroke he discarded the totality of Christian teaching as to the cause and cure of human suffering in favor of the Marxist dogma. Marx had long before declared in Das Kapital, "We can then foresee the advent of social conditions under which everyone will be relieved of the burden of material difficulty and distress."

The Marxist dogma is that "the ideal is nothing less than the material world reflected in the human mind." In the Marxian tradition runs this declaration of a United States representative in the UN, "The American people are convinced that the only solid foundation upon which we can build security is world-wide economic advancement." (Mike J. Mansfield, November 20, 1950. Italics supplied.) "Dignity and independence are fine words, but they are just words where people are hungry," declares a former Point Four administrator, expressing a sentiment that would hardly have carried the winter at Valley Forge. (Jonathan B. Bingham, March 22, 1952.)

No wonder the cry arises abroad, as voiced by the Indian industrialist, Minoo R. Masani, "You feed the body, but you starve the soul." Or as a young Iranian exclaimed to me, "You are building tiled latrines in our villages, but what we want is the..."
When former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other officials of the Truman Administration used to say the United States should postpone negotiations with the Kremlin until it could “negotiate with strength,” the possibility apparently was not considered that when such a time came, the Soviet leaders might not be interested in holding a great-power conference.

As a matter of fact, in the immediate postwar years Moscow had repeatedly indicated its preference for bilateral negotiations with Washington, on the Realpolitik ground that the two superpowers, alone among nations, had the resources and the influence to determine the destiny of the world. In those days the United States had no desire to be closeted alone with the U.S.S.R. and preferred to meet Russian diplomats in larger gatherings even if this meant interminable sessions which usually offered a platform for Communist propaganda. The frustrations of these conferences eventually created here increasing doubts as to the value of any negotiations with the Kremlin until the West had restored the balance of power in Europe and Asia, which had been severely shaken by the weakening of Britain and France and the defeat of Germany and Japan.

**Moscow Prefers Tête-à-Tête**

Now that this balance is on the point of being restored, Stalin’s successors, while continuing to declare that they are ready and willing to seek peaceful settlements by all available means and urging a five-power conference on world problems with the participation of Communist China, seem less interested in large-scale negotiations than at any time since 1945. Is that because, as some observers have suggested, the Russians fear that they might be outmaneuvered at a four-power conference of foreign ministers such as has again been proposed by the United States, Britain and France in their note of October 18 suggesting a meeting at Lugano, Switzerland on November 9? Or is it because the Kremlin hopes to achieve its objectives more effectively through bilateral diplomatic negotiations with nations other than the United States, free from the goldfish-bowl publicity which has become a concomitant of international gatherings?

No one in the West is so bold as to claim intimate knowledge of the motives that may animate Soviet policy. This is the principal reason why Sir Winston Churchill favors an informal meeting of heads of state, as contrasted with the elaborate preparations surrounding a conference of foreign ministers flanked by numerous experts, so that the West might...
at least get a first-hand impression of Premier Georgi Malenkov who remains shrouded in the mystery associated with things unseen.

Moscow's reticence about attending the type of conference thus far favored by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who has been reluctant to accept the Churchill prescription, may be explained by its unwillingness to face world scrutiny on such issues as the unification of Germany or the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria. On balance, however, Russia would seem to have as much to gain as to lose by settlement of these issues. For example, if we want the Russians to withdraw their troops from East Germany, Moscow could insist on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from West Germany, and this would confront us with a real dilemma at a time when West Germany is as yet unarmed. Or, as some commentators have suggested, the Kremlin may be so preoccupied with its own internal problems and with the increasingly difficult task of controlling its satellites in Eastern Europe that it might prefer to adopt an isolationist stance, turning inward as Russia has repeatedly done in its history both under the Tsars and under the Communists.

While these various considerations play a part in determining the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., they should not obscure a significant development—that is, the extent to which, without fanfare, the Soviet government is realigning its relations with other nations through the old-fashioned methods of unpublicized diplomacy and trade. The most striking example of this method can be seen in the case of France. Capitalizing on France's well-known fears about the restoration of Germany as a great military power, the Kremlin has reminded the French of the dangers of the European Defense Community (originally proposed by Paris to ward off the danger of uncontrolled German rearmament) and has hinted at the possibility of some form of Franco-Russian security arrangement, at one time favored by General de Gaulle. Meanwhile, the right-of-center anti-Communist government of Premier Joseph Laniel is encouraging the expansion of trade with the U.S.S.R. through export subsidies; and both the public and the cabinet in France are torn between the desire to end the war in Indochina by negotiations with the Vietminh and possibly with Peiping so as to strengthen the French military position on the Continent as a counterweight to Germany and the fear that withdrawal from Indochina might shake France's rule in North Africa. Comparable moves are being made by the Kremlin in other areas of the world. In these moves Communist China serves as a magnet for industrial nations which compete with each other for markets, notably Britain, Germany and Japan.

**No War, No Talks**

If, as is generally assumed, one of the principal objectives of the Soviet government is to drive wedges into the anti-Russian coalition led by the United States and to postpone the rearmament of Germany and Japan, the Kremlin's current policy of no war but also no international negotiation may achieve considerable success. This policy may be aided, rather than hindered, by reports that Washington, for reasons of economy in manpower, material and money, may decide to curtail expenditures on "conventional" weapons and concentrate on the output of the "unconventional" atomic and hydrogen bombs.

If these reports should turn out to be accurate, our European allies, as well as Japan, whose rearmament is being urged by Washington, may come to the same conclusion—that no real purpose will be served in the future by the creation of standing armies and the accumulation of conventional armaments, which, relatively, impose a greater burden on their economies than they do on ours. But since we have not shared with them the secrets of our atomic and hydrogen bomb manufacture, they may argue in the future that the best defense against atomic war is to avoid war altogether, thereby carrying the "neutralist" argument to its logical conclusion. Such a development would not necessarily invite aggression by the U.S.S.R.—at least this is the assumption which underlies the calculations of many Europeans. But it might well leave the United States in a position of isolation, while the major nations of Europe, and Japan as well, turn toward exploring the possibilities of trade, which, rightly or wrongly, they anticipate in the Communist East.

President Eisenhower's statement at his press conference on October 27 shelving the possibility of a top-level four-power conference until the Kremlin had made a concrete peace gesture has already caused the British press to demand that Churchill should "go it alone," as the conservative *Daily Mail* put it on October 29, adding: "A Churchill-Malenkov get-together would do no harm and might do infinite good."

The predicted horrors of nuclear destruction may well forestall another war. The world may have peace without the benefit of great-power negotiations. Such a peace, however, would gradually bridge the gulf which since 1945 has separated the non-Communist from the Communist nations and thereby bring about far-reaching changes in the international landscape.

_Vera Micheles Dean_
promised was not popular even at that time. It led to his departure from the State Department early in 1947. Since then the official point of view which opposes compromise has noticeably hardened.

It has been hardened by disillusion with the results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945, which many Americans thought would bring about truly representative government in the Eastern European countries and would lead to the unification of Germany along lines considered wise in Washington. It has been hardened also by the course of affairs in the Far East, by the special privileges which the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 gave Russia in Manchuria, by the triumph of the Chinese Communists in the civil war that forced the surrender of the mainland of China by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and by Russian and Communist Chinese support of North Korea in the Korean war. The anticompromise point of view has been stiffened also by the frequent vetoes of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council, which is the forum for a kind of continuous negotiation. In sum, the prevailing American psychological attitude of hostility to negotiation that would involve compromise rests on the belief that the Soviet Union has increased its power since the end of World War II at the expense of the United States and through exploitation of a certain na"ıveté on the part of the diplomatic negotiators Washington has used in the past.

The European approach to the Russian problem is at bottom quite different from that of the Americans. Few Frenchmen share the common American view that Russia is an imminent menace. Few Frenchmen, so far as one can judge without polling the whole country, show bitterness about Yalta or Potsdam. But the opinion that negotiation is useless because nothing would come of it is widespread in expert circles. Here again, however, there is a sharp conflict, as in the United States, between the executive and the legislators. While the dominant factions in the French cabinet favor the creation of the European Defense Community, for example, it is doubtful that the National Assembly would support its creation now. On both sides of the Atlantic official efforts to free foreign policy from the restraints of popular—or parliamentary—psychology seldom succeed in full.

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REFERENCE BOOKS

The complexities of our times call for a knowledge of innumerable facts in order to understand the news of the day in the field of international affairs. Reference books have therefore become indispensable to all those interested in this field. The Statesman’s Year Book, 1953, by Dr. S. H. Steinberg (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1953, $8.00), and the Political Handbook of the World, edited by Walter H. Mallory and Joseph Barber (New York, Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1953, $3.75), are compact reference books containing up-to-date facts and statistics on government, industry, resources and many other subjects about every country and territory in the world.

Those wishing more detailed information on foreign governments will find it in Modern Foreign Governments, by Frederic A. Ogg and Harold Zink (New York, Macmillan, 1953, $6.25), and Contemporary Foreign Governments, by Herman Bokema and associates (New York, Rinehart, 1953, $5.50).