RACE, GENDER, AND SCIENCE
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THE "RACIAL"
ECONOMY OF
___ SCIENCE

TOWARD A
DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

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This paper considers some writings of minority groups, as they responded to and resisted the claims of scientific racism. In exploring the relationship between language and resistance we focus on two very different groups of individuals stereotyped as different and inferior in the biological, medical, and anthropological sciences, namely African-Americans and Jews. We concentrate specifically on the period of transition to modern science between 1870 and 1920, when the claims of scientifically established inferiority were pressed most insistently by the mainstream scientific community. Our analysis reveals a body of literature by minorities and the marginal about the sciences of themselves that has been virtually untouched by historians of science. What did the men and women categorized by the biological and medical sciences as racially distinct and inferior say about the matter? How did they respond to the claims made about them in the name of science?

Limitations of space have made us very selective with materials. Examples have been chosen for their effective illustration of points, and the goal is to open up a problem for discussion in the history of science and racism that has hitherto been almost entirely ignored.

The Problem Defined

This paper derives from a consideration of two intertwined issues: the centrality of scientific racism to the Western intellectual tradition, and the absence of sustained criticism of scientific racism from within mainstream science in the period under study. Historians have long been aware of the existence of scientific racism in Western societies, especially its intensification and institutionalization in the second half of the nineteenth century. Scientific racism was significant because it provided a series of lenses through which human variation was constructed, understood, and experienced from the early nineteenth century until well into the twentieth century, if not until the present day. We assume in this paper that the races that peopled the texts of science in the past were "artificial," constructed categories of social knowledge. These categories had material weight in the lives of individuals and groups; racial identities were embodied in political practices of discrimination and law, and affected people's access to education, forms of employment, political rights, and subjective experience. Scientific language was one of the most authoritative languages through which meaning was encoded, and as a language it had political and social, as well as intellectual, consequences.

In studying the history of scientific racism, we have been struck by the relative absence of critical challenges to its claims from within mainstream science. This absence is in itself an interesting problem in the sociology of scientific knowledge, since controversy and contention are often taken to be characteristic of science and the route by which empirical certainty is established. When it came to the sciences of race difference, however, disagreements tended to be minor and technical. Since racial science was invariably a science of inequality, produced by European men in an age of widespread racism, to a large (but not predetermined) extent the scientists' own racial identities and identifications prevented them from asking critical questions about their own science—its assumptions, its methods, its content. The concepts within racial science were so congruent with social and political life (with power relations, that is) as to be virtually uncontested from inside the mainstream of science.

One place one encounters a "critical tradition" in relation to scientific racism is in the writings of those stereotyped by the sciences of the day. These writings had a problematic relation to the mainstream, since by the very definitions of racial science the stigmatized were largely outside, or at the margins, of science. Their exclusion was part of the very process of the construction of the sciences of difference and inequality, a result of the scientific expectation that the so-called lower races served mainly as objects of study, but not as scientific truth-seekers themselves. Yet many individuals reacted to scientific racism by actively seeking to enter the relatively closed circle of science, or to use its tools and techniques, to define and defend themselves.

There is far more writing by such individuals than is generally recognized by historians of science. Much of the historical work of uncovering the "struggles and strategies" (in Margaret Rossiter's words) of minority writers, as they confronted a hostile and stereotyping science of race, remains to be done. Our purpose here is to reflect generally on such writing, and to present some examples of the "textual" strategies we have uncovered. The problem of resistance to imposed meaning and identity in the human sciences is only beginning to be articulated by scholars. The situation contrasts markedly with the issue of social and political resistance, long considered an essential part of historical analysis, for example in the brilliant work on slave revolts and runaway slave communities, or the fight for black or female suffrage. These studies are indispensable to the study of intellectual resistance, since the capacity to formulate challenges to dominant discourses is closely tied to the
political and social resources of the groups making the challenges. Often, the strategies of intellectual resistance—struggles over meaning—mirror or are part of the same process of political struggle. Confronting scientific racism necessitated acquiring a degree of control over the elements of an intellectual idiom, their reassembly and employment for new ends. How could science be used to transform the racial valuations built into discussions of human variation? Can we discern in the writings of minorities a variety of different tactics, and if so, what were they? As a genre of writing, does it have distinctive features? What effect did the resistance of minorities to negative scientific claims have on the dominant discourse? What does the study of such writings offer the historian of scientific change?

In the history of science, the reasons for theoretical neglect of such questions are rather straightforward. The temptation to think of science as a neutral and universal form of knowledge is still strong, despite many years of criticism of traditional scientific epistemology. By thinking of science as objective, scientists have been in a position to dismiss areas of knowledge from the past that are now viewed as obviously out of date and biased—such as scientific racism—as nothing but "pseudoscience." Studying the resistance of men and women to what has been labeled pseudoscience is then seen as a narrow endeavor, of interest primarily to the "victims" themselves, but not central to the story of modern science. Furthermore, calling scientific racism pseudoscience also allows scientists to refuse to confront the issue of the inherently political nature of much of the biological and human sciences, and to ignore the problem of the persistence of racial metaphors of inferiority in the sciences of today.

Critical approaches from outside the history of science have been more useful to our work on oppositional, cognitive strategies, even though scientific writing usually lies outside their purview. Antonio Gramsci's explorations of cultural hegemony and the role of the "organic" intellectual in his Prison Notebooks; the deconstructionists' attacks on essentialism and metaphysics, and their emphasis on the radically heterogeneous nature of the text; Michel Foucault's projects on the inherently political character of knowledge; his analysis of power as something dispersed discursively through entire systems of discourses and practices, and the problematic character of resistance from within the regime of power and knowledge; recent analyses of minority writing that examine the degree to which female and minority literary traditions represent explicit or implicit subversions of the dominant discourse: all of these developments are relevant to analyzing scientific racism. Our study can be seen as a contribution to the debate about how people use languages to constitute themselves as self-conscious subjects, or find a self-representation that is not sexualized or racialized. Our work is distinctive in its focus on science as an especially weighty discourse of identity, whose appropriation by oppositional groups was extremely problematic. The period from 1870 to 1920 has been chosen on purpose because, as we shall show, science acquired its modern epistemological, institutional, and cultural forms during this period. Our interest in this paper lies in the interplay between these cultural forms: scientific racism, and scientific resistance. Strategies and mean-nings are always historically specific and cannot be given transcendent value; our focus throughout is on a particular kind of discourse in a particular moment in history, and the strategies open to resisting individuals and groups.

The Authority of Modern Science

Responding to scientific racism was peculiarly difficult because of certain characteristics of the emerging discourse of science itself. Our argument is that from the mid-nineteenth century onward, scientific claims could be effectively rebutted only by scientific discourses to which resisting groups stood in an especially disadvantaged and problematic position.

Our period situates scientific racism in a moment of elaboration and institutional embodiment of modern science and its epistemology. It was the time in which, as Morrell and Thackray have remarked in their history of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), science became consolidated as "the dominant mode of cognition of industrial society." As a mode of cognition, science was conceptualized as "a sharply edged and value-neutral domain of knowledge"—as an apolitical, nontheological, universal, empirical, and uniquely objective (in part because uniquely methodological) form of knowledge unlike any other. The result was the self-definition of science as the nonpolitical, unbiased arena of knowledge.

This conceptualization was not a "natural" outcome of the unproblematic study of nature, but a social outcome of a process whereby science was historically and materially constituted to have certain meanings, functions, and interests. In a complex series of innovations, science's epistemological claims were given definition and institutional representation in the form of new scientific societies and organizations sharply delimited from other institutions. These innovations were tied not only to industrialization, but to the politics of class, and the closing of ranks of bourgeois society in the face of challenges from the working class in the 1830s and 1840s. Race and gender were also crucial to the construction of modern science, in that science was defined as "masculine" and European in its abstraction, detachment, and objectivity.

Morrell and Thackray point out that appeals to an impersonal "nature" are common in times of turmoil, what made the mid-nineteenth century distinctive was the successful institutionalization of a particular view of that "nature." The processes of boundary setting were contested at many points, since they meant the delegitimization of many areas of knowledge and redefinition of those areas as "non-science" or "pseudoscience." Morrell and Thackray, for instance, demonstrate that between 1832 and 1870, as the BAAS created a new ideology of science, practitioners in fields of inquiry ruled "unscientific" were excluded from the association and thereby from representation within "science." Areas fraught with moral and/or political controversy kept a place within the boundaries of science only when purged of those concerns, as scientists adopted the value-
neutral, empirical language now seen as defining science itself. Science as a form of knowledge separated itself from other knowledge systems; in the process, the dichotomies between the pure and the impure (or the applied sciences), the rational and the irrational, the objective and the subjective, the hard and the soft, the male and the female, were given material form. Such polarities, and the institutional boundaries that created and maintained them, were not the inevitable results of a nature merely "discovered" and described; they were the products of active institution creation, demarcation setting, and the successful use of political and cultural resources to achieve these ends.11

The formation of the scientific text as a new, standardized cultural genre, replacing the more open, varied, metaphorically porous, literary forms of science, is a further aspect of scientific modernization that bears on the problem of the responses to scientific racism. It was in the late nineteenth century that the modern scientific text as we know it stabilized to become the standard, accepted form of writing in nearly all branches of the natural sciences. We are referring here to the scientific paper—the short, depersonalized, empirical paper that is still the hallmark of science today. In a persuasive account of the scientific paper as a cultural and literary genre that emerged in the specific, historically contingent conditions of the late nineteenth century, Georgy Markus argues that the scientific text served normative goals, and through its form—its depersonalized authorship, its demand for a peculiarly competent scientific reader—successfully satisfied the expectations of science for constant innovation and accumulation of knowledge.12 The neutral style of the scientific paper, the absence of a strong, individualized, authorial "I," the emphasis on the factuality of nature, on a nature revealed by specific methods (experimental, technical)—all these features rendered the scientific text problematic for the nonscientific writer and reader and successfully circumscribed the process of contestation.

The new cultural genre of science was an added impediment to opposition in the realm of scientific racism, since it delegitimized the cultural forms of the earlier period.13 The scientific text became more sharply distinguished from the literary; in the process the range of literary repertoires of meaning—the opportunity for literary play and hermeneutics—was reduced. One thinks, for example, of the charged and metaphorical language of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species compared to the dry, limited vocabulary of the sciences of evolution by the 1920s and 1930s. Darwin could not keep control over the metaphors he introduced (such as natural selection, struggle for survival, survival of the fittest). Nearly every term he used was multivalent and was appropriated in selective and varied ways by very different groups for very different purposes. Though Darwin endeavored in later editions of The Origin of the Species to reduce the metaphorical ambiguities of his science, his attempts failed, and until well into the twentieth century Darwinism served as a metadiscourse that opened up, rather than merely closed off, the discussion of nature. By the 1900s in the physical sciences, and by the 1920s in the biological sciences, however, the metaphors of scientific language had become much more tightly controlled. The modern scientific text had replaced the expansive scientific book, and the possibilities of multivalent meanings being created out of scientific language were thereby curtailed.

The Marginalization of Moral/Political Argument in Science

The result of the various processes of transformation of science that accompanied industrialization and modernization was that, from 1870 to 1920, science became both more specialized and authoritative as a cultural resource and language of interpretation. It began to replace theological and moral discourse as the appropriate discourse with which to discuss nature. Science also encroached heavily on political discourse, as many political issues were transposed into the realm of neutral "nature," the scientists' province. The outcome was a narrowing of the cultural space within which, and the cultural forms by which, the claims of biological determinism could be effectively challenged.

The effects of this narrowing can be seen in the marginalization and delegitimization of a number of forms of oppositional writing that had been used before about 1860. We will give a few examples. One was to keep in the foreground the moral issues of rights and justice, and to refuse to separate them from scientific ones. These rights, belonging to individuals as members of the human family, rights debated in political and theological terms until the 1850s and 1860s, were increasingly reduced to questions about the racial "natures" of individuals, questions that scientists now claimed had objective, neutral answers. Moral rights were thereby translated into matters of anatomy and physiology.

In the mid-1800s, African-Americans, confronting a "purely factual" science whose message was apparently ever more racist, in its conclusions concerning themselves, tried to resist the process of reduction and "naturalization" associated with science. In 1854, for instance, the abolitionist Frederick Douglass, in an address titled "The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered," attacked the scientific racists by questioning their logic, their data, and their conclusions concerning the supposed gulf separating the white and black races. He proved to his audience that anatomically and chronologically the similarities between the Negro and the white race far outweighed the differences, that the human species was one, and that the Negro could therefore claim full membership in the human family. But at the end of his address, Douglass made a crucial move from the discourse of anatomy to the discourse of morality and rights: "What, if . . . the case of anatomical similarity between whites and blacks is not made out? Does it follow, then the Negro should be held in contempt?" He answered with a resounding "No," because the title to freedom, liberty, and knowledge was not a question of "natural" difference or similarity, but an issue of natural rights and morality. "It is registered in the Courts of Heaven, and is enforced by the eloquence of the God of all the earth." Douglass here asked a question that would virtually disappear from science: What difference does difference make to human
rights? Douglass's answer was that it made no difference, because equality and rights were moral, political, and religious issues. The silence of most scientific texts on this matter after 1860 suggests the power of science to occupy the terrain formerly held by moral discourse, and to disguise the political projects that helped constitute the scientific field.

African-American intellectuals continued to infuse discussions of race with theological, moral, and political concerns. They continued, especially, to evoke the older tradition of Christian monogenism long after it had lost ground as an acceptable style of scientific argumentation in mainstream science. Christian monogenism was one of the few powerful traditions linked to science on which they could draw in self-defense; moreover, theological discourse was one of the most significant intellectual productions of the black community. A notable example of the genre is the work of the Harvard-trained physician and Pan-Africanist Dr. Martin R. Delany. He used the Mosaic story of the Deluge to structure a scientific study of race unity in his *Principles of Ethnology* (1879). His strategy made sense within the black tradition but it rendered his book a cultural and linguistic hybrid unlike white scientific writings on race in the same period, a hybrid reflected in its very title, half English and half Latin. Religiously oriented ethnography survived in a form because it served the political and psychological needs of the African-American. Isolation from the norms of science meant that those norms were less internalized. The creation of a different narrative form resisted the conventions of science, but as a strategy of resistance, theological arguments had the disadvantage of seeming illegitimate or "unscientific" when measured by the canons of mainstream science.16 Another strategy of resistance was the employment of wit, irony, or parody. These literary devices became marginalized and delegitimized in the second half of the nineteenth century precisely because they did not fit the depersonalized, nonauthoritative style of modern science. As a style, humor had the advantage of distancing and subverting the claims of science, thereby serving as a strategy of empowerment. An exceptional use of the ironic voice is found in an anonymous article in the black American periodical, the *Anglo-African Magazine*, in 1860. The article, which was almost certainly the work of the black Scottish-trained physician Dr. James McCune Smith, is especially interesting because it represents, as far as we know, the first account of Darwinian ideas by an African-American. Titled "A Word for the 'Smith' Family," the article put Darwin's new science to witty use to defend the unity and success of the black people named Smith. The very commonness of the name Smith was taken as proof of the evolutionary success of black people, who were shown to have thrived, adapted, and multiplied through natural selection and the struggle for survival. The theory of common descent was also used implicitly to poke fun at the pretensions of all the white Smiths who thought they were distinct and superior to black Smiths. All Smiths, the author suggested, were linked together in an evolutionary kinship.17 Wit and irony gave a writer control and power over language and content. Parody could perform a similar task of distancin in relation to the claims of science. But all three literary (or cultural) styles, because they impressed directly the author's own personality on the text, had less and less place in scientific discourse as the century wore on. As strategies of resistance, they too became marginal to the scientific enterprise.18

Using the Scientific Idiom

Despite the continuing resort to political and moral written arguments to challenge the claims of the scientific racists, the professionalization of science made such tactics less effective. By the last third of the century, effective strategies of resistance were often structured by the dominant discourse. Science's conceptual categories, rhetorical styles, and methodologies were adopted. Of course, science had always been used as a source of ideas and arguments by people challenging the conventional wisdom and dominant ideologies of their day. Feminists in the eighteenth century defended the rights of women in the language of Newton, artisanal socialists in the early nineteenth century called upon Lamarckian evolutionism to serve their antibourgeois, confrontational needs. After the mid-1800s, however, writers were forced to use the sciences of the day more narrowly to challenge scientific claims if they wished to have a hearing within science. As minorities moved into the scientific arena, their own competencies in the scientific idiom grew, as did their ability to meet science on its own terms. It is no surprise, then, to find that evolutionism, hereditarianism, the new Mendelism, and even "eugenics" (which in the United States was racist almost by definition) were embraced by African-Americans, Jews, and other minorities to counter the charges of racial inferiority. The cultural forms of scientific texts were imitated in a necessary process of identification with the norms and standards of science. Blacks produced texts of blackness, with anthropological illustrations of heads, cranial measurements, and scientific tables of racial health and illness. Jewish scientists particularly used scientific representations of self because of their greater access to scientific education and greater commitment to the norms of science.

The use of science to dismantle the claims of science involved the authors in complex processes of transformation of the meaning of terms. Any discussion of the critical responses to scientific racism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century must acknowledge how the need to meet science on its own terms limited the nature of the response. This was also true of other discourses—for example, literary discourse—but scientific discourse was distinguished by its high barriers of entry. By the end of the nineteenth century, professionalization separated science from both "high" literary culture and popular culture. Science acquired technical procedures and practices, as well as new vocabularies unfamiliar to the nonscientist; these could only be acquired in the professional scientific academy. Only the trained scientist, it was claimed, was able to speak
coherently and legitimately about scientific matters. Disciplinary boundaries were a further disincentive to the kind of critical inquiry that dismantling scientific racism and sexism required. Exclusion from the academy meant exclusion from the authoritative use of the idioms of science. Whenever racial minorities and women wrote critically about the sciences of themselves, their writing ran the risk of being ignored or dismissed because it came from "outside" professional science, and was therefore by definition "unscientific." Furthermore, resisting the claims of scientific racism by pointing out its subjective, metaphorical, particular, or politically biased nature (namely, that science was articulated around notions of race) was extraordinarily difficult because many minority writers shared the belief of the mainstream scientists in science as a progressive, instrumental, and objective form of knowledge. Given the epistemological status of science, to admit that race, especially one's own, was an issue in science was to make the writer immediately less than fully "objective" and therefore less than fully "scientific." For the African-American or Jew writing as a scientist, or from within science, the writer's own status as objective observer of nature was at stake. The problem of both using science as a language of self-assertion and identity, while exposing its essentially political character in relation to racial claims, was rarely addressed by resisting groups because rarely recognized.

Some Tactics and Responses to Scientific Racism

In relation to the terrain and idioms of science, different groups were very differently situated. Access to education and the languages of science varied, and was indeed a part of the social construction of race as a category of human and political difference. Yet even when the barriers were very great, as was the case for African-Americans, critical engagement with scientific racism long predated the Civil War; the way this critical response influenced black periodical writings is relatively unstudied. Jews as a group had far greater access to education in general and were strongly attracted to the scientific professions. In some branches of science, in fact, Jews made up 6 to 10 percent of all scientists, a figure much higher than their total representation in the population.

What is not generally realized is the degree to which Jews themselves engaged with racial science, because of its potentially harmful implications for themselves as a "race." Their cultural production has barely been studied in the context proposed here. As Jews (and other groups stereotyped in the biological and social sciences of the day) were drawn more deeply into the sciences of racial difference, whether in measuring themselves as a race by craniometry and other methods, or by comparing one fraction of the Jewish "race" with another, or by commenting on or contesting the thesis of Jewish pathology and illness, they were tempted simultaneously to embrace and reject the field: to embrace science's methods, concepts, and the promise it held out for discovering knowledge, and to reject, in a variety of ways, the conclusions of science as they appeared to apply negatively to themselves. Audre Lorde has stated that "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." Yet our studies suggest that when minorities took on the matter of racial science, in the idioms of science, that science was inevitably changed. Even for the most oppressed, science created spaces for self-definition and self-representation. It is these interstices—or more precisely, the strategies that created them—to which we turn now.

Our discussion takes the form of a simple typology. One of the typology's functions is to draw attention to a variety of responses to scientific racism and a range of textual materials that are usually overlooked. By providing a simple classification of these materials, we show that despite the individuality of the responses, despite the very different social experiences of the writers analyzed, despite the fact that "race" was not a unitary category but had multiple meanings, certain similarities in textual strategies can be found in minority responses. These similarities indicate the power of scientific racism to map the terrain within which, and the terms by which, resistance and challenge could be carried out. Recurring tropes, recurring techniques of re-envisioning identity, certain patterns in the tactics of re-representation, characterize the critical tradition we examine.

The kinds of responses illustrated here are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. We find that a writer employed a number of responses or strategies, either simultaneously or successively over the course of a writing career. Since the dominant ideology of scientific racism was itself heterogeneous, and fueled by contradictory impulses, so were the resisting discourses that echoed, commented upon, and modified them. "Cannibalization," disarticulation and reassembly and the employment of multiple modes of attack were the tactics that made sense. Our typology, then, is a highly dynamic one, employed mainly to point out how responses placed the writer in different relations to the dominant discourse, with varying consequences psychologically, intellectually, and scientifically.

The most pernicious effect of racial science was the profound internalization of the negative terms and norms of the discourse itself. Insofar as resisting discourses are necessarily tied to, reflective of, and constructed in similar terms to dominant discourses, "internalization" is to a certain extent characteristic of all strategies of intellectual resistance. "Internalization" here, however, means more than this—we refer to the very profound psychological and social intrusion of negative images and meanings contained in the stereotypes, in the construction and understanding of one's self-identity. Such internalization was recognized by the stereotyped people as a common and profoundly problematic outcome of stereotyping discourses. "In the psychology of the human mind, suggestion plays an important part," wrote the African-American George Parker in 1908. "If it be true that as a man thinketh, so he is, then the self-making power becomes proportionately more powerful when applied to a whole race. For years it has been constantly affirmed and reaffirmed that races of African blood have contribut
nothing to humanity's store of knowledge and civilization, and this incessant affirmation has produced a conviction of truth not only in the minds of those who affirm it, but also in the minds of those whom it wrongs. 29 The psychological processes of identification with and internalization of the dominant discourses of "otherness" are extremely complex and varied. Gilman has discussed the fragmentation of identity that internalization of the norms of "otherness" entails, and the conflicts that arise when we use on ourselves the discourse that labels us as different and unacceptable. 30 Our interest here is in the special weight of scientific discourses of otherness and inequality on individual and group self-consciousness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in which the self was understood and represented through a preexisting, racialized science. Absolute application, withoutqualification, of the dominant discourse to oneself or to one's group is for rather obvious reasons relatively rare. Psychologically the outcome is extreme and potentially devastating self-hatred. The publication of one such self-hating text, by the Jewish student of philosophy Otto Weininger in 1903, was followed a few months later by his suicide. Weininger, a student of the Viennese philosophers Laurenz Müller and Friedrich Jodl, attempted to combine a biology of human sexuality with a philosophy of sexual and racial identity. His self-inflicted death, in the house in which Beethoven had died, reveals the profound conflict he experienced when biological determinism came into direct contact with self-definition.

No matter how bizarre Weininger's attempt to place himself within the discourses of race may appear to be, in his own times he was understood as a scientific investigator whose ideas, though controversial, were nevertheless taken as contributions to scholarship, not as examples of psychosis. His well-known text was called Sex and Character, a title not unrelated to the problem of internalization. For even in the case of such self-hating texts, it is evident there must always be a way out of extreme negative self-stereotyping, whether or not the step is taken. As a male author, Weininger tried to rescue himself from complete negativity by projecting onto the female sex all the most negative qualities found in the science of biological determinism. Women were portrayed as biologically predisposed to illness, hysteria, and to an inferior and incomplete form of speaking and thinking. Such strategies of internalization and projection in principle provide a form of psychological rescue for the author. But for Weininger, both homosexual and Jewish, it proved a failure. 31

The choice of the female as the site of negative projection in Weininger's text was not idiosyncratic but deeply structured by the stereotyping discourses of the day, as is shown in texts by male authors writing in very different social and racial circumstances. For example, the African-American William Hannibal Thomas wrote The American Negro in 1901, just two years before Weininger's book, during the height of American scientific racism. Thomas's work provoked an immediate angry reaction within the African-American intellectual community. Kelly Miller, professor of mathematics at Howard University, commented that the book had been "more widely noticed than any other recent work on the race problem," and he drew attention to its similarity to Jewish self-hating texts. 32

Thomas, a northerner who went to the South to study the Negro and did not like what he found, wrote a text that might have been produced by the most racist white scientist. Yet here too processes of projection, of "self-rescue," and re-representation similar to those in Weininger can be discerned, despite the differences in personality, nationality, and the terms of the dominant, scientific, stereotyping discourse. First, Thomas maintained that the women of the Negro race embodied all of the corrupting sensuality that scientists had attributed to the entire Afro-American race. In this way Thomas implicitly exonerated the male author from the most negative aspects of the stereotyping discourse of science.

Second, like Weininger, Thomas attempted to shift the definition of "race" away from a permanent, outwardly visible "sign" such as color, to a subjective, psychological condition within. To Thomas, the term "Negro" referred negatively to a "characteristic form of thought and action" (the equivalent to Weininger's "psychological constitution" of Jewishness), so that any person, of whatever hue, who exhibited such characteristic traits was to be considered a "Negro." The inclusion of all people of a particular color (such as blackness) in the same category was an unjust classification "which acts with great severity against a saving remnant of good men and true women." 33 By projecting blackness onto women and away from color per se, the mulatto author both internalized the terms of racialized and scientized discourse, and distanced himself from complete application of the negative elements of racialist discourse to himself.

A second response to racial science was to accept the terms set by the dominant discourse, but to change the valuations attached to them. The significance of biological race differences was accepted, but the "inferior" element in the hierarchy revised and renamed. This strategy entailed a transvaluation of the terms of the dominant discourse. For example, blackness became an oppositional structure to whiteness, and negativity was thereby transformed into positivity.

Once again, this kind of strategy is familiar in discourses other than scientific ones; we mean to call attention here to the authority of scientific language in structuring such reversals. We call this strategy "transvaluation" because in such writing the response was always couched in terms similar to the dominant discourse, so that one mythology of identity was in a sense replaced by another. Though as a type, the form of writing moved the resisting author further away from total acceptance or accommodation to the dominant discourse of difference, the terms of the dominant discourse were very far from being transcended. In addition, the reverse stereotype that was created had many of the disadvantages of stereotyping in general—it failed to give space to individuality and variation, and could therefore be circumscribing. Furthermore, the simple process of transvaluation of the terms from negative to positive was not always convincing, since the resisting minority voice was always in a position of lesser legitimacy than that of the dominating voice. For the writer, however, such transvaluations often had considerable weight. Reactive and defensive though transvaluations may have been, the result was often empowerment. Upon the basis of such reversals, political solidarities were created. At times, too, they could result in telling criticisms of the science of race of the times. 34