The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries witnessed a great flowering of Sanskrit intellectual production in many areas. During this period, key scholars working in the fields of grammar, poetics, and hermeneutics (Mimamsa), at virtually the same moment, began for the first time to explicitly refer to themselves and their views as “new” (navya), in contrast to their predecessors in their respective fields, now labeled as “old” (pracina, jira, etc.). The grammarian Bhattoji Diksita, the poetician Jagannatha, and the Mimamsaka Kanhadeva, all active in Varanasi in the latter decades of the sixteenth century and the early decades of the seventeenth, are the first in their respective fields to systematically deploy doxographical distinctions between “new” and “old” in developing their own views.1

As these scholars began to talk and think of a “New Grammar”, “New Poetics”, and “New Mimamsa”, the model of scholastic “newness” that was certainly foremost in their minds was that of “New Logic” (navanyayya). This “New Logic” had become firmly established with the work of the fourteenth century logician Gangeśa. Gangeśa’s Tattvacintamani marked a decisive break with the earlier logical tradition – much of the later Nyaya literature takes the form of commentaries and sub-commentaries on the Tattvacintamani itself, rather than on the Nyayasutra and its commentaries, which had formed the foundation for most earlier work in the field. Yet the transformation of Nyaya in the wake of Gangeshas’s work, though radical and thoroughgoing, consisted largely in a shift in discursive style and method rather than in a departure from the major tenets and doctrines of the earlier logicians. This new mode of discourse is marked chiefly by an extreme formalization of language – by the elaboration of a set technical terms and categories which allow for an increasingly precise specification of the relations between entities both concrete and abstract, and by an exhaustive effort to develop, in terms of these relations, more and more carefully refined and tested definitions of these entities.

As has been generally recognized, this Navyanyayya mode of formalization came in time to have a decisive impact on Sanskrit philosophical
and technical discourse generally. Certainly by the end of the seventeenth century, the basic elements of Navyanyāya technical terminology were in current use by at least some authors working in most of the major Sanskrit scholastic disciplines; the deployment of such terminology in new fields seems to have played a significant role in the seminal works of the “new” grammarians, poeticians, and Mīmāṃsākās mentioned above. Yet the specific processes by which the formal language of Navyanyāya and the modes of definition and argument associated with it migrated into other disciplines have never been adequately mapped out, and the nature and extent of the transformation in Sanskrit philosophical discourse ensuing from the spread of Navyanyāya methods remain poorly understood.

I would like to make a preliminary effort here to chart and to make sense of the specific applications of Navyanyāya terminology and discursive method in the works of Khandadeva, the seminal figure in what came ultimately to be known as “New Mīmāṃsa”. It has been rather commonly remarked that Khandadeva’s works are written in Navyanyāya style, but a close examination of his major works reveals that, while he does sometimes employ Navyanyāya technical terminology, he does so only sporadically and quite sparingly. The use of such discursive techniques is certainly not in any sense a hallmark of his style. It appears to be, rather, a tool he employs only on rare occasions, and to meet specific purposes.

Judging from my own survey of Khandadeva’s major works, there would appear to be two quite distinct sorts of discussion in which he typically resorts to the use of Navyanyāya style. The most immediately apparent and most readily explicable occasion for such use is in the conduct of interscholastic debate, either with the New Logicians themselves, or with others who make heavy use of Navyanyāya in their own arguments – most notably the “New Grammarians”.

Sanskrit philosophy of the late sixteenth and seventeenth century produced a tremendously intense debate over the nature of language, chiefly between the grammarians, logicians, and Mīmāṃsākās – all three fields saw the production of works devoted solely to the analyzing the structure of “verbal awareness” (śābdabodha); Khandadeva’s own Bhāttatantrarahasya, his third and last major work, is the most important entry to this debate from the Mīmāṃsā side. While the arguments deployed on all sides are complex, this debate turns ultimately on a few key questions – what is the primary qualificand (pradhāna viśeṣya) of the verbal awareness arising from a sentence? by what part of the sentence is this primary qualificand expressed? and, exactly how do the
other components of a sentence meaning construe with this primary element to produce a coherent sense? To sum up the positions on the most basic question rather crudely, the Logicians argue that the primary qualificand of a typical sentence is whatever is signified by the term (or terms) marked with the nominative case – what we would in English call the grammatical subject. The grammarians take the action expressed by the verb-root to be the primary qualificand.

The Mīmāṃsakas reject both these positions, arguing that the primary qualificand in any sentence is what they call bhāvanā – that element of “bringing into being” which characterizes all activity, as distinct from the specific procedures signified by the verbal root. This element of bhāvanā, they contend, is expressed not by the root, but by the verbal suffix attached to it.

The basic contours of the Mīmāṃsakas’ argument here are quite old, dating back to the fifth century at least. Yet Khaṇḍadeva’s defense of this long-established Mīmāṃsa position surveys and aims to counter those criticisms recently raised against it by the New Logicians and Grammarians, who both devote considerable energy to demonstrating that bhāvanā does not exist at all as something distinct from the meaning of the verb-root. The bulk of Khaṇḍadeva’s Bhattatantararahaṣya is devoted to the proof that bhāvanā is expressed by the verbal suffix, that it is the primary qualificand of a sentential awareness, and that the meanings of the verbal root, and of all those active factors or kārakas (agent, direct object, instrument, etc.) mentioned in the sentence, construe directly with this bhāvanā as its “principal qualifiers” (prakāra–at e r m drawn from Navyanyāya language analysis and having no currency in Mīmāṃśa usage prior to Khaṇḍadeva). The argument is framed largely in terms set out by the New Logicians in their own analyses of sentential structures and meanings; apart from the question of prakāra, Khaṇḍadeva devotes a great deal of attention to the question of what precisely is the “delimitor of the expressiveness” (sakya–at avacchedaka) of the verb-suffix, and what is the “delimitor of the expressed-ness” (saktat avacchedaka) of its meaning – here again, the terms of the argument are manifestly those Navyanyāya, and are new to Mīmāṃsā discourse.

While Khaṇḍadeva’s reframing of Mīmāṃsā sentence-theory in Navyanyāya terms is most voluminously apparent in his Bhattatantararahaṣya, much the same argument, less elaborate but fashioned along the same lines, can be found in his earlier works as well. In his Mīmāṃsākāustubha and Bhattadipikā, both of which take the form of commentaries on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃśāsūtra, the general theory of the
verbal suffix and the organization of the other components of the sentence around it is set forth in the Bhāvarthādhihikarana (Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.1–4). The Mīmāṃsākaustubha is Khaṇḍadeva’s encyclopaedic survey and critique of earlier Mīmāṃsā literature, and appears to have been the first of his major works. The Bhāvarthādhihikarana of the Mīmāṃsākaustubha begins by following the pattern typical of Khaṇḍadeva’s treatment of other topics – a careful outlining of the question to be decided (viśaya), the doubt which gives rise to this question (samśaya), the logical connection of this topic with those which precede and follow it (sangati), the arguments raised by real or theoretical opponents of the accepted conclusion (pūrvapakṣa), and the ultimate proof of the validity of this conclusion (siddhānta). Having completed this standard treatment of the topic of bhāvanā, however, Khaṇḍadeva introduces a new objection and a new line of argument. The objector begins:

All this [preceding argument] would make sense if there really existed some “bhāvanā” distinct from the meaning of the verb root. But we don’t see any evidence for this ...  

What follows is something very like a miniature version of what will later become the Bhāttatantrarāhasya – a rehearsal and countering of the New Logicians’ and New Grammarians’ arguments against bhāvanā, and an exploration of the ways in which root-meanings, kārakas, and other elements of a sentence construe with this bhāvanā as the primary qualificand of the sentence. Again, the argument turns on the specification of “delimiters of expressiveness” and “delimiters of expressedness” (sākyatāvacchedaka, sāktatāvacchedaka), and the understanding of the root-meaning and the kārakas as “principal qualifiers” (prakāras) of the bhāvanā.

Khaṇḍadeva’s use of Navya terminology is relatively free here, but only in this “appendix” to the earlier, sūtra-centered discussion of the nature and status of bhāvanā. The general confinement of such terminology to this latter section shows clearly that it is being brought in for a specific purpose – to deal with arguments against bhāvanā arising outside the Mīmāṃsā system. In discussing the general Mīmāṃsā view on the nature of bhāvanā and its place in the sentence, Khaṇḍadeva frames his discussion in terms that would have been familiar to Mīmāṃsakas even a thousand years earlier. Only when directly confronting recent criticisms of the New Logicians and Grammarians does he adopt their idiom.

The same pattern is repeated in Khaṇḍadeva’s second major work, his Bhāṭṭādipika, a brief gloss on the twelve chapters of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra; here again, he begins his discussion of the Bhāvarthādhihikarana with a compact presentation of his position on bhāvanā, framed in classical
Mimāṃsā terms, followed by an objection to the very possibility of bhāvanā, encapsulating the critiques of the New Logicians and Grammarians, to which Khandadeva responds by reformulating and reasserting his position through the use of Navyanyāya formal terminology.

Khandadeva’s procedure, in both texts, is hardly surprising; it makes perfect sense that in order to effectively counter recent attacks formulated in Navyanyāya terms Khaṇḍadeva would find it useful, at least in some measure, to adopt such terminology himself. To effectively counter the claim that the subject of a sentence or the meaning of a verb-root is the “primary qualificand” of any sentence, for instance, it is necessary to stake out a position of one’s own on what this “primary qualificand” should be. While there is some danger in allowing one’s opponents to set the terms of debate, one can respond to specific critiques formulated in terms of a new technical language only by taking up such terminology oneself, either to use it in formulating a counter argument or to challenge its applicability. Still, while it is hardly astonishing that Khandadeva should find it convenient to adopt a certain amount of Navyanyāya terminology in responding to Navyanyāya arguments, the general confinement of this terminology to such specific responses in his treatment of bhāvanā shows clearly that what we see in Khanḍadeva’s works is not a wholesale adoption of “Navyanyāya style”, but a selective application of certain key terms and formal techniques of Navyanyāya to deal with specific problems he confronts in elaborating and defending his positions.

Khanḍadeva’s use of such techniques, however, though always quite sparing and deliberate, is not confined to occasions when he is confronting the arguments of New Logicians, Grammarians, or other extra-Mimāṃsā opponents. A second and ultimately more interesting application of Navyanyāya terminology in Khanḍadeva’s works is in the handling of certain key intra-Mimāṃsā disputes, particularly in cases where Khanḍadeva himself wishes to challenges the established doctrines of earlier Mimāṃsā. I would like here to examine one particularly noteworthy instance of this phenomenon. It concerns the question of whether and under what circumstances an interpreter must resort to “figurative indication of the meaning of a possessive affix” (matvarthalaksanā). Recondite as the question may seem, it had been an issue of some importance in Mimāṃsā interpretive theory for more than a millennium before Khaṇḍadeva, and Khanḍadeva’s radical position on the question sparked one of the more heated controversies in seventeenth and eighteenth century Mimāṃsā. The classic discussion of matvarthalaksanā is in the Udbhidadhikarana of the
Mimāṃsāsūtra (1.4.1–2), and turns on the proper interpretation of the following sentence: “One [who desires cows] should sacrifice with the Udbhid” (“udbhidā yajeta [paśukāmaḥ]”). Here the meaning of the obscure word “udbhid” is in question – should we take it to refer to some object which is capable of “digging up” (udbhedana), such as a shovel, or should we understand it to be the proper name of a sacrifice?

The classic Mimāṃsā analysis of such Vedic commands requires that one take the sacrificial result – cows, in this case – to be the object of the “bringing into being” expressed by the verbal suffix, and the meaning of the verbal root – sacrifice – to be the instrument (karaṇa); thus one can restate the command, “One who desires cows should sacrifice” as “One should bring cows into being by means of sacrifice” (yāgena paśūn bhāvayet). In the example above, the term “udbhid” occurs in the instrumental case – if one were to interpret it as referring to a shovel or some other such object, one would have a sentence with two instruments – the shovel, and the act of sacrifice. Arguing that it is impossible to connect two instruments with a single bhāvanā, the Mimāṃsakas suggest that the term udbhid could construe only if one took it to figuratively indicate the meaning of an (unstated) possessive suffix, taking the sentence to mean, “One should bring cows into being by means of a sacrifice containing a shovel” (udbhidvā yāgena paśūn bhāvayet). Rather than resort to such figurative indication, the Mimāṃsakas historically argued that it would be best to interpret the word udbhid as the proper name of a particular sacrifice – thereby a single instrument, the particular act of sacrifice, would be designated both by the verb-root and by the proper name, and the sentence could be restated as “One should bring cows into being by means of the sacrifice [called] Udbhid” (udbhidā yāgena paśūn bhāvayet). They concede, however, that there are some instances where one must resort to “figurative indication of the meaning of a possessive affix” (matvarthalaksanā) to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation. The standard example is “One should sacrifice with Soma” (somena yajeta) – the word soma, unlike the word udbhid, is well known and thoroughly conventionalized in the sense of a particular substance, and cannot be reinterpreted as a sacrificial name without violating our basic linguistic intuitions. So, in such an instance, we must perforce accept matvarthalaksanā, and take the sentence to mean “One should bring about a sacrificial result by means of a sacrifice containing soma” (somavatā yāgena phalam bhāvayet).

In his own treatment of the question of matvarthalaksanā, Khaṇḍadeva breaks decisively with the entire earlier Mimāṃsā tradition. He ultimately
comes to the conclusion that one need not resort to matvarthalaksanā to explain sentences such as “One should sacrifice with soma”, and that one would not need to resort to it to explain “One who desires cows should sacrifice with udbhid,” even if the word udbhid were taken to signify a substance. (He supports the conclusion that udbhid is a sacrificial name, but on grounds other than those adduced by the earlier Mimāṃsakas.) This challenge to established Mimāṃsā doctrine occasioned a great deal of controversy between Khaṇḍadeva’s opponents and followers within the field of Mimāṃsā. Khaṇḍadeva himself evidently saw it as a major issue in his own work – in addition to the three major texts mentioned earlier, he wrote a small text devoted exclusively to defending his views on the question, under the title “A Rejection of Matvarthalaksanā” (Matvarthalaksanākhandana). Khaṇḍadeva’s treatment of the matvarthalaksanā question is of considerable interest for our purpose, as his presentation of his own view on the matter differs significantly in the Mimāṃsakaustubha and in the Bhāttadīpikā, and this shift in position appears to be linked with a change in the extent and character of his use of Navyanyāya terminology in the latter work.

When Khaṇḍadeva first outlines his new position on matvarthalaksanā in the Udbhidadhikaranā of the Mimāṃsakaustubha, his presentation, in light of the great controversy that was to ensue from it, seems surprisingly tentative. The ground for his argument is first laid as he sets forth the position of the hypothetical objector or pūrvapakṣin. Noting that the standard Mimāṃsā argument for taking the word udbhid as the proper name of a sacrifice rests on the supposed impossibility of there being more than one instrument in a single sentence, the pūrvapakṣin directly attacks this premise: there is nothing at all to prevent there from being two or more instruments in a single sentence. He points to a quite famous example in which the Mimāṃsakas themselves accept multiple instruments in a single sentence. In the Arunādhikaranā (Mimāṃsāsūtra 3.1.12), the following sentence is analyzed: “One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]” (“arunāyā pingāksyātakahōyanā somaṃ krīṇati”). In analyzing this sentence, the Mimāṃsakas take considerable pains to establish that, contrary to what one might imagine, the term “red” does not construe with the word “cow” – rather, since “red” and “cow” are each marked with the instrumental case-ending, each will construe independently with the bhavāna expressed by the verbal suffix, and each will thereby be understood as an instrument of the act of purchasing the soma. It is only by a subsequent awareness (pārṣṭhikabodha) that one concludes
that the redness which subserves the act of purchase can do so only by qualifying an object such as the cow, and that the cow which subserves the act of purchase must therefore be red. There is nothing to prevent one from applying the same reasoning to “One who desires cows should sacrifice with udbhid.” A shovel or other substance expressed by the word udbhid, because it is marked with the instrumental case-ending, and the verb-root “sacrifice”, because of its proximity to the verbal suffix, can both independently construe with the bhāvanā as instruments; in a subsequent moment of awareness one will conclude that the “sacrifice” can only be performed by means of some substance, and that the shovel will thus subserv the bhāvanā by serving as the material of sacrifice. So, there is no need for matvarthalaksanā, and no need to understand the term udbhid as the proper name of a sacrifice.

In countering this (self-composed) objection against the standard argument of the Udbhidadhikarana, Khanḍadeva offers a three part response. He first offers a new argument which demonstrates, independently of the standard claim of matvarthalaksanā, that the word udbhid should be taken as the name of a sacrifice, rather than as designating a substance: On the pūrvapaksin’s reading, the command “One who desires cows should sacrifice with udbhid,” would have to enjoin, as a means to a specified end, a bhāvanā, having as its instrument the action expressed by the verbal root √yaj (“to sacrifice”), qualified by a particular substance (the shovel). If, instead, one accepts that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice, the command will enjoin, as a means to the specified end, only a bhāvanā with the action expressed by the verbal root as its means. This is a simpler reading – one which requires the injunction to enjoin less – and ought to be preferred solely on those grounds.14 Acceptance of a “qualified injunction” (viśiṣṭa-vidhāna) requires that one postulate implicit injunctions to cover each qualifier – such a reading suffers from the fault of “heaviness” (gaurava) and ought always to be rejected in favor of an interpretation which requires one to postulate less.

Having established an independent basis for supporting the accepted interpretation of udbhid, Khanḍadeva then offers a brief defense of the classical matvarthalaksanā argument outlined above – that a bhāvanā can have one and only one instrument, and that, since the verb root itself must express the instrument of the bhāvanā, a substance-expressing term marked with the instrumental case could construe only if it were linked with the meaning of the verb root via a figuratively indicated possessive suffix.15 Then, and only then, does he outline his own, new argument as an alternative to this standard view:16 in cases like the
pūrvapakṣin’s reading of “One should sacrifice with udbhid,” and in proper qualified injunctions such as “One should sacrifice with soma,” both the meaning of the verb-root and the substance expressed by the term in the instrumental case construe, immediately and directly, as instruments of the bhāvanā – it is only subsequently (pārsthika), when postulating the qualifier injunctions entailed by these qualified injunctions, that one must posit some relation between these two – such as would ordinarily be expressed by a possessive suffix. Khaṇḍadeva now quite readily accepts the parallel the pūrvapakṣin drew with “One should purchase the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old cow” – here too, one has two distinct instruments, which must be subsequently understood to be related to one another. The main point, though, and the key divergence with prior Māmāsa analyses of cases such as “One should sacrifice with soma,” is the acceptance of two distinct instruments for a single bhāvanā. Such a sentence expresses the instrumentality of both the soma and the sacrifice, and the subsequent awareness which connects the two in no way undermines this expressed instrumentality.

Even so, Khaṇḍadeva here seems somewhat reluctant to acknowledge the extent of his break with the traditional Māmāsa approach to this question: Khaṇḍadeva’s new analysis, as we have seen, preserves a role for the postulation of a possessive relation between these two instruments, if only subsequent to the initial construal of the sentence, and he asserts on this basis that, even if one allows that multiple instruments may construe with a single bhāvanā, the pūrvapakṣin’s view that the word udbhid refers to a substance cannot escape the flaw of matvarthalaksana (ibid., p. 166). But this is actually somewhat disingenuous – as Khaṇḍadeva’s initial response to the objection made clear, it is not the specific postulation of a possessive relation which undermines the pūrvapakṣin’s case – rather it is the need to postulate any qualifying injunctions at all, to justify his reading of “One who desires cows should sacrifice with udbhid” as a qualified injunction. The “heaviness” of this reading would be the same, whether the additional postulated injunctions were understood to convey a possessive relation between the two instruments or not. As both Khaṇḍadeva’s supporters and opponents would agree, and as he himself ultimately comes to acknowledge, his position on the question of matvarthalaksana is irreconcilable with all previous accounts, and represents a decisive break with the tradition.

Khaṇḍadeva himself first openly acknowledges this break in the Bhāttadipika, again in his treatment of the Udbhidadhikarana.17 The basic argument, though far more terse, is quite similar to that found in the
Mimāṃsākaustubha, and divides into the same three sections – an explanation of the “heaviness” entailed by the pūrṇapakṣin’s reading (which is adequate grounds for rejecting it with or without matvarthalaksanā), a sketch of the traditional argument that the impossibility of accepting two instruments would force the pūrṇapakṣin to resort to matvarthalaksanā to justify his reading, and, finally, an outline of Khanḍadeva’s distinctive argument, which allows multiple instruments for a single bhāvana, and hence eliminates the need for matvarthalaksanā, at least in the initial stage of interpretation. Yet, while the structure of the argument remains basically the same, the presentation is quite strikingly different. In the Mimāṃsākaustubha, Khanḍadeva presented the traditional view and his own new one simply as two alternate readings of the adhikarana without any explicit indication that one should be preferred to the other. Now, for the first time, he labels the traditional view, that view maintained by all Mimāṃsakas without exception up to the time of Khanḍadeva himself, as the position of the “old ones” (prāṇcaḥ). In summing up this position and contrasting it to his own, Khanḍadeva now makes it absolutely clear that he regards this “old” view as fundamentally mistaken:

... So [for the reasons just outlined], matvarthalaksanā is inescapable – this is the view of the old ones. But, really, even in the example [“One should sacrifice with soma.”], the soma construes precisely as an instrument, and precisely with the bhāvana, since, even if it [the soma] is already preempted by one instrument, there is nothing wrong with a second instrument, described by something different (bhinanirūpita), construing with it as a principal qualifier (prakāra). For the instrumentality of the sacrifice is not described by the bhāvana, but is rather described by heaven [the result to which it will lead]. And therefore, just as its instrumentality, although described by something other [than the bhāvana], construes with the bhāvana as a principal qualifier, likewise the instrumentality of the soma, described by the sacrifice [construes with the bhāvana as a principal qualifier]. And because, in both cases, the fact of their being described by this or that is arrived at only by a subsequent awareness, there is no contradiction [between them]. So, even on this view, although there is no matvarthalaksanā, nevertheless the heaviness of enjoining a bhāvana qualified by both sacrifice and its subordinate substance, which is produced by the [inferred] injunction of these qualifiers, befalls [the pūrṇapakṣin], and cannot be denied.18

As in the Mimāṃsākaustbha, Khanḍadeva briefly notes that a possessive relation between the soma and the sacrifice will have to be deduced in a subsequent stage of awareness, but he now describes this as the “postulation of the meaning of a possessive suffix” (matvarthakalpanā), rather than as matvarthalaksanā.19 As the quoted passage makes absolutely clear, Khanḍadeva now denies outright that matvarthalaksanā is ever required under any circumstances.
Most noteworthy for our purposes, Khandadeva’s newly forthright rejection of the traditional Mīmāṃsā doctrine on matvarthalaksanā is coupled with a redescription of his argument in terms drawn from Navyanyāya. The key point, that multiple instruments may construe with a single bhāvana, is here justified principally by appeal to the Navyanyāya notion of describers (nirūpakas). While the sacrifice and the soma are both mentioned as instruments, and both construe as principal qualifiers (prakāras) of one and the same bhāvana, the instrumentality of the sacrifice and that of the soma are “described” (nirūpita) by two different entities: by heaven, in one case, and sacrifice itself in the other – the respective results toward which each is conducive. Thus the two instrumentalities are not identical, represent two distinct qualifications of the bhāvana, and therefore do not in any way obstruct or preclude one another. In the Mīmāṃsakaustubha Khanḍadeva made a case for basically the same conclusion without resorting to Navyanyāya terminology at all, yet here it forms the very basis of his argument.

Simply to note this marked upshift in the use of Navyanyāya terminology in the quoted passage of the Bhattadipikā is not, of course, to explain it. It certainly does not signal any wholesale adoption of the language or discursive method of New Logic on Khanḍadeva’s part. The use of such terminology in the Bhattadipikā as a whole, while perhaps somewhat more in evidence than in the Mīmāṃsakaustubha, remains quite rare and tends to be confined to a few key discussions. What then is the real significance of the terminological shift we see in Khanḍadeva’s two major treatments of matvarthalaksanā? Is the recasting of the debate in Navyanāya terminology in the quoted passage of the Bhattadipikā a simple window-dressing – introducing a bit of trendy jargon into an argument that could have been made just as effectively in more traditional terms? Or is it something more than that – are there things Khanḍadeva can say in this new language more than that – are there things Khanḍadeva can say in this new language of Mīmāṃsā that he could not easily have said in the old? It’s hard to give a decisive answer one way or the other. Certainly, Khanḍadeva’s basic argument against matvarthalaksanā could in principle be formulated in traditional Mīmāṃsā terms, and indeed essentially was so formulated in the Mīmāṃsakaustubha. For a typical Mīmāṃsaka, the parallel with the case of the red cow – in which Mīmāṃsakas had long accepted multiple instruments construing with a single bhāvana – would likely provide far more compelling support for Khanḍadeva’s position than this talk of “describers” and “principal qualifiers”, and would be much harder to get around in an argument. My own, admittedly rather cursory, survey of the later arguments against
and in support of Khaṇḍādeva’s position on matvarthalakṣanā would seem to support this basic intuition; later discussions, pro and con, tend to be formulated very much in traditional Mīmāṃsā terms, and do not generally pick up on Khaṇḍādeva’s own incorporation of Navya terminology.

Yet the case against matvarthalakṣanā we get in the Bhaṭṭadipikā is not simply a rehash of the that found in the earlier text. Most notably, Khaṇḍādeva now openly admits what he had earlier tried to downplay – that his argument completely overturns what had heretofore been the unquestioned Mīmāṃsa view of this issue; it seems somehow more than a coincidence that this open declaration of a new doctrine is coupled with even the limited and selective introduction of a new way of talking about the question in hand. Moreover, the language of “describers” offers Khaṇḍādeva a ready made tool for specifying what exactly it is that differentiates the functions of the two instruments, preventing them from obstructing or making one another redundant. Certainly there is something new in the substance of Khaṇḍādeva’s argument here – something which cannot easily be disentangled from the terms in which it is formulated.

In any case, it should certainly be clear from the foregoing discussion that, while none of Khaṇḍādeva’s works is untouched by the language of the New Logic, what we find in them is never simply an adoption of or an assimilation to Navyanyāya style. Whatever we may make of Khaṇḍādeva’s use of Navyanyāya terms in particular cases, there is no mistaking that this mode of expression is for him one discursive tool among others – something to be employed on particular occasions and for particular purposes, rather than a dominating mode of discourse which simply displaces older forms of argument.

My growing sense is that the same may be said of the spread of Navyanyāya language into other fields as well. While there were few disciplines in the Sanskrit intellectual world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that were not touched in some way by the style and terminology of Navyanyāya, the spread of this mode of expression appears to have been a far more complex and locally conditioned process than has generally been acknowledged. If we are ever to make detailed sense of this process, it is necessary above all that we ask ourselves not what Navyanyāya did to Indian philosophy, but rather what Indian philosophers did with Navyanyāya.
NOTES

1 Bhattacharya studied grammar with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa and Mīmāṃsā with Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa, both famous teachers in late sixteenth century Varanasi (see Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 241); Jagannātha’s father is said to have studied Mīmāṃsā with Khaṇḍadeva in Varanasi (see Nāgasaṭhāṭṭha’s commentary on verse 2 of Rasagāṇādharā [Benares Sanskrit Series 12ff, 1903; p. 2]), and Jagannātha himself studied with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa’s son Śeṣa Vīraśvara (Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 5: Philosophy of the Grammarians, p. 215).

2 See, for example, Tattvarthindu, ed. V.A. Ramaswami Sastri (Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 3, Madras, 1936), Introduction, p. 118; Bhāṭṭadīpikā, ed. S. Subrahmany Sastri (Madras, 1952), Vol. 4, p. ii; Umesh Mishra’s appendix to Ganganath Jha’s, Purvamāṃsā in its Sources (second ed., Varanasi: Benares Hindu University, 1964), p. 56.

3 Most notably, apart from Khaṇḍadeva’s own work, Raghunātha Śiromani’s Aṣṭhyātavāda, Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra’s Śabdasāktiprakāśikā, and Gāḍādharaḥaṭṭa’s Vyāpatītivāda in the field of Nyāya, and, in the field of grammar, Bhattacharji Dīkṣīta’s Vaiyākaramatanonmaṇjana, and Kaṇḍadevaḥaṭṭa’s Vaiyākaraṇabhāṣā (an extensive commentary upon the former).


5 Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series 58 (Varanasi: Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series Office, 1923–1933), part 3, pp. 1–44.

6 ahu sarvam idam dhūvarthāitrītrkabhāvānāsadbhāve samañjasam | na tva tasyām eva pravṛṣāṁ paśyāṁ | (ibid., p. 12).

7 Ed., with the commentary Prabhāvali of Śambubhaṭṭa, by N.S. Ananta Krishna Sastri (Bombay: Nirmaya Sagar Press, 1921–1922), pp. 132–140.


9 See, for example, Apadeva’s Mīmāṃsāvyavāprakāśa, edited with the commentary Bhāttārikmāra of Anantadeva (Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series 268ff, Varanasi, 1921, pp. 52ff), Dinakarabhaṭṭa’s Bhāttadinakara on PMS 1.4.2 [Sarasvati Bhandar, Ramnagar Fort, Mīmāṃsā Ma’s #30, 46r–48v], Gagābhāṭṭa’s Bhāttacintāmaṇi on PMS 1.4.1 (Adyar Library, Ma’s #64971, pp. 55–58).

10 The work is unpublished, and survives only in a single manuscript – see A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji’s Sarasvati Mahal Library, Tanjore, Vol. XII, Purva-mīmāṃsā and Utara-mīmāṃsā (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1931), pp. 5159–5160. The manuscript is from the library of Gāmbhirāraya Dīkṣīta, father of Bhāṭkarāraya, who seems to have played a major role in promulgating Khaṇḍadeva’s Mīmāṃsā in South India in the early eighteenth century. One of Bhāṭkarāraya’s surviving Mīmāṃsā works is the Vaidakāṭṭhāla, purportedly the transcript of a debate between himself and one Śvāmīśaṭtri, in which Bhāṭkarāraya defends and the latter attacks Khaṇḍadeva’s position on mātuḥvaralakṣāna (see Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, Vol. IX [Madras: Adyar Library, 1952], pp. 139–140). One other short work of Khaṇḍadeva survives, also in a single manuscript belonging to Gāmbhirāraya Dīkṣīta (ibid., pp. 5157–5159) – its title is Śhākinī Bhāvaṇāvāchārvakaḥdānan (“Rejection of the View that Bhāvana is Expressed by the Substituend”).

11 Mīmāṃsākaustubha on 1.4.2 (op. cit., part 2, p. 160 – see also pp. 157–158).

12 For a fuller discussion of the Arunādhikaraṇa, see my article “The Hierarch-

13 Or more precisely, with the compounds "pink-eyed" (*piṅgūkṣyā*) and "one-year-old" (*ekāhāyanyā*); the Mimamsakas, with the support of Sanskrit grammatical theory, argue that each compounds directly designates the possessor of these attributes (here understood, by context or implication, to be a cow) – unlike the morphologically simple word "red" (*arunā*), which designates a particular quality, rather than its possessor; see, especially, Kumārila’s *Tantravārttika* on PMS 3.1.12 (Anandashrama Śanskrit Series 97, Vol. 4, pp. 33–41.

14 Ibid., pp. 162–164.
15 Ibid., pp. 164–165.
16 Ibid., pp. 165–166.
17 Bhātāṭipīka on 1.4.2 (op. cit., pp. 75–80).
18 ... *matvarthalaksānāvyākṛti praśca* || vastutas tu drṣṭante ’pi somasya karaṇaṇayāṁ evaṁvayaḥ ... ekakaraṇāvaruddhe ’pi karaṇaṇātārayā bhīnnaṁirūpitaśva prakārataya bhāvaṁnāvopapatteḥ | na hi yāgakaraṇatvam bhāvanāṃirūpitaṁ, api tu svargaṁirūpitaṁ | atāś ca yathāvāntaṇirūpitaṁ api takaṇaṇatvam prakārataya bhāvanāyām anveta, tathaiva somakaraṇatvam api yāgaṁirūpitaṁ | ubhayatra tattamirūpakaṇvasya pārṣyākabodhahalabhāvāc ca na ko ’pi virodha iti nāsmin api pakṣe yady api matvarthalakṣanā, bhūtāpi viśeṣanāvīdyākṣaṇyāyogabhayavāsyīṣṭābhāvanāvidhi-gauravam āpadyamānam nāpābhyatām sākṣam | (ibid., p. 76).
19 Ibid., p. 76.

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