A. Introduction

Complex humanitarian emergencies have become a central issue for the international community, especially since the end of the Cold War. To a great extent, these emergencies share five common characteristics (based on Natsios, 1996: 67):

♦ The deterioration or complete collapse of both central government authority and (parts of) civil society.
♦ Episodic food insecurity, frequently deteriorating into mass starvation.
♦ Macro-economic collapse involving hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and net decreases in Gross National Product.
♦ Mass population movements of displaced people and refugees escaping conflict or searching for food.

The international community has been groping for an approach to respond to these emergencies.\(^1\) Practical results of peacekeeping often remain disturbingly unsatisfactory, even to such an extent that denunciations of peacekeeping and aid have become common. Hampson (1996: 205) observes in his study on nurturing peace-settlements that

The failings of humanitarian interventions and various international mediation efforts in Rwanda, Somalia, and until quite recently Bosnia-Hercegovina have tarnished the reputation of the United Nations and jeopardized public support for peacekeeping and third-party involvement in the settlement of intrastate disputes. If there is "new" conventional wisdom in some circles, it is that outside third parties have little to contribute to the peaceful settlement and resolution of such disputes and that intervention is desirable only when a conflict has reached a "hurting stalemate" and the parties themselves are sufficiently wearied by war to begin a search for alternatives to the use of force.
To make matters worse, there is an increasing awareness that peacekeeping, as well as humanitarian relief, may actually fuel and worsen the conflicts they are intended to solve (New York Times, February 27, 1999). Authors, like de Waal (1996), have produced searing indictments of humanitarian aid and its consequences. Reviewing Somalia (and other African cases), Maren (1997: 12) argues that "aid [can] be worse than incompetent and inadvertently destructive. It [can] be positively evil."

This paper attempts to draw lessons from the developments in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in the 1990s. It addresses some of the main practical and conceptual problems that have come to the fore, and it attempts to identify some of the current critical questions and possible directions of peacekeeping.

B. The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Aid

Before the end of the Cold War, states and the United Nations system were mainly engaged in a relatively simple form of peacekeeping. They essentially confined themselves to diplomatically engendering a cessation of hostilities and the employment of a neutral armed observer force as, for example, happened in Cyprus and South Lebanon. Ratner (1995: 9-24) calls this first-generation peacekeeping. In a similar vein, humanitarian aid was mainly supposed to be a one-time, short-term operation.

With the end of the Cold War, the nature of peacekeeping changed. The rapidly rising number of violent conflicts, largely intra-state wars, led to new forms of peacekeeping and an initial increase in humanitarian aid to stop the widespread suffering. This second-generation peacekeeping encompassed more than just a neutral, military intervention, it also took on rebuilding war-torn societies in the hope of preventing future conflict. A host of parties — international and national NGOs, the UN system, the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Red Cross system, bilateral development agencies, local communities, national governmental bodies, military organizations, and the media — and a wide range of activities — encompassing at the minimum demilitarization, humanitarian relief, political reconstruction, social reintegration and reconciliation, as well as economic (re)building — interact and all require urgent simultaneous action to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

Such peacekeeping thus combines elements of peacemaking in order to reach an official settlement and peacebuilding, as well as aspects of preventive diplomacy to avoid spreading of the conflict (Ratner, 1995: 16). It also involves the whole process going from humanitarian aid to regular development cooperation. Some observers argue that second-generation peacekeeping can generally best be seen as rebuilding with an essential security component (see Bush, 1996: 1). By necessity, it incorporates a more long-term development perspective than first-generation peacekeeping.

First-generation peacekeeping resembles the notion of negative peace, which is essentially the absence of violence. Second-generation peacekeeping is more closely related to the notion of positive peace, which is a situation where conflicts are resolved non-violently and the possibility of war has been eradicated (Galtung, 1996: 30-31). In other words, peacekeeping has become more ambitious. However, as the criticism shows, it still needs major practical and conceptual improvements to become more effective.

C. Practical and Conceptual Roadblocks on the Way to Peace

Looking back into the 1990s, it is possible to distinguish several challenges to which the internationally community had to respond. In some respects, its response either failed or faltered because it did not fully — want to? — understand and face up to four related challenges:

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2 This paper uses the terms humanitarian aid, relief, emergency relief, and relief aid as synonyms.

Neither the international community nor the UN system was prepared for action in intra-state wars. There was conceptual confusion as to what was happening and how to intervene.

A specific part of this confusion was addressed in the debate on the difficulties for linking humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and development in the so-called continuum approach.

The flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA) were decreasing.

The roles, relationships, and management of different types of organizations involved in peacekeeping and rebuilding were often ill-understood.

I. When and How to Intervene?

The wars that erupted after the Cold War presented new, unexpected characteristics. Their intra-state character made it difficult to determine on which basis international actors could intervene in — at least nominally sovereign — states. Most development cooperation was traditionally based on the premise of working with national governments. The question of how to remain neutral is daunting in daily practice with the conflicting demands and territorial claims of various parties, varying from local NGOs and local communities to rebel groups, when the government is either absent, weak, or illegitimate. What are actually legitimate claims and parties in a situation where the whole societal fabric is breaking down?

Originally, many of the armed conflicts were primarily dealt with from a security perspective. Yet, the emphasis on military interventions backfired to a large extent. First, massive military interventions in, for example, Somalia failed miserably. In addition to the bloodshed, local coping mechanisms were destroyed and local needs were insufficiently recognized. Second, development actors were sidelined, while it soon appeared that military actors generally could only play a small role in linking relief, rehabilitation, and development.

In the process, the international community edged closer to a looser conception of sovereignty. During the Cold War, states were carefully guarding their sovereignty and foreign criticism was routinely derided as meddling by outsiders. After the Cold War, the international community reasoned differently: "states with failing governments give up their sovereignty and place an obligation on others to intervene to save their people. At the urging of France, the UN General Assembly has established a rather weak right of 'humanitarian interventionism'" (New York Times, February 27, 1999). This form of interventionism is still evolving slowly and unequally from "security of state" to "security of people." Geo-political strategy and the strength of the national governments deeply influence the degree of intervention that states are willing to make. Hence, China and Mozambique get treated quite differently.

II. Linking Humanitarian Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Much of the debate on conceptualizing the links among relief, rehabilitation, and development occurred in the hope of placing these as discrete stages in a continuum. Initially, relief and development activities were carried out by different organizations. This made sense in the wake of natural disasters insofar as these were one-time events that caused a disruption of regular societal processes, but did not destroy the societal fabric. In these cases, relief organizations could usually focus on saving lives through relative short-term operations. This model, in which development could retake its course rather quickly, became the standard model for providing relief during and after conflict.

However, it soon appeared that this model was considerably less valid in the growing number of multi-causal complex emergencies that affected the lives and livelihoods of a skyrocketing number of people, mainly located in the developing world (Duffield, 1994).

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7 The difference between man-made and natural disasters is not always clear-cut. In the case of recurring natural disasters and/or a population that is already vulnerable, for example by moving into marginal lands or river basins due to overpopulation or environmental degradation, the wider social and political systems need to be taken into
Conventional forms of relief created dependencies: refugee camps became permanent settlements, or they became bases for rearmament, and food aid negatively affected local food supply and agriculture. Even worse, relief aid was increasingly used by warring factions as a resource in prolonging the conflict. Moreover, many of the complex humanitarian emergencies were protracted or recurrent to such an extent that they became (semi-)permanent. As a result, it became increasingly clear that in many cases short-term conventional relief was hampering long-term development processes by focusing more on the symptoms than on the causes of the disasters.

At the same time, prevention of armed conflict received growing attention. Even in situations of conflict, pockets of stability existed where regular development activities could go on. In other cases, development activities could be integrated into relief, for example by food for work, which could reduce some of the possible aid dependency.

Although there are great difficulties in getting a war-torn society back on its feet, the aftermath of conflict also offers new possibilities for positive change. Wood (1997) indicates that "post-conflict situations often provide special opportunities for political, legal, economic, and administrative reforms to change past systems and structures that may have contributed to economic and social inequities and conflict." Moreover, many initiatives of the local population are carried out independently — if not in spite of — the international donor community. Refugees, for example, have their own means of finding out whether they can safely return, by sending out family members to check the areas of (re-)settlement.

All this blurs the traditional distinction between security, relief aid, and development. It also implies that rehabilitation has often become the neglected stepchild in the competition between relief and development organizations (Moore, 1996: 1-6). In a similar vein, the lack of cooperation hinders a coordinated, or at least coherent, approach towards rebuilding war-torn societies in which short-term relief contributes to longer-term development goals. Indeed, an armed conflict is a major disruption of development processes, which themselves must already have been dysfunctional by leading up to the conflict. After such a conflict it is rare that the status quo ex ante can be re-established on instigation of external actors. In sum, the assumption that emergencies can be characterized by a continuum going from relief to rehabilitation to development, supposes a linear sequence of events through which the original situation can be restored, and it superimposes external assistance on the local fabric. It thus disregards the simultaneity of development and emergency situations, is "conceptually wrong" and can be "operationally misleading" (Stiefel, 1994: 15-22; see also Bush, 1996: 2).

Hence, relief aid, rehabilitation, and development cooperation need to be linked more closely. On the one hand, development should be integrated into relief. On the other hand, regular development activities should also address potential disaster vulnerabilities and contingencies. In sum, development organizations should prepare themselves for working in crisis environments.

Yet, a stronger focus on development does not provide a silver bullet, because development cooperation itself has not always been a success story (Ranger, 1996: 322-324). It is widely felt that development cooperation has too often lacked positive results. To a large extent this has contributed to a donor fatigue that heavily influences the ability of relief and development organizations to function properly.

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8 In addition, aid personnel were more frequently threatened and increasingly became victims of violence (Connoly, 1998: 6-9).
9 For examples, see Allen, T. (ed.) (1996). The experience of the War-torn Societies Project also shows that donors should not overestimate their impact.
10 Development- and relief-aid imply new availability and/or redistribution of resources. Since this can, inter alia, change the power balance in certain countries or regions, aid can also become a source of conflict. See for further analysis Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid, Cambridge: Collaborative for Development Action: Local Capacities for Peace Project, 1996.
11 Notice how the term continuum combines related, but yet analytically distinct concepts. On the one hand, it presumes a discrete continuation of the stages relief, rehabilitation, and development, and on the other, it basically assumes that development is a linear sequence of which a disaster is only a temporary disruption.
12 Duffield argues that crisis situations also reflect a crisis in developmentalism and its underlying modernist assumptions of continuing progress. In this sense, complex emergencies bring to light the dilemmas and problems
III. Shrinking Resources

This fatigue was accompanied by the failings in peacekeeping, especially peace enforcement, which caused a precipitous decline in confidence in the capacities of the UN system. As a result, the UN’s resource-base declined.

Some broad trends in funding, albeit with irregular counter examples, can be distinguished. The overall amount of ODA has been decreasing. Of this ODA, the amount spent on development cooperation is going down faster than humanitarian relief money. Until recently, the amount of relief aid was growing considerably. This trend has now been reversed, which means that many relief organizations will have to scale down their operations. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of funding for development cooperation has been transferred to humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. Within funding exclusively for development cooperation, multilateral funding has been decreasing more than bilateral funding. Within multilateral development spending the amount allocated to the UN is being reduced more quickly than that to the international financial institutions.  

These funding trends contradict the broader interpretation and goals of second-generation peacekeeping. One cannot escape the conclusion that many rich countries pay lip-service to the ideals of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, but are insufficiently prepared to make them work. Have they become too insecure after the public backlash against peacekeeping? Do they want to focus on the problems “back home”? Or are there other reasons for this contradiction?

IV. The Roles and Management of the Organizations Involved

1. Interorganizational Coordination and Competition

In a comparative case study on the success or failure of peace-settlements, Hampson questions the prevailing attitude that peacekeeping too often lacks success and should therefore be abandoned. He offers a more subtle explanation (1996: 233):

In instances where a workable settlement was reached, as in the cases of El Salvador and Namibia, third parties made a critical contribution to the peace process by helping with not only the negotiation but also the implementation of the agreement. In instances where the peace process clearly failed, as in Angola, failure was associated with a lack of adequate third-party support and involvement during the peace process.

In other words, third parties can contribute positively to peacekeeping, but they need to do so in an intelligent manner. Too little or wrong support wreaks havoc. But support in nurturing an initial peace agreement and sustaining support later in the implementation stage can help to consolidate peace! Moreover, Hampson (1997: 233) continues to make a case that

Third parties need other third parties if they are to work efficiently and effectively in nurturing the conditions for peace. No single third party alone had the resources or leverage to make the peace process work. In those settlements that did succeed, many laborers tilled the soil so that the peace process could bear fruit. The United Nations required the backing of great powers. Great powers needed the local support of a country’s neighbors. Regional actors and groups need the assistance of subregional groups. Governments and international organizations also required the active assistance and involvement of non-governmental organizations and agencies, particularly during implementation of the agreement.

Intuitively, this makes sense. In reaching an initial peace accord that holds long enough for subsequent implementation, many tasks, such as monitoring of cease-fires, refugee resettlement, election monitoring, and rebuilding economic infrastructure, need to be taken care of. However, none of the organizations involved can practically possess all the resources and capacities to carry out these tasks on its own. Moreover, outside help should only be intended to help the local...
population back on their feet, it should not impose aid on them. Otherwise, there is a huge risk that the forms of aid will not be internalized or create dependency. Consequently, local participation is key to successful peacekeeping.

However, many organizations involved in peacekeeping fail to cooperate adequately. Partly this springs from the three factors mentioned before:

♦ When the UN system enthusiastically embraced peacekeeping in the early nineties, it was insufficiently prepared. In particular, peace enforcement turned out to be much more difficult and dangerous than expected. The original emphasis on security and military intervention sometimes led to deterioration of the conflict. Moreover, the UN system suffered from over-extension (Weiss, 1998: xi). There were simply too many conflicts and an inadequate response capacity and resources.

♦ The traditional categories of security, relief, rehabilitation, and development cooperation reflect more the institutional make-up of the international donor community than the realities at the field level. The cultures and capacities of these organizations differ considerably and they often work in different phases of the peace process, so that cooperation is being hampered. Overcoming these functional divides is one of the main challenges for successful peacekeeping. For example, international organizations need to develop entrance and exit strategies in which they respectively take up and hand over work to other organizations, e.g., the roles of military personnel need to be complemented with regular development activities in agricultural development for food security.

♦ Most dauntingly, the types and number of organizations have proliferated, in particular, the number of NGOs has grown. While this offers a greater diversity in possibilities for support in peacebuilding, these organizations together with (inter-) governmental organizations also vie for media attention and concomitant funding from donor governments and the public at large. As a consequence, there can be considerable competition, which actually obstructs the peace process. When Médicins sans Frontières (MSF) left the refugee camps in then Eastern Zaire to punish Rwandan Hutu inmates for turning these camps into military bases, other medical charities took its place within a few days (New York Times, February 27, 1999).

2. **Intraorganizational Issues**

It should be acknowledged that many difficulties make successful service delivery in complex emergencies nearly impossible for the individual organizations. Resource shortages, continuing antagonism, cultural differences, and many other factors conspire against success. Yet, these circumstances may hide an even deeper cause that is rarely noticed: the internal design and roles of these organizations.

Multilateral and bilateral international organizations, as well as NGOs, work in situations with dual accountability. The paymasters, generally the governments, other institutions, or the public from the developed countries, are not the same as the final customers: the local population (which in complex emergencies is rarely homogeneous). As a consequence, most organizations involved have to cater to the needs of two types of constituencies: their funding sources and the local actors. In addition, international organizations are often hampered by international decision making, for example at international conferences, in which the final documents focus on what the final situation should look like, without a clear understanding on how this can be achieved by the organizations supposed to carry out the recommendations. Moreover, in virtually all cases priorities should ideally come from the local communities themselves in order to ensure follow up and self-reliance. However, these local actors tend to get lost in the maze of international governmental decision-making and fundraising.

Many instruments and assumptions of the management of these organizations contradict local participation. Through their organizational set-up, local positioning, use of professionals, and program/project approach, these organizations frame the situation in which the local population can participate (Craig, Porter, 1997; Maren, 1997). While this may be necessary to control organizational processes, it leaves many local participants with insufficient input in “their” rebuilding process. Examples include organizations that attempted to address local needs but failed to build on local capacities; aid organizations that were being accused of siding with one party or did not know how to position themselves in a new emergency; food aid that disrupted local markets
and farming opportunities, and so forth. In sum, there is conflict between control, as desired by central management and donors (and provided by traditional management theory), and local participation as desired by local actors.

In addition, many traditional assumptions from management theory do not hold in complex emergencies (compare Perrow, 1986: 3). As a result, participation and service-delivery are severely impeded, and a more regular development process cannot take place. Walkup (1997), for example, describes how international organizations through the coping mechanisms — including denial — and attitudes of their staff members become dysfunctional. A search for alternative organizational approaches is necessary! In particular, it is necessary to build effective bridges among the local parties and the international organizations to promote a common understanding.

In sum, responding to the challenges of peacekeeping and building organizational capacity, in particular in relationship with the local population, has been a tortuous journey for most organizations and requires far more attention.

D. The Search for Alternatives

In recent years, several attempts have been made to address these problems. PRODERE in Central America is a good example. It shows that alternative approaches to peacekeeping, though not always in the public eye, have already been in the making for a long time. PRODERE originated in 1989, and it stands for Programa de Desarrollo para Desplazados, Refugiados y Repatriados en Centroamerica (Development Program for Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Returnees in Central America). Its main objective was "to contribute to the peace process in Central America, by providing assistance to populations affected by military conflict to enable them to successfully resettle in their places of origin and by providing development support to the communities in which they live.”

PRODERE was active in the six countries of Central America. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua had all experienced civil conflict. Belize, Honduras, and Costa Rica had to confront the refugee flow and other consequences of these conflicts, such as missed opportunities for trade and development. About two million people had been forced to abandon their homes.

PRODERE involved various state institutions and NGOs in each one of the countries, agencies of the UN systems, such as the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). PRODERE received and coordinated special assistance from the Italian Agency for Bilateral Cooperation and the European Community.

The reinsertion of displaced persons, refugees, and returnees required the creation of the conditions of development. PRODERE promoted multi-sectoral programs aimed at expanding opportunities for access to health, education, and employment while supporting initiatives for the protection of human rights and the preservation of the environment. It used area-based, integrated, and non-discriminatory intervention — no discrimination between population groups such as displaced persons, refugees, repatriated persons, demobilized former soldiers, and the local population — which was hoped to “lay the foundations for sustainable and lasting development” by addressing the root causes of conflicts and increasing the number of beneficiaries.

Key to the PRODERE approach was the establishment of inter-institutional committees, which provided a mechanism for joint decision-making and simply bringing together local governments, state institutions, and most of all participants of civil society. An important part of PRODERE thus became developing the tools and types of committees in which the local participation could take place.

15 In cases of corruption, both organizational control and participation have gone awry.
16 Surprisingly, scholars of business and public administration tend to pay little attention to the organizations involved in these emergencies, whereas international relation scholars often neglect the internal management of the organizations (see Brechin, 1997, Dijkzeul, 1997).
17 The War-torn Societies Project is another example, which attempted to foster peace and rebuilding through an innovative participatory action research methodology.
population and NGOs could participate, also to be able to overcome social exclusion. The four main areas of attention for joint planning were:

♦ Local Health Systems.
♦ Local Education Systems.
♦ Local Economic Development Agencies.

All these areas knew a lack of state investment; therefore joint planning provided a mechanism for the local management of resources. This is important because development activities generally need to enjoy the material and moral support of the local beneficiaries in order to be sustainable. Joint planning also helped to overcome the innumerable legal, political, and institutional obstacles — that often lead to marginalization of local population groups — by creating consultation mechanisms, in which various social and political actors discuss options and adopt decisions, whenever possible, by consensus. In addition, efforts made to coordinate and connect the various projects made it possible to more clearly define overall and systemic problems and solutions.

Special tools for land-use planning were developed that identified some of the main economic constraints, as well as environmental problems. Sometimes, experts helped to develop social investment plans or socio-economic base-line studies. In some cases, this led to the foundation of small enterprises. In other cases, a clean drinking-water system was set up, or people were trained about their legal rights, schools were built, and so on. In particular, establishing land entitlements was a crucial and practical human rights issue for the returnees, who generally make a living from farming the land. For all four attention points there were major improvements for the local population. All in all, PRODERE reached over 1,500,000 Central American participants. It helped to rebuild the fabric of societies devastated by war, and it contributed to the decentralization of institutions and to democratic decision-making processes in Central America. From 1996 on, other development programs took over and conflict has not recurred.

PRODERE also provided inspiration for similar programs in Cambodia and Somalia, and it contributed to the intellectual capital of the Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability Division of UNOPS, which executes integrated rebuilding programs in many war-torn societies. Later developments, such as the Truth Committee in Guatemala, involved some of the same constituents and would probably have been difficult to conceive and carry through without prior PRODERE experience. It will be interesting to see whether the PRODERE mechanisms still function in the aftermath of hurricane Mitch or if they have deteriorated since.

Although much work remains to be done in Central America, there are useful lessons for peacekeeping in the PRODERE experience. It showed that peacekeeping and development activities need to be closely integrated. PRODERE used neither centralized state-planning nor did it just rely on the market to set priorities. On the one hand, traditional models of centralized planning often proved inadequate in terms of land-use management, development of local infrastructure, coverage and quality of basic services, and inter-institutional coordination. On the other, the "market" would not be able to carry out long-term social investments and generally does not focus on marginalized refugees and displaced people, who nevertheless need support and opportunities to voice their interests. PRODERE instead linked market forces, public bureaucracy, international organizations, and local actors (or broader civil society) with each other in a participative area-based manner. In this way, it attempted to strengthen local democratization, public investment, and private enterprise simultaneously in a more sustainable manner. PRODERE also provided a methodological bridge for UN organizations, NGOs, and public bodies to interact with the local population without antagonizing them or creating dependency. It also contributed to extensive coordination among donor organizations. Finally, PRODERE was able to function in six countries simultaneously.

E. Questions

Second-generation peacekeeping can be a long and arduous process, with failure lurking in an unexpected corner. Each operation is different, and the situational characteristics of each conflict make it hard to identify general trends. Moreover, many questions are still left unanswered.

The first one concerns the type and number of conflicts. In the early 1990s, the number of complex humanitarian emergencies increased rapidly. Later, it leveled off and started to decrease
slightly. The prospects for the future are unsure. Will, for example, the combined impact of economic deterioration, population growth, environmental degradation, and lingering, unresolved social trauma once again bring about an increase in numbers and intensity of these conflicts? In this sense, successful peacekeeping, including rebuilding and regular development cooperation, is key to preventing renewed outbreaks of old conflicts.

Second is the contradiction between, on the one hand, the broader concepts of positive peace and second-generation peacekeeping, and on the other, the decline in funding. It makes the degree of commitment of the industrialized countries questionable. It suggests that peacekeeping, despite the lofty language of local empowerment and participatory rebuilding, has actually become more political conflict containment than an effort to create comprehensive settlements to reach stability. In this respect, Duffield (1996: 156) sketches a "futuristic nightmare":

A world in which a vast and glittering wealth gap separates the [economic] core and crisis regions, in which dynamic areas are securely ringfenced [in particular from refugees], while those conflagrations within the seething hinterland that threaten core interests are policed by mobile and technologically replete humo-cops.

This worst-case scenario makes limited peacekeeping necessary to stem refugee flows and lessen media outrage, but it would fail to address the rootcauses of conflict sufficiently, so that they remain at best smoldering. In such a scenario, humanitarian aid would just be a stopgap measure. It would become increasingly stuck between an inability to bring about necessary change at the political level and violent escalation at the field level, which would lead to a worse lack of results. Hence, rich countries should carefully check their degree of commitment. With all the risks involved, reaching a peace settlement needs to be followed up by carefully supporting the implementation and consolidation process.

If third parties want to be involved in peacekeeping than a whole range of questions need to be addressed further. In answering these questions, the degree of local participation should be taken into account. Not just to identify local needs, but also to build on local capacities. It is particularly important to assess the initial lack of preparedness, how much it has improved and what still needs to be done. When and how should outside forces intervene? On which grounds? When is a conflict situation ready for intervention? How can such readiness be nurtured? When should outside parties leave?

Further, it is important to find new ways to link relief, rehabilitation, and development and to move beyond the continuum. Regular developmental aspects need to be emphasized in all stages of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.

Finally, it is important to address the interorganizational relationships in order to prevent or mediate competition. Furthermore, it is crucial to overcome the functional divides between (military) security forces, and relief, rehabilitation, and development organizations. How do these organizations hand over tasks and where do they need to cooperate? Does the appointment of a lead agency, e.g., UNHCR for refugees, foster sufficient coordination? Similarly, the sometimes conflicting relationships between NGOs and public institutions — national and international — need to be streamlined, while maintaining a variety of approaches. The PRODERE experience shows that in principle many organizations can work well together in an interdisciplinary manner. Internally, many organizations should check how their internal control mechanisms contradict local participation. Nurturing local institutions and strengthening their accountability to the local population is probably the most crucial and difficult aspect of humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding (see de Waal, 1997).

In sum, this list offers several crucial strategic questions:

**Strategic Questions on Strengthening Peacekeeping**

- How many and what types of conflict are currently developing? Do they share the same post-Cold War characteristics as those in the early 1990s, or are different forms of underdevelopment and marginalization leading to new conflicts?
- How committed are outside parties, in particular the rich countries, to peacekeeping? What financial and other forms of support are they prepared to make?
- How do the many parties involved foster local participation?
- When and how to intervene? Will the concept of sovereignty continue changing? What is the best moment to intervene? Is it possible to combine interventionism with impartiality?
- How can relief, rehabilitation, and development be better linked?
- How can the interorganizational relationships be improved? What are the entrance, exit, and
cooperation strategies? Is there a trade-off between a diversity of approaches and competition?

- How can individual organizations strengthen local participation while maintaining control over their own organizational processes?

This list is not exhaustive, nor will the answers always be the same for each peacekeeping operation, but answering these questions in a coherent manner can make many incremental contributions to successful peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.

F. The Role of the European Union

It is ironic that some of the same trends that foster European integration, such as the integration of free markets, nation states, and information technology, also contribute to the disintegration and marginalization of countries that do not succeed in participating in these trends.

In addition to moral concerns and a desire for peace, the European Union has several practical grounds to be involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in war-torn societies. Some of the countries in conflict are former colonies of European Union member states. It is remarkable how much member state ODA is still going to former colonies and overseas territories (OECD DAC, 1999, table 34: A69-A84). In addition, some conflicts happen in the backyard of the European Union, e.g., former Yugoslavia and Cyprus. An inability to solve these conflicts would mean a loss of confidence in the functioning of the European Union, as well as an increase in refugees and a loss of economic opportunities. In particular, the combination of increasing refugee streams and immigration with (growing) xenophobia, as well as a danger of importing local conflicts, e.g., the Turks and Kurds, is something that many European governments are afraid of. Hence, one can make a case that enlightened self-interest requires a European approach to humanitarian aid and peacekeeping.

Currently, 18 per cent of European ODA is channeled through the European Union (OECD DAC, 1999: 107-108). Can the European Union gain credible political clout that helps to bring about peace settlements? Will it follow up in implementation and consolidation? How deep goes the commitment in the European Union to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid? In this respect, the Union has to answer the questions identified above. None of the answers will necessarily lead to a typical European approach in peacekeeping and aid, nor will they warrant any success. Also in Europe do peacekeeping and humanitarian aid require intensive care to become successful.

G. Conclusions

In the 1990s, peacekeeping moved from a limited involvement to stem violence to second-generation peacekeeping. Rebuilding became a more important aspect of peacekeeping. The role of state sovereignty declined and many non-state actors, such as national and international NGOs, expanded. Local, integrated, area-based development received increasing attention. The results of peacekeeping, in particular military peace enforcement, were mixed. Successes in Central America and to some extent Southern Africa, Cambodia, and Kosovo, were counterbalanced by the tragedies and atrocities in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, West Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Still, as the PRODERE case showed there is no reason to be too negative. Much is possible, but peacekeeping requires careful, ongoing support from several third parties.

Originally, the international community was ill prepared to deal with intra-state conflicts. It was and is difficult to determine when and how to intervene. In addition, lack of resources, the continuum debate, declining confidence in and support for peacekeeping (and the UN system), inter-organizational misunderstanding and competition, and internal set-up of organizations

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21 A recent OECD/DAC peer review commended “the EC’s peace-building and related activities.” It will be interesting to find out what the details of this peer review, as well as the follow-up, have been.

22 Some older Dutch diplomats still regret that the growing European integration in the early 1970s increasingly tied Dutch development cooperation and influence in the UN system to that of Germany and France. These diplomats felt that their policies, under the influence of Jan Tinbergen (Noble prize winner in Economics, 1969), were in the
involved hampered the actions of the international community. These factors also made the necessary participation of and accountability to the local population far more difficult.

This paper identifies several questions on the future of peacekeeping. These questions are also important for the European Union. This book offers state-of-the-art discussions on these questions and related topics. Some lessons have been learned during the past few years, but daunting challenges still confront the world community.

Bibliography


