Locke
Questions for Study and Discussion:
Locke, Second Treatise of Government
1) What, for Locke, constitutes natural law? How does it differ from civil law? What role does this concept play in Locke's philosophy?
2) Are parental, political and despotic powers distinguishable? Compare Locke's discussion of these powers (ch. 6, 7 & 15) with Aristotle's discourse on the association of the household (Book I of the Politics)
3) In chapters 6 and 7 of The Second Treatise, Locke argues vigorously against patriarchal theories of government. He opens this discussion by pointing out that husbands and wives share in the temporary "dominion" of parents over children. Yet Locke never moves beyond this point to posit a theory of women's equality with men. In terms of logic, how is he able to avoid such a conclusion to his arguments against patriarchy?
4) What is property? On what basis does Locke justify individual appropriation of the fruits of the earth? What is the relationship between property and political power? How do individual rights relate to the public good?
5) Does Locke distinguish consent from coercion? If so, how? In equating the consent of the community with majority rule, has Locke adequately safeguarded individuals from tyrannical authority?
6) What is sovereignty? Where is it located, in Locke's political vision?
Following are various views concerning the relationship between economy, religion, and philosophy in Locke's thoughts. Which interpretation do you believe provides the best account of the meaning and the significance of the argument of the Second Treatise?
"In short, Locke has done what he set out to do. Starting from the traditional assumption that the earth and its fruits had originally been given to mankind for their common use, he has turned the tables on all who derived from this assumption theories which were restrictive of capitalist appropriation. He has erased the moral disability with which unlimited capitalist appropriation has hitherto been handicapped. . . . He also justifies, as natural, a class differential in rights and in rationality, and by doing so provides a positive moral basis for capitalist society."
C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p. 221
"Locke's teaching on property, and therewith his whole political philosophy, are revolutionary not only with regard to the biblical tradition but with regard to the philosophic tradition as well. Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man -- as distinguished from man's end -- had become that center of origin."
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 248
"If we wish to grasp why labor should be the title of the industrious and rational, it is essential to remember that the duty of labour was central not only to the capitalist system of production and exchange but also to the Calvinist doctrine of the calling. It was the moral sufficiency of the calling as the definition of the terrestrial components of human duty which Locke assumed throughout his mature writings. It is not true that Locke regarded unlimited appropriation as the essence of rationality. The law of reason was a moral law and unlimited appropriation was at best a morally perilous calling. The social expression of the motive of covetousness in a money economy had accentuated many forms of human corruption. It had also led to a rise in the standard of living. Locke regarded the first development with disquiet and the second with some enthusiasm. . . . All social institutions were to be judged on the extent to which they facilitated physical ease and purity of motive in men's performance in their callings."
John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, pp. 250-1, 248
"Locke's doctrine of property is directly intelligible today if it is taken as the classic doctrine of 'the spirit of capitalism'. . . . Since the nineteenth century, readers of Locke have found it hard to understand why he stated his doctrine in terms of natural law. . . Locke [had to confront] a problem: in his age most people still adhered to the older view according to which unlimited acquisition of wealth is unjust or morally wrong. This explains why, in stating his doctrine of property, Locke . . . occasionally mentioned and apparently approved the older view. . . . But he soon drops these niaseries: the burden of his chapter on property is that covetousness and concupiscence, far from being essentially evil or foolish, are, if properly channeled, eminently beneficial and reasonable, much more so than 'exemplary charity.' By building civil society on 'the low but solid ground' of selfishness or of certain 'private vices,' one will achieve much greater 'public benefits' than by futilely appealing to virtue, which is by nature 'unendowed.' One must take one's bearings not by how men should live but by how they do live."
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History , pp. 246-47