War and Social Integration: The Effects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict on Jewish Emigration from Israel

Yinon Cohen


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WAR AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION: 
THE EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT ON 
JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM ISRAEL.*

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Protracted conflicts may affect measures of social integration in dissimilar, even opposite ways. Employing Jewish emigration rates from Israel as a measure of social (dis)integration, I test the effects of two aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict on emigration rates during 1951–1984: (1) annual military reserve duty and (2) subjective intensity of the conflict or its salience as reflected in the media. These two aspects are hypothesized to affect emigration rates through different mechanisms. Reserve duty constitutes a heavy cost to the individual, which directly affects the majority of Israeli households. It is expected to increase emigration rates by increasing individual costs of living in Israel. Increased salience of the conflict, on the other hand, is likely to attenuate emigration rates via social mechanisms that enhance social cohesion and integration. Results support arguments for opposite effects of the two aspects of conflict on emigration rates.

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines and analyzes effects of the Israeli-Arab conflict on emigration from Israel. Israel, to say the least, is not proud of its emigrants and considers emigration a major social problem. In seeking to clarify the connection between conflict and emigration, it may be useful to view Jewish emigration rates from Israel as a measure of social (dis)integration. Social integration has long been considered a function of external conflicts. One of the oldest hypotheses of classical sociology (e.g., Simmel 1955; Coser 1956) postulates that, under certain conditions, conflict with an outside enemy will increase social integration and cohesion. It follows, that during periods in which these conditions prevailed in Israel, conflict should have reduced Jewish emigration rates.

This sociological reasoning, however, is diametrically opposed to contemporary economic and social-psychological theories of migration (e.g., Sjaastad 1962; Taylor 1969). Assuming that most people seek peace and avoid wars, these theories view external conflicts as "push" factors incurring individual costs that may be avoided through emigration.

Both theoretical perspectives, sociological and economic, seem reasonable. Is it possible that both are valid? Conflicts, especially protracted ones, have numerous manifestations whose effects on specific measures of social integration are not necessarily similar. Uncorrelated aspects of a conflict—for example, heavy casualties on one hand and increasing international support on the other—may affect a specific measure of social integration in different, even opposite ways.

In the following, I will explore and develop this issue by focusing on the differential effects of Israeli-Arab conflict on Jewish emigration rates from Israel during 1951–1984.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

During every period of migration, a significant proportion of arriving immigrants return to their countries of origin after a short period of time. Since most migrations lack ideological basis, no criticism is leveled against the country of origin or against those failing to adjust to the country of destination. Neither
the immigrant nor the countries of origin or destination are blamed.

The situation in Israel is very different. In contrast to other immigrant societies that have increasingly restricted the inflow of new settlers during the last half century, Israel has continuously encouraged unlimited Jewish immigration since the early days of its independence. In keeping with the goal of increasing the Jewish population, Israel, unlike other Western states, has persistently discouraged emigration (of Jews), primarily by exerting moral and ideological pressures on potential leavers. Even the demographically neutral terms—immigration and emigration—have been replaced in Israel by value laden terms having positive connotations for immigrants and negative ones for emigrants.

One explanation for the negative attitude toward Jewish emigration is to be found in the centrality of the norm of “living in Israel” in the Zionist value system—the official and accepted ideology of the State of Israel since its establishment. The strong emphasis of living in Israel delegitimizes leaving it. But this is not simply a matter of ideological purity; there are practical reasons as well. Israel has been engaged in a continuous conflict with the Arab world since its establishment. Loss of Jews resulting from emigration, a decline in immigration, or a decline in fertility rates is therefore perceived as a threat to the state’s ability to prevail in the conflict. Moreover, Israeli Jews seek to maintain a solid Jewish majority in their country, yet there has been a steady increase in the proportion of Arabs in the population (excluding Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), from 12.2 percent in 1950 to 17.3 percent in 1984 (State of Israel 1985a). Many perceived this demographic trend not only as a threat to Israel’s security, but also to the entire Zionist enterprise (Kass and Lipset 1982). The norm that emigrants violate by leaving the country is best evidenced by the negative treatment given by the press and political establishment. For example, in a memorable television interview, May 5, 1976, then Prime Minister Rabin referred to emigrants as “deserters” and “a fallout of weaklings” (Jerusalem Post 1976).

Clearly, Jewish emigration from Israel is a deviant individual behavior, provoking intense response from the collective. It is, therefore, reasonable to conceptualize the rate of this behavior as an indicator of social integration.

*Outer Conflict and Social Cohesion in Israel*

Sociological literature since Durkheim (1951) has suggested that major popular wars tend to increase the social cohesion of their societies. Wars give rise to patriotism and national faith and distract people’s activities and attention from inner conflicts toward a common end (Simmel 1955).

Not all wars have increased social integration in the societies in conflict. Williams (1947) and Coser (1956) specified the conditions under which conflict with an outside enemy increases social cohesion. For an outer conflict to increase social cohesion, some level of consensus must prevail prior to and during conflict such as belief in the necessity of conflict, that it threatens the entire society, that the society is worth preserving, that conflict will produce the desired results, and that conflict is being managed efficiently (Coser 1956; Kriesberg 1982; Markides and Cohn 1982). In the absence of consensus, “disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion will be the result of the outside conflict” (Coser 1956, p. 53). Thus, the connection between the level of the Israeli-Arab conflict and emigration rates from Israel is expected to depend on the degree to which there is consensus within the Jewish population in Israel.

Previous research on Israeli society has revealed that the ongoing conflict with the Arab world has mitigated intercommunity tensions between religious and nonreligious Jews (Peres 1971), improved the climate of industrial relations (Kimmerling 1974), and attenuated internal conflicts regarding policies on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Isaac 1976). Aronson and Horowitz (1971) not only pointed out the connection between conflict and social integration in Israel, but added that raising morale and increasing consensus were among the “latent functions” of at least some of the Israeli-initiated military operations over the period 1951–1969. Israeli society has indeed been characterized by consensus

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1 Former Prime Minister Menachem Begin calculated the extent of the problem. In June, 1976, he told the Israeli parliament that “Since the state was founded we have lost [through emigration] four Divisions or 12 Brigades.” (Kapeliouk 1977).
regarding the conflict. This body of literature, however, refers to the pre-1973 period, during which it is generally agreed that Israel was characterized by a high level of consensus.

Following the 1973 war however, the consensus regarding one dimension of the conflict-integration issue—the efficient management of the conflict—evaporated (Kimmerling 1985; Eisenstadt 1985). If this is true, then one would expect to find, ceteris paribus, a negative relationship between the Israeli-Arab conflict and emigration rates of Jews from 1948 to 1973 which should no longer hold for the period 1974–1984.

Research on Emigration from Israel

Previous research on emigration from Israel has not utilized the theoretical framework discussed above. Instead, researchers adopted standard migration theory that distinguishes between “pull” factors of the destination country and “push” factors in the country of origin that affect the individual’s decision to emigrate (e.g., Ritterband 1978). Based on this theoretical framework, and on the assumption that most people love peace and hate war, previous research examined whether the Israeli-Arab conflict was indeed a “push” factor, increasing emigration rates in a manner parallel to that by which unfavorable economic conditions in Israel induce some people to leave the country. Interestingly, neither the political situation in Israel nor the permanent conflict with the Arab world was often mentioned as a significant factor in the decision to emigrate (e.g., Sobel 1986; Fein 1978; Toren 1976; Shokeid 1988).

Economists focusing on annual emigration rates have relied on the conceptual framework of human capital theory, viewing emigration as a long-term investment which is essentially similar to investment in acquiring formal education. Plaut (1983) and Lamdan (1982) tested the effects of economic- and conflict-related variables on annual emigration rates. As expected by human capital theory, they found that economic conditions in Israel in a given year are the best predictors for emigration rates in the following year. However, their findings regarding the effect of the Israeli-Arab conflict were equivocal. Plaut reported a significant positive effect of a dummy variable for 1974 (the year following the 1973 war), while the coefficients for the 1956 and 1967 wars, as well as for the annual number of Israeli casualties of terrorist attacks, were not statistically significant. Analyzing emigration rates of Jews for the years 1954–1979, Lamdan also detected a significant positive effect of the 1973 war on emigration in 1974, but without observing any such effect for the 1956 and 1967 wars. However, his measure for the average number of days Israelis spent on military reserve duty yielded a significant positive effect on annual emigration rates, independent of demographic and economic factors.

Interestingly, the sociological and economic theories (human capital and its psychological variant—the push-pull model) appear to generate opposite predictions regarding the connection between the state of the Israeli-Arab conflict and emigration, at least prior to 1973. While sociological theory views the conflict as increasing social integration and hence attenuating emigration rates, economic theory regards the conflict as increasing the individual cost of staying in Israel and hence, increasing emigration. The fact that the relevant empirical results reviewed above are inconclusive, and seem to depend on the specific measures of the conflict used in the analysis, is consistent with the possibility that these various measures are associated with different aspects of the conflict, affecting emigration via different mechanisms and in different directions.

Models relying on human capital theory view emigration primarily as a psychoeconomic phenomenon, with the lone individual deciding on the basis of cost-benefit calculus whether or not to emigrate. Emigration rates are thus viewed, according to this theory, merely as an aggregation of decisions made by atomistic individuals (cf. Granovetter 1985). Such macro characteristics as the state of the economy and conflict are considered to affect emigration rates simply by affecting the utility calculus of individuals. Since most people prefer a life free of wars and economic recession, these models predict that a rise in the level of conflict and worsening economic conditions will increase individuals’ cost of staying and thus enhance their propensity to emigrate. However, although empirical data support the human capital story when the economic situation is the determinant of emigration, results regarding the effect of the conflict provide similar support only when reserve duty (but not number of casualties, or
dummies for major wars) is used as a proxy of the severity of the conflict.

This is not surprising given that reserve duty is the one individual cost of the conflict directly affecting the majority of Jewish households in Israel, and therefore, it is most likely to affect emigration rates through the individualistic mechanisms specified by human capital theory. Other manifestations of the conflict, such as number of casualties and relative size of the defense budget, either directly affect only a handful of individuals or have no such individual affect at all. In contrast to the intuitively understood individual mechanisms by which the conflict is considered to affect emigration according to human capital theory, the sociological argument for a negative relationship between conflict and emigration rates relies on a complex set of mechanisms of a social, and therefore less intuitive nature. These social mechanisms, involving concepts such as collective conscience; social integration; and feelings of nationalism, patriotism, and camaraderie, are invoked to explain behavior that a simplistic individualistic cost-benefit analysis would rule out as irrational. It is plausible to contend that, in addition to one aspect of the conflict—reserve duty—affecting emigration through individual mechanisms, other manifestations of the conflict (which are not perfectly correlated with reserve duty) affect emigration via social mechanisms that have little or nothing to do with maximization of individual utility. If this is so, and if consensus is prevalent, it is possible, indeed likely, that these other aspects of conflict increase social cohesion, thereby leading to reduced emigration rates.

One such aspect of the Israeli-Arab conflict is its subjective intensity, or salience, among the Israeli population (Kimmerling 1974). Although the salience of the conflict and the annual reserve burden are likely to be correlated, their effects on social integration and emigration are not necessarily similar. Although a heavy reserve burden tends to increase emigration (probably of those overserving), increased salience of the conflict, at times of consensus, is likely to promote social integration and therefore attenuate emigration.

I do not argue that economic factors do not affect emigration, nor that conflict is the main variable affecting emigration. Rather I argue that, in addition to economic factors, at least two additional aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict affect emigration rates, in opposite directions. The reserve-duty burden is expected to increase emigration by raising individual costs of remaining in the country, whereas heightened salience of the conflict is predicted to reduce emigration rates of Jews via the social mechanisms of increasing patriotism and national feeling, thereby increasing social cohesion and reducing deviant behavior such as emigration.

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2 During the years 1950–1984, less than 7,000 Israelis—civilians and military personnel in Israel and abroad—lost their lives as a result of the conflict (Kimmerling 1985). This figure represents less than one quarter of one percent of the average Jewish population during those years. This is a relatively small percentage compared with the fatalities incurred by Israel during the 1948 war (one percent of the Jewish population) or by some countries involved in World Wars. Although economic theory predicts that fear of death or injury induces people to emigrate, the relatively low level of fatalities in Israel since 1950 may explain the lack of evidence of any such connection. By contrast to the low objective probability of being killed as a result of conflict, all physically fit Jewish men aged 21 to 55 years (and single women aged 20–24) are required to contribute several weeks of military reserve duty annually. Moreover, while Israelis tend to complain about the hardship resulting from the reserve burden, they apparently do not believe that the conflict endangers their lives more than do car accidents (Kimmerling 1985, p. 152, Table 5.2).

DATA

The United Nations organization recommends an operational definition for an emigrant: one who leaves the country with the intention of remaining abroad for at least one year (U.N. Economic and Social Council 1976). Although this definition is problematic for the simple reason that some emigrants decide not to return to their country of origin after arriving in the destination country, it is particularly unsatisfactory in Israel's case where the act of emigration is negatively valued, and emigrants tend not to declare their intentions upon departure. Hence, estimates of annual emigration rates from Israel must rely on other sources of information. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics publishes five time series of emigration rates (emigration per 1,000 in the population), all based on
the official forms that Israeli citizens are required to complete upon departure and return to the country. The first series is based on the balance of movement (departures minus arrivals of citizens in a calendar year). The following three series are based on the number of Israelis who left Israel in a given year and did not return within one, two, and four years, respectively. The final series is based on the number of deportees in a given year who did not return within a year, minus returnees after a stay abroad of at least one year (State of Israel 1985b).

None of these measures is completely satisfactory. The series based on the balance of movement is biased upward and is used for estimating the upper bound of the number of emigrants for the entire period (net departures of nearly 400,000 Jews for the period 1948–84 [State of Israel 1985b]). However, annual changes in this series are brought about by emigration and not merely by departures—the correlation between departures and this series for the entire period is negative. The other series are biased downward as they exclude emigrants who visit Israel periodically and are never recorded as remaining out of the country for periods longer than the spells between consecutive visits.

I have chosen to use the first series, based on the balance of movement, in the following analyses for two reasons. First, it is the only series including data for the entire period, 1951–1984. Second, it is the only series reporting emigration statistics separately for Jews and non-Jews. None of the other series contains data for the years 1951–1960, nor does any of them distinguish between Jewish and Arab emigrants (the arguments advanced above apply only to Jewish emigrants). I propose to analyze changes in annual emigration rates rather than to provide estimates of the number of emigrants. The high correlations between the various series (over .8, data not shown), suggest that the choice of a specific series is unlikely to affect the results radically.

Details of the annual reserve-duty burden

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3 The publication of the Central Bureau of Statistics (State of Israel 1985b) presents emigration rates for the years 1961–1984 only. Such being the case, I used information contained in the statistical abstracts of Israel (State of Israel, different years) to construct the series for the entire period.

4 Since 1954 the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has conducted Labor Force Surveys from which the percentage of employed men temporarily absent from work is obtained. For the years 1950–1953 these percentages were estimated using information on absenteeism in manufacturing establishments (State of Israel 1957, p. 192).

5 During 1954–1957 only one Labor Force Survey was administrated compared with quarterly surveys in subsequent years. This explains why Figure 1 does not reveal an increase in the reserve burden for 1956, in spite of the 1956 war. The war had been fought in the first week of November, whereas the 1956 survey was conducted four months earlier. Thus, the value for 1956 underestimates the “true” reserve burden for that year, but not by much. Fewer reserves were drafted in the 1956 war than during other wars, and more importantly, the 1956 reserves were drafted as late as 3 to 6 days before the beginning of that war and were discharged immediately following it (Dayan 1965). By comparison, during 1967 and 1973, the entire Israeli reserves were mobilized for over a month.
mention of the conflict on the front page) to 5 (a conflict-related headline across the entire front page). I have extended this measure over the period 1971–1984. This ordinal scale of 0 to 5 enables construction of a salience score for conflict for any consecutive time span by adding scores for a given number of days and dividing the result by the number of days. Since this variable is also likely to affect emigration after some time lag, the average salience score for the current and preceding years has been used for predicting emigration in the current year. This measure is preferable to that of the reserve-duty burden in evaluating the sociological effects of the conflict. Although the reserve-duty reflects the personal burden and perhaps the “objective” intensity of the conflict, newspaper headlines better reflect its subjective salience in the public.

To control the effect of economic conditions in Israel, I have included in the models three economic indicators published by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (State of Israel 1985a) for 1951–1984: (1) average unemployment rate for current and preceding year, (2) real per capita private consumption (a proxy for standard of living and permanent income), and (3) annual rates of change of real per capita private consumption.

The effect of any possible trend in the emigration rate is controlled by including a time variable in all models, whereas the fact that newcomers are more likely to emigrate than others is controlled for by using the percentage of foreign born Israelis as a proxy for the proportion of new immigrants in the society.

RESULTS

As predicted, the correlation between the salience of conflict and emigration rates is negative (see Table 1). However, the correlation between emigration and salience for 1951–1973 and 1974–1984, is −.55 and −.13 respectively (Table 2). Thus, it appears that the initial hypothesis linking heightened salience of conflict with attenuated emigration rates holds only until the 1973 war which eroded consensus among Israelis. The correlations between the economic indicators and emigration are also in the expected direction: negative for private consumption and positive for unemployment.

The negative correlation between time and emigration suggests a trend of gradually decreasing emigration since the establishment of the State of Israel. For obvious reasons, time is almost perfectly correlated (.99) with both consumption per capita and with the percentage of Israeli-born Jews in the population. Whereas these correlations allow only one of these variables to be included in a given regression model (because of problems of multicollinearity), they suggest that decrease in emigration is due partly to the continuous rise in standard of living and partly to decrease in immigration to Israel during 1951–1984.

Since the correlation between time and reserve duty is higher (.89) than that between time and salience of the conflict (.53), it appears that the individual cost of the conflict has increased over the years more than its public salience.

These trends are evident in Figure 1 where annual values for emigration rates, the salience of the Israel-Arab conflict, and the

6 To maintain consistency, I have followed Kimmerling’s criteria as to what exactly constitutes a conflict-related item throughout the entire period, with one exception: President Sadat’s visit to Israel and the subsequent negotiations leading to the Camp David accords. Unlike all other news items related to negotiations between Israel and any Arab partner that were treated as conflict related in the construction of salience scores, items related to Israeli-Egyptian negotiations from November 1977 (Sadat’s visit) to March 1979 (signing of the Camp David peace agreement) were not. This decision reflects the uniqueness of Sadat’s peace initiative which was unprecedented in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict and in its effect on the public mind. At any rate, this coding decision radically affected the salience score for 1978 only (it affected two months in 1977 and three months in 1979). The salience score for 1978 is 1.54, compared with 3.09 had the negotiations been treated as conflict related. Omission of the 1978 data from the overall analysis does not appreciably alter the results.

7 Unemployment rates since 1954 (unemployed actively seeking work as a percentage of the civilian labor force) are available from Labor Force Surveys. For the years 1950–1953 unemployment rates were estimated from information regarding the daily average number of unemployed as recorded by the Israeli Adult Labor Exchanges (State of Israel 1985a).
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations; Israel, 1951–1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Emigration</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Time</td>
<td>67.50</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consumption</td>
<td>11,736</td>
<td>4,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. % Cons. change</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unemployment</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Saliency</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reserve</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. % Israeli Born</td>
<td>44.06</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See text and notes for sources.
Emigration—Jewish emigrants per 1,000 in the Jewish population.
Time—Year (range 1951–1984).
Consumption—Private consumption expenditure per capita in 1984 Israeli shekels (1 US$ = 1.5 Shekel).
% Cons. Change—Annual percentage change in consumption.
Unemployment—Percentage of unemployed actively seeking work.
Reserve—Percentage of employed men temporarily absent from work. See text for details.
Saliency—See text for details.
% Israeli born—Israeli-born Jews as a percentage of the Jewish population.

The relative burden of reserve duty are plotted for the years 1950–1984. As result of the 1973 war, the reserve-duty burden more than doubled virtually overnight and (with the exception of 1967) has remained 60 to 100 percent higher than the 1950–1972 levels. By contrast, during 1978–1980 saliency of the conflict, which peaked in 1967 as a result of the 1967 war, returned to its level of the early 1950s and early 1960s following Sadat’s visit to Israel.

Data in Figure 1 reveal a steady decline in emigration rates between 1950 and 1973, a sharp increase in 1974 following the 1973 war, and no clear pattern thereafter. Contrary to popular belief that emigration rates increased during the late seventies and early eighties, it reached an all time low during 1983, indicating that Israelis do not emigrate during wars, however unpopular (as was the invasion of Lebanon), but wait until they are over.

Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 present the regression coefficients on emigration rates for 1951–1973, the period in which consensus prevailed in Israel. As expected, the effect of salience of the conflict is negative and statistically significant, independent of time and change in per capita consumption. The results remain essentially the same when consumption is substituted for time. On the other hand, the coefficient for the second measure of the conflict—the reserve-duty burden—is also significant in both models, but in the opposite direction. It would appear that these two measure of conflict affect emigration in different ways. Whereas heavy reserve duty leads to increased emigration, as predicted by human capital theory, the salience of the conflict as reflected in newspaper headlines tend to attenuate emigration over the 1951–1973 period.

Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 contain results for the entire period of 1951–1984 with an interaction term between salience and a dummy variable included for the period 1951–1973. As shown in models 4–6, no additive effect of salience on emigration is evident; only the interaction term is statistically significant, and in the expected direction. Thus, salience reduces emigration during the first period, but it has no overall

Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations, Israel 1951–1973 (above diagonal), and 1974–1984 (below diagonal).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Emigration</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.85</td>
<td>−.88</td>
<td>−.30</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>−.55</td>
<td>−.59</td>
<td>−.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Time</td>
<td>−.50</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.99</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−.59</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consumption</td>
<td>−.63</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>−.63</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. % Cons. Change</td>
<td>−.38</td>
<td>−.14</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unemployment</td>
<td>−.54</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>−.42</td>
<td>−.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Saliency</td>
<td>−.13</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reserve</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>−.21</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. % Israeli Born</td>
<td>−.45</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>−.15</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>−.17</td>
<td>−.34</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
War and Social Integration

Emigration
(Per 1,000)

Saliency of Conflict

Military Reserves

See text for definitions and sources.

Fig. 1. Emigration rates, Saliency of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, and Relative Burden of Reserve Duty; Israel, 1950–84.
effect. The effect of reserve duty is positive for the entire period. Together, these results suggest that although heavy reserve duty increases emigration irrespective of internal conditions in Israel, salience of the conflict attenuates emigration rates, but only during the period of relative consensus in Israel. There is no evidence, however, that the salience of conflict during 1974–1984 led to increased emigration. Indeed, results regarding the effects of both economic- and conflict-related variables on emigration rates are more clear-cut for 1951–1973 than for the entire period of 1951–1984. In fact, none of the coefficients for conflict- and economic-related variables are statistically significant in model 7, where the results for the 11-year period 1974–1984 are presented.8

Notwithstanding the evidence that both measures of conflict affect emigration (in models 1–6), clearly, economic and demographic indicators explain most of the variance in emigration from Israel. Model 3, which includes only time and consumption change, accounts for 44 percent of the variance in emigration. Since time is correlated almost perfectly with consumption per capita and percentage of Israeli-born Jews, the effect of this variable (time) could be due to either decrease in the proportion of foreign born Jews in the population or to the secular increase in standard of living. It is impossible to tell which or in what combination. In regressions where these two variables were substituted for time, the results were similar to those reported in Table 3.

As for economic indicators, there is no evidence that unemployment per se increases emigration. This is not surprising given that unemployment affects only part of the population, generally those lacking the necessary resources to take the costly step of emigration. On the other hand, per capita consumption and its fluctuations, which constitute indicators of standard of living and affect the entire population, strongly influence emigration.

I also ran the empirical models (1–6) for Arab (i.e., non-Jews) emigration rates. My thesis specifically applies to Jewish emigration only and excludes Arab emigration. If conflict-related variables affect both Jewish and Arab emigration rates similarly, the thesis would not be supported. Neither the coefficient for salience of conflict nor the measure for reserve duty was statistically significant in any of the models when Arabs emigration rates served as the dependent variable (data

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8 Despite the hazards of inferences based on a sample size of only 11 years, it seems fair to speculate that additional factors, not included in the models presented in Table 3, affected Jewish emigration from Israel from 1974 onward. I have examined the effects of two additional conflict-related variables for the period 1951–1982, as well as for the years 1951–1973 and 1974–1982: defense consumption as a percentage of Gross National Product (State of Israel 1983) and number of Israeli fatalities—civilian and military personnel—resulting from the conflict. The results (not shown) reveal that, ceteris paribus, these variables did not affect emigration rates in any of the periods. It is possible that from 1974 on, economic conditions in destination countries increasingly began to affect emigration from Israel (see, however, Lamdan [1982] for evidence that this was not the case until at least 1979).
not shown). Thus, while the two conflict-related variables used in the analysis are admittedly crude, the fact that they are related to Jewish, but not to Arab emigration rates, provides additional support for the theoretical interpretation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Table 3 tells a clear story: two different measures of the Israeli-Arab conflict have opposite effects on Jewish emigration rates from Israel. Taking men out of their everyday work into the military increases emigration; a shared notion of the necessity and importance of conflict holds the populace at home. To the extent that these results are applicable to other societies engaged in continuing external conflict, one implication of these findings is that one aspect or measure of the severity of a particular conflict is unlikely to provide an overall indication of the effects of conflict on the issue under examination. Knowledge of the conflict, the society, and the connection between the two is necessary for understanding the effects of conflict on measures of social integration.

It is possible to subsume the results of this paper within the framework of economic models of migration by arguing that some aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict (at times of consensus) increase the psychological cost of emigrating. Thus, economic models of migration could include "social acceptance" in the utility function. However, sociological theory is necessary for specifying the conditions under which, and the social mechanisms by which, conflicts affect the psychological costs of emigration.

Unfortunately, there is no readily available method of directly testing the hypothesis advanced in this paper, namely, that the mechanisms through which the subjective intensity of conflict decreases emigration rates operates via the promotion of social integration. By contrast, the individual mechanisms through which reserve duty leads to increased emigration are better specified. However, the aggregate nature of the data prevents a direct test of the argument that reserve duty increases emigration because people do not like serving in the military reserve (and not simply because reserve duty is a proxy for the general security situation). Future research could settle this particular issue by using individual-level data comprising reserve duty information for emigrants and nonemigrants. Meanwhile, the fact that men between 25–35 years of age, who are more likely to be called for military reserve duty than others, also emigrate in larger proportions than any other sex-age group (Cohen, forthcoming; Palittel 1986) is consistent with the hypothesized mechanism.

The waning influence of salience of conflict on emigration after 1973 is consistent with the hypotheses developed earlier. However, to the extent that the 1973 war did indeed put an end to consensus in Israeli society, one would expect salience of conflict to increase emigration during the 1974–1984 period, especially since the 1977 elections and the war in Lebanon in the early 1980s did not reverse the trend of disagreement. One possibility for the observed results (no effect of salience on emigration in post 1973 period) is that the consensus was eroded following the 1973 war, but that this process has not yet reached the threshold below which it threatens to disintegrate Israeli society. Another possibility, not mutually exclusive, is that following the shock of the 1973 war, emigration from Israel is no longer perceived as being illegitimate. Although the negative attitudes toward emigrants expressed by the political establishment and sections of the press have largely persisted since 1973, there is some evidence that over the last five or six years, emigrants are less ashamed of their behavior than before, and that those remaining are less critical of them (Sobel 1986; Yaar 1988). If Jewish emigration from Israel is progressively gaining legitimacy, thereby becoming a normal form of behavior as in most other countries, it is unclear whether emigration can still be regarded as an indicator of social disintegration and be linked to the subjective intensity of the conflict. To be sure, this process of legitimation of Jewish emigration by Israeli society has just begun, and is by no means complete. Whether emigration from Israel will ever be perceived as normal behavior remains to be seen.

REFERENCES


