INTERSTATE PEACEKEEPING:
CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND EMPIRICAL EFFECTS

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Version: September 14, 2004

* The author owes debts of gratitude to more people than can be listed here for help and feedback with the project of which this paper is a part. She thanks in particular, Nisha Fazal, Hein Goemans, Lise Howard, Bob Jervis, Bob Keohane, Lisa Martin, Jack Snyder, Alan Stam, Barb Walter, and Suzanne Werner. This research was made possible by grants from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping is perhaps the international community’s most important tool for maintaining peace in the aftermath of war. Its practice has evolved significantly in the past ten or fifteen years as it has been used increasingly in civil wars. However, traditional peacekeeping between states is not well understood. Its operation is under-theorized and its effects under-tested. This article explores the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace, and examines its empirical effects after interstate wars. To take the endogeneity of peacekeeping into account, it also examines where peacekeepers tend to be deployed. Duration analysis shows that, all else equal, peacekeeping significantly increases the chances that peace will last. Peacekeepers can help adversaries to maintain peace by making surprise attack more difficult, by reducing uncertainty about enemy intentions, and by preventing and controlling accidents and incidents that can spiral back to war.
Maintaining peace in the aftermath of war is a difficult endeavor, and the international community is often called on to help. Arguably the most important innovation in international conflict management since World War II is the practice of peacekeeping: the deployment of international personnel to monitor a cease-fire or to interpose themselves between belligerents to keep peace after a war. \(^1\) During most of its history, peacekeeping was used to help maintain peace after interstate wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the practice has been adapted to the context of civil wars, taking on new tasks such as election monitoring, police training, and even providing an interim administration. This article analyzes whether and how peacekeeping stabilizes peace in its traditional interstate setting.

Traditional peacekeepers are either unarmed or at most lightly armed, they are mandated to use force only in self-defense, and they operate with the consent of the belligerents. How does their presence prevent the resumption of war? The peacekeeping literature does not spell out explicitly how peacekeepers might keep much larger and better armed forces from fighting. Nor has there been much systematic empirical analysis of whether interstate peacekeeping works. This article explores the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers might affect the durability of peace, and examines empirically whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when they are not. Using duration analysis, and taking selection effects into account, this article demonstrates that peacekeeping helps even the most deadly of adversaries to avoid war. A brief overview of cases illustrates how it does so.

Despite the blossoming of a vast literature on the topic in the last fifteen years, peacekeeping remains under-theorized and under-tested. In particular, two very conspicuous gaps remain. Very little has been done to spell out systematically and explicitly the causal
mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace; and there has been little empirical testing of whether peace is more likely to last after interstate war when peacekeepers are present than when they are absent.

The vast majority of the literature on peacekeeping is descriptive and prescriptive and relatively atheoretical. It lists the functions and principles of peacekeeping and describes its practices but does not spell out a causal argument about how peacekeeping is supposed to work. Critics have decried the failure of the peacekeeping literature to explain the connection between peacekeeping and “positive peace,” that is, the resolution of fundamental issues, as opposed simply to maintaining a cease-fire. But the gap in the theory is much wider than that. An implicit sense of some of the ways peacekeepers make a difference emerges from many of the case studies of peacekeeping missions, but the literature never spells out explicitly how the presence of lightly or un-armed peacekeepers changes the situation facing the belligerents such that another war becomes less likely. The causal connection between peacekeeping and even negative peace has not been fleshed out and made explicit.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the peacekeeping literature is the dearth of attempts to assess whether it empirically keeps peace. Much of the literature consists of case studies of individual missions, which if they address this issue at all, can make only counterfactual assessments. There is comparative work on the success and failure of peacekeeping, but this work takes peacekeeping missions as its universe of cases so cannot assess the “value added” of peacekeeping.

What testing there has been on peacekeeping’s effectiveness has focused on civil wars, not on traditional peacekeeping between sovereign states. This emphasis on internal conflicts is
understandable given that civil wars, and therefore peacekeeping missions within states, have recently outnumbered interstate wars and operations to maintain peace between states. But as recent interstate wars (between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between the US and both Afghanistan and Iraq,) remind us, interstate conflict remains relevant. Moreover, the policy debate about peacekeeping’s expansion into internal conflicts is based on a comparison, often implicit, with “the good old days” of interstate peacekeeping. As a baseline therefore, it is important to know how well peacekeeping works in its traditional context.

While there are no rigorous studies of whether peace is more likely to last after interstate wars when peacekeepers are present than when they are not, there have been a few studies of general UN involvement, including discussion and resolutions, fact-finding, mediating, and peacekeeping, in interstate crises. Ernst Haas and his coauthors produced a substantial body of work assessing conflict management by international organizations. In a study of interstate disputes referred to the UN, to regional organizations, and non-referred disputes, Haas finds that UN military operations, including peacekeeping, are almost always moderately or greatly successful. His measures of success do not allow a direct comparison of disputes involving the UN with non-referred disputes, however, because “success” is measured only for referred disputes. His measures are based on an implicitly counterfactual assessment, presumably relative to no UN involvement.

In their study of UN involvement in crises, Wilkenfeld and Brecher find that the UN makes it more likely that a crisis ends in an agreement than when the UN is not involved, but that the UN has no effect on the likelihood of the parties experiencing another crisis within five years. Surprisingly, however, the authors do not consider the endogeneity they have identified
in the first part of their article: namely that the UN tends to get involved in the most “serious” cases in terms of violence, gravity of threat, and several other indicators.

In a similar but more quantitatively sophisticated study, Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel also examine the effects of UN involvement on the recurrence of conflict. They also control for other factors that might make recurrence more likely, such as the level of violence, history of conflict, relative power and crisis outcome. Oddly, they also “control” for the level of UN involvement which seems to be the very thing they are assessing. They too find that the UN has no significant effect preventing the recurrence of conflict.10

The literature on traditional interstate peacekeeping does not compare peacekeeping cases to non-peacekeeping cases. The literature on UN involvement in general not only lumps peacekeeping in with other forms of UN action, but also comes to contradictory findings – Haas finds positive effects while Wilkenfeld and Brecher and Diehl et al. find no significant effects.11

This study builds on the existing peacekeeping literature and on a growing set of systematic analyses of war termination and the duration of peace.12 Walter argues that unlike belligerents in interstate wars, contestants in civil wars require outside help, in the form of third-party guarantees, to reach peace. I argue that interstate belligerents may also require assistance to maintain peace. One form this assistance might take is peacekeeping.13 Such help is not a necessary condition for peace, as Walter argues it is for civil wars, but it nonetheless contributes to the likelihood that interstate peace will last.

This analysis differs slightly, however, from the work of both Walter and Goemans by asking not when do warring parties reach peace? but rather, once they have ceased-fire what determines whether peace lasts or falls apart? In other words, the dependent variable here is the
duration of peace rather than war termination. In that, it builds on work by Werner and Fortna. Werner argues that changes in states’ relative capabilities after peace breaks out are the most important cause of the resumption of war. She finds that third-party enforcement, including peacekeeping, increases rather than decreases the chances that war will resume. She notes, however, that this finding might be spurious in that third parties are more likely to guarantee peace when it is most precarious. Fortna examines a number of mechanisms by which interstate belligerents might maintain peace. This study explores the role of one of these mechanisms in more detail, focusing on peacekeeping as the policy tool most relevant to outsiders hoping to stabilize peace.

CAUSAL MECHANISMS OF PEACEKEEPING

The literature on traditional peacekeeping identifies two main functions: observation and interposition. First, by observing and reporting the parties’ behavior, peacekeepers ensure that no one is violating the agreement. Observers also help resolve minor violations of the cease-fire before they escalate. Second, by interposing themselves between armies, peacekeepers create a buffer to help prevent incidents and accidents. International monitors perform the first function; armed peacekeeping forces perform both observation and interposition functions. The presence of peacekeepers is also thought to provide a moral barrier to hostile action, alleviate tensions and cool tempers. Practitioners would likely emphasize the mediation and day-to-day conflict resolution roles of international personnel.

By their presence and their ability to observe, peacekeepers are meant to help keep the peace. But how exactly does this work? How do lightly or unarmed personnel, there strictly
with the consent of the belligerents, prevent the resumption of war? Peacekeepers will be powerless in the face of determined aggression, while if the belligerents intend to observe the cease-fire anyway, peacekeepers are seemingly unnecessary. What are the causal mechanisms linking peacekeeping to the maintenance of a cease-fire? What does their presence change for the “peacekept” such that renewed fighting becomes less likely?

Cease-fires operate on the basis of reciprocity. The belligerents agree to stop hostilities simultaneously, each side commits to maintaining the cease-fire as long as the other does, and if one side attacks, the other promptly responds in kind. Fundamentally, it is the prospect of this response that deters either side from defecting from the agreement. But for reciprocity to work, several things have to be true: the long-term gains of peace must outweigh the short-term benefits of attacking; both sides must believe that the other intends to maintain peace, or that violations of the cease-fire will be reliably detected in time for it to respond before being overrun; and accidents or unauthorized violations must be prevented or controlled lest they spiral back to full-scale war.

Peace is difficult to maintain in the immediate aftermath of war. The parties to a cease-fire agreement are by definition deadly enemies and they almost certainly have strong incentives to take advantage of each other. One or both sides may have agreed to a cease-fire in order to rebuild and attack again later. If one side sees an opportunity for a quick or relatively cheap victory, it will likely forego the cease-fire for advantage on the battlefield. Both sides have good reason to suspect the other of just such malign intentions. Levels of tension and mistrust are extremely high in the immediate aftermath of war, creating incentives to react quickly and forcefully to any hint of a cease-fire violation rather than waiting for a possible attack to unfold.
Uncertainty about, or misperception of intentions can easily create a security dilemma spiral. If accidental or unauthorized violations occur, reciprocity itself can quickly drive a spiral of retaliation back to full-scale war.\textsuperscript{19} Even if leaders suspect that a violation occurred by mistake, it may be too risky not to respond. And if the original incident is publicly known, there may be strong domestic pressure to respond with force.\textsuperscript{20} Cease-fires are fragile.\textsuperscript{21}

In short, war may resume through deliberate aggression, through a security dilemma spiral driven by uncertainty about enemies’s actions and intentions, by accident, or most likely, through some combination of these. How does peacekeeping help? If it can disrupt any of these causal pathways to war, it can make peace more durable. Peacekeeping can contribute to reciprocal arrangements in several ways: by increasing the costs of attack, by reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and by preventing and controlling accidental violations and skirmishes.

Peacekeeping might alter the costs and benefits of maintaining the cease-fire or attacking. In theory, a large international military force could physically deter an attack by either side. Part of the effort of retaliating against an attack could thus be delegated to the international force. Alternatively, the force might serve as a trip-wire, with any attempt to roll past it bringing outside military forces into the conflict. In practice, however, peacekeeping’s role as a physical constraint is quite limited after interstate wars. Peacekeeping forces are not large or well-armed relative to national armies. Nor has the UN usually responded with force against violations of a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{22} Lightly armed forces operating on the basis of consent and the non-use of force can not present a strong deterrent. However, the presence of a buffer force may raise the cost of an
attack slightly simply by being in the way, and by observing military activity along a cease-fire line, peacekeeping may make surprise attack more difficult by detecting preparations for war.

Peacekeepers may also affect the cost of attack through international opinion. The “spotlight of international attention” may help to deter violations of the agreement. Blatant violations of a cease-fire often have diplomatic costs in the Security Council and can entail tangible losses in economic or military aid. The presence of peacekeepers, in other words, may induce international audience costs by publicizing infractions. The more a given state is dependent on outside political, economic, or military support, the more susceptible it will be to adverse international attention. These increased costs may not outweigh the benefits of an attack, but they make it relatively more costly to reinitiate war.

The second requirement of reciprocity is that violations be reliably detected. Retaliation is only possible if cheating is caught. In the tense atmosphere of mistrust immediately after war, belligerents may not feel they can wait until after an attack is well underway to react. If there is an advantage (real or perceived) to striking first, uncertainty about each others’ intentions may lead to war even when neither side would prefer to attack. The presence of peacekeepers or international observers can help reassure both sides that the other is complying in good faith with the cease-fire agreement.

States will rely for the most part on their own intelligence to detect impending attack, and cease-fire violations are by their nature very obvious events for the receiving side. The peacekept often do not need monitors to tell them whether one side is complying, in fact peacekeepers generally respond to complaints of violations lodged by the parties. How, then, does their presence provide reassurance? Because of the diplomatic costs associated with
breaking a cease-fire, there is strong incentive for an aggressor to blame the other side for provoking retaliation. Claims of being the victim of attack are therefore not necessarily credible, and as in any playground squabble there are likely to be disputes over “who started it.” Monitors thus act as neutral referees. Investigation of incidents gives credible information on compliance and is important for distinguishing unprovoked aggression from legitimate retaliation. Accurate and unbiased monitoring therefore works in close conjunction with the audience costs discussed above. In this capacity, observers provide information not only to the belligerents themselves, but also to the international community. In doing so, states may be reassured that if they are attacked unprovoked, the world will know about it.

Peacekeeping may also prevent uncertainty about intentions from driving a spiral toward war by serving as a signaling device. To the degree that peacekeeping increases the military or political costs of attacking, it ties belligerents’ hands. States that are simply biding their time with a cease-fire, intending to attack when the opportunity presents itself, will be less willing to accept an intrusive peacekeeping force than will those with more benign intentions. Consenting to a peacekeeping mission therefore provides a credible signal of intention to maintain a cease-fire. Conversely, withdrawing this consent sends a clearly hostile signal.

The contribution of peacekeeping to the third requirement of reciprocity may be the most important. Reliance on reciprocity makes cease-fire agreements very vulnerable to accidents, misunderstandings, or small incidents. Because violations are met with immediate retaliation in a reciprocal arrangement, if troops stray over the cease-fire line, or if leaders do not command full control over their troops and an unauthorized attack takes place, the other side will respond in kind, setting off a vicious cycle of retaliation. Much of peacekeepers’ day-to-day work
involves activities to prevent violations from spiraling out of control. This work operates on two levels, local and state-to-state.

Peacekeepers often respond to skirmishes or isolated incidents by meeting with local military commanders and arranging restoration of a cease-fire. This dispute resolution can snuff out sparks before they start a conflagration. Peacekeepers also often work preventively; for example, making local arrangements for both sides to pull forces back from a cease-fire line that leaves them dangerously close to each other. Local military commanders might be able to resolve disputes or work out preventive arrangements on their own, but in the tense atmosphere following a war, bilateral communication is difficult. Local commanders’ primary concern is military security, not necessarily avoiding a spiral toward war. An impartial actor, immune from the security dilemma, can take the initiative to bring commanders together or to arrange mutual consent for restoration of a cease-fire in a way that makes no one look weak or lose face.

Interpositional peacekeeping forces that patrol a demilitarized zone help prevent accidents and skirmishes simply by separating combatants who would otherwise be dangerously close to one another. Local accident prevention and control can therefore help prevent a spiral to renewed warfare.

At the state-to-state level, the machinery of lodging formal complaints of violations with peacekeepers, who then investigate, can take governments off the hook for not responding with force to minor violations. If this machinery did not exist, leaders might feel pressure to retaliate so as to maintain a show of resolve – either to deter the enemy lest it be testing for weakness, or for domestic political reasons (or both). In the face of a firing incident or a small incursion, leaders can use the peacekeeping dispute resolution machinery as an option between ignoring the
incident and appearing weak, or responding with force and risking escalation. Using the “proper
channels” to lodge a complaint allows for rhetoric of taking the moral high ground through
restraint and keeps arguments about who started what, when, and how on the level of verbal
diplomatic battles rather than actual battles.

The preceding discussion has specified a number of causal mechanisms through which
the presence of international peacekeepers might help to keep peace in the aftermath of interstate
war. Peacekeepers can increase the costs of breaking a cease-fire at the margins by making it
more difficult to launch a surprise attack and by physically being in the way. They may also add
significant international diplomatic costs to violating a cease-fire. Peacekeepers can reassure
belligerents about each other by serving as a neutral referee distinguishing violations of the
cease-fire from legitimate and provoked retaliation and by providing a credible signal of
intentions. Through local mediation, and by providing dispute resolution machinery for
complaints and investigations, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents or skirmishes from
spiraling back to war. While these effects can sometimes be observed in individual cases (see
below), the presence of peacekeepers is likely to have probabilistic rather than determinative
effects. It may make war less likely without making it impossible. Statistical analysis is
therefore best suited to evaluating the overall effect of peacekeeping.

Assessing Empirical Effects

It is by no means obvious that peacekeeping works. Interstate peacekeeping is used quite
frequently: international personnel have deployed to try to keep peace between almost three-
quarters of the warring dyads since World War II. But a quick bivariate look at the numbers
would suggest that peacekeeping is not associated with stable peace. Quite the opposite in fact: when peacekeepers are present, war appears much more likely to resume. Another war between the same states eventually breaks out in over half of the cases where peacekeepers were keeping watch, compared to only one-fifth of the cases where no international personnel were present.25

Is peacekeeping really a hindrance to stable peace, making war more likely to resume? A moral hazard argument, often made in reference to Cyprus, suggests that peacekeeping can get in the way of long-term conflict resolution. By keeping a lid on the violence, peacekeepers may remove any incentive for enemies to settle their differences.26 However, for this argument, it is the fact that peacekeeping missions are so successful at preventing political violence that is the problem, so the moral hazard argument cannot explain why war seems more likely when peacekeepers are present.

A more logical explanation for the apparent negative relationship is that it is driven by a selection effect. Peacekeepers do not get sent to a random selection of conflicts that are otherwise more or less equal. Just as more cops are sent to high crime neighborhoods, peacekeepers may get sent where they are most needed; that is, where peace is most likely to break down. Of course the selection bias may go the other way as well. If peacekeepers are only deployed “where there is peace to keep” or when the belligerents show strong “political will for peace” (both prescriptions have become almost clichés in the policy literature on peacekeeping), then peacekeepers may be deployed to the easiest cases rather than the hardest ones.27

To judge the effectiveness of peacekeeping therefore, we first need to know where peacekeepers tend to be deployed, particularly with respect to factors that affect the difficulty of maintaining peace. The field of international relations does not have a highly predictive model
for when peace is likely to break down, but from existing studies we do know some variables that affect the durability of peace. These include the decisiveness of military victory, the history of conflict between belligerents before the war, contiguity, the balance of power between states and especially changes in relative power over time, the cost of war, the issues at stake, particularly whether the conflict threatens the very existence of one side, and whether the war was a contest between just two states, or a multilateral conflict. If any of these factors also affect the likelihood that a peacekeeping mission is deployed, we need to take them into account to test the effectiveness of peacekeeping. As most peacekeeping is conducted by the UN, and therefore authorized by the Security Council, we might expect peacekeeping deployment to be less likely if one of the belligerent states is a permanent member of the Security Council wielding veto power. If the involvement of such a great power in the fighting affects the duration of peace, then we also need to control for this.

In the empirical analysis below, I begin by treating peacekeeping as a dependent variable, exploring the effects of these factors on the likelihood that international personnel are sent to keep peace. In the following section, I treat these factors as control variables so as to test the independent effect of peacekeeping on the durability of peace.

Data and Methods

To assess both where peacekeepers get deployed and their effects we need to examine the universe of cases in which peacekeeping might have been used. I have compiled a data set of all cease-fires in interstate wars ending between 1946 and 1997 (see the appendix). Each of the forty-eight cases is a cease-fire between a pair of principal belligerents in the Correlates of War
Version 3 (COW) data. A cease-fire is defined as an end to or break in the fighting, whether or not it represents the final end of the war. Wars that stop and start again are therefore split into separate cases. To avoid selecting on the dependent variable, it is important to include cease-fires that failed so quickly that the next round of fighting was considered by COW as part of the same war. It is possible that the data misses some very short-lived cease-fires. However, any resulting selection bias will work against the argument that peacekeeping makes peace more likely to last. We are much more likely to be aware of failed cease-fires that took place while peacekeepers were present, precisely because they were there to monitor such events, than we are to know about short cease-fires when no international personnel were involved.

Because some wars involve multiple dyads, or more than one cease-fire, and because some dyads fight more than once, not all of the cases are independent of one another. I correct for the statistical problem of autocorrelation by calculating robust standard errors, with cases clustered by conflict (e.g., all of the dyads in the Korean war are in one cluster, all of the wars between India and Pakistan are in another). Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is both multilateral and has led to several wars, the Middle East wars dominate the data set. In the tests below, I include a control variable for the Arab-Israeli wars to see whether these wars are significantly different from others.31

There are two versions of the data. The first captures a snap-shot of each case at the time of the cease-fire. I use this version when the dependent variable is whether or not peacekeepers are deployed. The second version, more appropriate for testing the effects of peacekeeping, allows for duration analysis with time-varying covariates. In this version, each cease-fire case is divided into observations spanning a length of time.32 This allows me to record changes over
time, such as shifts in relative power, or whether peacekeeping missions are deployed or depart. Note that using a time-varying measure of peacekeeping likely underestimates its effects. Peacekeeping is not given credit statistically for peace that continues to hold after a successful mission has departed; that is, peacekeepers are not given credit for creating self-sustaining peace. If despite this underestimation, we find a positive effect of peacekeeping on the duration of peace, we can be especially confident in the result.

Peacekeeping is coded with a dummy variable (any vs. none), and with a categorical variable distinguishing between mission types (none, monitoring mission, armed peacekeeping force). The number of peacekeepers deployed is also recorded. Because peacekeepers do not have a perfect record but do not always depart when war resumes, there are several cases in which peacekeepers are “left over” from an earlier cease-fire. That is, peacekeepers were deployed after one war, peace subsequently failed, and then when peace is restored, the original peacekeepers are still present. In analyzing peacekeeping as a dependent variable, I use two measures: one that captures all peacekeeping missions, and one that records only newly deployed peacekeeping missions.

Two dummy variables capture the military outcome of the war, whether it ended in a tie (20 cases) or a military victory for one side (25 cases), and to distinguish the most decisive outcomes, whether it ended with the elimination of one side or a foreign imposed regime change (3 cases). These data are from COW, Stam, and Werner. The cost of war is measured as the natural log of battle deaths (from COW). The measure of belligerents’ ante bellum history of conflict is based on the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over the course of their shared history. This variable ranges from 0 to over 3 disputes per year, with a mean of slightly

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less than one dispute per year. Dummy variables denote whether the belligerents are contiguous (37 dyads are), and whether the war was a multilateral contest rather than a war between only two states (32 are multilateral). COW capability data are used to measure the balance of power at the time of the cease-fire and, following Werner, shifts in relative capabilities over time. Further dummy variables indicate whether a permanent member of the Security Council (US, USSR or Russia, China, France, and the UK) fought in the war (true of 17 cases), and whether it was an Arab-Israeli war (19 cases). The coding of whether the war threatened the existence of either side (17 cases) is from Brecher.

In the first part of the statistical analysis, the dependent variable is peacekeeping. There are monitoring missions in twenty-six cases (seventeen of them new for that cease-fire), armed peacekeepers in another eight (six of them new). I use logistic and multinomial logistic regressions to investigate where peacekeepers are most likely to be deployed. In the second part, where peacekeeping is the main independent variable of interest, the dependent variable is the duration of peace. Peace is considered to fail if and when the dyad fights another war meeting the COW criteria. For example, the 1949 cease-fire between Israel and Egypt fails in October 1956 with the Sinai War, while the cease-fire between Israel and Syria falters in June 1967. If no new war occurs between the belligerents before January 1, 1998, the data are censored at that point. War resumes before this date in twenty-one cases. For this analysis, I use a Weibull model. The results are substantially the same if the less restrictive Cox proportional hazards model is used, but the Weibull produces more precise estimates in a small data set such as the one used here. Note that while the N is relatively small, the data cover the full universe of cases, not a sample thereof.
The two part analysis used here, evaluating first where peacekeepers go and then their effects, is not the ideal way to study a process in which a key explanatory variable is endogenous to other independent variables. A model that estimates the selection process and the effect of the key variable simultaneously, such as a two-stage model, would be better. For two reasons such a solution is not possible here. First, two-stage models require at least one “instrumental variable,” that is, a variable that is a good predictor of peacekeeping but is not correlated with the duration of peace. Unfortunately, most of the things that are likely to determine whether or not peacekeepers are deployed may also shape the prospects for peace. Second, to my knowledge, two-stage models have not yet been developed for duration analysis. The method used here is a somewhat clumsier version of a two-stage model.

Where do Peacekeepers Go?

Table 1 shows the results of logistic regressions testing the effects of variables on the probability that some form of peacekeeping mission (whether unarmed monitors or armed peacekeeping forces) will be deployed. The multinomial logit results in Table 2 distinguish between these two types of missions, allowing us to investigate whether different forms of peacekeeping are more likely in some situations than in others. The tables show results for all peacekeeping and for the measure that codes only new peacekeeping operations. While the latter is more useful for learning about where peacekeepers tend to be deployed, the former is important for evaluating variables that we should control for when we test the effects of peacekeeping. As we might expect, the predictive power and fit of the models in Tables 1 and 2 are better for new peacekeeping deployments alone than for the measure that mixes new missions
in with those left over from a previous conflict.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

Not surprisingly, there is a clear relationship between the decisiveness of victory and the likelihood that peacekeepers will be deployed. Military outcomes can take one of three values: elimination or foreign imposed regime change, victory short of this, and military tie. There are no cases of peacekeeping after the most lopsided military outcomes. While elimination or victor-imposed government is rare (occurring only between North and South Vietnam, the USSR and Hungary, and Uganda and Tanzania), it is statistically unlikely that the negative relationship with peacekeeping would occur by chance in our data (P(\chi^2)=0.02). In Tables 1 and 2 these cases are dropped to control for the effects of these most lopsided outcomes. The positive coefficients for the variable “tie” indicate that peacekeepers are much more likely to be deployed after wars that end in a draw than in a military victory for one side. This relationship is statistically significant in all but one of the models in Tables 1 and 2, and even there it comes close (p=0.14). There is thus a very strong negative relationship between decisiveness and peacekeeping.

New peacekeeping operations, especially monitoring missions, are most likely to be deployed after more costly wars, but when both old and new missions are considered, this effect falls away and armed peacekeepers are less likely to be present after costly wars. Peacekeeping missions seem more likely when belligerents have a long history of conflict, though this finding is not statistically significant when both types of peacekeeping missions are lumped together (as in Table 1). The results in Table 2 suggest that when there is a long history of conflict, peacekeeping is more likely to take the form of an armed mission than an unarmed observer mission.
Surprisingly, the relationship between contiguity and peacekeeping is negative. It is not significant for both mission types together, but armed peacekeeping is significantly less likely between neighbors, reflecting the presence of peacekeepers after wars among non-contiguous states such as Egypt and both France and Britain (as well as Israel) as the latter withdrew from the Sinai. However, this finding is not robust to different model specifications (for example, it falls away if the Mideast dummy is omitted from the analysis). Peacekeeping, and especially monitoring, is more likely after multilateral wars. Peacekeepers are less likely to be deployed after wars between states with unevenly matched capabilities, although this relationship does not hold when older peacekeeping missions are considered as well. There is no significant relationship between peacekeeping and permanent membership in the UN Security Council when mission types are lumped together, but as Table 2 makes clear, armed peacekeepers are much more likely than monitors when one side can veto the mission. This is somewhat counterintuitive, but seems to reflect the fact that a stronger mission will be required to keep the peace when a great power is involved. The practice of deploying armed peacekeepers as opposed to monitors was first developed for a war including two permanent members of the Security Council (in the Sinai). The control variable for the Arab-Israeli wars is not significant except for new armed peacekeeping missions, which are much more likely in the Middle East.

While peacekeepers are more likely to be present after wars that threaten the existence of one side, this is often because they are still in the region after an earlier war. New peacekeeping is less likely in such high stakes wars. There are no cases of armed peacekeepers when the war threatened one side’s very survival. The relationship between peacekeeping and territorial conflict (results not shown) is similar but somewhat weaker.
In sum, while the relationship between situational variables at the time of a cease-fire and the probability that peacekeepers will be deployed is fairly complicated, there is some evidence that peacekeepers are more likely to be sent to more difficult cases, rather than to ones in which peace will likely last in any case. The clearest finding to this effect is that the more indecisive the military outcome, the more likely peacekeepers are to be deployed. As we shall see, the more indecisive the outcome the more fragile the peace. New deployments of international personnel are also more likely between evenly matched opponents, and after complicated wars with many belligerents. Armed peacekeeping forces are more likely when the belligerents have a long history of conflict, and when one side is a great power wielding a veto in the Security Council. All of these findings suggest that peacekeeping deployments respond to need; they are more likely when they are most necessary. This trend is mitigated somewhat by the finding that peacekeepers are less likely between neighbors, and after wars that threaten one side’s very survival.

**Does Peace Last Longer when Peacekeepers are Present?**

While not all of the situational variables have a clear or consistent effect on the likelihood of peacekeeping, I include all of them as controls when testing the effects of peacekeeping on the durability of peace so as to avoid omitted variable bias. I also include a measure of change in the belligerents’ relative capabilities over time, as Werner found this to have a significant effect on the duration of peace.42

The results in Tables 3 and 4 show the effects of peacekeeping and the control variables on the duration of peace, or more technically, on the hazard of another war breaking out in a
given period if peace has lasted up to that period. The tables report hazard ratios, which are interpreted relative to one (1.0). Ratios greater than one indicate an increase in the hazard, or the risk of another war, ratios less than one indicate a decrease in this hazard. For example, a dummy variable with a hazard ratio of 2.0 means that the variable doubles the risk of war, while a hazard ratio of 0.75 indicates a 25% reduction.

[Table 3 about here]

The hazard ratios for peacekeeping provide clear evidence that this policy tool is effective. The results in Table 3, column 1 show that when peacekeepers are present the risk of another war drops by more than 85% relative to cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices after a war. The size of the peacekeeping mission does not make a difference, however (column 2). The effect of mission size is small in part because of the unit of the analysis (the estimated effect of adding a single monitor or soldier), but it is also statistically insignificant.

Table 4 shows the effect of peacekeeping broken down by mission type. Unarmed monitoring missions reduce the risk of another war by 85% relative to no peacekeeping, armed peacekeeping missions by 90%. The effects are jointly significant. The hypothesis that peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present is strongly supported.

[Table 4 about here]

The results in Tables 3 and 4 also shed light on other variables that affect the duration of peace. Decisive military victories are much more stable than are less decisive outcomes, and peace is more fragile between states with a prior history of conflict. Multilateral wars are less likely to resume, but note the large (though not significant) hazard ratio for the Arab-Israeli wars, which are all multilateral. When this control is dropped, the hazard ratio for multilateral wars is
not statistically significant. Changes in relative capabilities after the war are associated with the resumption of war. A preponderance of power by one side at the time of the cease-fire may lead to less stable peace, while if anything, more deadly wars lead to more stable peace, but these effects are not always statistically significant, so we should treat these findings with caution. The risk of war may be higher when the conflict threatened one side’s very existence, and lower when one side is a great power, but neither finding is consistent across model specifications.

In sum, once we control for other factors that affect the ease or difficulty of maintaining peace, it is clear that interstate peacekeeping is effective. All else equal, peace lasts longer when international personnel are present to help maintain it than when warring states are left to their own devices after a cease-fire.

Evaluating Causal Mechanisms

While the quantitative analysis presented above is suitable for testing whether peacekeeping helps to maintain peace, statistics cannot speak to the causal mechanisms through which it has such an effect. For this only qualitative analysis will do. In order to begin to evaluate causal mechanisms, this section provides a brief overview of several cases in each of three categories: those with no peacekeepers, those with monitoring missions, and those with armed peacekeeping forces. For a number of reasons, it is difficult to test causal mechanisms definitively. We cannot observe causality directly, but must infer it. Without getting inside the heads of leaders as they make decisions about war or peace, it is impossible to know exactly how the presence or absence of peacekeepers affected their calculations of costs, benefits, and risks. In individual cases we must make counterfactual assessments of whether and how things would
have been different if peacekeepers had been present or absent. What follows should therefore be taken not as a rigorous test of the causal mechanisms spelled out in the first section of this paper, but as a less definitive illustration of the ways in which peacekeepers keep peace and the limits on their ability to do so.

**No Peacekeeping**

Consistent with the statistical findings above, most of the cases that saw no peacekeeping deployment are wars that ended with very clear victories for one side (North and South Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Hungary, Tanzania and Uganda, Britain and Argentina, and China and India). The stability of peace in these cases is best accounted for by the decisiveness of these military outcomes. Of the no peacekeeping cases, those that ended with less decisive outcomes have not enjoyed stable peace. A look at two of these cases sheds some light on what happens when belligerents are left to their own devices.

The 1972-1978 war between Ethiopia and Somalia concerned the disputed Ogaden region, owned by Ethiopia but claimed by Somalia, and home to ethnically Somali tribes. Somalia’s regular forces fought alongside rebels in the region, and had occupied the Ogaden by 1977. Aided by Cuban troops, Ethiopia then repelled Somalia’s forces. The war ended in March 1978 when Ethiopia had regained the territory. Somalia withdrew its troops in response to a US peace proposal. No international peacekeepers were deployed.

Tensions remained extremely high between the two countries and there were intermittent clashes and low-level fighting along the border in the years after the cease-fire. These eruptions escalated, leading to serious fighting in February 1987. This resumption of fighting does not
qualify as a full-scale war in the COW definition, as it killed only some 300 people, so is not included as a failure of peace in the quantitative analysis above. This case suggests, however, that when peacekeepers are absent, low-level incidents and clashes can escalate to fairly severe fighting.

The same is true in the Sino-Vietnamese case. Long-standing tensions between China and Vietnam boiled over after serious border incidents in January 1979. China invaded, but hit unanticipated resistance and withdrew to the border by March, ending the war. Skirmishes continued along the border, however. These clashes escalated in 1983 and again in 1984, becoming particularly intense in 1986 and 1987. This renewed fighting qualifies as a full-scale war, as it claimed approximately 3,000 lives.48

Whether the presence of monitors or armed peacekeepers providing a buffer along the Ethiopia-Somalia or the China-Vietnam borders could have prevented renewed fighting is a counterfactual question. But in both cases, in the absence of any peacekeeping mission, low-level incidents and skirmishes increased tensions and escalated to more serious fighting, including full-scale war in the Sino-Vietnamese case. In cases in which there is neither a very decisive victory for one side, nor a peacekeeping mission, peace proves to be very unstable.49

Monitoring

Most of the peacekeeping after interstate wars has entailed unarmed monitoring missions rather than lightly armed peacekeeping forces.50 UN monitors oversaw cease-fires during and after the first Arab-Israeli war, after India and Pakistan’s wars over Kashmir, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Gulf war. The OAS sent monitors to El Salvador and Honduras after the Football war.
Small contingents of monitors from ad hoc groups of neutral nations were sent to Korea as part of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, and to Vietnam after the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973. Monitors left over from earlier missions were also present, though largely inactive, after the Six Day war and the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, and after India and Pakistan’s war over Bangladesh’s secession.

A closer look at the monitoring missions in Palestine, Kashmir, and Central America suggests some of the ways in which monitoring missions stabilize peace. The prospects for stability in the immediate aftermath of these cease-fires were relatively poor. In each, at least one side refused to accept the de facto outcome as the settlement of the dispute, and each left the adversaries’ forces in very close proximity. With troops “eyeball to eyeball” as they say, firing incidents were almost inevitable, and tensions tended to remain very high.

United Nations monitoring got off to a rough start. The new organization’s first mission was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) sent to Palestine during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. A small group of UN monitors was originally sent to observe a four week temporary truce in June 1948. Interestingly, both sides complied with this truce right through the day it expired, even though attacking as the end of the truce neared would presumably have been advantageous. After another short stint of fighting, a Security Council ordered cease-fire went into effect on July 18. This cease-fire was meant to be permanent and a larger team of 572 observers was deployed. However, fighting resumed when Israel launched an offensive in the Negev and then western Galilee. The cease-fire had lasted only three months, during which the UN was a target; UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte was assassinated by a Jewish terrorist organization. The presence of monitors failed to keep peace in this case.
Cease-fires along the various fronts and a series of General Armistice Agreements between Israel and each of the frontline Arab states finally ended the war in 1949. After its initial failure, UNTSO monitors observed the peace for almost eight years between Israel and Egypt until Israel attacked with British and French support during the Suez crisis, and almost twenty years between Israel and both Syria and Jordan. The UN’s second mission was the UN Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the cease-fire after the First Kashmir War in 1949. UNMOGIP helped keep the peace between India and Pakistan for almost seventeen years until the outbreak of war in 1965. Both UNTSO and UNMOGIP are still in place today, though they are largely inactive.

How one judges these results depends in part on the counterfactual. The strife between Arabs and Israelis, and that between India and Pakistan have been the two most intractable interstate conflicts since World War II. Does the fact that these wars re-erupted while observers kept watch mean that monitoring was ineffective? Or was renewed war inevitable and the fact that peace lasted as long as it did testament to the effect of monitoring?

To get at the effects of monitoring it helps to examine the day-to-day operations over time. Both of these missions served mostly to deal with skirmishes and incidents and to keep them from escalating out of control. Monitors acted as impartial referees over “who started it,” provided on-the-spot investigation and mediation, worked out small troop withdrawals to stabilize cease-fire lines and worked to reestablish cease-fires when clashes took place. These missions did not generally provide early warning (although UNMOGIP did inform India of Pakistan’s preparations for war in 196554), nor were they large enough to serve as any kind of buffer. As the examples below indicate, they were much more about dispute resolution and
preventing accidental spirals.

In the early years of its operation, UNTSO was relatively effective at putting out sparks, and there were many sparks to put out. Along the Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Syria, for example, there were numerous incidents and armed clashes over fishing rights in Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), between Arab and Jewish farmers in the demilitarized zones, and over Israel’s civil engineering projects in the demilitarized areas. Israel intended to exert its sovereignty over the demilitarized areas, while Syria claimed the territorial issue was unresolved and contested Israel’s actions, often by force. These disputes and clashes, and others like them on Israel’s other fronts, were investigated on the spot by UNTSO observers and discussed in the Military Armistice Commissions (MACs) set up between Israel and each of its neighbors. Investigation and mediation of cease-fires during clashes were quite effective in keeping the level of violence along the cease-fire lines to a minimum.  

The Armistice Agreements of 1949 were meant to be very temporary arrangements while a political settlement was worked out. As it became clear that settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was not possible, the machinery set up in the agreements to try to keep peace began to break down. The dispute resolution procedures of the MACs, for example, became fora more for mutual accusation and recrimination than for resolving problems. The MACs were largely defunct by the mid 1950s, and after the Six Day War in 1967 Israel stopped cooperating with the UN dispute resolution machinery altogether, so while monitors were still present, they were much less active in terms of day-to-day operations and investigations. Peace was much less stable after the 1967 war. Clashes along the Israeli-Egyptian front reached full-scale war in the War of Attrition in 1969, and the whole region was again at war in 1973. Monitors could not
have prevented the 1973 war. Whether an active monitoring operation might have helped prevent the escalation three years earlier between Israel and Egypt is impossible to say. Many other factors were at work of course, but it is notable that the period between 1967 and 1973, which might have been expected to be relatively stable after Israel’s decisive victory was the only period without active UN monitors or peacekeeping forces (see below), and was the least stable period in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In Kashmir we see a similar pattern: monitors were very effective early on but after years of negotiations failed to settle the Kashmir conflict, tensions rose and in 1965 Pakistan and India were again at war. In its first sixteen years UNMOGIP “fulfilled its basic prophylactic task of helping to maintain local calm and to defuse such incidents as occurred.” ⁵⁷ UNMOGIP’s presence and investigations helped India and Pakistan to contain the inevitable clashes and for years to avoid war. ⁵⁸ Pakistan’s decision to instigate guerilla attacks, thus triggering war in 1965 was not prevented by the monitors, though the decision covertly to sponsor guerillas rather than conduct an outright invasion reflects Pakistan’s desire not to be seen as the aggressor and its concern with international opinion. This strategy worked; the world initially condemned India for its response and for being the first to attack across the cease-fire line and the international border. After the Second Kashmir War in 1965 a distinct UN monitoring mission (the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission, or UNIPOM) was sent to the international boundary between India and Pakistan (as opposed to the disputed line within Kashmir) to oversee a rather tense cease-fire and later, after the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966, the withdrawal of forces to the status quo ante bellum. This mission of 90 observers helped ensure a smooth transfer of territory held by each side on the wrong side of the border, but was no longer needed after the withdrawals and
was terminated in March.\textsuperscript{59} Meanwhile UNMOGIP was still in place in Kashmir. India, never a big fan of UN involvement in the dispute, became very mistrustful of the international organization after its failure to condemn Pakistan publicly for initiating the 1965 war, and no longer participates fully in UNMOGIP dispute resolution.\textsuperscript{60} UNMOGIP continues to try to mediate day-to-day skirmishes. Even without full Indian cooperation, it is given credit for stabilizing the cease-fire line (known as the “line of control” after 1971) in Kashmir to some extent. One Pakistani General noted that despite its diminished role, “UNMOGIP’s investigations and reports have ‘a dampening effect’ on any incident that starts.”\textsuperscript{61} UNMOGIP observers are stationed in the Kashmir valley, however, and therefore were not able to prevent clashes on the Siachen Glacier or, more recently, the serious fighting in the mountainous terrain of Kargil in 1999.

The UNMOGIP case highlights a bind the UN is in when a cease-fire it is monitoring is violated, not through accidental or small incidents, but deliberately (though covertly in this case). Historically, the UN has been highly concerned with maintaining the perception of impartiality. If it publicly condemns the initiator as an “aggressor” it jeopardizes its ability to mediate to reinstate the cease-fire, which is the organization’s highest priority. Stopping the immediate killing often takes precedence over longer term considerations of credibility. In 1965, UNMOGIP observers reported Pakistan’s actions to New York, and U Thant considered going public with reports of Pakistan’s violation of the cease-fire. He issued a draft report to both India and Pakistan; Pakistan of course objected, and U Thant decided to keep quiet:

Weighing carefully all considerations, I came to the conclusion that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective had to be to see the fighting end rather than indicting or denouncing any party for
starting and continuing it.\textsuperscript{62}

With the UN unwilling to condemn aggression publicly, international audience costs have little effect. Throughout the Cold War, the UN was very cautious about condemning states for violating the cease-fires it monitored. When major violations did break out, the international organization usually made even-handed statements and called for a new cease-fire. Constrained by the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN was often not free to blame either side for violations of the cease-fire. But on top of this constraint there developed an organizational reluctance to do or say anything that might jeopardize “impartiality.” This unfortunately undermined the organization’s ability to use the spotlight of international attention to help maintain peace. The UN often seemed to be in the position of a watchdog who fears that barking might offend the robber (or the robber’s patrons). Ironically, in the India-Pakistan case, reluctance to condemn Pakistan led India to conclude the UN could not be relied upon in the conflict, so impartiality was compromised in any case.

The tension between credibility and impartiality continues to create dilemmas for UN peacekeeping,\textsuperscript{63} but reevaluations of peacekeeping policy after the Cold War have changed UN culture on this point considerably. The UN has become much more willing to take diplomatic and even military action against spoilers of the peace.\textsuperscript{64}

Both UNTSO and UNMOGIP were quite effective in mediating, restoring local cease-fires and generally keeping tense situations from spiraling out of control. In neither case, however, could unarmed monitors prevent or deter deliberate decisions to attack. Observers could do nothing but watch as war broke out in 1956 over Suez, for example. Nor could they prevent (though they might have condemned) Pakistan’s instigation of guerilla war across the
cease-fire line in Kashmir. And while both missions are in place to this day, they are largely inactive as neither Israel nor India cooperates with the missions.

The case of El Salvador and Honduras after the so-called Football War in 1969 also provides a glimpse into the empirical effects of monitoring. Thirty-three military observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) were sent to monitor the cease-fire that ended the war and El Salvador’s withdrawal to the status quo ante bellum. OAS policy was to pull the observers out as quickly as possible once things settled down, and all but two were pulled out within six months.\(^6\)\(^5\) Clashes broke out again however and the observers were sent back in. They managed to quiet things down, but again pulled out quickly – despite a request by the belligerents that it continue, the mission was terminated by December 1971. Serious fighting erupted again in 1976 and observers were deployed once more.\(^6\)\(^6\) This time the OAS consented to leave some of them there until the dispute was eventually sent to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. This on-again-off-again pattern of monitoring makes this a useful case for assessing the effects of peacekeeping. In the Football War case the selection effect noted above is clear – observers were sent in only when things got bad, and the stabilizing effect of monitors is also evident – the skirmishes settled down when they were present and flared up when they left.

**Armed Peacekeeping**

Armed peacekeeping missions have been relatively rare in interstate wars. Peacekeeping forces deployed after the Sinai war, and along both the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian fronts after the Yom Kippur war. More recently, the UN sent an mission to help keep peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000.\(^6\)\(^7\) Armed peacekeeping missions were also present from earlier
deployments in civil conflicts in Cyprus when the Turco-Cypriot war broke out, and in Lebanon when Israel and Syria fought there in 1982.

In both the Sinai war and the Yom Kippur war, great power involvement and/or the threat of direct superpower involvement raised the stakes of peacemaking and peacekeeping considerably. The practice of sending large numbers of armed soldiers under the auspices of the international community as a buffer to keep peace was developed to allow the United Kingdom and France to save face as they pulled out after the Suez crisis in 1956, and to oversee Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai. By positioning itself between withdrawing Israeli troops and Egyptian forces, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) helped to prevent incidents among enemy combatants. Once the withdrawal was complete, UNEF monitored the Israeli-Egyptian border.

UNEF’s eventual fate is a classic case of the limits of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operates with the consent of the parties involved. So in 1967, when Nasser asked the UNEF to leave, the operation had to withdraw, and Israel launched a preemptive attack. UNEF was deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border. Once Egypt revoked consent, UNEF was powerless to prevent this war. Agreeing to peacekeeping ties belligerents’ hands, but they retain the ability ultimately to untie the knot.

UNEF also clearly shows the effects of peacekeeping, however. First, the fact that Nasser felt it necessary to ask the mission to leave indicates that it was a political if not a military constraint. Nasser withdrew consent for UNEF in part to respond to accusations within the Arab world that he needed UN protection from Israel. But apparently, as tensions mounted toward war, he felt that should he desire to fight Israel, the UN peacekeepers presented a significant obstacle. Second, whether Egypt intended to strike Israel unprovoked or only in response to an
offensive by Israel against Syria (the Soviet Union had erroneously reported that Israel was amassing troops on the Syrian border), Israel took the move as a signal of impending attack.\textsuperscript{70} Just as agreeing to peacekeeping signals benign intent, withdrawing consent signals the opposite. Belligerents can untie their hands, but not in secret.

Third, comparisons across time and across space show UNEF’s effects on peace. Across time, we can examine the Israeli-Egyptian border before, during, and after UNEF’s deployment. The pattern of hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors was largely that of infiltration into Israel (at first often by farmers separated from their land by the cease-fire lines, and later by \textit{fedayeen} guerillas) and reprisals by Israel in return. The Egyptian-Israeli front had been volatile before 1956, but was largely quiet while the UNEF buffer force was there. After its departure and the 1967 war, clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces escalated back to the level of full-scale warfare in the War of Attrition in 1969-1970.

Comparing the Israeli-Egyptian front while UNEF was deployed to the Israeli-Syrian and Israel-Jordanian fronts where no peacekeepers were present we also see a large difference. “There was a marked contrast between the quiet along the Egyptian border and the confrontation situation in other sectors.”\textsuperscript{71} There was a higher concentration of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, making this front more problematic, but the difference also reflects the effect of UNEF’s role as a buffer force, in this case with authorization to apprehend infiltrators crossing from Egypt into Israel.\textsuperscript{72}

No armed peacekeepers were in place in the Middle East when the 1973 war broke out (and UNTSO was by now completely inactive\textsuperscript{73}), though it is debatable whether they would have been able to prevent the deliberate Egyptian and Syrian attack. They would presumably have
made the surprise attack on Yom Kippur more difficult, however. After the Yom Kippur war armed peacekeepers were deployed both in the Sinai (UNEF II) and in the Golan Heights as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces. UNEF II not only helped maintain the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, it also allowed the peace process that eventually led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This is an important counter example to the moral hazard argument mentioned above, that by maintaining a cease-fire and keeping the costs of conflict low, peacekeepers can hinder peace processes. It is hard to imagine Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem or the Camp David negotiations occurring while serious clashes took place along the Egyptian-Israeli front. A non-UN force, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) took over peacekeeping after the peace treaty was signed. The MFO remains in the Sinai, verifying that neither side is preparing to attack the other.

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) deployed in the Golan Heights after the 1973 war was, like UNEF, a classic buffer or interpositional force stationed in a demilitarized zone separating the two sides. UNDOF monitors the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces, providing some early warning should either side try to seize territory in the strategic Heights. It also serves a dispute resolution function, dealing with alleged violations over “unauthorized crossings” into the buffer zone. Israeli and Syrian continued acceptance of UNDOF serves as a signaling device, indicating relatively benign intentions between otherwise deadly enemies. In the data set used in Tables 3-4, the UNDOF mission is coded as a failure with peace lasting eight and a half years because Israel and Syria fought again in Lebanon in 1982. However, peace has lasted remarkably well in the Golan where the peacekeepers are deployed. The fact that these two adversaries did not fight over this most contested strategic
piece of territory even while they were fighting each other in Lebanon (nor when Israel annexed
the Golan, extending Israeli jurisdiction and administration to the territory in 1981) is strong
testament to UNDOF’s peace keeping effects.

The first section of this article hypothesized that peacekeepers might make peace more
stable by 1) raising the cost of returning to war by making surprise attack more difficult and
raising the international audience costs of aggression; 2) by reassuring each side about the other’s
intentions by monitoring and by providing belligerents with a credible way to signal their
intentions; and 3) by preventing accidents or skirmishes from escalating back to war by
mediating and investigating alleged violations. What do the cases surveyed here tell us about
these causal mechanisms in practice?

Evidence that the presence of peacekeepers raise the costs of aggression is inherently hard
to come by. Deterrence is notoriously difficult to evaluate empirically, particularly in individual
cases. Its failures are much more obvious than its successes. There are clear cases in which
peacekeepers failed to deter aggression, for example, the Israeli offensive breaking the cease-fire
in 1948 in the first Arab-Israeli war. It is much harder to know if leaders who might otherwise
have contemplated an attack were dissuaded by the presence of peacekeepers. Decisions about
surprise attack are, by their very nature, particularly difficult to observe empirically. It is notable,
however, that the most notorious case of a surprise attack in the period surveyed here, the
Egyptian and Syrian attack on Yom Kippur 1973, occurred when there were no active
peacekeepers in the region.

There are also cases in which peacekeepers’ ability to raise the cost of aggression can be
seen in the breach. Nasser’s request that UNEF withdraw suggests that its presence limited his ability to maneuver militarily and politically. Pakistan’s choice of covert aggression, instigating guerilla attacks against India in 1965 provides another example. An overt attack would have been militarily more effective, but Pakistan successfully avoided international condemnation by provoking India to be the first openly to cross the cease-fire line. The presence of UN monitors thus constrained Pakistan’s war options, though it did not foreclose them. However, the UN’s failure to call Pakistan to task for provoking this war illustrates the limited use peacekeepers have made of the “spotlight of international attention.” In general, while states may care very much about international opinion, there is only scant evidence that the presence of peacekeepers invokes these concerns. The combination of Cold War politics and an organizational reluctance to condemn aggression publicly served to undermine this potential causal mechanism of peacekeeping. With the Cold War over and the UN’s organizational culture changing, invoking international audience costs has likely become more important, but evaluating its effectiveness in more recent cases, particularly in civil wars, is beyond the scope of this paper.

The evidence that peacekeepers reassured belligerents about each other’s intentions is stronger. Whether or not peacekeepers actually deterred surprise attack, there are a number of cases in which their presence served to mollify each side’s concerns about such an attack from the other. Historians credit UNMOGIP, for example, with reassuring India and Pakistan that the other was not preparing a surprise attack. Since the Yom Kippur war, the presence of UN and then MFO peacekeepers and their verification technology have served to reassure both Israel and Egypt that neither is mobilizing to attack the other across the Sinai. The same could be said for UNDOF in the Golan, although neither Israel nor Syria is likely to rely heavily on UN
peacekeepers for intelligence about the other’s military.

There is also evidence that acceptance of and continued cooperation with peacekeepers serves as a credible signal of benign intent. That Israel and Syria continue to countenance UNDOF signals that despite their hostility for each other, neither intends to attack the other directly. Once again, however, this effect can be best observed in the breach. Increasing reluctance to cooperate with UNTSO inspectors and the MAC dispute resolution procedures both reflected and signaled rising hostility between Israel and its neighbors during the 1950s, and Nasser’s request that UNEF leave was interpreted by Israel as a signal of impending attack.

The effects of peacekeepers’s mediation and investigation on the likelihood that small skirmishes will escalate to more serious hostilities can be seen in a number of cases. While they did not make peace last forever, missions such as UNTSO and UNMOGIP stabilized cease-fire lines in the immediate aftermath of war by arranging local cease-fires when fighting broke out. By submitting complaints for UN investigation, India and Pakistan and Israel and its neighbors were able to respond to perceived violations without escalating their conflicts. Variation in the presence and activity level of peacekeepers both across time periods and across fronts in the middle east indicates the effectiveness of peacekeepers in subduing the level of hostilities and preventing escalation. The on-again off-again nature of OAS peacekeeping between El Salvador and Honduras provides more evidence that cease-fire lines remain calmer and escalation is less likely when peacekeepers are present. The fate of peace in those cases in which there was neither a decisive victory, nor a peacekeeping mission deployed, as between Ethiopia and Somalia or between Vietnam and China, further indicates that the presence of peacekeepers helps to prevent escalation of relatively low level skirmishing back to war.
For the reasons given above, this overview does not provide a definitive test of the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping. Some tentative conclusions can be reached, however. Peacekeepers have some ability to raise the cost of aggression, but this ability is limited. Their presence makes surprise attack more difficult, but they have not historically been effective in invoking international audience costs to resuming war. There is stronger evidence that peacekeepers have served to reassure belligerents about the other’s intentions, both by monitoring, but perhaps more important, by providing a credible signal of intentions. And there is fairly clear evidence that peacekeepers serve to minimize the risk of accidents or skirmishes from escalating to full-scale fighting.

**Conclusion**

Recent scholarship on peacekeeping has focused on its adaptation to internal conflict, but traditional peacekeeping between states has not been well theorized, nor rigorously tested. This article has explored the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers make interstate war less likely to resume, and has tested the effect of peacekeeping over its half-century history.

On the face of it, it is not immediately obvious how unarmed or relatively lightly armed international personnel, deployed with, and therefore dependent on, the consent of the warring parties can reduce the chances of another war. While the brief survey of cases given here is not a definitive test, it suggests that peacekeepers can disrupt the processes that might otherwise lead back to war in several ways. At the margins at least, they may make deliberate aggression physically more difficult, and they can make surprise attack less likely. Peacekeepers have the potential to raise the international costs of aggression, bringing tangible losses in terms of
military support and aid, as well, perhaps, as less tangible losses in reputation and support, but Cold War constraints and the organizational culture of the UN thwarted that potential. Peacekeepers can help disrupt security dilemma spirals of misunderstanding and uncertainty that can lead to unwanted war by monitoring compliance and serving as a neutral referee for the inevitable charges of cease-fire violations. Peacekeeping can also serve as a credible signal of intentions among belligerents who otherwise have difficulty making their aims known. And last but not least, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents and small skirmishes from leading back to war. On-the-spot mediation can restore calm, while formal investigative mechanisms give belligerents an alternative to either doing nothing and appearing weak in the face of perceived provocations, or of responding and escalating the situation dangerously.

Unlike causal mechanisms, the overall effects of peacekeeping can be tested definitively. Here the results are quite clear. Peacekeepers are not deployed at random; they are most likely in cases where peace is relatively difficult to maintain, particularly when there has been no decisive military victor. It is therefore important to control for factors that shape both where peacekeepers go and whether peace lasts. All else equal, peace lasts substantially longer when international personnel deploy than when states are left to maintain peace on their own. In short, peacekeeping works. Peacekeeping is not a panacea; it alone will not stop deliberate aggression. But at a time when the relevance of international organizations and the UN in particular is being questioned, it is important to acknowledge the utility of conflict management tools such as peacekeeping.
Appendix. Cease-Fires, the Resumption of War, and Peacekeeping (1946-1998)

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</table>

**Peacekeeping:**

0 = none
1 = unarmed monitors
2 = armed forces

* denotes cases in which the only peacekeeping mission present was “left over” from an earlier cease-fire.
Notes

1 This is usually done by the UN, but sometimes by regional organizations or by an ad hoc group.


5 See, for example, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, (December 2000); Amitabh Dubey, "Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlements" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans,

6 The conventional wisdom is that peacekeeping is less effective in internal conflicts than in its traditional setting between sovereign states. For a preliminary comparison of peacekeeping’s effects in the two types of war, see Virginia Page Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars," *International Studies Review* 5, (December 2003).


11 The results of recent studies on civil wars are similarly contradictory. Doyle and Sambanis (fn. 5) find that some forms of peacekeeping lead to “peacebuilding success;” Dubey (fn. 5) finds that peacekeeping has no significant effect on the duration of peace; while Fortna (fn. 5) finds peacekeeping to have a significant positive impact in the post-Cold War era.

12 On war termination see, for example, Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War

13 For an analysis of third-party mediation and security guarantees after interstate wars, see Fortna (fn. 12, 2004).

14 This notion is tested directly below. Werner’s study covers a much longer time period (1816-1992). However, peacekeeping was only “invented” after World War II, making the time period examined here a better test of its effects.


17 Monitoring missions typically range in size from a few dozen observers to several hundred, and are unarmed (though observers are military personnel). Peacekeeping forces are lightly armed for “defensive purposes.” In interstate cases, these missions have ranged from about twelve hundred to thirteen thousand troops. I use the general term *peacekeeping* to refer to both
types of missions, and use the terms monitoring and peacekeeping forces or armed peacekeepers to distinguish between them.

18 Diehl (fn. 16), 10; James (fn. 3); Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).

19 For a fuller discussion of these difficulties and mechanisms that can be used to overcome them, see Fortna (fn. 12, 2004).

20 It is rare for states to be drawn into war purely by accident, it requires deliberate action to decide to retaliate. But the familiar dynamic of the security dilemma suggests how accidents might set off an escalatory cycle of clashes that can lead back to full-scale war. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

21 Note, however, that some might argue just the opposite, that peace should be most stable in the immediate aftermath of war. According to the informational perspective on war, it is states’ inability credibly to reveal their intentions and capabilities that leads to war. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, (Summer 1995). The fighting of the war itself, however, credibly reveals this information. The danger of renewed war should therefore be lowest when one has just been fought. This argument does not hold up well empirically, however. Rather, peace has been found to be most precarious just after fighting ends, becoming more stable over time. Fortna (fn. 12, 2004), 171-2; Werner (fn. 12), 927.

22 The development of more robust “peace enforcement” missions in civil conflicts, increasingly common after the mid-1990s (for example, the NATO mission in Bosnia or the UN mission in Sierra Leone) represents a significant departure from traditional peacekeeping and may make the
deterrent effects of peacekeeping more important.

23 Even for states with a powerful ally in the Security Council willing to veto any UN sanctions, blatant violations can temper that ally’s diplomatic support.

24 Direct effects of monitoring may be more important in civil conflicts, particularly for rebel groups without sophisticated intelligence gathering capability.

25 To be exact, of the 48 cease-fires analyzed below, peacekeepers are present in 34. Of these, war resumes in 18, or 53%. Of the 14 with no peacekeepers, war resumes in only 3, or 21%.

26 Luttwak’s more general argument is similar – that intervening to set up and maintain a cease-fire too early, before war “burns itself out,” only postpones the war-induced exhaustion that will lead to accommodation and stable peace. Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," Foreign Affairs 78, (July/August 1999).

27 For a related argument, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?," International Organization 50, (Summer 1996).


29 As noted above, this study builds on my previous work (see fn. 12), examining in more depth one of a number of mechanisms used to maintain peace. Several other of these mechanisms, particularly demilitarized zones and arms control measures, are somewhat correlated with peacekeeping. Because these other mechanisms are not causally prior to peacekeeping, I do not include them in the analysis presented below, but I have checked whether the results hold up when these correlated mechanisms are controlled for. They do so. The hazard ratios remain the same, although as we would expect when multicollinearity is introduced, the standard errors become somewhat larger, in some cases missing the conventional 0.05 standard for significance.

30 For a similar approach to evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the context of civil wars, see Fortna (fn. 5).

31 For more detailed information on the Cease-Fires Dataset, see Fortna (fn. 12, 2004). The data are available at http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/.
The time periods run consecutively from the cease-fire to the outbreak of another war, or until the data are censored in 1998.


Werner (fn. 12).


Note that the failure of peace between India and Pakistan in 1999 with the Kargil War, and between the US and Iraq in 2003 occur after the data are censored.

Duration or survival models such as the Weibull have several desirable properties. They do not require an arbitrary specification of “successful” peace (such as a five year cut off), but can treat the stability of peace as a continuous variable. They are also adept at handling censored data, in which observation ends before peace has failed. While we know, for example, that the Korean armistice has held to date, we do not know for certain that it will continue to hold in the future. Duration models incorporate this uncertainty in their estimations. For a technical discussion, see William H. Greene, *Econometric Analysis* (New York: MacMillan, 1993).

Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, "Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, (October 1997). The results for peacekeeping are, if anything, stronger in the Cox model, but analyzing goodness of fit by plotting the empirical Aalen-Nelson cumulative hazard function against Cox-Snell residuals suggests that the Weibull model fits the data better than the Cox.

For work in this direction see James Raymond Vreeland, "Selection and Survival,"
His solution is not applicable here because the assignment of peacekeeping is static, not dynamic, i.e., it is determined at the beginning of a spell of peace, not at independent intervals over the spell of peace. See also Frederick J. Boehmke, Daniel Morey, and Megan Shannon, "Selection Bias and Continuous-Time Duration Models: Consequences and a Proposed Solution," (Manuscript, University of Iowa, July 2004).

In other words, the relationship shown holds constant the fact that neither side has been eliminated, nor had a new government imposed on it. Because there is no variation in peacekeeping in the few cases with such extreme military outcomes, this variable cannot be included in the multinomial logit analysis.

This makes it impossible to include the stakes variable in the multinomial logit. The negative relationship is statistically significant in a cross-tabulation between stakes and peacekeeping ($P(\chi^2)=0.02$).

Werner (fn. 12). It is not clear, however, whether changing capabilities affect the resumption of war, or whether the resumption of war (or its anticipation) change measures of material capabilities. See Fortna (fn. 12, 2003), 353.

These peacekeeping measures include both newly deployed missions and those left over from an earlier conflict. The results are the same or stronger if the measure including only new missions is used.

As noted above, war outcomes fall into three categories: ties, which are shown here to have the highest risk of resumption; decisive victories short of elimination or regime change, which is the omitted category in tables 3 and 4; and elimination or foreign-imposed regime change, shown to
be the most stable.


48 For an overview of the repeated rounds of fighting between China and Vietnam, see Bercovitch and Jackson (fn. 45), 188-89, 212, 216-17. The interstate conflict eventually wound down with the resolution of Cambodia’s civil war in 1991.


50 Most peacekeeping missions in civil wars, on the other hand, have included at least some armed troops, often along with sizable civilian components.
The UN-flagged force that fought during the Korean war is not considered a peacekeeping mission here, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee deployed after the war is. It consisted of monitors from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia operating in twenty teams of at least four observers. *Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea*, Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953.

The other cases in this category provide less insight. While monitors in Korea may have helped stabilize the armistice to some extent, nuclear deterrence makes the case overdetermined. Monitors deployed in Vietnam in 1973 were quickly overtaken by events. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) deployed at the end of the Gulf War is an unusual case in that, having sanctioned the war against Iraq, the UN could not claim impartiality as observers. This mission was later converted into an armed peacekeeping mission. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) operated much like UNTSO and UNMOGIP. UNIIMOG is credited with keeping a number of serious skirmishes in the first months of the cease-fire after the Iran-Iraq war from escalating out of control and with helping to keep peace until Iraq’s more pressing security concerns in the Gulf War prompted reconciliation with Iran in January 1991.


Azcarate (fn. 55), 100; Bull (fn. 55), 54, 62; Burns (fn. 55), 27.


United Nations (fn. 52), 138-9.

India’s wariness of UN involvement reflected reluctance to hold the plebiscite promised in Kashmir in 1949 as part of UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions, as well as a desire to settle issues with Pakistan bilaterally. It also stemmed in large part from the sovereignty
concerns of a relatively new state. As is often the case, states who have newly won independence from colonial powers are reluctant to allow international forces back on their soil, thus constraining UN involvement.

61 Gen. (ret.) Jehangir Karamat of the Pakistan Army (Presentation at CISAC, Stanford University, May 19, 1999).


64 During the tenure of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN became less reluctant to condemn belligerents. Howard (fn. 4). This trend has continued under Kofi Annan. See, for example, United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.

65 The OAS Secretary General, Galo Plaza had been involved in UN peacekeeping in Lebanon and Cyprus and was determined to avoid getting “locked in” and having peacekeepers stay for years. He insisted, “the parties themselves must take over full responsibility.” Quoted in David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 590.


67 This last case falls outside the temporal scope of the quantitative analysis above. Adding it
would only strengthen the finding that peace is more likely to last when peacekeepers are present.

68 Britain and France agreed to withdraw as soon as a UN force was in position to ensure that hostilities would not resume. United Nations (fn. 52), 45.

69 Bailey (fn. 53).

70 Up to this point, Israel had viewed aggressive posturing in Egypt as merely political maneuvering Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 3d ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 245-48.

71 United Nations (fn. 52), 54.

72 Ibid, 53.

73 UNTSO observers were not even able to tell which side started the Yom Kippur war. Bailey (fn. 53), 308; Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 99.

74 Opposition from Arab states and the Soviets to the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace process precluded any continued UN peacekeeping role.

75 Israel, previously opposed to strong peacekeeping forces, pushed for a large force of at least 3,000 troops. Syria, on the other hand, was concerned about infringements on its sovereignty, and wanted a non-military operation of only a few hundred monitors. They settled on 1,250 UN troops. The issue was touchy enough politically that even the name of the operation was an issue, with both “observer” and “force” in the title as a compromise. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), 1044, 1094.


77 Should either side request the UN mission to depart, this would be seen as a distinctly hostile
act by the other.

78 The impotence of peacekeepers in the face of determined aggression is perhaps best exemplified by peacekeepers in Lebanon in 1982 whose role was reduced to counting Israeli tanks as they rolled by.

79 Brines (fn. 54), 310.

80 Israel has always been concerned with US opinion, often waiting for a green, or at least a yellow light, from Washington before acting militarily. Khouri (fn. 70), 244; Ma'oz (fn. 73), 100-01. India also delayed military action against Pakistan in 1971 because of concerns with international reaction to a precipitous attack Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 120.

81 This is true both of scholars generally inclined to see the peacekeeping as efficacious, such as Wainhouse (fn. 65), chap. 3; and of a skeptic on the UN’s role like Brines (fn. 54).