The study of cooperation is fundamental to the study of international relations. In the absence of a higher authority to enforce agreements, how do states manage to cooperate? This course examines theoretical approaches to conflict and cooperation in international relations, including the obstacles to cooperation under anarchy, and the possibility of surmounting those obstacles. The empirical focus of the course is on issues of cooperation in peace and security, for example, deterrence and crisis bargaining, the outbreak and conduct of war, war termination and maintaining peace, and alliance politics.

**Prerequisites:**

General familiarity with theories and literatures of international relations. Students who have not taken, or are not currently taking, the International Relations Field Survey (6801) should discuss with the instructor whether this course is appropriate.

**Course Requirements:**

Students are expected to come to class ready to discuss the week’s readings.

Twice during the semester each student will prepare a short memo (2-4 pages double-spaced) briefly outlining the major themes of the session, raising questions for discussion in class, and suggesting a few testable hypotheses on the week’s topic. These are due (to be posted to CourseWorks) no later than 5pm, two days before the relevant class (i.e., Tuesday for regularly scheduled sessions).

The major assignment for the course is a research paper. The paper should present publishable-quality original research on a topic related to cooperation and security. A statement of your proposed research question and hypotheses is due October 2. Presentations will take place on November 6 and November 13. For those who present on the 6th, the final paper is due November 10; for those who present on the 13th, the final paper is due November 14 (see below).

Late assignments, including memos, will be penalized by one third grade per day (i.e., an A paper or memo turned in 1 day late is an A-, 2 days late a B+, etc.) except in cases of medical or family emergency.

The written research paper will count for 40% of the grade, its presentation in class for 20%, each memo 10%, and participation in class for the remaining 20%.

Requirements for R credit: the two memos and participation in class discussion.
Schedule

Because I am expecting a baby in late November, we will operate on a compressed schedule. We will meet for two extra sessions early in the semester (dates to be arranged the first week of class), and will not meet for the last two weeks of class (November 20 and December 4). In the unlikely event that I cannot come to IAB for one or both of the presentation weeks (November 6 and November 13), we will make alternative arrangements.

Final papers are due quite early (November 10 and 14 depending on when you present), so that I can get you feedback and turn in grades before the baby arrives. I will relax my usually firm policy against incompletes for those who would prefer more time to write the paper, but it may take me quite some time to get comments and grades for those who choose this option. For those taking an incomplete, the paper must be turned in before the end of the summer (September 1, 2009). Please note that carrying too many incompletes can affect your eligibility to take comps.

Readings

The following books (readings marked with an asterisk (*) in the syllabus) have been ordered at Book Culture Bookstore, on 112th St., between Broadway and Amsterdam, many of the books we read short portions of are available there as well.

Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (Columbia University Press, 1999).

Journal articles and most other readings are available online through e-journals <www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/ejournals/> or through electronic reserves on CourseWorks. All readings are on reserve at Lehman library or through e-reserves.

I assume that some readings will be familiar to you from 6801, please review them for the relevant weeks.
Session 1. Introduction and Course Logistics  
September 4

I. Cooperation Theory in International Relations

Session 2. The Evolution of Cooperation under Anarchy  
September 11

(review from 6801)


Oye “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy” (review from 6801)  
Axelrod & Keohane “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy”

*Stein, Arthur “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” in Baldwin,  

Keohane, Robert “Reciprocity in International Relations” *International Organization* 40:1  

317-349. (review from 6801)

Fearon, James “Bargaining Enforcement, and International Cooperation” *International  
Organization* 52:2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305.

Majeski, Stephen J. “Asymmetric Power among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of  
Cooperation in International Relations” *International Studies Quarterly* 48:2 (June  
2004).
Session 3. Information, Credibility and Signaling, and Domestic Politics
September 18


Session 4. Debates: Realism vs. Institutionalism, Offensive vs. Defensive Realism
[Date TBA, week of September 22]

Keohane, Robert “The Demand for International Regimes” in Krasner, Stephen ed. 

*Baldwin, David ed, Neorealism and Neoliberalism.* Following chapters:
1 – Baldwin “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics” (intro)
5 – Grieco “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation”
7 – Snidal “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”
11 – Keohane “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War”
12 – Grieco “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation”


Montgomery, Evan Braden “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty” *International Security* 31:2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151-85. (See also Correspondence in IS 32:1 (Summer 2007)).
Session 5. Collective Action, Order and the Construction of Cooperation and Conflict in the International System
September 25


*Cronin, Bruce *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (Columbia University Press, 1999) Chapters 1-2 and 6, pp. 3-38, 125-141. (review from 6801)


II. Cooperation in Security Affairs

Session 6. War as a Problem of Cooperation
October 2

** Research Proposal Due **

Fearon, James “Rationalist Explanations for War” International Organization 49:3 (Summer 1995), pp.379-414. (review from 6801)

Reiter, Dan “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War” Perspectives on Politics 1:1 (March 2003), pp. 27-43.


Gartzke, Erik “War is in the Error Term” International Organization 53:3 (Summer 1999), pp.567-87 (review from 6801)


*Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (Columbia University Press, 1999). Chapters:
1– Snyder & Jervis “Civil War and the Security Dilemma” (review from 6801)
8 – de Figueiredo & Weingast “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict”


Session 7. Deterrence, Crisis Bargaining, and Reputation
October 9

(note: not available online, whole book on reserve in Lehman)


Session 8. Arms, Arms Control and the Conduct of War  
October 16

Schelling, Thomas and Morton Halperin *Strategy and Arms Control* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), Intro and chapters 1-3, pp. 1-39. (note: not available online, book on reserve)


*Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation.* Chapter 4 “Live & Let Live in Trench Warfare in WWI.”


Session 9. Negotiation and War Termination
October 23


*Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton University Press 2002), especially Introduction, chapters 1, 2, and 4, and one case study.


Session 10. Maintaining Peace  
[date TBA: week of October 27]

*Fortna, Virginia Page Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and The Durability of Peace  

Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen “Making and Keeping Peace” International Organization 59:2  
(Spring 2005), pp. 261-292.

Quinn, J. Michael, T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of  

Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and  

Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil  

Sambanis, Nicholas “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the  
Theoretical Literature” World Politics 52:4 (July 2000), pp. 437-483

Tir, Jaroslav “Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of  
Session 11. Cooperation among Allies  
October 30


Session 12. Research Paper Presentations  
November 6

** If you present this week, your final paper is due Monday November 10, by 5pm **

Session 13. Research Paper Presentations  
November 13

** If you present this week, your final paper is due Friday November 14, by 5pm **
Selected Additional Readings

Theory:


Axelrod and Keohane in Baldwin ed *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.


Bendor, Jonathan “Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:4 (December 1993), pp.709-34


evon Stein, Jana “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance American Political Science Review 99 (2005) 611-622


War:


Deterrence and Reputation:


Danilovic, Vesna “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:3 (June 2001), pp. 341-69.


George, Alexander and Richard Smoke Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 1974).


Gelpi, Christopher “Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining”


**Conduct of War and Arms Control:**


Gaubatz, Kurt “Changing Interests and Persistent Rules: The Protection of Non-Combatants in War” unpublished manuscript.


### War Termination and Maintaining Peace:

- Gartner, Scott “I’m OK, You’re OK, Let’s Fight: An Organizational and Game Theoretic Model of War Termination”
- Ikle, Fred *Every War Must End* (Columbia University Press, 1971).
Alliances:


Additional Topics:

Rapprochement and end of the Cold War:


Deutsch, Morton *Resolution of Conflict* 1973 chapter 13 “Factors Influencing the Reduction of Conflict” pp. 351-400

Sanctions:


