THE MEANING OF DHARMA AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE TWO MIMAMSAS: APPAYYA DIKSITA’S ‘DISCOURSE ON THE REFUTATION OF A UNIFIED KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM OF PURVAMIMAMSA AND UTTARAMIMAMSA’

Among Sanskrit intellectuals active in the last centuries prior to the consolidation of colonialism and the introduction into South Asia of radically different knowledge systems, the most remarkable in southern India, for the breadth of his learning and his striking innovation in multiple disciplines, was Appayya Diksita.1 His literary activity fell in the last half of the 16th century, possibly extending into the early 17th. But astonishingly little hard information about his life is available, despite the fact that scores of works attributed to him are extant.2 What is known more or less for certain can fit on a single printed page (and that page has recently been written, in the introduction to a new edition and translation of one of Appayya’s linguistic treatises).3 Both the breadth of his learning and the quality of his innovation are fully on display in two works, one truly grand, the other more modest, that deserve to be far better known than they are. The first is the Caturmatasārasamgraha, ‘Compendium of Essential Tenets of the Four Schools’, a monumental review of the four major Vedānta systems of Appayya’s time, and, so far as I am aware, the only such systematic account ever produced in the premodern period (it is the Humvee to the Kia of Mādhava’s doxographical epitomes in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha). These remarkable verse compositions (except in the case of the second, which is in prose) set out in accordance with the topics of the Brahmasūtra (BS) text the major tenets of Dvaita (in the Nyāyamuktāvalī), Viśiṣṭādvaita (Nayamayūkhamālikā), Saivādvaita (Nayamanimālā), and Advaita (Nayamantjarī), in what is probably an evaluative sequence.4 The second is the work under consideration here, the Pūrvottar-anirnānsāvājanakṣatramalā, ‘The Milky Way of Discourses on Mimamsa and Vedānta.’ We might better capture the spirit if not the letter of the title by translating it ‘Collected Essays in the Prior and Posterior Analytics’, or perhaps instead, with a nod to Gadamer rather than Aristotle, ‘… in Philosophical and Theological Hermeneutics’.

‘Essays’, however, I mean quite seriously: the genre here is a new one, presenting a series of independent studies (a set of twenty-seven) of particular and often very abstruse topics in the two systems. The relationship between Purvamāṃsā and Uttaramāṃsā flagged in Appayya’s title is the object of a long-standing debate in many Vedānta schools. Both knowledge systems ground themselves on the authority of the Veda, and employ many of the same exegetical principles to make sense of the Vedic textual corpus. Yet their semantics and pragmatics, so to speak – what they understood the texts to mean and how they proceeded to act upon that understanding – appeared to many traditional thinkers to be radically incommensurable, and finding a way to reconcile them was a serious challenge. Indeed, their problematic relationship is embodied in the very nomenclature that links them, in the differentiation itself of a ‘posterior’ from a ‘prior’ darśana, like that of a ‘new’ from an ‘old’ testament. Viewed more historically, the nomenclature seems likely to have emerged out of the dispute that hinges on this relationship and that forms the central problem of Appayya’s essay translated here.

Whatever may be the earlier history of the terminology (and I am unaware that it has ever been clearly traced), we find it distinctly if still inchoately articulated in the text that forms the purvakāṣṭha of Appayya’s account, namely the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja (11–12th century). Rāmānuja’s summary of the purpose of the first sūtra of the BS (the jijnāsāsūtra) runs as follows: ‘Since the fruit of works known through the prior part of the Mīmāṃsā (mīmāṃsāpūrvabhāga) is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of brahma – which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part (uparitamabhāga) of the Mīmāṃsā – is unlimited and permanent; for this reason brahma “is to be known”, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.’ It may not be without some further significance to determining this terminological history that in the summary contained in Bodhayana’s vṛtti (early centuries C.E.) reproduced by Rāmānuja there is no mention of ‘prior’ and ‘latter’. But that does not mean that the problem of the relationship of the two knowledge systems was not already on the table. Indeed, what the Vṛttikāra insists on is precisely the unity (aikāśāstra), as Rāmānuja puts it: ‘He [Bodhayana] will declare later on “This śārīraka-doctrine is integrated (samhitam) with Jaimini’s doctrine so as to make up 16 adhyāyas” – that is, the Treatise of Twelve Chapters, or the Mīmāṃsāsūtras (MS) of Jaimini, and the Treatise of Four

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Chapters, or the BS of Vyāsa Bāḍārāyaṇa, should be taken together as constituting a single work of Sixteen Chapters; ‘this proves the two to constitute one body of doctrine’. 9

Whereas Rāmānuja provides a range of reasons in his commentary on BS 1.1.1 why the ‘latter part’ of Mīmāṁśā requires the ‘earlier’, he nowhere seems to base this on the notion that the definition and nature of dharma, the subject of the major thesis (pratijñā) of the Pūrvamīmāṁśā (‘Now, then, the inquiry into dharma’, athātō dharmaṁjjñāsā), comprise not only its declared topic, karma, but also brahma, whose definition and nature form the subject of the major thesis of the Uttaramīmāṁśā (‘Now, then, the inquiry into brahma’, athātō brahmajjjñāsā). Arguing out this theorem appears to have been the contribution of Rāmānuja’s great commentator of the early 14th century, Sudarśanasūri in his Srutaprakāśikā. It is that commentator whom Appayya has squarely in his sights when defining the limits of the term dharma and critiquing the doctrine of the unified knowledge systems.10 There can be no doubt whatever about Appayya’s conclusion itself: ‘Therefore, given that contradiction between the two systems – with respect to primary meanings and end-results – ever rears its head, even the rumor that they form a single knowledge system can gain no standing in the thoughts of the learned’ (samgrahaśloka 13 infra). What is unclear, to me at least, is whether this should be taken as representing Appayya’s personal view, given the complexities that remain to be disentangled. Not least of these is the fact that Śrīkanṭha, the founder of the Śaivādvaita Vedānta system to which Appayya apparently subscribed, declares explicitly ‘We do not hold that the two systems, the analysis of dharma and the analysis of brahma, are completely different; on the contrary, we hold that they form a single knowledge system’.11 One thing beyond dispute, however, is that Appayya’s rejection of the theory should not taken as intended to undermine the validity of Vedānta itself. As he declares in his commentary on Śrīkaṇṭhaśivācārya’s text, what refuting the unity of the two systems is meant in fact to provide is scope for the commencement of the BS.12

Whatever his own views may have been on the points of intersection and separation in the two knowledge systems, Appayya’s work is a valuable index of Pūrvamīmāṁśā thinking on the problem of the scope of dharma, the system’s very keyword. Indeed, the way the essay frames the term’s meaning is crucial. Here and there throughout the history of Mīmāṁśā an anxiety is almost palpable concerning the potential expansion of dharma’s semantic field, about
its slippage or spread or appropriation. The present collection of essays is eloquent testimony to how very real the possibility of this extension was—an extension that, in the view of Mimamsa, was wholly unwarranted. To one of the preeminent thinkers of the early-modern period in Indian intellectual history, dharma meant first and foremost what it meant for the Mimamsa system from the beginning: ritual action based on transcendentally authoritative texts, the Veda. And it is hard not to see his Vedanakśatramālā as yet another attempt in the long history of attempts by Mimamsa to maintain its monopoly over this primeval definition against actual historical encroachments.

Rather than dismissing the development as ‘encroachment’, however, we do better to link this to what the Egyptologist Jan Assmann has called ‘subversive inversion’, a process of transvaluation of semantic and conceptual goods across socio-religious boundaries found in many times and places. It is richly illustrated in Indian history, especially by Buddhists in their appropriation of vaidika categories and concepts—preeminent among them dharma itself.13 The most remarkable attempt in Sanskrit intellectual history to arrest this process of subversion by delimiting in the strictest possible terms what does and does not count as dharma and to defend the proposition that its sole source is the Veda is offered by Kumārila in his Tantravārttika on MS 1.3. There he observes that, like spoiled children who hate their parents, the Buddhists refuse, out of shame and resentment at any competing foundational claim, to acknowledge that every metaphysical truth in their system—anything concerning dharma—must be derived from the Veda.14

We do not have to go outside the vaidika world, broadly viewed, to find evidence of this process of extension as well as of Mimamsa angst. A well-known example is in fact the term veda itself, which forms the textual reference point of the system. Despite Mimamsa’s constantly reiterated restrictions on the category (the vidhi, arthavāda, mantra, and nāmadheya of the Rk, Yajus, and Sāma samhitas), ‘Veda’ too was a category ever at risk of illegitimate expansion. Think only of Jayantabhaṭṭa’s elaborate defense (in the fourth chapter of the Nyayamaṇji) of the Arthavaveda as a fourth (or as he says, actually the first) Veda, or of the Mahābhārata’s famous claim to constitute a ‘fifth Veda’, or of the tendency of the Upanishadic corpus toward almost infinite expansion. One final related point may be made here. Mimamsa itself was a prime source for terms and categories that either through inversion or extension
became keywords in Indian culture at large. The very idea of smṛti, for instance, or so I have suggested, originated with Mīmāṃsā – as a Vedic text no longer extant, no longer actually still being ‘heard’ (śruti) in its original wording during recitation, but existing only as a ‘memory’ (smṛti) of the original, and in new wording – and migrated thence to the wider intellectual universe, again despite Mīmāṃsā’s attempt to delimit the genre. Precisely the same thing could be demonstrated for other expressions and ideas, such as that core component of dharma, puruṣārtha itself.15

Much remains to be explored in reference to Appayya’s project in the Naksatramālā, both within the general context of early-modern Indian intellectual practices and discursive styles, and specifically in the Auseinandersetzung with Viśiṣṭādvaita, to say nothing of the detailed problems that confront us in just making sense of the text. The present essay has been ripped somewhat untimely from the womb so as to provide to this collection of reflections on the history of the concept of dharma one important local attempt to make sense of the term and its limits near the end of the creative period of Sanskrit intellectual history. It is especially valuable for us to encounter the actual arguments of those for whom dharma was a living reality, and who themselves struggled to understand its nature and the claims it made upon them. In my effort to make these arguments heard I have striven to provide a translation as readable and usable as possible, though the text is one that does not always yield its meaning readily, or offer easy solutions to its stylistic complexity.16

The Discourse on the Refutation of a Unified Knowledge System of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā (appayyadiksātanāṁ pūrvottaramīmāṃsāvādanakṣatramālāntarbhāvya-ākāsāśtryāmārāṇāvādāṁ)

[235] Accordingly, insofar as brahma has been proved [in the previous discourse]17 to exist as the ultimate referent of all language, it must of necessity also be the referent of the word dharma, which is used to refer to ritual action’s (karma) being a means to otherworldly good (alaukikaśreyah). Moreover, brahma must be directly expressed by the word dharma by reason of the semantic relation just noted. This is so because Mīmāṃskas argue that the meaning of the word dharma, insofar as it is held to be used in reference to a thing’s being a means of securing the good as understood from the Veda, must refer to class categories, properties, and substances no less than to ritual actions. [Thus Kumārila:] ‘It will be established that class categories, properties, and substances are dharma. Even though these are perceptible
entities whereas dharma is imperceptible, it is not in their sensory form that they are dharma. Their being means of securing the good is cognized from the Veda alone [and not from perception]; and it is in that form that they are dharma, and so beyond the realm of the senses’.18 Thus, the word dharma used in the [first] sūtra [of the Pūrva-māṇḍūkya system], ‘Now, then, the inquiry into dharma’ [MS 1.1.1] must comprise brahma, and brahma must therefore also be an object of the examination of dharma that Jaimini [the author of the MS] in that sūtra states as his main thesis (pratijñā) to undertake. To examine whether or not this is in fact the case is the reason for initiating the following discourse.

Our opponents, who argue that brahma is the object of the examination of dharma, attempt to prove this by the following syllogism:

[puṇvapakṣa] brahma – its true nature, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so – is an object of Jaimini’s proposed examination, because brahma is a means of attaining otherworldly good, just like ritual action itself.

The long qualification beginning ‘its true nature’ is meant to preclude the possibility of the above inference being [vitiated by the fallacy of] proving what has already been proved, since brahma, in its character of being a deity in general (since it is included as such in the ‘offerings to the constellations’ [naksatresṭi] and other similar rites), would already have to be [1] an object of Jaimini’s examination of whether or not the deity is predominant or subordinate [in its relation to the act of sacrifice]; or, in that same character, [2] an object of his examination of the question whether or not deities have the right to engage in ritual action. [236] This is the first position in the debate.

[siddhānta] Now the second position. Were brahma the object of Jaimini’s proposed examination of dharma, one would have expected the examination of brahma to occur at the beginning of his work, but we do not find that to be the case. Nor is it possible to suppose that the great sage wanted to undertake an examination of brahma but was somehow impeded from doing so, or simply forgot. This is a sage who analyzed the whole field of ritual action – its true nature, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so – in the Treatise of Twelve Chapters [i.e., the MS], and who, noticing that certain interpretive principles used in that text were not explicitly given in sūtra form, produced the Saṃkṣaraṇa-kāṇḍa as a supplement to the Treatise in order to gather
these principles together. How then are we to suppose that he either was impeded from examining, or just plain forgot to examine brahma? Nor can it be claimed that the analysis of the true nature of brahma, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so was accomplished by the same principles used to examine ritual action, and for this reason no separate examination of brahma had to be provided. That the interpretive principles used for the analysis of sentences concerned with brahma are distinct from those used for sentences concerned with dharma is proved by the fact that the latter were systematized in the Treatise of Four Chapters [i.e., the BS]. Nor is it possible to believe that the stated thesis of examining brahma can be brought to fruition only on the assumption that the Treatise of Twelve Chapters and the Treatise of Four Chapters form a single knowledge system. There is no valid reason to believe that they do form one system: they have different authors (vaktra); their introductions containing the statement of their major theses (pratijñopakrama) concern the examination of dharma on the one hand and brahma on the other, and they were undertaken to frame analytic principles regarding positive and negative objectives that are mutually distinct. Hence, the inference given above is blocked. [This can be shown by a counter-syllogism:] brahma [an already existent thing] is not expressed [by the word dharma] as something to be accomplished [i.e., an action] is so expressed, because it is something different from ritual action, just as a pot [is not expressed, being different from ritual action.]

[pūrvaṇa] Now the third position. My inference is not blocked, because it is possible for the theses [of the MS and the BS]⁰⁹ to be brought to fruition only by the supposition that [Mimamsā and Vedānta] form a single knowledge system. And there are factors lending support to such a supposition, such as the fact that both works are commentaries on a single text, namely the Veda. Nor does the fact of their having different authors militate against this supposition: the exegeses of Vāmana and Jayāditya, for example, even though the authors are different, form a single knowledge system, insofar as they are a commentary on a single work, namely [Pāṇini’s] grammar. Nor do their introductions containing the statement of their major theses regarding dharma on the one hand and brahma on the other block my inference: the word dharma refers equally to karma and brahma, and when the thesis of the Treatise of Twelve Chapters, which is [thus] common (sāmānyata) to the Treatise of Four Chapters, has been dealt with, it stands to reason that thereafter, after
the examination of *karma*, we should have a reference to the sub-thesis (*avāntarāpratijñā*), that is: ‘Now, then, the inquiry into *brahma*’, just as we have [the reference to another sub-thesis in the continuation of the MS], ‘Now, then, the inquiry into what is subsidiary’ [MS 3.1.1]. Nor is the inference blocked by the argument that [the two systems] frame analytical principles that are mutually distinct. That there should be a distinction in analytical principles (*nyāya*) in accordance with [differences in the] objects to be analyzed makes perfectly good sense. We find in the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters* itself that distinct analytical principles are framed in accordance with the objects to be analyzed, such as the division of ritual action [MS 2], the relationship of dominant and subsidiary elements in a rite [MS 3], and so forth. Thus, my inference is not blocked, whereas yours is ineffectual.

[siddhānta] Now the fourth position. I do not mean, by saying that the principles are ‘distinct’, merely that they are different. I mean that they are contradictory. [238] And this contradiction is a matter of common knowledge, given that, in the *Treatise of Four Chapters*, we find that Jaimini’s doctrines are generally presented as the prima facie view to be refuted. These are two knowledge systems, initiated by two different authors relying on two contradictory doctrines, and it is impossible therefore to suppose that they were produced as a single system by these same two men in unanimity. As for the word *dharma*, it is used in counterpoint to *brahma* as referring to sacrifice and other ritual action in the *sūtra* ‘Jaimini [thinks] for the same reasons that *dharma* [is what brings about the fruits of actions]’ [BS 3.2.40], which is contained in the topic ‘From him [i.e., the Lord, there comes] the fruit [of works]; for [that only] is possible’ [BS 3.2.38]. Moreover, the great sage Āpastamba uses the word *dharma* only in the sense of action to be performed such as sacrifice, when he says, ‘*Dharma* and *adharma* do not wander about saying “Here we are!” Nor do the gods and *gandharvas* or the ancestors proclaim “This is *dharma*, that is *adharma*”. Rather, it is what the *āryas* commend to see performed that is *dharma*, and what they condemn is *adharma*’ [ADS 1.7.6]. In accordance with his view, therefore, the word [dharma] contained in the *sūtra* on the inquiry into *dharma* must be admitted to refer to sacrifice and other such action to be performed. And so it is unreasonable to suppose that the two *sūtras*, one on the inquiry into *dharma* and the other on the inquiry into *brahma*, can be distinguished as referring to a thesis that is common to both systems [MS 1.1.1] and to one meant to be a sub-thesis
Therefore, your inference is blocked, and mine is not ineffectual, because anything that, under a given description, cannot be performed can have no connection, under that description, with being taken in the sense of the word dharma, since this denotes actions that are to be performed.

Now the fifth position. It is not proved that the doctrines of Jaimini and Vyāsa stand in contradiction with each other. In some places in the Treatise of Four Chapters Jaimini’s doctrine is not in fact presented as the prima facie view to be refuted. With respect to the topic dealing with human goals (puruṣārtha) [239], the prima facie sūtra containing a repudiation of brahma, ‘On account of [the Self] standing in a supplementary relation [to ritual action], [the statements as to the fruits of the knowledge of the Self] must be narrative portions (arthavādas) [in praise of action], thus Jaimini believes’ [BS 3.4.2] is a restatement, not of Jaimini’s own position, but rather of a position that he includes as a supplement (abhuccayavāda) [and that does not therefore necessarily reflect his own views]. And that is why, in such sūtras as ‘To the highest [brahma] [the souls are led], so Jaimini believes, owing to this being the principal sense [of the word brahma]’ [BS 4.3.12], we find a restatement of a position as belonging to Jaimini that proceeds precisely by way of recognizing brahma. Similarly, the sūtra ‘Jaimini [considers that scriptural passages mentioning those stages of life in which celibacy is obligatory contain] a reference only to those stages; they are not injunctions; for [other scriptural passages] forbid [those stages]’ [BS 3.4.18] restates a repudiation of ascetic renunciation merely provided as a supplement by Jaimini; it is not a restatement of his own settled view. Accordingly, in the sūtra ‘But of him who has become that [i.e., entered onto a higher life-stage] there is no becoming not that [i.e., descending to a lower stage], according to Jaimini also...’ [BS 3.4.40], it is shown that Jaimini also disapproves of any deviation from renunciation once a person has renounced. Thus elsewhere as well, in each individual case [apparent] contradiction may be resolved through interpretation. Moreover, the use of the word dharma to refer uniquely to something to be performed (anusṭheyāśādhāranyya) is also unproved. We find it used to refer generally to the Blessed One (bhagavatsādharanyokteh) in the Mahābhārata:

The sages who know the Veda and the people who know the transcendent Self say that Krishna, the great one, is the eternal dharma [MBh. 3.86.22 crit. ed.].
Thus, because [1] real contradiction between the two knowledge systems does not exist; or, [2] even if contradiction were thought somehow to be present, an actual refusal to recognize brahma is not expressed in any śūtra in the Treatise of Twelve Chapters; and [3] because the word dharma is common to the topics of both systems [karma and brahma] – for all these reasons, there are no grounds for refusing to accept that they form a single system even though the authors are different. Thus, your inference is indeed ineffectual, insofar as something not performed can very well be an object of Jaimini’s proposed examination, since the word dharma is found used in reference to such things.

[240] [siddhānta] Now the sixth position. The statement that there is no contradiction is unproved. There is an undeniable contradiction between accepting brahma or renunciation and rejecting them. Moreover, one cannot maintain that the śūtra that presents Jaimini’s acceptance of both brahma and renunciation is an indicator that this acceptance of the two constitutes his real settled view. For this situation can be accounted for differently: Jaimini’s thought is being represented as self-contradictory and introduced in the Brahmaśūtra with the intention of showing its unacceptability for that reason, according to the interpretive principal enunciated in the topic ‘On Śāmkhya’: ‘And moreover [the Śāmkhya doctrine] is objectionable on account of its contradictions’ [BS 2.2.10].

It is also illogical to state that, while granting that Jaimini and Bādarāyana may stand in contradiction with each other over certain either/or issues (aikāntyādisu) such as the acceptance or rejection of brahma, still, insofar as the rejection of brahma and so on is never actually enunciated in any single śūtra in the Treatise of Twelve Chapters, that treatise does not therefore stand in contradiction with the Treatise of Four Chapters and so can reasonably be said to form a single knowledge system with it. The reason this argument is illogical is because it does not prove that the principal aims [of the two śāstras] do not stand in contradiction with each other.

(1) For example, when Jaimini proposes a description of the means of knowing dharma in the śūtra ‘An investigation of the conditions [of knowing] it’ (MS 1.1.3), the description of these means offered in his first chapter is already in contradiction with the BS. To explain: One pūrvapakṣa śūtra reads ‘Since the purpose of the Veda lies in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda that do not serve that purpose are purposeless; and with regard to those parts the Veda must be said to be non-eternal [unreliable]’ [MS 1.2.1].24 This means
that scripture in its entirety, if it is to culminate in something purposeful, must of necessity have some action as its purpose. Those portions of scripture not having that purpose – that is, portions whose purpose is not action insofar as they are not concerned with action-sentences (an action-sentence is something like ‘He who desires prosperity should sacrifice a white animal dedicated to the Wind Deity’) – are said to be ‘purposeless’, that is, without any function. [241] Therefore, it is claimed [in the prima facie view] that the whole range of sentences that do not have action as their purpose have no validity. On the basis of this sūtra thus understood the MS goes on to raise a doubt about the validity of the narrative portions of the Vedas. The siddhānta sūtra on this topic reads ‘Since [these narrative portions] form single discursive units with commandments, [they can acquire validity] through the purpose of commending [the actions that actually are the object of commandments]’ [MS 1.2.7]. This sūtra means that narrative portions concerned with already-accomplished entities can have a purpose by way of the function of commending commandments [that is, substantiating their credibility, value, etc.], since these portions form discursive units with commandment sentences. On the basis of this sūtra thus understood, the validity of such portions of the Vedas is established in the topic ‘On the arthavāda’ [MS 1.2.1-18] insofar as these do form single discursive units with commandments. And this position is corroborated in the topic ‘On the audumbara post’ [MS 1.2.19-25]) by referring back to the matter raised in ‘On the arthavāda’ when it is said, ‘But the fact of such sentences being taken along with other sentences has already been explained [i.e., the narrative passages are to be taken along with other injunctive passages]’ [MS 1.2.22]. Now, if the proposed inquiry into dharma were meant to be inclusive of an inquiry into brahma, then the proposed description of the means of knowing dharma given in the sūtra ‘An investigation of the conditions [of knowing] it’ would be inclusive of a description of the means of knowing brahma. And if that were in fact the case, then, given the doubt about the purposelessness of non-action matters, this [purposelessness] would have to have been refuted [in the MS] by the following sort of division: that the validity of some would be established by their being considered supplementary to commandments regarding acts like sacrifice that are means to ends, and the validity of others, by their promulgating entities such as brahma that are ends in themselves. There are additional substantive contradictions raised elsewhere in the epistemology chapter that would have to have been reconciled.
(2) Likewise, a topic in the eighth chapter [beginning] ‘When there is [apparent] conflict [between commandments], the procedure should be determined by the sacrificial substance, since the act as such bears upon the substance’ [MS 8.1.32-34] is introduced in order to ascertain that the procedure to be followed in the case of the cake offering to the god Indra should be that of the rite of cake offerings to the Fire god, given the identity of sacrificial substances; rather than the procedure of other rites relating to Indra using other substances, given the identity of the deity in question. Here the reasoning approved by Jaimini is that ‘deity’ is a secondary element, since it is merely a verbal referent. Yet this view stands in contradiction with the view of Vyāsa [242]. In Vyāsa’s system, in the topic ‘On the deity’ [BS 1.3.26 ff.], it is maintained that the deities are actually present in the sacrificial space and are to be considered predominant elements since they are consumers of the oblation.

(3) Another example: In a topic in the second chapter, ‘Commandment, however, is an undertaking’ [MS 2.1.5], 25 Jaimini has maintained that ritual action produces its end-results by means of a ‘transcendental potency’, apūrva. That position is contradicted by Vyāsa’s as expressed in the topic ‘From him [i.e., the Lord, there comes] the fruit [of works]; for [that only] is possible’ [BS 3.2.38]. There he argues that it is [not apūrva but] the supreme Lord who bestows the end-results when his grace is gained by ritual action and worship. What we have therefore is a contradiction between the two knowledge systems themselves [and not just between their authors].

(4) There is also a contradiction between them occasioned by the repudiation of brahma and renunciation. To explain: There are discourses [in the BS] concerning brahma, such as ‘That art Thou’, which make known the identity of brahma and the individual soul. Now, by the Mīmāṃsā rule ‘Because it forms a single discursive unit with a commandment’ [MS 1.2.7], whereby a discourse unrelated to action is held to be supplementary to a commandment [of action], these discourses are said to be supplementary to a commandment to perform worship. Acts of worship, for their part, by another Mīmāṃsā interpretive principle (on ‘sprinkling’ [MS 2.1.9-12]), become supplementary to sacrificial rites insofar as they purify a ritual substance, namely, the agent himself who is engaged in the rite. [This is so for the following reason:] An agent pure and simple (kārtmātra) is something common [to both ritual action and] worldly action, since worldly action is possible even if the Self is held to be identical to the body. 26 [Nevertheless] the Self referred to as an element to be
purified by worship in those Vedānta [i.e., Upanishadic] passages that are not found in the context of any specific ritual activity, such as "One should worship the Self", must have an existence separate from the body: this is presupposed by the commandment to sacrifice as well as by the Self’s being said to be an enjoyer of heavenly rewards. This Self is thus necessarily connected with ritual acts; and thus, by way of both [the syntactical association of the Self-as-agent with the act to be performed] and the scriptural passage "One that is performed with knowledge..." [CU 1.1.10], it makes sense to connect these [acts of worship] with ritual acts.27

It will not do to object that acts of worship of the Self cannot be supplementary to a sacrificial rite because brahma [=the Self] is proved to transcend the individual soul in view of the scripture that ascribes to brahma qualities such as absolute purity that are unimaginable in the individual soul [243]. For Jaimini established a hard and fast rule that all non-action discourses must be taken as supplementary to commandments, and only by violating this rule in the topic 'On coherence' [BS 1.1.4 ff.] could the [passages of the] Vedānta pretend to acquire validity independent of action. And it is, after all, only when this putative validity is established with respect to brahma and its qualities – by means of indications of general purport such as [congruence with] an introductory passage (upakrama) – that brahma can even be proved to transcend the individual soul through qualities such as absolute purity. But according to the view of Jaimini, the mention of such qualities is only supplementary to ritual commandments: the description of them has in fact the purpose of commending the individual soul, and it is this that provides for the coherence of the discourse as a whole. Who would dispute this? We find in various mantras and narrative passages of the Veda commendatory descriptions of unimaginable qualities of one entity or another that is connected with the ritual, as in the following: ‘Do not scratch the heaven with your index finger, nor harm the atmosphere with your middle, O origin of the earth’; ‘Let your smoke ascend to the heaven, your flame to the atmosphere; fill the earth with your ash, svāhā’; ‘The seasons are devoid of sin’; ‘This universe was water’.28

Moreover, when brahma has been repudiated, the means of attaining brahma, namely renunciation, has likewise been repudiated. And this is why Mimāmsakas commonly hold that renunciation is nothing but a ruse for self-advancement29 on the part of those disqualified from participating in ritual action, blind people, for example,
or cripples. It is therefore incorrect to hold that there is no contradiction between these two knowledge systems.

(5) It is also incorrect to hold that the word dharma ultimately expresses the same thing as the word brahma. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that the purpose of the Mahābhārata sentence you cited earlier – ‘They say Krishna, the great one, is the eternal dharma’ – is commendation, just like the sentence ‘Rāma is dharma incarnate’. Therefore my inference is not blocked, [244] and yours is indeed ineffectual.

[pūrvapakṣa] Now the seventh position. My inference is not blocked for the following reasons: (1) It is possible to avoid the contradiction revealed in the description of the means of knowing [dharma] found in the first chapter of the Mīmāṃsāśūtra in the following way: In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, it is true that the premises of validity and the doubt about the lack of validity of non-action passages (on the grounds that they would be purposeless) would seem to apply equally to discourses concerning brahma. But whereas Jaimini enunciated an argument for validity with respect to narrative portions that are supplementary to commandments of ritual action – namely, that they have their purposefulness precisely through such supplementation – he hid his intention with regard to the discourses on brahma, and did not openly broach the argument for validity [that he really did believe, namely] that these have intrinsic (svata eva) validity, irrespective of their supplementing commandments of ritual action, because their object is brahma, which in itself is the supreme human goal.

(2) It is possible to avoid the contradiction cited for the topic in the eighth chapter. In the settled view of this topic, ‘When there is conflict...’ [MS 8.1.32], the argument is not that the deity is a subsidiary element, because then there would be no difference between a substance’s being a subsidiary element and a deity’s being such. Rather, the fundamental argument (mūlayukti) of the passage is indicated by the rest of the śūtra, ‘since the act as such bears upon the substance’: The identity in the sacrificial substances is decisive because what we see pertaining to these substances is the ritual act itself, which has the form of the offering of such substances: It is the substance and not the deity that we actually see being offered up.

(3) It is possible to avoid the contradiction in the topic ‘Commandment, however, is an undertaking’ [MS 2.1.5]. Here it is only said that there exists an instrumentality of ritual action. It is not maintained that apūrva and apūrva alone is the instrument while dismissing the role of the Lord’s grace.
(4) It is possible to avoid the doubts about, among other things, the repudiation of brahma. The rule ‘Because it forms a single discursive unit with a commandment’ [MS 1.2.7] is concerned with establishing the authoritativeness only of narrative discourses like ‘The Wind is the swiftest...’ [245] and so on, by their supplementation of commandments; it is not concerned with discourses dealing with brahma.

(5) Last, it is unreasonable to assume that the statement in the Bhārata has merely the purpose of commendation. According to the Bhārata, the word dharma expresses merely a means to other-worldly good, and so it can be used equally to refer to brahma. The assumption that the accurate use of dharma requires additional modifiers such as the fact of being something commanded or performable, so that its primary expressive power should exclude brahma, lacks explanatory parsimony, and is thereby vitiated. Therefore, my inference is not blocked, whereas yours is ineffectual.

[siddhānta] Now the eighth position. First of all, your resolution of the contradiction [between the MS and] the matter in the first chapter [of the BS] is incorrect. It is ridiculous to assume that Jaimini, after having resolved doubts about the authoritativeness of some discourses not concerned with action, should have ‘hidden his intention’ with respect to other similar discourses [i.e., those of the Upaniṣads], given that the general thesis (sāmānyapratijñāna) [regarding authoritative knowledge about dharma] and doubt about lack of authoritative knowledge applies equally to both. Jaimini established the authoritativeness with regard to dharma of the Veda in all its four parts – commandments, narrative portions, mantras, and proper names – and in their specific modalities (saprakāram) [by directly commanding, by commending, and so on], and went on to establish the authoritativeness of Vedic texts remembered (smṛti) and of the practices of those learned in the Veda to the degree necessary there [in MS 1]. Now, how are we to believe that the same man proposed an analysis of the means of knowing dharma, in common with [in your view] an analysis of the means of knowing brahma, and raised certain doubts about the authoritativeness [of some discourses on dharma] because of their apparent purposelessness – something common also to those narrative portions of the Vedānta section that are concerned with brahma – but only resolved the doubts about the narrative portions that are supplementary to action, and not those related to the narrative portions of the Vedānta that are concerned with brahma? Why would anyone who understands the principles of interpretation (nyāyavid) place trust in such empty speculation? [246].
Furthermore, the thesis of examining dharma and the thesis of examining the means of knowledge about it apply [according to your view] to both ritual action as well as to brahma and the worship of brahma equally. Now, in the topic ‘On narrative portions’ [MS 1.2.1-18], one of the siitraas that state the prima facie view reads ‘Because of the purposelessness [that would be entailed] of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4]. The target of this siitra is not only those passages that narrate the end-results of commandments for ritual action (such as ‘By means of the final oblation one attains all desires’) but also those passages that narrate the end-results of commandments for worship, since the objection, the ‘purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’, applies equally to both. Thus:

[1] If the narrative of the end-result of the ‘Prajapati Wisdom’ [CU 8.7.1] – ‘He attains all worlds and all desires who understands in accordance with a knowledge of this Self’ – were meant to be taken literally, then the worship of the ‘brahma consisting of bliss’ would be pointless, since that is described in scripture as merely for the purpose of attaining all desires (‘He enjoys all desire’ [TU 2.1.1]); the worship of the ‘subtle’ (dahara) [CU 8.1.1 ff.] would be equally pointless, since it is described in scripture as merely for the purpose of attaining all worlds (‘Those [worshippers] become able to wander at will through all worlds’).

[2] If by the aforementioned acts of worship one attained not only all worlds and all desires but also liberation, then the ‘Wisdom of the Honey’ [CU 3.1] whose end-result is the attainment of liberation along with pure pleasure of the sort enjoyed by the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and Sdhyas; the ‘Upakosala Wisdom’ [CU 4.10], whose end-result is liberation preceded by the attainment of the three worlds (the Gdharapatya and so on); the ‘Aksara Wisdom’ [BAU 3.8.7 ff.] and all others whose end-result is liberation pure and simple, without the addition of one or another enjoyment contingent on the attainment of a particular world – all these would be pointless.

[3] Now consider the person authorized to perform worship but who is completely indifferent to the enjoyment of objects and wishes only to attain the bliss of brahma. For him the end-result is not the attainment of a particular world or the enjoyments found there – on the contrary, these are held to be merely obstacles to the attainment of the results he really wants. [247] Thus, since the ‘Aksara Wisdom’ and others are prescribed in scripture as affording the desired results immediately and without obstacle, others such as the ‘Honey Wisdom’ that are not so described would be pointless.

[4] If the end-result of all forms of brahma wisdom – whether enhanced by greater or lesser degrees of [acts of] the dharma of social orders and life stages; whether endowed with greater or lesser excellences; or unregulated by length of time, that is, whether undertaken at no regulated time or throughout one’s entire life – were unqualifed liberation, then those forms of brahma wisdom that are described as superior in regard to excellence, act, or time, would be pointless.
[5] If the narrative portions concerning the end-result of wisdom (such as ‘[The man of wisdom] becomes spotless and goes to a highest state of perfection’ [MU 3.1.3]) were meant to be taken literally, then liberation too would be obtained as the end-result of this commandment. If this were so, then two other statements on the attainment of all desires (‘For all desires the new and full moon sacrifice...’; ‘For all desires the jyotisoma...’) would likewise have to comprise liberation. And thus since one could obtain liberation from performing the new and full moon offerings just once, or the jyotisoma sacrifice just once, then all acts of worship of brahma meant to be performed throughout one’s life, along with all [acts of the dharma] of social orders and life stages, would become pointless.

Since the sūtra on ‘the purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ would have this kind of broad application, a rejoinder that applies equally to all [such passages on both karma and brahma] would have to have been enunciated in a sūtra [by Jaimini]. What we find however is that the sūtras offering this rejoinder, MS 1.2.16 and 17 (‘The mention of “all” refers to the fact of the man being entitled [to perform all acts and obtain all their rewards]; The result being accomplished by means of actions, the difference in the results could be due to the magnitude of the actions’), apply only to narrative portions concerning commandments of ritual action. In the case of the first of these two sūtras, the word ‘knowledge’ is carried over from the previous sūtra (1.2.15, ‘It is praise of knowledge’): We are to understand that in the discourse on the final ladle offering, mention of the ‘complete attainment of desires’ is merely for the purpose of commending the rite, and is not intended literally to be enunciating the end-result, and also because the final ladle offering is a ritual purification of fire [248] and is enjoined independent of any end-result. The ‘complete attainment of desires’ mentioned for the sake of praise is concerned with the question of qualification: Only after the final ladle offering has been made and the sacred fire has been fully ‘accomplished’ does a man become qualified for sacrificial rites with their full range of end-results. The accomplishment of such results is contingent on the performance of the full-ladle offering, and so the complete attainment of results is mentioned as the result of the full-ladle offering, for the purpose of praising it.

One might object that, by reference to the end-results of ritual acts accomplished with fire, the full-ladle offering itself should not be praised as the means for the attainment of all desires, because there are things that in fact are not attained by acts accomplished with fire, such as the ability to fly or the acquisition of heavenly virgins. But the matter is expressed this way because the reference to ‘all’ in the statement about the full-ladle offering is contingent on a contextual
proviso: its scope is limited to the domain of end-results provided for in the command statements of ritual acts. We see such limitation by context or other factor at work in such [everyday] statements as ‘He has eaten all the rice.’

This aspect of commendation, however, cannot be posited in the case of statements that communicate actual end-results like ‘He enjoys all desires’, just as is the case with the narrative of the Evening Session [cf. MS 4.3.17].

The second śūtra [MS 1.2.17] obviates the doubt that, insofar as heaven is achieved by the āgnihostra ritual, all other rites like the [full and new moon] sacrifice, the soma sacrifice, and so on are pointless; and it does so by stating that a multiplicity of ritual acts produces a multiplicity of end-results, on the analogy with farming. Now, the doubt raised here applies equally to the section concerning worship, but we do not find that doubt to be obviated in the section containing the system’s settled views. For in the section [on worship] the principle of a multiplicity of end-results in consequence of a multiplicity of ritual acts does not even apply. The śūtra expressing the prima facie view, ‘Thus because of the absence of any end-result’ [MS 1.2.3], enunciates that the stated result does not occur, and this would be a cause of its invalidity. This putative invalidity is common to the narrative portion concerning end-results found in the ritual section (such as ‘His face shines who has this wisdom’) [249] and the narrative portion concerning end-results found in the brahma section (such as ‘Anyone who knows this will become handsome and famous’) [CU 3.13.8], but it is only with reference to the former that a śūtra obviating the doubt is found: ‘There is commendation of wisdom’ [MS 1.2.15]. The wise man’s face is said to shine thus only from his understanding the meaning of the Brāhmaṇa passage on the Gargatirirśtra, not, as in the case of a woman’s face, by reason of natural beauty. Thus the wisdom is being commended. But this mode of obviating [the doubt regarding the end-result of worship] cannot apply to the statement ‘Anyone who knows this will become handsome and famous’, since these two states, being handsome and famous, are held to be the actual end-result of attaining the ‘Light Wisdom’ [CU 3.13.7 ff.]. In short, śūtras such as ‘Because of the purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4] must inevitably be held to apply equally to narratives about the end-results of the various commandments for worship, yet we find that various śūtras on the system’s settled views have been composed that apply only to narratives about the end-results of the commandments for ritual
action. So who would not find it a ridiculous attempt at a way out to claim that in one place Jaimini revealed his rebuttal and in another hid his true intentions?

So [Jaimini] believes that the acts of worship of the Self must be supplementary to ritual acts, and the narratives about their end-results are not to be taken literally, any more than the narrative ‘Not hearing any evil report of oneself’ [regarding the end-result of making one’s ladle of palāśa wood, MS 4.3.1] is to be taken literally. It is in view of this that the doubt about the ‘purposeless of other [enjoined actions]’ and the arguments obviating this doubt are not raised in connection with them. And that is why there is the prevailing attitude of the followers of Jaimini that ‘the Vedānta [i.e., the Upaniṣads] is the wasteland of the Veda’, that is, they hold it is without substance insofar as there is nothing therein [relating to action] to deliberate over. And that is why your resolution of the contradiction [of Uttarātmanāmsa] with the matter of the first chapter [of the Pūrva-māmsa] is completely without merit.

The same holds true for your resolution of the contradiction with the topic in the eighth chapter. You argue as follows: Although all that is seen is the oblation, the sacrifice is something meant to conciliate the deity, and it is the deity, once its grace is won, that bestows the end-result, so the deity must be the predominant element; hence, [250] the similarity of deities trumps any similarity of oblations. It is precisely to dispel this doubt that the following sūtra is offered: ‘The scriptural reference to the deity is as a subsidiary element’ [MS 8.1.34]. Nor can one respond that this can be construed as referring to a supplementary position [abhyuccaya, that is, one that Jaimini himself does not actually hold but only reports]. For in the ninth chapter Jaimini makes the following argument. He offers the prima facie view first with this sūtra: ‘Or, it is the deity that motivates, since the feeding of a guest is for the sake of a guest’ [MS 9.1.6], which is to say: hospitality consists of paying worship to a guest, and since it is intended to please the guest, the guest must be the predominant element in the act; in the same way, a sacrifice consists of paying worship to a god, and since it is intended to please the deity, the deity must be the predominant element in the act – it is the deity, being thereby pleased, that bestows the end-result. This prima facie view Jaimini answers with the following sūtra: ‘No, rather, it is the act of sacrifice itself that is predominant, since it is the act that follows from scripture; the scriptural reference to the deity is as a subsidiary element’ [MS 9.1.9], which is to say: the predominant element in a
sacrifice is not the deity, since it is sacrifice itself that, by way of a
‘transcendental potency’, apiūvya, generates the end-result, not the
deity pleased by the oblation. Rather, the deity is referred to as
something subordinate to the sacrifice, since it is the reference point
for the [offered] substance. After enunciating this settled view Jaimini
shows the disanalogy of hospitality to sacrifice in the following sūtra:
‘With respect to a guest, it is he who is predominant in [the act of
hospitality]; but this is not so in a ritual act, because [in hospitality] it
is the pleasing of the guest that is predominant [and this is not the
case with a deity in a ritual act]’ [MS 9.1.10], which is to say: in
hospitality the pleasing of a guest is required, that is, one is required
to act in such a way that the guest is pleased, and so it makes sense
that the guest should be predominant there; but in a sacrificial act, no
pleasing is required, that is, one is not required to perform the act in
such a way that the deity is pleased, and so the deity is not the
predominant element in a sacrifice. Hereby Jaimini has refuted the
predominance of the deity in the sacrifice unequivocally.

Hereby fails your resolution of the contradiction with the topic
‘Commandment, however, is an undertaking’ [MS 2.1.5] [251]. For it
can be ascertained that, having clearly refuted the predominance of
the deity, Jaimini too must hold the position adopted by all com-
mmentators on the topic ‘Commandment, however...’ namely that
apiūvya alone is the instrument [by which ritual produces its end-
results, not the grace of the Lord].

Also incorrect is the resolution of the contradiction of the repu-
diation of brahma and the means of attaining it, namely renunciation.
Jaimini holds that the discourses concerning brahma communicate
the nature of the individual soul, which is the object of acts of wor-
ship supplementary to ritual in the form of purifications of the agent
[of the sacrifice]. Given this belief, there is no longer any proof at all
for the existence of brahma [since the discourses on it are now shown
to refer to something else], and accordingly it is impossible to avoid
the conclusion that both the two [brahma and renunciation] are in-
deed repudiated.

It is for this reason that [Kumārila,] the author of the Vārttika, in
the topic ‘On narrative portions’ [MS 1.2.1 ff.], after corroborating
the view that narrative portions such as ‘Wind is the swiftest...’ are
supplementary to commandments, states: ‘Hereby is explained the
non-deontic character (nairākāṅkṣya) of the Upaniṣads too.’33 But
the fact that, in the topic ‘On grammar’ [MS 1.3.24 ff.], the author of
the Vārttika, after citing certain discourses on the commandments
and end-results of acts of worship of the supreme Self, asserts that these [Upaniṣads] function as the means of achieving a state of flourishing and final bliss independently [and not supplementary to commandments of sacrificial rites], is something he has done entirely as a result of his own anxiety about repudiating brahma and renunciation; it is not in accordance with the doctrine of the author of the (Mīmāṃsā) śūtras, since we have shown that the śūtras of Jaimini and those of Vyāsa stand in clear contradiction with each other.

You also make the argument that, in order to avoid the charge of lack of explanatory parsimony with regard to accurate usage, we must necessarily accept that the word dharma is used equally to refer to brahma [as well as ritual actions], and that therefore there is no reason to suppose that the statement of the Bhārata [where dharma is used in reference to Krishna] must have the purpose of commendation [instead of being meant literally]. This can be answered as follows: True enough, there is no reason to suppose it is meant as mere commendation – for this is something actually proved from the context itself, which after all is a commendation of Krishna. That [context] does not sustain the argument that the word dharma expresses simply a means of other-worldly good [and not specifically sacrificial action] [252]. Were that the case, then the word dharma would refer equally to individual souls, which are means of other-worldly good as they are agents, and to a host of other things insofar as they are causes – and then in what way would it be praising the Blessed One to say that the word dharma refers to him? Therefore we must accept that the word dharma signifies simply ritual acts such as sacrifice if we are to preserve the prevailing and natural meaning (svārasyaprasiddhyartham) of the passage cited from the Bhārata. And it would then indeed be praise of him to say that the Blessed One, having descended to earth in order to preserve dharma, is himself dharma incarnate.

Or let us accept, for the sake of argument, that the word dharma [in the Bhārata passage] somehow can refer to brahma as well. Even so, the word dharma mentioned in the [very first] sūtra, on the ‘inquiry into dharma’ – just like the word dharma in the sūtra ‘Jaimini [thinks] for the same reasons that dharma [is what brings about the fruits of action]’ [BS 3.2.40] – has to be taken to exclude brahma. This is so because the dharma proposed as the object of examination is said to be something defined by Vedic commandment (in the sūtra ‘Dharma is a good defined by Vedic commandment’ [MS 1.1.2]). The word ‘commandment’ (codanā) is derived from a verbal root (cud) that
means ‘impel’ [*Dhātupāṭha* 10.53] and so it must enunciate a statement that prompts action. Therefore a commandment is a direct source of knowledge about *dharma*, whereas a statement providing information about already-existent entities that is transmitted in connection with this or that commandment can be a source of knowledge about it only insofar as it forms a unified discourse with such a commandment, by way of offering commendation or other [supplementary information about the act in question]. The end-result enunciated in narrative portions (on the Evening Session and the like) is to be taken literally only insofar as these form a unified discourse with a principal commandment, because this end-result is required by the commandment in question. By contrast, the end-result enunciated with respect to acts of worship of the Self, which are only subordinate elements of ritual acts since they are purifications of the agent, cannot be taken literally because that end-result is not required by a commandment. It is precisely with this in mind that Jaimini did not bother to answer criticisms [about such acts of worship] such as that deriving from [the prima facie view expressed in the *sūtra*] ‘Because of the purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4].

The blessed Bādarāyaṇa, however, [253] observed that Jaimini believed that *dharma* takes the form of sacrifice, produces an end-result that is only a state of flourishing, something both perishable and non-ultimate, and thereby constitutes the meaning of the entire Veda. And he observed further that Jaimini had no understanding of the fact that *brahma* is proved to exist by the entire *Vedānta* [the *Upaniṣads*], whose central idea is communicated by its introductory passages and similar [aspects of discourse] (*upakramādī*); that the end-result of acts of worship of *brahma* was final liberation, the eternal and ultimate human goal; and that ritual action was only contributory to this means. And he thought that, lest the world go completely astray by focusing on Jaimini’s system, he would confer a benefit on the world by composing the knowledge system that starts ‘Now, then, the inquiry into *brahma.*’ Accordingly, there is indeed a very great contradiction between the two knowledge systems of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. Since they cannot form a single knowledge system your inference is blocked, whereas mine is not ineffectual, and this for the following reason: Jaimini proposed as his object of analysis only action such as sacrifice, whose end-results are both perishable and non-ultimate; therefore, whatever is other than sacrifice cannot be for him an object of analysis in this system. You cannot object, on the
grounds that we do find [in the MS] analysis as to essential nature, physical dimensions, and the like, of things such as the sacrificial post, the oblation fire, milk-pail, and so on that are strictly speaking ‘other than sacrifice’, that brahma too, accordingly, could be an object of analysis. For what is meant by the word ‘ritual action’ is the object of an act aimed at an end-result that is perishable and non-ultimate. Nor can you charge that the inferential reason [namely, that brahma is included in ‘whatever is other than sacrifice’] is unproved given that brahma is in fact connected with the sacrifice, insofar as it is a deity. The deity may be the addressee of the spent oblation, but it is only the word that refers to the deity that is the object of an act – i.e., of the effort made to pronounce the word – and therefore the deity itself is not the actual object of the act.

Thereby is also laid to rest the following doubt [raised by our opponents] [254]: Although the dharma that Jaimini aims to analyze is concerned with action, and so cannot in any direct way be connected with brahma, it cannot be denied that [Jaimini’s notion of dharma] must also be concerned with acts of worship [of the Self], and accordingly it must have a connection with brahma since brahma is both the end-result and the object of those acts; and therefore by somehow dismissing the contradiction, on the grounds [of its being subsumed under] the common thesis [MS 1.1.1] [the BS] can be said to form a unified system [with the MS]. For we have already stated that the word dharma is concerned only with action whose end-result – as an examination of the totality of the Later Sūtras (uttar-astātrajāta) themselves shows – consists of a state of flourishing, something both perishable and non-ultimate. For there is a Vedic usage of the word dharma in this sense of mere action:

Other than dharma and adharma, other than this, what is done and not done, other than what is both past and future – speak to me of what there is of this sort that you have insight into.

This mantra from the Kathavallī [KU 2.14] is concerned with three things, agent, end, and means, that are different from the action constituting the means of producing perishable and non-ultimate end-results, the end-results themselves produced by those means, and the actor active with such means. Both sides agree on this [interpretation]. But in the sūtra ‘And there is question and explanation relative to three things only [not to the pradhāna]’ [BS 1.4.6], the mantra has been explained by our opponents in the following manner to obtain the aforementioned three entities:
'Dharma' refers to sacrifice and the like whose end-result is a state of flourishing; 'other than it', i.e., 'a means that is different from sacrifice.' 'Adharma' refers to what is other than dharma, i.e., what is achieved by dharma, namely a state of flourishing (heaven and the like); 'other than it', i.e., an end different from heaven. 'Than this' refers to the agent of the sacrifice who is present to our awareness, that is, the human person who is inclined toward end-results in the sphere of transmigration; 'other than this', i.e., an agent different from this person. 'What there is of this sort', the triad of agent and so on, 'that you have insight into.' 'What is done and not done... what is both past and future' are qualifications of all three, dharma, [adharma, and 'this']; 'done and not done', that is, the whole mass of things undertaken but not completed; 'speak of' some triad different from this familiar triad of means, [end, and agent] that is past, present, and future.

Another interpretation of the passage [they offer] is as follows:

'Other than dharma and adharma' is a question about what is not a means of normal good and evil; 'other than this, what is done and not done, [255] other than what is both past and future' is a question about an eternal end different from the non-eternal ends that have a past, present, and future. The question about the agent is included in the question about the end, since the agent is eternal and already implied by the end.

Now, the first interpretation is flawed because the construction is awkward for the following reasons: interpreting the word adharma, which is commonly used in the sense of evil, as the end-result (heaven and so on) of dharma; interpreting 'than this', which can be understood as an adjective to 'done and not done', separately as referring to the agent himself; taking 'what is done and not done', which can be understood as the substantive construing with the adjective 'than this', as an adjective referring to all [three], dharma and so on; interpreting 'what is both past and future', which can be understood independently because of their construing with the word 'other' that is used separately in the clause, as an adjective referring to all [three], dharma and so on.

The second interpretation is flawed because the question about the agent is not really made available: If you agree that the agent is comprised in the second question on the grounds that the agent is (a) eternal and (b) already-implied, an agent different from the agent of the end-results of sacrifice and the like is not made available, since (a) the agent of the end-results of sacrifice is also eternal and so can be included within the comprehensive concept of being other than something past, present, and future; and (b) it is already-implied insofar as it is the entity qualified by heaven and the like, just as the liberated being is qualified by the manifestation of absolute purity and so on.
Thus the opponents’ constructions are unacceptable; ignoring them we offer another, correct interpretation: By the first quarter-verse is posited a means different from both the one that has end-results that are perishable and non-ultimate but unaffected by any powerful adversity, and from the one that has end-results that are so affected. By the second quarter-verse is posited an agent different from agent of sacrifice, which is denounced in another mantra: ‘These are unsteady boats, these sacrifices, [256] in which is found the eighteen-fold action, and which fools welcome as the ultimate good—only to progress to old age and death forever more’ [MU. 1.2.7]. (Here the interpretation of ‘what is done and not done’ is [as a bahuvrihi compound]: one whose deeds are ‘not done’, i.e., as good as undone.) By the third quarter-verse is posited an end different from such ends as heaven; the two ‘ands’ construing with ‘past’ and ‘future’ are meant to include the present, which has the form of both past and future.

Since the set of three questions is composed eloquently by the three quarter-verses in order, with respect to an instrument, agent, and their end-results such as are different from those made known by... why do they torture it for the sake of a construction that produces just this meaning? 39 Thus, on both sides there is no dispute about the fact that in the mantra the word dharma is concerned solely with action whose end-result is perishable and non-ultimate.

Furthermore, even though we find this sort of usage [throughout the Vedas and in the MS], it would be a mistake, in view of later idiom (agrimavyavahāra), to assume that Jaimini’s usage alone is concerned with [ritual action], that no other such concept of dharma exists [elsewhere]. 40 For we find, in a sūtra of Kanāda (‘Now, then, we shall explain dharma’ [VS 1.1.1]), that the word dharma is posited as an object of examination, and that the sūtras that follow are concerned with dharma [as we understand it] if only slightly: For though in the beginning no consideration is paid to the type of performance concerned with sacrifice and the like, in the first section of the sixth chapter consideration is paid to the dharma of giving and receiving [257], and in the second section to some extent the dharma of the four life-stages is considered synoptically.

Therefore it is proved that the thesis of examining dharma is rightly considered not to comprise an examination of brahma. Here follows a summary of the two views: 42
1. ‘For a thing to be dharma there must be a relation to a class property, substance, or attribute, and this can pertain equally to brahma. Acts of worship of brahma are undoubtedly dharma.

2. ‘The thesis of considering dharma directly envisions this. Brahma would have to be considered like heaven or as [some other] end-result of action.’

3. Those who have insisted thusly that the two Mimamsa systems form a single knowledge system must be enlightened so as to remove any such hope.

4. If the thesis of the Prior System, through its various discourses, is supposed to touch on brahma the way it is conceived of by you [Vaisistadvaitins] as an object of its inquiry, then there must be such inquiries, and why are they not present? Surely, at all events, any contradiction [in the MS with brahma] would have to have been removed.

5. The word ‘command’ contained in the definitional sūtra [MS 1.1.2, codanālakṣaṇo ‘rtho dhyānaḥ] means an ‘injunction’ prompting action. It necessarily implies that discourse not concerned with action is purposeless – implies, that is, the prima facie view of the interpretive principle of ‘narrative portions.’

6. The purposelessness of narrative portions is obviated by their being held to be supplementary to commandments. Does that commandment pertain to the discourses of [Upanishadic] scripture? Surely even in your eyes that is equally present in them.

7. If it does not pertain to these [scriptural discourses], then Jaimini would have had to compose an explicit sūtra to the effect that they are ends in themselves. On what grounds could one assume that [although he did not] such must have been his ‘hidden intention’? Only a dimwit would do so.

8. How far are we asked to believe that this hidden intention of the great seer extends? Such arguments as those based on ‘The purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4] and on the end-results of commandments should apply equally to your [Upanishadic texts as well]. Or why, when the definition of dharma was being set out [by Jaimini in MS I] to establish the entire and perfect source of knowledge of dharma that applied equally to smṛti and custom – why didn’t the Vedānta portion similarly follow the way of smṛti?

9. Who would put any trust in your boast that the two form the work of a single system...
10. In the eighth and ninth chapters Jaimini says that the deity is a subordinate property of the sacrifice, whereas Bādarāyana says it is predominant in itself. What resolution of this conflict can present itself here?\(^{256}\)

11. And no resolution is possible for the disagreement that exists between the one who holds that apūrva alone is the instrument of the sacrifice, and the other, the Lord’s grace.

12. Therefore, in the Prior System, the dharma under analysis is the object of a person’s willed action (kāmikārya) and has end-results that are perishable and determinate. And with respect to this dharma the sage Jaimini holds that the Veda in its entirety is the source of valid knowledge. The Blessed One of the Lotus Eyes himself composed [new] sūtras for the knowledge of brahma, in order to make known to those devoted solely to ritual action that the view of their teacher was detrimental (ahitam).

13. Therefore, given that contradiction between the two systems – with respect to primary meanings and end-results – ever rears its head, even the rumor that they form a single knowledge system can gain no standing in the thoughts of the learned.

NOTES

1 I am grateful to Ethan Kroll and Samuel Wright (Chicago) for their suggestions, and especially to Lawrence McCrea (Harvard) for his careful critique of an earlier version of the translation.

2 The traditional number of his texts is the sacral 108. The New Catalogus Catalogorum lists 62. The Srimad Appayya Deekshitendra Granthavali Prakashan Samiti, Hyderabad, which has been issuing volumes intermittently since 1971, is planning to publish what I count as 41 texts in 15 volumes.

3 Gerow (2001: i).

4 A new edition – and in the case of the Nyāyamukttāvali, the editio princeps (on the basis of a manuscript held by the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, one of only two, it seems, that exist) – was published by the Samiti in 2001.

5 We are only beginning to understand the innovations of late precolonial Sanskrit scholarship. For a sympathetic account of Appayya’s literary science, see Bronner (2002, 2003).

6 See for example Clooney (1993).

7 Sṛabhāṣya, p. 21. The translation is that of Thibaut slightly modified, p. 5 (italics added); he gives ‘earlier’ for piūrva, but I find no suggestion in the original of temporal antecedence; Rāmānuja seems to have in mind, rather, an almost spatial relationship between two parts of a single text.

8 Vedāntadesāka remarks on this: ‘Their being called samhita implies that “unified system” means not only that they constitute a single knowledge-discipline (vidyāsthāna) but that they constitute a single text (prabandha)’ (Tattvavijñā, p. 39).

9 Trans. Thibaut (emended). Appayya has the Visistadvaita siddhāntin cite precisely this passage of the Sṛabhāṣya to clinch the argument for system unity (Caturma-
other.' This is essentially the same as the view advanced below, 'even if contradic-
brahma
the analysis of
scholars/C19
last great contributors to this conversation, the seventeenth-century Varanasi
text engaged the energies of commentators for much of the following millennium; the
Bh
forthcoming edition of the

get access to any of the more than a dozen other manuscripts that exist and that
from the British Library (referred to as BL). It has proven impossible, however, to
the manuscripts originally used for the edition, since they share some errors) and one
Research Centre (referred here as 'Adyar'; this appears to be a transcript of one of
been able to consult two manuscripts of the work, one from the Adyar Library and
ment Oriental Manuscripts Library' (p. 9). In addition to this printed edition, I have
two palm leaf manuscripts in private collections and 'Mss. at the Mysore Govern-

25 Understood traditionally to mean 'apūrva exists, however, [given that] action [is
enjoined].'

24 Here as occasionally elsewhere the translation of Jha is followed.

23 See Assmann (1997). The case of the early Buddhists is discussed in Pollock
(2004).

22 Read tadiyasya for the madiyasya of the printed edition (so BL, and, it seems,
Adyar; see below, tadiyasaiddhāntasya).

21 The text reads dharmah, and omits the na at the beginning of the citation.

20 The translation of Thibaut is generally followed here and throughout.

19 Or perhaps the thesis of just the former, or less likely, of just the latter.

18 brackets contain translator's additions; parenthesis, by contrast, indicate material
contained in the text but subordinated typographically in the interests of clarity.

17 Brackets contain translator's additions; parenthesis, by contrast, indicate material
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16 Appayya's work was published only once, from Srirangam in 1912, on the basis of
two palm leaf manuscripts in private collections and 'Mss. at the Mysore Govern-
ment Oriental Manuscripts Library' (p. 9). In addition to this printed edition, I have
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from the British Library (referred to as BL). It has proven impossible, however, to
get access to any of the more than a dozen other manuscripts that exist and that
undoubtedly would help clarify lingering uncertainties in the constitution of the text.
A number of the arguments that are set forth at great length in the

15 On dharma see my 1990 article, on smṛti, 1997; an essay on purusārtha is planned.

14 vedamālavaṁ punas te tulyakāṣamālakāṁsamyāvāṁ lajyā ca mātāpridrṣṭeṣu dhan-
putravaṁ nābhuyapagacchanti (Tantnavārttika, p. 113.21; cf. p. 81.17 ff.) Kumārila's
text engaged the energies of commentators for much of the following millennium; the
last great contributors to this conversation, the seventeenth-century Varanasi
scholars Sankara Bhatta, Dinakara Bhatta, and Khaṇḍadeva, are discussed in my
forthcoming edition of the Bhāṭṭārakā."

13 See Assmann (1997). The case of the early Buddhists is discussed in Pollock
(2004).

12 tasmād dharmavicārasāstreyā brahmavicārasya śiddhyabhāvat tadartham idam
śāstram arambhānyām (Manidipīka on Brahmavicārabhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭhaśīvācārya, p. 27).

11 Or perhaps the thesis of just the former, or less likely, of just the latter.


9 na vyāyam dharmabrahmavicārarāpyoh śāstrayarṇy atyantahedavādāṁ kim tv eka-
tvādinaṁ, and he goes on to say, of the text stretching from the first śāstra of the MS
to the last of the BS, etiavatparyantam ekam eva śāstram (Brahmasūrabhāṣya of
Śrīkaṇṭhaśīvācārya, p. 49).

8 4d. The siddhāntin also notes that in the

7 See Assmann (1997). The case of the early Buddhists is discussed in Pollock
(2004).

6 Appayya's work was published only once, from Srirangam in 1912, on the basis of
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A number of the arguments that are set forth at great length in the

5 Brackets contain translator's additions; parenthesis, by contrast, indicate material
contained in the text but subordinated typographically in the interests of clarity.

4 Stokavārttika Ćedanāśīra, 13–14. Only vs. 14 is actually cited by Appayya; I add
the preceding vs. for obvious contextual reasons.

3 Or perhaps the thesis of just the former, or less likely, of just the latter.

2 The translation of Thibaut is generally followed here and throughout.

1 The text reads dharmah, and omits the na at the beginning of the citation.
26 dehāmbhāvenāpi [laukkikakrtiopapati]; Adyar, dehāmbbhāvenārtham api (corrupt); BL unclear, but apparently: dehāṃbhāvē 'pi. The passage is obscure to me. Presumably the apāsana produces a sanskāra in the ātman without perceptibly changing it, just as the prokṣaṇa does for the rice. The Mimamsā nyāya of prokṣaṇa is usually invoked to identify an apāravāddhi (an act we would never do except for the fact a Vedic injunction tells us to), which does not seem relevant here.

27 I owe my understanding of this complex passage to discussions with L. McCrea. Upanishadic passages are generally given in the translation of Olivelle.

28 The citations (not always exact) are, respectively, TS1.3.5.1; KS 3.3. and 6.6.; AB 4.25; TA 10.22.1.

29 kathāniccay gatupanyāsah. Or perhaps, less cynically, ‘a suggested course of action.’

30 Reading kriyāvidhiśeṣa- (as two lines below) for kriyāviśeṣa- of the printed text and for Adyar’s kriyāvidhiśeṣa- (BL has a large lacuna here). The printed text would give: ‘narrative portions belonging to particular ritual acts.’

31 And this, implicitly, has no bearing on the actual presence of the deity at the sacrifice (I read tadhāpāśyatvāt for tadhāpākhyaśatvāt).

32 If texts that do not enjoin actions but simply describe existent things, such as results, were to remain true and authoritative about matters of dharma, then texts that describe such things as attaining all desires by a single rite would render all other rites meaninglessness. Such texts are therefore not to be taken literally but must be interpreted as subservient to other ritual action.

33 Presumably referring to Tantravārttika on MS 1.2.7 (especially p. 13 ff.), though I do not find mention of the Upanisads here nor this exact quote.

34 Presumably referring to Tantravārttika, p. 227.

35 We should probably read with Adyar yāgādikarmaśa (for the printed yāgādikam eva).

36 In what follows the printed text shows a lacuna through haplography; Adyar (folio 129) has the correct reading: na ca karmānyate ‘pi... iti tad vrat brahmaṇo ‘pi kim na syād iti vācyam. kṣayivāsātisayaphalodēśyakāmaṁbhane viśāvaya [read: -anuśṭanavisayasya] karmāsaṁbhena vivākṣitavat. na ca brahmaṇo ‘pi devatāvena... I am uncertain whether I have grasped the both sides’ refers, since Mimāṃsā is unlikely to be one of them.

37 The printed ed. and BL (anyatra dharman anumāṇa) as well as Adyar (anyatra dharman anumāna) all seem to be corrupt, but a reasonable conjecture eludes me.

38 This is a sangrahāsālōka of Appayya.

39 Ed. bhṛantikāt kālpayitum. BL: bhṛantīkram api kālpayitum; Adyar: [prayogādhāre...]. Bhṛantīkram avikalpayitum. I am uncertain whether I have grasped the true meaning of the sentence.

40 Ed. kiyaṁ api cintitaṁ sangrahataṁ; BL: kiyaṁ sangṛhitāḥ; Adyar: kriyāt sangṛhitāḥ (corrupt).

41 The verses show a number of text-critical problems, and their real meaning is not always clear to me.

42 I read saṁnami eva with BL, Adyar (Ed. samvetam).

43 BL: tātāksāśātīgocaraṁ... -pratijñānām; Ed., Adyar: tātāksaśādgoocared... -pratijñānām (Adyar pratikriyā).

44 Ed. vicārav; BL, Adyar: vicāra [Adyar omits vā, hypometric]. Conjecture vicārav (cf. vs. 4b)?

45 In place of the printed text (which gives tat tad vaco hi) I read with Adyar tattādvaśavbhṛ[ḥ].

46 Literally, ‘does not abandon’ (nojhāti).

47 Adyar pūraṇapakṣītaṁ (for pūrṇapakṣatām).

48 BL ca tāṁ (for tāto hi).
50 Adyar and BL viḍīphaloktyādi (for viṣṭaloktyādi).
51 Adyar and BL anagham (for -manasam).
52 Adyar and BL smṛtyācārādīvad vā (Ed. smṛtyācārādi tadvat).
53 Adyar and BL na (for na).
54 Ed. and Adyar smṛtipatham (BL smṛtipalam). I am unsure of padas bcd here.
55 Padas ab are dark to me: ‘When the matter cannot be hidden, [as?] when the syllable OM itself is clearly mispronounced’?
56 The Adyar ms. has a lacuna here to the end of the chapter.

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Secondary Sources
APPAYYAdIKṣITĀNĀM PŪRVOTTARAMĪMĀMSĀVAD-
NAKṢATRAMĀLĀNTARBHĀVYAIKAŚĀstryANIRAKARANĀVĀDAH

[235] evaṃ sakalaśabdavācyatvena svādhāṃ brahma alaukikaśreyaḥśa-
dhanatvapraṇvṛttinimittakakarmavaćidharmasaśabdaśavacyam api bha-
vati; sākṣād api ukta-praṇvṛttinimittasambandhena tad vācyāṃ 
bhāvitum arhati 'śreyaḥśaśdhanatāḥ hy esāṃ nityāṃ vedat pratīyate /
tāḍrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvam tasmān nendriyagocāraḥ' iti veda-vā-
gamyasreyaḥśaśdhanatākakarmavapraṇvṛttinimittakatayā abhyupagatasya 
dharmasaśadasya karmavat jātigunadravyānāḥ api artha iti 
mmāṃsakair uktavat; tena 'athāt dharmajijñāsaḥ' iti sūtragatadharm-
asaśabdaśarghitatayā brahmaṇo 'pi jaimitiyaḥdharmaśicārapratijñā-
viṣayatvam asti na vā iti vicārārthaṃ kathantaraṃ prastūyate –
tadasttitvāvādināṃ pareśām idam anumānam – brahma svarūpa-
pramāṇasādhanapalaśaḥ jaimitiyaśicārapratijñāviṣayatvam 
ācchitaḥ ucyati, brahmaṇo 'pi nacṣatraśtyayādu 
devatātvanvayāt jaimitiyē yagūṣu devatāprādhyānaya
tadabhatāvadyārtham evaṃ svarūpaśicārapratijñāviṣayatvam 
astī ti [236] ddhasaśadhanavānāyā svarūpapramāṇasādhanapalaśa 
ācchitaḥ ucyati, prathama kāṣyā.

atha dvītyā

brahmaṇo jaimitiyaḥdharmaśicārapratijñāviṣayatvāyām āgre 
davicāreṇa bhāvyam, na tv asau tatra dṛṣṭaye; na ca tam api cikīraṣa-
mahārṣeṇ vīghanāḥ kaścit utprekṣitum śakaye; nāpi vismaṇaṃ, yo 
hi dvādasalaksṇaṃ svarūpaṣicārapramāṇasādhanapalaiḥ saha 
kar-mājataṃ nṛṇīya tatrāśūritiṃ kaṃścit tadupayuktiṃ nyāyān 
ālakṣyā 
tatsaṃghaḥārāṃ dvādaśalaksṇaśeṣaṃ saṃkārṣanakāṇḍam akāṛṣit, 
tasya mahārṣeṇ brahmaśicāre vīghanāḥ vismaṇaṃ vā katham ut-

* In preparing the Romanized Sanskrit text the printing conventions of the ori-

ginal Vānti Vilas edition have been followed.
prekṣāmahe; na ca karmavicāropayuktanyāyair eva brahmaṇo ’pi svarūpapramāṇasādhanaḥpaniṇayaḥ sidhyātity abhipretya prthak tadvicāro na kṛta iti śaṇyam vaktum, karmaparāvṛtyaṁbhirnāvaka-
nyāyebhyo vilaksanāṁ eva brahmaṇaparāvṛtyaṁbhirnāvaka-
yāyāṁ caturlakṣaṇāṁ grathanadarśanāṁ; na ca dvādaśalakṣaṇaṁcatur-
lakṣaṇyoḥ aikaśāstryābhhyapagamenā brahmavicāra-pratijñānirvāhaḥ
kalpayitum śākyam, bhinnavakṛtayoh dharmabrahmavicāra-pratijñ-
opakramayoh parasparavilakṣaṇasādhyāsādhyārthanāvaka-
yāyagratanaḥpravṛttauḥoḥ tayor aikaśāstryakalpana pramāṇā [237]
bhāvāt; ato bādhitaṁ idam anumānam iti – brahma noktam sādhyā-
vat, karmānyatvāt ghaṭavat – iti.

**atha tṛtiyā kāṣyā**

na bādhitaṁ madanumānam, aikaśāstrya kalpanaṁena prat-
ijñānirvāhopapatteḥ; na ca tatkalpakābhāvaḥ, vedarūpa-karagrantha-
vyākhyātvasya tatkalpakatvāḥ; na ca vaktṛbhedaḥ tatkalpana-
bādhakaḥ, vaktṛbheṣiḥḥi vyākaranarūpaparabhandhavyākhyāna-
tvena vāmanajayāditya-vṛttyoḥ aikaśāstrya darśanāḥ; nāpi dharmabrahmavicāra-pratijñānopakramaḥ tadābhākaṁ, dharmasaṁ-
vede karmabrahmasādhaṁ ratenā dvādaśalakṣaṇaṁ catur- 
lakṣaṇaṁ dhāraṇaṁ pratijñāyaṁ vṛttayaṁ karmavicāra-anantaram ‘athāto 
brahma jāmājaṁāśa’ ity asya ‘āthātaḥ śeṣalakṣaṇam’ itivat avāntaraprati-
jñānaparātvo puruṣāḥ; na ca parasparvilakṣaṇanāyagratanaṁ tadbāhakaṁ,
nirṇaṁyāraṇusāraṇaḥ nyāyāvailalakṣaṇyopapattēḥ; dvādaśalakṣaṇyām 
apī karmabhedāḥ-āsāṁśibhāvaṁ nirṇyāraṇusāraṇaḥ vilakṣaṇaṁnā-
yagratanaḥdarśanāḥ; ato na bādhitaṁ madanumānam, tvad-
umānam tu apraya-jakam – iti.

**atha ca caturthi kāṣyā**

nyāyāṁ iha vaila-kṣaṇaṁ bhedamātraṁ na vivakṣitam, kim tu 
[238] virodhaḥ; prasiddho hi virodhaḥ; caturlakṣaṇaṁ jaiminimata-
svaḥ prāyaḥ pūrvapa-kṣikaranadarśanāḥ; na hi parasparaviruddham-
advayavalambanena dvābhyaṁ pravartitaṁ śastra-dvayaṁ tábyam 
aikamatyena ekasāstratayā kṛtaṁ iti kalpayitaṁ śaṇyam; 
dharmasaṁbādaś ca brahma-pratiko-tayā yāgadikarana-pratvena ‘pha-
laṃ ata upapatteḥ’ ity adhikaraṇe ‘dharma jaiminita eva’ iti sūtre 
prayuktāḥ; āpastambena ca mahārśinaḥ ‘dharma-dharmānu carata āvāṁ 
svāḥ iti na devagandharvā na pitara ity ācākṣate ayaṁ dharmo ‘yaṁ 
dharmo ity yat tv āryāḥ kriyamānaṁ prasaṁsantī sa dharmāḥ yad
The Meaning of Dharma

atha pañcamśi

asiddho 'yaṁ jaiminiyavaiyāsikamatayoḥ virodhaḥ, caturlakṣanyāṁ
kvacid api jaiminiyamatasya pūrva-paśikaraṇābhāvāt; yat tu
[239] puruṣartha-dhikaraṇe 'ṣeṣatvāt puruṣartha-vādo yathāneṣv iti
jaiminiḥ' iti brahmāpālāpaparam pūrva-paśaṇātram, na tat jaini-
nyabhimatasya pakṣasya anuvādakam, kim tu madīyasya-abhyuccaya-
vādasya; ata eva 'paraṁ jaiminir mukhyatvāt' ityādīṣṭeṣu
brahmābhyupagamenaiva pravṛttasya pakṣasya jaimiṇī-
śeṇārṇaṇa-vādāḥ; evam 'paramarṣaṁ jaiminir acodanā cāpavadaṭi hi' iti
sūtram samnyāsāpalāpasya jaiminīnā abhyuccayavādattvena upa-
yastasya-vānuvādakam, na tu tādyasa-dhāntasya; ata eva 'tad-
bhūtasya tu nātadbhāvo jaiminer api niyamadṛśāprābha-vēbhāyāṁ' iti
sūtre samnyāsastavaṁ samnyāsāt pracyutiḥ jaiminer api na sammataṁ
itya utkam; evam anyātrāpi tatra tatra virodhapihāra unneyāḥ;
dharmaśābdaya anuṣṭheyāśādharanyām api asiddham, 'ye ca
vedavo vīpṛa ye cādhyātāmavīda janāḥ/te vaḍantī mahāmānaṁ
kṛṣṇaṁ dharmaṁ sanātanam' iti mahābhārata bhagavatsā-
dhāraṇyo keḥ; ato virodhābhāvāt kathamāt virodhasadhaṁ
'pi brahmānabhyupagamāyāḥ dvādaśalakṣaṇyāṁ anuṣṭhitavāt dharmar-
śadāśādharāṅgac ca kāṛṭbhade 'pi aikāśāṣṭryāṅgikāre na kācīt anu-
papattih; tvādanaumānaṁ tu aprayaokam eva, anuṣṭheya-saṁyā
dharmaśābdāgrhītatvena jainiṇyāvicāra-pratijñā-vaśayatvopapattih iti.

[240] atha ṣaṣṭhī kākṣyā

yad utkam virodho nāsti, tad asiddham, brahmasaṃnyāsābhgyupag-
amābhupagamābhpyāṁ virodhasāprātyākhyeyavatāt, yat tu
jaimineḥ tadubhayābhgyupagamapradārahāṁ sūtram, tat tadahyup-
pagama eva tasya siddhānta ity asya jñāpakam iti na avadhārayitum
śaṁyāṁ, 'vīpratśedhāc cāsamanjasam' iti saṁkhyādāhikara-
noktyāyena jaiminimatasya pasparaviruddhātā aṇupāde-
yatvodghātaṇaparatvena anyathāsiddheḥ; yac coktam brahmāna-bhuyapagamatadabhuyapagamaikāntyādiṣu jaiminibādarāyaṇayoḥ virodhasadbhāve 'pi brahmānabhyupagamaḥ dvādaśa-kaṇḍḥṃ asūtritātvaḥ aviruddhāyaḥ tasyaḥ caturlakṣaṇyāḥ saha aikā-śāstryam upapadyata iti, tad apy ayuktam, aviruddhārthavāsiddheḥ; tathaḥ hi 'tasya nimittaparisthiḥ iti dharmapramāṇanirūpanam prati-jñāya prathamādhyāyena yat tatra pramāṇanirūpanam kṛtam, tat tāvad viruddham; tatra hi 'āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānārthakyaṃ atadārthānāṃ tasmād anityam ucyateḥ iti sūtṛena – āmnāyasya kṛtāṇvāpi prayaomaparyavasānāya kriyārthatvāvaśyambhāvāḥ atadārthānāṃ 'vayavyaṃ śvetam alabheta bhūtikāmāḥ' ityādi-kriyāvāyaṃapekṣitatayā kriyārthatvarahitānāṃ ānārthakyaṃ nispairojanaḥ [241] tvam, tasmāt akiyārthavāyajayataḥ apramāṇam ucyateḥ – ity etadarthakena vedesv arthavādaṇāṃ aprāmāṇyām āsaṅkaṃ, 'vidhinā tv ekavāyatyavāt stutyarthena vidhināṃ syuḥḥ iti sūtṛena – siddhārthavādānāṃ vidhiśākyaṃ ekavāyatyavāt vidhināṃ stutīrpeṇārtheṇa saprayojanāḥ syuḥḥ – ity etadarthakena teṣām vidhyekavāyatyāya prāmāṇyām upapādītaṃ arthavādādhikaranaḥ; audumbarādhikaranaḥ 'pi – 'uktam tu vāyāsaṃśatvam iti arthavādādhikaranaokṭhārtha-smārāṇena tad dṛṣṭhikṛtāṃ; dharmavicārapratijñāyāḥ brahma-vicārāsadhāraṇye hi 'tasya nimittaparisthiḥ iti dharmapramāṇani-rūpanaṣṭariṇāpi brahmāpramāṇanirūpāṇaśadāharaṇī syāt; tathaḥ sati akiyārthānāṃ ānārthāyasyaṅkāyāṃ keśāṃcide akiyārthānāṃ phalāsādhanayāgāvidhiśeṣatvena keśāṃcit svataḥphalabhūta-brahmapratipādakatvena ca prāmāṇyām upapadyata iti vibhajya pariharanteḥ; evam anyatraṃ pramāṇaḥdhyāyārthavirodho 'nu-samdhīyaḥ; tathaḥ 'vīpratipattau haviṣā niyametā karaṇas tadupākhyayatvāḥ ity aṣṭaṃkādhikaraṇe aṇdiraṇuprādaṇeḥu haviṣāṁśi-viṣyātyaḥ āgneyavidhyantaḥ, na tu devadāsamāṇyāt aṇdiravidhyantaḥ iti niṁṣaṅyārthe pravṛtte – devaṭāyāḥ śabdena uḍḍesyaṃmāṭrāraṣṭṛatvena guṇatvāt iti yuktih jaiminyabhimataḥ; tad api matam vaiyā [242] sīk-amataviruddham – vaiyāśikatantre devatādhikarane devatānāṃ yāgadeśe śaṃcidhānasya havirbhokṭṛtvā prādhanāsya ca sam-artheṣu tvam; tathaḥ 'codaṇā punar āraṃbhaḥ iti dvaitiyākādhikaraṇe karaṇaṃ apurvaṇā paḥlasādhanatvaḥ jaiminānā samarthiḥ, tad api 'phaṃ atā upapatteḥ iti vaiyāśikādhikaranaḥ viruddham; tadā karmopānanaprāśadītaḥ parameśvarasya phala-pradavataṃ śaṃcārthanaḥ; tasmāt śāstraṣṭra eva virodho 'sti; brahma-viṣyāṣāpaṃpraprayukto 'pi tayor asti virodhaḥ; tathaḥ hi – 'tat tvam asī ityādibrahamavishayāpi vākyāṇi jivaṃ brahma bodhayantūtī 'vidhinā tv ekavāyatyavāt – iti akiyārthānāṃ vidhiśeṣatvoktyā teṣām
atha saptam

asya jaiminyabhimatasya samanvay
devántesu upásanásamkáryatvenánuditasya
dharmasya svargaðibhoktryágávidhyáksiptadehátitatkártmarúpatvena
vyábhicaritakratúsambhandhitáyá taddvárá vákyapramáñena 'yad
eva vidyayá karotí' iti śrutipramáñena ca tásám kratúsambhandho-
papattéh na ca apahatapápmatvádíjiváśam [243] bhávita-
unámnáñena brahmáno jívád adhikatvasiddhe tádúpáśasanáñam na
kratusévatvarasaktir iti vácyam, akríyárháñamá vidhiśeṣatvaníyam-
asya jaiminyaabhímatasya samánvayádhikarañáena bhángam kṛtvá
vedántánám svátantryéna upákramádìtátparyálíngena ca brahma-
datguneśu pármányé vyávasthápite khálu apa-
tapápmatvádignáuñá jívádhikáma brahma sádyé, jaimínidrśṭyá téśám
vidhiśeṣatvé tathábhútágánumáranánapasyá jíva eva stútyarthat-
venánvayám ko váreyet; drśya té hi kratvanváyatattadvást-
asámząbhávitağánumáranám tattanmantrárthaśádése – yathá 'divam
greñá má lekhánti antaríksam madhyéna má himáih prthivá
sambhava', 'díyáṁ te dhúmo gagchatu antaríksam árciḥ pṛthivíñá
bhásmaná pránsva sváhá', 'apaḥaatapápmáno vā ṛtaṅhá', 'ápo vā idáṁ
sárvam' ityádiśu; evam brahmápalápe sáti tátprátyúpyáyah sámyáso
'pi apalapito bhaváti; ata eva kármánadákáriñá̄naṃ andhap-
ąngvádíná̄m káthamúci gatyúpanyásah sámyása iti mámsaka-
pravádaḥ; tasmát śástraor vírodho náśtíti ayuktam; dhármasabdasya
brahmásádhárayávacanám api ayuktam, 'te vádánti mahátmáñam
kṛṣṇám dhármansanáttanam' iti bháratavacanána dhármors vigrá-
haṅván rámaḥ' itívat stútyarthatvenápi upapattéh; tasmát madá-
umánañam na bádhí [244] tam, tvádanumánañ nam aprayójakam iti.

atha saptami

na távat bádhitaṃ madanumánam, púrvatántre práḿányapratítjñáyá
akríyáryáñam ánarthakynénaprámányasaṅkáyáś ca brahma-
parávyákasádhárayá 'pi, kriyáviśeṣártáhávádése vidihiśeśatvena sárthak-
atáyá práḿányaprákáraṃ uktvá, brahmáparávyáKayésvu svataḥ
purúsáarthabrahmáviśayatayá kriyáviśeṣéṣatvam anápeksya svata
eva práḿányam iti tátpráḿányaprákáraṃ anudghátya, tadvisaye
gúdhábhisamándhir áśít jaimínir iti prathamádhyáyodghátiávirodhaparíhárasambhavá; 'vprátipattau haiśá niyamétya' ity
aśátmikádhikaraṇasiddhánte devatáyá guñatváṃ na yuktih, dravya-

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syāpi gunatvāviśeṣāt; kiṃ tu ‘karmaṇaś tadupākhyatvāt’ iti sūtraśesoktaḥ – havistāgarūpasya yāgakarmaṇa haviṣhu upalabhyaṁnatvaṁ haviṣhāmāṇyaṁ balīyaḥ, hāvī hi tyajāmaṁ upalabhyaṭe, na devateti eṣāiva mulayuktīḥ – iti aṣṭamikādhibhakaṇanaḥvirodhaparīharaḥalabhāt; ‘codaṁa punar ārambhaḥ’ ity adhikaraṇe karmaṇaṁ dvārasadbhāvamātram uktam, na tv īśvara-prasādapratyakhyāṇena apūrvaṁ eva dvāraṁ iti samarhitaṁ iti tadvirodhaparīharaḥalabhāt; ‘vidhīnā tv eva kavākhyatvāt’ ity atra vāyukṣe [245] piṣṭhādivākyāṇāṁ eva vidhīṣeṣṭaṇva prāmāṇyaṁ uktam, na brahmaṁparavākyāṇāṁ iti; ata eva brahmāpālāpādiśaṅkāparīharaḥalabhāt bhīratavācanaṇāṃśeṇāra dharmāsābdasa yalaukikāśreyaḥsādhanamātṛavācitaḥ yārthasadāhāraṇyaśasmaṁbhave tatpra-vṛttinimitte vīhitātvānuṣṭhiyavādiśeṣeṇaṇaṇupraveṣeṇa brahmaṉaṁyār-ṛtaśaktikaiṇaṇasya gauravaparāḥhatatataḥ bhīratavācanaṇaṣayustyathaḥvaiṇaṇaṇupatteḥ; tasmāt na bādhitaṁ madanumāṇam, tvadanumāṇaṁ tu aprayaṇakam eveti.

athāṣṭamī kāksyā

prathamaṇādḥyāyārthavirodhhasamādhānaṁ tāvat ayuktam, ‘sāmaṁyapratijñānāprāmāṇyaśaṅkayoḥ sādhāryaṁ, keṣuṣaḥ akriyārtheṣu aprāmāṇyaśaṅkāṁ parīhṛtya keṣvesu gūḍhābhisaṃdhir asīt iti kalpanasyāpahāsyatvāt; yaḥ khalu vīdhyarthvādamantranāmadheyātmakavedasya dharmāprāmāṇyāṁ sapraṅkāraṁ upapādya śmrtyācārayor api tatra sāṃbhavat prāmāṇyaṁ upapādayāmaśa, sa kathāṁ jaimiṇiḥ brahmaṇapramāṇaṁvārasādāhāraṇyena dharmāprāmāṇaṁvāram pratiṇijyā brahmāparavāvedāntabhāgārpaṁhāvādaśādāhāraṇyena ānarthakyaḥ aprāmāṇyaśaṅkāṁ udbhāvya kriyāśe-sārthavādāmāṭre parīhāraṁ āḥa, na tu brahmaṁvaiṣavāvedāntarū-pārthvādēṣu – iti kathāṁ idam asāraṁ uprekaṇaṁ niṣyāvādaḥ [246] śraddhaṁhriṇ; kiṃ ca dharmāvīcārāpratijñāyaśas tamapramāṇa-vicārāpratijñāyaśa ca karmaḥbhṛmatadupāṣaṇādīśadāhāraye ‘anyānarthakyaḥ’ iti arthvādādhiṣkaraṇaṁpurvapakṣasūtrasaṁ pūrṇaḥyā sarvān kāmān avāppnoti ity ādikarmavidhi-phalārthavādavat upāsanāvīdhāphalārthavādāḥ api viṣayaḥ bhavyadhiḥ, tulyaṁ hi teṣā api anyānarthakyacodyam – yadi ‘sarvāmś ca lokān āppnoti sarvāṃś ca kāmān yaśaṁ tāṁ atmaṁ sarvādaṁ anuviṣya viyānāti’ iti prajāpatividhyāphalārthavādāḥ ‘pi vivākṣitārthah sāyāḥ, taḥri ‘sośnte sarvān kāmān’ iti kevalaṁ sarvakāmaṁvāpyarthatvena śrutānanda-maya-brahmopāsaṇā, ‘teṣām sarvēṣu lokēṣu kāmācāraḥ bhavati’ iti kevalaṁ sarvalokāvāpyarthatvena śrutā daharopāsaṇā ca vyarthā
syät; yadi uktopāsanābhīḥ sarvalokakāmāvāptisaḥitā muktiḥ, tarhi vasurudrādityamarutṣadhyatattulyabhogamātraprāptiṣahitamukti-
phalā madhuvidyā āgarhapatīdīlokatrayaprāptipūrvakamuktiphal-
opakosalavidyā ālokaviṣeṣaprāptitatratyabhogaharitakevalamukti-
phalākāsarādvyādīvyā ca anarthikā syät; yadi sakalavisayabhogo-
viraktaṁ brahmānandaikaprepsum upāsanādhiḥkāriṇaṁ prati lok-
aviṣeṣa-prāpṭiḥ tatrātyabhogaś ca na phalam, kim tu svvesitapha-
laprāptau antarayamātraṁ iti iṣyate, tada nirantarāvyāvīlambite-
psītaphala [247] prāpakatvena aksarādvyādīvyāḥ śrutaḥ iti atathāḥḥāt
madhuvidyādāyavāh nārtihkaḥ syaḥ; yadi aniyatakālārmbhatvena
yāvaivisthakatvena ca aniyatakālāparimāṇaḥ nyūnādhikagunāḥ
nyūnādhikavaraṇāśramadharmanugrhitāś ca sarvāḥ api bhramavidyā
aviṣṭaṁamuktiphalāḥ, tada guṇataḥ karmataḥ kālato vā adhikā
anarthikāḥ syuḥ; yadi 'niraṅjanāṁ paramaṁ sāmyam upaṭī' ityādayo
vidyāphālārthavādā vivākṣīṭārthāḥ syuḥ, tada mukter api va-
idhphalatvaprāptaḥ 'sarvebhāyaḥ kāmebhyo darśapuṇāmāsau',
'sarvebhāyaḥ kāmehbhyaḥ jyotiṣṭoṁaḥ' iti sārvakāmyāvākyayoh
tatsamāprāhakatvam api syād iti sakṛprayuktābhāyām
darśapuṇāmāsābhīyaṁ sakṛprayuktvam jyotiṣṭomēna vā muktisiddheḥ
sakalavānāsāramasāhityaṁ yāvaivistvam anuṣṭheyaḥ sarvāḥ api brah-
mopāsanāḥ anarthikāḥ syuḥ – ity evam anyāpamekṣaṭrasya sarva-
aviṣayatve ca sarvasādhāraṇena parihāreṇa sūtrītena bhavitaṁvam;
karmavidhyarthaṁvādāmātravisayavatvam eva ca pariḥārasūtraṁ
āṣyate 'sarvatvam adhiḥkārikāṁ', 'phalaṣya karmanispatteḥ teṣāṁ
lokavat pariṁnataḥ phalaviśeṣaḥ syāt' iti; tatra ādyāṣṭūrṇa 'vidyā
daphaṁsāḥ' iti pūrvaṭutraṁ prāṣaṁṣadāṇuvṛttiṣyuktena pūrṇahu-
tīvākyeṁ yathā kāmasārvavatvam, tat prāṣaṁśāmātraṁ, na tu śākṣāt
phalam, agnisāṃkārasya [248] ca pūrnaḥuteḥ phalaṁapekṣatvat, prāṣaṁśār-
tham upādiyamānakāmasārvavatvam adhiḥkārikāṁ, pūrṇāhutyananta-
ram agnisiddhau satyāṁ eva hi nānāphalesu karmasu adhiḥkriyate
purusaḥ; teṣāṁ phalaṁāṁ Siddhis pūrṇāhutyadhīneti tat pha-
saṁsravatvāṁ pūrṇāhutiphalatvena prāṣaṁśārtham upādiyate; na ca
agnisādhyakarmaphalāgraḥanaṁ sarvakāmāvāptisadānatayā
pūrṇāhutih prāṣaṁṣitum na śakyate, ākāśaṁgamaṁmarak-
anyālābhādeḥ agnisādhyakarmaphalatvābhāvād iti śaṅkyam, yataḥ
pūrṇāhutīvākyeṁ sarvatvam adhiḥkārpeṣaṁ – yāvat phalaṁātaṁ
karmavidhiyākṣeyev adhiḥkṛtam, tāvtya eva samkucitavṛti, sarvaud-
ano 'nenā bhuktaḥ – ityāda prakaranādīnaṁ samkocadarsanāt ity
ayam artha ucye; na ca ittham prāṣaṁśārthātvaṁ 'so 'ṣunet sarvān
kāmān' ityādiṣu ṛttrisatṛttrāhavādavat phalasamarpakaṇaṁ anigk-
artum śakyam; dvitiyaṣūtṛenaagnihotrataḥ svargasiddheḥ
iṣṭisomādyānarthakyam – ityādiśaṅkāparśikāraṇaya kṛṣṇāyena karmabhūyastvāt phalabhūyastvam ucyate; tatra śaṅkā tatvāt upāsanābhāge 'pi samānaḥ; tatpariharāḥ siddhāntabhāge na drṣṭyate; na hi tatra karmabhūyastvāt phalabhūyastvanyāyaḥ pravartate; 'tathā phalabhāvāt iti sūtroktam ucyamānaphalabhāvarūpām aprāmāṇ-yakāraṇam 'śobhate 'ya mukham ya evaṃ veda' [249] ityādikārmaṅkāṅdagataphalārthavādasya 'cakṣusyaḥ śruto bhavati ityādi-brahmaṅkāṅdagataphalārthavādasya ca sādhāraṇam, karmāṅkāṅ-dagatārthavāda eva parīhārasūtraṃ drṣṭyate; 'vidyā-prasāṃsā' iti viduṣo mukham evam gargaṭriṅātrabrahmaṇārthanapānenaiva śobhate, na vanītāṃkhaṇvalāṃyena iti vidyā prāṣayata iti; nāyaṃ pariharāḥ 'cakṣusyaḥ śruto bhavati itya atra pravartate, cakṣusyatvaśrutatvayoḥ 'yotirvidyāphalatvābhupagamāt; evam anyānārthakyādissūtrānām avarjaniye tattadupāsanāvidhiphalārthavādāsādāhāraye tattāsiddhāntasūtrānām karmāvidhiphalārthravadāvisāyaṇām eva grathane 'pi, jaiminē katvā pariḥārodghātanaṃ kva-cid abhisāmdhīnigūhanam iti evam gatyāśreyanam kasya nāpahāsyam; tasmāt atmopāsanānāṃ krutāṃśeṣavatārpaṇāṃ lokāsvaṃpāṇādvīt tatphalārthavādā avivaksitārthāḥ iti abhipreyta anyānārthakyāsāṅkā tatr pariḥāraṣ ca teṣu na pravartitāḥ; ata eva vedosāra vedānta iti vicārāmyābhāvāt asāratvābhhiprāyojai-minīyānām pravāda iti prathmādhyāyārthavirodhāsāmādhānaṃ tāvāv ayuktām eva; tathāvai aṣṭamākādhikaraṇāvirodhaṣāmādhanām api; tatra hi – haviṣo drṣyamānatve 'pi yāgaśyade-vatārādhanurūpatvāt devataiva prasannā phaladātri pradhānābhūtāt; athā [250] tatsāmāṇyām haviḥsāmāṇyāt baliya iti śaṅkānirā-kaṇaṅārthāṃ sūtram – 'guṇatvena devatāśrutiḥ iti; na caidat abhyuṣcayaparātanena yojāyitum śakyaṃ, navamādhāye jaiminē 'de-vātā prāyojaṃyed atithiḥvad bhojanasya tadarthatvāt iti sūtreṇa yathā atithipūjātmakam atithyam atithiprātyartham sat atithiprādhanām – evam devapūjātmakam yajanam api devātiprātyartham sad api devātāprādhanām, saiva ca prītā devatā phaladāṭritī pūrvapākṣam kṛtvā 'api śabdāpurvāt vayaṅkarma pradhānaṃ syāt guṇatvena devatāśrutiḥ iti sūtreṇa na devatāprādhanām yajānaṃ; tad eva apūrvadvārā phalajanaṃ; na tu haviṣa prītā devatā; tasyās tu dravyoddeṣayātā yāgopasarjanatvenaiva śrutir iti siddhānta abhidhāya, 'atithau tathāprādhanātvam abhāvā karmaṇi syāt tasya prītāprādhanātvāt iti sūtreṇa atithyavaiṣayam yajane darśitam – atithyam atithiprātiṣṭhānām – yathā atithi priyate tathā kartavyatayā vihitam iti tad atithiprādhanām yujyate, karmani tu nāsti prītīṣṭhānam – yathā devatā priyate tathā karma kartavyam
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iti; ato na devatāpradhānāṃ yajanam iti kaṇṭhata eva devatāpradhānyasya nirākṛtavyatvāt; etena ‘codanā punar ārambhaḥ’ ity adhikaranavi [251] rodhasamādhānām api nirastam, jaiminīna devatāpradhānye spaṣṭam nirākṛte ‘codanā punar ārambhaḥ’ ityadhikarane vyākhyātrbhīḥ vyavahṛtam apūrvam eva dvāram jaiminer api abhimatam iti avadhāraṇāt; brahma-tatprāpyarthasaṃśayaśāpalāpavirodhasamādhānam api ayuktam, brahma-viśayavākyānām kartṛṣaṃskāraraupakarmāṅgopāsanāviśayajvātmasvarūpasamārpaṇatvam abhyupagacchataḥ jainineḥ mate brahmāṇi pramānābhāvenaiva taddvāyāpalāpasiddher anīvāryatvāt; ata eva arthavādādhikarane vārtikakāraḥ ‘vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā’ ityādya rthavādānāṃ vīdhiśeṣa-tvasamarthanānāntaram uktaḥ—etena upaniṣadām api nairākāṅkṣyam vyākhyātām iti; yat tu vārtikakāraḥ vīdya kāraṇādhi-karane paramāntropāsanāviṣayatathāpavacanānāṃ udāhṛtya tāsāṃ svāntantreyena abhyudayanīhṛṣeyasādhanatvam uktaḥ, tat sarvadāh brahma-palāpabhiruṇāṃ teṣāṃ eva maniṣikāyā pravṛttam, na tu sūtrakāraḥ bhima-tatvayā, jaiminīva-viṣayāsikāsūtrānāṃ śphutavirodhasya darśītavat; yat tu pravṛttininīttagauravaparāhārārtham dharmāsābdasya brahmasādhārānyāvāsyaṃbhāvāt bhāratavacanasya stutyarthatvam na kalpyata iti; tatredam uttaram—addhā tasya stutyarthatvam na kalpyam, kim tu kṛṣṇastutipraķaranād eva siddham; tat dharmāsābdasya alaukikaśreyāḥsādhanamātravācītāyāṃ na nirva [252] hati; tad hi anuṣṭhātrtena alaukikaśreyāḥsādhanānāṃ ṽāvatmanāṃ nimittatvena tathābhūtānām anyeṣāṃ ca bahunāṃ dharmasābdah sādhāraṇa iti tadvācyatvoktyā bhagavatāḥ kā stutir labhyate; tasmād udāhṛtabhāratavacanasvārasyapradhiṣṭhārtham eva dharmāsābdasya yāgādikarmamātravācītvam anīkarta-vyām—dharmasamsthāpanārtham avatūṛṇo bhagavān sākṣat svayam eva dharmah ity uktyā stuto bhavati; astu vā yathākathāṃcit dharmāsābdasya brahmaṇy api vyṛṭtiḥ; tathāpi dharmajīñāsāśtroktāḥ dharmasābdah ‘dharmāṃ jaiminir ata eva’ iti sūtragata iva bhraṃvāyvrta eva grihyah, ‘codanālaksana ‘rtho dharmah’ iti viṣayatvena pratijñātasya dharmasya codanālaksanatvoktyeḥ; ‘cudaprereṇe’ iti dhātoḥ nispanno hi codanāsabdah pravartakavacanam ācaṣṭe; tasmāt codanā dharme sākṣat pramāṇam; tattacodanāsāṃśidhyāmāntāi siddharthabodhakāni vacanāni stutya-dvārā tattacodanākavāyakatyānāt tatra pramāṇāni; pradhānavi-dhyekavāyeyesa eva rātragratrayarthavādeṣu śrūyaṃpanāṃ phalaṃ vidhyapekṣītatvāt vivakṣitam; kartṛṣaṃskāratvena karmāṅgeṣu atmopāsaneṣu śrūyaṃpanāṃ tu phalaṃ vidhyaneṣeṣeṣvāt vivakṣitam ityabhīpṛyāyenaiva na teṣu jaiminīṇaḥ anyānarthakāyādi-
doṣaparīhāraś cintitāḥ; bhagavān bādarā [253] yaṇas tu kṣaṇīṣṇu-
sātiśayābhhyudayaḥpalam yāgaḍirūpaṃ dharmam eva saka-
lavedārtham manvānaḥ jaimiḥ upaṃdāyavagamitamahātāt-
paryasakalavedāntapramāṇakam brahma nityaniratiśayapuruṣārth-
arupamuktiphalāni taudupāsanaṇi karmanām tatsādhanaśahakāri-
bhāvaṃ ca nājñāsīt īty etat ālocya jaiminiyapāryālocanena loko mā
cāyam utābhavisyate hi yavahāya taḥāta brahmajanīḥnāsāʾ ityādiśastraṃ
gṛṇāṇāya īti asty eva jaiminiyābādadārāyaniyayoḥ śāstraḥ mahān
virodhaḥ; atah tayor aikāsāstryāsambhāvat bādhitaṃ tvadā-
numānaḥ, madanānumānaṃ tu nāprayojakam, kṣaṇīṣṇusātiśayapha-
lāṃ yāgādikam eva vicarayatvam pretiṭiṇātavataḥ tantri tadanyasya
vicarayatvagát; na ca karmāntyavte ʾpi yūpāhavaniyagodo-
hanādināṃ svarūpapramāṇādibhir vicāro dṛśa iti tadvat brā-
hmaṇo ʾpi devatātvena yāgādyanvayasadbhāvat hetvasuddhiḥ,
devatāyāḥ tyajyamanadravyoddeśyatve ʾpi tadvācakaśābdasyaiva
uccāraṇāṛṭhakṛṣṭirupānuśṭhānnaviṣayatvamānayasāhā dviṣā
tyatvābhāvāt; etena jaiminiye vicāryaparasya dharmāśabdasya
karmāparatvamānsākṣāt brahmāśparśiṃte ʾpi upāsanārūpakarmāpa-
ratvasyāpratyaṅkheyatāyā ʾtadviṣayapalārūpabrahmasparśitvam
avarjaniyaṃ iti pratijñāṣadhārayanyāt yathākathāṃcit virodham
avadhāya aikāśāstryaṃ [254] samarthanīyaṃ ity api śāṅkā nirastā,
dharmāśabdasya uttarasūtrajātaparyālocanayā kṣaṇīṣṇusātiśaṁyābhyy-
dayaphalakarmamātraparavasya uktatvāt; asti hi dharmāśabdasya
tathābhūtakarmāṃtrāt ʾpi vaiddikāḥ prayogāḥ ʾanyatra dharmād
anyatrādharmād anyatrāṃśmāt kṛtākṛtāt/anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc
ca yat tat paśyaṃ tad vadaʾ iti; ayaṃ kathavallmanaḥ kṣaṇīṣṇusātiśaṁyāphalasādhanakarmatatsādhyaḥpalaḥatsādhaka-
kartṛvīlayaḥasādhanāsādhanāsādhyaḥpalaḥatsādhakataḥ kartṛvīlayaḥa
sādhanāsādhanāsādhatrayapara iti matadvaye ʾpi samānāṃ; ʾtrayaṃ
ev ca caivaṃ upanyāsāḥ praśnaṃ caʾ iti sūtre pariḥ uktatarayalabhārthat ittham ayaṃ mantra vyākhyaṭāḥ –
dharmā ʾbhyaḥpalyaphalayāgādiḥ, tatoʾnyatra tadvilakṣaṇaṃ
dsādhanam, adharma dharmād itarāḥ tattādhyāḥ sargādir abhyu-
dayaḥ, tatoʾnyatra tadvilakṣaṇaṃ sādhyaṃ asmāt, buddhāsāṃhiniḥtāt
yāgādīṣadhakāt sāṃśārikaṇaḥpalaṇaḥvāt puruṣādy anyatra taddvi-
lakṣaṇaṃ sādhaṃ ca – iti yat tat sādhanādityaraṃ paśyaṃ,
kṛtākṛtāt bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ceti dharmādīnaṃ trayaṃnaṃ api
viśeṣaṃ, kṛtākṛtām prāraṇabhāparisaṃptaṃ yat prakāram ucyate,
tena bhūtābhavasādyavartamanāṃtakāt prasiddhasādhanādeḥ vi-
lakṣaṇaṃ sādhanādityaraṃ vada ity uktam bhavati; yad vā anyatra
dharmād anyatrādhamāt – iti prasiddhapunyapāpayor asādhanā-
prāṣaṇaḥ, anyatrāṃśmāt kṛtākṛtāt [255] bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ceti
bhūtabhāvishyadvartamāntakānītyasādhyetaranītyasādhyapraśnaḥ, sādhanapraśnasya tu sādhyapraśna evāntarbhāvaḥ, sādhaṃkṣaśīyāpi nityatvat; sādhyakoṭītvāc ceti; tatra adharmaśabdasya pāpe praśiddhasya dharmaṇāsvargādīphalatvena, asmāt ity asya kṛtaṃkṛtaviṣeṣanābhaṅveṇa pratiyamānasya vibhidyā svayam eva sādhaṃkatvena, kṛtaṃkṛtād ity asyātasmāt ity etadviśeṣyabhāvena pratiyamānasya dharmaṃdīvavātiṣeṣanatvena, bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca ity ātman prthāk anyatraśabdavyogat svantaṃtryaṇa pratiyamānolōḥ dharmaṃdīvavātiṣeṣanatvena ca yojanā kliṣṭeti prathamapraṇakāre doṣaḥ; dvitiyāpракāre sādhaṃprāśnālābho doṣaḥ, nityatvena prāpyakoṭītvena ca dvitiyāpraṇasāmgraḥitatiṣṭhābhavyupagme vāyādīphalasādhaṇāvilakṣaṇasādhaṇālābhaḥ vāyādīphalasādhaṇāvilakṣaṇāpi nityatvena bhūtabhāvishyadvartamāṇanyatvarūpasāmgraḥḥakakrocīkṛtavat, apahatapāṃpatvādyāvirbāviṣṭiṣṭatvena muktaṃvyeva vāyādīviṣṭatvena prāpyatvāc ca; tasmāt anupapānā prakīyā yojaneti, tām upekyā asmābhīḥ anyā rajī yojanā dārīsā, prathamapādēna yat balavadaniṣṭānaṃanyatvaṃbhāsṣaḥīṣṭiṣṭatvenāḥ, yac ca ānaṃbandhi tathābhūtaphalam, tadbhavyāvilakṣaṇam sādhanam upanyastam, dvitiyāpaṇēna ‘plāvā hy ete ’dṛḍhā yajnaraṃpā aṣṭādaṃsotam avarāṃ [256] yeṣu karma/etac chreyo ye ‘bhāṅgandanti mūḍhā jāraṃrtyu te punar evāpiyanti’ – iyādīmantrāntaranindītayāgādīsādhaṇāvilakṣaṇaḥ sādhaṇa upanyastah; tatra kṛtaṃkṛtād ity asya kṛtam apy akṛtam ākṛtaprayāṃ yasya tasmād iti vyākhyā, tṛtiyāpaṇēna vāyādīviṣṭaṃbhāvilakṣaṇam sādhaṃ upanyastam, tatra ca kārābhīyāṃ bhūtabhāvayānītvābhīyāṃ bhūtabhāvayābhāvākārasya vartmāṇasya samgrahāḥ, evam –

anyatraḥdharmaṃmanunāḥ prathitetaṃṣu
praṇātraṇye karaṇasādhaṅkatatpyaḥsveṣu /
padatraṇṇa suvace kramaś nibaddhe
kliṣṭante tām kim iti tatparayoganārtham //

iti madavaye ’pi tatra dharmaśabdah ksayiṣṇusāṭīṣayapalakar-māttrapara iti nivirvādam; kim ca tathāvīhāpyoṣagadarśānē ’pi agrimavyavahārānusātē tāvāṃmātraparatvam jainmīṃyapayo-gasya tāvān eva dharmo nānyo ’stiti bhṛāntikṛtā kalpayitum śakyaṃ; dṛṣṭam hi ‘athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāyōmah’ iti kaṇḍaṃsūtre vīcāryaparyāsy aṃsādhyapādasya agrīmaṃsūtāṃsaḥ kṃciddharma-monoparastvaḥ; agre hi yāgadhyānuṣṭhānapraṇakāro na cintitāḥ; kim tu sāṣṭhāḥdhyāye prathamāhnikē dhānapra [257] tīgrahadharmaś cintitāḥ, dvitiyāhnikēnā cāturāśramadharmāḥ kiyān api cintitāḥ saṃgraha-
तत्; तस्मात युक्तम धर्माविकारप्रतिज्ञानस्या ना ब्रह्माविकारसाधारणयम् इति सिद्धम्। अत्रायम् मतदवयसामक्षेपः –

जातिद्रव्यागुणंवयी धर्मतवम् ब्रह्मान्य ।’पि सामवेतम् /
तदुपासनक्रियाया निबंधदेहम् च धर्मतवम् ।/1/ /

tat sāksād gocarayed dharmāvicārapratijñānam /
svargādvid vicāryaṁ kriyāpālatavena va brahma //2//
ity aināsāstryam ubhayaṁ mīmāṃsāśāstryar yad āsthiṁa /
tatrasām apanetum tēsām pratibodhanam kriyate //3//
bhavatebhimarupayā brahma tattadvaco hi /
spraṭti yadi vicāryo purvaṇaṁpratijñāṇa /
kim iti na bhavita-vyayaṁ tadvičāraṁ tad āstām

nanu pariharāniyaṁ sarvdhāvā tadviruddhām //4//
lakṣasūtraṅgatacodanaṁpadan prerakaṁ vidhipadāṁ hi nojñhidh /
ākrīyārthavacāsāṁ anarthatām arthāvādanayapūrvapakṣatām //5//
arthāvādavacāsam anarthatā paryāhāṁ vidhīśeṣabhāvataḥ //
tat kim āgamavacāmni na spṛṣek codanāṁ tava samāṁ hi teṣy api //
nā spṛṣed yadi tato hi jaiminīṁ sa svayaṁphalaparāṇaṁ sutrayet /

[258] atra gudham abhisamādham alpadhīr asya kalpayati kena hetuno //7//

ittham guḍṭhabhisamādhiṁ kiyat tu visaye kalpanīyo mahaṁ
anyānārthahkayuktyādy api hī viphalaṁvkiyadūṣadhanāṁ te /
krīṇṇam dharmapramāṇaṁ kalayitum anasaṁ lakṣāṁ tanyoṁāne

smyṛtyācārāṁ tadvat sṛṣṭipatham agamat kim nu vedāntabhāgaḥ //8//
atra nibharam asākyasāṁvare prasphuṭe prapanva eva visvare /
śraddhāṁhita ka iheva tāvākiṁ aikamatyākṛtikatthānam tayoh //9//
aśṭama ca navane ca devatāṁ adhvareṣu guṇam aha jaiminīṁ /
svapradhāṇam atha biḍāraṇayaṁ tatraḥ u śrīmahāteṣaṇaṁ kā //10//

dvārāṁ yāgādānāṁ yad upuṭvaṁ devatāpradāṇaṁ iti /

vaisamyoṁ tatrāṁ pravartate naiva parihṛtiḥ kāpi //11//
tasmāt pūrvatvaṁ tantre kṣayaniyatapalāḥ kāṁkāryo vičāryo
dharmaṁ tatrāvaḥ vedāṁ sakalaṁ api munir jaiminīṁ mānāṁ uce /
etat karmakaniṁśhīr gurūṁkṛtaṁ aḥitaṁ tattvaṁ bodhayasyān

brahmaṁjaṁyāṁ suṁrāṁ akuruṁ bhagavāṇ puṇḍarikākṣa eva //12//
iti tāntrayor virodhe pradhaṁabhūtārthphalasamālambe /
jagrati na dhīṣu viduṣṣaṁ labhate padam aikāsāstryavārtāṁ //13//

ABBREVIATIONS

AB  Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
ADS Apastamba Dharma Śūtra
BAU Brhad Aranyakā Upaniṣad
BS Brahma Śūtras
CU Chāndogya Upaniṣad
KS Kāṭhaka Samhitā
KU Kāṭha Upaniṣad
MS Mīmāṃsā Śūtras
MU Munḍaka Upaniṣad
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TA  Taittirīyā Āraṇyaka
TS  Taittirīyā Saṃhitā
TU  Taittirīyā Upaniṣad
VS  Vaiśeṣika Śūtras

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