The Big Questions

▶ What accounts for the variation in the strength of state structures?

▶ What accounts for Africa’s slow economic growth?

▶ Why do some African countries suffer from high levels of political violence while others are spared?

States

▶ Who controls them?
  • “A continent where authoritarian rulers dominate.” BBC 20 Mar 2000

▶ What is their reach?
  • “The cities of West Africa at night are some of the unsafest places in the world. Streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate. The government in Sierra Leone has no writ after dark,” says a foreign resident, shrugging.” Kaplan

▶ What do they do?
  • “While neopatrimonial practice can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa.” Bratton and van de Walle 1994.

▶ How do they change?

Contemporary African Politics

Macartan Humphreys
mh2245@columbia.edu

The Global Picture

Studying Africa

▶ “In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence—as for example, God, or Law [...] The Negro [...] exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. [...]”

At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit.”

Hegel. The Philosophy of History. 93, 99 Lectures of 1830-1831

States

“There is no number two, three, or four... There is only a number one: that's me and I do not share my decisions”

Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President of Cote D’Ivoire

“A continent where authoritarian rulers dominate.” BBC 20 Mar 2000

The cities of West Africa at night are some of the unsafest places in the world. Streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate. The government in Sierra Leone has no writ after dark,” says a foreign resident, shrugging.” Kaplan

While neopatrimonial practice can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa.” Bratton and van de Walle 1994.
Executives

Polity Score

Arguments

- It's just the way Africans are (and more nuanced culturist explanations)!
- No, it's because of the colonial legacy! Irrelevant national borders, imported institutions and a history of extraction!
- No again! It's because of external influences after independence, manipulating and crippling African elites.
- No! It's just geography. The place is just too hard to rule

Economic Development

Global Growth

Real GNP per capita (PPP) growth rates, 1980-98

Source: Maddison (2001)
Economic Structures

Source: McArthur and Sachs (2002); WDI (2002); IMF (2002)

Poverty

The Math

► WOMEN: 85000 kg-km / year
► or \( \frac{85000}{365} > 200 \) kg-km per day
► or > 10 kg load for 20 km per day
► 5 hours per day

Real Implications

00’s hours of time per year  ton-km per year

Urasa, 1991, data for Rural Tanzania

Infant Mortality

MDG Top Priority and High Priority Countries
Key Questions
► What explains the poor growth?
► How do some areas succeed while others fail?
► What are the linkages between democracy and growth?
► What explains the prevalence of AIDS in Africa?
► Will pan-African initiatives help economic growth?

Arguments
► It’s neo-colonialism!
► No! It’s policies!
► No again! It’s institutions!
► No again! It’s geography!

Key Questions
► Why do conflicts start?
► Why do rebels join?
► What keeps them going?
► How is peace achieved?

The Extent of Violent Conflict

Source: PRIO
A Continent at Peace?

- Sudan
- Liberia
- Burundi
- Cote d'Ivoire
- Congo.

Explanations

- It's external: the fault of the cold war and IMF-World Bank structural adjustment!
- No! It's *poverty* and inequality: overpopulation, environment stress, and "relative deprivation!"
- No! It's *wealth*, and greedy rebels trying to get their hands on it!
- No again! It's weak states crippled by export commodity dependency!

The Syllabus

Coverage:
- Precolonial politics in Kenya and Sudan
- The Belgians in Rwanda
- Zambian Independence
- The British in Ghana
- Social Order: Experimental Evidence from Kenya
- Nkrumah and the Johnson Administration
- The Zambia-Malawi border
- Race and Genocide in Rwanda
- Nigerian Trade Unionism

Themes

- The human diversity of the continent
  - History and Explanation
- Africa and political science
  - Questions Asked
  - Methods Used, Methodological Diversity
- Approaches
  - Individual level and Structural approaches
  - Elite level and society level approaches
  - The rational and the irrational
- Internal and International forces
Requirements

► Lectures
  • Guest Lectures

► Media
  • Radio and Films

► Your Expertise
  • EIU, networks

Requirements and Resources II

► Reading
  • Online, libraries, course pack

► Vignettes (10 Minutes):
  • Stories: Movements, myths, extravagance
  • Investigative Research
  • Insights

Quiz (3 February):
  • names, locations and capitals of all countries
  • name of all heads of state

Requirements and Resources III

► Section:
  • Come with questions and arguments
  • Use the resources in the room

► Papers:
  • Undergraduates: 3 papers
    ► Due: 27 February, 2 April and 7 May 2004
  • Graduates: Research Paper
    ► Due: 7 May 2004

Key Questions

► What sorts of states were there in Africa?

► What is the distribution of states and stateless societies like? How are they characterized?

► How do stateless societies function? Role of ethnicity, religion, economics.

► Why do states form?

► What lessons are there for contemporary African states?
Precolonial States
► “Africa was an archipelago of loosely defined political systems: a world of societies rather than states and far more recognizable to anthropology than to international relations” Robert Jackson 1990

States and Stateless Societies
► Stateless societies account for perhaps 25% of African population at beginning of colonial period (Curtin, p71)
► But...Bias against studying stateless societies
  ▪ Normative Baggage: Kenyatta, Nkrumah
  ▪ Practical Obstacle: fewer records, written or oral, shorter genealogies
► And...The Distinction is Flawed
  ▪ There always exist some institutions. Many “hierarchical democracies.”
  ▪ Markers: absence of permanent bureaucracy, authority over public decisions not-permanent, diffuse and temporary. Gikuyu?
  ▪ Contra Kenyatta: Not size. Tiv system: c. 1 m people during colonial period

Ayittey Model
States: Ayittey Model
► Consensus
  ▪ Silent Chiefs; Require consensus
  ▪ “The very origins of African democracy lay in ordinary oral discussion—the Elders sat under a tree and talked until they agreed” Nyerere
  ▪ Arbitration and Dispute Resolution through Consensus
  ▪ Organizational structures based on kinship and ancestry; largely centered on ethnic groups
  ▪ Deposable Live-In Leaders
  ▪ No written constitutions
Empires and Trading Kingdoms

States
Aksum: “SSA’s First Indigenous State”
- 100 to 700 CE
- 20,000 in the city c 500 CE
- **Literacy**: Written script: Ge’ez
- **Agriculture**: Possibly developed the plough independently, irrigation, terracing
- **Trade**: with Persia and Rome
- **Stone Building, Tombs, Sculptures**;
- **Coinage**: (Only African Coinage up to 10th C)
- **Religion**: 3rd century CE coverts to Christianity (Sheba, Solomon and the Ark)
- Very unequal
- **Conspicuous Consumption**: … they also brought us coffee

Why Aksum?
- **Elevation**: 50% of 2000+m landmass
- Reduced risks of malaria, sleeping sickness (trypanosomes), bilharzia
- Tse-tse fly absent
- Good rains (Previously Two Rainy Seasons)
- Ecological diversity: Teff, low risk crop

Location
- Trade possible (Gold, Ivory, Incense, Obsidian)
- Technological Benefits from Red Sea links, e.g. the plough (maybe)
- Insulated

Aksum’s Decline
- Collapse by 8th century
- Environmental Degradation; Woodlands stripped, soil nutrients washed away
- Conflict in Middle East cut off trade routes
- Climate Change, bad rains

• Ghana: c 300-1087 (sometimes: 700-1240!!)
• North South Trade, Salt for Gold
• Later, slaves for manufactures and horses
• Several million people
• 200,000 strong army (1067 CE)
• Decline: Eventually loses monopoly on Gold
Empires and Trading Kingdoms: Mali
- 1230–c 1400 (although continued in smaller size to 19th c)
  - Previously a state in Ghana.
- Founded by Sundiata Keita
  - Succession decided by royal officials. Choosing lineages
  - Became 2nd largest Empire in the World (after Mongolia)
- Mansa Musa, with 60,000 people on hajj from Timbuktu
  - 500 slaves each carried a 4 lb bar of gold.
  - Depressed value for 10 years
  - 10,000 mounted cavalry (1324 account)
- University of Sankore at Timbuktu

Empires and Trading Kingdoms: Songhai
- 1468-1591 previously a state in Mali
- Becomes largest African state under Askia Muhammad (coup)
- Very centralized government
- Eventually attacked and destroyed by Morocco

Great Zimbabwe (13-15 C CE)

Characteristics
- Urbanization
- Bureaucratic centralization
- Standing Armies
- Hierarchies
  - Sometimes Assimilation: Mandinka, Fulani, Hausa, 18 and 19th C Islamic Empires.
  - Sometimes despotic: Shaka Zulu, Mossi States
  - Typically trading, often in slaves
  - Exception: “city without citadels”: Jenne-Jeno
- Difficult Secessions: Often Civil War over succession (Kanem)
- Nebulous Boundaries

Stateless Societies: Ayittey Model
Ayittey Model: Stateless Societies

- Council of Elders
- Formed from Lineages
- Village Assembly

Examples
- The Nuer: 200,000 people, 30,000 sq miles, Segmentary Lineage System
- Berber groups
- Tiv of Nigeria
- Igbo

Chief
- Council of Elders
- Formed from Lineages
- Inner Privy Council
- Village Assembly

The Igbo

- Highly decentralized
- No chiefs or kings (although tradition of Nri)
- Decision-making at village level with some inter-village consultations
- However, had slaves (ohu)
- Some influential age groups, lineage headships

Igbo Gender Politics

- Patrilocal, Exogamous
- Women’s meetings and market associations: Mikiri
  - Set prices, fixed fines etc.
- Actions against men for poor economic or domestic behavior:
  - Targeted Actions: “Sitting on a Man”
    - “Gathering at night, dancing, singing scurrilous songs... calling his manhood into question... perhaps demolishing a hut”
  - General Actions: Boycotts and Strikes
    - Cooking Strikes
    - Walk outs...
  
  Judith Van Allen, "Sitting on a Man"

Igbo II

- “The men... were very angry because their wives were openly having relations with their lovers. The men... met and passed a law to the effect that every woman... should renounce her lover and present a goat to her husband as a token of repentance... The women held secret meetings and, a few mornings later, they went to a neighboring [village] leaving all but suckling children behind them... [The men] endured it for a day and a half and then they went to the women and begged their return... [The men gave [the women] one goat and apologized formally and informally.”

J.S. Harris: The position of women in a Nigerian Society
Stateless Societies

► Fiercely Individualistic, Egalitarian
  • Although there were aristocrats, Nuer had Dinka and other captives
► Inter-generational Aspects: Gerontocracies
► Few or weak physical boundaries
► Law based on oral tradition
► Weakness of Stateless Societies:
  • Few large collective projects: infrastructure, security of trade, armies
  • Easy to Conquer in Pieces (But Hard to Rule)
► Demonstrate that order is possible without a state
  • Norms for decision-making and implementation existed

Some Explanations

Explanations 1: Order Without States
Decentralized Decision-making and the Problem of Collective Action

► Simple Games of Common Interest
  • The decision to leave a building once a fire starts
► Games of Pure Coordination
  • What side of the street to drive on?
► Games of Pure Conflict “Zero Sum Games”
  • Ping-Pong. Taxes-Production-Redistribution?
► Games with Mixed Motives
  • The Prisoners’ Dilemma

Example. Sharing the costs of providing a public good: an irrigation project on neighboring farms.

If nobody invests, they each earn 3. If anyone invests, the cost is 5, the return to each party is 4. Hence:
  • The private return is –1
  • The social return is 3.

Example 2. “Use Force” or “Don’t Use Force”

What will the outcome be?
What if they make their decisions sequentially?
What if they play this game twice?
What if they talk first and reach a decision about how to play?
Explanations 1: Order Without States
Decentralized Decision-making and the Problem of Collective Action

Solutions?
1. **Compensation**: We can work out how much compensation is needed to prevent somebody from “shirking”
2. **Arbitration**: “The Leopard Skin Chief”:
   (a) Forces farmers to take social considerations into account.
   (b) Facilitates communication: a go-between in bargaining

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Explanations 1: Order Without States
Decentralized Decision-making and the Problem of Collective Action

Solutions?
3. **Contingent Use of Force**: “If you hurt me, I’ll hurt you back…”
4. **Religious Beliefs**: Curses (Casamance Case)
5. **Cross-cutting Ties** (Gluckman) and Segmentary Lineage Systems: “My pain is your pain…”

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Explanations 2. The Logic of Gerentocracies

► Overlapping Generations Games

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Dickson and Shepsle 2002

Explanations 3: State Formation

► Supply side arguments: Predatory States
- Patrimonial
- Usufruct

► Demand-side arguments:
- Decentralization Inefficient
- Avoid Feuding
Explanations 3: State Formation

► Wealth
- Provides base for urbanization
- Requires protection

► Trade:
- Produces joint interests
- Produces demand for peace
- Requires centralization, specialization, investment and protection

► Coercion technology and manageable terrain
- If you do not rely on consensus
- Population Density and Geographic Distance
- Depends on technology:
  - Transport infrastructure—Ashanti empire and the King's highway. Fanti constitution, 1871.
  - Guns. Strengthened 19th century Akan empires but late coming.
- Exit Opportunities

Explanations 3: State Formation, Evidence

► The more centralization, the less feuding

► Demand side:
- The more long distance trade (concentrated capital), the more centralization
- The more "civilian centralization," the more private investment
- No relation between investment and military centralization

► Supply side:
- More trade associated with more public revenues
- States almost always hold monopolies and extract rents

Weak evidence for soil fertility

4. Explanations: Accounting for Size

► Population Density and Geographic Distance
- Land not central to value systems—few fixed investments.
- Value is in people; but people move!

- No international formal state system to help police border.

The Role of Geography

Myths? 1. Democracy is Alien to Africa

► "Democracy is not for Africa. There was only one African chief and [so] here in Zaire we must make unity" (Mobutu, WSJ 14 Oct 1985)

► "There is no number two, three or four...In Cote d’Ivoire there is only a number one: that’s me and I don't share my decisions." Houphouet-Boigny (WA 8 Aug 1988)

Myths? 2. Socialism is Indigenous to Africa

► Nyerere, Nkrumah: African Socialism follows from:
  • The extended family system
  • Traditional communal ownership of the means of production
  • Absence of individualistic or class economic conflict
  • No organized opposition
► But: Private ownership and no controls on markets; tolerance for disagreement. … (Ayittey)
  • Slavery
  • Free movement of capital and labor
  • No currency control (and subject to the importation of Cowries)

Myths? 3. Military Rule is Traditionally African

► "An exhaustive study of indigenous African political systems does not reveal soldiers or men in uniform serving as chiefs or heads of village governments. The heads of these governments were always civilian" (Ayittey 1991)
► But: While warrior class often distinct from political class—sometimes by generations many heroic leaders were military, notably Sundiata Keita and Shaka Zulu

Compatibility with the Modern State?

► Weak Emphasis on Territory, Few Hard Territorial Boundaries: People matter more
► Joint Jurisdiction Over Land: Unbundling of ownership and control
► States within States: Largely decentralized control
► Kinship relations central
► Interstate competition: When states grew poor they disappeared

Colonialism: The Scramble and Colonial Rule

► I When did it happen?
► II Why did Europe do it?
► III How was it achieved?
► IV How Did Europeans govern Africa (French and British Styles)?
► V Did Europeans govern Africa?

Lecture III: Colonization 11.7.1911

"I know their game. First traders and missionaries, then ambassadors, then the cannon. It's better to get straight to the cannon." (Ethiopian emperor Tewodros II: in Davidson, 1978, p. 75)
I Pre-scramble colonial possessions

- Portuguese: The first to arrive, the last to leave.
  On West Coast from 15th C. In Senegal c. 1441
  - Established fortresses
  - Slaves, Gold, Ivory
- Britain controlled coastal parts of Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and regions around Bathurst and Lagos
  - Controlled Senegal, Goree: 1765-1779
  - British war against the Ashanti (1863-64, 1874)
- France: regions around Dakar; 1626 Compagnie Normande. Campaigns in Senegal (1854-65), in Gabon (1843-44)

I The Triangular Trade

I Pre-colonial Intervention

I Mid 19th Century

- Very slow to move. Britain refused Earl Grey’s requests to build roads into interior of Gold Coast. Did not want to maintain older network
- British attempted to limit expansion beyond “5 miles of canon shot from forts”
- 1865: Resolution for withdrawal of British forces (see Document 11)
- Colonies were expensive, troublesome, unhealthy

I Late 19th Century U-Turn

- Leopold’s Hunger for Colonies
  - The Berlin Conference 1884-1885
    - To legitimize present claims
    - To organize rules for new claims
    - No Africans invited
  - Positions
    - British position: minimalist responsibilities
    - German position: “future powers occupying territory [...] should have no legal claim to it unless they exercise strong and effective political control.” Treaties count as proof.
    - Why?
  - Berlin enabled the Europeans to conquer Africa while doing as little as possible to control it

I Berlin Conference (ctd)

- “Effective occupation” focused on coasts. Everything else was “hinterland”
- France tries to claim that northern Nigeria is Algerian hinterland
- To minimize involvement Britain used a politics of exclusion rather than control:
  - “Our policy may for the present chiefly assume a negative character. So long as we keep other European nations out, we need not be in a hurry to go in.”
  - British Vice Consul of the Oil rivers Protectorate
II Moral Arguments
► Take up the White Man's burden
Send forth the best ye breed
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild
Your new, caught, sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.
Rudyard Kipling 1899 (Written for Americans after Admiral Dewey takes Manila)

II More Moral Arguments
► Make better use of the land (Locke)
► Stop savagery; human sacrifice
   ▪ Illustrated London News. 26 July and on 8 and 29 November 1873, under the headline "The Gold Coast and Ashantee War" Juju house and human sacrifices.

II Moral Arguments [Go ye afar!]

II Extending Civilization
I contend that we are the first race in the world, and that the more of the world that we inhabit the better it is for the human race. I contend that every acre added to our territory means the birth of more of the English race who otherwise would not be brought into existence.
Cecil Rhodes 1891
II But: The Record

 ► Massive Abuses

 ► Miserable Development.
   Illiteracy rates in Portuguese colonies 1959 (after 500 years of Portuguese Presence):
   - Mozambique: 98%
   - Angola: 97%
   - Guinea Bissau: 99%

II Economic Arguments

 ► Security
   - Keep sea routes to India open; Egypt, South Africa
   - Protect commercial in-land interests (Manchester firms)

 ► Trade and Investment
   - Colonialism allows for direct protection of property rights (Frieden)
   - Competitive Monopolies (See Document 12)
   - Monopsonies (Cotton)
   - Chamberlain, colonial secretary 1895: we should “try to make a business of the tropical African fields which others had staked out mainly with an eye to security”

II Economic Arguments: But...

   - < 5% of UK trade involved Africa and this mostly Egypt and S Africa
   - Minimal investments, even in cotton
   - 19th Century Popular opinion is anti-colonialism. “Economic gains can be made without conquest”
   - Merchants sometimes opposed colonial conquests, as in Zanzibar, for fear that this would disrupt trade
   - Colonies had a hard time supporting themselves!

II New nationalism

   C is for Colonies
   Rightly we boast,
   That of all the great nations
   Great Britain has most

   Mrs. Ernest Ames, ABC par Picciol Patrioti, 1899

 ► Belgium Motivated by the Dutch Example
   “Volksimperialismus” in Germany
   Africa a safe place to defuse Rivalries among European states (Doyle)
   Nationalism could serve to neutralize class conflict in Europe

II Economic Arguments

 ► Military Benefits
   - 40% of French forces in the Crimean war (1854-56) were Africans
   - Africans fought for the French in Mexico in the 1860s and in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71
   - 211,000 African troops deployed by French during WWI

II Who Benefits?

"Like a succubus Africa weighs on Europe's rest. One of the numerous malaises (but perhaps the heaviest) which now burden the old continent. Each European power has here its obstacle or hornet's nest. Le Rire (18.v.1896),"
II Who Benefits?

► "Seeing that the Imperialism of the last three decades is clearly condemned as a business policy, in that at enormous expense it has procured a small, bad, unsafe increase in markets, and has jeopardized the entire wealth of the nation in arousing the strong resentment of other nations, we may ask 'How did the British embark upon such unsound business? The only possible answer is that the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of a certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain... ." 

Hobson 1905

II Why then?

► Economic Timing:
  - More demand for commodities (Rubber)
  - End of slave trade → need for reorganization of exchange with colonies

► Political Timing:
  - Development of new nations in Europe

► Technological Timing
  - Guns
  - Quinine Prophylaxis

III How?

Cost to Britain for conquering 70 million Africans: about 15 pence each

III Technology

► "Whatever happens, we have got The Maxim Gun, and they have not"
  - Hilaire Belloc

► Gatlings (US gun, patented 1862) first used in Africa against Zulus, July 1879
  - Battle at Omdurman (Sudan) Toll: 48 on the British side v. 11,000 Dervishes
  - Hiram Maxim (US gun developed 1885), the gun is effective "in stopping the mad rush of savages"

III African Soldiers

► French sent two companies of Wolof soldiers to Madagascar. 1828.

► Italians used Eritrean Ascaris under Italian officers in Ethiopia and Tigray

► Mercenaries on both sides!: Wolseley had 2 partly Huasă regiments marching against Ashanti in 1874, Ashanti army also included a Hausa unit.

III Corporations (See Doc 15)

► Treaties: Recognized under Berlin.

► "We the undersigned chiefs...do this day cede to the Royal Niger company (Chartered and Limited), for ever, the whole of our territory..." 

► Status of African signatories irrelevant

► Chartered Companies (Until 1923 for Southern Rhodesia)
  - "The old dread of increasing our responsibilities by taking over more territory has, I venture to think, been proved by experience to be somewhat of a bugbear" (British Colonial Official 1890 [3])
III Rule by Corporations

► France: Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale
► UK: United Africa Company, British South Africa Company
► Belgium: Union Miniere du Haut Katanga
► US: Firestone?

III Corporations

► ABIR: The Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (Founded 1892)
  - Concession four times larger than Belgium
  - Exclusive Rights for 30 years
  - Local population should collect wild rubber for the corporation instead of paying taxes
  - Company given policing rights and powers of detention
  - State given 50% shareholding in the company

III Results of Brutality

► 1906: Entire Concession Devoid of Rubber
► Massive depopulation of Congo, from 20m (c. 1890) to 8.5 m (1911)
► Massive killing, mutilations and abuses
► Profits go to Leopold's secret bank account

III Eventual Outrage

► Heart of Darkness: 1899
► Congo Reform Association E.D. Morel and Harry Johnston published Red Rubber (1906) pro-colonialism, anti-atrocities. 19th century “blood diamonds”
► Taken away from Leopold 1908.

III Any African Resistance?

“Here we are, three white men in the heart of Africa with twenty nigger soldiers and fifty nigger police ... administering a district inhabited by half a million well armed savages who have only recently come in touch with the white man. The position is most humorous” (Pakenham, 1985, p. 201).

Richard Meinertzhagen, Kikuyu land 1903

III But...

1. Samori Ture (Mandika Empire 1882-98)
2. Asante Resistance (Ghana)
3. Battle of Isandlwana (Zulu)
4. Touareg Resistance (Mali, Niger)
5. Chimurenga Resistance (Zimbabwe)
6. Maji-Maji Uprising (Tanganyika)
7. Battle of Adowa (Ethiopia)
8. Casamance Resistance (Senegal)
9. Léyli Resistance
10. Tax Wars: Sierra Leone, “Hut tax” 1898, Angola 1902, Hereros 1904
IV French and British Styles of Rule

► Direct Rule: "placing the chief in an entirely subordinate position to the political officer"
  ▶ Portuguese (Overseas Provinces of Portugal) (1951–)
  ▶ French
  ▶ Belgian
  ▶ British (Lugard)

► Indirect Rule: "depended on the advisory relationship between the political officer and the native authority"

IV Indirect Rule: Continuity?

► Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sarduana of Sokoto:
  "They made no drastic changes, and what was done came into effect only after consultation...for what could one Resident, an assistant and a fewsoldiers in Sokoto do to change so vast an area as the Sokoto Emirate?"

IV French and British Styles? Really?

► French Direct Rule?
  ▶ But: tried indirect rule with Fulani Emirs in Cameroon, and also in Niger...

► British Indirect Rule?
  ▶ Non-interference with boundaries of traditional polities?
  ▶ British: rearranged areas that individual Mende chiefs controlled Sometimes appointed sometimes recognized
  ▶ Lugard: "The area over which each Paramount Chief has control will be marked on the map, and no alteration will be made on it except on the Lieutenant governor's recommendation and with the Governor's approval."
  ▶ Not attempted in Kenya and failed in Eastern or Western Nigeria.

IV Assimilation or “Separate development”

► Large cultural differences between styles
  "Nos ancêtres les gaulois"

► Seen as a trade-off between respecting the people or respecting their institutions?

► Implications for colonial employment, language etc.

► The Decentralized Despotism of Indirect Rule
  ▶ Takes sides
  ▶ Alhadi: "Divide and conquer"
  ▶ Produces political reification

V Was there any rule at all?

► The French did not develop the infrastructure necessary to "broadcast power" (Herbst)

► Measurement of roads:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British African Colonies</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>864</td>
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<td>410</td>
<td>437</td>
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<td>French Equatorial Africa</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>863</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>774</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

km of road per square kilometer
V Roads

Length of Roads on British Territory 1935

1 km

V Roads

Length of Roads on British Territory 1963

1 km

V Rule of the Few

Limited Control. Borders precede states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Officials</th>
<th>Subjects</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>British African Colonies</td>
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<td>French West Africa</td>
<td>3,660</td>
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<td>French Equatorial Africa</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>2,384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1939 Figures (From Herbst, p 78)

- Contact maintained by traveling officials
- Southern Africa Exceptionalism

V How? Rule of the Weak

“It will be many years before the police force will be strong enough to be able to accept the responsibility for enforcing law and order throughout the territory. There must therefore for some considerable time be a sharing of responsibility between the police and other organizations for the maintenance of law and order.”

Official Colonial Report, Northern Rhodesia, 1957 [from Herbst, p 79]

Closing Remarks, Puzzles

- Violence ≠ Control
- Global economic gains are not a sufficient explanation?
- If border were arbitrary, were they meaningless?
- If boundaries were challenged would rule over the hinterland have been stronger?
- Which form of government, direct or indirect, is more respectful?
- Which should be more favorable to future independent states?
Key Questions

► Why suddenly around 1960?
► What explains the variation in timing within Africa?
► How did struggles relate to colonial and pre-colonial forms of government?
► How did independence fighters organize? What accounts for the variation in the methods used?

Variation in the Methods Used

► Civil Disobedience
  - 1906-08 Civil disobedience under Gandhi and the ANC Habib
  - Bourguiba in inter-war Tunisia
  - Nkrumah in Ghana
  - Kenneth Kaundu
  - This tradition reduced African support for Algerian liberation struggle

► Religious
  - Djihad traditions, Algeria (1954-)
  - Simon Kimbangu and the Africanization of Christianity, (race, cross, gender)

► Violent
  - Ethiopian resistance to Italy 1937-1939
  - Ancestral warrior traditions: the Mau Mau, Casamance, Zimbabwe, (Joshua Nkomo presented with a spirit axe, bases names after spiritual mediums)
  - Guerilla, internationalized modern conflict. Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Namibia

Some Trends:

► British: case by case, between 1957 and 1980
► French: all at once in 1960 (except Guinea and Togo)
► Britain: earlier cases peaceful, later cases violent
► French: earlier cases violent, later cases peaceful

Some Cases:

► Ghana
► French West Africa
► Guinea
► Kenya
► Belgian Congo
► Bissau and Cape Verde
► Zimbabwe
Ghana's Path

- "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you."

Ghana’s Mass Mobilization

- "I pledge with all my life my support to the Convention’s People’s Party, and to my leader Kwaame Nkrumah...to strive with all of my heart to rebuild our lost nation, Ghana."

From Account written by Richard Wright

French West Africa

- Sustained non-violent political struggle
- 1947 United Gold Coast Convention
- Feb 1948 Demonstrations over inflated prices; negotiations not honored. Turns violent. UGCC leaders arrested
- Opening for Constitutional Reform, but led to clashes between established Ghanaian elites and youth groups; inter-generational, inter-class. Nkrumah resigns and forms CPP
- 1949 organization of mass meetings drawing on trade unions etc. demands: fully elected assembly; lower voting age (prev. 25)
- 1950 New Constitution: Positive action, national strikes. Leaders imprisoned; Nkrumah directs CPP from his cell
- Ref 1951. Wins 35 of 38 seats; election of prisoners! Although still a minority! There were reserved seats, including for 17 chiefs or their reps and 3 ex-officio British members
- Take up positions under a “bogus and fraudulent” constitution
- Reserves indirect rule with full suffrage direct local elections
- By 1954 opposition anti-unitary states parties: National Liberation Movement (Autonomy for the Ashanti region), the Togoland Congress (Opposed integration of Britsh Togoland), the Northern People’s Party (NPP), the Muslim Association Party.
- 1956 elections, CPP gets majority and good distribution leading to Independence

Ghana

- A Radical Political Struggle.
- The rite-region Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a Guinean section by 1947, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG).
- Independence movement also involved labor; Senghor sets up Bloc Démocratique Senegalais in 1948. Issues: degree of federalism: Senghor along with “poor states” Mali, Niger, Chad supports two large areas: West and Central; powerful enough to negotiate with France. Dakar at the head. Houphouet-Boigny opposed: bad deal for Côte d’Ivoire.

French West Africa

- Fractured Political Struggles
- 1944, Brazzaville Conference: “the constitution of ‘self government’ in the colonies, even in the distant future, is to be excluded”
- October 1945 deputies elected to constituent assembly join left blocs: Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny, Lamine Gueye
- 1946: Rassemblement Démocratique Africain in Bamako creates an umbrella group, headed by Houphouet-Boigny

Guinea

- Positive action; national strikes.

USSR

- All individually negotiate “No.”

Ghanaian elites and youth groups; inter-generational, inter-class. Nkrumah resigns and forms CPP.

Guinea

- Crippled by France, but supported by Ghana and USSR.
Belgian Congo

- **A short, decentralized struggle against a disinterested colonizer**
  - Attempt to isolate Congolese from events on continent
  - Limited forces of "modernization": no African papers, parties or representatives. No post primary education.
  - 1956: Demands from tiny "modern sector": clerks, shopkeepers, teachers.
  - Given rights to run in local elections: formation of localized parties:
    - ABAKO (Alliance des Ba-Kongo, Joseph Kasavubu)
    - CONAKAT (Confederations des Associations Tribales de Katanga, Moïse Tshombe)
    - MNC (Mouvement National Congolais, Patrice Lumumba)

- **Inspired by movements in the rest of Africa and Ghana’s All-African People’s Congress.**
- 1959. Urban organization: Riots, Attacks on Religious and Colonial Property
- January 1960. "Round Table Conference". Belgian washes hands, transfer in 6 months.
- Political disorganization in Congo, Katanga declares its secession in days.

Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde

- **A popular military struggle against overstretched imperialist**
  - 1956: Amilcar Cabral founds PAIGC
  - 1959: Strike Action in docks, violently suppressed
  - 1963: Full scale guerrilla war operating in Guinea Bissau
  - Gradual liberation of territories and provision of services to rural communities
  - 1973: declaration of independence

Zimbabwe

- **Fractured Military Struggle Against White Minority**
  - 1962, trade unionist, Nkomo, forms ZAPU; but slow to adopt guerrilla
  - 1963 split: Sithole, Mugabe form ZANU
  - 1966- ZAPU attacks, benefiting from Mozambique hinterland; ZAPU attacks from Zambia
  - Counterattacks include arial bombing of refugee camps and the establishment of RENAMO in Mozambique

Kenya’s Path

- **A Cocktail of Politics and Violence**
  - no African in the Legislative Council until 1948.
  - Division reforms.
  - Mau Mau Violence, especially among Kikuyu and "Suicide Tribes".
  - Kenyatta: arrested under suspicion of working with Mau Mau.
  - 1953: KAU outlawed.
  - 1952 – 1956, state of emergency
  - 1959: Elections for African seats; although Africans a fixed minority.
  - 1961: Kenyatta released. Leads KANU in opposition to National KADU.
Towards Explanations

Timing: The Impact of WW II
► Internationalization of contacts
► Destruction of myth of white man’s superiority
  • “This discovery—for indeed it was a discovery—had a revolutionizing psychological impact on the African” (Sithole)
► Exhaustion of Europe, psychologically and economically
► Promotion of doctrines of self determination and human rights

Timing: “Modernization”
► There was more nationalism in areas with longer contacts (Gold Coast, Senegal v. Congo)
► Undermines system of direct rule. Rise of individualism, wage earners, weakens ethnic ties and make indirect rule ineffective. Rise of a middle class.
► Exchange economies weaken in-group ties
► Urbanization facilitates political organization across ethnic groups: Almost all movements started in towns.

Timing: The Influence of Pan-Africanism
► Born of growing political organization of black activists from West Indies and United States
  • 1900 meeting organized by Henry Sylvester Williams. Development of “Pan-Africanism” defined in opposition to colonialisim practices
  • WEB DuBois, organizes a series of 5 conferences, beginning 1919.
  • Garvey demands control of ex-German Territories, threatens force.
  • 1945 meeting involved Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta
  • 1958 Nkrumah hosts All Africa People’s Congress
  • A forum for coordination among African leaders and a voice to express their concerns.

Timing: “Modernization”
► Development of a Lingua Franca facilitates organization (French, English, Swahili in Tanzania)
► Articulation of inequalities and injustices both nationally in print and internationally—Kenyatta tours of the UK
► New territorially based institutions: colonists create the object of nationalists.
► Business interests calculated that interests could now be made without direct political control.
► But Portugal too weak to “neocolonize.” Belgian business interests gamble in Katanga failed.

Variation in Forms
► States and Stateless Societies
  • Stateless Groups more opposed to colonial domination? Kikuyu? Ibo? Diola?
  • Compare with Wolof, Ashanti?
► Settler societies
  • Presence of Settlers: Causes problems on supply side and demand side
  • More violence in settler areas: Southern Africa, Algeria
Indirect rule maintained power in hands of traditional elites but eroded with higher levels of political organization and violence. But more exclusion of elites; more unemployed intellectuals; less identification of elites with the center; and more internal divisions.

Nigeria, Ghana

Militarily: especially in later struggles

Diplomatic Support:

Other Forces: International support

► Diplomatic Support:
  - "Had it not been for Russia, the African liberation movement would have suffered the most brutal persecution" Nkrumah
  - Militarily: especially in later struggles
    - Cuban troops in Angola, Guinea Bissau
    - Soviet surface to air missiles in Zimbabwe
    - Israeli support of South Africa: counter insurgency, development of nuclear capability

Other Forces: The Church

Mainstream churches very slow to support decolonization. But:
  - Nkrumah's claim
  - Church education produced radical leaders: it provided skills and motivations from the incompatibility of church doctrine and practice.
  - African "Christian Separatism" (Chilembwe, Zimbabwe; Tembu, South Africa)
  - Eventual radicalization of the hierarchy (Banda, Tutu)

Nationalism: The attraction

► Force for political organization elsewhere
  - Response to exploitation
  - Unifying
  - Can draw on international support
  - Can challenge and employ colonial institutions

► Can be used to challenge disparate goals
  - Masses want access to land and resources
  - Elites want jobs

Nationalism: The Problems

► Meaningfulness of "nationalism" in "African nationalism"
  - "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English,' 'Welsh,' or 'French.' The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not." (Obafemi Awolowo, Prime Minister of Western Region, Path to Nigerian Freedom)

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Closing Remarks

► Variation in struggles correlated with variation in political organization: but also variation in militarization: Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Congo, Zimbabwe.

► Independent Africa was born divided, no attempts to unite based on aspiring "nations" were successful: Saharan States, Biafra...
  - "We are really interested in the other African states but not in the sense of having a federated African states or a union of African states, because...it is most important for our countries in Africa...to do their utmost to develop their resources in their individual countries." 1959: Abubakar Tafawa Balowa
Strangers

“[T]he annoying legacy of the colonial spell is present in the perception of one party about the other. Gambians generally believe that the Senegalese are a vain cultural offshoot of the French, wily and always having something up their sleeves no matter what kind of assurance they may give about honouring their own part of an agreement. The Senegalese on the other hand like to see Gambians as carrying the trait of the English, inquisitive, captious and incurably fastidious. This provides a propitious climate for mutual suspicion.”

The Independent (Banjul), EDITORIAL, April 22, 2003

Key Questions, This Week

I. How did colonialism structure economies?
II. How did it structure international relations?
III. How did it structure legal systems?
IV. What are the psychological legacies?
Key Questions, Next Week

- How do the borders constructed by colonialism matter?
- How did colonialism shape state structures?
- How did it shape political demography?
- How did it shape political practices?
- How did it contribute to the reification of ethnicity?
- How did it shape socioeconomic divisions?
- How did it shape political culture?

Economies

- "The present day result of these centuries of foreign meddling and disruption are nonintegrated economies that concentrate on producing unprocessed raw materials for foreign consumers...the present economic order is characterized by an unfair division of labor that says: ‘You produce coffee and I shall produce computers.’ This is unfair because coffee is cheap and computers are expensive. This is just common sense.” Yoweri Museveni, *What is Africa’s Problem?*

Markets

- Urbanization patterns develop in response to colonial demands for labor.
  - e.g. mining towns in Zambia
- Established Markets
  - Market towns
  - Same physical infrastructure; stalls dating back to the 50s
- But: Most Markets and Routes Designed for Export
  - Commodities: natural resources, agriculture
  - Trade routes and infrastructure

Transportation Networks

- Agriculture, raw materials, little processing
  - A deliberate attempt to protect markets?
  - but what’s the counterfactual?
  - Continued dependence

Economies: Exports

- Colonial consumer goods become ‘essentials’

Colonial Legacies: Imports

- Touaregs in search of 4×4s
The Dependency School

- Rodney, Amin, Cabral
  - Counter Marx:
    - Development did not immiserate European masses;
    - Colonialization did not spur development. Rather, colonialism perpetuates underdevelopment.
  - The sources of underdevelopment found within the international economy.
  - The study of African economies becomes the study of international relations.

Failure of Africa to Unite

- Many small mergers fail:
  - Senegal, Mali (1959-60)
  - Senegal, Gambia (1982-1989)
  - Union of African States: Ghana, Guinea, Mali (1960-63)
  - Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania
  - Libya, Egypt (1972)
  - Libya, Chad (1981)
- Any cases of unions?

The Dependency School

- The capitalist world economy works by rules set by advanced economies with a view to exploiting the Third World.
- Global trade is manufactures for agriculture, with declining terms of trade for developing countries.
- Economic structures further weaken African bargaining power.
- This is done using collusion between the elites in the “core” and the elites in the “periphery.”
- For example, Bongo has ruled Gabon since 1967, following a coup organized in collusion with the French army. He has been linked by French and Swiss prosecutors to the corruption involving Elf Aquitaine.
- Colonialism is seen as establishing channels for foreign firms to reap the benefits of monopolies; these channels are meant to continue after the end of colonialism.
### One Commodity Countries

- Dependence of African economies on single commodities weakens their **bargaining power**. Unable to achieve self-sufficiency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
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</table>

### Dependency: Common Criticisms

- But there was development in Asia!
- But dependency theory ignores the abuses **within** Africa
- Well, what does the evidence say?

### The Record: Continued Investment in Africa?

**Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), $US millions**

**The Problem is the opposite:**
- Africans can’t export their agricultural goods
- They do import foods

**The Record**

- African states can’t get enough foreign investment: “What do we have to do to attract big U.S. companies to Africa? ... the market is there, the resources are there”
  - Sierra Leone Ambassador to the UN, Jan 2004
- Decolonization blocks routes
  - Saharan pastoralists complain that their freedom of movement was blunted more after independence than they were before
- However, there are significant investments by natural resource extraction firms. But even these are often not ex-colonial powers; e.g., US, China, Malaysia
Impact of legal Families

La Porta finds that “Countries that were lucky enough to be colonized by the British did relatively well [had good law enforcement]; those that had French colonizers or were foolish enough to voluntarily adopt the French or German legal family as a model suffered in comparison.”

Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 2000

Transplant Effect

“Legality” is “effective law”, not just the “quality” of the law on the books

- to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have an incentive to use the law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law.
- the judges, lawyers, politicians, and other legal intermediaries that are responsible for developing the law must be able to increase the quality of law in a way that is responsive to demand for legality
- Compare Angola with Senegal

Legacies: Psychological

- Gambia story
- Colonial superiority complex: used to enable foreign minorities to control local majorities. “It is suicidal for Europeans … to admit that natives can do anything better than themselves. They should claim to be superior in anything and only allow natives to take a secondary or subordinate part”
  
  Symonds, 1966, p. 76; Memmi, 1957/1965

- Colonialism led to the “generation of a deep feeling of inferiority as well as the loss of human dignity among Africans”
  
  Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism, 1989
Legacies: Psychological

► Read Ekeh on the “ideologies” of colonialism:
  ▪ Myth: “Colonialism brought great gains to a backward people
    ► at great expense to the West
    ► with little contributions from Africans”
  ▪ Effect: Division of Africans in “native” and “Westernized.” The “évolués” stuck between two mentalities; constantly having to prove themselves by other peoples’ standards

Reclaimed in Cultural Studies

► “As far as I am concerned the fundamental theme [of my book Things Fall Apart] is that African people did not hear of culture for the first time from Europeans; that their societies were not mindless but frequently had a philosophy of great depth and value and beauty, that they had poetry and, above all, they had dignity. It is this dignity that African people all but lost during the colonial period, and it is this that they must now regain.”

Achebe, The Role of the Writer in a New Nation 1964

Closing Comments and Puzzles

► That Africa suffers from the economic legacy does not imply that ex-Colonial powers continue to benefit.
  ▪ Present attempts to escape the legacy (NEPAD) still reliant on outsiders.
► Where legal legacy has been readapted this tends to be successful
► The psychological legacy is still salient. How can it be tackled?
  ▪ What are the appropriate counterfactuals?
    ▪ In-country variation?
    ▪ The Liberian and Ethiopian counterexamples?
  ▪ Why so little change?
    ▪ Is it because the deck is stacked or because of “QUERTY” effects?
    ▪ How can you tell the difference?

Weak structures but high demands

► Alien state structures and no state infrastructure
► Ill equipped “native” bureaucracies
► Especially Human Resources:
  ▪ Rodney: The main purpose of the colonial school system was to train Africans to help man the local administration at the lowest ranks and to staff the private capitalist firms owned by Europeans
  ▪ Example: Senegal, 1946: High school had 723 pupils, 174 of them were African

Weak Structures: Education

► “We took over a country with 85 percent of its adults illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors”
  
Julius Nyerere

► 1960: Number of Graduates among the 13 million people living in the Congo:
Weak Structures: Education

► “We took over a country with 85 percent of its adults illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors”
Julius Nyerere

► 1960: Number of Graduates among the 13 million people living in the Congo: 16

Key Questions: Theory and tests

► How do the borders constructed by colonialism matter?
► How did colonialism shape political demography? How did it contribute to the reification of ethnicity?
► What’s the evidence on macroeconomic impacts?
► Can this help us to understand democratization?

Political Forms of States

► Authoritarian Political Structures
  • “The political structures bequeathed by colonialism contained the notion that authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule and that political activity was a merely a disguised form of self interest, subversive of the public welfare” (Kasfir)
  • Political decisions justified either by force or by race

► Lessons:
  • Only violence can defeat colonial violence (Fanon)
  • New Rulers Inherit Colonial Arrogance?
  • Heightened levels of ethnic identification: early independence “tribalism”
  • Mother Teresa Syndrome? (Crawford Young): High expectations of services from the state?

1 Boundaries

► States contained traditional rivals:
  • Asante and Fanti in Gold Coast
  • Yoruba and Haus in Nigeria
  • Ndebele and Shon in Southern Rhodesia

► Borders split others:
  • Ewe between Gold coast and Togoloand
  • Ibo, between Nigeria and Cameroon
  • Somalia, between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya

1 Boundaries

► Englebert Measured “Horizontal Legitimacy”

► Measure for “Risks of Expropriation”

► Graphed results:
1 Boundaries and Institutional Quality

- Englebert’s “Horizontal Legitimacy”
- And a measure of “Institutional Quality”
- “Took out” effects of identity of colonial power
- Graphed results:

2 Social Structures

- With high expectations groups quickly started organizing themselves along class, ethnic, “traditional,” racial and religious lines and forming a host of civil society organizations...
- But both the “ethnic groups” and the “traditions” have a history

2.1 Colonialism and Ethnic Groups

- So you want to spread the word of God?
- First choose your languages:
  - Select a language.
  - Standardize the language.
  - Spread the language.
- But which languages?
  - As few as possible!
  - Depends on who your competitors are
  - Depends on who you know
  - Depends on who is politically powerful and how quickly others can adapt
  - Should not be a “corrupting” language (!)—such as Lingala

2.1 Colonialism and Ethnic Groups

- Implications:
  - Some Groups Privileged
    - Which cultures the colonizer understands
    - Who he gives jobs in missions to
    - Access to missionary education
    - But later, access to national education also!
- Size matters
  - Bambara spread very widely
  - Luganda in Uganda
  - There is now a unique “Shona” in Zimbabwe
  - In Zambia major trends towards linguistic consolidation

2.1 Growth of Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi

- Language use in Zambia and Botswana in 1990s

- Source: Posner
2.1 Evidence for Consolidation

Need a measure of linguistic consolidation
Need a measure of missionary educational activity

2.2 “Traditional Forms”

The “invention” of tradition (Colson) or the “negotiation” of tradition (T.O. Ranger)

Politics has primacy over tradition
Let’s look at land

2.2 Land Ownership

What’s at stake?
Disadvantages of customary land ownership?
Importance of enforcement (Coase)
Optimal type of land depends on the value of the land: why?
Example of items that cannot be traded by US custom?
Akyem ctd.
- Rising value of land led to selling of land outright by stools
- Rush to sell depressed prices: (almost) everyone loses
- 1904-1926: 109 cases of destoolment
- Okyenhene council uses by-law to reassert paramount chief’s right to approve all land sales
- British support “customary law,” unable to enforce private land rights themselves
- ...but customary law also suited paramount Chief—if not regional chiefs...

Akyem: Results
- **Mixed system**—gives citizens incentives to invest: private property over additions
- **Reification**: Atta’s ordinance made it unlawful for any “Head chief, chief or headman to disclaim dependence to a paramount Stool ... [or] on any pretext whatsoever transfer of withdraw his or her allegiance from the Paramount stool”
- **Contemporary Indirect Rule**: Now: Much formal legislation for privatization in Ghana. But “customary” law de facto left in place. Same alliances still needed. (Berry)

Some “Macro” Results
- Former British colonies prospered relative to French, Spanish and Portuguese; possibly because of the stronger economic and political institutions (David Landes 1998, chapters 19 and 20)
- French colonies less susceptible to state failure—repeatedly found by SFTF
- French colonies have more stable macroeconomies

3 Macroeconomic Impacts: Some Tests
- Contra Herbst: Cross national research indicates that colonial heritage matters
- But mixed results on form of impact. The evidence presented by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson

Some Econometric results: The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
  - Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
- What matters is not the identity of the colonizer but the conditions in the colonies:
  - How can you measure that?
Mortality Rates as an Instrument

“In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and they were more likely to set up extractive institutions. ... Exploiting differences in mortality rates faced by soldiers, bishops and sailors in the colonies in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita.”

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson

More specifically, our theory can be schematically summarized as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(potential) settlements} & \rightarrow \text{mortality} \rightarrow \text{institutions} \rightarrow \text{income per capita} \\
\text{Example:} \text{the establishment of structures to protect farmers}
\end{align*}
\]

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson

Example: Bates, argues that the British pursued policies to depress the price of cocoa in Ghana, but supported the prices faced by the commercial cereal farmers in Kenya. The reason? In Kenya, unlike Ghana, there was a significant number of European settler farmers, who exerted considerable pressure on policy.

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson

Alternative Explanations?

They control for present health and climatic conditions and the present demographic composition.

- “The results are also robust to the inclusion of controls for the current disease environment (e.g., the prevalence of malaria, life expectancy and infant mortality) and the current fraction of the population of European descent.”
- “The results are also robust to ... the current fraction of the population of European descent.”
- “Interestingly, we show that once the effect of institutions on economic performance is controlled for, neither distance from the equator nor the dummy for Africa is significant. These results suggest that Africa is poorer than the rest of the world not because of pure geographic or cultural factors, but because of worse institutions.”
5 Closing Remarks

► Does the rhetoric of colonial regimes insulate African regimes from genuine criticism?

• “What lessons on democracy am I supposed to learn today from a continent and imperialist states that would give none to me and my country during centuries of occupationist rule?”

Mugabe

► Key Puzzle To Take Home:

• There are many mechanisms through which we can see colonialism having negative effects. Why then do the places with the greatest penetration of colonialism appear to fare better?

Key Questions

► What is the state? How does it function?

► How to characterize the African states?

• Size
• Reach
• Persistence
• Memory
• Practices

► How can we account for the persistence of African States.

► How can we account for their practices: their strengths and their choices?

Definition of the State

► “A political community formed by a territorially defined population, subject to a single government”

► Core features (Montevideo Convention 1933):

• Permanent Population
• A defined territory
• “Effective” Government (with capacity)
• External sovereignty: the capacity to enter relations with other states

Definition of the State II

► Note:

• The state is not equivalent to the government and the head of state is not the same as the head of government
• The “legitimacy” of the government is not necessary. It is not necessary that power is vested in “institutions” rather than an individual

► This version of the Weberian notion:

• About the means of politics, not the outcome
• About force: a monopoly over force

Functions of The State

• David Easton: The state is the forum for the “authoritative allocation of values” for a society

• Harold Lasswell: It determines “Who get what, when and how”
The Core Puzzle of the Political Economy of States
► If a state is strong enough to protect the interests of its citizens then it has the power to abuse its citizens
► Olson: States are bandits, but they are stationary bandits rather than roving bandits
  • What are the incentives of these bandits?
  • What are their instruments to act?
  • What are the mechanisms to constrain them?

Characterization of African States I Size
Measure: The Share of Government Consumption in GDP
In Comparative Perspective...

How Big Is The African State?
Characterization of African States II

Challenged Monopolies
- Challenged Monopolies on Security
  - Chad: Exxon | Doba Chiefs | Air France
  - Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone
- Informal federalism
  - Bishops rule in Congo
  - Orma
- Challenged Sovereignty
  - Nkrumah reading

Characterization of African States III

Persistence
- African states, as units have persisted despite their weakness
- Few international campaigns
- Few unrecognized entities
- Exceptions?
  - Support for Taylor, Mugabe
  - Ghadaffi in Chad
  - Rwanda in Congo
  - Somalia story?
  - Others?

Characterization of African States IV

Poor Institutional Memory
- Institutions play the role of maintaining the “memory” of a state
- But...
  - The records office in Sierra Leone
  - de Menezes’ problems
  - Destruction of Congolese archives (C&D)

Characterization of the African State V: Practices

The (Neo) Patrimonial State
The Shadow State (Reno)
The Vampire State (Aytetey)
- “Those who came...shouting ‘The 31st December Revolution in Ghana is the culmination of the struggle against injustice, indignity and exploitation’ are themselves today meting out the worst injustice and indignities to us and sucking the blood of the nation to the last drop” (Ashai in The Free Press 1996 [Aiteey, 149])
Towards Explanations: Why the persistence?

- Africa as a political idea: African nationalism in reaction to colonialism
  - "politicians [maintain that] whatever the size, shape, population and resources of these jurisdictions, they have a right to exist because they are the embodiment of the African political revolution" (Jackson and Rosberg)

- African Compact
  - I'll defend you if you defend me
  - Facilitated by a balance of power
  - But: do we observe this?

Explanations: Why Persistence?

- Independence at a moment when the international state system was strong?
  - "the International is prior to the Internal"
  - But do we observe international bolstering of states' rights?
  - Other channels?

- Others:
  - African armies too weak
  - Cross-border ties may hamper aggression?
  - Weak structures may make neo-colonial administration unworkable?

Why are African states weak?

- The post-colonial argument: "Colonialists built weak, authoritarian states and left quickly" (Young)

- The neo-colonial argument: "African states are kept weak to benefit international actors" (Amin)

- The geographic structuralist argument: "Population distributions make broadcasting of power difficult" (Herbst)

- The material base argument: "African economies are too weak to support specialists in Bureaucracy" (Diamond)

- The vampire state argument: "African leaders feed off disorder" (Chabal and Daloz). Stresses intentionality.

The Geographic-Structuralist Argument

- Herbst: the problem is not weak boundaries: "the boundaries are the states"

- Leaders enforce boundaries dogmatically because they are weak: they have no other way of claiming order in the hinterland

- States are weak because they have not had to forge their own boundaries

- But: A little circular?

- Does it account for international variation?

The Vampire States Argument

- Politicians benefit from disorder
  - The political benefits of hiring incompetents

- But:
  - If process leads to collapse they undermine the material basis for patronage
  - By weakening state structures they undermine the political basis of patronage
  - It's not healthy bring a politician in Africa
Is it healthy being a politician in Africa?

Tradeoffs

**The economic tradeoff:**
- In some economies, “privatizing” public resources in very difficult
  - If workers can exit or otherwise withhold labor
- In others, privatizing public resources is easier
  - Natural resources can be liquidated quickly and often with low visibility

**The political tradeoff:**
- Polities vary in the degree to which politicians are subject to censure by “selectorates”
  - If workers can exit or otherwise withhold labor
- Polities vary in the size of the “selectorate” that has to be satisfied to maintain the president in power

**Model:**
- Individual members of the selectorate declare minimum levels of returns that they will accept before trying to turn the politician out of office.
- The politician decides how much of a public good to produce and how much of a private good to produce. He then divides the private good up between the most politically advantageous groups.
- The selectorate then decides whether or not to try to get rid of the incumbent.

The outcome:

- If politicians are subject to censure then their policies are less “vampire-like”:
  - The more regular the review
  - The larger the required selectorate
  - The more easy it is for the selectorate to guarantee the incumbent’s security
  - The more dependent the economy is on natural resources
- These features account for the variation within Africa; and they account for the variation between Africa and other parts of the world

An alternative: Choices Under Constraints Argument

- Motivation: Need to Explain the Variation: The Senegals and the Chads
- Policy makers have a choice between producing public goods or extracting private goods from an economy
- Public goods are enjoyed by everyone but private goods can be shared among people the policy maker selects
- There are two types of tradeoff:

Closing Remarks and Comments

- Challenged Monopolies and Vampire States: Are these positions incompatible?
  - Ayittey describes: “the towering importance and intrusion of politics into all spheres of human activity” but... “leaving aside the democratic requirements that a government must be by the people and for the people, one expects at a minimum a government to be responsive to the needs of the people... But even this basic requirement for “government” is lacking in Africa (Ayittey, 150)

- Herbst notes that African states are not born of domestic competition but... he also recognizes the extent of challenges to the state’s monopoly
- How can you distinguish empirically between the effective implementation of policies that undermine the state and the ineffective implementation of policies to strengthen the state?
- The problem that the realm of politics is insufficiently emancipated from society—as Chabal and Daloz argue—or that there is too much of a disjuncture between state and society—as Ekeh argued?
Structure
1. Ethnicity: Some Definitional Issues
2. The Need to Choose Coalitions
3. Rival Types of Coalitions: Why Ethnicity?
4. Mechanisms for why ethnicity might help in forming coalitions
5. Applications:
   1. Hausaland: Nation or Ethnic Group?
   2. Zambia: Which group do you belong to?
6. Measuring Ethnicity

Ethnicity
► "Ethnicity" commonly refers to collectivities that share a myth of origin
► Ancestry; others, the importance of history, most often migration and settlement
► Sharing a culture; a language
► Some include religion or even gender as an "ethnicity"

So you want to control politics?
► First define your coalition...

Minimum Winning Coalitions
► In a non-consensual system your best bet is to form a coalition that is big enough so that you can implement the groups decisions but small enough so that you do not have to share too much power
Minimum Winning Coalitions

- Who do you ally with? On what basis?
  - Ethnicity
  - Race
  - Region
  - Religion
  - Class
  - Gender
  - Urban / Rural
  - Co-citizens?

Who do you ally with?

- Do you choose people with the same interests as you?
- Or people who are “like” you in other ways?

Who do you ally with?

- Do you choose people with the same interests as you?
- Or people who are “like” you in other ways?

Who do you ally with?

- Do you choose people with the same interests as you?
- Or people who are “like” you in other ways?

The Problem With Ethnicity

- For Marxists, the problem is that social classes (not ethnic groups), should structure social organization.
  - Marxists responses 1: “Capitalism still in transition”: dual economies
  - Marxists responses 2: “Ethnicity is class interest” (Breton 1964, Skar 1967): “sons of the soil” v. outsiders; labor quotas by ethnicity
  - Marxists responses 3: Ethnicity is a ploy to distract people from their “true” interests (Gramsci)
The Problem With Ethnicity

- For **Modernization theorists**, the forces of modernization should erode ethnicity's organizational. Interest-based relationships should dominate. Literacy should free people of parochial affiliations...

  - **Modernization Theory Response responses 1**: "uneven modernization": backward groups get the political tools of modernization" sometimes the rate of social mobilization exceeds the capacity of elites to control it (Huntington)

  - **Modernization Theory Response 2**: Modernization is done via ethnic groups: ethnicity is used, functionally, to organize investments and urban activity: The Kalela dance.

Other Approaches

- **Constructivists, Interpretivists and Instrumentalists:**
  - "Ethnic identities are malleable" cf The Bantu Men's Social Center
  - Identities exhibit "situational selection" (Mitchell; Melson and Wolpe (1970))
  - Two aspects of variation: (1) which dimensions of identity are most salient and (2) what are the categories along those dimensions
  - These approaches try to explain not just why ethnicity matters, but why we see the ethnic group we see...
  - But what is the rate of change?

Minimum Winning Coalitions

Q: How do you form a minimum winning coalition?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanisms I: Category Based?

- **Minimal Group Theory** (Tajfel, 1982)
- **Identifiable Groups Solve Coordination Problems** (Hardin 1995)
- Policing boundaries is easier (Chandra 2003)

Mechanisms I: Category Based?

- **Identifiability**: The fact that ethnicity is associated with phenotypical characteristics means that it can be readily used to solve collective action problems even when people don't know each other.
  - It signals allegiance
  - It signals commonality of preferences
  - It signals a network
  - It solves a coordination problem
  - You can learn about who did what for me... (Chandra)
Mechanisms I: Category Based?

► But:

► Whatever the boundaries are between groups, they are constructed...

► What’s so special about ethnicity as a category? (Kurzban...)

Mechanisms I: Category Based?

Sometimes
Hard To Remove

But sometimes
Easy To Remove

Mechanisms I: Category Based?

“There were 250 children, ages 11 to 19. On April 30, around 5:30, we heard shots. In several minutes, the assailing rebels had become masters of the seminary. The soldiers charged with protecting us had fled. A troop of rebels had taken over the dormitories...The assailants gathered us in the middle of the room and demanded that we separate into Hutus and Tutsi. The students refused. They were united. Then the leader of the group, an enraged woman, ordered their killing. There were 70 students. The assailants fired their grenades.”

► Priest’s account of 1997 massacre by Hutu rebels in Buta

Mechanisms I: Category Based?

"In Sri Lanka (1983), Sinhalese rioters suspected a man in a car of being a Tamil. Having stopped the car, they inquired about his peculiar accent in Sinhala, which he explained by his lengthy stay in England and his marriage to an English woman. Uncertain, but able to prevent his escape, the rioters went off to kill other Tamils, returning later to question the prospective victim further. Eventually, he was allowed to proceed on his way, even though the mob knew it risked making a mistake, which in fact it had: the man was a Tamil."

► Horowitz (2001: 130)
And even identifiability is an outcome of politics.

Mechanisms II: Preference Based?

► Primordialism: Members of ethnic groups have “primordial” attachments (Kaplan)

Mechanisms II: Preference Based?

► But…


► Racism may be a volatile and eradicable construct that persists only so long as it is actively maintained through being linked to parallel systems of social alliance.

Mechanisms II: Preference Based?

► Some More sophisticated arguments:

- Members of ethnic groups have “like interests”?
- Members of ethnic groups have “Common Interests”?
- Evidence?

Mechanisms III: Other Information Based Arguments

► Technological argument:
  - “Ethnic Intermediaries”
  - Elites that must maintain captive support groups

► In-group Policing
  - Fearon and Laitin (1996)
  - In-group policing is a mechanism for resolving inter-group conflict

Mechanisms IV: Institutions-Based?

► Repeated Interaction
  - punishment strategies make opportunistic defection costly (Platteau 1994)
  - cf Greif (1993) on Maghrebi traders
Overview

► The Idea of Negritude
► Races in Africa
► The Idea of Race
► Race and Politics
► Choosing Between Rival Identitites

Negritude

► Re-evaluating the blackness, re-appropriating a term:
Marcus Garvey: blacks are "descendants of the greatest
and proudest race who ever peopled the earth."

► Strands
  • Cesaire: Historical development of black peoples
  • Sartre Hegelian approach:
    ➢ a Jew, a white among whites, can deny that he is a Jew, declaring
      himself a man among men. The black cannot deny that he is black nor
call his humanity as a black person an abstract, colorless humanity: he is black. Thus he
      driven to authenticity: insulted, enslaved, he raises himself up. He
      picks up the word "black" ["Negre"] that they had thrown at him like a
      stone, he asserts his blackness, facing the white man, with pride

Negritude

► Senghor: Essentialist interpretation

► To proceed it defines a personality type
  • Senghor there is an "eternal . . . black soul" based upon the
    categories of "emotion," "rhythmic attitude," and "humor"
    • "Emotion is black as Reason is Hellenic"

► And a mission:
  • De Bois: "the Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to civilization
    and humanity, which no other race can make...it is the duty of the Americans of
    Negro descent, as a body, to maintain their race identity, until this mission of
    the Negro people is accomplished"

Negritude

► Problems:
  1. It's constraining: "I am not a potentiality for
     something. I am fully that which I am." Fanon
  2. It relies on an identification of Black and African:
     is that valid?
  3. More deeply: it relies on a coherence of race as a
     concept: is that valid?

How Africa Became Black

► "[B]efore the arrival of white colonists,
Africa already harbored not just blacks
but...five of the world's six major divisions
of humanity, and three of them are confined
as natives to Africa...No other continent
approaches this human diversity."
  • Jared Diamond
Pygmy groups. C 200,000 dispersed among 200,000 blacks.

Khoisan include San and Khoi ("Hottentot" and "Bushmen").
- Archeological evidence of large declines in numbers in areas that are now Bantu areas.
- Dutch settlers also displace Khoisans more easily than "steel-equipped" Bantu groups.

Austronesians in Madagascar (Since perhaps 300 AD)

Greenberg

Claim: Semitic Languages are Afro-Asiatic and largely confined to Africa.
Note: No survival of language groups associated uniquely with Pygmy groups.
Note: Huge area associated with Bantu language group.

Greenberg

Claim: Linguistic evidence can be used to study major population movements.

Does Race Mean Anything Really?
Anthony Appiah: “No!”

Arguments for race hinge on incoherent ideas:
- 1. Common Descent
- 2. Common History
- 3. Common “Impulse”
- 4. Common Biological Features

Lineages
- The extraordinary Hamitic myth

Lineages
- Allow for the possibility that people outside the lineage are fundamentally different
  - and so inherently have different rights:
  - "The Touareg have no more reason to continue to exist than did the Redskins [in America]. Unfortunately the desert climate and the extraordinary camel present us with obstacles that the Americans did not have to face."
  - Rapport Politique du Cercle d’Agadez (September 1916)

Lineages
- Allow for the possibility that people outside the lineage are fundamentally different
  - and different allegiances and motivations:
  - "if they killed 15 blacks [nègres], we then killed 20 Tamacheqs...the Touareg and Maure populations are more or less complicit in the rebellion. We are willing to assume the right to judge them and to punish them."
  - [Black militia spokesman, Mali 1994]
Lineages?

We all come from the same lineages.

- Claim: “MRCA of the entire world is within historical times, 3000 BC - 1000 AD...Almost everybody is probably descended from Confucius”
  

- There are greater distances between some African groups than between some African and non-African groups.
  
  “The Hadzabe [Tanzania] and the Ju‘hoansi [Botswana] might be the oldest known split in the human family tree”
  
  Both have click languages
  
  Source: Alec Knight and Joanna Mountain

Common History

- Analogy with Locke’s discussion of personal identity: the problem is: you need to know the subject of the history before you can trace the history

An impulse?

- Appiah: In practice this is an a posteriori evaluation.
  
  In practice the definition of race is prior to the characteristics of the members of a race

So biology?

- Appiah: Evidence weak. Biological similarities almost as great between as within groups.
  
  The point of commonality seems to be simply the external features. But then the notion of race has no content.

So...

- The lineage idea might make limited sense but it is politically potent. It implies deep otherness.
  
  The shared history idea can not be used to define race, but can be used to mobilize: it implies shared rights
  
  The biological idea dehistorizes race. But much of the politics of race is about the construction.
  
  Malhadin’s discussion of the recialization of the Hutu / Tutsi distinction shows that biological features are of limited importance in the process.
  
  So we return to the politics

Choosing Allegiance: Citizenship or Ethnicity?

- Do co-ethnics on either side of borders express more attachment to national identities or to ethnic identities?

A Natural Experiment: Hausaland divided

- What does Hausaland divided look like?...
Citizenship or Ethnicity?

Finding (Miles and Rocheforte):

“People on the periphery express greater affinity for ethnically different co-citizens than for co-ethnics of different nationality”

Miles suggests: Military Rule, Closed Borders, Degree of Ethnic Heterogeneity?

But!: The salience of identity categories is context specific!

So: How can we study the impact of nationality, controlling for the type of identity category?

Malawi:
- Chewas and Timbukas are arch political enemies
- ... and social antagonism is acute

Zambia:
- Chewas and Timbukas are political allies
- ... and ethnic brethren

Why???
Measuring Difference: ELF?

$$ELF = 1 - \sum_i (share_i)^2$$

ELF fails to distinguish between politically different coalitional structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Relative Size</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Relative Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dinka (Afar)</td>
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<td>Venda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Other smaller groups</td>
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ELF fails to incorporate information on preferences

A Polarized Structure?

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<th>Share of Population</th>
<th>Low Income</th>
<th>High Income</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ELF fails to incorporate information on preferences

A Polarized Structure?

ELF is not helpful for forming policy

- Policy implications focus on the size of groups rather than on the interests of groups

“The creation or maintenance of extreme ethnic fractionalization may be more effective than economic development in ensuring that peace is maintained following violent conflict.”

Collier (1999)

Closing Puzzles

► Are cross national measures possible?
► What information should they contain?
► Should they only count “politically relevant” identities?
► Can they capture polarization?

Lecture 11: Class

Overview

1. Classes: what they are
2. The Economics: Using economic theory to predict common interests
3. The relation between inequality and development; Africa’s positions
4. The Politics: Collective Action Theory and Class Formation
5. Ethnicity and Class: A potent cocktail
6. How can you measure inequality?

► “The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African socialism and no parallel in African society. No class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans”

1965 Kenya Government Paper
1. What they are...

► “Objective” definition: Classes-in-themselves

- Often on the basis of income
- Sometimes in relation to educational or social background
- Defined in relation to economic interests.
- Sometimes on the basis of occupation...

Feudal Classes

More commonly in terms of the relations between individuals and the factors of production:

- Owners or controllers of capital vs. owners and controllers of labor
- Do you hire other people’s labor?
- Do you rely on capital owned by others?

This defines classes “in-themselves”

► What of classes “for-themselves”?

Classes for themselves...

► Class for itself: “A class of individuals conscious of sharing a common social situation and who unite to pursue common interests.”

- Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class.”

Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, Chapter 7

Classes for Themselves

► Some Problems

- If politics is prior to class, can class explain politics?
- Do we face the same analytic problems we encountered with the idea of race?

Implications

- We need to understand both the economic incentives of individuals and
- When and why individuals form groups to pursue those interests

Using “Class” to Study Politics

► If you accept that individuals are motivated by material interests

then

- Economic theory can often predict the motivations for whole classes of actors
- And collective action theory can predict which of those class interests will get acted upon
2. Economic Policies and Class Interests

- **Trade Policy**: Production possibilities...

- **Trade Policy**: ...together with preferences...

- **Trade Policy**: ...determine production levels and prices...

Note: The labor intensive good is more expensive on the world market (relative to the capital intensive good) than it is at home.

- **Trade Policy**: difference in prices produce gains from trade

...so, home should produce lots of the labor intensive good, sell it to others, and consume lots of the capital intensive good.

2. Economic Policies and Class Interests

- **Exchange Rate Policy**

  ...maintaining an overvalued exchange rate means that imported goods are cheaper than they would be otherwise but exports are more expensive than they would be otherwise.

- **Exchange Rate Policy**

  Overvalued exchange rates are good for:
  - Importers and industries with a lot of imported inputs
  - Consumers of imported goods
  - City people

  It is bad for:
  - Import Competing Industries
  - Exporters and producers of exportables
  - Country People
2. Economic Policies and Class Interests

- Inflation

Inflationary Policies can be good for:
- Borrowers
- The government

But bad for:
- Creditors
- People with liquid assets

Business groups are typically opposed to inflationary policies while unions are often more supportive.

3. Economic Policies and Class Interests

- These interests already depend on differentiation by occupation, asset ownership or wealth

But the division of populations into economic strata depends on the type and level of economic activity...

3. The Kuznets Curve

3. Inequality in Africa

- We expect poor, agricultural economies to be highly equal.

- But in Africa in particular because land is widely shared, there is little landlessness and production of export crops generally remains in the hands of rural workers

- Che Guevara stymied by the absence of a landless peasant class in Congo

3. Accounting for Inequality: Quantitative Evidence

  - Yes! Puzzlingly high levels of inequality in Africa are hard to explain.

  - Political measures can account for variation in inequality: Democracy has an inequality reducing effect only in relatively wealthy countries. Presidential systems typically most unequal

  - But a distinctly African (intercept) effect is still eliminated only if Africa is interacted with ELF: ELF is especially strongly associated with inequality in Africa

  - So again we need to treat these “objective” class differences as an outcome of politics and not just an input

4. So is it just politics?

- Class has a political not an economic basis
  - Michael Cohen: “Classes are categories of people sharing common political and economic interests arising from their access to public authorities and the public resources and opportunities which they control”

  - Richard Sklar: “Class relations, at bottom, are determined by relations of power, not production

  - Does this make the term useless for political analysis?
4. The Problem of Collective Action

► The Problem
- "rational, self-interested individuals will not act [voluntarily] to achieve their common or group interests" (Mancur Olson 1971)

► The Solutions. Successful collective action depends on:
- The degree of overlappingness of interests
  - If factors are sector specific, their interests may overlap more with their sector-group than with their class-group
- The size and concentration of the group
  - Agricultural interests are more difficult to organize than industrial interests
- The availability of selective incentives
  - Non-material allegiances

4. Explaining Variation

► Highly distributive policies can undermine the overlappingness of interests:
  - Provision of licenses and quotas instead of tariffs
  - Direct transfers of assets

► Neopatrimonialism undermines class formation:
  - Sklar: dominant classes should not need authoritarian rule, they can rule through markets
  - Ethnicity or other enforcers of collective action can provide potency to class interests:
    - The Zaghawa in Chad
    - The case of Zimbabwe

5. Zimbabwe case (until recently!)

► What happened? Despite the rhetoric:
  - White economic dominance protected by Mugabe
  - Black entrepreneurship undercut: standoff with the Indigenous Business Development Center
  - Leadership co-opted
  - Funds cut

► Why?
- White "ethno-class" economically useful but politically unthreatening
  - For more on this: see Scott Taylor
    "Race, class and neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe"

6. How do you measure inequality?

- Like ELF, the gini is not unique

Measuring Inequality

- Like ELF, the gini is not unique
Measuring Inequality

Like ELF, the gini is not unique

- A Large Extremely Poor Class
- No Middle Class
- Some extremely wealthy individuals
- Very Large Poor Class
- No Elite Class

Global Ginis


Global Ginis II

Source: Milanovic, 2003

Closing Remarks and Puzzles

- What changed in Zimbabwe?

- Why is class mobilization so low even in more vibrant democracies?

- If talking of classes implies a fallacy of composition, then is it also meaningless to talk of exploitation by one group of another?

- “When the missionaries came to Africa they had the Bible and we had the land. They said: ‘Let us pray.’ We closed our eyes. When we opened them, we had the Bible and they had the land.” (Desmond Tutu, 1984)
Religion

- Ubiquity
  - Bookstores, Journals,
  - Sounds, Processions
  - Schools
- Overlapping membership
- Cross-cutting, through class, through region
- Rising - "fundamentalist" revivalist movements

Structure

- Religion, Ethnicity and Class
- Religions in Africa
- Religion as a source of beliefs and attitudes
- Religion as a source of organization
- Spiritual power as political Power

1. Religion, Ethnicity and Class

- Dimensions of comparison
  - Is membership elective?
  - Is membership associated with a set of institutions
  - Are there common interests among members
  - Are members readily identifiable?

Consider recent statements by LRA

Can individuals elect to join the group?

Can membership in the group be inferred from names, dress or symbols?

Does the group have institutions and traditions that can be used to facilitate collective action?

- Institutions for leadership
- For doctrine
- For allegiance
Individual members have common interests and attitudes to public policy?

Yes
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. The Data

By 1935...roughly 80% of the entire African population was divided roughly equally between Islam and Christianity

Tshibangu et al.

2.1 Christianity

► Most complicit with colonialism
► Christians embraced Christian, “modern” education
► Christianity dominated publishing and the book trade
► Training of Africans for roles in Church hierarchy produces some confrontations between colonial and religious powers

2.1. Christianity

► Growth of African independent churches aiming to “indigenize” Christianity
► In 1970: 6,000 strictly independent African church organizations with congregations of 16 million
► 1990s: c 10,000 organizations, congregations of 33 m
  ► South Africa 3,000
  ► Nigeria 800
  ► Congo 600
  ► Church of Christ on Earth (Simon Kimbangu), c. 3m followers in Congo, Angola.
  ► Rwanda, Burundi
► Played a protest role: against colonialism
► Played a conservationist role: embedding traditional practices in new religious forms

2.2 Islam
Islam in Africa

2.2 Islam

- Countries where Islam has been declared a state religion:
  - Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Mauritania, Comoros

- States where Islam / Christian divide is contentious:
  - Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania

- Less complicit with colonialism (Although see Cruise O’Brien reading)
- Compromises reached
  - Colonial support given to Kur’anic schools
  - Protection of the use of Shari’a for local civil law cases
- Rejection of “modern”/Christian education made Islamic elites less suitable for posts in new independence administration
- Independence as an “Ambiguous Adventure”

2.3 Animism

- Non-proselytizing
- Typically monotheistic but with lesser deities / spiritual powers
- Prominent role of departed ancestors
- A continuum between the visible and the invisible worlds: Adverse events in the visible world explained by actions in the invisible world
- Existence of a pre-life and an after-life
- Prominent role in health practices

- Commonly mixed with other religious traditions
- Powerful practices: divination, Xala, evil eyes, stomach-eaters, penis snatchers
2.3 Of Witches and Weather

► Extreme rainfall (drought or flood) leads to a large increase in the murder of "witches" - typically elderly women killed by relatives - but not other murders. The results are consistent with a model where households near subsistence kill (or expel) relatively unproductive members to safeguard the nutritional status of other members.

► Ted Miguel, 2003

3 Religious Beliefs and Individual Traits

► "The magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duties based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important formative influences on conduct."

Max Weber 1905

Hypothesis 1: Catholicism anti-trade? "Homo mercator vix aut nulquam placere potest Deo"—a man acting as a merchant can do nothing pleasing to God.

Hypothesis 2 (Weber): The effect of Calvinist theology on individual psychology was to break the link between production and consumption: Produce diligently but practice the "avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life."

But: Little empirical support (cf Cavalcanti, Parente and Zhao, 2003)

4. Religion and Collective Action

- Policing of Boundaries
  - Seemingly irreconcilable world views

- Initiation Institutions
  - The Mau Mau case
  - A signaling mechanism?
  - A source of division? -- the MFDC

- Selective Incentives
  - Provides rival source of dignity
  - Invisible rewards

- International Connections
  - Notably Islam and Christianity

5. “Irrationality” and Politics

- Perennial reports of Consultations by leaders
  - Houphouet-Boigny
  - Kenneth Kaunda
  - Idi Amin
  - Mobutu
  - Ahmed Sekou Toure
  - Mathieu Kerekou
  - Yaya Jammeh
  - Moussa Troare
  - Omar Bongo

- Elsewhere? Papa Doc, Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan reportedly consulted astrologers?

5. Irrationality and Politics

- Imperfect separation of traditional practices and the public sphere
  - Taboo against recognizing traditional beliefs in the public sphere.
  - But witchcraft explicitly available to temporal sphere — to enhance political power

- Advantages of Cutting a Deal
  - If political leader appears to be supported by greater spiritual forces of the invisible world their position is less assailable
  - Through consultations, leaders can tap informational networks

- Disadvantages
  - The power cannot be easily centralized and converted into neopatrimonial power — spiritual attacks can be targeted, but benefits — e.g. rainfall — are difficult to master
  - Access to the power is too decentralized, too arbitrary, too open to interpretation
  - Through consultations, marabouts become brokers of power

- Ellis: Traditionalist powers provide a substitute for state power in cases where state powers collapse

Closing remarks and puzzles

- Ellis notes that religious leaders often head national conferences and committees; but can not, or do not, use these to take control of the state. Why?

- Do political leaders take recourse to the spiritual world because they believe in its effects; or because they believe others do? Does it matter?

Structure

1. Civil Society and CSOs: What is it?
2. What does it look like?
3. A Framework for analyzing state-society linkages
4. Strengths and Victories
5. Weaknesses and Failures
6. Case study: Kenya
1. What is it?

► Defined as a set of groups:

- The World Bank's definition of CSOs: "not-for-profit, non-governmental institutions, covering a wide range of organizations from development NGOs and think tanks to trade unions, foundations, faith-based organizations, community-based organizations and business associations."

► Defined in terms of their principles:

- "Democratic" is often part of the definition
- There are often debates about whether to include Islamic groups or ethnic groups in the definition (cf. Monga)

► Sometimes in relation to the state:

- Larry Diamond: Civil society is the realm of organized social life that is open, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable. (1997, 5)

► Sometimes in opposition to the state:

- "that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and . . . can . . . prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society" (Gellner, 1994, 5)

► Sometimes in terms of their voluntary nature and in terms of non-political aims

- Michael Walzer: civil society is "the space of [politically] uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space" (1990, 293).

► Defined in terms of their radicalism:

- Monga: Civil society (in Africa) is "all those who are able to manage and steer communal anger"
1. What is it?

► Note that no definitions exclude oppositional political parties on analytic grounds, many do not exclude private sector organizations on analytic grounds

► But in practice...

1. What is it?: In practice

► Tends to include “horizontally” organized groups
  - Labor unions
  - Farmers associations
  - Bar associations
  - Trade unions
  - Student Associations
  - Business unions
  - Journalists and intellectuals
  - Women’s tontines or rosacas (Tripp)

► And “vertically” organized groups
  - Social origin
  - Ethnicity
  - Age
  - Church based groups

2. What do they look like?

[Image ofcompass]

Source: Barr, Fafchamps and Owens

Revenues of Ugandan NGOs

| Source: Barr, Fafchamps and Owens |

2/3 of Ugandan NGOs also run a business

Table 2: No revenue

South Africa: Swilling & Russell 2002. The Size and Scope of the Non-profit Sector of South Africa. Graduate School of Public and Development Management (P&DM), University of the Witwatersrand and The Centre for Civil Society, University of Natal.

2. What do they look like?

International Connections

Announcements for Proprietary Exhibitions (APE) Market for Partners Worldwide - July 2003

Source: Barr, Fafchamps and Owens

Financing of Civil Society

650 000 workers

Table 2: No revenue
2. What do they look like? Internationally supported formal role in policy making

► Recent statements by the World Bank, OECD and others:
  - "During Mr. Wolfensohn's tenure as Bank President from 1995 to present, the Bank has placed a high priority on strengthening its engagement with CSOs, including appointing staff in the Bank's country offices to facilitate these relations. Civic engagement is now an integral piece of the Bank's overall strategy, and, its two goals of strengthening the investment climate and empowerment in developing countries.”
  - World Bank Discussion Paper: "Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations"

► NGO involvement in World Bank and IMF PRSP processes
  - National Governments in charge of process
  - But required to make them "participatory"

3. State-Society Linkages

3.1. The Problem of Regulation

► "3,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country and only 150 have submitted their annual reports and statements of accounts to the Social Welfare Department...Most NGOs spend around 80% of the money available to them from government agencies or foreign sponsors as administrative costs, for which they do not rend proper accounts...NGOs are meant to be philanthropic, but many are fake and take a share of the money for their personal use."

► New regulations, and in Ghana now, blacklisting

3.2. The Legitimacy Problem

► NGOs should "be at the top of every conservative's watch list."
Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, November 2003

► "NGOs too sometimes attempt to defend their legitimacy without any reference to fundamental political rights. They insist that they «represent» civil society and thus lay claim to a representational function which, barring trade unions or farmers' organisations, virtually no NGO has."

3.3. Conceptualizing State-Society Linkages

► Relevant dimensions of variation:
  - How much does the state control state-society interactions?
  - How great a role does civil society play in public policy making?
4. Successes for Civil Society

- Congress of Trade Unions (Chiluba) v. Kaunda in Zambia
  - Initial debates on multipartyism take place in "The National Mirror" (Church sponsored newspaper)
  - Student and labor groups, labor and interest groups

- Women’s Forum in Sierra Leone, 1996
- Women’s protests?

Our next two vignettes:
- The National Conference v. Kerekou in Benin
- The Deposition of Traoré in Mali

5. Weaknesses

- Elitist—well educated, well traveled, well sought-after; often dictatorial in structure

- Reliance on financing from foreign governments and international NGOs; perceptions of undue foreign influences

- Vulnerable to government attempts to control them through legislation (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe) or control over employment (Ethiopia, Ghana)

- Weakened by weak private sector that could support non-governmental middle class

5. Vulnerable to co-optation

- If you fight for democracy, what happens if you get it?

- Because of weakness of state structures, CSOs often developed in response to individual leaders rather than in opposition to state structures

5. Obstacles

1. Small middle class

Source: World Bank

5. Little Freedom of the Press

Source: Reporters Without Borders
5. Freedom of the Press

6. Case Study: Kenya

- Donors want to fund through NGOs, but in doing so they may change the incentives of participants.
- Study of women’s groups in Busia and Teso districts in western Kenya, typically 20 members, 80% women, members typically 40 years old and with 5 years of formal education.
- In study 40 out of 80 groups were randomly selected for funding and support from a Dutch international NGO.

6. Case Study: Kenya

- Two days of group management and leadership training for three group members including the principal officers, five days of practical and experiential training on agricultural practices for four group members, and agricultural inputs.
- About $800 in investments per group.

6. Case Study: Kenya

- Outcome?
  - Changes in composition of groups
  - More turnover among group members
  - Increased entry into groups and group leadership by younger, more educated women
  - New entrants to program groups were more likely to have a salaried or formal sector job.
  - More men enter in leadership positions in women’s organizations.
  - So “providing development assistance to indigenous organizations of the disadvantaged may change the characteristics that made these organizations attractive to funders in the first place.”

Structure

- Three waves of democratization
- Africa’s two waves
- Explaining the second wave: hypotheses
- Explaining the second wave: evidence
- Democratic consolidation
Democracy

“In 1965, free and fair elections were held in the DRC with no Jimmy Carters and other international observers. Of the 137 parliamentary seats being contested, there were challenges to the results in five constituencies only! What, then, changed between then and now?”

From remarks to UNDP by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Democratization (Huntington)

- Three waves?
  1. Early 19th century until 1920s (29 democracies). Ebb (12 democracies)
  2. WWII until 1962 (36 democracies.) Ebb (30)

Transformation, replacement, and transplacement

“The two most decisive factors affecting the future consolidation and expansion of democracy will be economic development and political leadership”

Democratization in Africa

- More like two waves in Africa

Democratization in Africa

- More like two waves in Africa

Africa’s first wave

- Democracy part of independence act everywhere except conflict countries (Algeria, Western Sahara, Portuguese colonies)

- International forces:
  - Western bloc initially pro-democracy
  - Soviet block also supportive of democracy in Africa because it allowed space for competition

- Domestic forces
  - Granted international respectability
  - Supportive because it allowed space for opposition to colonial rule

The Ebb

- Doctrine of mass single party embraced by Bourguiba, Nkrumah, Toure, Nyerere
  - (See Government of Tanzania Report of the Presidential Commission)

- Supported by cold war powers
- And by intellectuals
- Why?
Arguments for One Party Rule

- **The Economic Argument**: Focus on state-led economic development
  - The Soviet model
  - Competitive democracy considered a luxury
  - Modernization theory suggested that economic development precedes democratization

- **The unity argument**: “one party, one leader, one government and no nonsense about it” Hastings Banda (July 1964)

- **The tradition argument**: “Democracy is not for Africa. There was only one African chief and he ruled for life.” Mobutu

---

Political Change Between the Waves: Coup d’Etats

- A coup d’etat “the sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group” McGowan

  - About 80 successful coups d’etat in SSA
  - A further 108 failed attempts

---

But some variations

- Some competition within single party regimes:
  - Tanzania, Zambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali...
  - Elite safe
  - Contestation on the ground

- Some “assigned” spaces on ideological spectrum
  - 1976, Senegal opens up a space on either side of the PS
  - Contestation on the ground

- Some cases of failed democratization
  - Ghana, 1979, under Rawlings, but new coup 1981
  - Nigeria under Obasanjo, 1979, but rigging in 1983 and a new coup
  - Algeria 1988-1992—forcing opening up by the FLN

---

The Second Wave

- Beginning 1990s
  - By late 1990s liberalization in all but Libya and Sudan
  - 70 multi-candidate presidential elections in the 1990s
  - Now multiple countries have had changes of government due to elections (not including “founding” elections):
    - Cape Verde, Sao Tome e Principe, Benin, Mali, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia
Change in 1990s. Routes to Change
► Managed Transitions: Overly optimistic elections (Kaunda, Banda)
  • In 1991, when aides came to inform him that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had lost the presidential election, the late Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko is said to have responded as follows: “How stupid? How can you lose an election that you organized?”
► National Conferences—Benin, R Congo, Niger; Togo, Zaire
  • Typically resulted in winner-take-all outcomes
  • Sustained struggles and “Pacted transitions”—South Africa
  • Elections as part of civil war settlements: Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia
  • Fig leaf democratizations? Kenya, Cameroon...
  • Stab Collapse

Models of Democratic Transition
► Modernization “Theory”
► Przeworski— “happens by chance, sticks if rich”
► Bratton and Van de Walle — “self-implosion of patrimonialism brings crisis”

...Failed to overcome ethnic divisions
► Ethnic favoritism
  • Moi: the Kalenjin
  • Biafra: the Bete
  • Eyadema: the Kabye
  • Rawlings: the Ewe

...Failed to bring development
► 1980s were the worst period in Africa’s growth history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>East Asia and Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ndulu and O’Connell, ‘Background Information on Economic Growth’.
Explanations 2. International Effects

- **Demonstration Effect** from Eastern Europe
  - *"...la France liera tout son effort de contribution aux efforts qui seront accomplis pour aller vers plus de liberté."*
  - 20 June 1990. Mitterand’s discours de La Baule
  - But this depends on international usefulness of different leaders—Mobutu bouyed by Rwanda

Explanations 3. Experiences of Democracy

- A past history of democratic politics increases the impulse towards re-establishment of democracy?
  - Existence of Democratic institutions
  - A democratic culture and vision
  - Fixed effects
  - Indeed democratic history increases likelihood of organized application

  Or is the effect the opposite?
  Those countries with the least experience have the greatest hunger...

Supply Side

- Liberalization distracts from failure
  - Required to continue receiving international support
  - Repressive capacities weak

Evidence: Economic Factors

- Modernization theory has limited explanatory power within Africa:
  - But
    - Botswana and Mauritius among the wealthiest
    - Mali, Niger, Benin among the poorest.
  - Paired Comparisons
    - Mali v Burkina Faso;
    - Togo v Benin
  - Przeworski Theory?
    - But no consolidation in urbanized Zambia or oil rich Congo, consolidation in Niger

Evidence: Economic Factors

- Cross-national variation in income, growth or crisis, does not explain variation in liberalization within Africa (Bratton and van de Walle)
  - Economic reforms negatively associated with liberalization
    - Reduced international pressure and
    - Avoided fiscal crises
    - Conditional on protests, poorer countries liberalize more quickly
Evidence: Democratic history

- The more past elections the weaker the liberalization
  - Democratic traditions were not strong enough to produce a program for new democracies
  - And indeed the effect seems to work in the opposite direction
- Direct and indirect effects of democratic history

Explaining Variation Between Francophone and Anglophone Democratization

- Widner’s **Dependent Variable**: The timing of democratization
- Stylized fact: This happened faster in Francophone countries
- **Explanations**
  - Incentives for Protest
  - Access of public to policy makers
  - Electoral incentives

Explaining Variation Between Francophone and Anglophone Democratization

- **I Rival Rent Seeking Opportunities: Supranational Currency Boards**
  - Anglophone Countries Used Macro Policies: Budget deficits → Import Controls, tariffs, licenses, Currency Controls → Price Controls
  - Francophone: More public sector employment
  - So, Francophone elites more severely hit by public sector contractions

Explaining Variation Between Francophone and Anglophone Democratization

- **II Different Outlets for Political Communications**
  - Anglophone Countries: Informal Associations
  - Francophone: More “Neo-traditional Corporatist Institutions”—more highly centralized, more cohesive
  - Hence francophone groups can mobilize quickly, but also negotiate rapidly with the center

Explaining Variation Between Francophone and Anglophone Democratization

- **III Electoral Systems in One Party States**
  - Anglophone Countries: multicandidate competition in single member districts
  - Francophone: party list voting
  - Hence Anglophone electoral systems were more competitive: and so leaders were more likely to lose.
Democratic Consolidation

The evolution of election dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of elections, 1994-2000</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties competing</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties winning seat</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats to winner</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of votes to winner</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Van de Walle 2003

Democratic Consolidation

- Resilience of ex single parties
  - Ex single parties have been successful, in 15 multiparty systems, pre 1989 single parties were still in power in 2002 and formed main opposition in another 8 countries

- Winners of transition elections typically consolidated positions in 2nd elections

Democratic Consolidation

- African polities have a large numbers of parties
  - 17/87 legislatures studied by van de Walle had 10 or more parties

- Nonetheless, there is typically one dominant party
  - Three quarters of Africa legislatures have ENP ≤3

Democratic Consolidation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FP/T</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>TRS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of cases</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties in legislature</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats to winner</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Electoral rules and party systems

Source: Van de Walle 2003

Consolidation: The Impact of First Elections

Table 1: Transition Dynamics and Democratic Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FP/T</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next class: Policy Choices I
Policy Choices

I Policies matter
II Alternative routes
   - African Capitalism
   - African Populist Socialism
   - Afro-Marxist Strategies
III Urban Bias as an Explanation for failure
IV A policy driven failure: Ujamaa
V Patronage driven failures: Corruption failures

Now, what are the alternatives?

I Policies Matter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>GDP growth (annual %)</th>
<th>CPIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary GDP share</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political constraints</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial constraints</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge constraints</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II Policy Headaches

So you have a state... what do you do with it

Political constraints: what constituencies should you satisfy?
Financial constraints: Where are you going to get money from?
Knowledge constraints: What works? What are your expenditure priorities going to be?

II.1 The Capitalist Path

- Fundamental policy questions:
  - Industrialization or agriculture
  - Diversification or specialization
  - Markets or States
  - Diverging Answers:
    - Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire

- Capitalist: Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Cameroon, Malawi, Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius (Nigeria)
  - Aimed at expansion of primary commodity exports
  - Encouraged domestic business classes
  - Encouraged private direct investment for import substituting industries
  - Cote d'Ivoire: Strong role for French capital
  - 1984: Foreigners held c. half of senior management positions in major Ivorian manufacturing enterprises
  - Industry grew from 14% to 29% of GDP over 20 years

Exceptionalism: Mauritius: Manufacturing export led growth: EPZs

Source: Daron Acemoglu
II.2 The “Populist” African Socialist Path

- Tanzania, Ghana, Guinea
  - Aimed for self reliance in production and trade
  - Nationalist and stress on local ownership
  - Controlled exchange rates and capital mobility
  - Aimed to reduce inequalities
  - Prevent the emergence of rural elites
  - Subsidies for public services and basic commodities
  - Aimed to foster industrialization
  - Requirement for big projects so deals with foreign capital
  - Agriculture hit in Ghana: In Ghana 1965 producer price was 65% of FOB price
  - Agriculture promoted in Tanzania

Comparative Growth Rates:
- Average combined growth rate for Ghana, Tanzania, Guinea, Mali: 1960-1979: 0.7%
- (3.6% GNP growth rates)
- Difficult to argue that policy choice was endogenous to expected performance
- However growth collapse in both sets of countries in 1980s

III Common Characteristic: Urban Bias

- Cities
  - That’s where you are,
  - That’s where the civil servants are
  - That’s where your political rivals are
  - That’s where the soldiers are

- Ghana - 1972: Operation Feed Yourself
- Liberia 1979: the Easter Rebellion

Playing with prices:
- To alter consumption or production patterns; e.g. to produce certain crops, to send children to school
- To transfer income between groups

The Problem

Supply
Demand
Food Prices
Desired price
Food Production

Squeezing Farmers: The Solution?

- Depress prices: Use monopsonistic marketing boards
- Set production targets centrally
- Provide subsidies
Squeezing Farmers: The Results

► Depress prices: Use monopsonistic marketing boards
  - Farmers produce less
  - They switch to non-marketable crops
  - They sell on the black market
  - They hoard
  - They come to the cities
► Set production targets centrally
  - Coercion required
► Provide subsidies
  - Elite farmers privileged
  - Inefficient production encouraged
► Overall: Less production, more pressure on prices, unsustainability

Ujamaa: The history

► In principle
  - Voluntary
  - Builds on African traditions; communalism
  - Decentralized
  - An attitude of mind: prices and wages

► In practice:
  - Rejects tradition
  - Centralized
  - Vilagization to benefit from returns to scale
  - Withholding of supplies
  - Coerced
  - Withholding of supplies
  - Fines and penalties
  - 1974-76 about 80% of the peasant population resettled
  - Decisions by the Center
  - Accompanied by wage and price controls: principles of socialist pricing

Bureaucratic Incentives: Ujamaa

► Policy Choices and Bureaucratic Incentives
► Quantifiable criteria
► Planning promotes aesthetic values over pragmatic values:
  - "Proper villages"
  - Rectangular fields
  - Monocropping
► Linear villages have administrative rationale but no economic rationale

Outcomes

► System ignored local knowledge
► Like the more capitalist systems it ignored producer incentives
► Results:
  - Peasants retreated: maintained private plots
  - Targets not met, agriculture collapsed
V Corruption

- Common Definitions:
  - The World Bank: "the abuse of public office for private gain"
  - OECD: "The use of public office for private gains"
  - Nye: "Behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains.

"Corruption is evil: it's the cancer of democracy and undermines public confidence. Everybody who is caught, will have no protection from me," Malawi’s President Muluzi, February 2004

Possible Benefits...

- The "grease" mechanism: You can avoid bureaucratic delays: "speed money"
  - ...especially in cases where bureaucratic machinery is overly cumbersome

- the "incentives" mechanism: If bribes work at a piece rate they can have better work incentives on government employees whose salaries are otherwise fixed
  - ...especially in cases where bureaucrats are poorly incentivized

But multiple costs

- Economic: Distorts Incentives
  - Inefficient investments

- Social: Inequity, Injustice
  - Wealthy off the hook
    - Allows markets to mediate transactions that we may not wish to be driven by markets (vote transfers, judicial decisions, market produces inappropriate prices)

- Political Processes: Undermines institutions
  - Reduces tax base (and so cash for salaries)

Besides Loot: The political benefits of corruption

- "A dog with a bone in his mouth cannot do two things. He cannot bark and he cannot bite"
  - Porfirio Diaz

- "Better to be inside the garden pissing out than outside the garden pissing in"

Ethnicity and Patronage:

Is socialism particularly hard in ethnically divided societies?

- Collier and Garg (1998) use data on towns that differ as to which tribe is locally dominant. They find:
  - Kin groups function as patronage systems, reducing the efficiency of promotions to the advantage of the dominant kin group.
  - In the public sector the locally dominant group exacts a 25 percent wage premium for its members.
  - In the private sector there is no such premium.
  - They argue that are stronger incentives to restrain kin group patronage in the private sector.
  - Hence ethnicity appears to have particularly negative effects on public sector delivery.

Social capital and patronage

► The Curse of Close Ties: “Social capital” can facilitate corruption

► Especially when elite group is small:
  - Lack of a tradition of a public domain
  - Non-anonymous societies (cf Trovoada)

Weak evidence of a relation within the African Sample

However, strong cross-regional evidence: Mauro

► Looks at the relationship between corruption and growth
► Because of the problem of endogeneity, he uses ELF as an instrument for corruption:
► Argument: More ethnic homogeneity leads to more efficient joint bribe maximization
► Finds: Corruption lowers private investment even in countries where bureaucracy is cumbersome

- Ethnic diversification and corruption are strongly correlated globally.

- Are they related in Africa?

Clear distributive Effects of Corruption:

**Hypothesis**: Corruption may be relatively pro-poor in cases where bureaucratic rules disfavor poor groups.

Especially bad for the poor:

Controlling for natural resource abundance, initial income of the poor, secondary schooling, inequality in land and education and overall income growth.

And especially good for the rich...

- Sani Abacha: Nigeria, $4.3 bn
- Felix Houphouet-Boigny: Ivory Coast, $3.5 bn
- Ibrahim Babangida: Nigeria, $3.0 bn
- Mobutu Sese Seko: Zaire, $2.2 bn
- Moussa Traore: Mali, $1.8 bn
- Henri Konan Bedie: Ivory Coast, $200 m
- Denis Sassou Nguesso: Congo, $120 m
- Omar Bongo: Gabon, $50 m
- Paul Biya: Cameroon, $45 m
- Haile Mariam: Ethiopia, $20 m

What do you need to be corrupt?

- A monopoly
- Discretion
- Ambiguity
  - i.e. the conditions put in place by the policies of the 1960s and 1970s

By early 1980s it was clear that all paths had failed and what was needed was a big change:

Enter: Structural Adjustment

Lecture Overview

- I Policy Conditionality: The Idea and the Actors
- II The Political Problem
- III The Political Responses: 3 Rival Routes
- IV The Outcome
- V Explanation
- VI Where are we now

I Policy Conditionality: The Idea

The problem:
- Growth collapses
- Poorly performing government enterprises (Nellis, 1986: 62% of public enterprises sampled showed net losses, 36% had negative net worth)
  - Inefficient
  - Used for corruption
- Trade regimes used for private benefits: licenses
- Macroeconomic instability deters investment
- Producer price controls making things worse

The Context: General rise of neoliberalism

The Main Actor: World Bank

- Established 1944
- Borrows from rich countries, lends to poor
- First loan of $250 million was to France in 1947 for post-war reconstruction.
- Initially 38 members, now 183 members
Shares

- Votes based on shares held:
  - Gambia: 793
  - Botswana: 865
  - Sudan: 1,100
  - Senegal: 2,322
  - Nigeria: 12,905
  - South Africa: 13,712
  - India: 45,045
  - United States: 265,219

Mandates

- World Bank original mandate:
  - to "reduce poverty and improve living standards by promoting growth and investing in people"
  - "Our dream is a world free of poverty"

- IMF mandate: to “help promote trade, regulate the international monetary system, and act as a lender of last resort for countries in economic crisis”

- You must join the fund in order to join the Bank

Bilateral Aid

- United States: USAID 1961
- Britain: DFID (prev. ODA) 1964
- Sweden: SIDA 1965
- Canada: CIDA 1968
- Japan: JICA 1974
- Germany: GTZ 1975

The Strategy: Structural Adjustment

- 5 February 1980—Robert McNamara received approval for SALs from the World Bank Board
- Berg report helps produce broad support
- Academic analyses also -- e.g. Bates

- Aims:
  - Provide Macroeconomic Stability
  - Maintain growth

Sustained Rise in Conditionality

II The Political Implications

- Effective transfers: from urban consumers to rural producers; from civil servants to private sector workers
- Less political choice: redundancy of decision-making processes: weakening of institutions

- Less pork:
  - Losses in revenues—relatively high dependence on trade taxes
  - Losses in control over allocations of goods and services (and less access to secrecy)
  - Less jobs to provide
  - Hence, less flexibility in the face of crisis
The Fundamental Tension

► Can you have economic decentralization without political decentralization?
  - If the previous economic policies were designed to hold political coalitions together, then removing those policies weakens those coalitions
  - Friends are hurt, enemies become stronger

No built-in political solution

► Herbst criticism: The SAPs had no vision of how politics ought to be reshaped
  - Focus mostly on reducing the activities and the size of the state, and calling for "good governance"
  - ECA 1983: "What is required from African governments is to make it possible for the population to interrelate positively with all the development variables: natural and financial resources, development institutions, local and foreign technologies"
  - Lack of a vision particularly severe in Africa where development strategies and political process presuppose centralized power...

III Resolving the Tension: 3 Routes

1. Do the economic reform and have more contentious politics: possibly leading to political from the bottom or from the top
   - Aim to demonstrate that reforms help many and open up politically
   - Shift your constituencies

2. Manage the economic reforms in ways that strengthen you politically:
   - privatize to friends
   - shift blame
   - use scarcities and sackings to your advantage

3. Fake the reforms

Route I: Reform and Collapse in Sierra Leone

► Joseph Momoh
► 1990: Reforms, first with World bank, then unilaterally.
► Price hikes
► Foreign exchange shortages
► Petrol shortages
► Food shortages: State Collapse, Civil War

Route II: Managing the Reforms in Morocco

► April 1979-May 1981: Amidst high unemployment, flour prices rise 80%, cooking oil rises by 75%, sugar: 97% while salaries rise by 20-29%
► Riots—1981, 1984 gave role for magnanimity
► Policy of International Blame
► But some continue to benefit: large scale animal raisers sold grain at 60% below market price, similarly with sugar (Akesbi)
► Privatization to the King’s Company, ONA
► Some political liberalization, long terms hold on political power

Route III: Faking reforms in Zaire

► World Bank and IMF lent billions to Mobutu: $375m between 1984 and 1986, $370m in new loans 1987
► Some actions: 1984:46,000 teachers (20% of total) fired
► But overall: little impact on distortionary policies: Debts rescheduled 11 times between 1975 and 1987
Resistance
► From Governments: Sometimes complicity, sometimes standoffs
► Academic community tries to work out why these optimal policies are not introduced
► Period of massive activity by national and international NGOs “50 Years is Enough”, “Faith and Credit”

IV The Outcome: Failure
► Negative relations between loans and growth
  • Przeworski and Vreeland (2000)
  • Barro and Lee (2002)
► Of 12 intensive loan countries, only 2 had positive growth: Uganda and Ghana

Failure: The Repeat Offenders
► 26 Adjustment Loans to Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire
► None of the top 20 recipients of adjustment lending over 1980-99 were able to achieve reasonable growth and contain all policy distortions
► About half the adjustment loan recipients exhibit “severe distortions” regardless of the number of cumulative adjustment loans

Regional Trends in the HDI

Regional Trends in Income per capita

Life expectancy and income in SSA

Source: UNDP. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Stewart | Poverty Workshop, 31 March 2003
Development Reversals

(Based on the Human Development Index, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI lower than in 1975</th>
<th>HDI lower than in 1980</th>
<th>HDI lower than in 1985</th>
<th>HDI lower than in 1990</th>
<th>HDI lower than in 1995</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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Source: http://hdr.undp.org/hdi and (second source here)

V Explanation for Failure

► I The selection problem: They were implemented only in the worst places, so of course you see a negative correlation.
   ▪ Actually, they were often implemented in places where success seemed likely. Countries with deep state collapse did not have programs.
   ▪ Instrumental variables approaches have not salvaged the SAPs (e.g. Easterly 2002, "What did structural adjustment adjust?")

Explanation for Failure

► II The conditionality problem: The problem with conditional aid is the *conditionality* not the policies
   ▪ Evidence (Burnside and Dollar): if you condition on the policies that countries are employing, then you find that aid increases growth: hence aid helps growth if (and only if) the policies are good
   ▪ But: If you use a richer dataset, you find aid doesn’t help even if the policies are good (e.g. Easterly 2003, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?”)

Explanation for Failure

► III Commitment Problems
   ▪ Because IFIs have their own interests, it is too hard for IFIs *not* to give loans
   ▪ The probability of receiving another adjustment loan does not decrease with the number of loans already received: no satiation (Easterly 2002)
   ▪ The selection problem of repeated loans: would these countries have done worse without repeated loans? Or do they provide strong evidence that loan conditionality is not the right strategy.

The logic of conditionality

The double commitment problem:
The logic of conditionality

► The double commitment problem:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>National Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give SA Loan</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Not Give Loan</td>
<td>Don't Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2,1)  
(-1,-2)  
(1,2)  
(0,0)

Explanation for Failure

► IV The ownership problem: Because these were largely imposed by the outside:
  - They were inappropriate: one size does not fit all
  - Domestic institutions were undermined
  - The stakeholders were not behind them

Solution: Participative approaches to strategy formulation. Will it work?

Other Explanations for Failure

► They were never fully implemented
  - Are partial reforms worse than no reforms?
► The "corruption" actually helped more people than we thought
  - Income from public sector jobs was widely distributed
► Structural adjustment is not enough:
  - "the investment climate issues turned out to be so serious in some of the African countries, that reducing import tariffs really didn't have very much effect. Tariffs were a barrier, certainly, but experience suggests that other barriers were more important.” David Dollar 2004
  - They were the wrong policies

V Where we are now

► 26 countries are receiving debt relief projected to amount to US$40 billion over time
► PRSPs introduced in 1999 as a requirement for low-income countries to receive debt relief through the HIPC
► Millennium challenge account places ex ante conditionalities

Next lecture:

- Geography
- Policies
- Politics
- Bringing it all together

Lecture 22: Growth
Structure of Lecture

► I. The Multiple channels: exogenous, endogenous, domestic, international
► II. A (qualitative) comparative approach
► III. Some growth theory: the Solow model and a poverty trap model
► IV. Growth regressions
► V. Dealing with endogeneity
► VI. Closing remarks

A Heuristic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>Foreign interventions in political economy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dictatorship and oppression</td>
<td>Foreign Trade barriers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Neopatrimonialism</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inefficient Bureaucracies</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment and Debt</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Wars</td>
<td>(Domestic) exchange rate and trade policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Destiny | | |
|---------| | |
| Geography: Health and Productivity | Small States |
| Fractionalization | Lack of access to trade |
| Colonial Heritage | Terms of trade volatility |

A Domestic-Destiny

► Tropical (cf Sachs and Bloom, Hoeffler 1999)
► Health: malaria, typanosomiasis …
► Tropical agriculture (rainforest, wet-dry tropics)

A Ethnicity

► Fractionalization associated with lower growth (Easterly and Levine)
► But: High fractionalization reduces growth rates by 3% in dictatorships. *No effect in democracies*

A Small States

► Less efficient governments
► Fail to benefit from gains from trade (although sometimes inter-district trade was banned)
► Less innovation
► Viewed as more risky by investors
► Econometric Evidence: weak
► But size (and its effects) can be attributed to policy choices

B Domestic--Policy

► Political Instability
► Dictatorship and oppression
► Neopatrimonialism
► Civil Wars

Collier and Gunning (JEP 1999)
B Democracies and Bureaucracies

► Public sector employment used as an instrument for redistribution

► Ratio of wage to non-wage expenditure is double what it is in Asia

► Implications for functioning of markets...

B Functioning of Markets

► Sins of Omission: Lack of public goods provision
  • Lack of publicly supplied electricity
  • High fixed costs for generators
  • Weak distribution networks → large inventories
  • Weak or corrupt courts → more vetting of partners

► Sins of Commission: Barriers to entry
  • Formal: (Kenya: “letters of no objection”; Uganda: Coffee only by rail…)
  • Lack of Credit
  • Lack of financial depth (Evidence: Weak)
  • Expropriation Risks

► But many of these domestic effects are affected by international relations

C External--Destiny

► Landlocked (Evidence: strong)

► Declining terms of trade and price shocks

► Borders

► Again, the impact of land-lockedness depends on endogenous features, (e.g. trade patterns -- cf Switzerland)

D External--Policy

► Aid: for better or for worse? Most evidence implies almost no effect.

► Export crop taxation (Evidence: strong case study evidence of negative impacts)

► Overvaluation (Some strong cross national evidence)

► High indebtedness discourages investment (fears of higher future taxation)

► So many explanations
A (qualitative) Comparative Approach

Collier and Gunning (JEL 1999):
► Conflict Countries in 1990s: (12% of population)
► Peaceful countries with inflation >25% (43% of population):
► Peaceful, non-inflationary countries with “distributive” policies (12% of population):
► The rest: (26% of population):

A Natural Experiment Approach

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A Natural Experiment Approach

Problems:
► We only see quick reforms
► We can only see early effects
► Non random sample of countries
► Complex causation
A Modeling Approach

We have a production function:

\[ Y = A \cdot K^a \]  
(with \( a \) between 0 and 1)

We have an expression relating investment to savings:

\[ I = s \cdot Y \]

And a law that governs the accumulation of capital:

\[ K(t+1) = K(t) + s \cdot Y - d \cdot K(t) \]

So the change in the capital stock can be written:

\[ K(t+1) - K(t) = s \cdot A \cdot K(t)^a - d \cdot K(t) \]

Implications

- Wealth is higher when:
  - Investment and savings levels are high
  - When capital depreciation is low
  - When technology is efficient

- Growth rates are higher:
  - When income is lower
  - (When technology evolves)
  - (When population growth rates are lower)
  - But eventually reaches a steady state

- Countries “converge” to their steady state

The simplest neoclassical growth model

We have a production function:

\[ Y = f(K) \]  
(sometimes convex, sometimes concave)

We have an expression relating investment to savings:

\[ I = s \cdot Y \]

And a law that governs the accumulation of capital:

\[ K(t+1) = K(t) + s \cdot Y - d \cdot K(t) \]

So the change in the capital stock can be written:

\[ K(t+1) - K(t) = s \cdot f(K) - d \cdot K(t) \]

Implications

- There are two “stable’ steady states—a high income steady state and a low income steady state

- To move from the low income equilibrium to the high income equilibrium you need a big increase in capital.

The Primacy of Traps

- High fertility—high infant mortality equilibrium
  - Less labor outside the home
  - More labor in the home but less investment in children

- Low income—high liquidity equilibrium
  - Because of risky agriculture, agents use asses for smoothing instead of for investing

- Low levels of trade—Low level of specialization
  - Don’t capitalize on gains from trade (static)
  - Lack of technology transfer (dynamic)
  - Lack of risk sharing (dynamic)

- Low levels of manufacturing—obstacles to transaction intensive production

- Volatility \( \rightarrow \) Low Investment \( \rightarrow \) Volatility

- “Bad neighborhood” effects
**Growth Theory: Where's The Politics?**

- The "A" term: how capital is converted into output. Depends on:
  - How well markets function
  - What technology is available

- The "s" and "d" terms: the decision to invest capital (and to maintain capital). Depends on:
  - Perceived risks for investors
    - Will cash be taken?
    - Will investments be expropriated?
    - Is it better to wait?
  - Liquidity requirements
  - Can you afford to tie up your money

**Suggested relationship:**

\[ \text{Growth} = f(\text{past income levels}, \text{investment rates}, \text{measures of human capital}, \text{political and economic determinants of the A term, political and economic determinants of the s and d terms}) \]

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real gross product</td>
<td>0.079 (4.72)</td>
<td>0.060 (2.40)</td>
<td>0.043 (2.01)</td>
<td>0.053 (2.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.000 (4.97)</td>
<td>0.000 (15.98)</td>
<td>0.000 (28.02)</td>
<td>0.000 (15.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP/cap.</td>
<td>0.005 (7.22)</td>
<td>0.005 (7.22)</td>
<td>0.005 (7.22)</td>
<td>0.005 (7.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.010 (1.94)</td>
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<td>Fiscal stance</td>
<td>0.015 (1.24)</td>
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<td>Aerial conditions</td>
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<td>Initial income</td>
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<td>0.000 (1.00)</td>
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<td>Labor mobility</td>
<td>0.000 (1.00)</td>
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<td>Male education</td>
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<td>Female schooling</td>
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<td>0.000 (1.00)</td>
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<td>0.000 (1.00)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Collier and Gunning 1999

Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP, measured over the full period in Barron and Lee, and Sachs and Warner, and as decade averages (with decade dummy variables) in Eastern and Levine, and Collier and Gunning. Observations posed by the parallel market premium, except for Sachs and Warner who also use their own exchange rates. All stage is measured by Barron and Lee as GDP/GDP and Levine, and Sachs and Warner, as fiscal surplus. Schooling is calculated in secondary schooling in 1960. Eastern and Levine, and Collier and Gunning enter for the log of enrollment. Social distance is measured by revolutions in Barron and Lee, by income quintiles in Eastern and Levine, and by percentage of enrollment in Collier and Gunning. For the first two regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the country level, and for the third regression, standard errors are clustered at the continent level.
Putting numbers of these effects is difficult
But...

- Landlockedness reduces growth by c. 0.5% (Hoeffler)
- Declining terms of trade reduces accounts for about 0.7% of Africa’s growth shortfall (Elbadawi and Ndulu)
- In countries with ethnic diversity, dictatorship reduces growth by 3% per annum (Collier and Gunning 1999)
- Civil conflict reduces growth by about 4% (Collier 1999)
- Restrictive trade policies account for c. 0.4 to 1.2% lower growth per annum (Sachs and Warner, Easterly and Levine)
- “Extractive” policies can reduce growth by 4-5%

In all cases, a strong effect is attributed to private investment... especially in Africa

But Africa suffers from Dis-investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8</th>
<th>PROPOSED COMPOSITION AND FACTOR PRODUCTIONS BY REGION 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Flow/Private Wealth</td>
<td>Capital Stock per Worker ($)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
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<td>East Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Collier, Hoeffler, and Patillo (1998), based on data for 49 countries of which 22 are African

80 cents of each dollar in aid between 1970 and 1996 went out as capital flight

Can we disentangle the effects of politics and investment?
Or of geography, policy and institutions?

In part due to exceptional volatility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 9</th>
<th>VOLATILITY INDICATORS: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SSA AND OTHER LOC</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Term of Trade</td>
<td>Real Exchange Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: For the Monetary Geometric and GDP measures of volatility, Asia is treated as a single aggregate. The term figure has been used for East and South Asia
Source: Collier, Hoeffler, and Patillo (1998), based on data for 49 countries of which 22 are African

Can the Endogeneity of Political Instability, Investment and Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>DYNAMIC PANEL GNH ESTIMATES OF MODEL COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>0.1283 (3.1130)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>0.2453 (2.0867)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>0.0103 (2.0483)</td>
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<td>Exports</td>
<td>0.0532 (1.0532)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth of Labor Force</td>
<td>0.0532 (1.0532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag of Income</td>
<td>0.0018 (1.3688)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, 1999
A Horserace? Geography, Trade or Institutions

Figure 1: The “Dey” determinants of income

Source: Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2002

So, Much Points to Endogenous Policies..

► Depends on competitiveness of electoral system: more competitive systems have less distributive policies
► Depends on extent of checks and balances within policy process: more checks and balances mean more distributive policies
► Depends on political risks—the greater the risks the less public goods production there is
► Depends on structure of the economy: Natural resource dependent economies have more distributive policies

These four, along with income data, account for about 37% of the variation within Africa (and about 65% of the global variation)

Choosing Sectors: Manufacturing

► Has high learning “externalities”
► Produces dense networks
► Benefits from rapid technological change
► Is less susceptible to expropriation
► Is adaptable to markets

Closing Thoughts and Puzzles

► Many of the “exogenous” problems (e.g. the impacts of size, of location, or transport infrastructure, of the disease environment) are mediated by policy choices. But these choices are a function of the structures of economies. So:
► Get out of natural resources:
  ▪ Unviable: The value of resource base depends on technology
  ▪ Bad direct economic effects but also bad indirect effects through policy choices
► ...and into manufactures:
  ▪ Has high learning “externalities”
  ▪ Produces dense networks
  ▪ Benefits from rapid technological change
  ▪ Is less susceptible to expropriation
► But: If manufactures is the way forward, how should agriculture be treated in the medium term?
► Puzzle: What are the moral implications of randomly choosing regions in Africa and concentrating assistance to generate “demonstration” cases of development.
Structure of Talk

- Key Puzzles
  - Who
  - Why
  - How
  - For how long?

- Narratives of four conflicts:
  - Sierra Leone
  - Guinea Bissau
  - Casamance
  - Azawad

Where?

Who

Casamance

SL

Who

SBU: Liberia

Who

Cote d’Ivoire
### Who

![Ugandans in Congo](image)

### Why

- To topple governments
- To take control of the state
- To secede
- To take control of assets
- To get loot
- To express frustration
- Don't know

### How

- "In the 1970s and until the mid-80s ... you had a very authoritarian UNITA, but the rebels respected the right to life, and in the so-called liberated zones, there were even improvements in health care and education. It was partly because there was a lot of surplus food and other materials."
  - Alex Vines

- "In wartime, there is no respect for human rights. War is war."
  - Dr. Jonas Savimbi

- "Dr. Savimbi would kill indiscriminately. He would order fingers, tongues, noses, and even genitals to be cut off. Sometimes he had this done just to exhibit his authority. The atmosphere was really violent."
  - Source: João Domingo Fernandes

### Some Variations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rebel Group Membership</th>
<th>Civil Militias</th>
<th>International Support to Rebels</th>
<th>International Support to Government</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Revolution</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azawad</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casamance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sierra Leone

- 23 March 1991 Civil War launched by RUF
- 30 April 1992 Coup by Strasser
- Nov 1992, RUF holds Puhehun, Kailahun, Kenema, and Kono (by Liberian border)
- March 1995, Strasser invites executive outcomes
- 1995 intensive fighting, starvation
- Jan 1996 Strasser ousted in coup
Sierra Leone

- Jan 1996: Strasser ousted in coup
- Mar 1996: Transfer to Kabbah
- 1996: Major actions by CDF militia groups
- November 1996: Abidjan accord, Amnesty, EO pullout
- Continued fighting, even between militias and government
- 25 May 1997: Coup by Johnny Paul Koroma (AFRC); Joint rule with RUF

Guinea Bissau -- 1998-9

- 1980: Luis Cabral ousted Vieira
- 1994: Multiparty elections, Vieira elected
- 6 June 1998: Mane sacked, followed by mutiny
- 7 June 1998: Mane forms Junta; enter 2,300 Senegalese plus 400 Guinean troops
- Fighting spreads throughout country, but c. 90% loyal to Mane
- January 1999: Senegal and Guinea start withdrawing troops

Guinea Bissau -- 1998-9

- February 1999: shooting starts again
- February, 300 ECOMOG troops arrive, new peace deal
- March 16: Senegal and Guinea troops gone; 600 ECOMOG troops in place
- March 31: Elections don't happen
- 6 May 1999: Mane attacks again, Vieira toppled
- Jan 2000: Kumba Yala elected
- November 2000: Mane assassinated
- Sept 2003: Yala ousted in a new coup

Casamance and Azawad

- 1990s Secessionist Struggles
- Ethnic conflicts
- Neighborhood effects
- Macroeconomic Commonalities (population size, population distribution, wealth, ethnic fractionalization)
Casamance and Azawad

**Casamance: 1982-1989**
- Trigger: Demonstration, 26 December 1982
- Military Response: Radicalization
- Financing: Reliance on subscriptions
- Activity: Low intensity
- Government: Military Plus Appeasement

**Casamance: 1989-1992**
- Rise in Activity: First use of automatic rifles and grenades / Military response
- International and Domestic Pressure on Dakar.
- Negotiations: Bissau Accord of 31 May 1991
  - Organization 1: Establishment of Political Wing, Abbé Diamacoune as Secretary General
  - Organization 2: Split and establishment of the Front Nord under Sidi Badji

**Azawad: 1990-91**
- Droughts and emigration to Libya
- June 1990 attack on Ménaka.
- Military targets and successes
- Trigger: Military Response and Radicalization, 3000 fighters in 15 bases.
- Domestic pressure on Traoré

**Azawad: 1991-1994**
- Direct negotiations, Tamanrasset, 5-6 January 1991
  - No independence, Administrative decentralization; Creation of jobs, 47.3% of funds investment for north
  - Slow implementation and rising frustrations
- Four-way split in movement: FPLA, MPA, FIAA and ARAL. Banditry.
- Continued Low intensity conflict. Gradual rise in criminal violence. In-group fighting

**Azawad: 1992- Now**
- Radicalization of Front Nord, turn against civilian population, beginning of war economies
- Splits within Front Nord. Divisions between the political and military wings. In-fighting and sub-divisions
- Financing: almost exclusive dependence on looting and natural resources.
  (Kafountine/Bignona-Banjul Story)
- Failed negotiations.
Azawad: 1994 - 1995 Intercommunal Violence

- 19 May 1994 Captain Abdoulaye Maïga formed the “Ganda Koy”. Militia formed, the “Ganda Koy”.
- Targeting of whites.
- Response to class-based ethnic grievances?
- Based in towns financed by citizens and army
- Hurting Stalemate: Highest level of violence, no political progress. Large scale refugee flows to Burkina Faso and Mauritania.
- Metisse Story

Azawad: 1995 - 1996

- Hurting intercommunal stalemate
- Exogenous rise in state strength
- Variation in the processes that led to the cessation of activities by the different groups.
  - Cooperation between FPLA and sedentarists
  - ARLA defeated by MPA
  - FIAA defeated by government plus MPA
- Intercommunal meetings
- Flamme de la Paix

Some Closing Remarks and Puzzles

- Given the variation, is “civil war” a meaningful category?
- Why are some wars so much more violent than others?
- The fundamental (rationalist) puzzle: If the deal from a peace negotiation can be implemented without having a war, why do we ever see wars in the first place?
- The fundamental negotiators puzzle: Why will warring groups ever implement the terms of a peace deal instead of starting to fight again as soon as the others stop?
- Why do some wars produce civil defense militias while others do not?
- Why has the frequency of wars declined in the late 1990s?

Causes and Duration: Main Explanations

- Motivational Explanations
  - Exclusion and Marginalization
  - Desire to capture the state
  - Cultural collapse: demographic explanations
- Permissive Explanations
  - Availability of financing
  - Weak States
  - Military technology—terrain, guns

Causes: The Greed Explanation

Quantitative Evidence:
Countries with a higher share of primary commodity exports are more likely to have civil wars. (Collier and Hoefler)

Countries with a higher share of oil exports are more likely to have civil wars. (Fearon and Laitin)

Why?
The Greed Explanation

Senegal and Mali cases:

1. Often the wrong natural resources:
   - Senegal: Fish, groundnuts and cotton in Senegal
   - Mali: Gold - Mali's third largest export after cotton and livestock (867 million 1994)
   - Sierra Leone: Plausible for leadership, not for followers

2. Chronology and Resource Type:
   - Lootable resources existed, but:
     - Senegal: (Marijuana, Cashews, Timber) only accessed in late 1980s
     - Mali: (Cattle) Highly diffuse, difficult to concentrate revenues.

Other problems

1. Many measurement problems
2. There is greed everywhere
3. We still need to understand the strength of the opposition
4. We still need to explain the motivation of the rank and file

Causes: Grievance?

Political marginalization:
- Senegal and Mali cases: Under-representation in the central administration; mayor of Ziguinchor, Kidal; and regional governors appointed from outside.

Cultural marginalization:
- Casamançais - "Forest people, pagans, palm-wine drinkers (or drunkards) and pork eaters"
- Touaregs - "Lazy, prone to violence and criminality, opportunistic, ethnically chauvinistic, and unpatriotic."
- What is an appropriate metric?

Causes: Grievance, Mali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Household Income 1995</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>School Attendance Rates 1995/96 (%)</th>
<th>Malnutrition Of Vitamin, Rate (%)</th>
<th>Vulnerability to Extreme Food Insecurity, 1995 (%)</th>
<th>Male Unemployment Rate 15-29</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>93 0%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louga</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35 2%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Louis</td>
<td>5,013</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>41 3%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xamou</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>40 4%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56 5%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Causes: Grievance, Senegal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Polarization in Senegal

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<th>GPI</th>
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<td>Saint Louis</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Kaolack</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>Diourbel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thies</td>
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<td>Fatick</td>
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<td>Ziguinchor</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
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Data source: Enqûete Senegalaise auprès des ménages, 1995

What were the political goals of the group?

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<th>GPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defend Community
Stop Corruption
Get Power
Bring Peace

Graphs by Faction for Section 3

And is that why people joined?

Recruitment

► “What made you join?”

► “I had a boyfriend who was a soldier, and I followed him...I was attracted by the uniform. Full combat looks smart. I sent my mother a picture of me in combat...Lot of young women followed the rebels because they offered them items and their regular men did nothing for them”

► Girl fighting in irregular SL army
(Source: Peters and Richards)
Who joined? Education

Who joined? Educational History of Combatants

Children and Orphans

Demography

Demographics

- Not new; but recently peaked
  - Child Crusades
- Technology makes it easier for children
  - Massive destructive capacity in light weapons
- Lack of cultural pass-through; lack of supervision
  - Problem exacerbated by AIDS epidemic
  - And (in turn) by conflict
Artificial Boundaries and Geographic Exceptionalism

- African wars strongly marked by geographical splits:
  - Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Uganda
  - Some exceptions: Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone

- Political and Physical Geography, “Remoteness”
  - In many cases: local colonial histories, special administrative status, local histories of revolt
  - Ethnic, Religious and Occupational Composition

- But these African conflicts are complicated by the fact that even when the nation is composed of multiple parts, those parts rarely have their own histories of nationhood either

Causes, Overview

- Overall: much support for “deep” explanations
  - demographic structures
  - the structure of national economies
  - the ties that bind people
  - the capacity of states to fight
  - the capacity of states to negotiate
  - semi-education
  - As yet only weak evidence that ethnicity matters. Ethnicity appears most likely to matter when there is a single dominant group.

- Many of the deep permissive explanations are closely associated with motivational explanations

Duration and Motivation

- Wars launched by coups and popular revolutions started in the capital tend to be short

- “Sons of the soil” war last longer—Sudan, Casamance...

- Wars over contraband or smuggled goods last very long (Angola, Sierra Leone)

(Source Fearon: 2003)
Duration and Terrain

- Mountains and forests

- Senegal-Mali case: Cross-national Correlation between forest cover and duration borne out. But not because military victory was easier in Mali. Senegalese army more likely to venture into forested areas than Malian to desert areas. In neither was a military solution successful; however in Mali a negotiated settlement was possible. The impact of forest cover on war duration is only binding when negotiated settlements are not possible.

Duration and Financing

- An army marches on its belly
  - Casamance: Funded by mostly renewable resources.
  - Mali, Niger: dependence on extraction and taking of cattle and 4 wheel drives. Resources rapidly exhausted.
- Some groups received sponsorship from traders—-with duration agendas
- International financing often has a duration agenda.
- Sometimes aimed at securing goods quickly (Congo)

Duration and Rebel Organization

- Multiple Splits in both Malian and Casamance groups delayed rather than eased resolution.
- Variation in “Organizational Culture”: In Casamance political leaders isolated from the functioning of the maquis; in Mali, all political leaders have been required to live with or to operate alongside the maquisards.

Duration and Organizational Structures: Azawad

Duration and Organizational Structures: Casamance

Natural resources and negotiation failure

- The existence of resources alters the value of economic activity during war relative to the value of a settlement
- Fragmentation of groups due to diffuse resources prevents negotiators from making credible commitments
- Compare alluvial versus kimberlite diamonds
- The economic value of the region has implications for the discreteness of the policy space

Duration and Organizational Structures: Casamance
Duration and International Aspects

- **Senegal**: Elements in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia benefit from the Casamance conflict.
  - Argo sales. Routing of cashew/cannabis exports through the zone / Providing markets to conflict areas

- **Mali**: Algeria, with its own political issues with Berber groups was keen on a speedy resolution. (Iyad/Fate of Refugees)

Most successful terminations

- Low international interest in war continuation
- International forces have stopped multiple wars, but there are risks
  - Sometimes capacity too low
  - Sometimes can increase spread of AIDS
  - Sometimes feeds local war economies
- But, most successful negotiations were
  - Those that occur after exhaustion
  - Those that come with jobs and rewards (Sierra Leone)
  - Those that involved widespread consultation (Mali)
- When leaders die

Some Closing Remarks and Puzzles

- What should you do after wars end?
- Should you focus on the future or the past? On amnesty and re-training? Or on justice and punishment.
- Can you do both?

The Big Questions

- What accounts for the variation in the strength of state structures?
- What accounts for Africa’s slow economic growth?
- Why do some African countries suffer from high levels of political violence while others are spared?
Precolonial States

► Extraordinary variation
  • Empires, trading states
  • Kingdoms
  • Stateless societies account for perhaps 25% of African population at beginning of colonial period (Curtin, p71)

Internally consistent state systems

► Reciprocity norms
► Overlapping Generations conventions

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<th>Time (t)</th>
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Dickson and Shepsle 2002

Empires and Trading Kingdoms

Compatibility with the Modern State?

► Weak Emphasis on Territory, Few Hard Territorial Boundaries: People matter more
► Joint Jurisdiction Over Land: Unbundling of ownership and control
► States within States: Largely decentralized control
► Kinship relations central
► Interstate competition: When states grew poor they disappeared
Hypocrisy

I contend that we are the first race in the world, and that the more of the world that we inhabit the better it is for the human race. I contend that every acre added to our territory means the birth of more of the English race who otherwise would not be brought into existence...

Cecil Rhodes 1891

Massive Abuses
Miserable Development
Poor Investments

But politics continued...

- States and Stateless Societies
  - Stateless Groups more opposed to colonial domination? Kikuyu? Ibo? Diola?
  - Compare with Wolof, Ashanti?

- Settler societies
  - Presence of Settlers: Causes problems on supply side and demand side
  - More violence in settler areas: Southern Africa, Algeria

Indirect Rule

- More internal divisions—Nigeria, Ghana
- Less identification of elites with the center
- But: more exclusion of elites; more unemployed intellectuals, less managed educational systems
- Higher levels of political organization and violence
- Indirect rule maintained power in hands of traditional elites but eroded their power base

The Legacies
One Commodity Countries

- Dependence of African economies on single commodities weakens their bargaining power. Unable to achieve self-sufficiency.

- Algeria
- Angola
- Botswana
- Burundi
- R. Congo
- Gabon
- Guinea
- Libya
- Niger
- Rwanda
- Sao Tome
- Somalia
- Uganda
- Zambia

Transportation Networks

Dependence of African economies on single commodities weakens their bargaining power. Unable to achieve self-sufficiency.

Brutality

1896  1996

Weak Structures

- Education: (1960: Sixteen Graduates out of 13 million people living in the Congo)
- Infrastructure (Roads and Ports)
- Dependent on external support

Arbitrary Boundaries

- States contained traditional rivals:
  - Asante and Fanti in Gold Coast
  - Yoruba and Hausa in Nigeria
  - Ndebele and Shona in Southern Rhodesia

- Borders split others:
  - Ewe between Gold coast and Togoland
  - Ibo, between Nigeria and Cameroon
  - Somalia, between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya

Variation in Results

- Former British colonies prospered relative to French, Spanish and Portuguese; possibly because of the stronger economic and political institutions (David Landes 1998, chapters 19 and 20)
- French colonies less susceptible to state failure—repeatedly found by SFTF
- French colonies have more stable macroeconomies
- Countries with more colonial penetration appear to have done better in terms of governance in the medium run
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson

Characteristics
- Small Governments
- Challenged Monopolies on Security
- Informal Federalism
- Poor Institutional Memory

Practices
- Informality of the state
- Overlapping interests of public and private spheres
  - The Sierra Leonean Minister of Environment
  - Divorce of public and private moralities

States weakened by lack of human and physical infrastructure
Dependence on aid and rents reduces need to extend control of the state
Lack of external threats limits need of state coercive capacity
International policies have often weakened states rather than strengthening them
Politicians benefit from disorder

But there has been change, a growing political opposition and civil society groups
- Congress of Trade Unions (Chiluba) v Kaunda in Zambia
  - Initial debates on multipartyism takes place in The National Mirror (Church sponsored newspaper)
  - Student and labor groups; labor and interest groups
- Women’s Forum in Sierra Leone, 1996
  - Other women’s protests?
- Our next two vignettes:
  - The National Conference v. Kerekou in Benin
  - The Deposition of Traore in Mali
And a resulting African wave of Democratization

► Beginning 1990s
  - By late 1990s liberalization in all but Libya and Sudan
  - 70 multi-candidate presidential elections in the 1990s
  - Now multiple countries have had changes of government due to elections (not including "founding" elections):
    - Cape Verde, Sao Tome e Principe, Benin, Mali, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia

Growth: Chief Explanations

► Exogenous
  - Severe health challenges
  - Severe agricultural challenges
  - Economic structure too reliant on primary commodities with variable and declining prices
  - Poor Market Infrastructures
  - Impediments to trade

► Endogenous
  - High political risk
  - Dictatorships have low growth—especially in ethnically fractionalized countries
  - Corruption
  - Civil Wars
  - Extremely low investment

Huge Swings in Policy Approaches

► Both the socialist and (more) liberal post independence routes failed
  - They were subject to elite capture
  - They were not participative

► After that, the structural adjustment reforms did not bring much growth either
  - They ignored the politics of reform
  - Incentives are wrong for conditionality
  - They misunderstood social structures
  - They were not participative

► How about present approaches, PRSPs, MDGs?
  - Are they participative?

► One thing that is clear: corruption hurts, especially the poor. Two sides implicated in corruption.

Much Points to Endogenous Policies...

► Depends on competitiveness of electoral system: more competitive systems have less distributive policies, the more individuals have power over political decisions, the less neo-patrimonial they can be

► Depends on external and financial sources of government support: on aid politics and on the structure of the economy

Strong arguments for shifting production to manufactures and services

► Has high learning “externalities”

► Produces dense networks

► Benefits from rapid technological change

► Is less susceptible to expropriation

► Is adaptable to markets

► Key problems: (1) Poor human capital (2) The difficult position of agriculture
Conflict: Core Findings

► Greed? Sometimes for sure. But weak general evidence for elites, and no evidence that this motivates followers.

► More likely:
  - Weak state structures
  - Poor conflict resolution mechanisms
  - Frustration with economic and political exclusion
  - Destruction of social networks

Evidence that combatants are drawn from groups devastated by health crises

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Dominant Themes:

- Strength of International Linkages
- Enormous Role of Physical Geography
- Great Diversity